ML20041G396
| ML20041G396 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1982 |
| From: | Ellis J Citizens Association for Sound Energy |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041G394 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8203220201 | |
| Download: ML20041G396 (57) | |
Text
_ ..
1 RELATED CORRmKm,,L,,@ --' ~~'
3/15/82
~
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOM IT N U."*,t; BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of '
APPLICATION OF TEXAS UTILITIES I GENERATING COMPANY, ET AL. FOR I Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446' AN OPERATING LICENSE FOR COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC
~ STATION UNITS #1 AND #2 (CPSES) g CASE'S' ANSWERS TO NRC STAFF'S FOURTH SET OF INTERR0GATORIES TO INTERVEN0R CASE Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.740b(b), CASE (Citit zens Association for Sound Energy),
Intervenor herein, hereby submits its Answers to NRC Staff's Fourth Set of Interrogatories to Intervenor CASE,' served 2/22/82 and received by CASE on ._'.
2/27/82I . CASE will respond to the NRC Staff's Request for the Production of Documents included in its Fourth Set of Interrogatories in this instant pleading as well.
ANSWERS TO NRC STAFF'S INTERR0GATORIES l C5-1. Probably; but we have not yet made this final determination. We will l
promptly supplement our answers as soon as such determination has been made.
(
C5-2. Unknown at this time. See answer C5-1.
C5-3. See answer C5-1.
1 ~
Sent First Class, addressed to zip code "78711." We assume that this was just a typographical error., be' we ask that the Staff double-check their records to be sure they show the correct zip ' code of 75224 for CASE. (See attached copy of mailing labbl.)
8203220201 820315 DR ADOCK 05000
. 1 .
C5,4. See answer C5-1.
C5-5. We have not made an ana' lysis in the context of whe"ther or not any documents prepared by the NRC Staff or Applicants are " deficient" (i.e. , this is not one of our criteria). Further, we are not certain exactly what the Staff means by "de fi ci e nt. "
C5-6. We have not yet made this detemination. We will promptly supplement At this time, 'we our answers as soon as such determination has been made.
assume that there will be certain Intpection and Enforcement (I&E) Reports which will will use in our cross-examination, but we have not yet detemined exactly which these will be.
C5-7. We have not yet made a complete analysis of this and are, in fact, still in the process of n!ceiving infomation from Applicants in this regard.
However, we provide the following partial listing:
Failure to Provide QC Surveillance Procedures T. garding Containment .
Building Seismic Category Class I Embeds Installations -- IM Report 76-o1 Failure to Provide Prescribed Documented Instructions or Procedures For Conducting QC Burveillance of the Contaimment Building Steel Liner Installation -- Is Report 76-01 .,
Failure to Incorporate Approved Design Changes Into Applicable Design Specification and tlork Procedures -- I&E Report 76-01 Failure to Provide Documented Instructions or Procedures As Prescribed Regarding Examination and Repair Activities on Seismic Category Class I Components -- I&E Report 76-01 Failure to Implement Prompt Corrective Action and Provide Adequate Measures to Preclude Repetition Regarding Concrete Aggregates -- I&E Report 75-13 Failure to Adhere to Procedure Requirements Regarding Concrete Place-ment -- I&E Report 75-10 ,
Failure to Adhere to Procedure Requirements Regarding Concrete Transit ,
Mix -- I&E Report 75-10
- Excessive Rate of Groundwater Withdrawal During Construction -- I&E .
Report Regarding Inspection Conducted June 6 and 10,1975 l
C5-7 (continued):
s Failure to Implement the Quality Assurance Program for Civil Construction -- I&E Report 79-H Failure to FoHow Inspection Procedure for Inspection of Class IE Cable Tray Supports -- IEE Report 79-06 .
Failure to Follow Equipment Maintenance Instructions -- ME Report 79-Oh Failure to Follow Concrete Placessent Procedure -- I&E Report 79-03 Failure to Fonow Welding Procedures -- I&E Report, MRC Inspections on August 21-25, 1978 Failure to Follow Weld Monitoring Procedures -- IEE Report, ERC Inspections on August 21-25, 1978 Failure to Adequately Control and 'Ihg Nonconforming Items -- I&E Report, NRC Inspections on August 21-25, 1978 Failure to Achieve Adequate Radiographic Sensitivity -- IE Report l
78-20 Failure to Fou ow Welding Procedures -- I&E Report 78-18 Failure to Promptly Report a Significant Deficiency -- I&E Report 78-16 Failure to Follow Concrete Testing Procedares -- I&E Report 78-13 Failure to Follow Welding Procedure -- I&E Report 78-12 .
Failure to Adequately Control and Tag Nonconforming Itamas -- I&E Report 78-12 Failure.to Fon ow Piping Instanatica Procedures -- I E Report 78-H Failure to Maintain Proper Flow in lower Squaw Creek -- I&E Report -
78-08 Failure to Follow Concrete Testing Procedurca -- I&E Report 78-07 Failure to Follow Pipe Fabrication Procedures -- I&E Report 78-05 Failure to Remove Weld Surface Defect Prior to Final Acceptance --
I&E Report T(-10 Failure to Provide Welding Procedures at, tue Location Where the Prescribed Activity is Performed -- I&F Heport '(7-10 Failure to Follw Procedures for Certification / Documentation of Inspectors -- I&E Heport 77-02 Failure to Maintain Document Control -- I&E Heport 76-08 Failure to Fonow Procedures for QA Documentation of Surveillance Activities -- I&E Raport 76-06 Failure to Fouow Procedures for Welding of Safety Related Components
-- I&E Report 76-07 Failure of QA Supervisor to Ex'ercise Delegated Stop-Work Authority Regarding Welding of Safety Related Camponents -- I&E Report 76-07 '
Failure to Provide Prescribed Documented Instructions or Work Pro-cedures Regsrding -Installation of Containment Building Seimsic Category Class I Pipe Restraint Embeds -- I&E Report 76-01
, l
_. 4
EBC Insnectien & Enf'rcement (I&B)'Reportn, Rosarding Camancha Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPSB) .
~ 50 445 a 50-446/
I&E Report No. & Date Type of Violation Involved Problem Involved g
- L 80-02(3/20/80)' An egations of lax Quality Investigation of anegations in regard to lax Quality Control p Control, etc. procedures,. welding problems and veld defects attributed to 8 three Authorized Nuclear Inspectors (ANI) in 12/6/79 DAIJAS y TDG!B HERALD article were determined to have no merit by ERC..g CASE is not satisfied that allegations have no merit since S this is similar to the kind of anegations which we're made
.- at the, South Texas' Project.(STEP) which the ERC Region IV ['
office also stated'had no merit; it was. not 6ntil an NRC investigation was made at the national level that allegatials e at STNP vere proven to be true; see STNP investigation.
Unresolved item Class 1-to-Class 2 Transiti'on Orifices; it was not clear from 80-01 (2/15/80) the revised drawing or from the Component Modification Card how the oversize hole through the pipe van would be reduced to achieve the configuration required.
Unresolved item Test' report acceptance; it appeared that the A/E was approving
[ ,
the fortsat of the report, not its contents...the stated phrase does not mean what it says; it appeared to the RRI that site engineering staff bed provided an inappropriate instruction for the attachment velding, that the vendor bad " approved" the inappropriate design, and that site quality control had
, inspected the actual work and accepted the impossible.
80-01 (1/23/80) Violation, Infraction, Failure to provide instructions and procedures appropriate to Construction Permits, the circumstances; instructions and procedures provided for 10 CFR 50, App. .B, V securing Class IE Battery Chargers to the building stru'cture are inappropriate to the circumstance in that 8 3/8" finet velds were required; it is impossible to achieve the required fillet veld size for four of these weld locations because material thickness is less than 1200 inches; the 4 velds do not conform to required thickness for 3/8" fillet veld; weld-ing was accepted by site QC even though welds could not be
- made in the manner required. -
, ~,w .r
I NRC Inspectim & Enfercement (I&E) Reporta, Beatrding Commacha Peak Nur 1 mar Power Plant (CFS W ) .
50 4h5 and 50 kh6/
I&E Report No. & Date Type of Violation Involved _ Problem Involved g L
80-08(4/18/80) Unresolved item Clarification of Rockbestos electrical cable qualification; E
~there was no-clear evidence that the three separate type tests of cables had been acceplished nor was there. evidence f
{
in the report that individual conductor tests had been per- 5 fonned as required. 8
- , Unresolved item Clarification.of elec$rical cable repair procedures; review in-"$ ;,
dicates a lack of clarity in requirements oCprocedure. -
(- 80-08(4/2/80) Violation, Deficiency, Failure to report a significant construction deficiency; attempts '
4 Construction Permit, to remove concrete " honeycomb" in certain interior valls of 5 10 CFR 50 55(e) the' Unit Two Conttiac:ent Building had devalopd into an un-expectedly difficult deficiency; Permil Holder performed exten-sive engineering evalusMens for purpose of establishing :nethods of repair or for evaluating adequacy of structure without repair,
, not reported to NRC. .
l ;, m 80-03(3/20/80) , Unresolved item Aluminum-bronze discs for service water valves; failure to perform a
, heat treatment could result in stress corrosion cracking under unspecified corrosive environments; since the water in the Service Water System has a potential for being mildly brackish and therefore corrosive, the RRI considered that a potential for catastrophic failure of the dise does exist and that in tne event
,of such failure, the Service Water System might not be able to perfom its safety function.
80-03(2/7/80) Violation, Infraction, Failure to follow procedures,for cable pulling; installed cables
.' Construction Permits, were not protected fra abrasion or other damage in that a large 10 CFR ' 50, App . B, V Hilti bolt was attached to the end of a pull rope to facilitate threading the rope through the conduit and when the rope was *
, pulled through the conduit, the sharp-edged blunt end of the bolt 2
va's on the top thereby generatidd a condition for abrasion or other damage to the installed cables; the cable was not lubri- ,
cated prior to pulling it through the conduit.
y <~..s:- , ; . ._ . :s _
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NRC Inspection & Enfrreassat (I&E) Report'1, Remarding thanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CFBB) .
50-445 and 50-446/ -
I&E Report No. & Date Type of Violation Involved Problem Involved n Y'
80-15(6/23/80)- ' Viola tion, Infraction, Failure to establish quality assurance program for Class 5 pipe 2 Construction Pemits, support systems as required; Class 5 piping systests are those 8 10 CMt , App . B , II, in the non-nuclear safety category vbose failure in a seismic 5 FSAR event could result in a loss of capability of a safety-related $
~
function, k
80,-13.(5/21/8o) Violation, Infraction, Failure to follow velding procedure; hth, 5th and 6th veld layers.r Construction Pemit, on a Safety Injection system field weld had been deposited M 10 CFR 50, App. B, V using GTAW process -instead of SMAW process. ,' 2 Violation, Infraction, Failure to follow electrical inspection procedures; QC inspector Construction Permit, did not check to see if the individual conductors had been ter-10 CFR 50,' App. B, V minated to the proper place in the connector, nor that the pins had been properly inserted into the connector and locked in place; caission of detailed inspection of teminations of multi-pin connectors is a common practice.
80-12(4/30/80)
- Reporting of significant Meeting held with NRC add TU p rsonnel re: reportability and
, construction deficiencies, documentation of significant construction deficiencies, and j 10 CFR'50 55(e) reporting of other significant events of interest to NRC not required by current regulations.
80-11 (4/9/80) Violation, Infraction, Failure to follow piping installation procedares; suction nozzle
- Construction Permit, flange of Safety Injection Pump was being used as the temporary 10 CFR 50, App. B, V (and only means of support) support for pipe spools.
80-09(4/7/80) Violation, Infraction, Escessive rate of groundwater withdrawal durin6 construction; Construction Permits exceeded 250 gpm on March 19, April 25, December 4, and December
, 7, 1979 80-01/01 (4/7/80) Unresolved item - Effectiveness of site inspection program; trash and wood scrap in areas under venus transmission line towers; inspector stated that
, this raises questions as to the effectiYeness of the site in-spection program. ,
.80-08(4/18/80) Violation, Infraction, Failure to follow procedures for reporting and repair of da"*6ed
' 1 ~. Construction, Pemits, electrical cable; the implications of the incident have a poten-
. .; 5
._ 10 CFR 50, App. B, V tial impact on safety in that it is indicative of's breakdown
"~3-? lr+- '
in the Construction quality Assursace. Program, scoording to the ',
, NRC Resident Reactor Inspecto'r'(RRI).
. g
i NRC Inspection & Enforcasent (I&E) Reports, P _ ding Comanche Peak Nuc1' ear Power Plant-(CFB B) 50 445 and 50-446/ Problem Involved n I&E Report No. & Date_ Type of Violation Involved T Deviation, FSAR Incorrect design of pressurizer spray control valve piping 80-20(10/21/80)
Unresolved item Spent Fuel storage racks identified with sign "NON-Q" (not [ .
within scope of licensee's Q/A program) and in lay-down {
. positions , , , g Unresolved item, FSAR Design of the AC Inst.ruisent Distribution Paasis; safety and i nonsafety : cables tightly tied together contrary to FSAR cam -T' '
mitment to maintain a 6" aface between safety and nc'nsafety '
/
cables 7within panels .
