Text

Revised Tech Specs Re Cycle 5 Reload Analyses
	ML20039C038
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	12/17/1981
From:	; NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20039C037	List: B10353, Application to Amend License DPR-65 Incorporating Revisions to Tech Specs to Support Cycle 5.Completion of Revisions & Reanalysis Required for Item II.K.3.30 of NUREG-0737 Scheduled for 820701; ML20039C038;
References
	TAC-47471, TAC-47472, TAC-47978, TAC-49798, TAC-54199, NUDOCS 8112280344
	Download: ML20039C038 (49)
	v • d • e

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h Docket No. 50-336 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revisions to Technical Specifications December, 1981 1:

8112280344 811217~

PDR ADOCK 0500033b P

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Technical Specification Changes - Cycle 5 Reload

p. 1-7

. Mode 6 reactivity,

p. 3/4 1-1 Source'for boration operations.

~

p. 3/4 l-3 Source for boration operations.

p. 3/4 1-5 Revise moderator temperature coefficient at greater-than 70% rated thermal power.

p. 3/4 1-6 Delete requirements for middle of cycle moderator-temperature co9fficient determination.

p. 3/4 1-16 RWST' boron concentration.

p. 3/4 1-28 Regulating CEA insertion limits.

p. 3/4 2-3 Delete lower limits on linear heat rate specific to last cycle special testing,

p. 3/4 3-1 Resistance Temperature Detector surveillance requirements.

p. 3/4 3-4 Editorial change to notation (f).

. p. 3/4 3-12

. Editorial change to Action Statement numbering.

p. 3/4 3-14 Delete reference to CIAS and SIAS trip functions for containment purge valves,

p. 3/4 3-18 Revise trip setpoint and allowable values.

p. 3/4 3-19 Revise trip setpoint and allowable values.

Delete reference to CIAS and SIAS trip functions for containment purge valves.

p. 3/4 3-20 Revise allowable value.

p. 3/4 3-24 Delete reference to CIAS and SIAS trip functions for containment purge valves, i

p. 3/4 4-4 Clarify conditions durins which pressurizer level must be maintained.

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^

6 e.p. 3/4 4-23 Delete core barrel monitoring requirements, p.'3/4 4-24 Delete core barrel monitoring requirements.

p. B 3/4 6-2 Revise peak containment pressure during a LOCA.

p. 3/4 6-25 Enclosure Building Filtration System surveillance 6-26 requirements.

6-27

p. 3/4 7-16 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System sur-7-17 veillance requirements.

7-18

p. 3/4 9-1 Mode 6 reactivity condition.

p. 3/4 9-16 Storage Pool Area Ventilation System - Fuel 9-17 Storage surveillance requirements.

9-18

p. 3/4 10-1 Reactivity conditions during'CEA worth checks.

p. B 3/4 1-3 BoronIconcentration for boration sources.

p. B 3/4 4-12 Delete core barrel monitoring requirement.

p. B 3/4 9-1 Refueling operations boron concentration.

- 0 J

o TABLE 1.1 OPERATIONAL MODES REACTIVITY

% RATED AVERAGE COOLANT MODE CONDITION, K THERMAL POWER

TEMPERATURE ff 1.

POWER OPERATION

> 0.99

> 5%

> 300*F 2.

STARTUP

> 0.99

< 5%

> 300'F 3.

HOT STANDBY

< 0.99 0

> 300*F 4

HOT SHUTDOWN

< 0.99 0

300*F>

T**9

> 200'F 5.

COLD SHUTDOWN

< 0.98 0

g 200*F 0

5, 140*F 6.

REFUELING **

5. 0.95 l

Excluding decay heat.

Reactor vessel head unbolted or removed and fuel in the vessel.

l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 1-7 1)

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0 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN KARGIN - T,yg > 200*F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN KARGIN shall be > 3.20% ak/k.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

k/k, immediately initiate and continue With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN <3.20%

boration at h 40 gpm of boric acid solution at or greater than the re-concentration (ppm) until q.lired refueling water storage tank (RWST) the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS The SHUTDOWN KARGIN shall be determined to be > 3.20% ok/k:

4.1.1.1.1 Immediately upon detection of an inoperab1'e CEA.

If the inoperable CEA is immovable or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN, a.

required by Specification 3.1.1.1, shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable CEA.

When in MODES 1 or 2, at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verifyi a b.

that CEA group withdrawal is within the Transient Insertici Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after l

sach refueling, with the CEA groups at the Transient Insertion l

c.

Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

I See Special Test Exception 3.10.1.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-1 1--

,,-ese

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T,yg <,200*F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be 3,2.0% ok/k.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN <2.0%

k/k, immediately initiate and continue boration atl 40 gpm of boric acid solution at or greater than the re-quired refueling water storage tank (RWST) concentration (ppm) until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be detennined to be 3,2.0% ak/k:

a.

Immediately upon detection of an inoperable CEA.

If the inoperable CEA is immovable or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.2 shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable CEA.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by consideration of tha foll'owing factors:

1.

Reactor coolant system boron concentration, 2.

CEA position, 3.

Reactor coolant temperature, 4

Fuel burnup based on gross thernal energy generation, l

5.

Xenon concentration, and 6.

Samarium concentration.

4 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/41-3 i

o

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (MTC)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) shall be:

3.1.1. 4

~4 Less positive than 0.5 x 10 ok/k/'F whenever THERftAL POWER a.

is $_ 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, Less positive than 0.4 x 10~4 ok/k/*F whenever THERMAL POWER b.

is > 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and Less negative than -2.4 x 10 ak/k/'F at RATED THERMAL POWER.

c.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2**

i ACTION:

With the moderator temperature coefficient outside any one of the above limits, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The MTC shall be determined to be within its limits by con-4.1.1. 4.1 MTC measured values shall be extrapolated firmatory measurements.

and/or compensated to permit direct comparison with the predicted values.

I i

With K,ff > 1.0.

See Special Test Exemption 3.10.2.

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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/41-5

i REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.1.1.4.2 The MTC shall be determined at the following frequencies and THERMAL POWER conditions during each fuel cycle:

Prior to initial operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, a.

after each refueling.

b.

At any THERMAL POWER, within 14 EFPD after each fuel loading at equilibrium boron concentration.

4 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-6

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER 500RCES - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

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3.1.2.7 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall l

be OPERABLE:

One boric acid storage tank and one associated heat tracing a.

circuit with the tan'. contents in accordance with Figure 3.1-1.

b.

The refueling water storage tank with:

1.

A minimum contained volume of 57,000 gallons, 2.

A minimum boron concentration of 1720 ppm when in Mode 5, 3.

A minimum boron concentration as defined in Specification 3.9.1 when in Mode 6.

4.

A minimum solution temperature of 35 F.

AF ICAB:LITY: MODES 5 and 6.

A: TION:

With n borated water sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one borated water source is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCF REOUIREMENTS 4.1.2.7 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water, 2.

Verifying the water level of the tank, and 3.

Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temper -

ature wher. it is the source of borated water, b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the RWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the RWST anbient air temperature is < 35'F.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-16 m

6 i

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS REGULATING CEA INSERTION LIMITS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.6 The regulating CEA groups shall be limited to the withdrawal sequence and to the insertion limits shown on Figure 3.1-2.

Regulat-ing CEA's are considered to be fully withdrawn in accordance with figure 3.1-2 when withdrawn to at least 176 steps. With CEA insertion between the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits restricted to:

a.

4 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months interval, b.

S 5 Effective Full Power Days per 30 Effective Full Power Day interval, and c.

g 14 Effective Full Power Days per calendar year.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*#.

ACTION:

a.

With the regulating CEA gorups inserted beyond the Transient Insertion Limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within two hours either:

1.

Restore the regulating CEA groups to within the limits, or 2.

Reduce THERMAL POWER to the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the CEA group position using the above figures.

b.

With the regulating CEA groups insarted between the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits for intervals > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months interval, except during operation pursuant to the provisions of ACTION items

c. and d. of Specification 3.1.3.1, operation may proceed provided either:

1.

The Short Term Steady State Insertion Limits of Figure 3.1-2 are not exceeded, or 2.

Any subsequent increase in THERMAL POWER is restricted to f 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER per hour.

See Special Test Exception 3.10.2 and 3.10.5.

With K

> 1.0.

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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-28 FL

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August 1.1975 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

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3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the reactor protective instrumentation channels and bypasses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-2.

APPLICAPILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1.1 Each reactor protective instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK. CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the modes and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 Each test shall include at least one channel per function such months.

that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the " Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.

4.3.1.1.4 The response time of all REACTOR TRIP SYSTC4 resistance temperature detectors (RTD) shall be verified to be less than or equal to the value specified in Table 3.3-2 within one month of operation for newly installed RTD's and once every 18 months thereafter.

i MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-1 1

0 TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) '

(ffll TABLE NOTATION

~

With the protective system trip breakers in.he closed position and the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal.

(r) Trip may be bypassed below 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass-shall be automatically removed when THERMAL POWER is,>,

5% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(b) Trip may be manually bypassed below 600 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed at or abova 600 psia.

