ML20052A781
| ML20052A781 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vallecitos File:GEH Hitachi icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1966 |
| From: | Levine S US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052A734 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-81-483 NUDOCS 8204290167 | |
| Download: ML20052A781 (14) | |
Text
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O.E_it'I_M_._L E!/:.C17.IC 'E.S._?_P.E_AC'l_C_'_d.(GEri)
..:I,
- D00lG'T :D. 50-70 M *. ^.
I.
,II"L-'rwCTIO:1 On October 2.0., 1955, the O'.neral Tlectric Cor.7:.ny rt:t-itted *eu:n :. nt 19 to Focility Lice:nce 1*. ';?.-l for the ~en.rS1 Ilectrie 2::t .c oct,r Orr.).
- he snend..cr.t r
- ;.:ested huthorf.:n. ion of.sn increare in n'.xt:ra: r.. '.y c'ttte pover frr. 33 10 50 R :, c en-y?ar '.ieente (the curr ?nt H:-. :
expires '.*s.r c.h_.10. 1%._ S.I, er.d r6EP.C,'.-WCW ih>r.d use of a n:-1:-: Of fissile, ly;.ro2 ret, scarce, and speciel nuelcnr natiriels.
Cerer:.'. "le -
tric e. Lao r.ulnitted I.TD-500:-A,
- t. ne.t ?::511ty 'cr.cri; ti an sc.C ': f:ty Atclysis F.tp:.r ; for
'-I"R.
Ley :*. i t'.er ::i: - int : 2 cu;plcur..
-ion dated Ju.c 5, J::re 16, June 22,, J lv l?.,.Au:;nst 6, and 1.u,a.-.17.
1966.
Tr.is r.:. erJe1 de: cribes r nd n nly:rs the it,cility in i;
- . r
- -e.:
/
ctate, in:lu6in; cheng'2: teing r.sde to.phie the der.ir,n in n:c:.r.h :. c with current safety stan5srds.
These ehtr.acs cre discu:sc6 in devil 1rst.cr herein.
Fr:por.e6 toeb:,1 cal s;ocifier-t$ ons for op :rction of the facility vere also cut::itted.
Pr,pesc6 operction cf GE'2R, es 6t.t.::ribed in the r.nen5:.:ent, var. revie.ed by the Advis,ry Cocnittee on Setei.r Ir.fg n.r$r, (ACRS) nt its July 1?66 neeti ng.
Tr.e Co r.ittee concluded :htt
"-h:- :, ESP can be c, tert.tc6 :: pro..
posed a, power levels up to 53 f.:7 for E. t en-ye:.r y,eriod with::ut undue risk to the health and sEfe.y of the.'.:11.10."
A copy of the AC?.3 rc;o:-.
is attnet:5.
II.
O_W..V.TIFC-EISIOR_'i GE has subnitted dntr. coverir.g its ex;. rie cc si..ce Operation cf E?.
corsencei ir.1959 In general, these dr.ts shav that the reactor nr.d its ass:cisted r.ysters hcve oparcted with sdepste reliability, and ths: 1:.ere I
have been no serious safety problens. "In the ectly life of tbc 7 snt 1
i there ;ere rignificent r..::::bers of eg.:I;nent failurcs; however, r.:difica-tions and other cdrrective verk perfo-:r.d by GE has redu:ed the fresaency of fsilures to e. relatively low level.
Ih-re hr.:e been no significant releese: cf radioactivity to the envir:r. ant at the result of fuel or ex-perinent failures.
2he care sit:r.ifichnt cifficul-ies and essocir.,ed :.cdi-l fi:ntiore; t : the facility arc <!!sco.cr.ed b2'.rv.
l s
8204290Y O O
t
1.
Jrier.a 1D there wre three isolated ir.::::.e : ir..hich r::.;le esmr-:
rods isilec to.crur, fVily when required.
In July tnd CcuAcr of 1pT2 therc verc tuo t.daition 21 instnr.ecs.
Gl' rade an cr orsive investicstion in 0:tobcr 196? of the cause of these feilures.
I.: a result, they nod!-
fled their r:ds to use n "ssndwich" type construction for the beren arcin-les, steel; they repir.ced the letches betvcen ti.e feel fellevt.r cr.5 the prison r.ecthas with ones si:cilar to those in use at the Encir.ceri:ig ht f.ccctor (EE); and ti ey repiceed ibe control 2 od rollers viih ones sinilar to those ur ed :.t EE.
finee these changes were rMe thnre h;ve b:-en two inttnnees $n.i.ich a rca failed to scrse, ca:e 6ue to the pret:nce of r.rtn1 S
chi;.
r.nd, r.n the other occasion, due to the preconce of a foreign O ;lcet (a one-inch lo:c screv) in the drive essenbly.
Scre vas F.noth2r instr.r.ce in which a rad was slightly delayed $n sert : sirc due to corresion of th?
bs11 couy11:.c actust 5:c rod which had f r.e.hertently n:t b:-en chrr:ium pire.ed.
In Crauary Ir;66, 6ur$nc a renetor startu ' inup:,: tion, it. s di::,
cove:cd ttt.t one of th? poison rods vas unittched fron it: feel frll var section En3 that the resetor had been o,cercted for nt lent 14 days in this condition.
Sic vas due to two operator errors: the poison sectic.n w.s instclied upsf de do.n so that it had not been in:ched to the fuel follorer, Lnd the eron;; tool vis used in the pre-str:rtup. 711 ter.t, thur civing r.n erronanus ir.91cction of a successful tect.
E e ur.1ctchc6 r:,5
.;.? nLt Sc-te ted 6arin; startup since it apparently follevec the fuel foll; var coctier.
in the norral ranner.
GE has since ch;rced the pr:0?iure for chee?ing 10teh intecrity by cefinin,: the proper liftirs tool en$ by recuirirc thr.t the r:d-seated liC t is observed to go out when the lift is r..6e.
h The rupture diaphrac,s initially instclied on the inlet pipins to the renc-tor ver.ac1 to prevent overpressurizing the system fLiled rep?atr51y due to faticue.
F.cdesigned diaphregns vere installed in 1950 and hsve not it.11ef since'thet tine.
In 1961, the primry heat exchanger was replseed follov-irc a series of tube failures.
Since then the replacer.er.t hLs operated
~
vithout a failure.
In 1962, e crack occurred at a langituSinsi ser.m in c section of the 20-inch alursinum Interal piping near the disclarce of the prirary punp.
She applicant stated that this failtu a vss due to it. pro.: 2r design of a "Y", junction in the line.
I. redesicned section was installed and a thorough inspection of the entire prir.ary piping system shoved t'rtt the piping was sound.
