ML20052C033
| ML20052C033 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1982 |
| From: | Finamore B, Weiss E HARMON & WEISS, National Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8205040287 | |
| Download: ML20052C033 (37) | |
Text
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April 30, l9h2i Tl P' '
UNITED STATES OF MERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION p g ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD */
Before Administrative Judges: dCgjM -
Marshall E. Miller, Chairman 2 d/4yI $g I Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr. I- # O Dr. Cade t H. Hand, Jr. A t, &
)
In the Matter of )
)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ) Docket No. 50-537 PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION )
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY )
)
(Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant) )
)
INTERVENORS, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.
AND THE SIERRA CLUB, UPDATED RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY BY NRC STAFF Pursuant to 10 CFR S2.740, and in accordance with the Board's Prehearing Conference Order (Schedule) of February 11, 1982, Intervenors, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and the Sierra Club, hereby update their responses to NRC Staff Second (June 29, 1976), Third (November 12, 1976), and Fourth (November 18, 1976) Sets of Interrogatories to NRDC, e t al. ,
and NRC Staff Request for Admissions Regarding NRDC, et al.,
Contention No. 15 (April 13, 1976).
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2 UPDATED RESPONSE TO NRC STAFF SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO NRDC ET AL.
The entire Second Set of interrogatories relates to old Contention 14 (new Contention 8) . Intervenors are unaware of any information at this time that would indicate that any of the responses should be changed. Consequently, none of the responses are being revised at this time.
UPDATED RESPONSE TO NRC STAFF TEIIRD SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO NRDC ET AL.
GENERAL QUESTIONS In answering each interrogatory, please provide the following:
a) The direct answer to the question.
b) The basis for your answer.
c) Where the interrogatory requests quantification, the basis of you quantifications and calculations that support your quantifications.
d) Identification of all documents and studies, and the particular parts thereof, relied upon by you in answering the interrogatory.
e) Identification upon what person or persons you rely to sutstantiate your answers.
f) Identify the expert (s) , if any, you intend to nave testify on the subject matter questioned.
4 .
a 3
GENERAL RESPONSE For these interrogatories, parts a, b, c, and d are included in the response. For parts e and f, Dr. Thomas B.
Cochran of the NRDC staff is the only identified individual to date.
Contention 5 INTERROGATORIES 1 and 2 Interrogatories 1 and 2 have been withdrawn (see Letter from Bradley W. Jones to Eldon Greenberg and Barbara Finamore, dated April 1, 1982).
INTERROGATORY 3 The question is predicated on the basis of the answer to Interrogatory 1, which has been withdrawn. Consequently the question is no longer applicable.
INTERROGATORY 4 Do you believe that physical protection requirements can be separated f rom credible threats?
a) If not, why not?
RES PONSE No. Intervenors believe that physical protection should be adequate to assure that SNM is protected with a high degree of confidence against the maximum credible threat of thef t or diversion. See the "Rosenbaum Report;" the consultants' reports to the NRC in conjunction with the NRC Staff's "Special
a 4
Safeguards Study" and the " Security Agency Study;" the Petition of NRDC for Adoption of Emergency Safeguards Measures or, Alternatively, for Revocation of Licenses; and materials and references included in this NRC Docket.
INTERROGATORY 5 Interrogatory 5 has been withdrawn (see Letter from Bradley W. Jones supra) .
INTERROGATORY 6 Do you believe it is possible to quantify the threat of an act of sabotage or terrorism directed at the CRBR and/or its related f uel cycle f acilities?
a) If you believe it is possible, have you quantified the threat, and if so, provide your quantification and the basis for it.
RES PONSE Yes, to the extent that it is possible to identify (and quantify) threats (including maximum threats) that various knowledgeable people would consider credible. While all have not quantified the threat, this has been done by NRC staf f personnel. See, for example, 10 CFR S73.la, the quotes from the Rosenbaum Report, and the draft Executive Summary of the Security Agency Study as cited on p. 4 of NRDC's petition for emergency safeguards. Threats may be quantified in one or more GAO reports on safeguards, e.g. , "U.S. Nuclear Safeguards -- A
-National Strategy Is Needed", C-EMD-80-1, Feb. 19, 1980 and l
I
l i
5 "The Security of Nuclear Weapons Overseas -- Where Does It Stand?", C-EMD-80-2, Nov. 3, 1980.
INTERROGATORY 7 Do you believe it is possible to quantify the threat of plutonium being diverted or stolen from the CRBR and/or its related f uel cycle f acilities?
a) If you believe it is possible, have you quantified the threat, and if so, provide your quantification and the basis for it.