(c) Trip may be bypassed below 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed when THERMAL POWER is > 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(d) Deleted.

(e) Trip may be bypassed during testing pursuant to Special Test Excep-tion 3.10.3.

(f) AT Power input to trip may be pypassed.below 5%.of RATED THERMAL Power:

bypass shall be automatically removed when THERMAL POWER is > 5% of

([p.

3

~

RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and/or open the protective system trip breakers.

ACTION 2 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels and with the THERMAL POWER level:

i a.

< 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, immediately place the Inoperable channel in the bypassed condition; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

\\

l b.

> 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, operation may continue with the inoperable channel in the bypassed condi-tion, provided the following conditions are satisfied:

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-4

e

/

TABLE 3.3-3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE g

OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION FUNCTIONAL UNIT 1.

SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)

H a.

Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1

2 1, 2, 3, 4 I

ro b.

Containment Pressure -

l High 4

2 3

1,2,3

?

c.

Pressurizer Pressure -

l Low 4

2 3

1,2(e),3(a)~ 2 t

2.

CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS) l a.

Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 I

2 1,2,3,4 1

R b.

Containment Pressure --

y High - High 4

2(b) 3 1, 2, 3 2

G 3.

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS) a.

Manual CIAS (Trip Buttons) 2 1

2 1,2,3,4 1

b.

Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons) 2 1

2 1,2,3,4 1

c.

Containment Pressure -

High 4

2 3

1,2,3 2

1 d.

Pressurizer Pressure -

Low 4

2 3

1,2(e),3(a) 2

1

(

't 1

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) 1 x

f3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENIATION El MINIMUM E?

i i

Fi TOTAL NO.

CHANN S CilANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRiv OPERADLE MODES ACTION C

!)

7.

CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION s,

R N

OJ

($

a.

Containment Radiation -

5, 6 High Gaseous Monitor 1(d) 1(d) 1 3

Particulate Monitor 1(d) 1(d) 1 3

8.

LOSS OF POWER 4

a.

4.16 kV Emergency Bus

,Undervoltage (Under-voltage relays) - level one 4/ Bus 2/ Bus 3/ Bus 1.2,3 2

'*b.

' 16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Under-voltage relays) - level two 4/ Bus 2/ Bus 3/ Bus 1,2,3 2

i

-.- - --- a

TABLE 3.3-4

{

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES 8m ALLOWABLE

[

FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETFOINT VALUES z4 1.

SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)

N a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

Not Applicable Not Applicable b.

Containment Pressure - High

< 1.75 pois

< 5.20 pnig 4

c.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low

> 1600 psia 1 1592.5 psia l

2.

CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

Not Applicable Not Applicable b.

Containment Pressure -- High-High 1 27 psig i

g 27.15 poig 4

y 3.

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS) g a.

Manual CIAS (Trip Buttons)

Not Applicable Not Applicable b.

Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons)

Not Applicable Not Applicable c.

Containment Pressure - High 1

1 4.75 pnig 1 5.20 psig l

d.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low 1 1600 psia 1 1592.5 psia l

4.

MRIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION

> 500 psia Steam Generator Pressure - Low

> 192 5 pe tts

_4 0

Ma rch V,

~

m 3:

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued) g ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSlRUMENTATION_ TRIP VALUES, ALLOWABLE TRIP VALUE VALUES FUNCTIONAL UNIT m

S.

ENCLOSURE BUllDING FILTRATION (EBFAS)

Manual EBFAS (Trip Buttons)

Not Applicable Not App 11 cable b.

Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons)

Hot Appifcable Not Applicable a.

Containment Pressure - High 1 4.75 psig 1 5.20 psig c.

d.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low

> 1600 psia

> 1592.5 psia.

6.

CONTA1MMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (SRAS)

Manual SRAS (Trip Buttons)

Not Applicable Not Applicable R

Y b.

Refueling Water Storage Tank - Low 48 inches above 48 + 18 inches above a.

tanli bottom tank bottom

[

7.

CONTAIMMEMYPURGEVALVESISOLATION a.

Containment Radiation - High

< the value detemined

< the value detemined Gaseous Activity Tn accordance with Tn accordance with Specification 4.3.2.1.4 Specification 4.3.2.1.4.

< the value detemined

< the value detemined Particulate Activity (Half Lives Tn accordance with Tn accordance with greater than 8 days)

Specification 4.3.2.1.4 Specification 4.3.2.1.4.

l D

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c January 14, 1981 TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued) 3

~

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES r-0; 8

M ALLOWABLE TRIP VALUE VALUES FUNCTIONAL UNIT e5 8.

