ML20214W560
| ML20214W560 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 06/06/1987 |
| From: | Ellis J Citizens Association for Sound Energy |
| To: | TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214W563 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#287-3706 CPA, NUDOCS 8706160081 | |
| Download: ML20214W560 (33) | |
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, a w .7 t , , p. c 6/6/87 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '87 JW 10 All 51 ,
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOAR h,yh ,
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In the Matter of }{ Docket No. 50-445-CPA
}{
TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC }{ (Application for a COMPANY, et al. }{ Construction Permit)
(Comanche Peak Steam Electric }{
Station, Units 1 and 2) }{
CASE'S RESPONSE TO APPLICANTS' INTERROGATORIES TO " CONSOLIDATED INTERVENORS" (Set No. 1987-1) and MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy), Intervenor herein, hereby files this, its Response to Applicants' 3/18/87 Interrogatories to what Applicants have termed " Consolidated Intervenors" (Set No.1987-1) A/.
g/ CASE notes that there is no Board Order consolidating Intervenors CASE and Meddie Gregory for purposes of filing responses to interrogatories (and we would be opposed to any such Order); we therefore are responding separately, although there may be a few selected instances where we will adopt the same answers.
When last CASE spoke with Applicants' counsel regarding the timing of filing this response, we indicated that CASE wanted to respond in the same time frame as Meddie Gregory, which by agreement at that time with Applicants was to be the week of June 1, 1987. We note that the answers to interrogatories by Meddie Gregory will now be filed by June 15,1987 (Mr. Roisman's 5/27/87 letter to Applicants' counsel Mr.
Eggeling). CASE wants to alert Applicants to more details regarding our contention and its basis as promptly as possible; we are therefore filing this partial response at this time and will file a supplement to our answers as soon as possible, hopefully by the time Mr. Roisman files June 15, 1987. We may also have additional objections at that time.
8706160001 870606 PDR ADOCK 05000445 1 Q PDR
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F s s General Responses and Objections It should be noted that Applicants have, in their interrogatories, in effect asked for almost our entire case; obviously, we have not yet prepared our entire case. Further, in many instances, although much of the information is available, CASE has not broken it down and reassembled it in the manner requested by Applicants. Our problem is not that there is no information or documentation to support our contention; to the contrary, it is because there is so much that it is difficult to assemble it into a cohesive package or sections which will be responsive and helpful to Applicants as they have phrased their questions. We have attempted to respond, where possible, in the format of Applicants' Interrogatories (even though this requires, at-times, our having to prepare listings, summaries, etc., in a format especially to answer Applicants' interrogatories).
In general, CASE relies heavily upon information and documents obtained during the operating license proceedings for Comanche Peak (Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446) with which Applicants, the Board, and all parties in the construction permit proceedings (CPA) are well acquainted. The record of the operating license proceedings is a massive one, and CASE may rely in the construction permit proceedings on any of the tectimony, affidavits, documents, discovery received, and/or other information in the operating license proceedings (in or out of the current record of those proceedings),
as well as in Department of Labor (DOL) cases, and/or information from past and/or future whistleblowers and/or the testimony of possible other future witnesses (some of which have not yet been identified and none of which has been decided upon at this time).
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r-1 0 Unless otherwise indicated, it should be assumed that our responses refer to information from the operating license proceedings. Also, most (but not all) of the responses in this first response deal with design / design OA issues. All responses should be considered to be i_n addition to the information already provided in previous CPA filings. Many of the filings referred to in CASE's responses already contain extensive and/or detailed discussions regarding the matters at issue, and are documents which Applicants already have in their possession; we are therefore not repeating the extensive detail in this response, except in a few instances for purposes of illustration. CASE would object to, and moves for a protective order against, having to go into more extensive detail than contained herein at this time, until we have completed necessary discovery, and until and unless CASE decides to prepare the detailed listings and/or analyses which Applicants are requesting in many of their interrogatories.
It should be noted, however, that we already plan to supplement our responses shortly, as indicated in Footnote 1 preceding.
CASE's Responses Applicants' interrogatory 1:
"You have alleged (Amended Contention 2) that:
"'The delay in construction of Unit I was caused (sic)
Applicants' intentional conduct, which had no valid purpose and was the result of corporate policies which have not been discarded or repudiated by Applicants.'
"1. With regard to your allegation, please specify all instances of the Applicants' ' intentional conduct' upon which you base your allegation. In your response, please:
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t 0 "a) Identify all person (s) who engaged in this intentional conduct.
"b) Specify the date(s) upon which the conduct was undertaken.
"c) Explain precisely how the alleged intentional conduct caused a delay in construction of Unit 1; and, "d) Cite all documents which support your conclusions."
Answer:
CASE does not yet know all of the instances of Applicants' intentional conduct, and we have not combined into one analysis or document all instances of which we know of Applicants' intentional conduct upon which our allegation is based; there are numerous instances throughout the extensive record in the operating license proceedings and elsewhere. We are listing below some of them, which should be considered to be only a partial listing which we will supplement if and when we prepare further listings in the format Applicants have requested:
1.a) See answer to interrogatory 35 (to come later).
1.b) See answer to interrogatory 35 (to come later).
1.c) The intentional conduct of Applicants and their representatives has caused (and continues to cause) numerous delays in the construction of Unit 1, primarily because such conduct has delayed the prompt identification and correction of problems at Comanche Peak, allowed unacceptable or inadequate designs or work to proceed and become built into the plant, made it difficult if not impossible for anyone to determine what has actually been built at the plant, and resulted in a plant which is now indeterminate at best. More specifically, Applicants' conduct has caused delays in 4
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- ways which include, but are not limited to, the following partial list:
(1). Applicants insisted on waiting.until the end of the design y h process to attempt to locate and correct design errors (i.e., Applicants' " iterative design process"), in violation
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of the . requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. This-ultimately'resulted in numerous extensive delays.
