Text

Partially Deleted Secy Paper,Informing Commission of Directors Denial of Request to Reconsider License Amends Authorizing TVA to Temporarily Store LLW at Plant
	ML20034H334
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	07/28/1981
From:	Malsch M; NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
To:	;
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References
	FOIA-92-436 2.206, SECY-81-453, SECY-81-453-01, SECY-81-453-1, NUDOCS 9303170144
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i ADJUDICATORY ISSUE I.

(jdoistion Vote)

SECY-81-453 July 28,1981 t

For:

The Commissioners s

From:

Martin G. Malsch Deputy General Counsel

Subject:

DIRECTOR'S DENIAL OF 2.206 RELIEF (IN THE MATTER OF TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY)

Facility:

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3 To inform the Ccmmission of the

Purpose:

denial of a request to reconsider license amendments. authorizing TVA to temporarily _ store low-level waste at Browns Ferry and 60 recommend

,...r-w Review Time Expires:

August 10, 1981 (as extended)

Discussion:

By letter of October 28, 1980, Messrs. Thomas W.

Paul, c

t p N, J

Contact:

Sheldon L. Trubatch, GC X-43224 r

Information in thc :'tord was deleted in accordance with the freedom of Information Act, nemptions I

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9303170144 921207_

PDR FOIA CILINSK92-436 PDR

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2 Stewart Horn, and David Ely, on behalf of the Huntsville Chapter, Safe Energy Alliance of Alabama (SEAA), requested the NRC to reconsider the issuance of license amendments which authorized TVA to temporarily store low-level-radioactive waste in an existing

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covered pavilion on the Browns Ferry site.

_[ Attachment 1).

SEAA contended that Browns Ferry is located.in an area subject to frequent destructive tornado activity, that recent tornadoes in the area have generated rotational wind speeds of up to 250 miles p'er hour, that TVA designed the system for restraining low-level waste to withstand winds of only 95 miles per hour because it found the probability of tornadoes with higher wind speeds small enough to be neglected, and that the licensed temporary storage was not. designed in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix.A,.. Criterion 2, Design.

- Bases For Protection Against-

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Natural Phenomena.

By letter o'f March 6, 1981, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation advised-SEAA that its letter would be treated as a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.

On June 26, 1981, the Director denied he petition..

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JAttachment 21.[.In our. view,.

E f 'll The Director's analysis begins with General Design Criterion (GDC) 2 of Appendix A to Part 50 which 1

requires, in part, that structures,

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systems and components in a nuclear plant _imoortant to safety be designed to. withstand the effects of natural phenomena, including tornadoes.

Staff has: consistently interpreted this class of structures and equipment to be limited to Class I structures, i.e.,

structures vital to the safe.

shutdown of a facility and the removal of decay heat.

Facilities used to store low-level waste have not been classified as Class I structures. 2/

Accordingly, the Director found that there.are no predetermined design bases for the low-level waste storage facility at Browns Ferry, i.e.,

the design

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basis tornado provided by Regulatory Guide 1.76 is not applicable. 3/

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__jGDC 60, in relevant part, provides:

The nuclear power unit design shall' include means to control suitably the release of radioactive materials in gaseous and liquid effluent's and to handle radioactive solid wastes produced during-l normal reactor operation, including anticipated operational occurrences.

GDC 61, in relevant lpart, provides:

The... radioactive waste and l

other systems wh. ich,may contain radioactivity:shallEbe'i'

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designed to assure adequate ~ ~ ~

safety-under normal and i

postulated accident conditions.

These systems-shall be designed'with suitable shielding for radiation protection and with appropriate containment, confinement and filtering i

systems.

SI For the region of the country in which Browns Ferry is located, the design basis tornado has a rotational wind:

speed of 290 miles per hour.

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The Director considers that the storage activity-is adequately i

protected against postulated accidents for.several-reasons.