LOSS OF POWER ro a.

4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage.

(Undervoltage relays) - level one

> 2912 volts

> 2877 volts b.

4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage

> 3700 volts with

> 3663 volts with (Undervoltage relays) - level two an 8.0 + 2.0 second an 8.0 + 2.0 second time deTay time deTay 9.

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER a.

Manual Not Applicable Not App 1'icable-y b.

Steam Generator level - Low

> 12%

> 10%

E t

9 f

G 9

9 e

C TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

{

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILL'ANCE REQUIREMENTS N

CHANNEL MODES IN WillCH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CllECK CAL 10 RATION TEST REQUIRED zZ 6.

CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (SRAS) ro a.

Manual SRAS (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

R N.A.

b.

Refueling Water Storage Tank - Low 5

R M

1, 2, 3 c.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

M(1) 1, 2, 3 7.

CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVES ISOLATION R

a Containment Radiation - High l

a.

(yg Gaseous Monitor S

R M

Al.L MODES Particulate Monitor S

R M

Al.L MODES 8.

LOSS OF POWER a.

4.16 kv Emergency Bus

Undervoltage (Undervoltage relays) - level one S

R H

1, 2, 3 b.

4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Undervoltage relays) - level two S

R H

1,2,3 9.

AUXILIARY FEE 0 WATER a.

Manual N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

b.

Steam Generator level - Low 5

R H

1, 2, 3 O

O O

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

^

3.4.4 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with a steam bubble and with at least 130 kw cf pressurizer heater capacity capable of being supplied by emergen:y porer.

The pressurizer level shall be within 2 5% of its programmed valuc during periods of normal operation.*-

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.'

ACTION:

A.

With the pressurizer inoperable due to an inoperable amergency power supply to the pressurizer heaters either restore the inoperable emergency power supply within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HDT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

B.

With the pressurizer otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.4 The pr.essurizer water level shall be determined to be within i 5% of its programmed value at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

During transient operations (startup, power level changes, trips, etc.) the pressorizer level n be outside the + 5% band for periods not to exceed one hour.

?

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-4

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,v.

..i CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT.

ENCLOSURE BUILDING FILTRATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.5.1 Two separate and independent enclosure building filtration '

systems shall be OPERABLE.

,I APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

1 ACTION:

With one enclosure building filtration system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in COLD SHUT-DOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

~,-

'.6.5.1 Each enclosure building filtration system shall be demonstrated j

4 OPERABLE:

..I' JAt least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiat-r a.

ing, from the control room. flow through the HEPA filter and

~~

charcoal adsorber train and verifying that the train operates for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months with the heaters on.

b.

At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-25

~

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 1.

Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place testing acceptance criteria and uses the test procedures of Regulatery Positions C.S.a. C.5.c and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the~ system flow rate is 9000 cfm 1 10%.

2.

Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.

3.

Verifying a system flow rate of 9000 cfm 1 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

After every 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying c.

within 31 days a'ter removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Pegulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the labor.atory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.S2, Revision 2, March 1978.

d.

At least once per 18 months by:

1.

Verifying that the pressure drop across the cr.mbined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is ( 6 inches.

Water Gauge while operating the system lit a flow rate of 9000 cfm + 10%.

2.

Verifying that the system starts on an Enclosure Building Filtration Actuation Signal (EBFAS).

3.

Verifying that each system produces a negative pressure of greater,than or equal to 0.25 inches W.G. in the Enclosure Buildihg" Filtration Recion within (1) minute after an EBFAS.

f 3/4 6-26 J

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued) e.

After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove greater than or equal to 99%

of the DOP when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the system at a flow rate of,

9000 cfm + 10%.

f.

After each complete or partial replacenent of a charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove greater than or equal to 99%

of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the system at a flow rate of 9000 cfm + 10%.

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3/4 6-27

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PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.6

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CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.6.1 Two independent control room emergency ventilation systems shall be OPERABLE.

~

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

f With one control room emergency ventilation system inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.6.1 Each control room emergency ventilation system shall be demon-strated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verifying that the control room air temperature is less than or equal to 120 *F.

b.

At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 15 minutes.

c.

At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

MILLSTONE - UNI,T 2 3/4 7-16 a-mm~

s a

t PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in place 1.

testing acceptance criteria and uses the test procedures of Regulatory Positions C.S.a, C.S.c and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is 2000 cfm 1 10%.

Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory 2.

analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.

Verifying a system flow rate of 2000 cfm + 10% during system 3.

operation when tested in accorda'nce with ANSI N510-1975.

Af ter every 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying d.

within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.

e.

