ML20041D019
| ML20041D019 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1982 |
| From: | Conner M, Litton F, Lobel R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041D018 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-47471, TAC-47472, TAC-47841, NUDOCS 8203040071 | |
| Download: ML20041D019 (4) | |
Text
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMEN 0 MENT N0.7 2 T0 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65 N0Pw EAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.
MI.a.JNE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 COCKET NO. 50-336 Introduction By application dated December 17, 1981, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
. (NNECO or the licensee) proposed Technical Specification.(TS) changes necessary for'the Cycle 5 operation of Millstone Unit No. 2.
In addition to those TS necessary for the next cycle of operation, numerous other TS requests were submitted. To reduce the size of the reload package, we have determined that the following proposed changes may be evaluated independent of the Cycle 5 reload.
e Mode 6 reactivity control, o Boration requirements, e Special test peak linear heat rate, e RTO response time testing, e Containment purge valves actuation, o ESFAS allowable valves, o Core barrel monitoring, e Ventilation system HEPA filters, and e Editorial revisions.
l Discussion and Evaluation Each of the above proposed TS changes will be discussed and evaluated in the subsequent sections of this safety evaluation.
Mode 6 Reactivity Control NNEC0 proposed changes to TS Table 1.1 and TS 3.1.2.7, 3.9.1 and B 3/4.9.1.
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to redefine the Mode 6 reactivity. control. The current TS Table.l.1 s
defines Mode 6 (refueling) reactivity conditions (Keff) as'< 0.90.
TS 3.9.1 requires all full length control element assemblies (G As) to be fully inserted. Tbe proposed change would increase the refueling Keff to
< 0.95, remove the requirement for all CEA insertion and scecify an acceptable baron concentration of > 1720 ppm. This is necessary to be '
consistent with the initial conditTons assumed for the boron dilution event in the accident analyses.
It is also consistent with the current STS. We, therefore, find the proposed _ changes to TS Pages 1-7,.3/4 1-16, 3/4 9-1 and B 3/4 9-1 acceptable as modified to agree with STS and accepted by the licensee.
8203040071 820222 PDR ADOCK 05000336 P
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Boration Reouirements The current TS action statements in Sections 3.1.1.1, 3.1.1.2, 3.10.1 and B 3/4.1.2 require "..;immediately initiate and continue baration at > 40 gpm until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored". The proposed change would specify the sourece of, and thereby the minimum concentration of the boric acid solution.
OurrehiewofthisproposedTSchangerevealstheword"immediately"is used. About two years ago, we went through the exercise of replaciog this word with a definite time interval. Discussions with NNEC0 have resulted in agreement to perform this action with'in 15 minutes of detecting a reduced shutdown margin.
We find the proposed chances to TS Pages 3/4 1-1, 3/4 1-3, 3/4 10-1
, and B 3/4 1.-3 are acceptable as modified to meet our requirements and agreed to by the licensee.
In addition, we suggested to NNECO that the maximum boron concentration of 2400 ppm used in the trisodium phosphate (TSP) calculation be identified in the TS basis. NNECO agreed that this would document the assump. tion used in this calculation. This change should be made.
Special Test Peak Linear Heat Rate Amendment No. 61, (October 6, 1980) authorized low temperature cperation for special tests during Cycle 4, only. To insure control of peaking factors, the allowable peak linear, heat rate (LHR) was limited.to 14.2 kW/ft instead of its normal value of.15.6 kW/ft for this type of. operation.
Request No. 9 is to remove this extra limit line from Figure 3.2.1..We find this change administrative.in nature and, therefore, acceptable.
The TS page involved is 3.4 2-3.
RTD Response Time Testing in NRC letter dated June 30, 1981, we requested all CE designed units to propose TS to require resistance.teeperature detecters (RTDs) response time testing within one meath for newly installed RTDs and once every eighteen months thereafter.
Item 6 of NNECO's application propcses this requested change to TS 4.3.1.1.
This change is needed to assure that RTDs used in the reactor protection system (RPS) do not experience degradation with time in use..We find this proposed increase.in RTD response time testing acceptable. The affected page is 3/4 3-1.
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Containment Purge. Valves Actuation Part of the No. 5 proposal of December 17, 1981 is to remove the Contain-ment Isolation Actuation System (CIAS).and Safety injection Actuation System (SIAS) auto closure of the containment purge valves from TS Tables 3.3-3 and 4.3-2.
Previously, by Amendment No. 61 the TS were changed to require these valves to be 1,ocke.d closed in Modes 1-4.
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addition, we requested the electrical circuitry be physically disconnected.
NNECO confirms that this has been done.. Therefore, the TS Pages 3/4 3-14 and 3/4 3-24 should be modified to remove reference to the disconnected circuits.
ESFAS Allowable Values
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The second part of the No. 5 proposal is to change the allowable values in Table 3.3-4 for the engineered safety features actuation system.(ESFAS) trips. The proposed change is to specify more conservative allowable values than the current TS for containment pressure-high, pressurizer pressure-low, containment pressure-high-high, steam generator pressure-low and 4.16 kV emergency bus undervoltage-level one and level two. This.
change will make the ESFAS allowable values consistent with the RPS values.
The allowable values include the maximum expected drift assumed to occur
- between surve.illance int'rvals for each trip.. In addition, the. proposed e
change would remove the containment purge valve actuation (CIAS) and SIAS trip function requirements from Table 3.3-4 to be consistent with TS Table 3.3-3 and 4.3-2.
We find these proposed changes to TS.Pages 3/4 3-18, 3/4 3-19 and 3/4 3-20 acceptable based on the above comments.
Core Barrel Monitoring NNEC0 proposal No. 4 requests that the core barrel monitoring requirements be deleted. The requirements of TS 3.4.11 and 4.4.11 for monitoring and reporting core barrel movement were originally required after the Palisades plant experienced excessive barrel motion. The vendor, Combustion Engineering (CE), devised a generic design modification which has been made.to Millstone Unit No. 2.
Considerable operating experience since.has not revealed any excessive core barrel motion nor has inspection revealed excessive wear of the core barrel to reactor vessel interface nor in the. flange area.-
Under those conditions we find that the proposed removal of the action statement for reporting requirements is acceptable.
The affected pages are 3/4 4-23, 3/4 4-24 and B 3/4 4-12.
Ventilation Svstem HEPA Filters These proposed changes to TS 4.6.5.1, 4.7.6.1 and 4.9.15~ surveillance requirements would bring these early edition TS on the enclosure building, control room and spent fuel pool ventilation systems into consistency with current TS. The NNECO proposal would. bring the testing requirements,
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on these systems into. agreement with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2,.
dnd ANSI Standard N510-1975. These proposed TS are, therefore, acceptr.ble.
The affected pages are 3/4 6-25, 26 and 27, 3/4 7-1617 and 18, and 3/4 9-16, 17 and 18.
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Editorial Revisions The December 17, 1981 application also contains several editorial changes to the following pages.
Page 3/4 3 Replace " passed" with " bypassed" in table notation f.
Page 3/4 3 Substitute Actions "1"'and "2" of TS Table 3.3-3 for the current TS numbers "6" and "7" to be consistent with the table notation.
Page B 3/4 6 The maximum peak containment pressure from the LOCA event should be increased from 51.2 to 53.8 psig. This results from the increased power approval for Cycle 3 and subsequent operation.
We find these editorial changes acceptable.
Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the stanopoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the. amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety, of the public wi'll not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of s.
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the public.
Date:
February 22, 1982 Principal Contributors:
Monte Conner Rich Lobel Felix Litton y
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