Violation, Infraction, Unsuitable veld surface conditio.i as required by magnetic 80-20(9/24/80) '
NRC Construction Permits particle test procedures; NRC Resident Reactor Inspector y-CPPR-126 & 127, 10 CFR (RRI) and other inspectors noted discrepant conditions in 50, Appendix B, Criterion velds in components V
60-18(9/19/80) Violation, Deficiency, Failure to report a significant construction deficiency; nearly
, Construction Permits, 200 velds in safety-related., piping systems reported as being 10 CFR 50.55(e) undersized (and therefore presumably under-strength) were 7 not reported to NRC Unresolved item Absence of Weld Returns; beam seat clips velded to the column flanges and web did not have veld returns Unresolved item Embedment of anchor bolts through floor topping; concrete anchor bolts embedded might not develop design strength values due to having been embedded through an architectural concrete floor topping; bolt embedded length might not be adequate to' develop the design loads required. '
80-17 (7/31/80) Violation;Infraci, ion, Failure to follow drawing for veld prep details; reactor coolant Construction Permit, loop piping veld preps for Unit 2 did not confom to drawing, 10 CFR 50, App. B, V counterbore transition taper was 30 and 330 instead of maximaa angle of 10 8.
I .
80-15(7/23/80) Violation, Deficiency, Failure to follow construction procedures required by drawings; -
Construction Permits, drawings were not available on CPSE8 site at time of fabrica-10 CFR , App. B, V tion of components and therefore could not have been followed. ,
1e *,
4 1 .. /.)
C5-7 (continued):
The following, fran I&E Report 10-25, which the Staff has identified in response to CASE's first Set of Interrogatories , Question 1(a), as being the 'last documented
'SAPL' (Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance)" which "was conducted at Comanche Peak" and covere, the period August 1.1979, through July 31, 1980:
"b. Enforcement History
' The enforcement history for the Comanche Peak facilities was reviewed.
The following noncompliances, during the above stated review period, were identified by Region IV IE inspectors: .
Personnel not properly trained and indoctrinated Failure to follow procedures for verification of the performance of automatic welding machines Failure to follow nonconformance procedures for electrical cable Failure to follow procedures for hoisting safety-related components Failure to update procedures Failure to provide appropriate instructions for installation of
- Class IE equipment Failure to follow weld.ing procedures Failure to provide instructions and procedures appropriate to installation of Class IE battery chargers Failure to follow procedures for cable oulling Failure to follow procedure's for reporting and repair of damaged electrical cable Failure to follow welding procedures Failure to follow electrical inspection procedures Failure to establish quality assurance program for Class 5 pipe .
support systems Failure to follow inspection procedure for returning inspection stamps Failure to. follow inspection procedure to initial and date '
operations traveler l
- Failure to report a significant construction deficiency (50.55(e)) '
l I -
Failure to follow construction procedures required by drawings .
. 6-
C5-7 (continued):
't . Status and Summary of Noncompliance Items ,
"The NRC participants stated that as of this time all of the above items have been closed out by subsequent inspections.. The item in regard to the QA program for Class 5 pipe supports will be followed closely during future on-going inspections since it involves a substantial backfit inspection effort on the part of the licensee.
The NRC participants stated that 1689 NRC inspector-hours were consumed in 26 routine inspections at the Comanche Peak site. Based on the 17 items of noncompliance identified, this indicated about 100 inspector-hours were expended per noncompliance which is typical of an acceptable construction QA program but could not be rated as exceptional performance.
"d. Construction Deficiency Reports - 50.55(e)
" The following construction deficiencies were reported by the licensee during the evaluation period in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e):
- Spacing of Concrete Anchor Bolts
- QA of Welded Conduit Supports-
- QA of Seismic I (NNR) Pipe Supports Honeycomb of Unit 2 Containment Interior Walls Anchorage of Main Control Boards <
. - Material in Service Water System Valves "The NRC participants indicated that it appeared that the licensee's threshold for reporting significant construction deficiencies to the NRC was appropriate and timely, particularly since the management meeting discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-445/80-12; 50-446/80-12.
" e. Escalated Enforcement Action .
" An Imediate Action Letter was issued ~on September 7,1979, confirming a licensee decision to not place concrete in the wall to dome transition area of the Unit 2 Containment Building until such time as a proper engineering evaluation could be made of the omission and subsequent addition in another location of a group of reinforcing steel shear ties.
" f. Licensee's Responsiveness and Ability to Take Meaningful Corrective Action "The NRC participants indicated the following positions in regard to the licensee's response to various levels of NRC identified problems:
- Bulletins and Circulars - The responses to this class h'as been .
- adequate although much work still remains to be accomplished in . -
! regard to Bbiletins 79-01 (Class IE Equipment Qualification) and l 79-02 (Pipe Support Systems). The licensee stated that .they recognized that much work in these areas must be done and that they would fulfill requirements as construction progresses.
9_
1
C5-7 (continued):
- " - Enforcement Action Responses - The NRC personnel indicated that the licensee's responses have been cdncise, effective and to the point.
"g. Effectiveness and Attitudes of Licensee Personnel in Complying with NRC Requirements
- Licensee Quality Assurance Personnel - The NRC personnel stated that the overall impression was that the licensee had upgraded the quality of their personnel at all levels during the past two years.
- Licensee Construction and Engineering Management - The NRC personnel stated that it appears there is a continuing tendency to engineer away construction problems rather than enforce compliance to drawings and specifications. The licensee stated that he is taking several management actions with the engineering and construction personnel to alleviate this situation. The NRC personnel stated that there was no specific regulatory concern since safety does not appear to have been compromised as yet but could possibly be sometime in the future if appropriate actions were not taken as indicated above.
- Brown and Root Quality Assurance - The NRC personnel stated that
-- - overall abilities of the Brown and Root QA personnel appeared to
- have been improved during the past year, in part because of much improved procedural d.irection being given to them.
- Brown and Root Construction Supervision and Labor Force - The NRC participants indicated that their impression of this area indicated that there is a need to make this group more aware of nuclear power .
plant construction requirements. That there is a considerable difference to those of a conventional fossil plant. The licensee . '
responded that he has issued instructions to Brown and Root to reduce the labor crew size reporting to foremen and the number of crews reporting to general foremen. The licensee stated that it is expected that this will provide increased control over the quality affecting actions of the labor force.
"3. Summary of Licensee Performance "The Region IV Director, at the conclusion of the meeting, emphasized that the licensee has the principal and legal responsibility for all matters -
regarding the construction and operations of a nuclear power plant as specified in the law and in the R'egulations. Corporate management is essential in all phases of the project to assure appropriate execution of the licensee's responsibilities. The licensee responded that he'is aware .
' of his responsibilities and that in response to these responsibilities; he continuously incre~ased his involvement in the project during the past three years until he is now essentially in complete control of the project except for the immediate line supervision of the labor force. The licensee indicated that as new or additional involvement becomes necessary, he will respond accordingly.
" APPEN0!X B C5-7 (continued):
"A Number and Nature of Noncemoliance Items
" Noncompliance Category: Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Violations 0 0 Infractions 13 8 Deficiencies ? 4
" Areas of Noncompliance: Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 (List Areas as Required) (Points) (Points) (Points)
QA/ Management 20 10 Piping and Hangers 52 42 Electrical Equipment 24 4 Electrical Cable / Tray 40 30 Reporting 2 Total Points 88
" 8. Number and Nature of Deficiency Reocr s "1. Spacing of Concrete Anchor Bolts
- 2. QA of Welded Conduit Supports
- 3. QA of Seismic I (NNR) Pipe Supports
- 4. Honeycomb of Unit 2 Containment Interior Walls
- 5. Anchorage of Main Control Boards '
- 6. Material in Service Water System Valve.s
" C. Escalated Enforcement Actions
" Civil Penalties
'None l
i l " Orders
~
" None
" Immediate Action Letters
" September 7,1979: Omission of Uni.t 2 Containment Shear Ties "
e -
' -[,
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C5-7 (continued):
We am also in the process of reviewing audit reports whibh we recently received from the Applicants in response to our interrogatories and requests to produce, and it may well be that we will also find other information in those docunents which are pertinent to this question; however, at this time, we have not fully -
analyzed them.
C5-8. See pages 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this pleading, under the column " Type of W6oTation Involved."
We are in the process of assembling and consolidating documents in this regard and do not yet have it completed. However, we have already ~ identified the following and offer it as a partial listing:
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion No. Inspection & Enforcement Report No.
I 73-02, 74-01 II 73-02, 74-01, 79-11 J III 73-02, 74-01 ,
IV 73-02, 74-01 g V 73-02, 74-01, 75-10, 75-11, 76-01, "
76-08, 76-07,.77-02, 78-05, 78-11 78-12, 78-13, 78-18, 79-03, 79-04,
- 79-06, 79-07, 80-01, 80-03, 80-08, "
80-11, 80-13, 80-15, 80-17, 80-20, 80-23, 81-02, 81-15 VI 73-02, 74-01, 75-05, 76-08, 77-10 j VII 73-02, 74-01 -
IX 77-10 XV 78-12 XVI 75-13 XVII 73-02, 74-01
- XVIII 74-01 )~
C5-9, C5-10, C5-ll , C5-12, C5-13, C5-14, C5-15, C5-16, C5-17, C5-18, C5-19, C5-20, .
C5-21, C5-22, C5-23, C5-24, C5-25, C5-2_6, C5-27, C5-28, T5-29, C5-30, C5-31._
- We object to these questions to the following extent. As the Staff is well aware, .
the wording of Contention 5 as presently constituted was not CASE's wording. ,
CASE and the other two Intervenors in these proceedings were initially accepted q under the wording "The Applicant has failed to establish and execute a quality assurance / quality control program which adheres to the criteria in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B." CASE and the other two Intervenors fought to retain that wording (see especially CASE's 5/12/80 Motion in Support of Retaining Pmsent Wording of Quality Assurancg/ Quality Control Contention).
- .i
.e, 0
~.
C5-9, C5-10, C.5-11, C5-12, C5-13, C5-14, C5-15, C5-16, C5-17, C5-18, C5-19, C5-20, C5-21, C5-22, C5-23, C5-24, C5-25, C5-26, CS-27, C5-28, C5-29, C5-30, C5-31. (cont.):
As stated in our 5/12/80 Motion:
"The broadness of CASE's concerns in mgard to this contention are clearly indicated in our 5/7/79 Contentions (pages 50 through 57), and we particularly call the Board's attention to page 57, items 18 and 19,
- in which we state:
'Non-compliance with mgulations and procedures as detailed in '
the I&E reports supports and confinns Contention No.1.'
'I&E reports, plus the contentions in Contention No.1, clearly indicate a trend which would prove that 10 CFR 50.57('a)(2), (3),
and (6) will not be complied with by the applicant. Therefore, the CPSES should not be licensed to operate.'
"And on page 54, ' tem 7, we state: P
'There are nua 'ous other problems with construction and procedures which are indicated in the I&E reports, and CASE would incorporate them all herewith by reference. It is our intention to pursue them in detail during the hearings, and to present related testimony by expert witnesses. '"
We then suggested alternative wording for the contention which the Board did not adopt, and further elaborated our concerns:
"As has been previously indicated, CASE very seldom has the benefit of any legal advice. We believe that we have made it very clear that there are certain specific problems at CPSES with which we are concerned, but in addition, we are concerned as well with the overall impact of such problems, coupled with the manner in which the Applicant has operated .'
its lignite plants and the manner in which we expect them to operate CPSES. All of these things have a bearing and tie-in with the quality assurance / quality control contention.
"We are concerned primarily with the Board's de'ciding on wording for this contention .which accurately reflects CASE's concerns and which will not limit u's (as the Applicant's proposed wording would have) to an extent which would preclude our pursuing some of these concerns
, as indicated."
We'therefore object to these questions to the extent that they call for definitions of terms or identification of specific items which were not originally our terms or specific items. However, we will attempt to respond to the best of our ability
- to all of the questions, based on the analyses we have made at this time and in the context in which we have analyzed them at this time. It should be noted that . '
we are currently in the process of refining the specific areas with which we will deal in the hearings and the specific approach we will take the the various issues with which we are concerned.
. . e sa
C5-9. The phrase " construction practices employed" was not CASE's wording.
However, we will attempt to define it as it is used in thq contention:
The construction practices employed refers to the manner in which CPSES has been built. We believe that the Inspection and Enforcement (I&E)
Reports (which we do not believe even the NRC Staff would allege have caught each and every deficiency or violation which may have been committed at the p' ant), if analyzed, indicate a clear pattern and trend proving that the plant ,
ha. not been constructed properly and that there has been a continuing break-down cf quality assurance / quality control throughout the construction of the pl an t. CASE's concerns in this regard include, but are not now and never have been limited by, the specific items listed in the present wording of Contention
- 5. In addition to the specific problem areas identified in the wording of the contention, we are further concerned about what we believe is the overall failure of the QA/QC program at CPSES.
C5-10. We believe the " concrete work" referred to in the contention was taken from the following:
The 5/7/79 Supplemental Petition and Contentions of Intervenors, ACORN, Mary and Clyde Bishop and Oda and William Wood:
Pages 15,16, and 17:
"31. SAFETY CONTENTION SIXTEEN "The Comanche Peak containmnet units are structurally deficient for the safe operation of the plant.