2 e primary sysics flow ced differentitl 3.ressure monitoring system caused a nunber of spurious scrans due to the innbility of the origins 1 rapid response (40 millisecond) systes usins 1-of-l pre -
sure sent.ing logic to filter out back.;round hydraulic noise.
In 1964, the system was replaced by a slover response (150 millisecond) ballows type systen using 2.of-3 pressure censing 1c51c, thus clininating the probic=.
Be electrical power lov voltace scrEn relay has been renoved bechuze an undesirable number of scrans vss cc.used by 'r.omentary supply voltage flue-tus ions.
Sis relay served only an F.nticipatory functs 'n, t.nd :-ince in a t:ae loss of power situation at 53 It.rt, siEnsis frco flov, pret sure, or h
I
di;.i r : tie prc.:; rq v:uld c.arcly : hut the rc:. tc,r (:,vn, it war. det.. c t
-ent the rtelt.y
.s not r.ee6ed.
to the fuel usuld not te ex; 2:1.75, po.Ar cf 5., ;t.:: t.:d, tven thorsh curu.3:G2 vill pr:: vide s 1:ss-of-pov ye have rev'ev:5 the desi;n of th. ceran circuit and deterr. ired it t:: be t
e cca:tlle.
Tne er rc. r.cy diesel cenerator hos -weer iniled te rich up the lond Vn regired 6uz ir; reaci.or op ration.Eis fcilure vas due to an iny: eper 5..vern:r wrirc rc :ctor shutdown.I.lso, the ccnern.or i.as on three occ:-sl:.ns nm out.
3:c when the f.r:1 tr.-e.fer pt=p u-i:n:r.:.-ly trip;.e6 eff and faO.c6 to cupply f.v:1
- ntr:1. sa ting.
Testir.; of the c. eerner and the use of stricter procc.Gu..1 t !- d.
o t: thr it toni.or feel IcVel in th-6::y tanh hnve preventeS e.ny recern n:
cor;::1.
of '.he e f9f1:res since 1953.
9c.e eu.rgency cc ling systen hns been te; ted oecr 103 times n:.$ used h3 C.: 5.even rei-It has never ftiled to fu:.etion prererly.
- .: t ent. rc:.c.' cr.311nc etiie:.?re gm6 inn 5nriently due to tir.cr at :.ver.
2.e r/J Worr of s..u I:= :c. :.4.:._:
si:c.: :ht t
of cl+-e trJ cal p: var to this 8ystet.
sin: been red;;cd ty itsin;; this circuit tej arctcly fro Other reactnr contr o't e! rcuit s.
2.e re$etor p:l hest exche ger.ns 2 ep2 aced in 165 follovir:; c series of Inese alunin r:. tih es h:..e han re-3 nced viti nr.'.-
[
aiur.ime.; inba fr.f.lurcs.
steel t.,bn, end the hest exch 2ngnr has '\\:netioned since then without les:
a 3 e r.l..
J. failure of the personnel airir.ek to the contnirr.cnt occurred this yeLr s it.ulty interl:et s estem.
en :.ir.g c no::entary opening of both do:,rt. cue t:
GI diccno:cd the prob 3c es being c:. :-e5 by ins 6ecusto r. sin.onancc te?.en cdec.w.te s.eps to rectify the situstian.
An enalyr.is ins E,2teral icO.s heve developed in the chield cool!nc ceilt.
6::.e in 1,65 and it was determined that the coils vere not r.ecce6 r.r.3 th y Analysis of op: ration at 50 P.vt indiestes that with:ut cool-r 7:is temperature si. auld were secured.
ing the concrete temperature vill rise to 150"F. Shield tenycrr.tvres vill be tensure no., affect the shield integrity.
irg; esecucion to 50 Mut to assure that na p:tentici difficulties occur.-
Tne rrr.ter of unscheduled scrams in the psst 1.r s been high (87 in 1965).
ite rQ::rity of the scra:as have been caused by instrunent or electrical GE is raking an effort to reduce the nu=ber of spuricus r_sif.:r.c: ions.
Wis sicnifiennt t:r ns !.nd in the first he.lf of 1966 recorded only 9 l
re6uetion reflects the success of GE's effort to da e.
l t
s.
t i
1
L.
.......:r
.,5 % vt.
':ic: r vc 1 :c n i2 re.C::. t 6 r.:ri only 15 fafit:.-
.. d
':l; i:. af..lflet.nt rL610 activity reler. scc hve b:cn experien:ed.
A fr.v t.f Are in:Idents occurred fro:s failrres in the nov detetivr.te:s ex:.ori-rcnt 100p:.
HLuover, in no innttnce has failure of a GET?. cx;crir.:nt l'ed to a significtnt cerivity release to the envircr:1.2nt, over-expoture to Idr-coar,el, or 6e3ctericus effects to the reactor or other ex crire:.tc.
'P..e 70 instances of respired containrent icolttien enperienced at GITR
- 1. ave beer. a:e preisminantly to the activity relee se incidents dise,::scG t.tove, crise@ cut cler.nup opart tf uns after the relest es, cnd relcar,es cf 1;-16 activity frc the prJr..ry cytic.s vater re]etsid to the reactor 'pr.ol folleWr4 neturtion of 1he energency coolins syst c.
'Ite reliability of thc c utair.*:.:nt ispir. tion system his been exer.11cnt.
Cycr 350 test is-.lt-tin.n E n3 70 receired isoittions h:ve tn:-:en place with no rccord of a f:.'h re to i c:.Inte.
D.cre have been over 503 m rant initisted during op.t ht ion t.n$ ter*.s with :.o failures of the safety sys:er.
In cu-:.ary, the Gr.in facility hss been oper:_ted for Sver seven years, nr.d in our epinten hcs n:t c::;erienced significent snfs y prabicms.
Unile etc:.c cpe. ational 6ifficulties were experien :ed with ihr :izir.21 co.t:ol rr. 93,.the r:<ir. w-re.:lifici in 1562, cnd the prc'el ns vere cc 2-itir.11y elinir. m d.
7:rre ht.ve since been sone instan:cs of ctuch rods; h0 :ver, CI has carefully invcstigt.t:5 ccch occurrence cni th3y r.ppanr to htye bc.cn ircitten crents rr.ther than indicative of cystenatic difficultien.
On the whole, ve believe that the GDIR operatire experiente has ccnnn-ctrnted the st rety cn$ effectiver. css inherent in the desicn of the reac-tor, c:eneritants and operstins nethods.
III.