(2) Applicants have not responded adequately or in a prompt
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manner to concerns _when they were raised ~by individuals who
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were_still working at the plant, thereby continuing with
. improper, erroneous, unacceptable, unique (sometimes to the point of being indefensible, unsupportable, or unsalvagable) and/or inadequately documented construction and/or design. -
'(3) Applicants have engaged, and are continuing to engage, in-harassment and intimidation of QA/QC-personnel and/or other employees or agents of Applicants, thereby not only continuing with and expanding improper, erroneous, unacceptable, unique, and/or inadequately documented construction and/or design, but also making it difficult if not impossible for others (even had they been so inclined) to adequately and.promptly respond to such concerns.
(4) ' Applicants have knowingly utilized a large number of "somewhat knowledgeable" and "somewhat inexperienced" (incompetent)- engineering personnel in the engineering design process, as well utilizing improperly trained and/or incompetent personnel in other areas. This deliberate use of 5
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-incompetent and/or unqualified personnel has unnecessarily increased the number, types, and severity. of problems and
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errors at the plant, wasted much time and resources, and-g resulted in 'still further delay in the prompt identification-and' correction Of problems at the plant.
(5)' Applicants havet etained or rehired many of the same individuals who were involved in the original-improper,
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- if q
~J erroneous, unacceptable, unique, and/or inadequately documented construction. and/or design, thereby increasing the ' >
probability that such individuals will' continue and perpetuate the practices which resulted in the problems which have now made the condition of the plant. indeterminate at
, best. - This,-in turn, has resulted and will result in further
\ , delay in the prompt identification and correction of problems at the plant.
-(6) Applicants have retained, transferred, and/or promoted some
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of the same middle or upper management individuals of the parent company, Texas Utilities Company, and of other TU companies, who were in control or in positions of authority at the time of the original improper, erroneous, unacceptable, unique, and/or inadequately documented-construction and/or design, thereby increasing the
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probability that such individuals will continue and
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t perpetuate the practices which resulted in the problems which i have now made the condition of the plant indeterminate at
'best. This, in turn, has resulted an6 will result in further 6
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- delay in the prompt identification and correction of problems at the plant.
(7) 'In CASE's opinion, the apparent' support for and/or direction by Applicants of the inferences and tactics of Applicants' attorneys through the years has of ten been, and continues' to Ebe, a major cause of much wasted time and resources, obscuring of the facts, and resulting in still further delay
-- including delay in the prompt identification and ccorrection of problems _at the plant.
For example, presumably in consultation with their many and~various attorneys over time:
(a) Applicants have at times thwarted the use of one of the primary tools -- discovery -- which' is supposed to save time at trial; in'some instances they have refused to answer discovery, in some instances they have been unnecessarily and unreasonably slow in
. answering discovery or in updating . discovery responses (and, in fact,- there are some
' interrogatories to which CASE specifically requested responses, which we have not received, in t
order to more fully answer these interrogatories being addressed herein), in some instances they
.. have given answering discovery very low priority status, and in some instances (primarily but not exclusively prior to the 8/19/86 Agteement Between CASE and Applicants Regarding Discovery Matters ,
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n Relating to Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant) they have been difficult to deal with. CASE has usually tried to be very patient with Applicants, realizing that they indeed do have a tremendous task before them and many. legitimate demands on their time.
(b) In some instances, especially in the past couple of years or so, Applicants have filed interlocutory appeals with the Appeal Board, rather than utilizing the time taken up for the development and pursuit of.such appeals in more fruitful pursuits such as attempting to assure that the plant has been designed and constructed properly and safely.
(c) ' There are indications that Applicants' attorneys are taking the belated position that the design of the plant is-not a valid issue in the operating license proceedings, rather than utilizing the time taken up for the development and pursuit of such position in more f ruitful pursuits such ~ as attempting to assure that the plant has been designed and constructed properly and safely.
-(d) The various "get well" plans presented through the years have been difficult to follow, inconsistent, and shifting (almost to the point of being unintelligible at times, such as is the current situation).
(e) Applicants have been slow to, or have refused to, admit errors; see also (8) following; and t
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! t (f) Representations made to the NRC Staff, the Licensing Board, CASE, and the public have at times been questionable to say the least -- see also (9) following.
All of these have resulted in much time and resources-wasted unnecessarily in a wide variety of ways: by CASE in.
filing motions to compel, responding to motions for protective orders, appeals, etc., and by the Board in having to rule on motions to compel, motions for protective orders, etc.), and in much time and resources' wasted unnecessarily by CASE, the NRC Staff, and the Licensing Board in reading, reviewing, analyzing, discussing . filing pleadings regarding, and_having hearings regarding Applicants' various Plans, and generally in trying to determine the truth.
(8) -For years, Applicants have consistently refused to recognize and/or admit that the concerns raised by_ CASE witnesses during hearings and by other critics of their plant (such as whistleblowers) were valid concerns which raised significant or important issues. Although thers have recently been some admissions by Applicants (see,_for instance, transcripts of March 12 through 14, 1987_and April 7, 1987 meetings) that some such concerns were indeed valid, the record of the operating license proceedings still clearly reflects Applicants' continuing refusal to admit or repudiate errors and problems. In fact, as recently as April 27, 1987, Applicants went out of their way to point out to the
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t 'O Licensing Board in the operating license proceedings that (Applicants' 4/27/87 Comments in Response to " Proposed Order Concerning Standardized Computer Filing Formats" at pages 12 and 13):
". . . the Applicants submit that the Board is in error regarding the status of the CPRT Program Plan and the Results Reports prepared'in implementation thereof. None of these documents has been
' filed.' None of them has been offered into evidence; none is in evidence; and prior to the commencement of hearings, there is no means by which they might become in evidence. Rather, as we believe was stated in the letters transmitting these materials to the Board, this material was provided-to the Board for information only. At such time as hearings resume.on the Operating License application, those documents on which the Applicants will rely to establish their entitlement to an operating license will, through appropriate sponsoring witnesses, be offered into evidence in accordance with the Commission's Rules of Practice.