- 32. EXPLANATION
" According to at least one worker " honeycombs" occurred immediately after concrete pours and in sufficient quantity to make the containment units unsafe. " Honeycombs" represent breaks and cracks an51 improper bonding of concrete. Additionally, a fire occurred on the concrete in Containment Unit Number One while that concrete was in a curing stage. While conrete is curing, it '
should maintain a temperature of.between 50.and 80 degrees. The high temperatures fesulting from the fire make the. containment structure unsafe.
e
. . *i 4
.n C5-10. (continued): .-
3
$5. SAFETY CONTENTION EIGHTEEN l' Construction of the Comanche Peak facility has been
.narred by a lack of observance of quality assurance-quality control.
D6. EXPLANATION 5'The inspection and enforcement reports document a history of problems with welding. and concrete pours at the Comanche Peak site. . Falsification of documents took place under the super-vision of Robert W. Hunt Company, and according to recent investi-gative news stories appearing in the Fort Worth Star Telegram falsification of documents and failure to perform core samples tests continues at the Comanche Peak site. A worker who provided information to Intervenors stated that in the four years that he worked at the C6manche Peak- site he spent most of his time working around mortar and concrete and that the mortar he worked around never had a QA-QC test performed on it.
"37. SAFETY CONTENTION NINETEEN
Brown and Root has failed to adequately supervise and guarantee the safe construction of the Comanche Peak facility. ,
"3 8 . EXPLANATION
" Brown and Root has failed to observe quality assurance-quality co.ntrol. Concrete too old or too dry for proper bonding was poured in containment units under the direction cf Broim and Ro'ot, s
supervisors. Breaks and cracks and holes in the concrete in the -
containment units wene covered up by Brown and Root workers under the direction of Brown and Root . supervisors who did not properly s
N C5.-10. (continued):
report structural deficiencies. Mortar blo'cks were not properly bonded together and metal wire was not placed between the layers of blocks upon the direction of Brown and Root supervisors. Brown and Root terminated the employment of individuals who complained about incompetence and failure to meet safety regulations. Brown and Root hired unskilled laborers to perform very skilled tasks such as the inspection of welding."
CFUR's 5/7/79 Supplement to Petition for Leave to Intervene by Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation (CFUR), pages 13, 14, 15, and 16:
'IV.E . Concrete ..
'here is an overwhelming amount of evidenco from !RC Inspection r@d,s that substantial numbers of problems with concrete have occured during CPSES .f construction in progress; problems that directly relate .to safety and question the integrity. of critical structrues in the Catagory I class as well as raise ,.
questions ins to committment to QA by the applicant.
"For example, in a February,1976 IRC Report, coring samples were taken frora the Unit I Containment buildhg base mat, (Catagory I Struture), show-M ing' evidence of a 4 to 6 inch layer of honeycomb ctratification. The con- .
dition had the potential of becoming a significant construction deficiency.
The problem areas were found to be in areas of high concentrations of amhada and were identified as voids, lack of consolidation and inadequate working of concrete around embeds, and were located in the outer wall area. 24 core
}!
samples were'taken later and showed two seperate deficient areas in the peri-meter wall of the mat. Corrective measures taken appeared to be concerned with how to preclude the occurance from happening at Unit 2 and if the valve isolation embedments would perform their safety-related function after repairs.
It was decided that there would be four pours made at Unit 2 rather.than.the ona pour that had occured at Unit i as specified. There was no idication that I the Unit 1 base mat would be repoured to assure itc safety and integrity.
Instead grouting was done and repairc were made. This raises a serious question as to the strength of the concrete where voids have been filled with new m
l i
C5-10. (continued): .
material and may or may not adhere to the old concrete or may or may not even fill all the voids especially since the voids were discovered in February .
of 1976 and the repairs appear not to have been completed until August of 1976, six months later. The question of the valve isolation embedmonts ,
perfoming their safety-related functions was never addressed. Completed ,
corrective action was inspected by observation only.
i "Further, in Novermber of 1976 an tac Inspection report stated that during a routine inspection, expanded metal mesh used as a form for a previous concrete placement was found to be seperated from the adjacent placements by as much as 3/4 inch in an area greater than 200 ft. and left in place at the oonstruction joint while another placement was being poured at the l
i Unit 2 Contairment base mat. The unbounded metal mesh was not removed and -
the inspector noted that there was no special emphasis or effort by the oon-crete crew to vibrate the concrete next to the vertical construction joints concerned. It was disoovered that Gibbs and Hill had evaluated the feasa-f L
bility of using the metal mesh and leaving it in place but had not considered I the condition where the mesh might become unbonded. Also there were no ,g inspection requirements in B&R QC'ooncerning the bond condition of the metal mesh prior to subsequent pourings. The report indicated that the only corrective actions taken were the pressing of the mesh back againct the 2%
previous placement and the wiring together of the mesh in the areas where l{p 3
it overlapped or was found to be loose. Inspection re'quirements were re-l
' written to allow no unbc.ded mesh in construction joints for future 9 =~= ants.
The checking of previous placements was apparently not considered. ,
"In another Inspection report,a construction infraction occured due to lack of adherence to procedure requirements as required by 10 CFR 50. app.Be Crit. V, resulting in incomplete consolidation of concrete at the Unit 1 0 containment building base mat. The incomplete consolidation of concrete ,
l l occured between two adjacent concrete lifts causing a concrete vertical "oold joint" on the west side of the bottom of the reactor vessel cavity and a stop-work order was initiated. The infraction was caused by time l delays between the pours which exceeded the prescribed 70f, of the time of initial concrete set. This infraction, according to the iGC Roport of )
July 16-18, 197$, had "the potential for causing or contributing to an ,)
l l
C6-10. (continued):
occurance related to health and safety."
- Brown and Root found it necessary,following this serious infraction,'
to hold additional classroom training to instruct craftsmen and supervisors on the oorrect manner to place concrete in accordance with specifications and procedures and to assign additional supervisors to large concrete place-ments in the' future. Concrete craftsmen and supervisors by dafinition should know the oorrect manner in which to place concrete, how to read specifications and understand procedures, in particular those hired for the construction of a Nuclear power plant and the fact that they had to liave .
additional classrom training for this function raises serious questions as to the qualifications of B&R personnel. This fact also raises an even more serious question as to the safety and reliability of all previous concrete pours at the CPSES site. And further, this is not the only reference CPUR has found in }RC inspection reports where untrained personnel were.used in critical phases of construction resulting in serious safety violations, as we point out in othei contentions. - - -
- During an NtC inspection in November and December', 1975,. concrete aggregate.
problems were found to be of such magnitude that a "stop work" order was .
l initiated on the continued placement of Class I concrete. The inspector .
l pointed out that there was no evidence that the approximately 6000 esbic yards of Class I concrete previously placed in cont =1=nant foundation base
- l l
mats is of uniform concrete. In the same report, the IE inspector expressed l concern that the B&R QA staff "found it necessary to initiate omrrective I action of an intrusive nature against the construction. activities to obtain responsive action." The problem was considered an item of nonW4=noe, contrary to 10 CFR 50, ' App. B, Criterion XVI, and appeared that the licensee's established measures for initiating correct,ive action had not resulted in
~
pH =yt corrective action nor did the measure preclude repetition.
- In July of 1975 an infraction was identified as contrary to 10 GR 50, app. B, Crit. V because water was'added to the concrete in the transit mix ,
trucks during concrete placement of the Unit 1 Containment building base mat, on six different occasions without the approval of the testing laboratory representative. The infraction, again, had the potential for causing or contributing to an occurrence related to health and safety, according to ,
the lac Inspection Report. Once again B&R had to conduct a concrete placement y 1
C5-10. (continued):
oourse for construction personnel and added additional personnel for large y concrete placements as well as additional inspectors. j "In July of 1976, it was found that e::tra concrete cylinders were not <
cast for all batches of concrete batched without ice as required for the ,d. ,
rammining loads placed and extra thermocouples to be embedded in the place- %
ment to monitor the heat of hydration. The heat of hydration peaked at about 1360 F. and the report stated that temperatures above 155 wouhi have been il3 cause for conoerne The report further said that the concrete compressive .. strength test records indicated that two cylinders had broken froct batches i, where the placing temperature was in excess of 70'F. Although the two cylinders *d ; broke at greater than 4000 PSI, there was no evidence of the cylinder strength . g tests for the other thirteen batches of concrete which had possibly exceeded ~j..f 70 F because they also contained no ice. This problem was not resolved, to /: the satisfaction of the IRC, for four months. ,
?
*In January of 1977, the applicant, during a routine site surveillance
-- - found that concrete curing surface temperatures were below specification .
E.5
.5 limits. Further investigation could not identify a documented pour plan :;'
in the placement records which might have concerned itself with the 4=nand4ng I cold weather.' The concrete curing thich was below specifications was for 5f the amri14av building and service water intake structure areas. The inspector found this as a licensee identified problem of approximately one year before, ,J when the surface temperatures were below 32 F on the curing concrete of place- .' l d ment No. 101-2808-001 on both December 30 and'31, 1976. This same report said that there was no placement plan in the B&R QA document vault to meet ..
}
requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.55 and the project FSAR. A site surveil- ^.{ *
. lance report dated January 7, 1977 showed an identical condition, " frozen" concrete during curing of the Unit No. 1 Safeguards Building F.at. Once again l B6R revised their procedures for nonitoring the curing surface temperatures ,
for " future" placements. .A l *Nothing was done about the conc'ete r poured during freezing weather in the two winters reported; winters which had had long periods of extremely , cold weather with freezing temperatures comon. There is no way the contractor , can plead ignorance of the weather, nor can the applicant. So, was " cost x and schedule" the, reason concrete was poured, rather than safety? ;
i C5-10. (continued): ,
- Fifty five 2" ancher bolts were found to have been omitted fron the ,a reactor containment bilaing No.1 concrete placenent, in a routine review M by the IRC in April of 197/. Once again, B&R took corrective qtetion in the C form of training sessions and embed detail drawing development to " preclude a ann 414e occurance" and by assigning a full tim civil QC inspector to ;
ti document and verify concrete placement embeds. M "One of the most serious examples of concern to TIR in regard to the $ overall safety of all concrete construction and to the iguestion of oosarittment to QA i.. in the IRC Report 77-02 which reports the investigation into the ,. falsifacation of concrete air-entrainment test records in March of 197/.- h,l The incident occured during initial concrete placement in a Catagory I f Structrue when a level I concrete inspector working for R.W. Hunt, knowingly falsified an air-entrainnent test reading at a Unit I Safeguar.ls building ,S floor slab. fk;.,
"The falsifacation occured on January 20, 1977. It was :.ot reported to-the IRC until February 25,197/ and then only after a routine review by TUGCO/
GH QA staff member of B&R's IER'si one of which made a reference to the termination of a RMI employee for falsifying his report. k "The terminated person was a Ievel I inspector assigned by REFI to inspect M t concrete and to conduct standard lab tests on site. Personnel files showed j that the person was hired on January 12,1976 and terninated on February 8, d 1977. He was certified as 'a concrete inspector on January 19,1976, seven . days after being hired.; However, his record showed that ha had had no pre- h vious experience in concrete tecting or inspection, nor,did he graduate from ., j l l high school. Other records revealed that this same person had conducted j P cylinder comprehensive strength tests, ASTM C-117 and C-136 gradation tests 11
",j and ASTMc-566 moisture aggregates tests, without evidence of training.- -
7TUR contends that assurances of safety cannot be made until . a full '-. analysis of the consequences of the safety-related problems found over and g over agaiqt in the concrete construction of 5dC3 ccn be dotermined; that $J in fact, common threads run through the IRC Inspection Reports during the , l constructica phase' of CPSES from procedures required by law fourri to be - ' totally non-existant to the hiring of untrained, unqualitied personnel for 1 safety-related jobs, with an "I'll fix it if you catchi me" attitude prevelant 7, and a consistant disregard for the requirements of the law, bringing into g question every phase of construction. " C5-10. (continued): CASE's 5/7/79 Supplement to Petition for Leave to Interven'e and Contentions by CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy), pages 50, 53 and 54:
"1. CASE has been told by a worker at the CPSES that on one side of the ,'
reactor, where there is supposed to be some room between the contaiunent vessel , n end the . reactor, workers could not get the expansion joints to work correctly cnd poured concrete in on one side where the expansion joints are supposed to , ba.
"2. A witness has told CASE that following a Christmas party at CFSES, -
wh2re there was considerable drinking and many of the employees were quite drunk, o load of cement that had been ordered arrived for pouring. The foreman, without g proper supervision or an inspector being on du+ y, made the workers pour the cement ,,
- h
~~ 7 f .in the foms. He then had the workers clean up the party area and instructed the w:rkers to put all trash, ga:/bage, cans aild bottles into the foms and pour the cement over it. " ci i
4 . A review of the I8E reports reveals that there are continuing problems end violations by the applicant in regard to the improper pouring of concrete end concrete's not being up to specifications. As recently as February 20,1979 ,,
e tha applicant was advised by the NRC of a Notice of Violation for " Failure to
.<.5 Follow Concrete Placement Procedure."
'In an article in the April 4,1979 FORT WORTH BTAR-TELEGRAM, allegations i
vare made that untested concrete has been used in construction of portions of - CPSES, that quality control procedures have not been followed, that training has been inadequate, that sampling for sand and gravel was done in ways prohibited by standards the applicant had pledged to follow, that records were falsified.. 1
'T_*"_
s C5*-10 (continued): ,
.~ "IE report No. 78-13, conducted August 1-31, 1978, in citing the applicant :-
with a Notice of Violation for " Failure to Follow Concrete Testing Procedures,"
's states: .
'" Criterion V of Appendix B requires that established instructions, procedures, or drawings be followed for all activities affecting quality.