P J.!E R II;C E.S E Tce propos23 inercase in stesay ciste power level is the only one of the chtn;;cs rec..ested by CE that significantly affects reactor operating con-ditions.
T'.c principal changes in the thern.sl par:reters resulting frc:.
En increare in norral aparr. ting power level from 33 to 50 L-t are an in-crecse in the ecolant temperature rise across the core from 250F to 34 5 F, and r.n inercsne in the raxit:um fuel plate surfe.cc temperature frc= 2723F 0
to 327 F.
Ye hve c: pared the Lverage en$ pesh heat flunes and the burn-out rt.tio for GEIS during nortsl.:peration with respective values for other tes, reactor facilities using sir 211ar fuel.
'Ite pesh heat fluxes cre sig-nifictmtly lover in GEIR (1.1 x 10D LiU/Er-Ft2 379/g _pt,2) then in the Phun Ergok
(
h? heter Ihcility (P3h?) (1 53 x 106
), the Ei L2U/
Er-It,) an5 the High Flux Ina: Reacter (F33) (15 x 10g (1.44 x 10U2, but 2
B1U/Rr-Ft slith E -T gly higher thsn in the interials' Test Ecactor (M23) (0.8h x 10 BIU/
-).
'lte burnout ratio for GEIS, at full power is 2.2 as cer:gred to values of 2.0 for the F3RF and 2 75 for tha EFER.
All of these reactors vr.e the krnath correlation for the burnout ratio.
l
-_4
o. :r. u-n.. :.; a :..!t1 i 1,...
,t. o..D, % s: =.. '. r.
- v. -
s...,...
.......-s
,e
..~...,u......
- t..
he.:i t; te-et 6 ' :r.t!., 850-) cp' fi:v, ct:5 lh6'? inlet tenrerr.tu.rc, f.ht tejp 1.weln fo. pWer, flav, r nd te.rc:.tura scrar.s ) the turnout h..t flu:<.
ratio would be 1 5
!.11 availtble cCde:.cc inSiestes thit far nor..tl operation c.t.he propoced 50 li.n. power level, and expected irr.nr.ient Cevia!.ior.s, the Ei3 fuel viu be c. pere.ed at conditions t).:t are v:ll vithin tsfe linit:; c:.ttbli:hed by exp':riente et oti.cr facilit'.es.
T.:e recondary coolt.nt systen for C-l'O' tranrfcrL the rn: tor lent 'r:r. the pri:.try coolant systez to t!.e cooli t,ver,,fnich in : n f.:riu:'.6 Crz.ft -
ty;c unit utilfrini.: t wo 6 5 li? fc n,.
Ih? perf:rne!.ce of the e,ali's e nt is cuch 1) nt vhen the c'r tsuperr.t..ra it, I.t:.vc SCLP a::6 the b:--3dit ch r-20% a reiuction in p: var fron tha : r.>p ei 5' Ev:. ::ver lwel vi'.1 N rece::sury t:' ensure that the n.s.,:b.
- N '.:.et *.cn:ar ture.T li. T v il not le ence3c.d.
It is expacted that n::e.
1
- a. s.:ar.s '.>.c.... e
...5% of the tir.e from.Tuly to
.e.,t.
, u
.9..
-.'s.,
.- =-- =. 4. s ~ U. '. (. '. s r.
'..1..' *.. '... L'.
a.
teny:rcture l! nits.
We L.ve con::1uded that spar 7. tion r.t 57 Mut vill not sigr.if3 cs.:..3y r.ff::t sr.fn.y un c: c':Nr nor.n1 er e.ntieip.teC t rc:.s! nt :,r.d' ior.
'a '..e ope. c s f :. at the iu ter pver le'rel v11.13 r:vf de en inercr.ced f!:Wn
[
pr:5v.ct inventery r.n3 higher fuel c:20 clt:1 tenperatures, e.ll of vh':h tend o cc:.evist vorsen the cot. c ren' c.s of potent ial I celda:nJ, the r.:.rgi n: of stfety avciltble even u:dcr cc:clacnt conditi::ns, t.re n:.:
seriens1 decreered.
3
' Ibis is supprted by the accident ant. lyric s:hich fc11.vs in a later section.
r
.,. C _1 L..-, to.Pn..,.1K.,
n w
The npplicent hrs initiated eeveral t,yner r.5:'itf uns an$ codifications to the fucility end operatin;; procedures tr :.he it curft:n to present-day safety ;rnetices.
- hese incluce En energney.stcr roeirculation systen to be ured in.1.e event of a r.s,br 1
- sc cf pool vE.er or reactor coolant, a see.,ni:.ry r: set $vity shut down systen, se:e changes in the safety cirevitry to ins'.u e that Lit.sle failures vill n:. preclui: c:rst, insts11stion of re$uoient valves on a nu.ber of conttir_ ent vcssel penetrations, and more rigarous cant.tinzent testing requirer.ents.
2he in-tallation of the.: ster recirculation systen was a consequence of the Pivision of f.cactor Licensing's inzestisction of possible accid:nts l
thr.t could afruittneously Crain, the vater from the reactor pool and rece-
.or.'ersel.
Several such accidents bive been considered.
'lhese include loss of pool vater through the pool art.in line, loss of pool vater throuch the pressure vessel drain line, and loss of pool v ter throu;;b one of the 1
E
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s i
i e
.... l :. - Q : : :u -
.i:~.:n b:.
- .:-A.
t 1: tt* r L :o cc$ -
f.e. s v:rf). i ::.i:a te t.rs_ir l:.5 ef -1..
- .:i a:;. 11 :.:. - hc : ncter vc..N1 since the rupture.tould cepre:.s.? rite the pri::.try r.;.ntes :.nu the er.ergency coolir vsives voul6 oten.
Tne occurrence of these potentici necidents is conridered very unlikely.
Tne norr.lcs era 1: art t,f the co'ed pressure vc:.sel nr.S the drain lines nre valved tiff ra nnily and nre altost never opened.
In add.r. tion, if n brchh did onctu, the retetor core v:uld not be une:rtared for r.t lent.t 25 r-inutes, and th!s t*:_e could be extrnded r_n naditional ha.:r or r. ore by the t.v,v lable pool L::eup narply.
Forever, sin:;e tha r.cciituts : re n,t Incredilie, r.nd the ch?ap srpply is limited, GE vill r: ovide nu crercer.cy recirculation systes !.o -v.:2.p vnter lost frc. the : cactor cnd Inol ba:h into the poel.