RES PONSE We feel as stated in the response to 6 above that it is possible to designate a maximum credible threat to these facilities and that the safeguards should be designed against this threat. It is our opinion that the thef t of plutonium must be prevented with high confidence. Therefore, in our opinion, any estimate of the likelihood of the maximum credible threat occurring is not relevant. Moreover, the uncertainties associated with such an estimate are tot great.
INTERROGATORY 8 In regard to "NRDC et al. Request to Staf f for Admissions,"
dated September 16, 1976, interrogatories 45 and 4 6, can you quantify what you mean by:
a) "small quantities of plutonium" b) " widespread death and destruction"?
RES PONSE a) With respect to Admissions 45 and 4 6, "small quantities", in terms of bomb size, means approximately 4 to 10
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6 ,
kg without quibbling about the precise limits on this range.
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Widespread contamination, which could be costly economically and socially, could be caused by gram quantities (i.e., less than 1 kg) of plutonium.
b) " Widespread death" means anywhere within the range 10 2 and 10 5 dead people without quibbling about precise limits on this range. " Widespread destruction" means something j comparable to 0.1 to 10 times the destruction experienced at Nagasaki, again not quibbling about the precise limits on this range. Decontamination, following plutonium dispersion, could be extremely costly, i.e., several hundred million dollars.
See U.S. DOE, Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian Nuclear Power, Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program, (June 1980) (NASAP Report) ; U.S. AEC, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Glasstone, ed.) ( April 1962 and subsequent editions) ; and 10 CFR 73.2 (bb) .
INTERROGATORY 9 In regard to interrogatory number 4 6 of the set identified above, can you:
a) define " easily usable form" b) define "available" c) quantify " substantial quantities".
RES PONSE ,
L a) We assume you are referring to our Admission number 47, rather than 4 6. " Easily usable form" means a chemical and b
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7 physical form and isotopic concentration that can be used directly in the f abrication of an atomic bomb or plutonium dispersal device, or converted to a usable chemical and physical form (out not a different isotopic concentration)
.using equipment, supplies and techniques that would be available in many university chemistry departments, or if the
~
equipment or supplies are not immediately available, it could be obtained commercially or built f rom scratch a t a cost less than $10,000. We believe that f resh CRBR MOX fuel fits this definition.
b) " Available" means located on site and capable of being transported of f site ny a postulated threat of up to 15 well trained and equipped individuals, 1 to 3 of whom might be employees.
c) " Substantial quantities" means more than about 20 to 100 kg without quibbling about the exact limits on this range.
See PSAR, FES, and documents cited in response to Interrogatory 8 above.
INTERROGATORY 10 Can you describe a plutonium dispersal device that could be fabricated by a terrorist or saboteur?
a) If so, what quantity of plutonium would be needed?
b) Describe the form of tht plutonium that would be required.
c) What would be the consequences of such a device?
d) Do you know whether such a device has ever been fabricated?-
~
8 RES PONSE Yes.
a) A few tens of grams, more or less, b) PuO.-
4 c) It could be used to produce cancers (principally lung) in humans, and it could be used to contaminate buildings, large areas of land, etc.
d) Yes, but not for these purposes. They have been designed and used for bacteriological and chemical warf are purposes and for research associated with inhalation nazards of material such as plutonium toxicity in research laboratories.
See Dr. T.B. Ta y lo r , e t a l. , " Utility of Strategic Muclear Materials f or Unauthorizied Purposes," A Study by IR&T for NRC, DRAFT Final Report (Oct. 16, 1975).
INTERROGATORIES 11 and 12 Interrogatories 11 and 12 have been witndrawn (see Letter from Bradley W. Jones suora) .
INTERROGATORY 13 Please identify what you believe are credible scenarios which could result in plutonium diversion or purposeful releases of radiation from the CRBR and its related fuel cycle facilities against which no adequate safeguards have been proposed by the applicant.
RES PONSE !
An armed attack by from 6 to 15 highly motivated, well trained outsiders, possible aided by 1 to 3 insiders, when the l
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9 F i
attack force is armed with modern weapons that can be obtained l
illegally from military arsenals (e.g., automatic rifles, !
machine guns, grenades, small calibre anti-aircraft weapons, (
heat seeking missiles, anti-tank weapons, e tc. ) and the {
possibility of air support, or diversion by 2 or 3 insiders ;
acting in collusion. The threat assumed by DOD is greater than that assumed by either DOE or NRC. Presumably DOD does not L postulate incredible threats. See documents cited by NRDC in NRDC's Petition for Adoption of Emergency Safeguards Measures,
~
or, Alternatively, for Revocation of License, and GAO Reports ,
on safeguards cited in. response to Interrogatory 6 above. See !
, also responses to Interrogatories 1-5 of the Staf f's Fif th Set !
of Interrogatories to NRDC et al. ;
i INTERROGATORY 14 Regarding NRDC et al. Contention 5(c) , please identify what ;
you believe are the scenarios demonstrated to be credible by federal government analyses.
a) Please identify all federal government studies relied '
upon in describing such scenarios.