'" Texas Utilities Generating Company Procedure QI-QP-ll.1-10, Revision 0, y
' Sampling Fresh Concrete,' paragraph 3 1.2 requires that samples be taken 4 at two or more intervals during the discharge of the middle portion of the batch.
'" Contrary to the above:
Y
'"The IE inspector observed on the above date, during placement of concrete jj in a reactor building interior wall, that a concrete laboratory technician took a single sample rather than at two or more intervals during the discharge ,
of the middle portion of the batch. Discussions with the technician and the laboratory supervisor confirmed that this was the standard, but undocu-mented, practice when taking sample's where cylinder strength tests are not IA ' f
,y requirement." (Emphasis added.)
v
'"This is an infraction." a
There are numerous other examples of problems with concrete cited in the .
I&E reports, and CASE plans to pursue them at length durint tN. he Arings and to have witnesses to testify in this area. " Since the above was originally written in 1979, the problems with concrete have continued at CPSES. These problems have been documented by I&E Reports, including but not limited- to the following, which is a sampling of reports over the years: I&E Report 75-13 -- Failure to Implement Prompt Corrective Action and Provide Adequate Measures to Preclude Repetition Regarding Concrete Aggregates ~ I&E Report 75-l'0 -- Failure to Adhere to Procedure Requirements Regarding . Concrete Placement - I&E Report 75-10 -- Failure to Adhere to Procedure Requirements Regarding Con-crete Transit Mix I&E Report 79-03 -- Failure to Follow Concrete Placement Procedure I&E Report 78-13 -- Failure to Follow Concrete Testing Procedures I&E Report 78-07 -- Failure to Follow Concrete Testing Procedures
C5-10 (continued): I&E Report 80-08 -- Failure to Report a Significant Construction Deficiency ("honeycon6s" in interior walls of Unit II Containment Building) I&E Report 79-11 -- Failure to Implement the Quality Assurance Program for Civil Construction (Placement of an undetermined amount of concrete of an unknown quality on the dome of the Unit 1 containment without the knowled9e of Applicants' Quality Assurance organization and without benefit of re-quired inspections and testing of the concrete) I&E Report 79-09 -- Allegations by former Comanche Peak employees which appeared in news articles of the FORT WORTH STAR-TELELAAM on April 4, 5, 6, and 8,1979 (it was not possible to either substantiate or refute several of the allegations) I&E Report 79-09 also included the following information on pages 34 and 35: aReferenced NRC Reports 3 Because of the congruity of matters being investigated, the IE Investigation Reports No. 50-445/77-02; 50-446/77-02, dated }brch 23, 1977, and 78-07., dated May 10, 1978, are by reference, an integral part of this report. In a'ddition, the f ollowing IE Inspection Reports and corresponding licensee replies are referenced for additional information regarding IE concrete inspection activites: IE Inspection Report 50-445/75-06; 50-446/75-06, dated April 28, 1975 . IE Inspection Report 50-445/75-07; 50-446/75-07, dated June 11,.1975 - l IE Inspection Report 50-445/,75-09; 50-446/75-09, dated July 14,~1975 l l IE Inspection Report 50-445/75-10; 50-446/75-10, dated August 7, 1975 I IE Inspect' ion Report 50-445/75-11; 50-446/75-11, dated' August 28, 1975.- IE Inspection Report 50-445/75-12; 50-446/75-12, dated October 1, 1975 1 ' IE Inspection Report 50-445/75-13; 50-446/75-13, dated December 12, 1975 IE Inspection Report 50-445/76-03; 50-446/76-03, dated April 1, 1976 l IE Inspection Report 50-445/76-04; 50-446/76-04, dated April 20, 1976 IE Inspection Report 50-445/76-05; 50-446/76-05, dated May 26, 1976 l IE Inspection Report 50-445/76-06; 50-446/76-06, dated June 25, 1976 IE Inspection' Report 50-445/76-07; 50-446/76-07, dated August 3,~1976 l IE Inspection Report 50-445/76-08; 50-446/76-08, dated Adgust 19, 1976 IE Inspection Report 50-445/76-10; 50-446/76-10, dated October 14, 1976 l
C5-10. (continued): IE Inspection Report 50-445/76-11; 50-446/76-11, dated November 2,1977 IE Inspection Report 50-445/76-12; 50-446/76-12, dated January 3, 1977 IE Inspection Report 50-445/77-03; 50-446/77-03, dated March 31, 1977 IE Inspection Report 50-445/77-04; 50-446/77-04, aated May 17, 1977 IE Inspection Report 50-445/77-06; 50-446/77-06, dated May, 27, 1977 IE Inspection Report 50-445/77-07; 50-446/77-07, dated July 7, 1977 IE Inspection Report 50-445/77-09; 50-446/77-09, dated September 6. 1977 IE Inspection Report 50-445/77-10; 50-446/77-10, dated October 18, 1977 IE Inspection Report 50-445/77-11; 50-446/77-11, dated November 2, 1977 IE Inspection Report 50-445/78-01; 50-446/78-01, dated January 30',19[8 ' IE Inspection Report 50-445/78-09; 50-446/78-09, dated June 6, 1978 _, IE Inspection Report 50-445/78-11; 50-446/70-l'1, dated June 29, 1978 IE Inspection Report 50-445/78-13; 50-446/78-13, dated September 18, 1978
- IE Inspec' ten Report 50-445/78-16; 50-446/78-16, dated November 17, 1974*
I l I&E Inspection Report 80-01 -- Further information regarding " honeycombs" in interior valls of Unit II containment building. Further removal of the " honey-comb" was suspended pending an in-depth investigation and engineering review since the area and depth appeared to be exceeding expected levels. Applicants utilized the services of a consultant, Meunow and Associates, to attempt, by microseismic means, to obtain infonnation on the total extent of the problem. Accnrding to the statement of the RRI in the inspection report
"...the inicrosaismic (sonic) investigative technique is unique to the con-sultant, Mr. Meunow, who developed it and is the only known person able to interpret the oscillographic data obtained." (Emphasis added.)
One of the most' troublesome aspects of,the continuing concrete problems at CPSES, to CASE, is the tendency of Applicants and NRC Staff to say that Applicants won't do it again, without really thoroughly examining what has already been done, For example, if what the ,RRI said in I&E Report 80-01 (see above paragraph) is correct, how can the- NRC or the App.licants know the status of the concrete in the interior walls of Unit II containment building? What independent investigation and analysis has the NRC made of this problem? How was it accomplished? What were the results? And over and above this one particular problem area is the trend of the type of work being done at the plant and the continui g breakdown of the entire QA/QC prog ram. - _ 24 -
C5-ll. We believe the " mortar blocks" referred to in Contention 5 was taken from ihe 5/7/79 Supplemental Petition and Contentions of Intervenors, ACORN, Mary and Clyde Bishop and Oda and William Wood, pages 16' and 17: See this pleading, items 35, 36, 37, and 38 on pages 15 and 16.
"33. SAFETY' CONTENTION SEVENTEEN
- Walls of a Seismic One category in the control room are unstable and unsafe.
3 4 . EXPLANATION
*According to workers who constructed walls to the control room, the mortar blocks used during construction were made ,
from mortar that was too old, and when those blocks were put in place they were not properly bonded together and metal wire was not properly placed between every two layers of blocks.
~
*The affidavits of workers which further explain and support Contention Sixteen a'nd Contention Seventeen are available to staff inspection upon request."
C5-12. We believe the " steel" referred to in Contention 5 was taken from the 5'/7779 Supplement to Petiton for Leave to Intervene by Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation (CFUR), pages 11 and 12: 9 IV.C. Steel
- More docunonted evidence from NRC Inspection Reports show that a number l
of problems regarding steel used in the centainnent structure and other saf6ty related work have 'occured which do not neot the requirengnts of the law. In sone cased the problems found dove-tail uith the problens found in welding infractions with the sane procedurni problens: crrors, failure to follow As in the above, corrective measures often procedures and non-existant procedures. only affected work from that point on or procedures were changed to make the procedure fit the problem. C5'12. (continued): 8 For example, in one NRC report, it was stated that the licensee's contractor was installing containnent buildings seismic catagory class I pipe restraints embeds without prescribed documented instructions or work procedures. In addition to that deficiency the same report stated that the inspector found that installation of the containment building drain sump pipe restraints were being installed without benefit of installa-tion procedures, contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterien V, and con-trai'y to the Gibbs and Hill specification entitled Miseellaneous Stebl and dated February 28, 1975. The date of the found problem was January 7-9, 1976 and raises a serious question as to the integrity of the installation of steel in the entire year preceeding. Mn January of 1978, an NRC report stated that during an independent review of structural embeds it was found that while the reactor coolant pumps and steam generator vertical cupport . embeds were fabricated and being installed, the detailed design in the CPSES PSAR figure 3.8-17 was sub-stantially different. The detail in the PSAR showed the embed anchorage - assembly extending through the floor liner plate into the containment base mat. The "as-built" condition did not penetrate the plate. A " design change" was then instituted and approved by the licensee "after the fact".
"In October of 1975, a liner plate anchor stud puil-out was caused by a lamination in the steel plate installed in the ' reactor vessel'. cavity l in the containment base mat. While Brownnand Root did not consider the problem sufficient to report it as a non-confomance, it was learned by the NRC inspector that Brown and Root and TUSI were concerned between themselves that other liner plates might have similiar laminations. Neverthe-less, Brown and Root and TUSI's corrective action stated only that the.
matter would be " reviewed". No further action was taken to determine the extent of defects in stell already installed.
"Following an inspeciton of the Brown and Root Fabrication Shop an NRC inspector found that the QA Supervisor had not issued a stop-work order ,
as required by law, .even though he was aware that there were no in-process controls in the shop while safety-related work was and had been going on, also as required by law. The stop-work order was issued only after the NRC inspector found the deviation, drawing an unavoidable conclusion that C5-12. (continued): safety-related work in the fabrication shop would have continued ad-infinitum without in-process controls to guarantee the safety and quality of the work. There were no steps taken to review the safety and quality" of Work that had been on-going previous to the NRC inspector's finding.
*In reviewing testing records an NRC inspector found that contrary to Df own and Root's own written procedure requiring independent laboratory testing of all suppliers, a procedure approved by the licensee, a supplier, ,
Bethlehem Steel Corporation was conducting its own Q1 tests on steel supplied to Brown and Root. When this was reported to the NRC, Brown and Root cor-rected the probem by re-writing the procedure allowing s6ppliers to test their own products, a questionable practice at best and one not designed to assure quality control or assurance. Furts an arrogant disregard for the law, as shown by Brown and Root's decision to rewrite a procedure so that it fits a problem, thereby negating the problen, is disquieting.
*Further, it has been alleged by an unidentified source, that the re-inforcing steel around penetrations has broken when workersn attempted to bend it, indicating the quality of the steel is in question.
"CF5R contends that these questions and allegations regarding the in-tegrity of the steel already in place in the plant,as well as that which is to be used in the future, must be addressed. "
C5-13. We believe that the " fracture toughness testing" as the phrase is used in the contention came from the 5/7/79 Supplement to Petition for leave to Intervene by Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation (CFUR), pages 16 and .17: d IV.' . Fracture Totwhness Testine
" Exhibit H of the agreement between Westinghouse and Texas Utilities specifies that Westinghouse will perform the fracture toughness testing en the reactor vessels steam generators and pressurizers for CPSES Unit 1 and Unit 2.' -
6CFUR brings.into question the jeopriety of the supplier of. the most L critical components of the plant testing those s ee components that said supplier, (WestiBghouso), is selling to the applicant. Lhen in fact, in a less critical area, Brown and Root 8s QA was called into question by the NRC Report 75-06 when it was found that. reinforcing steel metallurgical tests
. m
1 C5-13. (continued): were not conducted by an independent te::ter, .as required by Brown and Root's procedure 35-1195-CCF-8
CFin believes that assurance of safety cannot be catisfactorily given by the asylicant without independent testing of such critical components as the reactor vessel's steam generators and pressurizers. Given the threat
~
to life and health that could occur from an accident at CP35, it is in-cumbent upon the apolicant to not only be comitted to Quality Assurance, but to be alert to any hint of chicanery where the health and safety of the public might be in question.# C5-14. We believe the " expansion joints" referred to in Contention 5 came from two separate sources about basically the same problem: From the 5/7/79 Supplement to Petition for Leave to Intervene by Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation (CFUR), page 16: l "IV. . *= melon hint, "An allegation has been n: ado and brought to the attention of CFIR that the expansion joint between the Au:d.11ary B;ilt'.ing and Contaimment Unit 2, (EA wall and IA wall), contains a structural defect in that the expansion joint did not work, that steel was substituted to correct the probleu and l l that concrete was poured over the cavity. 1
*TIR has no way of verifying this allegation but believes the matter .
is of a sufficiently serious nature to we.rrant an investigation aral corrective action, if necessery. " From the 5/7/79 Supplement to Petition for Leave to Intervene and Contentions by CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy), page 50:
"1. CASE ha's been told by a worker at the CPSES that one one side of the reactor, where there is supposed to be some room between the contain-ment vessel and the reactor, workers could not get the expansion joints to work . correctly and poured concrete in on one side where the expansion joints aro supposed to be." -
C5-15. We believe the " placement of the reactor vessel for Unit 2" referred' to in the contention came from: . The 5/7/79 Supplemental Petition and Contentions of Intervenors, ACORN, Mary and Clyde Bishop and Oda and William Wood, pages 22 'and 23:
. l
C5-15. (continued):
"58. EXPLANATION "As re' ported in a Dallas Times Herald newspaper article of February 28, 1979, the reactor vessel for Comanche Peak Unit 2 would not fit correctly on the supports built for the vessel.