The assumption that anything else is properly before the Board for anything other than information, or that anything else might properly be the basis for any aspect of a Board decision, is, we respectfully submit, not correct." (Emphasis added.)
It is thus clear, from Applicants' own statements, not only that they still refuse to admit or repudiate their errors and problems, but that they have absolutely no intention of ever doing so in the future. Their stated intent is to place in the record only those documents and that testimony which are favorable. This refusal by Applicants to admit the existence of problems and to admit and repudiate Applicants' role and responsibility for them has resulted and will result in still further delay in the prompt identification and correction of problems at the plant.
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(9) The testimony and inferences of Applicants' witnesses and attorneys in the operating license proceedings has often been misleading and has (in CASE's opinion) often contained material false statements. Such testimony and inferences-have helped to obscure the facts, wasted much tir.e and resources, and resulted in still further delay in the prompt identification and correction of problems at the plant.
Some specific examples of this include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) Initially the Licensing Board and (he NRC Staff were under the impression that the independent design review work to be done by Cygna (the independent design review organization chosen by Applicants at that time) would include and address the Walsh/Doyle allegations -- in fact, the Board' at one point expressed concern that Cygna's review should not be limited primarily to the Walsh/Doyle aspects of the systems that were to be examined (2/24/84 Transcript pages 10,337/14-10,339/4). It was not until 11/21/84 -- some nine months later --
that Applicants' Mr. ' Beck stated (certainly to the surprise of the NRC Staff) that Cygna's role, particularly in Phase 3, was not intended ever to address item by item specific Walsh/Doyle concerns and that that was simply not the scope of work that was given to Cygna (11/21/84 Transcript of 11
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conference call, Enforcement Interview, Division of Licensing, with NRC Staff, Applicants, Cygna, and CASE participating, page 10, line 25, through page 11, line 3, et seq.).
(b) Another instance of misleading statements and inferences by Applicants and their counsel can be
'found in the 2/22/84 and 11/21/84 Transcripts.
During the 2/22/84. hearings, there was a discussion between the Licensing Board Chairman, Applicants' counsel, and CASE regarding what documents Applicants or CASE should be sending to Cygna (see-2/22/84 Transcript page 9906/22-9907/18). At that time, Applicants' counsel stated that he would provide Cygna with "all public documents." Yet -
some nine months later, on 11/21/84, Cygna stated that, although they had requested lawyers to receive copies of all of Applicants' motions for summary disposition, they had not as of that date received them (see 11/21/84 Iranscript of conference call, Enforcement Interview, Division of Licensing, with NRC Staff, Applicants, Cygna, and CASE participating, page 15, line 20, through page 16, line 10).
(c) At one point during the 4/24/84 Cygna hearings, there was considerable discussion regarding standard industry practice (Tr. 12,359-12,376/20),
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.O particularly in connection with two documents which CASE's expert Mr. Doyle, who was cross-examining Cygna witnesses at the time, attempted to use in his cross-examination: American National Standard ANSI / MSS SP-58, " Pipe Hangers and Supports ---
Materials, Design and Manufacture;" and Standard Practice MSS SP-69, " Pipe Hangers and Supports --
Selection and ' Applkcation" -- both of which were developed and approved by the Manufacturers.
Standardization Society of the Valve'and Fittings Industry, Inc. (see CASE Attachments A and B hereto, respectively).
Cygna's witnesses were not familiar with the documents, did not know whether or not-they were used at Comanche Peak, and had not considered them at any point in doing the design review (Tr.
12,369/21-12,370/5, 12,371/3-12,372/1, 12,374/12-12,376/20). Mr. Doyle was unsuccessful in utilizing these two-documents which, as he put it, were " generally used outside the nuclear industry and Criterion 1 [of 10 CFR Part 50] would suggest that if this criterion for processing plants, refineries, et cetera, is critical to their design, then under Criterion 1, the same applies to a nuclear power plant" (Tr. 12,375/17-21).
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-s Applicants' counsel Mr. Reynolds objected to the use of the document-(Tr. 12,372/2-5),'and there were several of Applicants' engineering personnel-
-present in'the room at that time who were J
presumably knowledgeable'regarding what was supposed to be in use or applicable =to Comanche Peak. The clear inference from the objection of' Applicants' counsel and the silence of Applicants' engineering personnel who were present was that the two documents ha'd nothing whatsoever to do-with Comanche Peak.
However, the fact was that Applicants were then and had for some- time been committed to the ,
use of both MSS SP-58 and MSS'SP-69 at Comanche Peak. Gibbs & Hill Specification 2323-MS-46A, Revision 5, February 10, 1984, specifically stated (pages 3-15 and 3-20, see CASE' Attachment C hereto):
"3.3 CODES AND STANDARDS
" Design, fabrication, materials, certification, code stamping, and testing requirements included in this specification shall be.in accordance with the edition and addenda of the following codes, legislation, regulations, and standards, in effect on July 28, 1975, unless otherwise specified below or authorized by the owner. . .