RESPONSE
i See response to Interrogatory 13, above. See also OTA, Nuclear Proliferation Saf eguards (1977).
INTERROGATORY 15 Do you believe that an act of sabotage or terrorism i directed at the CRBR-could be the initiating cause for a CDA?
10 RES PONSE Yes. We believe a tnreat of the type described in answer to Interrogatory 13 above could overcome the CRBR quard force and intiate a LOF initiated CDA. We have not engaged in any I really detailed scenario building, in any black hat activities, or in any war gaming activities of this nature. Our principal concern is over whether Applicants and Staff are postulating an appropriate level of threat and whether the safeguards at the CRBR and its related fuel facilities will be able to overcome with ample margin for error the maximum credible threat. See Applicants and NRC Staff responses to NRDC's request for admissions 20, 21, a nd 2 2, related to (old) NRDC Contention 5.
See also, Transcript of meeting of ACRS Subcommittee on Clinch River Breeder Reactor [ACRS Transcript], (March 30-31, 1982) pp. 5, 182-184.
INTERRROGATORY 16 Do you believe that an act of sabotage or terrorism directed at the CRBR could be the intiating cause for other severe CRBR accidents?
a) If so, please identify such accidents.
RESPONSE
Yes, e.g. sodium fires and acts similar to those that have already occurred at foreign reactors. See also response to Interrogatory 15 above.
11 INTERROGATORY 17 Provide what you believe are credible sabotage or terrorism scenarios which you believe would be an initiating cause for a CDA or other CRBR severe accident which would endanger the public health and safety.
RESPONSE
Same as our response to Interrogatories 13 and 15.
INTERROGATORY 18 Do you believe it is possible to calculate a probability for such acts of sabotage or terrorism as described above being an initiating cause for CDAs or other severe CRBR accidents.
RES PONSE See our response to Interrogatories 6 and 7. We believe that success of an attempt at the maximum credible threat level must be prevented with high confidence. Uncertainties in estimates of the probability of the act occurring are such as to make probability estimates irrelevant.
INTERROGATORY 19 Ilow would you calculate such a probability?
RESPONSE
See our response to Interrogatory 18. !
INTERROGATORY 20 :
Have you calculated such a probability?
a) If so, what is your calculated probability? ..
b)' Please provide your_ calculations and the assumptions used.
}.
12 c) What ef fect, if any, did you allow for the following in your calculations:
i) redundant and diverse engineered safety features,
- 11) substantial structural and' shielding requirements for safe operation for missile shielding, iii) the defense in depth safety philosophy.
RES PONSE See our response to Interrogatory 18.-
INTERROGATORY 21 Do you believe that the expected consequences of a postulated act of sabotage could be more than a small fraction (less than 10%) of the maximum consequences predicted for a CDA?
a) If your answer is affirmative, please provide the quantitative basis for your conclusion.
RES PONS E Yes, but of course the answer depends on who is doing the predicting and to what' extent the predicted consequences represent-a.conservati've estimate. We see no basis.for concluding lthat a LOF CDA initiated by willful human action shouldhahe'expectedconsequenceslesssevere (less than 10% of
-the maximum consequehces) than a LOF CDA initiated by some unanticipatdd combination 'of events. To the contrary, we have
, someconfigencethat, by careful planning, saboteurs could produce an event of greater'condequence, for example, by insuring there were large' breaches in the primary and secondary b a
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r containment barriers. We have performed no such calculations j ~and are not' aware of such calculations by others.
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INTERROGATORY 22 i
Provide programs you believe would make the CRBR and [
I supporting facilities adequate. !
a) Have you computed the cost of such programs for CRBR
't and supporting facilities?
b) Please describe the cost and provide .your calculations.
RES PONSE Tnere are no known programs to make safeguards at the CRBR ;
3 i
and supporting fuel cycle facility adequate; Intervenors would j j propose to cancel the CRBR and the present LMPBR program. We would save approximately $2 billion, or more, directly by I cancelling the CRBR. The net benefits of such an action can.be estimated by subtracting the sunk cost (approximately $1 I billion) from the estimated cost to complete CRBR (approximately $3.5 billion, or more with anticipated cost .
over runs) .
INTERROGATORY 23
~
Do you believe that there are unique aspects to either the CRBR facility itself or to the CRBR. facility. site that make it i particularly susceptible to a threat of terrorism or sabotage?'
RES PONSE i I
)
- Yes. The fact that the plutonium used in the CRBR-(particularly the initial loadings of fresh fuel from DOE j a
_ - _ ~ _ _ -
i 14 inventories and Pu generated in the CRBR blanket) represents a preferred material for the construction of atomic bombs, as .
l opposed to material that would be extracted from high burnup ;
i
! LWR fuel. See Applicants' response to question II.3 in NRDC's !