The vessel was 45 degrees off it's mark and presents a serious safety problem if not properly corrected. The wide margin of error indicates serious communication problems exist between Gibbs and Hill, Inc., Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Combustion Engineering, and Applicant which could result in serious safety problems." From the 5/7/79 Supplement to Petition for Leave to Intervene and Contentions by CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy): From'page 54: ,
"6. Unit No. 2 has not, been built correctly, as evidenced by the fact that the reactor vessel for Unit No. 2 won't fit correctly on the supports built to hold it. (See page 23, Contention 6.2. for details.) This was a major design and construction error, and raises questions about the capability '
of the applicant to operate CPSES." From page 23:
"2. The applicant has failed to properly update the construction costs portion of its filing to include costs of approximately $500,000 for making corrections so that the reactor vessel for Unit No. 2 of CPSES will fit correctly, or to l adjust the fuel load date for Unit No. 2 accordingly. According to a report l in THE DALLAS TIMES HERALD 2/28/79, the reactor vessel for Unit No. 2 ' won't
! fit correctly on the supports built to hold it. The four steel supports are i riot aligned correctly with the parts of the reactor vessel that are supposed to rest on them. If the reactor vessel were to be rotated to fit correctly on the supports, then some pipes would not line up correctly.' According to ! a television news report, a company representative stated that the cost for correcting the error would be approximately $500,000 and that the completion of the second unit would be delayed somewhat. It was reported that the problem arose because the second unit's reactor vessel was to have been l a mirror image of the first, but was .actually a duplicate instead." l l l
C5-15.(continued): As we understand it, basically what happened was that Applicants' response to the problem was to innovatively decide that they would build the support struc.ture 450 away from where it was so that things would line up, even though this is not the way the plant was designed. They then came up with specifications to build the new supports. Before the supports had been completed, an NRC inspector came by and decided to take a closer look. He noted that the hole drilled where the steel bar was to pmvide structural strength was smaller than the specifications called for. He also inquired as to why Texas Utilities had not reported the additional diffi-culty of the reactor vessel's not fitting to the NRC. The utility reply insofar as to why they had not yet reported anything to the NRC was that nothing had actually been installed and therefore there was no " deviation." The utility mply insofar as the undersized hole was that they would have to check that Mt with their architect / engineer. The architect / engineer obligingly changed the specifications so that the undersized hole was acceptable insofar as specifica-tions were concerned. Apparently now everyone (the Applicants and the NRC regulators) was satisfied. But many other things had to be changed as a result of this misorientation and is apparently indicative of similar procedures with other aspects of the plant's construction, whemby if something's not done according to specifications, you simply change the specifications so that everybody's happy = mgulation. This is one of the most troubling aspects, to CASE, of the manner in which CPSES has .. been constructed. The time frame during which this took place is very important: it was teported to the RRI on February 20, 1979, that a major error had been detected in the I design of the Unit 2 mactor vessel support structure."2 The work appears to have been completed prior to August 1,1979. However, in I&E Report 80-25 (which, according to NRC Staff's answers to our interrogatories, is the'"last documented - i 'SAPL' (Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance)" which "was conducted at l Comanche Peak"}, which covers the period August 1,1979, thmugh July 31, 1980, it was stated:
" Licensee Construction and Engineering Management - The 'NRC personnel stated that it appears there is. a continuing tendency to engineer away construction problems rather than enforce compliance to drawings and specifications."
l " Brown and Root Construction Supervision and Labor Force - The NRC participants l indicated that their impression of this area indicated that there is a need i to make this group more aware of nuclear power plant construction requirements."
.(Emphases added.)
CASE's concem about the misorientation of the reactor pressure vessel is shared by others. It is discussed at some length in House Report No. 97-277, October. 20, 1981, " Licensing Speedup, Safety Delay: NRC Oversight, Ninth Report by the Committee i l on Government Operations," prepared by Congressman Toby Moffet's Environment, l Energy, and Natural Resources Subcommittee. A copy of this report was sent to l all parties by CASE with its 11/2/81 Transmittal of Additional Information. 2 See I&E Report 79r03. See page 10 of this pleading.
, ~(
F C5-15 (continued): The report stated regarding Comanche . Peak (we have marked the portion pertaining.
'specifically to the misorientation problem): ,
25 E. CoxANCHE Pzrx One more plant not vet discussed in this Chapter was on theindus-try. toured lists of N HP delnv but now is not expected to be delayed by th'a licensing pnress. That is the Comanche Peak facility being built by Texas Utilities Generating Company. When the Comancha Peak
- const.ruction irrinit. was issued in Ibvmber 1971, it.s pmjected fuel load date was .Inne 1979." Since that time, some 30 months of slip-page have ahvady occurred le.ed on the utility's official ch.im that construction will be complete December 1981. As already noted, the .
NRC expects another twelve months of slippage to be announced by the utility, making total slippage at least 42 months and eliminating any pmjected NRC delay."2
'A brief look at the Comanche Peak history dis' closes a sadly famil-iar saga' of construction, financial and safety problems. Texas Gen-I crating's schedule has aheady been alteird four times, beginning in L
1970, again in 1977, in late 1979 and in 1980. In 1977 " rescheduled commercial operation" was given as a reason. No offic,al reason was i mported to the NRC for the other schedule revisions.5" NRC doemnents on Comanche Peak show far more than those
). cryptic ent. ries, however. Comanche Peak has been plagued by con-st.ruction problems avminiscent. of the Marble Hill and Zimmer dif-ticulties. I aulty welding practices ivsulted in the reweldingof some 60 percent of the safety ivlated welds at one point in the construction.*
Poor quality concerte with excessive "honeycombing" (hole and por-ousness in the concrete that. weaken it) have irguired extensive n-work. In one instance, concrete of unknown and untested quality was - <
,- pomed on the dome of the containment building without, proper in- - --
'm spection.$".NRC inspectors divovered that Brown & Root, the build-
,: ing contractor had excesively blasted with dynamite and "over-t bmken" the ledmck umund the foundation perimeter."' The bedrock
^
was intended to be the solid foimdation for the containment and the (1 reactor. That construction error require additional grouting and con-crete work to repair and irsolidi fv the foundation."" A particularly troublesome un'd costly construction error was made by Texas Generating and its contractors at the Comanche Peak site in early 1979. Simply put, a major misreading of the design for Unit 2 resulted in the support. 8tructures for the reactor being built in the l wrong place."' It should be noted that this costly and ultnnately time-L~. consummg error by the utility and its contractors occurred on Unit 2, not on Unit 1. It is the latter unit which the industry has alleged was L being delayed by the NRC. The realities of nuclear powerplant con-I .struction, however, are that major additional workloads on the build-ing contractors, design engineers and top management of the utility-from whatever part of the overall project-inevitably contribute to the total co'nstruction burden and difficulty of meeting time and cost zu arings, at Appendix, answer 2D attachment. in Ia. rnent d ume in hat I ce s1Ig c se, h d ke o 4 nd tu Id. I nu ,
** Id.
[ E
' C5-15. (continued):
26 schedules, as this case demonstrates. The NRC reported the construc- I - tion errorin March 1979: It had been determined that the reactor vessel support shoes, their ventilation duct work, and the surrounding rein-forcing steel had been rotated forty-five degrees from the cor-rect position through a design error. As a result of the error, the reactor vessel would not match the vessel support feet nor would the piping system to the other reactor loop com-ponents.* Major design and construction changes were of course required to correct the error. Not only did new structures have to be built so that the reactor could fit into place and all the piping would fit, it was also necessary to build additional sup actor in the right places. Again, as theport NRCstructures described thetoprocess support the re-laterin March 1979: The reactor vessel concrete support structure is misoriented approximately forty-five degrees. By design, the reinforcing steel, which supports the reactor vessel support plates,is of a greater design strength than the reinforcing steel which is beneath the unsupported reactor vessel nozzles. Therefore, there will be a loss of shear strength in those areas where the concrete base for the steel support plates are to be relocated. ~ -- Hence, the design repairs have centered on the placement of
~
additional shear reinforcement in the areas where the steel support plates are to be relocated."' In addition to causing direct delays in construction this misalign-ment error has fueled the ardor of those citizens living near the Comanche Peak site who have intervened in the case because they have some doubt about the competence ' of the utility and its con-tractors.* In sum, the Committee review of those plants other than Diablo - Canyon which the industry has claimed were being delayed by the NRC shows either that they are not being delayed by the N'RC or that any delay is minimal, particularly in comparison 'to the extensive de-lays attributabic to the utilities themslves and to the nuclear market. place. Diablo Canyon's two units stand as the one example worthy of some further examination where the NRC can be said to be the source of " delay." The bases'for that NRC delay, however, are far from spu-riousias the Committee review shows. L- the conte Yo e Sont a roj t in l$earf es he o the rerstat and ovest a o . aubcommittee of,the House Energy and Commerce Committee. 96th Cong.,2d sees. 32 -
C5-15. (continued): . The misalignment error is symptomatic of a much broader and all-encompassing problem, CASE believes -- the complete breakdown of the quality assurance / quality control program at Comanche Peak. It raises grave questions about the way the plant has been built and about the ability of the Applicants to construct and operate the plant safely. Further, and equally important, it raises grave doubts about the NRC's regulatory functions and abilities to protect the public health and safety as they are mandated to do. How can the NRC now say that everything's fine at CPSES when, by its own statements in its own regional evaluation (the last documented Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance), "it appears there is a continuing tendency to engineer away construction problems rather than enforce compliance to drawings and specifications," and "there is a need to make this group (Brown and Root Construction Supervision and Labor Force) more aware of nuclear power plant construction requirements"? What about the work which was done prior to what we assume the NRC believes to be the discontinuance of the " continuing tendency to engineer away construction problems" and the making aware of the Brown and Root Construction Supervision and Labor Force of nuclear power plant construction requirements? (It should be pointed out that there is no documenta-tion at this time that these problems have actually been solved, since according to the NRC Staff's own' answers to our interrogatories, the October 30, 1980, NRC mgional evaluation is the last documented Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance. ) C5-16. We believe the " welding" referred to in the contention came from: the
- . - 5/7/79 Supplemental Petition and Contentions of Intervenors, ACORN, Mary and Clyde 1 Bishop and Oda and William Wood, page 17 -- see this pleading, pages 15 and 16, items 37 and 38.
From the 5/7/79 Supplement to Petition for Leave to Intervene by Citizens for j , Fair Utility Regulation (CFUR), pages 9,10, and 11: V IV. B . Welding "There is a substantial amount of documented evidence in the NRC Inspection reports that show welding in many areas of CPSES has not met l requirements of the law. . In some cases, while investigating non-confoming welds, procedural errors were also found. In some, the total non-existence of required procedures was discovered. In others, a systematic failure to , follow procedures was ' discovered. In many of these instances, corrective measures were taken which affected work from that point on but no action < was taken to discover the extent of defects already embedded in concrete. .
" Welding problems appear in the Inspection Reports at least from January. <
1976 Procedures required by law (10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteiion V) were . found to be lacking _for installation of temporary attachments to the reactor l sump JMpe restraints or for examination and repair. In a related matter, it was discovered that the repair procedure being used permitted detectable laminations to remainNhe plate, contrary to the ASME Code which the contractor , m
. i C5'16. (continued): .
was supposedly using. TU's response was to not accept the NRC criticism but to hire a third party to test the welds.
- Also in January, '76, procedures required by law (10 CFR 50; App. B.,
Crit. V) for QC surveillance of the containment building steel liner installation were discovered to not exist. This infraction was discovered while repair records were beirg reviewed concerning some non-conforming welds, (a general wold review was also going on at the time.) The non-confoming welds in-volved one with unacceptablo porosity (non-confomity #5) and one with a burn-through (non-confomity #15). The particular orocedures were in preparation at the time, although the installation of the containment building steel liner had been teking place for five months. Therefore, it is CFUR's contention ,, that the contractor's claim of innocence appears suspec't and the infraction appears to have been a deliberate avoidance of the requirements of law.
" Also in January, '76, during a routine review it was found that approved '
design changes involving liner plate welding requirements which had been " - sent to the contractor and sub-contractors by TUSI in July had not been in- I corporated.yet into documents used on site, over a period of six months. l I This was an infraction of the law.
*In July,1976, an infraction was found in that there was a total lack of procedure as required by law (10 CFR 50, app. B, crit.V) for control or l inspection of important parameters involved in welding of safety-related com--
ponents in the contractor's Miscellaneous Steel Fabrication Shop.
"in August,1976, it was discovered that argon flow-regulators used for welding were not in the calibration program and were not being calibrated.
Over a period of at least five months, no corrective action was taken, al-though woik with the meters continued.
