ML20041E248

Revised Statement of Contentions & Bases of Intervenors. Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20041E248
Person / Time
Site:	Clinch River
Issue date:	03/05/1982
From:	Finamore B, Greenberg E National Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, TUTTLE & TAYLOR
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 8203100293
Download: ML20041E248 (41)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

$ kl Before Administrative Judges: @

Marshall E. Miller, Chairman RECELVED Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr. 6 3 Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr. MAR 091982*-  :-

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In the Matter of )

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) Docket No. 50-537 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY )

PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION )

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY )

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(Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant) )

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REVISED STATEMENT OF CONTENTIONS AND BASES OF INTERVENORS NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

AND THE SIERRA CLUB I. INTRODUCTION In accordance with the Board's Prehearing Conference Order of February 11, 1982, Interverors, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and the Sierra Club, submit this Revised Statement of Contentions and Bases. What Intervenors have done 8203100293 820305 36h I DRADOCK05000gg (

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2 is to make mechanical corrections to existing contentions,3[

i- delete several contentions knich are no longer relevant, revise certain other contentions in order to spell out their intent in-greater detail, and add new contentions based upon information developed since the suspension of these proceedings. Following the restatement of contentions and bases in the first part of this memorandum, we will briefly explain the changes made.

Intervenors have discussed these revisions at length with counsel for Applicants and Staff. Certain agreements as to admissibility of new contentions have been reached, and such areas of disagreement as existed have been narroked. Further, discussions among counsel are continuing with respect to those contentions upon which no agreement has yet been reached. We l

understand that Applicants and Staf f will advise the Board early next week what precise areas of disagreement, if any, j remain.

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1/ The term " mechanical corrections" is used throughout this memorandum to refer to the following general revisions to existing contentions: -

, 1) Rekording f or purposes of clarity and consistency.

i 2) Rewording of contentions to make them applicable to NRC Staff actions and analyses.

3) -Inclusion of references to relevant documents such as the 1917 FES, the 1977 Staf f Site Suitability Report, 'and the DOE LMFBR ' Program Impact- Statement Supplement.

4) Removal of references to superseded documents such as the DES.

. 5) Rewording of contentions to refer to the inadequacy of a l particular analysis 'rather than to its nonexistence, in cases

! where the relevant analysis was performed af ter 1977.

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II. REVISED CONTENTIONS AND BASES

1. The application as submitted is illegal.

e) The LWA procedure should not be applied to first-of-a-kind reactors such as the CRBR where the safety and environmental issues are inextricably intert wined or where, as here, because of important safety issues, completion of the SER and resolution of safety issues is an essential component of an adequate NEPA revie w.

2. The envelope of DBAs should include the CDA.

a) Neither Applicants nor Staff have demonstrated through reliable data that the probability of anticipated transients without scram or other CDA initiators is sufficiently low to enable CDAs to be excluded from the envelope of DBAs.

b) Neither Applicants nor Staff have established that Applicants ' "reliabilito program" even if implemented is capable of eliminating CDAs as DBAs.

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( 1) The methodology described in the PSAR places reliance upon f ault tree and event tree analysis. Applicants have not established that it is possible to obtain sufficient f ailure iaode -

data pertinent to CRBR systems to validly employ these techniques in predicting the probability of CDAs.

(2) Applicants' projected data base to be used in the raliability program is inadequate. Applicants have not established that the projected data base encompasses all credible failure modes and human e lements.

(3) Even if all of the data described in Applicants' projected data base is obtained, Applicants have not established that CDAs have a sufficiently low probability that they may be excluded from the CRBR design bases.

(4) Applicants have not established that the test program used for their reliability program will be completed prior to Applicants' projected date for completion of construction of the CRBR.

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3. The analyses of CDAs and their consequences by Applicants and Staff are inadequate for purposes of licensing the CRBR, performing the NEPA cost / benefit analysis, or demonstrating that the radiological source term f or CRBRP would result in potential hazards not exceeded by those from any accident considered credible, as required by 10 CFR S 100. l( a) , f n'. 1.

a) The radiological source term analysis used ineCRBRP site suitability should be derived through a mechanistic analysis. Neither Applicants nor Staff have based the radiological source term on such an analysis, b) The radiological source term analysis should be based on the assumption that CDAs (failure to scram with substantial core disruption) are credible accidents within the DBA envelope, should place an upper bound on the explosive potential of a CDA, and should then derive a conservative estimate of the fission product release from such an accident. Neither Applicants nor -

Staff have performed such an analysis.