Eis syster. Vill ba capable of pu:;.'n; veter hek into i; e 3. col at A
- .;.e equivalent t o 11e rr.xir.un re.te of 1: rs.hich cv.'M 0:cui fron rapt::: cf the Isrces.t s.inric precsure versel Im.zle ;:::mrn in; the betten t.'ai..
he sysics is, r;vided vith re din.' at ;rge, is eqtble of c$ ther r. arc ;l or nut:::ntic cetuatior., cnd is tic.3 into the erercency e}ectrical p:r.:r syste;.
'S vill clso perioi'.cally cc:r3 t esi.c of the "as-is" syv.-
d::.or.st rr.t e. cootin. cd prf:r:-:.r.0c capabil'.ty.
.e 1:-vc revicv06.h: r ;; r.
6ct.isn r_ *. te:
re uire nents r.rf 1
.f.t.e sa s;.st e. is ca p3t h.' r2. -. _;.
rerforrinc itc ir.tcnded !tmetion.
A r,9condary rN et.ivity shutds.:n cyatc a hr_s n.ver h::n in,t311ed et G :T.,
I but DE now ple:a to provide or.c thicb is to M fW. tior.nl 3 rior to op rs-tion t bove M M.rt.
'ihe ry ton is derigned to chut down the reactor t...d keep it cuberitical even if the c2ntrol reds cE::not be inserted into the cere.
She design be. sis f or the syster is to provide injcetion of p > iron into the reactor in suf ficient t$ue to prever.t cr,re nelting. in the cvent the rods cf.nnat be ir,serted t nd reactivity is beir;; r.aded to the core at the r2xi::tu: ra.te obtainsble fr,
x+.non bu acut.
She system is designed to add cedolinium nitrate solution to the reretor vessel as follows:
(1) LitMn one reinute aftcr initiation, the rn.ctor core vster vill contain sufficient poison to reduce recctivity by $2.
(2) Eccnriless of reactor flow ccndition fellovinc. initiation of the poi:an syste:c, there vill never te less thsn '2 of prison in the core vater.
(3) Sie total quantity of poison vhen injected and dispersed through-out the primary system and pool coolant (nbout 22,033 gallons) t:ust have a negative reactivity effect of at Icast 1157o ak/k.
'ite gadolinius nitrate poisen is injected from two tcnks into the pressure l
vesrel by vo positive displacement injection pu ps.
'Jhc pumps tre powered by two air cators driven by co: pressed nitrocen.
Injection is rs.nually l
initit.te6 fro = the control root by activating either of two souibs to oren 1
l
...,.,,..J t, 0. 3...
.y s
.. r,.
ut r..11 p car ::arce k rcqui:cd.
.a L:licve ::.i.,
.::..*ill Tr v!de t. n: er.rr.ry cnd r.cecy.ttble additio::;l nM.r r:
ion ry.imt :.ny unf.ra:,cen Eccident which raicht irn,bilize the c ntrcl r,f ; r:-
(wiev.:n3 the G$if,1::
Lirment:t'en cysic:r. nar.2 t:rcos viere 1:gr:;;~en s 16 te r.2de v::e iden:1fiod.
r.r-:er.tc to ti e r.crs, lo ;1e could ba bypasced by 012. :C;ec'fice.lly,. c,mc of iL; ci tsi.e cirettit chkr:cc 1::
17 fa! !.:ru.
GT.
this situati:;n yrb. - t o t c rrect
- vtr level.
! ;r:e.:.e i.:e hvc revis:cd th:ua denicn <hs:c s r : e le)iev ti.ese ch'.ngc the GEF, instrL. crc.ction sycie:. is necegabic f;r the e,;;:.:,
oced or.tration.
. -h t he e.: 1.ir t r.; synte : ' r.r tear. drrorst re ed t o i t
.tsroviding ed'. '.63nt iselniin valves for e.ll.ni. vin-aut:e '- :.c M ghly r c. '..i i.e,
r.c that ci-n:. t Er c nsidered tr. ex.er.sion of contr. ire..:n:
s-v:1ves-off lit: s lording to :;r fr.3 cl.-::ed syster.r.
rr t.r-- r. -
rolation,siver in the M.i:.:h sc;. ply t.nd exh ur.:
In ;:r:!
.;is..
Cuets of
.. n, m..,.
8,. y,...
th:
..i
..v...,.
o,. rc.:,,..-a....... g..:
...,.,3 e.
, e,.,,.~
- 4.. v i<.
.. e 3 3 r,....,.
4....._1.., ~,.
t 14. c..e
..s. s.
ns vill grer.1ly. nhance the tu!IC!n3 ir.1ecrity.
All Ofth :.if:: 1 :n1 s vill be invallcd pri.
to th. :.:x:
ical E;ecifier tions far individ.,sl ec:,inf r? ent ra: c-:rationcleth rr. e tests m e yite.d iy t h -
vacrrr. relief systcm vill 1.: 3nstedled on the conthir;m.c %2.
Ysten vill o. ploy a llooid r:.:r'.eter..v.ne of relief t.c:1,nr:tr (e re5 deve et 11 n. 52tive pret.t.re of 0.1 r;ig t.nd c.nt ain 3, o :!:.*.-
- t..
er 5 pig.
Such a device it. iriaru.tly relitbi': enou;*h 3: M r. red;.n-N-
.it r.ot re y.: ired.
'r.'e have revi: ei the de:1cn of the ocvice rter 'ned it to be eccepttble f.r the intended ure.. Instelled t.rier to optrath
!.*..t
, vhich antSi r..an: luild.'ng has fx :trly i.r u: : a r. rs.t -: t :.ted ct a tre: 2. e
> t E.tu!e snd et approxi.%telv. tv;.ver.r interrnb.
Ec final Ic:4 in each test, ky.e6 to 5 prig, has sivsys teen within the f::which tecan ef t.er ra.:e.f r ::f all rsj:.r le 0..isnec criterion :.f Tor.tiired free volume pe'r 6cy.
In t'e feturt,.h: systen till b.-
r Sed t o r.n sn.usi intecrated lenh rate teht ir. the "as-is" c:ndit ! r.
essure of at lens. 2 5 psic.
test ct 4.h pr.ic, the esti.str.d tax 1:r.:r. accident pressureTo 3r vide a p int of reier i
{ucted for a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
will pr irdividuni ;cu trations vill be :Sce.In c.ddition, n:re frc7.:ent 1rth as. css vill be leak tes',ed cvery six r n:hsThe airlocks and ventile.-
Cther stall y.:netr:.-
ssocic.ed vith lines ir. ex.: erit.snt ft.:ilitics f..ost of which t.re y cap;.ed.off or ir.olsted fr:n the c:ntsinnant cinosphere) elee:rical 11 be tested aru:ually.ti:ns, and per,eirstions of lir,es asso:iated with closed licuid s This prr.gran rhets cur current criter!r. for s.ent tests.
i t
i...