At least once per 18 months by:

1.

Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6 inches Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm 1 10%.

Verifying that on a recirculation signal, the 2.

system automatically switches into a recirculation mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks.

t 80 L

3/4 7-17

PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) f.

After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove greater than or equal to 99 % *.' of the DOP when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm + 10%.

g.

After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove greater than or equal to 99%

of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm + 10%.

l J.

l l

99.95% applicable when a filter efficiency of 99% is assumed in the safety analysis; 99% when a filter efficiency of 90% is assumed.

l 3/4 7-18

1.

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j.

3/4.9 REFUELING OFERATIONS 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATI QS.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIF,8 3

e o

h 3.9.1 With the reactor vessel head unbolted or removed, the boron con-centration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintaine-d uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of following reactivity conditions is met:

a.

Either a K f 0.95 or los:,, or eff b.

A boron concentration of greater than or equal to 1720. ppm.

APPLICABILITY : MODE 6*.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately I

suspend sll operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 40 gpm of boric acid solution at or greater than the required refueling water -storage tank concentration (ppm) until K is reducted to less gg than or equal to 0.95 or the boron concentration is restored to greater than or equal to 1720 ppm, whichever is the more restrict?ve.

The-provisions cf Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4. 9.1. l' The more-restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions l

shall be detemined prior to:

7 l

l l

Removing or' unbolting the reactor vessel head, and a.

b.

Withdrawal of any full length CEA in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within the reactor pressure vessel.

i 4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the reactor cooiant system and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical-analysis at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The reactor shall be. main ~tained in MODE 6 whenever the reactor vessel head is.. unbolted or removed and fuel is in the reactor vessel.

o sp' MILLSTONE 1 UNIT 2 3/4 9-1 o

REFUELING OPERATIONS STORAGE PDOL AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM - FUEL STORAGE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATJON 3.9.15 At least one Enclosur,e Building Filtration System shall be OPERABLE and capable of automatically initiating operation in the auxil-iary exhaust mode and exhausting through HEPA' filters and charcoal adsorbers on a storage pool area high radiation signal:

APPLICABILITY: WHENEVER IRRADIATED FUEL IS IN THE STORAGE POOL.

ACTION:

L'ith the requirements of the above specification not satisfied. suspend all operations invc1ving movement of fuel within the storage pool or crane operation witt. loads over the storage pool until at least one spent fuel storage pool ventilation system is restored to OPERABLE status.

t SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.15 The above required Enclosure Building Filtration System shall be demonstrate: OPERA 5LE:

At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, a.

from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 h6urs with'the heaters on.

1.

b.

At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communi-cating with the system by:

It:LL5 TONE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-16 s

%#w

1 REFUELIN6 OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

V6 ifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in place 1.

tes Jag acceptance criteria and uses the test procedures of Regulatory Positions C.S.a. C.S.c and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is 9000 cfm ?,10%.

Verifying within 31 days after removal that a' laboratory 2.

analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accor-dance with Regulatory Po.;ition C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.

Verifying a system flow rate of 9000 cfm + 10% during system 3.

operation when tested in accordance with XNSI N510-1975.

After every 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying c.

within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Narch 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, d.

At least once per 18 months by:

Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA 1.

filters and charcoal adsorber banks is [ 6 inches Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 9_000 cfm +'10%.

2.

Verifying that on a Spent Fuel Storage Pool Area high radiation automatically starts (unless already operating) signal, the system and directs its exhaust flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber bars.ks.

O d

i MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-17

REFUELING OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank by e.

verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove greater than or equal to 99%~.

of the DOP when they are tested in place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the sy, stem at a flow rate'of 9000 cfm + 10%.

f.

After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove greater than or equal to 99%

of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the system at a flow rate of 9000 cfm + 10%.

f.

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9 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-18 e

/

3/4.10 SPECI AL TEST E7CEPTIONS SHJTDOWN MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION The SHL)TDOWN MAEIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be 3.10.1 suspended for measurement of CEA worth and shutdown margin provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated CEA worth is available for trip insertion from OPERABLE CEA(s).

APPLICABILITY : MODES 2 and 3.

ACT10f t; With any full length CEA not fully inserted and with less than the immedi-a.

above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, ately initiate and continue boration at > 40 gpm of boric acid solution at or greater than the required refueling water storage l

concettration (ppml until the cHUTDOWN PARGIN required

[

tank (R'iST) by Specifiention 3.1.1.1 is restored.