Only dry trash may.be. stored in the l

pavilion, the' amount.of-radioactivity'in each. drum is

-j limited:to 0.5 curies, and the l

total amount of radioactivity.

allowed is 1320 'cu'riesv ~ The -drums are held'in: place by a restraint.

j system designed'to withstand'a

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tornado:having a wind. velocity of 95 miles per hour.

Such"a tornado

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occurs with a frequency'of;oneEper j

hundred years; and' the. probability that the Browns Ferry.: site will experience a tornado with. wind-i speeds exceeding 95" miles per hour-

_ is approximately.cnce every;20,000 years.

If a tornado-carries-a drum-I offsite, and it remains intact, it 1

will probably not l'ead to'an ~

individualiexposure in excess of

~j the 10 CFR Part 20 limit of 500 1

mrem.

Direct contact with the drum l

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would lead to a dose rate of 700 mrem per hour and an individual is unlikely to. stay in contact with a drum for three quarters of an hour or long enough to exceed the dose criterion.

In addition, efforts to recover any containers carried offsite by a tornado would be initiated as quickly as possible by utility, local ar.d staff officials.

Even if a drum were to rupture, the exposure to.any individual is likely to be smaller than-the individual dose from direct contact with an intact drum because the contents of the drum would be dispersed.

Finally, storage at the pavilion is intended to be'a temporary measure pending a more permanent disposition of the~ waste.

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Recommendation:

o Martin G. Malsch

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Deputy General Counsel 1

Attachraents:

1 1.

Ltr, 10/28/80, SEAA.

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to NRC 2.

Director's Denia1, 6/26/81

.3.

Safety Evaluation 4.

Ltr, 1/21/80, Mills to Denton, w/ attach.

5.

Trubatch Differing

-t, opinion t

Comissioners' coments should be provided directly to the 0ffice of. the

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Secretary by c.o.b. Monday, Auaust 10, 1981.

Comission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Comissioners NLT. August' 3,1981, with an infonnation copy to-the Office of the Secretary.

If the paper'is of such a nature that it-requires-

- additional time for analytical review and coment, the. Commissioners and the Secretariat.should be apprised of when. comments may be expected.

DISTRIBUTION:

1 Comissioners Commission Staff Offices Executive Director for Operations l

Executive Legal Director Secretariat.

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.. -...- 3 r cl0H October 28, 1980

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Safe Energy Alliance of Alabama

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Huntsville Chapter Suite 407. Terry Hutchins 31vd.

102 Clinton Ave.

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Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nucler Reactor Regulation U.S.. Nuclear R egulatory Commission

. Wash rston, D.C.

20555 i

Dea: V:. Denton; This letter is a recuest for reconsidera icn of the issuance, by the NRC. of amendnents No. 's. 60, 55 & 32 to Facility Licenses Nc's. D?R-33, D?R-52, and DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry Nucler Plant, units No 's.1, 2, & 3 dated F.a--ch 17, 1980.

These a endments an:hcrice the tempora y s:crage cf low-level radioactive waste in an existing covered parilion situated on the site of 3FNP.

This request for. recensideration is motivated by the fact i

tha: the approved terpera-y Low Level Waste Storage (LLWS) paeilion is {ct designed.to. withstand tornade winds of,over SO--

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- X ;.y nph velocities.

I?N? is located in an a ea of Ncrth Alaba:a that has cone to be known as " Tornado Alley".

On April 3rd and L h 1974 a series of scrnadoes associated with a s:cr that caused 315 deaths and

=cre han $600 tillion in da.= age passed within 2 miles of 3FNP.

Fifty-eight (58) 500 C linetransmission towers carring power frc: 3?N? were snapped causire over a million dollars worth of damage.

As a result cf the loss of these power lines unit one

@ 3?N? was forced to shut down due to the sudden drop in demand the ;crnsdoe's destructive activity had brought about.

Despitethishistchyofveryrecent serious. tornado activ'ity, TVA, in the application for an a endnent to 3?N? 's operating license vb.ich would s"ow the Agency to Store :.LRW onsite,. clearly states that the probability of a destructive tornado occurir4 at this facility was considered to be so s all as to be negligable.