*In May,1977.. inspection revealed extensive discontinuities in the weld-ments of certain brakkets. In November,1977, the licensee reported that l cettain "B" series Cadweld sleeves were welded to steel plate embedments in l
reverse orientation. This item is unresolved because of other possible simiG , lar conditions. -
*In October,1978, an automatie welder in safety-related work was found .
l l
' to be travelinE at 2.5 inches per minute, whereas the travel speed required was 4.6 inches per minute, which affects the heat e.nd therefore the strength of the weld. ,
C5-16. (continued):
- Most serious of all, in October,1978 a particular cadweld splice came apart while positioning an attached length of rebar. In the courser of in-vestigation, it was documented that the licensee had failed to promptly re-port the incident, (a violation > of 10CFR 50.55 (e) (2)). It was further docu-mented that there had been a habitual mode of operation in violation of the FSAR and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.10, wherein unqualified and inadequately supervised splicer helpers were doing all preparation of the splices up to the point of loading and firing, sometimes in poor lighting and hazartious conditions. Alsos in part due to the same poor conditier,s and in part due to the lack of adequate records, no one was sure who had done what work or when, and several other visually detectable defects had passed inspection, as well as the one which came apart.
- *Some 675 other splices made by the same splicer were not available for inspection, including 3 of the 4 splicos he apparently mado that night.
Furthermore, to CFUR's knowledge, there has never been any Inspection Report stating that 10 CFR So, Appendix B, Criterion II (" Activities affecting quality shall be accomplished under 1,uitably controlled conditions.") was violated by the working conditions described in the Inspection Reports, although it is obvious that such conditions were a most likely cause of the defective welds and inspection.
*CFUR contends that no matter how carefu]Iy the personnel are trained, if they have to make their way around reinforcing steel 150' above ground with, no scaffolding, at night with the aid of flashlights, and if inspections must be made in the same conditions, Quality Assurance as intended in the law is impossible. There is no assurance the welds unavail 2ble f 3r inspection were any better. CFUR contends that the law with respect to working con- ,
ditions was violated and that corrective action should have been ordered.
*Further, an allegatien of fraudulant practices due to poor, workman . .- ,
ship has been made by an unidentified source, portaining to cadwelds. One of the accepted ways an inspector tests a cadweld is to use a thin metal cod which he. pokes into the weld to see that it doesn'.t go all the way .
~
through, thus detemining the integrity of the weld. The allegation has been made that it was the practice of some of the helpers to stuff cotton or mud $
~
into the. area of t'.h7wel'dlo keep, the rod from ' going all the way through. 500* to 1000 cadwelds are mada a day.
C5-16. (continued): .
*CFUR contends that the above excerpts of documented svidence from NRC reports and the allegation of bad workmanship raise serious questions.as to the safety and soundness of construction cor:pleted and in-progress wherever web 5ing was and is taking place and should be addressed so that a theough analysis of the consequences of these and other safety-related welding prob less can be detemined."
From the 5/7/79 Supplement to Petition for Leave to Intervene and Contentions by CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy), pages 50, 51, 52, and 53:
*3 Witnesses have told CASE that they knew, as welders, that the welding of the steel beams and rods at CPSES would not pass a rigid test. The/ stated that the reason for. this was that a number of workers were allowed to weld without having the proper training and being properly qualified.
'A review of the Inspection and Enforcement Repo:ts (I&E Reports) of the Nuclear Regulatory C amission reveals that there have been continuing problems and violations by the applicant in regard to welding. For example:
H(e.) Report 78-16, conducted 10/2-31/78: "...it appears that certain of your activities deviate fr a commitments made in your Final' Safety Analysis , Report (FSAR) as indicated below:
'" A . FSAR Section lA(B), on page 1A(B)-5, states that installation and testing of mechanical (Cadweld) splices in. reinforcing bars in i
the containment structure will comply with Regulatory Guide 1.10. l Paragraph C.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.10 requires that each member ( ,of the splicing crew be qualified by making qualification splices. ! When crew members work as a unit, the crew may be qualified as a unit.
"! Contrary to the above:
l '"It was established, based on interviews with cognizant craft " l and.TUGC0 quality assurance personnel, that craft personnel who [ have not been given qulification tests have made Cadweld splices independently of the qualified splicer up to the point of loading and firing the filler metal cruc'ible. Such personnel are not identified in appropriate quality assurance records relatable to any given splice, day or crew composition.
C5-16.(continued): ,
'"This is a deviation."
WAccording to the applicant's letter of December 8,1978:
'" Corrective Action: Use of cadweld helpers per the previous program has been stopped.
- Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence: Revision 4 to Brown and Root's Construction Procedure 35-1195-CCP-19 has been issued and no longer provides for cadweld helpers.. Personnel ' setting up' and ' firing' cadwelds will be qualified cadwelders in accordan'ce with this procedure.
Date Corrective Action and Preventive Measures Completed: Corrective action was initiated on October 12 and completed on November 19,1978. Preventive measures were completed on November 15, 1978."
'"Report No. 78-17, conducted Oct. 4-12, 1978: "The Licensee, on october 4, 1978, reported...that a Cadweld splice in the Unit 1 Contaianent wall
- reinforcing steel had pulled apart upon application of a light. force while preparing the spliced bar for additional splicing. The mode of failure was such that grossly poor workmanship had to be the cause,
" '. either by intent or by negligence. The Cadwel? splicer, according to licensee quality assurance records, had perfonned over six hundred (600) other splices throughout the various Category I buildings and involved both Units 1 and 2. The Cadweld splicer had been terminated in March 1978 for disciplinary reasons not related to his actual work. .
'"The following facts were established from licensee quality assurance '
records made available to the IE Resident inspector:
'"a . The failed Cadweld splice was made on the second shift during the evening hours of December 16, 1977, andwasoneoffour(4) splices made that evening by the splicer.
'" b . The splicer had made a total of six hundred eighty-seven (687) splices over a period beginning January 21,1977, and terminating March 27, 1978.
'"c.. The splicer had been qualified initially and his work inspected and tested commensurate with the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.10 throughout his working period.
'" d . The licensee / contractor quality control organization had rejected a total of eight (8) splices made by the splicer for visual defects during the above working period.
'"e. . None of the twenty-five (25) tensile tests conducted on the splicer's work evidenced failure.
C5-16. (continued):
'" f . All but twelve (12) splices made by the splicer were embedded in concrete and thus were not readily available for examination.
Of the four made on the evening of December 16, only one splice in addition to the failed splice was available for examination." (Emphasisadded.)
' CASE has been unable to find any indication that any of the above-referenced splices which were embedded in concrete were ever tested further. We contend that this should have been done immediately upon discovery, and that.since that apparently was not done then, that it should be done now.
"We ask that the entire Report No. 78-17 be incorporated herein by reference and tha't its contents be reviewed in its entirety. As can be readily seen, there .
are several areas of part;icular concern; for example:
"On page 4, item 4.b.: "The B&R (Brown & Root) inspector stated that he recalled the particular work that evening because of the difficulties and hazards involved.. He stated that much of the splicer . setup work was done under poor lighting conditions and that he had had to use a penlight to make his inspections. "
l (Daphasisadded.) dThere are numerous other I&E reports which deal specific
- ally with problans in welding at CPSES. CASE will be looking at them in more detail in the hearings and plans to have witnesses to testify in this area."
Since the preceding was written, the problems with welding at CPSES have not ceased. It should also be noted that in response to CASE's 12/4/80 Third Set of Interrogatories to Applicants, the following msponses were received: -
" Question ll .c. : Is it the standard modus operandi for work being done on the containment wall about 150' above the gmund to be done with no scaffolding?
" Answer: Yes. Although work platfonns ,and safety belts are provided, it is conmon for work to be accomplished within the confines of the rebar without l
' scaffolding.
l
C5-16.(continued): .
" Question 11.f. : Was the procedure referenced in c. above the practice at the time that similar work was done on the Unit 2 containment wall?
"Answe r: Yes.
"11.g.: Is it the standard modus operandi for work being done on the contain-ment wall about 150' above the ground to be done with only site area lighting available?
"Answe r: Yes. However, area lighting is normally supplemented by lighting mounted on a work platform at the surface of the concrete, which in the subject situation, was approximately 60 feet below the level of the cadwelds. In a small percentage of the cadwelding activities (such as the subject situation) flashlights are also used to better light the work area.
"ll.j.t Was the procedure reference in 9. above the practice at the time that similar work was done on the Unit 2 containment wall?
" Answer. Yes.
"ll.k: Is it the standard modus operandi for splice setup work being done on the containment wall about 150' above the ground to be done with the aid of flashlights?
"Answe r: Yes , as explained above in response to interrogatory ll.g.
"11.n.: Was the procedure referenced in k. above the practice at the time that similar work was done on the Unit 2 containment wall?
"Answe r: Yes.
"11.0.: Is it the standard modus operandi for work being done on the contain ment wall about 150' above the ground to be inspected with a penlight?
" Answer: Penlights are furnished to inspectors to aid. inspection efforts in areas where supplemental lighting may be necessary.
"11. r. : Was the procedure reference in o. above the practice at the time that simila'r work was done on the Unit 2 containment wall?
" Answer. Yes."
Problems with concrete have been documented by I&E Reports, including but not limited to the following: [ I&E Report, NRC Inspections on August 21-25, 1978 -- Failure to Follow Welding Procedures I&E Report, NRC Inspections on August 21-25, 1978 -- Failure to Follow Weld l. l Monitoring Procedures I&E Report 78-18 -- Failure to Follow Welding Procedures I&E Report 78-12 -- Failure to Follow Welding Procedure I&E Report 77-10 -- Failure to Remove weld Surface Defect Prior to Final Acceptance-C5'16. (continued): I&E Report 77-10 -- Failure to Provide Welding Procedures at the Location Where the Prescribed Activity Is Performed I&E Report 76-07 -- Failure to Follow Procedures for Welding of Safety Related Components I&E Report 76-07 -- Failure of QA Supervisor to Exercise Delegated Stop-Work Authority Regarding Welding of Safety Related Components ISE Report 80-01 -- Failure to Provide Instructions and Procedures Appropriate to the Circumstances (Instructions and Procedures Provided for Securing Class IE Battery Chargers to the Building Structure Are Inappropriate to the Circumstance in the 8 3/8" fillet welds were required; it is impossible to achieve the required fillet weld size for four of these weld locations because material thickness is less than .200 inches; the 4 welds do not conform to required thickness for 3/8" fillet weld; weld-ing was accepted by site QC even though welds could not be made in the manner required.) I&E Report 80-13 -- Failure to Follow Welding Procedure I&E Report 80-20 -- Unsuitable Weld Surface Condition as Required by Magnetic Particle Test Procedures I&E Report 80-18 -- Failure to Report a Significant Construction Deficiency (Nearly 200 welds in safety-related piping systems reported as being undersized (and therefore presumably under-strength) were not reported to NRC) I&E Report 80-17 -- Failure to Follow Drawing for Weld Prep Details (counger-bore transition taper was 300 and 330 instead of maximum angle of 10 ) See also pages 8, 9,10, and 11 o'f this pleading for pertinent information regarding welding problems contained in I&E Report 80-25, the last documented SALP which was conducted at Comanche Peak, covering the period August 1,1979, through July 31, 1980. We are also in the process of reviewing audit reports which we recently received , from the Applicants in response to our interrogatories and requests to produce, and it may well be that we will also find other information in those documents which are pertinent to this question; however, at this time, we have not fully analyzed them. C5-17. Since this was not!our wording, we are not certain exactly where the wording " inspection and testing" came from. However, in the context of the contention as we view it, the inspection and testing pertains to all areas of the QA/QC program. Reference was made in this mgard in the following: From the 5/7/79 Supplemental Petition and Contentions of Intervenors, ACORN, See page 15 Mary and Clyde Bishop and Oda and William Wood, pages 16 and 17. . of this pleading, items 35 and 36.
~
From CFUR's Supplement to Petition for Leave to Intervene by Citians for Fai.r Utility Regulation (CFUR); pages 4 through 9: C5-17. (continued):
"IV. THERE WILL BE A NUMBER OF CONTENTIONS THAT FOLLOW CONCERNING MATTERS WHICH7ARE A RESULT OF THE MANNER AND WAY IN WHICH CONSTRUCTION HAS TAKEN PIACE.
+IV.A. Lack of Organization, Quality Assurang, Design Control Procurement f
i Document Control.jstructions, Procedures, and Drawings, Documents Control, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Serhees,
! Identification and Control of Materials, Parts, an1Co_moonents, Control of Seccial Processec. Inspection, Test Control, Cohtrol of Measuring and Test Equipment, as Required By _ Law.
*According to 10 0FR 50, Appendix B, the law clearly requirns that, "The applicant shall be responsible for the 6stablishment and execution of the QA program. The applicant may delegate to others such as contractors, agents '
or consultants the work of establishing and executing the QA or support there-of, but shall retain responsibility therefor."
" According to paragraph 17.1.1.2 of TUGCO's PSAR, the CorporatecQAQFrogram and the CPSES QA Plan are the primary docunents by which TUSI assures effective control of all project quality-related activitios. That the Corp-QA Program specifies the quality requirements to which CPSES 41 Plan will comply and transfom into specific procedures, methods and techniques and will provide detailed information in the form of procedures to assure compliance by all involved individuals.
