ML20052A773
| ML20052A773 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vallecitos File:GEH Hitachi icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/13/1958 |
| From: | Price H US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052A734 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-81-483 NUDOCS 8204290153 | |
| Download: ML20052A773 (5) | |
Text
.
d, go (
.. ~
e
+ + *
- l l.
l 3
}J, L..;.* 9 2:.1.!.*
.' "* = sf s, 9*
7 *. 7.,*!* * ( *
- e **f
- - ~ = s=
T~
t
}p n c-
_ au.... :..t v."..,..sye.
- y. y w,_...:. p....r. ;-
./,
OF h7CT,':STNG PJD F.r. GUT.'?!Og E_7. PE }'ATTTA 0.F C;p,TRAT. Fi.EOTR10 CMM 'ir.577]iG
... 7N.T6.R,_DS':Tr T 110 50-70 e
t The Gcr. oral Elcctric Test Reacto: is a 33 tsgavatt (hcat) li;ht unter coolei' cnd =oderated reactc.r desired to provide experimental freilities capble or irredhti.3 foci elc.:sts cn3 cc:ponents of nuclcar pr.vor phnts r.t high neutron riuxes.
The resetc.r is Ic:sted et the Gen 2ral Electric hlheitos Atonic Lebe-rt.tcry in Cr:lifornir..
The 'rcactor fr.cility was described in detail in tb Intt.r,:.c$it.to Decisic: of Jay A. Kyle, Eenring Inniner, dstc6 the 26th or rebn:sry,1958, in tha natter c.' the General Electric Ccap.ny, D::het no.
50 '/0, in connection with the Conpany's ap;lication for a Constructien Pemit.
~
There hr.ve been no si nificant design changes since thst tire.
At
.ht tir.e that a Ccnstnicticn Pernit vr.s granted the t.pplict.nt, no dstsiled description was avaiir.ble of the experi ents to be ccrr5ed out in the three loop.~. through tha cere the four hairpin loops in the pool external to tha rer.ctor core pressu-c v,es:c1, or of the capsule experirents.
Th: r.pplicant hr.s nov der.cribed tha propoced use of the capsules and two of the Ic. ops, a prc ssurised vater reseter experitent to be carried out in the center in-ccre 3 cop, and c boiling vster ror.ctor exp3rirent to be picced in one ce the hs$rpin loops externsi to the core vessel.
vill be vorth nore than 1.4% in reactivity.No experinant to be placed in ther,o loope This sane resetivity linit' of 1./.$
is also phced on the espsule expar! cents.
A further stipulation is that sig corbiution of exp:rir.ents or espsules which n:ight be involved in any one credible cceident vill not bo cble to introduce nore than 1.4% in reactivity.
Future phns call for use of nll seven loops of the fccility.
When these additional exp:,rir.:ntal fac511 ties cre ready for use, the topplicant vill be bound by the =sre oparating cor.ditions and licitations as proposed for the present experitents.. Under the proposed license the cpplicant cust demonstrate to the satisfaction of the AEC by written analyses thst the activation of these additional facilities vill not result in a grcater expectr.ncy or an. accident, and, in the event of an accident, vill not result' in a cor'e hazardcus* condition than*the naxi=un credible accident described for the present two experitental facilities.
~ '~
The reactor.0111" have a fixed coro configuration with.the prosent. exp'erizonts pir.n.ed....A* detailed nuelcar analysis has been parforced on this core concihration and the nuclcar paraneters have been detemir.ed.
~
i 8
8204290 A %
"IU*'em.n.6e. eginusumunut esee m -
.*p.e.
.-e.ep.,
e.
.O-e, ee
.5-h
.2-
,.a th' r.r..5 ytir., th ? r.p$ic.nt L.:. de:c:rir..r. tht U.,
- y st t r. c. n...:. -
ructiv'ty vit h:,ut cr:re ; ?.