"g. Manuf acturers' Standardization Society (MSS)
"(1) MSS SP-58, Pipe Hangers and Support-Materials and Design 14
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"(2) MSS SP-69, Pipe Hangers and Supports-Selection and Application" At best, Applicants' counsel apparently did not make any effort to ascertain whether or not the documents in question were applicable to Comanche Peak. Even had Mr. Reynolds not been aware of this fact, there were engineering personnel present who should have known and should have told him; if they did not know, this calls into question-their competence, and if they did know, this calls into question their credibility. And, if neither Applicants' counsel or engineering personnel knew, it appears that either no one with Applicants (counsel or engineering personnel) bothered to check after the hearing; or, if they'did, they did not bother to inform the Licensing Board (or presumably Cygna) that Applicants were and had been for some time committed to both documents in 4 question.
(10) Following the Board's 12/28/83 Memorandum and Order (Quality Assurance for Design), LBP-83-81 18 NRC 1410 et seq. (as clarified by the Board's 2/8/84 Memorandum and Order (Reconsideration Concerning Quality Assurance for Design) and the Board's comments at transcript pages 10,337/14-10,339/4 and 10,339/24-10,340/5, as corrected by the Board),
Applicants chose not to follow the suggestions in the Licensing Board's 12/28/83 Order. At that time, Applicants 15
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had an opportunity to follow the strong suggestions of the Licensing Board, which might well have resolved the concerns of the Board to the point that Applicants would have been granted an operating license following the completion, and
! testimony regarding the results of, that plan of action.:
! Applicants,,however, made a conscious and deliberate decision 1
to do something else, as discussed in more detail following
-- which ultimately resultedtin'still further delay.
2 (11)-Applicants then came up with a "get well" plan which was basically three-pronged: (a) an " independent" design review
-by Cygna Energy Services of certain specific systems; (b) an internal effort which finally took the form of seventeen Motions for Surmary Disposition by Applicants and their consultants on specific design / design QA issues; and (c) the retention of an independent expert from the academic community with impeccable credentials to review the basic engineering principles to be addressed in Applicants' Plan and to provide testimony to the Board.
Applicants have now abandoned their-1984 three pronged-plan: (a) they have'been slow to provide necessary information needed by Cygna to be able to complete addressing the issues into which it has been looking, they have attempted to narrow the scope and diminish the impact of Cygna's review, and portions of Cygna's review apparently are going to be taken over by Applicants' new consultants (who can make no claim to the independence criteria under which 16
a Cygna was operating); (b) Applicants have now withdrawn their Motions for Summary Disposition (an unusual, perhaps unheard of, action in NRC proceedings) over CASE's strong objections; and (c) no one has ever heard a peep out of Applicants' academic expert, Dr. Arthur P. Boresi, who was retained not by Applicants directly, but rather was retained directly by the law firm of Applicants' then-counsel Mr. Reynolds (see CASE Attachment D hereto, especially letter of April 27, 1984, from Mr. Reynolds to Professor Boresi, and May 10, 1984, " Notice and Acknowledgement of Work to Be Performed by University Faculty or Professional Staff for Outside Employers," signed by Mr. Reynolds). (This also raises the questions of why Applicants did not retain him directly and whether or not there is another whole layer of outside experts and consultants retained by Applicants' counsel of which the Board and parties are unaware).
(a) Applicants' reluctance to provide Cygna with necessary information in a timely f ashion and their narrowing of Cygna's scope has delayed and severely restricted Cygna's ability to promptly complete its review in the thorough manner which had been expected by the Licensing Board, the
'NRC Staff, and CASE. (b) Applicants' aborted Motions for Summary Disposition took up a tremendous amount of time and effort by Applicants, the NRC staff, CASE, and the Licensing Board and resulted in still further delay. (c) The primary delay thus far regarding Applicants' academic expert has been 17
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experienced because Applicants have not completed their
' responses to CASE's discovery requests regarding Dr. Boresi and because the Board has not had the benefit of his review and comments, plus the additional delay in arriving at the facts.
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Applicants' failure to complete their 1984 "get well" plan has helped to obscure the facts, wasted much time and resources, and resulted in still further delay in the prompt identification and correction of problems at the plant.
(12) In January 1985, Applicants asked that the hearings be stopped and that everything be put on hold while they attempted to get their act together. Applicants next came up with yet another plan (the CPRT Plan) which was to address and resolve all of the issues outstanding which stood between Applicants and their being able to obtain an operating license.
Again over CASE's strong objections, Applicants made a deliberate-decision to include, as part of that plan, reinspections of both construction and design at the same time (rather than the obvious and prudent alternative of performing the design reinspection first, followed by reinspection of any reconstruction necessary because of design changes). It has always been, and still is, CASE's belief that this has resulted, and will in the future result, in wasteful, unnecessary, and time-consuming additional delays because of the necessity of tearing out or reworking recently reinspected construction due to design changes.
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.I Now Applicants have apparently even abandoned parts of 1
the CPRT Plan, replacing it or revising it with such at-this- ;
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time still-unclear programs as the Design Basis Consolidation Program (DBCP) and others which do not even follow what CASE already considered to be inadequate procedures, etc., set out in the CPRT Plan.
(13) Over a period of several years, Applicants have consistently ignored CASE's continuing calls for a 100% reinspection of
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design, followed by a 100% reinspection of construction. Had Applicants not been so reluctant to bite the bullet and perform these 100% reinspections (in the logical order of design first, then construction), they could have avoided all of the now-aborted "get well" plans and the NRC Staff, the Licensing Board, CASE, and the public would.have more confidence that they knew what actually exists at Comanche Peak.