With all full lenrth CEA's inserted and the reactor subcritical by b.

less than the above reactivity equivalent, immediately initiate and continue boration at> 40 gpm of boric acid solution at or greater than the required refueling water storage tanke (RWST) concentration uatil the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 (ppn) is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The position of each full length CEA required either partially or 4.10.1.1 fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Each CEA not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 24 4.10.1.2 l

hours prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of l

t Specification 3.1.1.1.

l l

(

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 10-1 i

L St

v REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The boron capability required below 200 F is based upon providing a k/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN at 140 F during refueling with all full and part 2%length control rods withdrawn. This condition requires either 5,050 gallons of 6.25% boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks or 57,000 gallons of 1720 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

l' A minimum boron concentration of 1720 ppm is required in the RWST at all time in order to satisfy safety analysis assumptions.for boron dilution incidents and other transients using the RWST as a borated water source.

3 / 4.1. 3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUT 00HN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are limited to acceptable levels.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original criteria are met.

The ACTION statements applicable to an immovab1'e or untrippable CEA and 20 steps) of two or more CEAs, require a prompt to a large misalignment (Ince e'ther of these conditions may be indicative shutdown of the reactor s of a possible loss of mechanical functional capability of the CEAs and in the event of a immovable or untrippable CEA, the loss of SHUTDOWN HARGIN.

For small misalignments (< 20 steps) of the CEAs, there is 1) a small degradation in the peaking factors relative to those assumed in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints for DNBR and linear heat rate, 2) a small effect on the time dependent long term power distributions relative to those used in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints for DNBR and linear heat rate, 3) a small effect on the available SHUTDOWN MARGIN, and 4) a small ef fect Therefore, the on the ejected CEA worth used in the safety analysis.

ACTION statement associated with the small misalignment of a CEA permits a one hour time interval during which attempts may be made to restore the CEA to within its alignment requirements prior to initiating a reduction The one hour time limit is sufficient to (1) identify in THERMAL POWER.

causas of a misaligned CEA, (2) take appropriate corrective action to realign the CEAs and (3) minimize the effects of xenon redistribution.

Overpower margin is provided to protect the core in the event of a However, this misalignment large misalignment (> 20 steps) of a CEA.

The reactor would cause distortion of the core power distribution.

l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3 i

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' A.

I 7

This page intentionally left blank.

9 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-12

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CONTAINMENT, SYSTEMS l

BASES 3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 54 psig during LOCA conditions.

The maximum peak pressure obtained from a LOCA event is 53.8 psig.

The limit of 2.1 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to less than the design pressure and is consistent with the accident analyses.

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE The limitation on containment air temperature ensures that the containment peak air temperature does not exceed the design temperature of 288'F during LOCA conditions'. The containment temperature limit is consistent with the accident analyses.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

([

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the con-tainment vessel will be maiatained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is reautred to ensure that the vessel will withstand the maximum pressure of 53.8 l

psig in the event of a LOCA. The measurement of containment tendon lift I

off force, the visual and metallurgical examination of tendons, anchor-ages and liner and the Type A leakage tests are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the containment's strucutral integrity are in compliance with the recmunendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35 " Inservice Surveillance'of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Strucutres".

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-2

(

T 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION 1)

The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that:

the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume These limitations are consistent having direct access to the reactor vessel.

with the i11tial tonditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the j

taccident analysr 3.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY T:ME I

The minimum requirement for rr.'.

, scriticality prior to movemerLt of irradiated fuel ensures that su'-

time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products.

This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3f.9.4 CONTAINMENT pENET:*TIOi;5 The requirements on containment penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressur-ization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS k

The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity ecndition during fuel or CEA movenent within the reactor pressure vessel.

I MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-1

V Docket No. 50-336 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2' Discussion of Proposed Revisions to Technical Specifications December, 1981

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v Proposed Technical Specification CFanges The purpose of this Attachment is to provide an explanation for each of the changes proposed in Attachment 1.

(1) Pages 3/4 1-1, 1-3, 10-1 and B 3/4 1-3 have been revised, as indicated, to more clearly define the required boron concen-tration to be used when boration is necessitated to meet shutdown margin requirements in modes 1 - 5 and during CEA worth tests. This change is consistent with current Standard Technical Specifications.

Pages 1-7, 3/4 1-16, 9-1, and B 3/4 9-1 have been revised to incorporate Standard Technical Specification requirements for mode 6 reactivity conditions. The proposed reactivity con-dition during mode 6 defines an upper limit for all conditions during refueling. Page 1-7, defining Operational Modes, has been updated to reflect the proposed reactivity condit-in mode 6.

Bases pages have also been updated accordingly.

(2) NNECO proposes to more clearly define the fully withdrawn position of the regulating CEA's.