Eighth Set of Interrogatories to the Applicants. Further, it may be that other sites, e.g., Hanford, would be less
- susceptible to a threat of terrorism or sabotage.
- INTERROGATORY 24 Could you identify any domestic group, political, criminal, L
, or other, that you believe may be a credible threat to the CRBR-i; or any of its supporting fuel cycle facilities.
RES PONSE 4 Yes. Some of these are idertified in the reports cited in l I
our June 30, 1978, response to Interrogatory 1(d). For i i
example, a credible threat could involve 1 to 3 employees in- f collusion. As a result, employees of TVA, Commonwealth Edison, l and DOE who would be directly involved in the operations of the
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CRBR comprise such a group.
INTERROGATORY 25
- Does the NRDC, et al. , believe the estimates of the l plutonium dispersal hazard reported by B.L. Cohen in "The Hazards _in Plutonium Dispersal," Institute for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, March 197 5, are cor rect?
a) If your answer is no, please identify any and all errors in Cohen's analysis known to the NRDC, et al. Discuss'
. . _ _ _ - . - , . - - . ., _ -,,.m _.--,m
4 0
-15 the quantitative significance of each error as it affects .the resulting "one f atality for each 15 grams dispersed."
b) Is the NRDC, et al. , aware of any other assessments of the plutenium dispersal hazard made by person (s) 'other than Cohen? Please identify and briefly discuss the results quantitatively, if possible, for each such estimate.
c) If the NRDC, et al. , believes it inaccurately assesses the plutonium dispersal hazard, what is the basis (explain fully) for rejecting each of the alternative assessments identified in (c) above?
I r RESPONS E
~
No.
a) We have not as of this time attempted a detailed critique of Cohen's analysis to identify all the errors. Some j rather obvious errors include:
i) Failure to treat adequately the " hot -particle" effect.
9
- 11) Failure to properly calculate the bone _ dose. due to plutonium exposure as recommended by Karl_Z. Morgan. ,
iii) Most of the reasons cited by Karl Z. Morgan in his July 14, 1975, letter to Thomas G. McCreless of
. the NRC, for believing that Cohen underestimates the plutonium risk (see Part III of NRDC's Twelf th Set of- :
1
-Interrogatories to the NRC) .
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b) Aside from those cited by the NRC in answer to I.4 of ,
NRDC's Twelf th Set of Interrogatories to the NRC Staf f, we are l
4 aware of several studies that have underlying assumptions that l 1
3 contradict Cohen's, although only one of these studies (
(Gofman's and Taylor's) has as its objective an explicit quantitative estimate of the plutonium dispersal nazard. These _
include:
i) The reports by Tamplin and Cochran on hot !
particles.
- 11) Morgan's analysis of the risk of plutonium exposure of the bone, iii) Tne work of Martell related to polonium exposure of cigarette smokers. ;
iv) Gofman's critique of Cohen's work and his own i estimate of the plutonium exposure risk. I v) Theodore B. Taylor, et al., "
Utility of Strategic '
Nuclear Materials for Unauthorized Purposes," A Study r
T by IR&T f or NRC, DRAFT Final Report Oct. 16, 1975. -
DOE has made numerous studies of the hazards of plutonium dispersal, primarily in relation to single point detonations of r
nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons accidents, c.f. La ngham ,
l W . II . , e t a l. , " Plutonium Dispersal by Accidental or Experimental Low-Order Detonation of Atomic Weapons", LA-1981 Rev. Feb. 1966.
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17 c) We don't understand this question. Do you mean in (b) above? Except for our own hot particle hypothesis and the Morgan analysis, which we feel is substantially correct, we have not reviewed these other studies thoroughly in an ef fort to identify precisely with which underlying assumption we' agree or. disagree. At this time, we do not accept or reject these alternative hypotheses.
UPDATED RESPONSE TO NRC'S FOURTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO NRDC, et al.
GENERAL QUESTIONS In answering each interrogatory, please provide the following:
a) The direct answer to the question.
b) The basis for your answer.
c) Where the interrogatory requests quantification, the i'
- basis of your quantifications and calculations that support 1
!, your quantifications.
j d) Identification of all documents and studies, and the particular parts thereof, relied upon by you in answering the interrogatory, e) Identification upon what person or persons you rely to substantiate your answers, f) Identify the aapert(s) , if any, you intend to nave testify on the subject matter -questioned.
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18 GENERAL RESPONSE For'these interrogatories, parts a, b, c, and d are included in the response. For parts e and f, Dr. Thomas B.
Cochran of the NRDC staf f is the only identified individual to
- date.