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6 c) The radiological source term analysis has not adequately considered either the release of fission products and core materials, e.g. halogens, iodine and plutonium, or the environmental conditions in the reactor containment building created by the release of substantial quantities of sodium. Neither Applicants nor Staf f have established the maximum credible sodium release following a CDA or included the environmental conditions caused by such a sodium release as part of 1 1

the radiological source term pathway analysis, d) Neither Applicants nor Staf f have demonstrated that the design of the containment is adequate to reduce calculated offsite doses to an acceptable level.

e) As set forth in Contention 8 (d) , neither Applicants F

nor Staf f have adequately calculated the guideline values for radiation doses from postulated CRBRP releases.

l l f) Applicants have not established that the computer models (including computer codes) referenced in Applicants' CDA safety analysis reports, including the PSAR, and referenced in the Staff CDA safety analyses are valid. The models and computer codes used in the

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7 PSAR and the Staff safety analyses of CDAs and their consequences have not been adequately documented, verified or validated by comparison with applicable experimental data. Applicants' and Staff's safety analyses do not establish that the models accurately represent the physical phenomena and principles which control the response of CRBR to CDAs.

g) Neither Applicants nor Staf f have establis:r'd that the input data and assumptions for the computer models and codes are adequately documented or verified.

h) Since neither Applicants nor Staff have established that the models, computer codes, input data and assumptions are adequately documented, verified and validated, they have also been unable to establish the energetics of a CDA and thus have also not established the adequacy of the containment of the source term for post accident radiological analysis.

4. Neither Applicants nor Staff have given sufficient attention to CRBR accidents other than the DBAs for the following reasons:

a) Neither Applicants nor Staff have done an adequate, ,

comprehensive analysis comparable to the Reactor

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l Safety Study ("Rasmassen Report") that could identify other CRBR accident possibilities of greater frequency i

! or consequence than the accident scenarios analyzed by Applicants and Staff.

l b) Neither Applicants' nor Staff's analyses of potential accident initiators, sequences, and events are sufficiently comprehensive to assure that analysis of the DBAs will envelop the entire spectrum of credible accident initiators, sequences, and events.

I c) Accidents associated with core meltthrough following loss of core geometry and sodium-concrete interactions have not been adequately analyzed.

d) Neither Applicants nor Staf f have adequately identified and analyzed the ways in which human error can initiate, exacerbate, or interfere with the mitigation of CRBR accidents.

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l S. Neither Applicants nor Staf f adequately analyze the health ~

l l and safety consequences of acts of sabotage, terrorism or l thef t directed against the CRBR or supporting f acilities nor do they adequately analyze the programs to prevent such acts or disadvantages of any measures to be used to prevent such acts. .

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9 a) Small quantities of plutonium can be converted into a nuclear bomb or plutonium dispersion device which if used could cause widespread death and destruction, b) Plutonium in an easily usable form will be available in substantial quantities at the CRBR and at supporting fuel cycle facilities.

c) Analyses conducted by the Federal Government of the potential threat from terrorists, saboteurs and ,

thieves demonstrate several credible scenarios which could result in plutonium diversion or releases of f radiation (both purposeful and accidental) and against which no adequate safeguards have been proposed by Applicants or Staff.

d) Acts of sabotage or terrorism could be the initiating cause for CDAs or other severe CRBR accident; and the probability of such acts occurring has not b<!en analyzed in predicting the probability of a CDA.

6. Neither Applicants nor Staf f have established that the i

site selected for the CRBR provides adequate protection for public health and safety, the environment, national  ;

security, and national energy supplies; and an alternative ,

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! site would be preferable.

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10 b) The site meteorology and population density are less f avorable than most sites used for LWRs.

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- ( l) The wind speed and inversion conditions at the l Clinch River site are less f avorable than most i sites used for light-water reactors.