Active. tion o^ th
.....G n 2./t :tep D nrtion o r i.dMtion.1 loap vill rcquire chnger, in th ecro con #3.;.:rt. tion r.r.d usy r.lter the nuc1c r chr.r.ctoristics or the renctor. The prop r ed opri. ting licer.: c for this fseility would recuiro tht ruture char.ces in the tap.rature or void ec3cients or the core te linited in order to prevent clininstion of the coc rt..ctor's inh: rent t.bility to uithstr.r.d, without r.21 ting or th3 ruol c]cr.hnt -
clodding, a stop inwrtion of 1./f. in reactivity.
To e nsure thit op:rntion or the exper5r. ental facilitics oc the resetcr vill not rcn'lt in undre hrtrd to the henith and tsrety or the public, a nu.bar or race-card co-drois nr.! r.dch!:.thtive procedures hvo been cst:.bihhed by the cppli-hir.itstice within vMeh the reseto: vill be cparated hve been det.c:-itad, c r.nt, irah:dir g the :cestrictions on the r:nctivity vorths or the eg:ritants previcusly r.oted, rmd r. Iaba: ctory S:.fccusrds Group has boon estab1f sh< d by the General F.lectr$c Cen:/ ny te cdviso on all phres o* the rc:.:tce cq:-::.tions a.d c:.:; ri-Tha S.rt;-nrds Group vill revicv nr.d r.pyrce:c r.11 ntu c: p: cp::cd cents 1 proyr.,.
revisior.s or procedures cnd standsrds for the reactor and its asso:iated exp3ri-nents.
Kince cMnger. in d:cign r,nd in cparationn1 prc.cedures are ncecir.r.ry du-h; the o7tratien or t. tent rer.cto:- (ccility, prticult.rly in the cirst yecr of opration, Tb p: opoicd licor.se vould reouire that the Corr.ission be noticled of e.ny sub-str.ntial chu.ys to the design or oparating procedures oc tha racility, or t.r.y cht.nge which decrer ses the surcty of the facility, tafore such chnges r.re rAdc.
Ee;ard G veluatiren The remits or the naxinxa credibic necident ac pestulcted in the ripplicction for a Constrootion Termit hve chr.ge6. The calculated tctal er.crgy i'.velved ir.
the accident bs been reduced from 950,000 BTU to 730,000 BTU. This difccrcnce is dus ent3 rely to a reduction oc the energy involved in r, nuelcar crr.tesion The accident still involves a 2G0 Mv-sec.
vhich cight accengny the accident.
7.uahar er.ercy release but, cro= the description or the rr.ri=ca credibic r.ccident, thtre is no reason to exp:ct any nuclear excursion in conjunction with the A steond change in the ecnscenances oc this r.ccident is that the total ecc3 dent.
pres:ure rise is nov cxpacted to be 4.3 psi cs compred with appoximtely 3.6 pai in the Construction Pcrcit application. This dirrcreneo evcives from cssus-Ang thnt none of the energy cvailable cro: the cecidsnt is used to raise the tengrature or the water vapor in the contain=nt building, but tht the entire r,ncunt or oncrcy relcesed in the accident is utilized in re.ising the air te:pr.r-ature in the containnent vessel. This rassu ption is, or course, more pessicis-tie. K third cMngo is a recalculation or the radiction shine at the GIMR due to a taxir.:m credible accident at the GF.TR. The renultant integrated dese c 9 R for the first half-hour period colleving the accident is subt.tantially o
The lever than the value quoted in the application for a Construction Perr.it.
4
=. --... --........
3 w
f r _;.M.is cc
. 0..:o c ff a c;:. Tir:.t, th; t..']ictr.t h:.s con:id:r. d th t 10 %"
- .c :.;tl..;r : c e. t.i :..J c ;.n fis ica pro _.::n, plus
? of the solid f':
(..
- 3. icn '
pro!. ct:, eseg: inst:.nt:.n;:,usly to th2 cor.t 5.cnt vessel, cs oppo:,2d to IC';%
of the totn fit:cica products issu.:3f. to cr.ccp2 in the Con: traction Tcr;'.it 1.pplication. This prc. scot approach is core realistic. Secondly, the cppliennt hr s, in his prescnt cciculation 3, t:2cn $nto account the ettenut. tion effects of the can.a rcya in the steel in the centairc. ant vescel trad th: air.