+ Howevor, CFUR has found that there is overwhelming documented evidAn'ee from NRC Inspection Reports dating from Decenber,1973, that a consistant 1
disregard for QA by the applicant has existed throughout Comanche' Peak. l i plant life from inception to the present time at every critical stage of devel-opment, in clear violation of the law. According to an NRC Inspection Report dated Decenber 3,1973, an inspector detemined that certain AEC requirements That the authority and and guidance had been onitted from the QA documents. I duties of TUSI staff QA engineers and TUSI engineers working under CPSES pro- , j ject engineers were not clearly understood nor delineated in writing even ' i thoughiboth groups had been and were engaged in design review and procurement NRC Reports showed that the QA ,.l documents. This was a violation of the law. program indicated that neasure had been octablished to assure that documents I would be utilizied at the locations where QA work or activities were being perfomed), however, the Qar.Rian did not contain a precedure to implement the C5'-17.(continued): . requirement, even though work was on-going. The requirement that activities affecting Quality Aball be accomplished under suitably controlled conditions was not addressed by either the Program or the Plan even though work was on-going. In addit. ion, neither the Program nor the Plan clearly required com-pliance with AEC requirements or guidance for design controls or changes in procurement docaments, nor did it include specific instntetions to infom the responsible reviewing engineer how or by what guidlines he was.to determine the adequacy of the basic provisions of ANSI $5.2, pp5. re: requiring contrae-tors to provide a QA program.
"In the same NRC Report dated December 3, 1973 it was found that no proceduro in the QA Plan gave guidance to persons codducting QA reviews of design and procurement documents and even though the Program said that TUSI had established meacures to require compliance with Criterion V, the Plan did not have a procedure for it to be accomplished.
*The NRC Report showed that the QA Program and Plan had nor written ,
--- procedures or instructions established at s' time consistant with the schedule for accomplishing desigh procurement and PSAR development activities, even though the QA Program had been approved by TUSI's pre'sident and copies had been distributed to personnel. Procedures "not included or inadequate" in l
the QA Program and Plan included the minimum job qualifications of TUSI personnel performing quality related work. I
'Further, there were no instructions as to how management would regularly' review the status and adaquacy of the part of QA they are responsible to i
execute which management is required to do.by' law. (10 CFR 50, App. B). l
- Ahother NRC report during the same time period identified violations re: Quality Surv'ei11ance, Design,which was not being carried out according to written policies in the PSAR and QA manuals even though design and pro-curement work was in progress. For example, although TUSI consultant EDS Nuclear had enumerated 19 general and 200 specific comments regarding the three prime contractors, Westinghouse, Gibbs and Hill and Brown and Root, the comments .of EDS Nuclear had not been discussed with the three contractors .
"In 1974, NRC inspection reports identified problems in procedural control with sub-contractors " Conduct of Audits" being discrepant in several areas, additional QC procedures required for sub-contractors on-site testing, inconsistancies in the delineation of responsibility be-
=
r C5-17. (continued): , tween the sub-contractors of the SSI Dam, which required revision of the sub-cont.ractors Q&, QC procedures. Brown and Root's on-site construction procedures had not been fully developed for the SSI Dam even though work was in progress, specific surveillance activities for construction of the l i SSI Dam was inadequate in the CPSES QA Plan. Later in the year the sub-I j contr&ctor was still developing a procedure for inspection and testing to accompany the SSI Shutdown Dam inspection and test schedule. Again in 1974 Brown and Root QC procedures were found to be inadequately controlled. Three proepdures reviewd by-the inspector re the SafeShutd'wn o Inpoundment
; Dam,. were found to be either in error, incorrectly referenced *to work which
was' to. be. accomplished in accordance with a different proce. dure, or were not revised in accordance with the requirements off. Brown and Roots QA procedhres. The inspector emphasized that these' errors were indicative of a deficiency in theB&Rcontrolof; changes.tcandissuanceofQA/QCprocedures.In197Nf,?.. other sub-contractors testing and inspection procedures were not fully developed for the SSI Dam and things such as " indefinite statements" were found in procedures soittive to determing corrective actions especially in regard to time of reporting such an action. dother procedural deficiencies were found :in'th'at'BrownpRootdnspoetion procedures for the excavation for the reactor containment structure of CPSES, Unit 1 and 2, did not exist. Thero followed rock overbreak in both excavations with Unit i being Worse than Unit 2. Procedural deficiencies were found in ch sges initiated for concrete testing and inspection for excavations of Catagsry I structures as well as conttruction procedures for blasting for plant structure of SSI Dam.
"In 1975, the Brown and Root program manual did not contain references -
to other B&R QA Control Manuals in use nor' was it " clear as to the manuals
~
funttional a'pplication to the Corrianche Peak Project." Since Brown and Root's QA' manual was not functionally applicable to Comanche Peak in 1975, a year into construction, then any representation that a QA Program was in place is false. And further, serious questions as to the safety and sound-ness of the construction nust be answered. It was found, even after revisions were made, ' that B&R manuals used in the field were out-dated. That year, it was found that B&R site organsation, individual: duties and respon- , l l
C5-17. (continued): cibilities were not calarified, that the TUSI site surveillance staff's duties and responsibilities were not clarified, that the TUSI site surveillance QA Plan didn not sulliciently describo requirenents for timely follow-ups to correct deficiencies identified during site construction.
"The applicant 4 was found to be in non-compliance with NR'; Regulations Criteria I and II,10 CFR 50, App. B, when contrary to the lawNonstruction department personns1 were performing QC inspection and acceptance activities which were not designated functions of the construction department, ile., they, (peesonnel from construction) were being used as Receiving QC inspectors for concrete, without cny training or qualifications for that job. CFUR has fcund and will show in contentions which follow, that consistantly, problems relating to concrete have occured.
"In 1975, it was found that a femal QC/QA program had not been developed to verify field measurements performed by TUSI personnel or analytical re-sults provided by independent laboratories re: the environmental program.
Enviponmental inspection reports did not include comments as to current or planned construction activities that could ' result in adverse effects. This was found in June of 1975 and was not resolved until Jan of 1976, seven months later. In 1975, the present environmental inspection reports did not include comments to ensure the requirements of the Final Environmettal State-ment, and related to the conditions for burning or burying waste vegetation material. A TUSI spokseman said that the item had been " inadvertently om-itted".
*In April of 1975, NRC Inspection Reports show that contrary to 10 CFR 50, app. B, Criterion V, B&R QC inspection procedures and instructions were not available that would verify confomance with B&R CP-QC-14, " Concrete Inspection and Testing. Again, contrary to 10 CFR 50, app. B. Ciit, I, QC inspection activities were conducted by individuals reporting to an organization whose functional authority is not independent of unde influence and responsibilities for schedules and costs, in violation of the law, and again had to do with concrete inspection and testing.
, *In January, 1976, an NRC inspection found that the environnental' control program did not provide adeqaate information to show how control measures would be provided to prevent environmental occurances. In July of 1976, NRC Reports show that a sub-contractor did not have fully completed forms for C5-17. (continued): several pieces of liner plate for the Unit I containment and sump penetrations. Also in 1976 another violation of 10 CFR 50, app B. Crit V, occured when an inspection found that a sub-contractor > enconpassed engineering functions beyend that which is described in the CPSES t.A Program manual. In July of 1976, a re . port showed that contrary to the requirements of the law, document control was being violated in that revisions to drawings were not distributed to and used at the locations where the prescribed activity was taking place. During this inspection forty findings identified problens concerning document control. Also in July of 1976 the B&R pipe fabrications phogram includ.ed, a plan;to initiate fabrication from unapproved drawings supplied by a sub-contractor,
' contrary to the CPSES PSAR, paragraph 17.1.3.3.
*In August of 1976, an NRC Report stated that B&R QC had started using a different system for developing DDR trends which- identified deficiency type, but the data had not yet been reported in the motthly report or used to reduce the frequency of DDR's. In that same report, it was found that calibrations services purchased by the sub-contractors had not been pur-chased from approved suppliers and that GA was not a requirement of the purchase orders. The problem was found in August of 1976 and was not re-solved .until April of 1977 when the inspector conducted a walk-through of the calibration facilities. During this time, major revisions had to be made to the Construction, QC Inspection, and QA Surveillance procedures.
4Further, in August of 1976, NRC Inspection reports showed that Brown and Roothad purchased material with inadequate documentation even though purchase ordert, specified specific documentation requirements. oThe trend snalysis through August 5,1976 showed that 335 DDR's had been written. 57 were for lack of or incomplete documentation on receipt ofmatebalsandequipment: 36 concered aggregate: 30 concered concrote and 28 an iron sub-contractors activities.
"The same NRC report stated that letters commenting on revisions of Gibbs and Hill specifications were ' dated after the purchase order supple-ments which implemented the revisions. Also in 1976, TUGCO purchased material was received with inadequate documentation. Further investigation. -
revealed that the documentation problem had been addressed as early as August of 1975.
~C5-17. (continued):
"In September of 1976, an NRC Report showed that a revision to Gibbs and Hill Specification 2323-MS 43A had arrived on site two months after the veddor had accepted the supplement to the purchase order which in-plemented the revision. The time lag in issuing the revision to the site caused material to arrive on site without the necessary procurement docu-ments available as required.
*0n September 20, 1976 the licensee infomed the Region IV staff that gradation problems with filter "A" material r.ny have the potential' of being a construction deficiency within the neaning of 10 CFR 50.55(e). It was detemined that large sandstones in filter "A" material had been found on August 19,1976 and were out of the grain size distribution specified, and required 9 feet of previously place naterial to be removed. In reviewing a letter from Brown and Root to TUSI, the inspector said that the letter offered "infomation on Erown and Root QA surveillance and status of material suppliers's QA program implenentation" which found that the supplier, General Portland was not conducting monthly raw material reports, material was not being checked, daily checklists were not ecmpleted on raw naterial going into the dump hopper and not all material was being screened and washed as
- required by purchase ordor. This construction deficiency resulted in a stop-work order.
" Drawing control problems found in December of 1976, showed that at the Unit 1 Containment and Auxiliary Building areas drawings wore being used for construction while marked "Not for Construction"; which Brown and Root explained didn't mean "not for construction" at all but something else. The Catch-22 explaination was that the stamp on a drawing applied only to the latest revision and work may proceed with the drawing in areas not affected by the latest revision, However, during the inspection it was discov'ered that .
a drawing marked'"Not for Construction" was being used where the last two revisions had not yet been approved by TUSI. The inspection report remained unresolved until B&R procedures were revised to Pelarify the allowable use of drawing stampod in various ways." ,
- Section 3.8.1.2.1 of the CPSES PSAR contains the comitment to the ASME Section III, Division'2, Code. In the Code, under personnel qualifications, it states that a candidate for concrete. inspection personnel be qualified in accordance with Appendix VII. Under the heading " Level I" it states that requirements include " completion of 8th grade plus 2 years of experience C5-17. (continued):
plus satisfactory completion of a training course and examination." Contrary to that requirement, in March of 1977 R.W. Hunt, a concrete testing sub-con-tractor was found to havo negated that requirenent during an NRC inspection. R.W. Hunt was hiring people without the 2 years experience requirement. This deviation did. result in a serious violation when a Level I inspector without any previous experience, falsified concrete documents. (CFUR will cover that later in these contentions.)
*During the same NRC Inspection report of March, 1977,it was found that there was procedural disparity in Brown and Root QA procedure No.15.1 and the B&R QA Manual, section 15.6.and were related to the falsification of concrete recoreds. Further in the'. March, 1977 report, it was found that the R.W. Hunt Company hcd failed to report the employee's alleged falsification of concrete records, in direct violation of the law. A procedural infraction, re: certifi-cation / documentation of inspectors was written against R. W. Hunt at the same time because the sub-contractor had allowed the Iavel I inspector to perform concrete cylinder compression break tests and aggregate sieve.anaylsis without evidence of demonstrated proficiency in accordance with the sub-contractor's procedure requirements and in yhlation of 10 CFR 50. App.B. Crit.V.
*In a November,1977 NRC Report, lack of quality records were found re the steel support structures for the Reactor Coolant and Steam Generator.The forms, selected at random during a routine inspection, did not contain signa-tures and dates, nor any reference to eight components supplied without doc-umentation. A subsequent review of an A/E contract drawing found a welding design change without authorization by the B&R shop inspector.
"CFUR contends that in the absense of QA, there is no confidence that CPSES will perform satisfactorily in service and therefore detailed testimony with the option of cross-examination, is absolutely imperative to convince the Commission and the public that CPSES is safe and reliable enough to con-mence pre-operational testing,"
From 5/7/79 Supplement to Petition for Leave to Intervene and Contentions by CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy), after going through the specific items already quoted herein; on page 54:
"7. There are numerous other problems with construction and procedures which are indicated in the I&E reports, and CASE would incorporate f. hem all herewith by reference. It is our intention to pursue them in detail during the hearings, and to present related testimony by expert witnesses."
, C5-17. (continued): In the almost three years since the pmceding was written, there have been continuing problems with construction at CPSES and with the QA/QC at the plant. See our comments on page 33 of this pleading, first paragraph. C5-18. We are not certain, since this was not our wording, exactly where the specific wording " materials used" came from. However, there are specific in-stances where questions have been raised in I&E reports about the materials used. We have not at this time identified these reports in this context. As we stated before, we are in the process of analyzing and organizing the I&E Reports and the audit reports recently mceived from Applicants and will supplement our answer as soon as we have done so. (See also the information from CFUR's pleading in answer C5-17 preceding, where some specifics are given.) C5-19. We believe that the wording " craft labor qualifications and working con-ditions (as they may affect QA/QC)" referred to in the contention came from: The 5/7/79 Supplemental Petition and Contentions of Intervenor:,, ACORN, Mary and Clyde Bishop and Oda and William Wood. -See pages 15 and 16 of this pleading, items 37 and 38. The 5/7/79 CFUR's Supplement to Petition for Leave to Intervene by Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation (CFUR), page 42 of this pleading, paragraph 3; page 44 of this pleading, paragraph 2; page 46 of this pleading, last paragraph con-tinued on page 47. The 5/7/79 Supplement to Petition for Leave to Intervene and Contentions by CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy), page 55:
"8. The applicant has failed to address the possible effects on the quality of workmanship which may be caused by: use of undocumented workers; use of inexperienced workers; high number of deaths among workers during construction; long working hours of workers. These matters need to be addressed and assurances obtained that there has been no lessening of quality of workmanship due to them. "
We have not specifically sorted the I&E Reports into this particular classifica-tion as worded in the contention. We will supplement when we have done so. C5-20. See answer to C5-19 above. Our answer with regards to the wording
" training and organization of QA/QC personnel" is basically the same as for C5-19.