(2) The population density of the CRBR site is less favorable than that of several alternative sites. ,

L (3) Alternative sites with more f avorable meteorology and population characteristics have not been -

] adequately identified and analyzed by Applicants

, and Staff. The analysis of alternative sites in -

j the ER and the Staff Site Suitability Report gave F

insufficient weigh t to the meteorological and population disadvantages of the Clinch River site >

and did not attempt to identify a site or sites

, with more favorable characteristics. ,

i c) Since the gaseous diffusion plant, other proposed  ;

energy fuel cycle f acilities, the Y-12 plant and the ,

Oak Ridge National Laboratory are in close proximity to the site an accident at the CRBR could result in the long term evacuation of those facilities. Long t

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11 i term evacuation of those facilities would result in i

unacceptable risks to the national security and the F

national energy supply.

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8. The health and safety consequences to the public and plant employees which may occur if the CRBR merely complies with

, current NRC standards for radiation protection of the public health and safety have not been adequately analyzed by Applicants or Staff.

a) Neither Applicants nor Staff have shohn that exposures to the public and plant employees will be as low as practicable (reasonably achievable) .

b) Neither Applicants nor Staf f have adequately assessed the genetic effects from radiation exposure including l genetic effects to the general population from plant employee exposure.

c) Neither Applicants nor Staf f have adequately assessed the induction of cancer from the exposure of plant employees and the public.

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t 12 d) Guideline values for permissible organ doses used by Applicants and Staff have not been shown to have a valid basis.

( 1) The approach utilized by Applicants and Staff in establishing once-in-a-lifetime organ dose equivalent limits corresponding to a whole body dose of 25 rems is inappropriate because it fails to consider important organs, e.g. the liver, and because it fails to consider new knowledge, e.g.,

recommendations of the ICRP in Reports 26 and 30.

(2) Neither Applicants nor Staff have given adequate consideration to the plutonium " hot particle" hypothesis advanced by Arthur R. Tamplin and Th omas B. Cochran, or to the Karl Z. Morgan hypothesis described in " Suggested Reduction of Permissible Exposuro to Plutonium and Other Transuranium Elements," Journal of American Industrial Hygiene (August 1975).

9. The ER and FES do not include an adequate analysis of the environmental impact of the fuel cycle associated with the CRBR for the following reasons:

4 13 a) The ER and FES estimate the environmental in iacts of the fuel cycle based upon a scale-down of analyses presented in the LMFBR Program Environmental Statement and Supplement f or a model LMFBR and fuel cycle. The analyses of the environmental impacts of the model LMFBR and fuel cycle in the LMFBR Program Statement and Supplement are based upon a series of faulty assumptions.

b) The impacts of the actual fuel cycle associated with CRBR will differ from the model LMFBR and fuel cycle analyzed in the LMFBR Program Environmental Statement and Supplement. The analysis of fuel cycle impacts must be done for the particular circumstances dpplicable to the CRBR. The analyses of fuel cycle impacts in the ER and FES are inadequate since:

( 1) The impact of reprocessing of spent fuel and plutonium separation required for the CRBR is not included or is inadequately assessed; (2) The impact of transportation of plutonium required for the CRBR is not included, or is inadequately assessed; f

14 (3) The impact of disposal of wastes from the CRBR spent fuel is not included, or is inadequately assessed; (4) The impact of an act of sabotage, terrorism or theft directed against the plutonium in the CRBR f uel cycle, including the plant, is not included or is inadequately assessed, nor is the impact of various measures intended to be used to prevent sabotage, theft or diversion.

10. Neither Applicants nor Staff have adequately analyzed the alternatives to the CRBR for the following reasons:

a) Neither Applicants nor Staff have adequately demonstrated that the CRBR as now planned will achieve the objectives established for it in the LMFBR Program Impact Statement and Supplement.

(1) It has not been established how the CRBR will achieve the objectives there listed in a timely fashion.

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15 (2) In order to do this it must be shown that the specific design of the CRBR, partJcularly core design and engineering safety features, is sufficiently similar to a practical commercial size LMFBR that building and operating the CRBR will demonstrate anything relevant with respect to an economic, reliable and licensable LMFBR.

l (5) The CRBR is not reasonably likely to demonstrate the reliability, maintainability, economic feasibility, technical performance, environmental acceptability or safety of a relevant commercial LMFBR central station electric plant.

d) No adequate analysis has been made by Applicants or Staff to determine whether the informational requirements of the LMFBR program or of a demonstration-scale f acility might be substantially better satisfied by alternative design features such as are embodied in certain foreign breeder reactors.

g) Alternative sites with more favorable environmental and safety features were not analyzed adequately and insufficient weigh t was given to environmental and safety values in site selection.