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-4 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director October 28, 1980 t

Edward Epstein the associate administrator for Environ = ental -

Moni:cring & Fredication of National Oceanic & Atmospheric i

Adninistratien on a field visit to North Alabama after the April 197h tornadoes estimated that the rotational speed of such te -

l nadoes 'was between 200 and 250 =ph.

This dismissal of the need to design LLRW structures capable of withstanding tornado winds in an area that has recently suffered frc a devasting tornado puts TVA in direct conflict with the Ccde of Federal Regulations Title 10 Chapter 1, Part 50, Appendix A.,

. ?. 361 Criterion 2 Desien Basis for Frctection Acainst Natural Phenerena which states:

S tr.:c ur e s, systers, and cc ponents i pertan to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural pheno ena-such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsur2mi, and seiches without loss of capability to perfor: their safe y fanctions.

The design bases for these structu es, systers, and co=ponents shall reflect:

(1)

Apprcpriate censideration of the =cs; severe of the natural phene era-that have been historically reported for the site.and surrcund-ing area, with sufficient ra d n for the linited accu acy, i

quanti-y, and period of time in which the historical data have been accunulated. - ( 2) appropria:e combinati'ons of.the '-

mr effects cf nc=al and accident conditiens with the effects of the natu a'_ phenc ena and (3) the i pertance of the safety Panctiers to te performed.

Desoite later claims to have adhered to the CFR noted above, TVA in i s Plan for Oe porary Onsite Storage of Low-Level Radio-l active Waste @ 3?N? Units 1, 2, 3 dated Janualy 21, 1980 in Section h General Considerations Part G Sub 2 states:

"The probability of a tornado with =aximum wind speeds higher than the 95 mph value striking the plant in any one year is 7 x 10-This is considered to be small enough to be neglected."

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October 22, 1cSO l

Fr. Ea old E. Denten, Directer a

In effect TVA has chosen to neglect the possibility of a tornado re-occurring in an area that has already suffered severe danage frc: a series' of tornados with wind velocities more than tc'_ce those that TVA has planned for.

TVA is gambling on the possibility that another severe storn will not strike SyNP or its The pecple of North Alaba a will suffer the consequences entirens.

i cf such negligence and it is for this reason that we request the FE0 to direct TVA to adhere to the CFE which calls on them to be prepa ed for the "most severe cf the natreal phenemena that have l

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teen historically reported fer the site and su-cunding area."

Sincerely yours, i-

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.Chemas W. Paul 7

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1 The S de Energy Alliance of i

Alabama, Huntsville Chapter I

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/ Docket File (3) Program Support Staff, NRR

/HRC PDR I&E (3)

< Local PDR S. Chilk, SECY (5)

Docket Nos. 50-259 at0RB #2 Rdg C. StSchens, SECY 50-260 1EDO Rdg

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50-296 H. R. Denton

_J. Murray, ELD E. G. Case A. Rosenthal, ASLAB June 26,1981 D. Eisenhut ASLBP R. Purple NSIC R. Tedesco TERA Mr. Thomas W. Paul T. Novak ACRS (10)

Mr. Stewart Hom G. Lainas A. Shepard (3)

Mr. David Ely J. Heltemes, AEOD Ross Safe Energy Alliance of Alabama T. Ippolito T. Murley Huntsville Chapter

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Suite 407 - Terry Hutchins Blvd.

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U1 gT Huntsville, Alabama 35801 OELD

.g M. Bridgers (EDD-10218)

Gentlemen:

C. Miles B. Snyder Your letter of October 28, 1980 requested that I reconsider issuance of Artendment Nos. 60, 55 and 32 to Facility License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 respectively, for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2 and 3.

These amendments were issued on March 17,1980, and authorized 1YA to temporarily store low-level radioactive waste in an existing covered pavilion on the Browns Ferry site. As I advised you in my letter of March 6,1981, your letter was treated as a request for action under 10 CFR 2.206 of the Comission's regulations.