As such, page 3/4 1-28 has been revised. The proposed limits are consistent with the current definition of withdrawn for the shutdown CEA's.

The proposed change will permit additional operational flexibility to move the regulating CEA's between 176 and 180 steps further minimizing the potential for guide tube wear.

(3) Pages 3/4 6-25, 26, 27, 3/4 7-16, 17, 18, and 3/4 9-16, 17, 18 are proposed to be revised. The proposed changes relate to the Enclosure Building, Control Room, and Spent Fuel Pool ventilation systems surveillance requirements. The changes update the Tech-nical Specification testing requirements for these ventilation systems to those of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2 and ANSI Standard N510-1975. These proposed changes are consistent with current Standard Technical Specifications.

(4) Pages 3/4 4-23, 24, and B 3/4 4-12.

NNECO proposes to delete Technical Specification requirements to monitor core barrel vibration. The original purpose of Specifications 3.4.11 and 4.4.11 was to monitor for potential core barrel movement at Millstone Unit No. 2.

This phenomenon was discovered at another plant designed tor the same vendor and resulted in certain design modifications in the hold-down rings for the vessel internals.

The core barrel vibration surveillance requirements were in-tended to verify the performance of the redesigned hold-down mechanism.

V

. NNECO has performed a structural analysis which supports the proposed deletion of core barrel vibration surveillance re-quirements at Millstone Unit No. 2.

In addition, core barrel vibration data obtained to date indicate no reduction in hold-down force on the core barrel.

NNECO intends to administratively monitor core barrel vibration at Millstone Unit No. 2.

(5) NNECO proposes to delete reference to the Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS) and the Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) for the Containment Purge Valves in Table 3.3-3 of the Technical Specification 9.

By Amendment No. 61 to the Millstone Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications, the Staff re-quired NNECO to maintain the containment purge valves lcoked closed in MODES 1 - 4.

In addition, the CIAS and SIAS electrical circuitry has been disconnected at the Staff's request.

Therefore, NNECO proposes to delete all reference to these trip functions for the containment purge valves on Pages 3/4 3-14 and 3-24.

An editorial change has been made to Page 3/4 3-4 to correct Table Notation (f). The word " passed" should correctly read

" bypassed."

In Table 3.3-4 on Page 3/4 3-18, 19, and 20, the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System trip setpoint for containment pressure-high has been revised to be consistent with the value used in the Reactor Protection System. As the revised set-point is more conservative than the current value, no safety analyses are effected. The allowable values have also been revised to include the maximum expected drift assumed to occur between surveillance intervals for each trip function.

In addition, reference to CIAS and SIAS trip functions have been deleted from the containment purge valve isolation feature listed on page 3/4 3-19.

This is consistent with the require-ment to maintain the containment purge valves locked closed in modes 1 - 4 with the CIAS and SIAS circuitry disabled as discussed above.

(6) In Reference (7), the NRC Staff requested that NNECO propose Tech-nical Specifications to require time response testing of all safety system resistance temperature detectors (RTD) within one month for newly installed RTDs and once every eighteen (18) months thereafter. In response to that request, NNECO hereby proposes to amend Section 3/4.3.1, Reactor Protective Instrumentation, to include the Reference (7) requests.

Page 3/4 3-1 of the Technical Specifications is proposed to be revised accordingly.

(7) NNECO proposes to revise the limit for most positive moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) above 70% of Rated Thermal Power.

This change is the result of Cycle 5 core characteristics and is supported by analyses. This change appears on Page 3/4 1-5.

(8) The middle of cycle moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) testing on Page 3/4 1-6 is proposed to be deleted. The original intent of this Technical Specification was to confirm the ad-equacy of vendor predictions of the moderator temperature co-efficient during each fuel cycle as the boron concentration was reduced with fuel burnup. NNECO has successfully demonstrated the capability to predict moderator temperature coefficients through four fuel cycles with two fuel vendors. The current requirement to measure the MTC at beginning of life ensures that no unforeseen changes have occurred in the reactor core characteristics.

In addition, since MTC testing is a high risk plant test involving significant control element assembly movement and axial shape index shifts, deletion of the current Technical Specification requirements for middle of cycle MTC testing will enhance overall plant safety and reliability.

(9) The lower limit on linear heat generaticu rate denoted in Figure 3.2-1 on Page 3/4 2-3 has been removed. As this limit line was based on Cycle 4 specific evaluations, its applicability in Cycle 5 is no longer valid. As such, Figure 3.2-1 is proposed to be revised accordingly.