.,.:..r:
2.e CLZ. ex.:.crin nt faciU ties include toproxistely 25 core esp:rle-locs-tions, l 9 paol c:.spsule cocitient, hydraulic :.huttle facilitics, 2. rail enble ft.cilitics assi s;. ace for bulk irredintions in the pool.
T.2 re setor is alro de:ig':<:d to neer:vsicte u, t 3 in-ed:e and 2 pool recircul'. tins loop erp2r;r.ints; horever, r.uch ca_:crir. nts huve bacn d!ccor.tince' a:.d r.ut'rr$2:stion for the uce of lotp:. is r.ot beir.; requeste3 :.t 1%is t;: c.
Dst of Om irr-61ation sy ee in Gi'E is bei 0 ure5 in the 3:refvetio:, of cotsit-fD :md oth2r r:3io=.ctive is.tges or in the irrr.0intion of :.'t -riels to dettr:.i:.e irrediatien etfccts.
1rred:htie.- icatirc of react:r ^t 1s also t.e::.unts for c large cht re of the irradistien sp. e.
All in.e:re capnin.es cre irradinted in core filler 3.dece :25e of alu:.:rc~
or b?ryllicr..
Ley r.re ft.ctene5 ir.:) h 2r. in il esc filler 71 ces t-6:c.in fevirt s r.nd cre ee.ni. cd with " nni r.i nacr iv..c. el"r"., their ler..h:
s to pr: vin ennult.r ;E:ssces for coriant fl:.u.
In-c:>rc cr.;
- .cs :.y c.: st :.
fu:-1 er other t uerials, but if fuel is ussi, t:.tel ff se.:or...rver in c ;-
srle vill be ]Init ed to 70 Ev or 1253.
7he Casign of t he in-:sre cz..
vill te cr.;eh -hat stenfy-ttr.te nurfSee rm rttures c.rc less.hr E ~
(v.-11 telev the t.s trt. tion t er.7?rature of.5,4'?), e.nd lots of fl e v4..
n:.
result in failure.
In-core capsules vill :.1ra b: 14.r:itef to n 1 ;: n..- rtilo
'of 1 5 ur.6nr reactor ever-pover, lov cc:r'.:s flew and h:th ir.let ::...:.r=,ure
(
conditions.
Pool c:7 rles c.rc 12radicted in rensvrble fccility tubes p:sithned cy:.-
etnt to the pressure vessel nt the vir :1cci position of the cor.
T..e capr.ules era sopprrted by and cooled thrsufh the pool cc.arule huhr vhich er. circles the pre:sure vescel just b21sv the core.
Iov flev sci:r. prote:-
tion is afford 2d to thosc es.psuler whieb v.110 have e burnout rhti: of 1:so thcn 15 vithout forced flow.
F.e en;2rir.ts t vill bc designca to thr.t follouira lov flev ser:-r., decsy heat eca te r.6:-petely renoved by n:tn--21 convection or, if necessnry, by En.rer;cncy coo:ing cyrten. *;e bclie.e these 6csign requir -ncnts vill cive LC:::::.t! :.ro uction a,.cinst ex;e:i::nt burnout.
The hy2rarlie shuttle and trail enble facilit tes pr:: vide for insertion end re. oval of experinents in the reactor p al vhile the resetor is :p3rs. tint;.
Experitent in the hydraulic shuttle facility are inserted r.nd recov:26 by, the hydrsulic pressure of water flovirs thretch r. tube.
7his vster flov slso provides cooling for the experinent.
Tne trnil cable experinents are ranipticted by neans of a flexible etble end cay be cooled by ths.. cap-sule becder or fiom an independent trail cable co: lins system vhich, tun;s pool is.ter thronsh the trail cable fs:$11 y.
Locs-of-flow scran protection is pr.vided for all trail cable experi.ents cnd nnxirms fisrion por:r is linited to 20 Kv.
She r:2xi=um permissible reactivity effect for Eny c:geri-
- rent in the by5raulic shuttle, the trail cable facilities or any pool :apsule e
6
- h c n:,1-io:. t.-ll.ur. i:.. 9.v; re.:!i) : - U... *l':/r.ifrc...:*..i,
- L t.:
'::. :.:. ::.. d 2 x 3 :-) an/t.lt c e.
- e :. *"u':. renctivit; i..: r t :, ?.
rate I::: ) id.er verth exper.:r.ent vill he 2 x 10-5 tik/t/ cec.
Peactiviiy ch*.rces within thane litits nre not expected to result in darace to the reactor.
Some of the c-xperinents have Cas lines connected to then for coalits, ecup-ling or si,n.1 trantnission,Lurp:,sec.
GE has tr.Ryzed the consecutnces of i
a bresh 17. ; ras line or a failure in the cap:ule.Sich would relence re iie-netivity 12;;o the lines; and concludes that no si.nificnnt do. es t:.,trr.:.nn:1 rould result. /cother p:.ter.tini prctics in the u:e of cas lines t: ca.;;ri-tente is the effect of the forrr. tion cnd rcn: val of voids on core rent.ivity if ras leGn 6evelegd.
H:vcver, ruch enperitents v!)1 not te c,:r.ted vith C':s pressurea: greater -han t.he prir.:ry systr.r. 0;::Et tre presrure unic:..; thc hi-b 3retsr: c cas is ce;bl.y conts.ined cnd the spce between thc c:.n.r.in.rs is 1. r.iv.re3 to 6 Meet leskE;.e.
La totsl rmetivity effect of expritents vlll te li!nited so that core reseti"Ity J inits vill no: le exec-ded.
In r.aditien, the rnx12 r: r:: et ivity a63iti.,n that can be c used by uncer.trolle5 t_:/canent r,f any c>: eri enu er credilele err.Mnsti::n of experitents vJll be hi-.iniG:r-tf valy.lin'.nd o 1.L' d:/h. 1.11 enperir.ar.ts vill be desist.ra.o p-cluf.* vuea:.. rolled vcc: ent.
To jus:,ify the 1.D th/k linf.t, GE has c.nsly:cc stve-rni restulhted f6ilures r
involvirs rea.ctivity cr.cursions ceuced by experit?nt n:ve.en..
T.4 r:sults of the ant. lyt.is for n 1.M Lh/h raup, based on r. ei.;.rvle b:in vuhe3 o t of the core by the force of cravity and prit.ry coelt.nt fl:v indic:..es ihnt, vith sert.c, fuel telting is u.like)y, sithough t.:nc neehenier.1 defor..: tien of the.Nel elenents may cecur.