The basis for your request is that Browns Ferry is located in an area subject to tornadoes and that the existing'pavilien is not designed to withstand tornado winds of over 80 mph velocity. Enclosed is a detailed response to the points raised in your letter. While I recognize that this pmbably is not the response you preferred, I hope that it satisfactorily explains the basis for our actions with respect to storage of low-level radioactive waste at Browns Ferry and the reasons why your request for reconsideration of our previous action is hereby denied.

A copy of this determination will be placed in the Comission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D. C.

20555 and at the Athens Public L1brary, South and Forrest, Athens,-Alabama, 35611. A copy will also be filed with the Secretary of the Comission for its review in accordance with 10 CFR Section 2.206(c) of the Comission's regulations.

Sincerely, Origini SW k

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R. R. snton y

i Harold R. Denton, Director

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION HAROLD R. DENTON, DIRECTOR l

t In the Matter of

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

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Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-250, (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant,

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and 50-296 Units 1, 2 and 3)

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DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 In a letter dated October 28, 1980, Messrs. Thomas W. Paul, Stewart Hocn and David Ely, on behalf cf the Huntsville Cha:ter, Safe Energy Alliance -

l of Alabama (SEAA), requested t'at NRC reconsider the issuance by the NRC of amendments Nos. 60, 55 and 32 to Facility Licenses Nos DPR-33, DPR-52 and i

DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos.1, 2 and 3.

These amendments were issued by the NRC on March'17,1980 and authorized TVA to

, l temporarily store icw-1evel radioactive waste (LLRW) in an existing covered i

pavilion on tne Browns F,erry site.

.c In their letter of October 28, 1980, the SEAA stated the reasons why we should recensider the authorization and these are sunr.arized below:

1.

The area of northern Alabama where the BFNP is located is subject to j

frequent, destructive tornado activity.

l 2.

On April 3-4, 1974, a series of tornadees passed within 2 miles of the I

BFNP. Fifty-eight (58) 500 KV line transmissien towers carrying power from BENP were snapped. As a result of the loss of these power lines.

one unit at BFNP was forced to shutdown since tne plant was not able i

to distrib,ute the total power capable of being generated by the plant.

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During tne April 3-4, 1974 cutbreak of tornad:es, the rotati:nal wir.d speed at scme lecations was estimated to be between 200 and 250 rph.

Despite this history of very recent serious tornado activity, TVA, in 4

their application requesting authorization for temporary onsite storage i

of LLRW, had concluded - en a probahilistic hasis - that design of the drum restraint and hold-down system for wind speeds of 95 mph was adequate, considering the relatively short period of tire drums of LLRW might be stored in the building.

Specifically, TVA concluded that the pr:bability of a ::rnado with maximum wind speeds higher than the 95 miles per hour value striking the plant in any one year is

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a 7 x 10~'.

TVA c:nsidered tnis small enou;h to be reglected.

Despite statements that temocrary storage cf LLRW in the building 5.

will comply with all applicable Commission regulations, the het1 ding and drum restraint syster were not designed

=ccordance with 10 CFR-50, Appendix A, Criterion 2 - Des.cn bases for crotection against natural phen ome r.a_.

The NRC staff comments on the ab ve points are summari:ed below:

1.

The NE: staff, in conjuncticn with other government agencies, keeps track of all reocrted tornadees. Alabama, along with most other southern, midersterm and midwestern states, is prone to b~e subject to frecuent, severs tornadoes. Regulatory Guide 1.75 describes a design basis tornado acceptable to the Regula~ tory staff for each of three regions within the contiguous United States that structures, systers e

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3-and coeponents.in a nuc1 car plant ir.cortant lo safety (emphasis acced) should be designed to withstand. All of the United States east of The recommended set the Rocky Mountains is classified as Regicn I.

of properties defining a design basis tornado in this Region I is the strictest for any region of the country.

2.