Applicants' actions, however, have now made it difficult if not impossible for anyone to determine what has been built at the plant (i.e., the quality and safety of the plant is
- indeterminate at best) and have, by their own actions, called into question even their CPRT Plan (which is, at least at this time, in Revision 3) plus whatever other side programs
, Applicants have developed or have in development. This has and will continue to result in still further delay.
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l 1.d) The following is a partial listing of supporting documents, which will be supplemented at such time as CASE may further analyze and compile documents in the manner requested by Applicants:
1.d)(1) NRC Staff Exhibit Nos. 180 through 196: " Supplemental Testimony of William A. Crossman, Robert C. Stewart and Robert G. Taylor Regarding the Annual Assessments of the Applicants' Performance (Contention 5)" (Staf f Exhibit No.
180) and attachments thereto (Trend Analyses by NRC Region IV for 1976 through 1979, and Inspection Report 80-25 performance evaluation for the period 8/1/79-7/31/80, Staff Exhibit Nos. 181 through 196), admitted into evidence 7/27/82 at Tr. 2336. Included in these NRC Region IV Trend Analyses and performance evaluation were the following:
From 1976 Trend Analysis, NRC Staff Exhibit 184:
"Cgrporate Management Involvement in Regulatory Matters "During the early part of 1976, it became apparent to the Principal Inspector that the effectiveness of the licensee's OA/QC Program was in a state of degradation as a result of a domineering and overpowering control by the contractor's site construction management.
"On June 11, 1976, at the request of the Region IV staff, the President of TUCCO/TUSI, two Senior Vice Presidents and the OA Manager met in conference at the NRC regional office in order to alert top management of the seriousness of the apparent breakdown in corporate management. Follow-on meetings were held July 30 and September 3, 1976 (ref. IE Inspection Reports 76-08 & 76-09). In addition, numerous informal discussions were held on and off site during the period September 1976 thru January 1977. Recent site inspections have revealed signs of a slow, but progressive, turn-around to a more effectual management control by the licensee; however, the matter remains an item of priority until a more satisfactory condition is demonstrated by the licensee. Additional meetings with the licensee corporate management have been mutually agreed to. The next meeting is tentatively scheduled for the second week in February 1977. . ."
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From 1979 Trend Analysis, NRC' Staff Exhibit 195:
" Corporate Management Involvement in Regulation Matters
"(1) The licensee always has senior site management available'for the various interviews.
"(2) The licensee sends'all letters to us signed by.
the legally responsible company. officer.
"(3) The site management appears very responsive to our. inspection findings.
"(4) It is my impression, based on' discussions with the licensee's two Executive Vice-Presidents most involved with the construction phase, that they are very involved and knowledgeable of our inspection findings.
" Effectiveness of OA/0C Program "This item seems to need addressing in two parts to be effective:
"Part one is the overall theory of Quality Assurance as a management tool. In this area, I believe that the licensee has been led down a poor path by Brown & Root during past years.
It appears to me that Brown & Root has, in many instances, provided construction procedures to fulfill [10 CFR Part 50]
Appendix.B that provide a minimum amount of direction to the construction force and yet comply to the words, if _ not the spirit of Appendix B. This is:not too bad if'the construction force is really a competent group but leads to some pretty bad things if that is not the case. What I have begun to see, but have difficulty proving, is that the Brown &
Root construction philosophy is to build something any way they want to and then put it up to the engineer to document and approve the as-built condition. If the engineer refuses, he is blamed for being to (sic) conservative and not responsive to the client's needs.
Thus, the driving force force (sic) behind my request for a special engineering audit of site operations.
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"The second part of the addressment is to that phase called QC. Only recently has there been a real effort on the part of the licensee itself, or on the part of Brown & Root, to write explicit instruction to the line inspectors on what they were to inspect.
Previously, the procedures were frequently pretty general, again not too bad if the inspectors are knowledgeable in the subject being inspected but terrible if they are not.
In a couple of cases, I have been able to show them that their people are essentially incompetent even though they had been through the site training and had been certified as competent. I see a desire on the part of the licensee to turn this situation around in the important areas of electrical and piping installation. However, the situation discussed above has a bearing since too often an installation clearly accomplished other than as originally designed and buildable has been approved by the licensee's on-site engineering arm as fulfilling requirements.
In effect, the engineer has approved a nonconforming installation in advance of QC being called. QC is then signing for the as-built condition and the underlying problem is not addressed. . .
"Any Other Trends Indicative of Poor Performance "I don't see any other probler not discussed above except possibly a future development in the public relations arena. it seems likely to me that the licensee will use his full powers to be less open with us in the area of identified construction deficiencies than he has in the past. 1 think he will take maximum advantage of [10 CFR) part 50.55(e) and the ,
[NRC Staff] guidance to go through the necessary formalities but avoid, if at all possible, having to report to us. It is, of course, premature to really get into this arena until we prove a case."
From NRC Region IV Inspection Report 80-25, NRC Staff Exhibit 181, page 6, item 2.g.:
" Effectiveness and Attitudes of Licensee Personnel in Complying with NRC Requirements 22
-_. _ _ _ _ _ . - ~._ __ _. _ ____ . _ .- _ . _ . _ . , _ , . _ _
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"- Licensee Construction and Engineering =
Management - The NRC personnel stated that it appears there is a continuing tendency to engineer away construction problems rather than enforce complia.1ce to drawings and specifications.. The licensee stated that he.is taking several management actions with the engineering and construction personnel to alleviate this situation. The NRC personnel stated that there was no specific regulatory concern since saf ety does not appear to have been compromised as yet but could possibly be sometime in the future if appropriate actions were not taken as
' indicated above. ..