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( 1) Alternatives which were inadequately analyzed include Hanford Reservation, Idaho Reservation (INEL), Nevada Test Site, the TVA Hartsville and Yellow Creek sites, co-location with an LMFBR fuel reprocessing plant (e.g., the Development Reprocessing Plant) , an LMFBR f uel f abricating plant, and underground sites.

14. The unavoidable adverse environmental ef fects associated with the decommissicning of the CRBR have not been adequately analyzed by Applicants and Staff, and the costs.

(both internalized economic costs and external social costs) associated with the decommissioned CRBR are not adequately assessed in the NEPA benefit-cost balancing of the CRBR.

a) There is no adequate analysis of decommissioning in Applicants' Environmental Report, or in the FES; b) Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) related to LWRs prepared by NRC have been inadequate due in part to recently discovered omissions (see below) , and the FES ,

for the CRBR is no different; 1

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17 c) Applicants and Staf f must systematically analyze all neutron activation products that may be produced in the proposed CRBR to determine the potential isolation period, f ollowing decommissioning, and then provide a comprehensive analysis of the costs (both economic and s ocie tal) of decommissioning. Neither Applicants nor  ;

Staff have adequately analyzed the implications of neutron activation products, such as nickel-59 and niobium-94, for che decommissioning of the CRBR.

16. Applicants and Staff have gis an inadequate attention to the presence of liquid radioactive effluent from the Oak Ridge Reservation and the radioactive sediment already present in the Clinch River.

a) In assessing alternative sites f or the LMFBR demonstration plant, the suitability of the CRBR site, and the NEPA cost / benefit analysis, neither Applicants nor Staff have adequately considered the increased risk of radiation exposure to existing radioactive sediment, through dredging, pumping and river traffic, that would occur at the Clinch River site.

18 b) In assessing alternative sites for the LMFBR demonstration plant, the suitability of the CRBR site, and the NEPA cost / benefit analysis, neither Applicants nor Staff have adequately considered the health and safety effects of CRBR operation 3 and discharges in conjunction with the cumulative effects of nearby existing and proposed plants, including the ORNL, the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, the TSA synfuels plant, and the PCB lo w-level radioactive waste incinerator.

c) The Staff baseline monitoring program is inadequate because neither Applicants nor Staf f have an adequate understanding of existing radioactive contamination of-the Clinch River, and therefore cannot adequately insure that CRBR radioactive releases to Clinch River will meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20.

d) Applicants' proposal to transport components and materials for the CRBR by barge rather than rail would increase the risk of radiation exposure from radioactivity existing in the Clinch River sediment.

It is therefore in violation of the 10 CFR Part 20

, requirement that Applicants maintain radioactive levels in effluents to unrestricted areas as low as is reasonably achievable.

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17. Neither Applicants nor Staff have demonstrated that sufficient fuel would be available for CRBR operation to enable the CRBR to demonstrate the objectives of the LMFBR program and remain in operation for a sufficient length of time to justify the project.

a) According to DOF, policy, the need f or plutonium for the U.S. nuclear weapons program must take precedence over the need for plutonium for the LMFBR program.

b) The U.S. weapons program is currently depleting existing DOE stocks of fuel-grade plutonium, the traditional source of plutonium for the LMFBR program.

c) Neither Applicant nor Staf f have demonstrated that alternative sources of fuel for the CRBR will be available when needed f or CRBR operation.

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18. Neither Applicants nor Staff have demonstrated that Applicants' quality assurance program, to be applied to the design, fabrication, construction, and testing of the structures, systems, and components of the facility, is adequate to meet NRC requirements, or that such program would protect the public health and safety adequately even if it complies with NRC requirements. ,

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20 a) Neither Applicants nor Staf f have adequately demonstrated that the proposed quality assurance r program will meet the requirements of General Design q Criterion 1, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A.

b) Neither Applicants nor Staff have adequately described  ;

the proposed quality assurance program nor demonstrated how the applicable requirements of Appendix B will be satisfied, as required by 10 CFR S 50.34 (a) (7) .