If no sert.: it caruned, c subatt::ti t.
pr-tion of the core vauld telt with the reactivity transient L:in; ter:.ir. :cd by the negritive effect provided by redistribution cf fuel.
"ven if the renctivity is inserted steprise vithout suhtequent scrn cetion, GE': cr.al-ysit inSicates that, vhile the er.ergy relecse is strut twice that for the run,, ir.serti m cr.nc en$ core der;ase is carrc r.pandin,1y in:rcsted, the extent of core teltir:;; is still le:s than 50,1
'ilese t.ccidents t.re ex re: eely ur.-
likely since they reovire occurre ice of two or :re indc3. ender,t failurc-s in the r.eehenical supports f:r the capsule, none of which have occurred 6urirs the course of ntout ei ht years of orcratio..
In P.ny event, the er.n:c quar. cs C
of e 1.% ak/k exreriment ricetivity addition accident vould be ra::h less severe than the upper-litit accident discussed in the accident snslys.is see-tion.
In view of this, the recuired nu:ter of independent failures to initin.e the cecident, and the ; cst history of no similar techanical failures, Ve believe that the reactor can be safely operated with the 14 (J:/k reac-tivity lindt.
. {
t
.< i........
... c. 3.,.. _....
..,t., y q _.a.,
11 rc.s 1: ir2 :..ii:.'.d
- 5. :na:. n.; n i h.re of :. :.i:. -le e.. :-ir ent vould relesne no
- + than d.~t. ; IGU t:ini ch. : ic:.1 cr.2r.. for rl:{1y cos.tnined capsules tani ISO 3 Mti for /.,oubl,y cor,tni:.cd cy.uint,.
Tar c3Siem, these linits corr'.::p:.nd to 0.33 kilo; re: Lt.d 1.0 kil:.;ran, rc. ;ec tively.
2.e propo ed li d:a tre b.::2i na exprir.2nts g. f:..:- A by rf: in.hich various cuantitics ci enesprrinud I!:.T vare injected vr.ry <;uickly into e rf.chani-ccl tech-up :.? the ccie by taans of a burst di sphr-;::.
ihe resul.s nf the t'.stn in VM:h I kile;.cm of 1%I 15s injected inte th..mt r-fil' 6 c.re r.ock.:p :.hr -i rune d:-::r.e in the in.efitte vicinity of th: reaction, but the et.pr.uie was :,ot ejseted and there was no si;e.ifiennt dr.r..cc t:. the adjacent "cc re c npon.:nt s".
7he results of this test,$ndier.tre -hst e.en in the unit. cly ever.t of complete failure of e 5: bly tr.er.; ruit.:ed c:. peri-ner,t, core 63::r.;c v:uld not te serious cnd into:-feren: e ith cent ol r:ds v:.uld n:,t :.ecur.
Ir. O - r..re prolable cr.se f fcit.rt.- :.f a singly enes;-
sulctcS cr. 3rir?nt,12rt lvins about cr.2-t hird f this t.no..nt, only ::fr.or local datr.;e vould 'ce expected.
In view of these test 2 oritt., v: beli: ve the linita proposed cre satisfactory.
L:pl.rivas vi31 cls; is litited to 2503 I,3' 121 1 c:.:rt y. c1c ?.re s trivs'.c c; cnd vill ic restricted to fLeilitie.s oi,tsidi. the tressure versel.
In tidi-tion, n11 e:: plosive irradiations crc to be yerformed in dorble conteir.eri of a desfi n which vill b2 proof tested by rer:nted de; ratien of ivice: tre exp1.csive liuit to assure That the cepule 6oes not feil.
'ihe Eet al esp-i sules irraGiated rcr.t clso u-G;-rgo extensive cuality cc.r. trol t est.e. inclui-in;;;.wz1yr. to deterr.ina the cha'se location vithin the c:.p:-ule.
h is not expected that any of tha explosive 1:hterini vill ever det tre-te; h:c: ec, if such an explosion did cecer, ee believe thr.t the linitt.tions on tot.e.1 energy r*.lcase cer.bi2vd with the espsule design and test re:;uirer..c.:s vs il effective 3y prevent sicnificant atmece to the reactor er e:q.erir..en.s.
Exp;rinants containing plutonium vill be coubly encapsulated and vill te subject to special pre-irradiatien handlin; reonirenents.
In SSdi. ion, rear san.ples and n.onitorir.s of pool vster s-ill be used to c'etect yestille capsule let.kr2se.
l'e H.ieve the verrt accidents that could reasoneb',y be e:.pected to be
'sted with experin:ent 'irradir.tions vould be dt.e to the recetivity ass.
effect associated with uncontrolled :,venent of an experi::.2nt, as dis-cusred ebove, or due to the sudden failure of a fueled experitent with c:.nsequent release of fission products to the contain:ent luildins.
Ix2
'its eveluctior3 of the sudden capsule failure, GE assured a cross failu e of a pool capsule operating at the tsxitz.in allovable pouer of 70 Ev.
'Je co not agree with all of the assumptions used by GE in cnalysis of this accicent, and our incependent anelysis ir.dicates thst the taxinu': doses t:, the cycrator 1:2y be scr.ewhst higher than those calculated by Gr.
T2cv-
<ner, r.ssuming rensor.abic cvacestion tin.es, we have detercined that coses to oprators are unlikely to exceed the suiceline values of 10 C. R 10.).
, ~. ~.
...g e
e
~
-'.1.t ?. d,
,1...:.
.r.d cvr.h.. tic:.c discusr ed t.Lo"e r.re tuppleunted tj t.
t.11ed r.:.vit.- of each es:retir ent by ex!.ar$cn:ci pctsontcl.
At CET.1, ca...
cx;.srhant is reviewed indepen5cntly by the Wst Tr.cir.cering and !!ucicar Onfety Ce+plia 2ce groups.
he review procedures hvc been develop-d over a period of years and have been effective in ninirizin;',crperirent failures and cor.seper.t relcese of radio *::tive nnteri5l.
In view of the excellent cafety history accu.:ul.ted for the GE'i?. experi:.ent progrec., ve believe the proposed e::p cir.:nt linits in conjunction with existing interr 31 review proccacres z.re reae.orsble and scegate.
VI.
A.'.'CIIE.!T !.?t7.i7. 313 GE hsn rsde a cor.prch;nnive accident cn217 sin f r CE'I?. at the prop sc9 inerct.ul _c:c.ar level, he accidents cnsly:?d include rccctor st' rtup transler.ts, loss of prirtry sysica presare, lors Of pr5rary sysie.c flec, lors of pavar and loss of recondt.ry systen hect re=: val cr.pstility.