Contention 7 (new Contention 11)
INTERROGATORY l Regarding Cochran and Tamplin's hot particle theory, have you developed or acquired any new information that was not submitted to the Commission prior to its rule-making determination in 41 Fed. Reg. 15371.
a) If so, please provide.
RES PONSE Yes.
a) NRDC testimony in the GESMO proceeding ( Doc. RM-505) ;
Re: Chapter IV Section J, Appendix D, March 4, 1977, Prepared by Arthur R. Tamplin and Thomas B. Cochran.
NRDC Critique of the NAS-NRC Report, " Health Effects of Alpha-Emitting Particles in the Respiratory Tract, Arthur R.
Tamplin and Thomas B. Cochran, March 1977.
BEIR III.
Cross, F.T., e t a l. , " Carcinogenic Effects of Radon Daughters, Uranium Ore Dust and Cigarette Smoke in Beagle Dc4s", llealth Physics, 42, No. 1, January 1982, pp. 33-52.
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19 Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Annual Reports for 1978,
,1979, 1980, Part 1 Biomedical Sciences. ;
See also Response to Interrogatory ll-18c of NRC Staff First Round of Discovery to NRDC et al. We will supply those I reports tha't Staf f does not have.
i ~
INTEROGATORY 2 i i
Have you performed an analysis to determine what the total residual risk is for the CRBR assuming that the CRBR meets all applicable radiation protection standards and regulations.
- R_eSeONSe No. ;
INTSRROGATORY 3 Based on tne Commission's finding that the_ hot particle theory as described by Tamplin and Cochran is not substantiated by scientific evidence (See Federal Register) , do you agree that the risk to employees and the public is the same for i
j uniform and nonuniform distribution of insoluble particles of plutonium in the lung. I RESPONSE i No.
INTERROGATORY 4 i
If the answer to number 3 is no please describe in detail
- the-basis for this position. -
- RESPONSE 1
See publications by Tamplin and Cochran cited in response ;
I to la above.
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.- 1 20 INTERROGATORY 5 If the answer to number 3 is no, is this answer based on -
any evidence or information other than that which has already t
been submitted to the Commission in the rule making proceeding !
t Docke t No . 2 0. 5. Please provide' this information if it exists.
RESPO NSE l Yes, see answer to Interrogatory 1 above.
t INTERROGATORY 6 ,
In NRDC's response dated June 2, 1976 to the NRC Federal Register Notice denying its rule-making " hot particle" petition i
(41 Fed. Reg. 15371) the NRDC indicated that the Staff misinterpreted the phrase " critical tissue mass" as used in the corollary to the "not particle" hypothesis. Please provide the correct interpretation.
RESPONSE
f' A critical tissue mass is a mass of tissue of suf ficient size to have the ability to trigger a carcinogenic response when subjected to ionizing radiation.
We have in the past also used the term critical tissue structure (see Supplemental Submission to EPA, p. 3) . Since ,
the precise carcinogenic mechanism following radiation exposure :
of tissue is not understood, the terms " mass" and " structure"
[
can be used interchangeably in our statements of the hypothesis and corollary. It would be in error to presume that the
. hypothesis and corollary are descriptive of the ' carcinogenic
21 mechanism. We are not postulating a precise mechanism, rather Hwe are attempting to give a qualitative description of "
j
, experimental observations of a response. The critical tissue L >
mass (or structure) is operationally defined by the observation :;-
of the lesions in rat, hamster, beagle and human tissue following the irradiation by insoluble particulates of alpha activity of the local tissue surrounding these particulates. ;
f 1
Contention 8 (new Contention 11) '
INTERROGATORY l i Do you believe it is necessary for purposes of ALARA for 'O occupational exposure to establish numerical criteria for the CRBR?
a) If so, provide the criteria and the basis for it. -
RES PONS E 1
i No.
j a) We believe that a proper application of the ALARA ?
principle can be made to the CRBR without a predetermination of numerical guides. In fact, inasmuch as the CRBR is a i'
- one-of-a-kind plant and inasmuch as ALARA requires a O case-by-case assessment of the factors involved even if 4 numerical guides are used, there is really no sense in trying
[ to establish numerical guides. !!-
[ INTERROGATORY 2 fi Have you calculated occupational doses for CRBR?
[ .a) lIf so, provide your calculations and assumptions 'used. '
22 RES PONSE No.
INTERROGATORY 3 i'
The CRBR DES estimates the annual occupational exposure dose to be 1000 man-rem. Do you believe this is a conservative estimate.
i a). If not, why not.
' b) Have you developed any estimates? If so, please provide with explanatory basis.
RESPONSE
I No. D
- a) We have seen no evidence to suggest that it is conservative.
i i b) No.