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19. Neither Applicants nor Staff have demonstrated that Applicants' plans for coping with emergencies are adequate ,

to meet NRC requirements, or that such plans would protect the public health and. safety adequately even if they comply with NRC requirements.  ;

a) The PSAR contains insufficient information regarding Applicants' ability to identify the seriousness and potential scope of radiological consequences of emergency situations within and outside the site boundary, including capabilities for dose projection using real-time meteorological information and for dispatch of radiological monitoring teams within the Emergency Planning Zones. ,

21 b) Applicants and Staff have failed to account properly for local emergency response needs and capabilities in establishing boundaries for the plume exposure pathway and ingestion pathkay EPZs for the CRBR.

c) The PSAR contains insufficient analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors and distances within the plume exposure path hay EPZ for transient and permanent populations, nor does it note major impediments to the evacuation or taking of protective actions. t d) The PSAR contains insufficient information to ensure the compatibility of proposed emergency plans for both onsite areas and the EPZs, with facility design features, site layout, and site location.

e) The PSAR contains insufficient information concerning l

the procedures by which protective actions will be carried out, including authorization, notification, and instruction procedures for evacuations.

f) Applicants ' proposed emergency plans f ail to take into account the special measures necessary to cope with a f CDA, including the need f or increased protective, evacuation and monitoring measures, reduced response ,

time and special protective action levels.

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22 g) Applicants and Staf f have failed to provide adequate assurance that the proposed emergency plans will meet the requirements and standards of 10 CFR S 50.47(b) .

20. Neither Applicants nor staff have adequately described the risks and consequences associated with CRBR accidents beyond the design basis.

a) The Staff concludes in the FES that CRBRP accident risks can be made acceptably low with the incorporation of certain features and design requirements, yet neither Applicants nor Staff have adequately described these additional features and requirements, nor demonstrated that they will sufficiently lower the risks of CRBR accidents.

b) NRC policy, reflected in 45 Fed. Reg. 40101 (June 30, 1980), requires a discussion of consequences substantially greater in scope and detail than that contained in the FES.

21. Applicants ' proposed system for classifying and categorizing postulated DBA accidents, as described in PSAR Table 15. 1.2- 1, is arbitrary, f ails adequately to .

23 take into account actual U.S. and foreign breeder reactor experience, and is inadequate for purposes of protecting i

radiological health and safety.

22. Neither Applicants nor Staff have demonstrated that the design of the containment reduces offsite doses during accidents to a level that is as low as reasonably achievable .

23. Neither Applicants nor Staf f have demonstrated that the facility will be provided with systems necessary to establish and maintain safe cold shutdown and maintain i

containment integrity that are capable of performing their functions during and after being exposed to the environmental conditions a) associated with postulated accidents, as required by General Design Criterion 4, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A; or i

l b) created by sodium fires or the burning (or local detonation) of hydrogen.

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24. Neither Applicants nor Staf f have adequately described the additional features and requirements necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the CRBR can be constructed and i

operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

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25 III. EXPLANATION OF REVISED CONTENTIONS AND BASES

1. c) This subsection was deleted because the application no longer refers to " reference" and " parallel" designs.

e) This subsection was reworded for purposes of clarification to state that the LWa procedure "should not be applied" to this proposed reactor, reflecting that this is a mixed question of law and fact. No substantive changes have been made.

2. The second sentence which originally appeared in Contention 2 was moved to subsection (a) and reworded to clarify the particular areas in which Intervenors believe the analysis is deficient.

a) This subsection was reworded to clarify the particular areas in which Intervenors believe the analysis is deficient.

b) Mechanical corrections were made throughout this section.

26 c) (2) and (3) These two subsections were originally part of subsection (b) (2) , but were separated into two subsections and renumbered to reflect the fact that they present two distinct assertions.

3. This section was substantially reworded for purposes of clarification and specificity, although the basic arguments presented are the same as those presented in the original Statement of Contentions.

The opening sentence was reworded to clear up a possible ambiguity, since the original sentence refers to the

" adequacy" of CDA consequences without further explanation that an " adequate" analysis is necessary f or licensing and NEPA purposes. The sentence was also reworded to reflect our original assertion that the source term analysis methodology is deficient particularly because it does not include CDAs as DBAs. This assertion was originally found in Contentions 2 and 3.

a) through e). These subsections were included to clarify and specify our original assertions regarding the inadequacy of the source term analysis.

f) This subsection is the same as original subsection

27 (b), except that mechanical corrections were made and the references to previous interrogatories were deleted as unnecessary.

g) This subsection is the same as original subsection (c), except that mechanical corrections were made and the references to previous interrogatories were deleted as unnecessary.

h) This subsection is the same as original subsection (d) except that mechanical corrections were made.