On April 3-4, 1974, there was an outbreak of 148 tornadoes within a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period in 13 states and Canada. This is by far the largest number of tornadoes within a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period on record. At the height As 55AA of activity,15 tornad:es were on the ground simultaneously.

pointed out, over 300 ;eeple were killed. The tornadoes ranged from

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Mississippi, Alabara and Georgia in the south to Illinois, Indiana, Ohio and Michigan ir the north. There were two approximately parallel tornadoes that sweet a path that extended from Mississippi, through-northern Alabama and-into Tennessee, both _of which crossed the Tennessee.

River to the east of the EFNP.in the general area between Athens, Alabama and Huntsville, Alabama. The first tornado was named First First Tanner Tanr.er and the second tornado was dubbed Second Tanner.

touched cown at 1520 hours0.0176 days 0.422 hours 0.00251 weeks 5.7836e-4 months CST and lifted off about 61 minutes later, traversing a path approximately 51 miles long, with a width of 1/8 to 1/4 mile on the average. Second Tanner touched down at' 1930 hours0.0223 days 0.536 hours 0.00319 weeks 7.34365e-4 months , lasted for about 55 minutes and swept across a path approxinately the.

sare length and width as First Tanner. Tornadoes are generally rated-on a scale of 1 to 5, based on windspeed, path length and path width, There was a short section with a rating of "5" being the most severe.

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4 in the overall' path of the First Tanner tornado north of Wneeler F.eservoir and east of the BFNP assigned a damage category 5".

As pointed out by SEAA, this : rnade knocked-out the 500 KVa transmission system, causing a shutdown of Unit 1; Unit 2 was undergoing preoperational testing at the tire and Unit 3 was still under construction. At no time did the less of offsite transmission lines affect the capability to safely shutdown the reactor facility and maintain it in a safe shutdown t

c:ndition. Br:wns Ferry Unit 1 resumed partial operation the next day when the 500 KVa West Foint line was restored to service.

3.

There is no question that the Browns Ferry site is located in an area occasicnally traversed by. tornado s:ccms. Wind speeds in excess of 40 mph are occasionally recorted but wind speeds in excess of 80 mph During the design of the Erewns Ferry facility, we thoroughly are rare.

evaluated the neteorological conditions at the site. We have rereviewed

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the straight-line winds and tornado wines th_at, structures at the Srewns j

Ferry site mi;ht possibly be subjected to.

A determination of the wind hazard pr:bability for a given site censists l

of separate estimates of windspeed as a function of recurrence interval

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(or probability per year) for straight-line winds and tornado winds.

The two sets of data are not from the same statistical population and.

thus, cannot be combined into a single data set. Two curves arise:

(1) determinatien of the expected value of the fastest mile per hour l

l wind using the windspeed data collected at a given site; this curve is t

generally accepted to be of the extreme value type I distribution; s

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i (2) cetermination of the ex;ected value of winds;eeds arising fro

.i tornadoes wnich involves tornaco occurrence rates, path length and widtn, 4

and some measure of the intensity (strength) of the individual torned:es that comprise the data set for a given meteorologically.and topographically i

homogeneous region. The two curves are not identical.

For low ~ probabilities (<1 x 10-#/yr), tornado windspeeds are greater.

i than these projected fr m the straight-line wind data; for high probabilities, the straight-line winds are greater than tornadic winds for a given j

probability. F:r a site such as 5rtans Ferry, Alabama, the straignt-line winds-dominate tne pr:babilities through about 100 mph corresponding i

to 1 x 10-#/y. For a c5 mph winds:eed, the pr:bability f:r this t:

from ttreadees be frc: straight-line winds is as above, but for it.to be, the probability decreases to 5 x 10~ /yr. Thus, the pr:bability cf-seeir; l

95 mph from straight-line win:s is' higher than seaing 95 eph~ in~ a~ ternado-

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in this area. This is explained, in part, by *t t fact inat torna:ces 1

must occur first in order for 95 mph win:s t: ex'st from them; and the :- ad:

f occurrence rate in this area is ab:ut 1 x 10 Iyr. In ciner worcs, the l

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robability that a tornado will strike the facili,ty is about once every t

The probability of a structure at the Browns Ferry site 10,000 years.