I.'
rce.etor cert. is cssu..ed, none of these t ecicents results in fuel fniltrc.
S:: ar.r.ly-is bel:,v covers rod withdrav21 rei kre of flow neci$e:.ts where nc rrs= 6:2s not occur.
Lors of coolant accidents, nr voll as the upper-l'r.it se:idt:.t postulat ed by the applietr.t, tre clse din;::s ed 121-v.
Rod t'ithirsval 1,ccia:nts - he nost scvere no-scrnu red vithdrc M acci-dent rn.ly e5 by GE is a contir.uous roS vith.h-cval fer.o full porer.
~ hit v.s attermined to be a nore severe accident in tern; of ar.oura of fuel nelted nnd attend: nt consegaences than red vith5rre 11 cecidents inu 1crer p xars.
Se GE analysis considered vt-ricus te.-. :rcture coeffiri:nis as a far. tion of core operating conditions and r:.np r:.octivity incertion rates up to lof per second (the design insertien raic is about 8f per second).
For the nost severe case in ter::s of total energy relen:,e (a reactivity insertion rate of I f p::r seconS an$ a tenperature es ffic$ent 4
of.0133 ok/1:/DF), the fuel coolant outlet ter.peratere from the hetiest-0 fuel eler.?nt vould be about 303 T at the reak of the excu.rsion.
Cince this terptrature is significantly below tile 350 F scturt: tion tctperature, 0
void forettion vould not be effective in reducing retctivity; consecu:ntly, the shutdown u.echaniszt in this case is the nelting of fuel and its rer.ovs1 from the core.
(A 2% core I:eltcovn with sutsegent rc. oval frc::
the cen-4 trt1 rccion of the core pro,vides en esti=r.ted reactivity loss of stout 2 5 dollt.rs which is sufficient to shut the reactor covn. )
Ee energy reles:e was eniculated to be 2800 !*v-see over a tine period of about 29 seconds, resulting in a neltdown of 2 to 10% of the core.
For this time scale, a
.dar_tging pressure pulse vould not occur.
'Ihree lititirs codes of dissirs-ting this core energy were investigated. One code von i be to contain the enercy in the prira.ry system with a resultant increase in the coolant ten-perature to 2280F.
Another one would be the dissip.ation of energy to the reactor pool vnter which would result in a terpersture increase of 223F.
Finally if all of the excursion energy vere availcble to flash vnter to steam, the contain=ent pressure vould increase less than 0.1 psi.
4
,, -..-. e. C )_ C..,,
4=J
(,
s.s..,
w., _s..
1,.a
.s.
.., 1 s.. *.
......,..4/.
(...,. ( 3
- p. 9. 3.. g,,c y*e 6...
g, d.* 41..
...,,. g.,..e. g J.
y
..p.s.....g e.,..
e.*...g
.*1.
....s 4
c.d'*
d.'u, 3 9A mg }. {is.
Ioss of ~i. re Acci6:.us - T4e nor,t r.avere cetihat 1:.volving, lors of c.ol.
se,. rl:/.i vitno.at sc.r. r os ;ulst :i b.v tLa i.z..0 ia.nt 1: the.,ri=.tr.v.mun.o rhaft, seinare ceci5 cat.
2:e.tr.:.s.o is of tle contrife,-c) t.~:a vhich would parait s0ze liuited fl:.or psst the sto-ed f pdler durir ; a flov cesst-Cavn.
k, s.:ca pl.itn of suCaen> comp 1tte fi:7 st:s.o.n.e iss therefore s
unres lis t?.<:.
For its s.nnlysis, GE : s. :.e6 t'.e.rres: re drop t.et oss the o
yenp in :.hr. seized cooCition v:uld be (q:?.1 to the total prcrcure drop in the pr.'utry cyste.r.,
Und:.r these e. 'itier.s the riou vould cohst dovn te the c;.9cency caslir3 valve trip flov of G03 ;;c:. in 21 ut 0.33 sec-ondts t.n$ ' he trip vy..lf. re sult in depru,r ri:.ti. n of the.nrin.:.V :. v.ter..
F.201 r?lti1G voul6 c r..suce rapi6ly citer C:gr.:ssuri:ttion ad$ v:uld csur.e r m. L., t r... u.. o.u. n u.,.. e.,. 4..,,.
,a.,
..,.4
.....,c
.c
....<.o.,.
...,.3 S
vell vithin a ten-r? coni rcriod, and the e.cr6 reltast should te on the s.......
order cf 23 to 50 X.-cec.
Even if it vm t.::. :.25 th: trinsict.t persitt<'.
for ten :#:ani:. viih r. unifor.: pover level >f 5.? F.::, the tot:1 cnergy :.
1,.,.,,.,....., c-, e m..
o..... <. c.
,. i.e, c
....,2
- s. t.. >. (.. L.,.. o o r u. s..
1,.
t.v tht. prize ry cc:10:.t s.yst:= anS pool T.u., p.3 th-pas.:re rire in the cont eire.unt v.uld be re.r-li.rible.
C:.n:c...ent1.y it 5: unlikelv. thi.t
- .ny L '.ivity vodd be ralened fros the con sir.urnt synten.
(
Jes; of Coolr.nt Accid:-:.ts
'!he vorst loss of coolent cc-iients 1:,r GEDs inv.lve coinci0ent lorc cf prittry :,yst ?c ar.c resetor p.ol s -der.
She nost severe teci3c.,t of this typ inv0.vcs E treck in E 3-int rc.t.: tor 1
versel nozzle pc:20tratin-the botto: hers of the vessel.
2.c n.,r:1c ru.itur.' vould depressurite tbc pri:Ery capitnt sync = t.nd 2,e cr.ir enc.y 5
coolin; valven v:,cid open, allowin-the ren:. tor pool to drain through t;he ve. vel naz.le.
If no Letion vere taken the cere voc16 he unrove. ed in aheut a half hour. FGeup vater from the fceil.ty a torste t?.ns (25 033 Callons ninirtra) c::uld be Edsed by ntnesl ryste. Actusti:n tnd de) y e :e uneaurins f r En ad61 tion 1 hstr or r. re.
- 2) reSuce the possi'cility of un: vcrins the care, GE vill ins all a rteir:ultti:m systen (previously discussed) so thnt the VEier lect from the resctor essel vill bt-retornt5 to tha.enetor pool ss rapfdly as it is britc 1:st.
Use of this systc=
vill prevent core celtdown.
Un. tr-IAni.t Acci.de...2t - 2:e ete. licant hss h.v.rothesized r.:i uppr-limit type of Eceident for Gh3 vhich they term the taxi =u:s credible accident.