C5-21. The tubstantial questions as to the adequacy of the construction of the facility' are many. We have already partially answered this question: see our answer to C5-17 of this pleading in particular. The basic questions which are raised are whether or not the Applicants should - be allowed to receive their operating license for CPSES and whether or not the NRC's mview, analysis and conclusions regarding whether or not Applicants should be allowed to receive their operating license for CPSES has a sound basis. See especially our comments on page 33 of this pleading, first paragraph. C5-22. Again, as in the many other instances stated in our responses, the phrase " lack of compliance" was not our wording. The wording contained in the 5/7/79 Supplement to Petition for Leave to Intervene and Contentions by CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy) was stated on page 50, Contention No.19:
"CPSES has not been built in a manner so as to comply with certain regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in particular 10 CFR 50.57(a)(2),10 CFR 50.57(a)(3), and 10 CFR 50.57(a)(6), and therefore should not be licensed for operation."
Applicants have not done what they said they would do, they have not complied with the NRC's regulations regarding their QA/QC program; violations have occurred again and again. The most recent striking example of this is contained in the Novembe r 23, 1981 letter to Brown and Root from ASME, copy of which was attached to CASE's 2/10/82 First Set of Interrogatories and Requests to Produce to NRC Staff. As Staff is aware, this was the Report of ASME Nuclear Survey Conducted on Octobe'r 12-14, 1981 for New NA and NPT. Specifically, the letter stated:
"The deficiencies noted in your program include, but are not limited to, the following items which require corrective action:
I. Quality Assurance Manual (A) The manual was vague, failed to establish required control, respon-sibilities, or provide for objective evidence that required activities were satisfactorily performed. (b) The manual established 'the Sumer addenda 1974 for piping and Winter addenda 1974 for component supports as the Code effectivity. The manual addressed activities only pemitted by later Code addenda; such as NX-2610, NA-3867.4(f) and supply of material - NCA-3820('e ), without any identification of the applicability of these provisions. (C) The manual control system did not include the exhibits displayed in the manual or any manual approval method. (D) The program elements of process control, nonconfomity control and document control required significant changes. l (E) The design control element (control) of field change design informa-
- tion and feed back of construction infomation to the Owner) was miss-ing from the manual.
(F) Al.1 elements required changes to provide definitive information since few auditable controls were included. l II. Implementation l i (A) Document Control - The manual requires that the File Custodians in l each department maintain a log of design changes received from the Owner. The File Custodian.is to mark the involved document' to in-dicate that a design change had been received and then the document user checks the log to find the applicable design change (s). C5-22. (continued): II. Implementation (continued): The log being maintained by the QA Department File Custodian contained numberous mistakes and was m',ssing information. Three of three de-sign packages, checked by the team, contained design changes not properly identified in the log. (B) Instruction Procedures & Drawings - B & R Construction Procedure 6.9C, reviewed by the Site QA Manager, was in direct conflict with the QA Manual and the Code (NA-5241) in that it stated that the ANI should sign a blank process sheet and then B & R would add the ANI hold poi nts . The AIA representatives stated that this procedurd was not honored by them and that they had requested the procedure to be revised. The procedure has not been revised. The purpose of the Site QA Manager's review is to assure that the procedure complies with the Code and the QA Manual. (C) Control of Purchased Materials, Items and Services -
.(1) Vendor. Control - B & R pmcured plate material from a vendor that they had surveyed and qualified as a Material Supplier of bolting and plate materials. The material had been formed into a saddle configuration by this vendor. The B & R survey and qualification of this vendor did not address review of any operation relative to fonning and the B & R purchase order did not define a fonning process pr procedure.
(2) The same material addressed in Cl was observed in the production shop with work in process. This material had not been receipt inspected in noncompliance with the QA Manual and the material was not identified as required by the B & R purchase order. B & R had divided the material and transferred the material identification incorrectly. B & R does not verify the transfer of material identification and during the review of the manual stated that this verification was unnecessary. (D) Control of Construction Processes - l (1) Process Sheets were observed in production that had not been reviewed with the ANI for establishment of hold points in non-compliance with the B & R QA Manual and NA-5241 of the Code.~ The process sheets CC-06B-002-S33R and AF-035-023-S33A are
. included in this finding although numerous such process sheets are in production. (See B above)
(2) Welding Procedure Specification 11012 for welding with impact , test requirements did not specify the travel speed but instead I controlled the heat input by Volt / amp range and maximum bead l width for a given electrode diameter. The Procedure Qualifi-cation Record 010AB127 for this WPS recorded a beam width l greather than that allowed by the WPS. C5-22. (continued): (E) Nonconformity Control - Nonconformity Control Report (NCR) M-2952 reported that a spool piece had been welded into the system backwards. B&Rl determined the disposition to be rework and not repair and thereby the disposition to cut the spool piece out and reweld it in the correct configuration was not reviewed by welding engineering, as would have been required by a repair designation. There appeared to be no consideration of the heat input effects on the material, etc. as would be expected with this type of nonconfomance. (F) Identification and Control of Material and Items - Component Supports are procedure as stamped items by the Owner. The Code Data Report does not list Code Case N-225. The Component Support is supplied to B & R with only the Code Data Report by the Owner. B & R then cuts the component support, removing the welds, and uses the material to fabricate other component supports. B & R does not have the Certificate of Compliance (C of C) for the material. (G) Authorized Nuclear Inspector Involvement - The ANI hold points on process sheets have been bypassed on numerous occasions. The ANI logbook documents these conditions and the volume would indicate a significant breakdown of the program and interface between B & R and the Authorized Inspection Agency personnel (See B and D-1 above)." This was discussed further in the November 25, 1981 letter from ASME 'to Brown and Root (copy of which was also attached to CASE's 2/10/82 First. Set of Interroga-tories and Requests to Produce to NRC Staff):
"The evaluation of the report has been completed and the decision is to concur with the team's recommendation that a resurvey is required.
"After due con 2deration of the findings as reported to you previously, the decision is that your subject Certificates are being permitted to expire on January 8,1982 and new Certificates will only be issued after evaluation of a successful resurvey report.
" Note that because of the expiration, we expect return of the Code Symbol Stamps NA & NPT on January 8,1982."
~
Although Applicants and NRC Staff did not see fit to report this to the Board in these proceedings because they did not believe they were required to and
- believed it was not that important, CASE does not share their small opinion
! of the importance of this event. Applicants and Staff have now confirmed that l Applicants have been proceeding with construction at.CPSES since January 8,1982, without the NA & NPT Certificates of Authorization and without the Code Symbol Stamps NA & NPT. . i C5-23. As has been stated before, our contention was taken primarily from I&E ~ Reports. We have not analyzed or sorted the I&E Reports into the category . specified in the particular wording referenced in this question. However, we are working on this and will supplement our answer as soon as we have completed i t. l C5-24. See answer te C5-23. C5-25. See answer to C5-23. C5-26. See answer to C5-23 and answer to C5-22. C5-27. See answer to C5-23. C5-28. See answer to C5-23. C5-29. See answer to C5-23 C5-30. See answer to C5-23. C5-31. The findings required by 10 CFR 50.57(a which we assert the Commission cannot make with respect to Comanche Peak are: 50.57(a) Pursuant to 50.56, an operating license may be issued by the Commission, up to the full tenn authorized by 50.51, upon finding that: (1) Construction of the facility has been substantially completed, in conformity with the construction permit and the application as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; and (2) The facility will operate in conformity with the application as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; and (3) There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by the operating license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in com-pliance with the regulations in this chapter; and (4) The applicant is technically and financially qualified to engage in the activities authorized by the operating license in accordance with the regulations in this chapter; and (5) The applicable provisions .of Part 140 of this chapter have been satisfied; , ad . l , (6) The issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common defense l and security or to the health and safety of the public. General Comments: Although Applicants and Staff were able to prevail on the Board in these proceedings to change the wording of the contention, this has not limited CASE's concerns to those set forth in the specific wording of the ' contention as ! presently wri t, ten. Further, we are not only concerned with the Applicants' nasponse l to their QA/QC requirements, but with-the response of the NRC as well; we have i grave questions and reservations about the NRC regulation of Applicants at CPSES. l This has been heightened recently by the cavalier attitude of the NRC to the [ ASME's allowing the certification and stamps to expire at CPSES. -
~
CASE believes this recent event gets to the ve y guts of the whole purpose of having a QA/QC program, and it concerns us very much that the NRC Staff does l not seem to be at all concerned about it. l General Canments (continued): We are further very concerned that the NRC Staff has not seen the need to do any trending about the overall (over the life of the plant's construction) potential problem areas which could affect the safe operation of CPSES insofar as construction problems are concerned. It was our understanding that.such trend-ing was being done at Region IV, but from the Staff's recent answers it appears that we were mistaken in this regard. We believe that such trending should have been done and done on a continuing basis, not only for CPSES, but for CPSES as compared to STNP to see if there are detrimental trends common to both plants where Brown and Root is the constructor. CASE is now working on such trending and will supplement our answers as soon as it is completed. It should also be pointed out that, although the specific wording of the con-tention was not. CASE's wording but was taken in many instances from pleadings of ACORN and CFUR as well, many of the other two Intervenors' concerns came from I&E reports. CASE has always said that we intended to pursue all the I&E Reports in these proceedings. We will therefore adopt most of the concerns expressed by ACORN and CFUR as our own, since they do indeed supplement and support many of our own concerns. Respectfully submitted, Yo fS
. grs.) Juanita Ellis, President CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy) 1426 S. Polk Dallas, Texas 75224 214/946-9446 214/941-1211, work l
l l l l H _ i l t l
a T xas 75224 214/946-9446 (CITIZENS ASSN. FOR SOUND ENERGY) 214/941-1211, work March 15,1982 Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Washington, D. C. 20555 Attn
- Chief, Docketing and Service Section
Dear Secretary:
Subject:
Application of Texas Utilities Generating f Company Et. Al for an Operating License l for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Units #1 and #2 (CPSES), Docket 50-445 & 50-446 3/15/82 CASE's Answers to NRC Staff's Fourth Set of Interrogatories to Intervenor CASE
- y. _
We are attaching the criginal affidavit regarding subject answers. Respectfully submitted, I CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy)
.%%d d6 s
(Mrs.) Juanita Ellis President Attachment cc: Service List
.e
STATE OF TEXAS ) Juanita Ellis, being duly sworn, deposes and says: That she is President of CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy), and knows the contents of the foregoing 3/15/82 CASE'S ANSWERS TO NRC STAFF'S FOURTH SET OF .INTERR0GATORIES TO INTERVEN0_R CASE and that the same is true of her own knowledge and belief. t i d'r t !Pr j * ( /l ~. p$nitaEllis SWORN TO and Subscribed before me on this 15th day of March ,'1982.
/ Y- d- W A'
~, ' Notary Public My Commission Expires: m n //-/
(SEAL)[ ! The original of this page is being mailed under separate cover, First Class Mail, tothe Secretary, U. S. Nuclear Re5ulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, y Attention: Chief, Docketing and Service Section, on this 15th day of March ,- 19&E I 1
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pw connEsWWE NC. t UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LTEEllSIlld BDAR6 In the Matter of I ,
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I APPLICATION OF TEXAS UTILITIES I Docket N'os. 50-445 GENERATING COMPANY, ET AL. FOR AN I and 50-446 OPERATING LICENSE FOR COMANCHE I PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION I UNITS #1 AND #2 (CPSES) I CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE By my Signature below, I hereby certify that true and correct copies of caw's ANSWERS TO NRC STAFF'S FOURTH SET OF INTERR0GATORIES TO INTERVENOR CASE have been sent to the names listed below this Ibth day of Earcn 1982, by: First Class Mail Administrative Judge Marshall E. Miller David J. Preister, Esq. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Environmental Protection Division Washington, D. C. 20555 . P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, TX 78711 Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom, Dean G. Marshall Gilmore, Esq. Division of Engineering, Architecture, 1060 W. Pipeline Road and Technology Hurst, Texas 76053 . Oklahoma State University Stillwater, Oklahoma 74074 l Dr. Richard Cole, Member , Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C, 20555 washington, D. C. 20555 l Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq. Atomic Safety and Licensing i DebevQise & Liberman Appeal Panel 1200 - 17th St., N. W. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20036 Washington, D. C. 20555 Marjorie Ulman Rothschild, Esq. Docketing and Service Section Office of Executive Legal Director Office of the Secre,tary l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D. C. 20555' Washington, D. C. 20555 l l l* J/Aub WO s.) Juanita Ellis, President ASE (CITIZENS ASSOCIATION FOR SOUND ENERGY) l i}}