4. a) and b) These subsections reflect mechanical corrections and a separation of original subsection (a) into two subsections because Applicants may in fact have performed an analysis for the CRBR comparable to the Reactor Safety Study (see DOE LMFBR Program Statement Supplement, Appendix C).

c) This subsection is the same as orignal subsection (b),

and has been reworded to reflect the fact that there is no core catcher in the present design, but that a need still exists to analyze accidents associated with core meltthrough following loss of core geometry.

O 28 d) This subsection has been added to include reference to the f ailure adequately to analyze ways in which human error can initiate, exacerbate or interfere with mitigation of CRBR accidents. The basis for this addition is new information derived from the Three Mile Is land Accident. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident (NUREG-0660) (Aug. 1980); U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Identification of New Unresolved Safety Issues Relating to Nuclear Poker Plants (NUREG-0705) (March 1981); see also letter dated January 27, 1982, from Richard Shikiar, Director, Social Change Study Center, to Dr. Thomas Cochran, NRDC (discussing presentation of Harold Denton, Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC, at Peer Advisory Panel meeting concerning qualifications of nuclear poker plant operators); see also discussion on pp. 120-121 of DOE's draf t supplement impact statement on the LMFBR program describing research and testing programs that have occurred since 1975 (particularly reports listed at footnotes 1 and 4 on

p. 141 of draf t) .

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5. Mechanical corrections only have been made to thir contention.

6. b) In addition to mechanical corrections made to this subsection, several references have been included to reflect the need for analyses of population densities at the CRBR site and alternative sites. The basis for this addition is new information relating to the appropriateness of remote siting. See, e.g.:

(1) Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC, Reoort of the Siting Policy Task Force (NUREG-0625)

(Aug. 1979) which sets forth recommendations of a number of charges to current NRC policy on nuclear power reactor siting, including:

(i) renewal of present policy of permitting '

plant design f eatures to compensate for unfavorable site characterization in favor of emphasizing site isolation, and (ii) use of selective siting to reduce the risks associated with accider.ts beyond the design basis (Class 9) .

30 (2) Proposed revision of NRC reactor siting criteria (4 5 Fed. Reg. 50350, July 29, 1980) (Advance i Notice of Proposed Rulemaking);

l (3) Proposed rule regarding the review of alternative sites under NEPA (45 Fed. Reg. 24168, April 9, 1980);

(4) Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for Revision of the ROT 11ations Governing the Siting of Nuclear Poker Plants (45 Fed. Reg. 79820, December 2, 1980);

(5) N RC , A Comparison of Site Evaluation Methods (NUREG/CR-16 84) (July 1981) 2/

c) This subsection was revised to include a reference to the Y-12 plant. The basis for this revision is new information derived from the Progressive case l concerning national security activities at the Y-12 plant (see U.S. v. The Progressive, Inc., C.A.

No. 79- 14 28) .

2/ The proposed rules referred to in b) and c) above arose from requirements of the NRC FY 1980 Authorization Act (P.L.

No.96-295, 94 Stat. 780, June 30, 1980) directing the NRC to develop regulations establishing demographic requirements for facility siting. It also directed NRC to develop reactor siting criteria for new plants by specifying maximum population density and population distribution criteria independent of dif ferences in design among plants and that in developing demographic criteria a f ull range of accidents, including those beyond the design base accident, be considered.

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8. This contention combines, for purposes of clarification, with mechanical corrections, old contentions 7 and 8.

Certain background informational references in old subsection 7(c) have also been deleted, although Intervenors continue to rely upon this information.

d) ( 1) This subsection has been included to explain in greater detail why guideline values are invalid.

9. Mechanical changes have been made to this contention, and reference to previous interrogatories were deleted as unnecessary.

10. Several changes of a mechanical and updating nature have been made to this contention. First, old subsection (g) (2) has been deleted to reflect new analyses of Applicants. Second, old subsection (g) (1) has been combined with (g) itself. Third, in subsection (g) (1)

(old subsection (g) (3) ) reference to the hot pilot plant has been changed to the " Development Reprocessing Plant" to reflect changes to DOE's proposed reprocessing program. Fourth, references to TVA's Hartsville and Yellow Creek sites have been included in subsection (g) (1) to reflect the new availability of these alternative

32 sites, as a result of cancellation by TVA on March 4, 1982 of existing plans f or these sites.