1 I INTERROGATORY 4 Do you believe the methodology employed to estimate genetic effects as described in Chapter V of the BEIR Committee Report, i
- "Tne Ef fects on Population of Exposure to Low Levels of
-Ionizing Radiation" is an accaptable methodology to employ in
- estimating the genetic risk due to operation of the CRBR?
, a) If not, please explain why.
RES PONSE Yes (recognizing this report is superseded by BEIR III) ,
- but we do not believe that it is conservative, i.e., that it
- overestimates the risk.
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23 INTERROGATORY 5 Do you agree with the estimates in Table 4 of the BEIR Committee Report on p. 57.
RESPONSE
No. We feel, consistent with the Discussion that begins on page 57 of the BEIR-I Report, that these may underestimate the effects. Moreover, the paper by Lyons, e t al. , Nature New Biology, Volume 23 8, July 2 6, 1976, pp. 101-104, indicates that the BEIR Report may have underestimated the induced mutation f requency at low dose rates. See also, John W. Gofman,
" Radiation and Human Health," Sierra Club books, 1981.
INTERROGATORY 6 What methodology would you employ to estimate the genetic effects of occupational exposures at the CRBR?
RESPONSE
We would employ the same methods as those in the BEIR Report but we would use an estimate of the frequency of induced mutations that is consistent in the paper of Lyons, et al.,
referenced in our response to 5 above. We also recognize that experts such as Gofman (supra) employ different methods.
INTERROGATORY 7 Do you know of any information that might ef fect the estimates of genetic risks in Table 4, p. 4 7, o f the BEIR Committee Report.
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24 I RES PONSE Yes. See our response to interrogatory 5 aoove, and BEIR III.
INTERROGATORY 8 What methodology would you employ in determining the induction of cancers from the radiation exposure to CRBR plant employees.
RESPONSE
We would utilize the risk model set fortn by E.p. Radford in the BEIR-III Report subjec t to the following changes:
a) We calculate the bone dose from Pu using the assumptions proposed by K.Z. Morgan.
b) We would use the hot particle hypothesis for estimating the ef fects of insoluble alpha emitting particulates in the long.
c) We recognize that several studies, e.g., the reports of Mancuso et al. (See footnote in Science, 216, p. 474, Apr. 30, 1982), Gofman (supra) , and the new A-bomb data, (See Science, 2l2, pp. 1364-65, 19 June 1981 and other related reports) suqqest that the dose-effect model in the BEIR-III Report may seriously underestimate the effects at the dose and dose rate of occupational exposure.
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i Contention 9 (new Contention 6)
INTERROGATORY l Do you believe that the values of the environmental impacts
.l for the fuel cycle identified in Table -D2 of the CRBR DES are i
i accurate.
1 RESPONSE l 4
No. i INTERROGATORY 2 i If your answer is that some of these values are not accurate could you please identify.those values.
RESPONSE
d The DES has been superseded by the FES. Among our concerns j l are the following: (1) In the FES, Table D2 is for a model.
fuel cycle that does not represent the actual fuel cycle of the :
CRBR. '( 2) The CRBR core change is not reflected in Table D2.
J (3) Table D2 suf fers from all the problems cited by the D.C. ,
Circuit in NRDC v. NRC, No. 74-1586 ( April 2 7, 1982) relative i 2
to Table S-3 (Original, Interim and Final Table S-3 Rules) .
^
! Table D2 specifically relies on reference 2 of the FES Appendix
< D (p. D-14) which constituted part of the technical basis for i
- Ta ble S-3. (NRDC v. NRC supra a t 3 9. ) (4) Due to a lack of adequate discussion and detailed references it is impossible to-determine how Staf f generated the numbers in Table D2. (Our-
. comments on the DES, reprinted at pp. A-63 to A-64 of the FES, still apply) . ,
- f. .
26
- INTERROGATORY 3
.i Have you calculated values for those impacts?
RES PONS E No.
?
INTERROGATORY 4 k What are those values and what is the basis for them.
i 4
' RES PO NSE
- No t a pplicable.
. INTERROGATORY 5 4 Do you believe that i t is necessary in order to analyze. the environmental impacts of the fuel cycle for the CRBR it is t necessary to know the location of the fuel fabrication and ;
- i reprocessing facilities and ultimate waste disposal centers.
) RESPONSE No, but when one or more sites are in existence, under discussion and likely to be selected, they should be analyzed !
to show the range of possible impacts. This is particularly I true when the probable alternatives are limited as is the case i i j with respect to the alternative sources of plutonium to fuel {
4 the CRBR.- ,
i INTERROGATORY 6 !
j If you believe that it is required that these locations be ;
I known at this time what is the basis for your answer.
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l RESPONSE See our response to Interrogatory 5 above. ;
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27 Contention 10 (new Contention 7)
INTERROGATORY l What is the basis for your contention that the CRBR is not reasonaoly likely to demonstrate the reliability of a relevant LMPBR central station electric plant?