Finc11,
7 there is a slight change in tho inhc1:. tion radiation do:cr. to the off-site population follevh; th, nax3r.un crediblo nccident. In c11 but ;,ho bons dose ca:ee, the figures t.ro reduced frc= these of the Ccnstrcct',n Tc r.it !.ppid ention beccuse of the reduction in the p;rcent ge of the fission.rreduc.ts t.ss= d to e:. cape to the ccatainn:nt vassal. Th: bone des hcs ir.creascd beetu.<: the calcuhtions nr.c includa contributions fron the rcre carths and st;or. tin.-.70 in cJdition to strontit.-69 used in the prelfr.bary hat:.rds c.aluaticn. h. aver, th:se dosages are not prohibitive, k*e are in tsrcenant with th$ cpplier.nt on then: chtn;es in the nixb.u cr.4:ble Lecident to the retetcr and feel, as we did ct the Construction ?crnit stcie, that this accident does not represent an undus hs: Erd to the haalth tnd isf;ty of the public.
The ntyir.un credible.:.ceidsnT, to the pressurined vater loop requires three coi,cident fnilures to initiate it.
Thes2 nra the failure of two n:b.ys in the scran systen., and a coolcat loss, cithcr tl. reach gi.:np failurc or loop rrptiu c.
These failur:s ctuse nelting of the test fr.cl ele.. cat bec use of loss of cooling, fo11cred by a net:1 utter recction, c.d result in an energy rels tce 75% as h rce cs the nt>*rm credible accident fcr the reactor, nd c fission product relecte to the contain~.ent vessel scnr.: hat less than the naci:n:= credible acci:Snt.
Tne difference of 25% nrises fron tha assunption that no nuclecr excursion vill accor.p:.ny this accidant.
L'a cor. cur in ti.e nstnitude of the n.winus credibic cccident to the pressurizad vtter loop as calcule.tsd by the applictat.
Since the consequences tre less than the nnxi=u.. credible accident to the rcactor, and its likelihood reasoncbly ranote, vc bEliove that operstion of this loop is cn acceptable risk.
The naxbun credibic accident to the boiling unter 1 cop is also a result of '
nelting of the test clenent with a subsequent netal vcter reaction.
Also, as in the ecse of the pressurized water loop, thir accid::nt is the result of three sinultanoons failures; ntnely, loss of coolant, eithc.r by pump fcilure or loop rupture and failure of both rolays in the recctor scran circuit.
has con.:,tred the energy release in this accident with an equivalent under.
T e applihant h
Th~f explosion to estinate the possible effcets in the reactor pressure vessel, h*e has tssuned that all the zirconiun claddin; nelts and that the subsequent chte.ical recction goes to 25% of ecspletion.
of this energy is dissipated by the initial shock wave.It is further assuned that 305 The applicant ec1cuhtes that both i.ncr and outer tubes of the loop test section vill be r.:ptured and that the re ctor pressure vessel may sustain a parnanent deflection of 1 or 2 inches depth.
h*e believe that the consequences for this tecident, herever, voald not be v:rse than the :taxinun credible accidt.nt for Se presrurized uster los,
and it is mu co. chrien th.t c_ r..te r--r e-
~
-- =.=_.;.-
=. = :...:...:. - -
-u-l As hdic:.tod prev'ously, the cpplicant plcns ulth:.tely to activate the five remaining Icopa of thi fscility which are discussed in the Final S=. cry Safe-gunrds Pep;rt.
Provided that it is de=onst: cted thct operation of these ad-dition-1 c:ge:-h ntal fccilities vould not result in c grecter expectcncy of cn accident, cnd, $n the event of sn accident, $n a nore hacardens condition th:sn the no:1==. credible cccident described cbova for the prerstrincd v..ttr or boiling wcter loopr, we believe that operation of all the cxperhontal facilitia.
of thic rc.ct,r cro be conducted without unduc hr.:crd.