"- Brown and Root Construction Supervision and Labor Force - The NRC participants indicated that their impression of this area indicated that there is a need to
, make this group more aware of nuclear power plant construction requirements.
That there is a considerable difference to those of a conventional fossil plant.
The licensee responded that he has issued instructions to . Brown and Root to reduce the labor crew size reporting to foremen and the number of crews reporting to general foremen. The licensee stated' that it is expected that this will' provide increased control over the quality affecting actions of the labor force.
"3. Summary of Licensee ' Performance "The Region IV Director, at the conclusion 'of the meeting, emphasized that the licensee has the principal and legal responsibility for all matters regarding the construction and operations of a nuclear power plant as specified in the law and in the Regulations.
Corporate management is essential in all phases of the project to assure appropriate execution of the licensee's responsibilities. The licensee responded that he is aware of his responsibilities and that in response to these responsibilities, he continuously increased his involvement in the project during the past three years until he is now essentially in complete control of 23
1 the project except for_ the immediate line supervision of.the labor force. The licensee indicated that as new or additional involvement becomes necessary, he will respond accordingly. . . "
Construction Appraisal Inspection 50-445/83-18, 50-446/83-12,
-under cover letter dated 4/11/83, for inspection conducted 1/24/83-2/4/83 and 2/14/83-3/3/83 (hereinafter referred to as the CAT Report), NRC ' Staff Exhibit 206, bound in at back of volume following Tr. 6286, accepted into evidence at Tr.
7726; especially the following, excerpted from pages IX-3 through IX-9:
"(2) Field Structural Engineering
". . . A review of the'Cibbs & Hill ' CMC Master
'Index' (structural) indicated there were on the ,
order of'four-to-five thousand of such changes that had been generated but had not'yet been ' final' reviewed by Cibbs & Hill.
"It was determined that proper verification of such ,
changes might ultimately be accomplished. However, the volume of CMCs [ Component Modification Cards]
and DCAs (Design Change Authorizations] remaining l to be reviewed by the original designer, as well as l- those designs that have as yet to be performed in the structural area, is of concern to the NRC CAT
^
inspector. The concern involves the adequacy of review which will be provided considering the approaching September,1983 Fuel Load Date.
". . . The NRC CAT inspector determined that ,
inspections performed and' completed were not always e to the latest issued design document. . . In addition, the licensee's QC inspections were performed in six instances to CMCs with earlier revisions than the latest revision issued and in ,
effect at- the time the inspection was performed o
[Similar conditions were discovered and discussed in the Electrical and Instrumentation Construction Section of the report Section II)]. . . ."
(Emphases in the original.)
"(3) Electrical Engineering
". . . A review by the NRC' CAT inspector of the
'DCA Verification Log' indicated that of some four-3 hundred eleven design changes verified, fifty-three had not been incorporated into the actual design a
24 1
.~ .
documents used for QC inspection. Due to the high number of unincorporated changes, licensee representatives indicated that the procedure would be changed from the current thirty percent sample to a one-hundred percent sample.
"However, the NRC CAT inspector had other additional concerns with the licensee's program at the time of this assessment. . .
". With the approaching Fuel Load Date, and the numbers of DCAs to be verified, the thoroughness of the review by DCVG may be jeopardized due to pressures from the construction completion schedule. . .
". Unsatisfactory conditions discovered during the verification process were not documented on an NCR but rather on a ' Request for Information of-Clarification' (RFIC) form . . .
". Documented deficiencies relative to installation were not documented on the Master Punchlist for
' turnover', as the licensee representatives indicated only NCR items were referenced on the master punchlist. These deficiencies were applied to a separate ' deficiency' list, and then were tracked by the DCVG. . .
"The responsible licensee representatives, during the discussion of these inadequacies, commited to revise the program by the addition of a tracking system which would correlate the affected inspection documentation to the latest related design change document. . .
"At the time of this inspection, as no work has been essentially fully completed from the design and construction standpoint for these areas, the NRC CAT inspector cannot determine from a sampling review whether or not the activity or installation was performed to the approved design and that an adequate inspection was performed to this approved design. . . . the existing design verification program would not satisfy the licensee's FSAR commitments . . . Whether or not the licensee's proposed revisions to the program are adequate to accomplish the desired objective in the alloted time span cannot be determined. . . .
"(5) Piping Support Engineering "The review of these CMCs and inspection 25 I
l t
3 documentation in the ASME area by the NRC CAT inspector also revealed that design changes are apparently initiated as a result of the performance of QC inspection. These changes are then processed to accept the 'as-built' configuration, rather than modify the support to actually satisfy the design document in effect at the time of the inspection.
These practices do not provide incentives to the crafts to properly construct in strict accordance with the design document. ..
"(b) VCD Program Walkdown by OC Inspectors "From this' review, it was difficult for the NRC CAT inspector to determine the thoroughness and adequacy of this [ Vendor Control Drawing or VCD Program] walkdown and/or inspection. . .
Additionally, the NRC CAT inspector could not determine when a component was ' final' inspected."
(Emphasis in the original.)
"The NRC CAT inspector considers that these inspections do not necessarily provide adequate assurance that the elements / components have been installed to requirements. As indicated in the Mechanical Construction Section (Section III.B.2) of this report, numerous examples of hardware accepted by VCD walkdown were found not to comform (sic) to design by the NRC CAT inspectors, the ASME Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI), and QC during subsequent inspections. ..
"c. Summary Comments Concerning the Design Change Process "The design change process at CPSES is complex, and at times, cumbersome. The NRC CAT inspector's review of design change processes in the various disciplines revealed a design change program with controls incorporated under a ' design-construct-design review' philosophy. This philosophy resulted in a large number of design changes and a repetitive inspection process. (NOTE: There are approximately 70,000 Crics and 15,000 DCAs that have been issued. This number does not include revisions).