Die
' cor.sec.:ences.resul ing fra: thic accident r.ro no.e ctvere than thote which ticht result fra: any techanisti: acci5cnt thtt we have been nble to icer.-
1L if.v.
For this reason > ve believe that this accident re.ercter.:s e suitt.tle up.rer lir.it en which to,)udge the potentiel consecuences to the toe.l.th cr.$
sefet.y of the.tublic.
.t 1
v
.3..
'd.c p:str":t..e-d r.ccidin. n! sen en th t the rehr.tur ct.nnet be cer:..:td for vora u::hnyta rc. san, t nd thst th: ;rir:.ry systen pipi:., cid rcar. tor pool vall are ruptured resultir;; in a :.ud".en totcl less of core crolir.g cep:.-
bility.
'Jbe erre tenperatwe rises :n.ridi,y r.bove the t.21 ting point; cnd it is a:: sui:ed tLt the v.ollen cerc 10 61cpersca "oy e violent stcr.n explo-sion which terminntes the nuclear 2 caction.
It is nest::.2d thst the stest explo:icn dirp: rces the core in such r. unner that r,ptir.vn eenSititur for en ale:*inu=-vster reaction tre eMair.:d, t.nd on the t.cis of expri:.?ntal evide:nes it is cont.rvr.tive.ly cct':stod thst cbact 10." ef th aluminun vill reset, cre!ttre, e css bubb1: thM rises throu@ the pool into the contairrent atnesI ere.
4: er.erce W_Ence, cc.countin; for verk de.a by h
the exy.nding bubble, in31<:stec C.rt contsire.ent prcmsurt v ald 2iro to 2 psig dua to str. n f ort.:ation tra reie'.s e r.ni syt:ac.;uen:. r +pid c:n c.lun of high temparsture hydrc :en.
't. *.s p t.t sure occurs :. tout 10 r ee::.i<.
riter initiction of the accident.
' ce el.mlic.s.nt at.:vnen s !.ect.15 :a k f r.bcut k.!> pri recults about 2 ho.:rs 1:.itr frcm vapoli:stien of c cl:.. lut conti:.uous En:1 0:..tinum 1cnkt.se of N:.tcr onto th: nelten core.
'io erti:.ste the ;:tentini fecer ir::.his L:.id::c, the ::;;11:- ::
-J 1007 of the 7,oble ccres, 25 of the : cl:; ens,15,% cf the v:.1: tile rolf.ds, eni 0.5~4 of all other s:>31C ficnien pr el. ett vere dity rced vJthir. th:-
conthirt. ant
.yr. ten t.nd ev:.13 r.ble f:r cround level ?.er.ksge.
Q r,tsnt :.r.2-age fr:.:c crev 25 level at the.
.xi: un 0::::gn ic:4.ege : Ets of 2p c1 15..>
c:n-tent: per d.sy v:n a:su=e6 r::6er ai fas;heric ir.v. rsion cenaf t$ rns vith t.
ene r eter pr r+cond vind pae2.
U.& r thece czMtions, the t;.plicar.-
calen3 s.ted t.
snir.us 2-hou cesa at tM closest site bounit.ry 803 r.:!tt; s cvcy of 1.1 red to the vhole boSy r.r.'. l*50 ren t o the thy oid.
'lhe applicant'c noSel for the 2-h:ntr, site bounf ary calculttions Esi.u::S iodine deposition tetween the facility r.nd necrest b:,uncary S33 r:etctr.
distant in a rf.nner resulting in L rt Cuttion iacter of 5 for the trr ud d$ffusion conditions.
We do not use.11y asra:e credit for th$ s ccposi-tion effcet; LovcVer, it hcs been n:aseed r.sny times at the Lite, and l
the results irdicate a reduction facter of 5 is a conservative ascuupidon for this location.
In vicv of this, ve believe it is ap;ropriate to c.11ov l
the assuned re. duction factor of 5 for iodine de;.,:-ition to tha site boundary.
We have rzde irdependent calculati ns of the deses at the site boun5sry and our results cgree with those of the n onlicant for the 2-hour e.vrosure
(
period.
We have also mde dose estiLntes for a 50-day exposure period; the l
reruits indicate a controlling thyroid dose of 500 rcm at a distance of about 2 ciles from the facility.
'Ibene deses are within the guideline values of 10 CFR 100 for the site bour.dsry cnd lov population distances.
O e
i
.' i ?.
Whi.1_0!.L__.T.JCCI F _ICA_'il.G_::3_
GE has suln$tted proposed techr.f cal specifications to covern operation of the reactor c.t the higher power level.
Tney h;ve also subcitted a d:.cuinnt -Icich provides the tc.chnicci and operr.tionci Lancs for tl.e::e specifi ca tio.s.
Ce tr.ve reviewed the technical specificctions and brve tsde certain r.inor chs!.ges with which GE concurs.
Toese r.odif$cd speci-ficctions, to te incorprnted in the revised operatin.; licenne, vill provide cd?...:.te safety li:.its for operation of the GETt et 50 'Ot.
Tr.e bt:.ec for the p. oposed technical speifict. tier.c vere submitted by 0F Et :ur req est in E nticipation of the Edoption of E prop Se3 rule rhich pre. vide a fo: docu: renting the technical cnd operatjensl 1.r.er: for the c-.:cifict.iens (sce the notice of.Napesed 791s '*skir.s pblirted in the Feder:1 ?r;icter on I.usust 16,1c66).
Ue have not had an opper-tunity to cntirely deternine the cdequccy of the bases
.:t:.itted by E.
Si::ce thic c'.2 irrion of bases is one of the firct msde, and s,1::ce th2y r.rc not yet a require =ent of our result.ti:.nr. ve prop:ce to its.:c the t.Jeh.1:.1 t. :cifirc.f tns without t ernplete : etolution of the br:r s.
li.vaver, w vill devote seditionEl effort vith GM to c:s':re that thir t hrly net of baces v$11 te adequite.
V3 II.
COICIU8IO'.i GE bcs crereted the GE'E for I ore than seven yeErs without nurico:. inci-dent.
GP is r:.aking virnificent design and pro:edural chtnses t:, u,:date the fccility to our present safety sicndErds.
Ve have reviewed ti22e chances nni 1: ave found that they vill enhnee the safety of operation of this facility.
L'e believe that there is reasonabic ensurcnce thtt the health and safety of the public vill not te endancered by operr. tion up to 30 M.rt, f) c Saul Invine, Chier
'ibst & Power Rchetor Safe y 3 ranch Division of Tschetor Licencir.g I'bte: August E9, 1966 t
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