D.:rire routine o,:> rations of the expe:inental fr.cilities of the recctor, there eyists cons posribility that a sn11 =ount of :.ctivity..cy u.ccpe f rom t.n e x-pu-insnt ir.io the contn'.2::ent vessel.
A rcdiation nenitor vill record the cctivity hvel, both graecus and pcrticult.te, in the vde.tnity of the pool and
$n it.t c:6ust du:t fr= ths exper3n:.nt:1 cret.s, and in addition there tra nonitors in the etcck.f20m thich the centr.ir.:nt cir is dischsrged to the i
environ..;-nt, In cny sittstion where radiccctive gescs could conceivably cscap:
i-frsn nn expc-inent into ths containment vestal, they nould be diluted by the ventilatio:. syst:n and the nir contained in the centti==t vctsel cad fis-per cd to the ct.esph:: c, providin-the cctivity cs nt.surad by the r.onitore it "less ths.n 10-h nicrocuries/ce.
At csphere dilution r:;uld then be.tcquctc y
to red:cs re,y off sit: conecntration below th;t specified by Comir.cien Erruh. tic:.
(10 CM Pcrt 20).
If the gcccous r.ctivity execads 10-h nicrocurics/cc or an cepivalcnt activity cs net.su: red on other r.onitors, the ventilction d:. pcrs :.ad isolation vr.1ve would be autonaticclly closed to sec1.the cont i=cnt vessel, cad i
si= ult n:cualy trip an alcra to initiate the evccuatica of the cont:iment vossa..
The ccscs held in the scaled containnsnt vessel uculd thcn be c11oued to daccy ad be relearcd to the ct=orphers under controlled cond;tions.
2.-s:d en the contci=ent provided, tha procedarcs for disporing of any activity ralcssed into the containt.r, r.nd the exclusion t.rea provided, it is our 'celief that routir.e-releases of Cccoons activity frop experinsntal failurer ctr. be scfoly handled.
Any non-g::seous rcdioactivity rhich.ight be released to the coolt.nt system fro =.n expericantal fcilure would be first contained within ' he. coolant syst:n t
which is located in the chielded.couipment space inside the contair.:snt vcssel.
Non-volatile fission products which night be p: ecent in the coolt.nt lcnking -
fro: ncchtnien1 pump secls, valve sts:s, etc. of the coolant system.ould drain '
to a su=p and then be pumped to the contaninated vcste retention tank.
our belief that this system will ensure that such retivity releases to the It is coolmt system would constitute a negligible hazard.
EpO3.f OF TiiE AWISORY CO.'CGTTEE ON P.EACTCR SAFIGUAD.DS i
In its report of July 12, 1958, the Advisory Cen ittee on P.eadtor Safegucrds s
concluded that the GETP. nay be operated as a testing reactor as proposed by the General Electric Conpany without undue hasard to the public.
()
O
+ -.-
1
-3
- c.."..,... ;
n= d=
0 On the basis of the foregoin; we believe that:
1.
Routina roleeses that can be expected enn be safe 3y handled by the cc.-bination of contair.:ent; ventihtion and unste disposal system, L.d the exclut, ion radius provided.
2.
The li:itatiens on the experixent:1 pro;;r:: vill':,r.ke,~
the no:i:tr endible accident to the experinental facilitys loss hr.:..rdour th.u2 the c.axi=:. credibic necidnt to ths N
entire fccility.
?ne nari.v.n credibis ;;ccident to the entirc fccility does 3.
not rc ult in unaccept:ble exposures to the pulolic."
CC::0LUSIO:!
Ue helievs th7.t the GG c n be operated within the linihtio:.:: r.ni p:.ce-d;;.;3 outlined in the cppliettion and in the proposed license without, imcte risk to the health r.nd safety of the public.
FOR WE DIVISIO!! OF IJCE!SI:!G JJTD RICUL4ric;:
s H. L. Price Director Date : AU313 E5S e
W G
O t
a e
.