RES PONSE First, the burden is on Applicants and Staff to show that it is. This has not been done. Second, there are significant design differences between the CRBR and a commercial-size economical LMFBR, e.g., it size, steam generator design, core design, safety margins, and engineered safety features. Third, the history of LMFBRs in the U.S. and abroad is not favorable in this regard. For example, EBR-I and PERMI-I suffered CDAs; the Soviet breeder's steam generators exploded; the British demonstration plant was plagued by design and construction errors and operational probI ms. The FFTF is 7 years behind schedule and has experienced in excess of $1 billion in cost overrun. Fourth, the U.S. LWRs have ye t to achieve their desiqn reliability. Fifth, the corporations that have given us the FFTP and the Midwest reprocessing facility are now building the CRBR. Sixth, DOC has established a three (to five) year operation of the demonstration plant as the project objective.
Three years is an inquf ficient time period, as the LWR industry demonstrates, and furthermore, due to lack of available fuel, it is unlikely that this period can be met. Seventh, the CRBR is having problems with its steam generators.
,s .
28 INTERROGATORY 2 What is tne basis of your contention that CRBR is not reasonably likely to demonstrate the maintainability of a relevant LMFBR central station electric plant?
RES PONSS See answer to Interrogatory 1 above.
INTERROGATORY 3 What is the basis of your contention that the CRBR is not reasonably likely to demonstrate the technical performance of a relevant LMPBR central station electric plant?
RES PONS E See answer to Interrogatory 1 above.
INTERROGATORY 4 What is the basis of your contention that the CRBR is not reasonably likely to demostrate the environmental acceptability of a relevant LMF3R central station electric plant?
RES PONS E See answer to Interrogatory 1 above. Moreover, the environmental acceptability of an LMFBR will depend upon the acceptability of its fuel cycle facilities.
INTERROGATORY 5 What is the basis of your contention that the CRBR is not reasonaoly likely to demostrate the safety of a relevant LMFBR central station plant.
RES PO NSE See answer to Interrogatory 1 above.
29 INTERROGATORY 6 Regarding your Contention 10(a) (1) wnat is the basis for your belie f that the CRBR will not be able to meet its programmatic objectives within the time required by the ERDA Ad minis t ra to r ?
RESPONSE
Lack of fuel. See also our response to Interrogatory 1 above, otherwise we have not completed our analysis relative to this interrogatory.
INTERROGATORY 7 What is the basis for your Contention 10(a) (2) that the core design and engineered safety features are not sufficiently similar to a practical commercial size LMF3R so that building and operating the CRBR will not demonstrate anything relevant to an economic, reliable and licensable LMFBR.
RES PONSE Neither Staf f nor Applicants have established precisely what the CRBR will demonstrate with respect to core design and engineered safety features relative to the uncertainties associated with the construction and operation of an economic, reliable, licensable, commercial-size LMFBR. Tney have not established that the construction and operation of the CRBR for 3 years will prove to be a net benefit within the NEPA cost-benefit analysis when compared to simply going through the design and licensing exercise up to the LWA or CP phase.
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' INTERROGATORY 8 What is the basis of Contention 10(a) (2) that the size-of the core is not sufficiently similar to a practical commercial I
size LMPBR that building and operating the CRBR will demonstrate anything relevant with respect to an economic
- reliable and licensable LMFBR.
a) What do you believe would be the proper size for the i
CRBR?
b) What is the basis for you answer?
RESPONSE
See our response to Interrogatory 7 above.
a) For the reasons stated above, we see no virtue for
- cons tructing the CRBRP.
1 INTERROGATORY 9 Regarding Contention 10(d) do you believe the informational requirements of the LMFBR program or of a demonstration-scale i
facility might be substantially better satisfied by alternative
} design features such as are embodied in certain foreign breeder reactors.
- a) If your answer.is yes, please identify such alternative design features embodied in foreign breeder reactors.
b) Do you believe any foreign breeder reactor designs
- of fer any advantages over CRBR design.
I
- 1) If so, please identify.
T a
31 RES PONSE See our answer to Interrogatory 7 above. Furthermore, we see no reason why, since the CRBR is purported to be a demonstration facility, the safety features that may be necessary on a commercial size LMFBR should not be incorporated into the CRBR design even though they are not essential for this particular reactor, so that these features could be tested.
a) Fly wheels on the sodium pumps, a pool-type design, a core catcher, a design which has an improved reactivity coefficient for tnermal expansion. Other design alternatives not presently in foreign reactors should also be considered, e.g., self actuated shutdown systems.
b) Yes, Intervenors believe that, e.g., the pool-type design can be made safer than the loop-type design.