14. This contention has been revised to make mechanical corrections, and to take into account certain new information with respect to problems of decommissioning.

Reference to previous studies in old subsection 14 (c) have I

been deleted, although Intervenors continue to rely upon the information therein. In addition, reference is made in subsection (c) to the implications of neutron activation products such as niobium-94. This reference is based upon recent evidence that permanent entombment may not be a viable form of decommissioning, since some reactor components will contain extremely long-lived isotopes of nickel and niobium. (See "A Long-Term Problem for the Nuclear Industry," Science, Vol. 215, January 22, 1982).

15. This old contention has been deleted.

16. This is a new contention based upon new information indicating that Clinch River sediment radioactivity levels may be higher than those indicated in Applicants'

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33 Environmental Report. The December 1981 Environmental Impact Report of the Tennessee Synfuels Association (TSA) on its proposed Oak Ridge, Tennessee synfuels plant indicates that TSA is presently sampling Clinch River radioactivity levels near the CRBR site at points one-half mile apart. The sampling referred to in Applicants' ER (Fig. 2. 8-6) , ho wever , was performed at points approximately one mile apart. TSA's f ailure to rely upon Applicants' data, as well as the discrepancy in sampling techniques, triggered Intervenors' review of earlier scientific documents and ongoing research regarding Clinch River radioactivity le iels. These documents and research indicate that Applicants' ER and the FES are deficient since they do not adequately discuss the radioactivity leve ls , liquid ef fluent and radioactive sediment in the Clinch River. See Clinch River Study (Struxness 1967) ;

USGS, AEC, ORNL study (Pickering 1969) ; unpublished core sample data collected in 1977-1980 analyzed by ORNL; and environmental monitoring report data from the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant (Union Carbide Nuclear Division 1980).

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17. Tn!- w contention is an elaboration of old contention 10 (a) (1) , relating to the likelihood that the CRBR will achieve its objectives in a timely fashion. This elaboration is based upon new information regarding the increased need for plutonium for the U.S. weapons program, and difficulties in developing alternative sources of fuel, such as spent fuel reprocessing. Such information indicates that there may be little, if any, plutonium available for the CRBR af ter 1990. See generally Briefing by the Department of Energy to Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, December 8, 1981.

18. This contention is new and is based upon recently encountered difficulties in implementation and enforcement of the Commission's regulations concerning quality assurance. First, the Commission Chairman and Executive Director for Operations indicated in recent Congressional testimony that they were aware of such quality assurance problems. Testimony of Nunzio J. Palladino, NRC Chairman, and William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, before the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the House Interior Committee, November 19, 1980. Second, the Commission has

35 recently emphasized the importance of quality assurance programs to the protection of the public health and safety. See, e.g., NRC 1980 Annual Report, pp. 69-70.

Finally, several recent f ailures of quality assurance programs at the Diablo Canyon, South Texas, Midland, Zimmer, and Marble Hill plants emphasize the importance of detailed quality assurance programs at the LWA and CP level.

19. This contention is new and is based upon the extensive revisions to the emergency planning regulations promulgated by the NRC on August 19, 1980 (45 Fed. Reg. 55402). See also NRC and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Poker Plants (NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1) (Nov. 1980).

20. This contention is new and relates to the f ailure of the FES adequately to discuss risks and consequences associated with CRBR cccidents beyond the design basis.

Subsection 20 (a) is premised on the failure of the FES to explain what features and requirements will be

6*

36 incorporated to reduce risks. While arguably this contention might have been asserted in 1977, it was Intervenors' position - never ruled upon by the Board -

that the FES was inadequate and should have been recirculated prior to hearing. In such circumstances, it was not incumbent on Intervenors to amend their contention at that time, and an amendment now is appropriate. In any event, if such failures persist, this contention could plainly be raised at some point in the future, i.e., upon release of the SER, and, therefore, there is r.o valid objection to it at this time. As to subsection 2^ (b) ,

this is based upon Commission policy, adopted in 1980, requiring consideration of Class 9 accidents in environmental impact statements, and it plainly could not have been asserted previously.