"Although this design change process may be difficult, there is nothing in NRC requirements to discourage or prohibit the use of such a system.
In general, design change controls at CPSES satisfied the applicant's FSAR commitments and the ANSI standard requirements. However, with this
[
. 26 I
i
. s l
type of system in place, actual verification of hanger, support, electrical, and mechanical equipment installations to the appropriate design requirements cannot be performed until ' work activities' have been completed. Few, if any, installations could be verified as few have been designated as completed under the licensee's context of ' completion.' Thus, the final adequacy of these controls could not be determined by the NRC CAT inspector."
"2. Corrective Action Systems "The CPSES FSAR requires a nonconformance report be
' utilized for the identification, documentation, dispositioning, and verification of deficiencies in characteristics, documentation, or procedures which render the quality of an item unacceptable or indeterminate'. The FSAR also requires procedures for trending of nonconformance reports to identify trends adverse to quality and for the initiation of corrective action requests for significant and repetitive nonconformances. . .
"As discussed in Sections II, III, and IX of this report, overall findings indicate numerous instances in the electrical and mechanical areas where nonconformances were identified. However, various methods (e.g., punchlists, inspection reports, verbal, and other informal methods) were used to address and resolve these nonconformances, providing no collective evidence of appropriate corrective action and/or justification.
Additionally, the NRC CAT inspectors discovered that the Mechanical / Civil QA/0C Supervisor directed his supervisors to document nonconforming conditions on an unsatisfactory Inspection Report (IR) only, contrary to the licensee's FSAR commitments and QA program requirements."
12/28/83 Board Memorandum and Order (Quality Assurance for Design), LBP-83-81 18 NRC 1410 et seq., especially pages 1 through 7, 20 through 26, 29 and 30, 33, 41, 48, 58 and 59, 62, 65 and 66, 69 through 71. The Board stated, for instance, at pages 69 through 71 (excerpted):
". . . we have carefully analyzed those aspects of the record that have been most significant or that appeared on initial impression to be the most troubling. This analysis has persuaded us that the record before us casts doubt on the design quality of Comanche Peak, both because applicant has failed 27
_ - - _ - _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ __ . - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
to adopt a system to correct design deficiencies promptly and because our record is devoid of a satisfactory explanation for several design questions raised by intervenors. ..
". . . We consider the absence of a program to correct design deficiencies promptly to be a serious deficiency, mitigated only slightly because it was acquiesced in by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's staff."
2/8/84 Memorandum and Order (Reconsideration Concerning i- Quality Assurance for Design), especially pages 2 and 4 through 7.
10/2/85 Memorandum and Order (Applicants' Motion for
. Modification), especially page 4 Footnote 3:
"We note that our December 1983 Memorandum and Order, LBP-83-81,18 NRC 1410 at 1452 concluded, in part, that '[T]he record before us casts doubt on the design quality of Comanche Peak, both because applicant has failed to adopt a system to correct design deficiencies and because our record is devoid of a satisfactory explanation for several design questions raised by intervenors.' Nothing subsequently presented to us, up to this time, has detracted from this conclusion."
1.d)(2) 12/28/83 Board Memorandum and Order (Quality Assurance for Design), LBP-83-81 18 NRC 1410 et seq., especially pages 24 f and 25, which stated, in part:
! "Despite the fact that some of their (Messrs. Walsh and Doyle] observations were potentially valuable, applicant was procedurally deaf to their 4 concerns."
9/23/83 Board Memorandum and Order (Emergency Planning, Specific Quality Assurance issues and Board Issues),
, including, for example, Applicants' failure to properly consider and deal with the concerns of Mr. Robert flamilton regarding adhesion testing of protective coatings (page 21)
!j
! 2/8/84 Memorandum and Order (Reconsideration Concerning Quality Assurance for Design), bottom of page 5 continued on top of page 6.
I i 28 1
. _ _ . _ _ . .________...___,-.-__.-m. . _ _ , _ _ . _ . - , . , _ _ .
1.d)(3) 1/4/83 Memorandum and Order (admitting into evidence and making part of the record in the operating license proceedings CASE Exhibit 738, Recommended Decision dated December 3,1982, filed by an Administrative Law Judge of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) in a matter involving the alleged illegal discharge of Charles A. Atchison, complainant, by Brown and Root, Inc., respondent (Case No.
82-ERA-9)), which stated, in part (excerpted from pages 2 through 6):
" Exhibit 738 is a detailed, closely reasoned opinion and proposed order, finding that Mr.
Atchison's wrongful discharge as a quality control (OC) inspector by Brown and Root resulted from his complaints about and reporting of construction defects and quality control deficiencies. . .
Sustantial evidence was described and analyzed concerning Mr. Atchison's reporting of alleged welding defects in pipe whip restraints, filing of nonconformance reports . . ., ostensible reasons for discharge, NRC investigative reports . . . , Mr.
Atchison's job performance, and the ' pow-wow' note of April 12, 1982.
"Some of the exculpatory testimony offered by the respondent's witnesses was found to be ' incredible, false and pretextual'. [ Footnote 3 omitted.] It further stated:
"'The weight of this evidence supports a finding that as of his April 12, 1982 job removal by Brandt and job termination by Purdy, respondent had no legitimate business reason for his removal and termination, and that he was removed by Brandt and terminated by Purdy solely because he filed NCR #296 and NCR #361, protected conduct within the Act's meaning; but for this conduct complainannt, as of April 12, 1982, would not have been removed from his non-ASME job in Brandt's group, and terminated by Purdy. It is further found these protected activities were the sole bases for Brandt and Purdy's conclusion complainant was unable to perform his assigned tasks, and did not follow superaisory instructions and the motivating basis for Brandt and Purdy's 29
evaluation and administrative response, Brandt to remove and Purdy to fire.'"