Furthermore, Intervenors believe the SNR-300 has a core-catcher, which is a preferable means of accomodating CDAs Contention 10(o)
INTERROGATORY l What advantages do the following sites have in your opinion over the CRBR site?
a) llanford Reservation b) NRTS Idaho Reservation c) Nevada Test Site d) Savannah River
l 32 e) Co-location with LMFBR Fuel Reprocessing Plant f) Underground Sites RES PONSE We have not completed our analysis relative to this interrogatory. Moreover, it is not our function to perform the alternative site analysis. Our current conclusions are as follows:
a) Population density, meteorology, colocation of f uel cycle facilties.
b) Population density, meteorology and dose.
c) Population density, meteorology and dose.
d) Population density, meteorology and dose, e) Reduces transportation of spent fuel. We prefer colocation with other f uel cycle f acilities as well.
f) Improved containment.
UPDATED RESPONSE TO NRC STAFF REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS REGARDING NRDC, ET AL, CONTENTION 15 NRC Staf f Request for Admissions Regarding NRDC, e t al. ,
Contention 15 requires no updated response, since Contention 15 has been withdrawn by Intervenors.
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Respectfully submitted, M8
. Ellyn hy Weiss /'
- HARMON & WEISS
- 1725 Eye S treet , NW Washington, D.C. 20006 (202)833-9070' i l I
' Barbara A. Finamore i~
S. Jacob Scherr Natural ' Resources Defense ;
- Council, I nc . .. )
i 172 5 Eye Street , NW I Wa shing to n , D.C. 20006 l
(202)223-8210
! Attorneys for Intervenors 3 Natural Resources Defense
! Council, Inc., and the Sierra Club
- April 30, 1982 l
Washington, D.C.
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. _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ - . ~ _ _ _ , _ _ ____..-.; -
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BEFORE THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of )
)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY )
PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION ) Docket No. 50-537 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY )
)
Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant )
)
AFFIDAVIT OF DR. THOMAS B. COCHRAN I, Dr. Thomas B. Cochran, being duly sworn, depose and say:
- 1. I am employed as a Senior Staff Scientist by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and, as such, I am duly authorized to execute the foregoing answers to interrogatories.
- 2. The foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dr. Thomas B. Cochran Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of April 1982.
_] .- )
l '$+ hun &'l Notary Ptyblic
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y CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of INTERVENORS, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. AND THE SIERRA CLUB, UPDATED RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY BY NRC STAFF and INTE RVENORS , NATU RAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. AND THE SIERRA CLUB, UPDATED RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY BY APPLICANTS were served this 3 0th day of April 1982 on the following:
- Marshall E. Miller, Esquire Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4350 East West Highway Betnesda, Maryland 20814
- Danie l Swanson, Esquire Stuart Treby, Esquire Bradley W. Jones, Esquire Office Of Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Maryland National Bank Building 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bernesda, Maryland 20814
- Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Boa rd U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
- Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
- Docketing & Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 (3 copies)
- R. Tenney Johnson, Esquire Leon Silverstrom, Esquire Warren E. Bergoholz, Jr., Esquire Michael D. Oldak, Esquire L. Dow Davis, Esquire Of fice of General Counsel U.S. Depa rtment of Energy 1000 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washinaton, D.C. 20585
- George L. Edgar, Esquire Irvin N. Shapell, Esquire Thomas A. Schmutz, Esquire Gregg A. Day, Esquire Frank K. Peterson, Esquire Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 180 0 M S treet , N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 Dr. Cade t if . Iland , Jr.
Director Bodega Ma rine Labora tory University of California P.O . Box 247 Bodega Bay, California 94923 lierber t S . Sanger, Jr., Esquire Lewis E. Wallace, Esquire James F. Burger, Esquire W. Walker LaRoche, Esquire Edwa rd J. Vigluicci Of fice of tne General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority 400 Commerce Avenue Knoxville, Te nnes see 37902 William M. Leech, Jr., Esquire Attorney General William B. !!ubbard, Esquire Chief Deputy Attorney General Lee Breckenridge, Esquire Assistant Attorney General State of Tennessee Of fice of the Attorney General 4 50 James Robertson Parkway Na s nv i lle , Tennessee 372L9
Lawson McGhee Public Library 500 West Church S treet 4. , * .
l Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 William E. Lantrip, Esquire City Attorney Municipa l Buildinq P. O . Box 1 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 ,
Oak Ridge Public Library Civic Center <
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37820 Mr. Joe H. Walker 4 01 Roane S treet Harriman, Tennessee 37743 Commissioner James Cotham Tennessee Department of Economic and Community Development '
Andrew Jackson Bu ilding , S u ite 1007 Nashville, Tennessee 32219
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Barbara A. Finamore i
" Denotes hand delivery.
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