(10) Pages 3/4 3-12 and B 3/4 6-2 contain editorial revisions. Action Statement numbers on Page 3/4 3-12 have been revised to reflect the current table notation of Table 3.3-3.

The maximum contain-ment pressure following a LOCA noted on Page B 3/4 6-2 has been revised as a result of power uprating in Cycle 3.

The_ maximum containment pressure is that which would occur following a LOCA initiated at a containment pressure of 2.1 psig permitted by Technical Specification 3.6.1.4.

(11) Page 3/4 4-4 is proposed to be revised to clarify the intent of Technical Specification 3.4.4, pressurizer. The revision requires that the pressurizer level must be maintained within

+ 5% of its programmed value only during periods of normal operation. The change takes into account the fact that during transient conditions, the pressurizer level may vary - from the i 5% band.

O Docket No. 50-336

+

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Cycle 5 Steam Line Rupture Analysis 1

December, 1981

~l

5.3.7 STEAMLINE RUPTURE The steamline rupture accident was reanalyzed for Cycle 5 due to the change in shutdown margin,. trip reactivity curve, and kinetics coefficients.

The transient which was reanalyzed is the most limiting case and assumes the steamline rupture of a pipe inside the containment at the outlet of the steam generator.

The plant initially is at no load conditions with offsite power available.

The reanalysis was performed with the assumption that auxiliary feedwater flow is initiated automatically during this transient.

It was assumed that 2800 gpm of auxiliary feedwater, 35% more than the maximum runout flow, is d livered to the affected steam generator three minutes after the beginning of the transient.

This is conservative with respect to the expected time of auxiliary feedwater initiation since automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system would occur on a low steam generator water level trip signal..The three minute time delay for auxiliary feedwater delivery is also conservatively small.

The assumption was also made that the minimum capability for injection of boric acid solution (1720 ppm) corresponds to the m6st restrictive single failure in the safety injection system.

This corresponds to the flow delivered by one high pressure safety injection pump and one low pressure safety injection pump

~

delivering full flow to the cold leg header.

The steam generator pressure, RCS temperature, pressurizer pressure, reactivity, and core heat flux transients for this case are shown in Figures 17-21.

Table 10 li,sts the time sequence of events.

As shown in Figure 20, the core returns to critical after CEA' insertion (assuming the most reactive CEA is stuck in the withdrawn position).

This is due to the high cooldown rate, in the presence of a negative moderator temperature coefficient, resulting from the steam discharge and feedwater addition.

However, the addition of boron from the high pressure safety injection pump brings the core subcritical again.

The peak heat flux attained during this transient is small, approximately 3 percent.

By this time the faulted steam generator is essentially depressurized and the primary system cooldown is due mainly to the boiling of feedwater.

At 180 seconds, auxiliary feedwater flow is delivered to the faulted steam generator, which further cools down the RCS.

However the positive reactivity insertion due to this additional cooldown is offset by the addition of boron via safety injection, and the core remains subcritical.

Results show that the DNB margin design basis will not be violated.

That is, DNB will not occur on at least 95 percent of the limiting fuel rods at a 95 percent confidence level.

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SEQUEtlCE OF EVEllTS - STEAMLIt1E RUPTURE AT F10 LOAD TIME (SEC)

EVEt1T SETP0ItiT OR VALUE 0.0 Steamline Rupture occurs 3.5 Low Steam Generator Pressure trip signal 478 psia occurs; main steam isolation begins 4.9 CEA's begin to drop into'the core 10.4 Main steamline isolatien valves closed 12.0

~ Pressurizer empties 12.5 SIAS initiated on low RCS pressure 1563 psia 94.0 Peak Reactivity 0.21%aja 139.0 Peak Heat Flux

3. 2%

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FIGURE 19 MILLST0f1E 2 STEAMLIllE RUPTURE TOTAL REACTIVITY VERSUS TIME 42 o

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FIGURE 20 MILLSTONE 2 STEAMLINE RUPTURE HEAT FLUX VERSUS TIME l

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v t e Letter Sequence Other
TAC:47471, (Approved, Closed) TAC:47472, (Approved, Closed) TAC:47978, (Open) TAC:49798, (Approved, Closed) TAC:54199, (Open)
Initiation Request Acceptance... Administration Questions Answers Results Approval Other: B10325, Forwards Reload Safety Analysis Submitted in Support of Cycle 5 Reload.Rept Includes Results of Boron Dilution,Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow,Seized Rotor Reanalysis & Control Element Assembly Ejection & Withdrawal at Critical, ML20033A519, ML20039C038, ML20041D017, ML20041D021
MONTHYEAR1983-07-01 [Table View]

ML20039C038

Text

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