21. This contention is new and is based upon recent experience which indicates that Applicants' proposed system for classifying and categorizing postulated DBA accidents is arbitrary and inadequate. First, the problem of leaking welds in steam generators has been shown to be a real one, as reflected in the experience of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority's 250-MW prototype f ast reactor.

See Nucleonics Week, p. 6 (Feb. 18, 1982). Second, steam generator corrosion has been shown to be a L

6*

37 real problem at the TMI and Ginna plants.

22. This contention is an elaboration of Contention (8).

Contention (8) as originally drafted covered the health and safety consequences associated with both normal operations and accidents. Intervenors, in new Contention 22, have broken out the accident component to clarify that the ALARA concept must be applied to accidents as we ll as normal operations. Furthermore, this contention is based upon discussions of containment design in the 1977 FES (Sec. 7.1). As noted above, given our position in 1977 that recirculation of the FES was required, such new contention need not have been asserted then, and it is appropriate that such contention be admitted now.

23. This contention is new and is based upon information related to hydrogen control in LWRs and the lessons learned from the Three Mile Island accident. See, e.g.,

NRC, Special Report to Congress, Identification of New Unresolved Sufety Issues Relating to Nuclear Poker Plants (NUREG-0705) (March 1981) , with specific reference to discussions of (1) the safety implications of control systems, and (2) hydrogen control measures and ef fects of

F bo 38 hydrogen burn on safety equipment. See also proposed l rules to require improved hydrogen control capability during and following reactor accidents (46 Fed. Reg. 62281, December 23, 1981) (see also 46 Fed. Reg. 57521, 47 Fed. Reg. 2286). There is a direct correlation between control of hydrogen in LWRs and hydrogen generation and control of sodium fires in liquid metal f ast breeder reactors.

24. This contention is new and is based upon the requirements of 10 CFR 550.35 (a) (4) . For the reasons stated in connection with contention 20'(a) above, Intervenors submit that it is appropriate to put for ward this contention at this time.

Respectfully submitted, 6lbr V. C Cyeenk (by hk Ra-,)

Eldon V. C. Greenbergt v TUTTLE & TAYLOR 1901 L Street, N.W.

i Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 861-0666

_ h bW I Barbara A.' Finamore S. Jacob Scherr Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

1725 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006 l (202) 223-8210 i

Attorneys for Intervenors Natural Resources Defense Coancil, Inc.

, and the Sierra Club I

l Dated: March 5, 1982 i Washington, D.C.

L

O

=

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE '82 If:1?-8 P1'03 E

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Revise'd Statement of Contention and Bases of Intervenors Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and the Sierra Club were served this 5th day of March 1982 on the following:

Marshall E. Miller, Esquire Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4350 East West Highkay Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4350 East West Highkay Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Daniel Swanson, Esquire Stuart Treby, Esquire Of fice Of Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Maryland National Bank Building 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Docketing & Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 (3 copies)

R. Tenney Johnson, Esquire Leon Silverstrom, Esquire Warren E. Bergoholz, Jr., Esquire Michael D. Oldak, Esquire L. Dow Davis, Esquire Office of General Counsel U.S. Department of Energy 1000 Independence Ave. , S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20585

• George L. Edgar, Esquire Irvin N. Shapell, Esquire Thomas A. Schmutz, Esquire Gregg A. Day, Esquire Frank K. Peterson, Esquire Morgan, Le wis & Bockius 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr.

Director Bodega Marine Laboratory University of California P.O. Box 247 Bodega Bay, California 94923 Herbert S. Sanger, Jr., Esquire Le wis E. Wallace, Esquire James F. Burger, Esquire W. Walker LaRoche, Esquire Ed ward J. Vigluicci Office of the General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority 400 Commerce Avenue Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 William B. Hubbard, Esquire Assistant Attorney General State of Tennessee Office of the Attorney General 422 Supreme Court Building Nashville, Tennessee 37219 Lawson McGhee Public Library 500 West Church Street Knoxville, Tennessee 37902

e William 3. Lantrip, Esquire City Attorney Municipal Building P.O. Box 1 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Oak Ridge Public Library Civic Center Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37820 Mr. Joe H. Walker 401 Roane Street Harriman, Tennessee 37748 Commissioner James Cotham Tennessee Department of Economic and Community Development Andrew Jackson Buildine Suite 1007 Nashville, Tennessee s2219 f Nw- k. fcussw Edrbara A. Finamore

• Denotes hand delivery.

l t