(Footnote 4 omitted.)
". . . We have previously ruled that allegations of wrongful discharge of a QC inspector for reporting construction defects is a serious matter, and that
' labor practices such as the firing of employees who report construction deficiencies can have serious safety implications.'" (Footnote 6 omitted.)
". . . The Intervenor has challenged the NRC Staff's competence in handling and investigating OC allegations by ' whistle-blowers,' and has questioned the Staff's alleged bias in favor of the Applicants. Clearly further evidence on these issues will be required when the evidentiary hearing resumes." (Footnote 9 omitted.)
". . . The Recommended Decision results from an appeal of that determination, and is based upon a full evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. Such decision contains important additional evidence directly connected with testimony already in our record. In fact, we are surprised that only the Intervenor called this matter to the Board's attention on December 14, 1982 and filed a copy on that date. We have previously admonished both the Applicants and the Staff that they have an affirmative duty to inform the Board promptly of new facts or developments.
[ Footnote 12 omitted.] This Recommended Decision is a potentially significant matter which Applicants and Staff should have immediately forwarded to this Board." (Footnote 13 omitted.)
7/6/83 Memorandum (Response to Commission Order of June 30, 1983) which stated, in part (pages 1 and 2):
". . . this Board has determined that a recent decision of the Secretary of Labor concerning the dismissal of Charles A. Atchison is entitled to collateral estoppel effect in this proceeding.
This establishes that one individual was discharged by applicant for reporting quality control deficiencies.
"We believe that pursuit of the implications of the Secretary of Labor's decision requires us to inquire further into whether or not there is a practice of discouraging quality assurance reports 30
t e ea ,
at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station."
7/6/83 Board Memorandum and Order (Collateral Estoppel; Atchison Case), adopting Secretary of Labor Final Order determining that Charles A. Atchison was fired for engaging in a protected activity and that Brown & Root's alleged reasons for firing him were pretextual; the protected activities for which Mr. Atchison was fired was the filing of non-conformance reports and the reporting of defects outside the area of his responsibility.
7/29/83 Board's Proposed Initial Decision (Concerning aspects of construction quality control, emergency planning and Board questions), especially pages 21 and 22, where it is stated, in part (Footnotes omitted):
"Mrs. Hamilton alleged that for a year quality control inspectors were directed not to write NCRs on work done by the paint department. Mr. Hamilton testified that he was directed to stop writing if not any, at least so many, NCRs. Neither the staff nor the applicant addressed these allegations directly. These allegations are, however, closely related to the issue of management's commitment to the quality control program. As such, they remain open.
"In addition, Hr. Hamilton's allegation that craf t personnel harassed quality control inspectors is related to management's attitude towards the quality assurance program. If management permitted or failed to discourage harassment of inspectors, that would, of course, reflect adversely on that attitude. The question of whether this has occurred remains open.
"Mr. Hamilton alleged that he and two other inspectors were fired for trying to do their inspection job. The given reason for his firing was that he refused to make an inspection under what he believed were unsafe working conditions.
However, he alleged that other individuals who refused to make the same inspection under the same conditions were not fired. This allegation is relevant to the applicant's attitude towards the quality control program and will be dealt with in a subsequent decision."
See also pages 17 (Morale), 28 (Henry Stiner), 41 (Darlene Stiner), and 42 (Charles Atchison).
31
a e* i 8/3/83 CASE Letter to Board Under
Subject:
Record Regarding Discouragement from Reporting Nonconforming Conditions at Comanche Peak Nuclear Plant, to which we attached Affidavits, a Deposition, and details regarding CASE's belief that:
". . . there are clear indications that there is a pattern at Comanche Peak not just discouraging the writing of nonconformance reports, but of firing OC inspectors and craftspeople who refuse to wear blinders and insist that nonconforming items be reported. We further believe that there is a, pattern of discouraging workers from doing the job right to begin with. This also includes what is generally called ' constructive discharge' (whereby a worker is given distasteful jobs to do, harassed, made to feel unwelcome, his/her concerns ignored, etc., to the point where the worker no longer wants to continue working at the plant and quits.)"
(Emphases in the original.)
NOTE: CASE's next supplement will begin with a continuation of our responses to Interrogatory 1.d)(3).
Respectfully submitted, D 5& j k[dk/
y'(Mrs.) Juanita Ellis, President t/' CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Ene rgy) 1426 S. Polk Dallas, Texas 75224 214/946-9446 32
o .. .
STATE OF TEXAS )
Juanita Ellis, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
That she is President of CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy),
and knows the contents of the foregoing document:
CASE's 6/6/87 Response to Applicants' Interrogatories to " Consolidated Intervenors" (Set No.1987-1) and Motion for a Protective Order and that the same is true and correct to the best of her knowledge and belief.
ju_~ L fdA'.>
.) Juanita Ellis,7 resident E (Citizens Association for Sound Energy)
SWORN T0 and Subscribed before me on this 6th day of June , 19 87 gcl h t ,. 7 ,
I v lh A R y f, fg y p Notarg,Public My Comission Expir'ey,: ./ / #d*> 8 9 o
. ;'i:',
, . . .k
. , -,'q/
(SEAL) ,
The original of this page is being mailed under separate cover, First Class Mail, to the Secretary, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Chief, Docketing and Service Section.
)
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