i beinc subjected to a wind speed of a certain velocity can be appr:ximated 1

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from the following:

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4 i Mean RecurenceInterval Expected Prohability Windsoeed, coh Type of Wind 10'I

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10 years 10-2 70 Straight wind 100 years 10-3 85 Straight wind 1000 years 10,000 years 10 100' Straight wind 10-5 150 Tornado wind 100,000 years 10-6 210 Tornado wind 1,000,000 years 10-7 260 Tornado wind 10,000,000 yeors 4

General Design Criterion 2 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, requires, in part, that structures, systems and comoonents in a nuclear plant ie:criant to safety (emphasis addedl be desigr.ed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, such as tornadoes, without loss of capability _to perfom their safety function. For EFNP, and other nuclear plants, i

structures and equipment wtese failure could cause signi.ficant release of radioactivity or which are vital to a safe shutdown of the facility i

and the removal of cecay heat are classified as Class I structures.

Class II structures and equipment are defined as those which are necessary for station operation but are not essential to a safe shutdown. The l

classification of structures and equipment - and the basis therefor is discussed in TVA's Final Safety Analysis Report (F5AR) for the 5FNP l

and in the Corxnission's Safety Evaluation Report dated June 25,1972. We i

have concluded that the structures and equipment at EFNP are appropriately j

classified. Class I structures at EFNP are designed for nomal dead and f

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live loads,100 mph wind, 3DO eph tornado wind an: 3 psi pressure drop, 6

operating and design basis earthquakes cf 0.1; and 0.2; maximum ground j

accelerations, respectively. Soil, hydrostatic and missile loads have also been included. Facilities or structures that are used solely for the f

1 storage of LLRW are not classified as Class I structures and are not t

h required to be designed to these leads. In lich't of the limited hacard l

i involved with these wastes, see paragraoh 6, we believe that the cavilion i

need not be desicned for any ca-ticular loadinc.

)

i 3.

The applicable regulatory standards for protection of waste systers are 1:

)

1 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. General Design Criterion (GDC) 60 and 61, which

}'i provide:

I "The nuclear p wer unit design shall include ceans to control suitacly tna release of radicactive catarials in gaseous and l'

liquic effluents and to handle radi, oat _tive solid west _es pro-l i

a duced curinc normal reactor cperation, including anticipated t

cperational ot:urrences" and i

The... radioactive waste and Other systems whitn may contai..

radica:tivity shall be designed to assure adepuate safety under normal and pestulated accident cor.ditiens. Thes e systers shall p

be cesigned...witn suitable shieldinD for radiation protection

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1 and with appropriate containment, confinement and filtering

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systems.

.c Your petition does not raise any issue with respect to normal f

I coeratiens and for the reasons discussed in paragraph 6, below, we believe that the storage activity is adepuntely protected agains postuleted accidents, including tnese resulting from postulated tornados.

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The possible reoccurrence of a tornado at EFNP was considered,in TVA's applicatien and the NRC's safety evaluation related to the amer.dments in Question. Such consideration is reflected in the conditions associated

{

with the ter.porary storage of LLRW in the pavilion.

(a) Only dry, compacted or noncompacted trash may be stored in the pavilion. Scent ion exchange resins or evaporator bottoms (which might contain liquids and which are the only waster that usually contain any significant amount of radioactivity) are not authorizec' to be stored in the pavilion.

(b) The amount of radioactivity in any drum of waste stored in he r

pavilion is limited to 0.5 curies. The total amount of radioactivity i

that :.ay be stored -in the pavilion is limited to 1320 curies. The

)

contact radiaticn dcse rate at the surface of sny drut must be less than 0.7 R/ hour.

(c) All containers of trash placed in the temporary storage facility i

are to be held secure at all times by means of an installed restraint system. Thit system has been designed to hold all containers secure during all severe environmental conditions up tc and including the design basis event. The design basis event used by TVA was a l

basic wind velocity of g5 miles per hour with a 100 year recurrence.

i frequency.

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As a prudent measure, TVA has adopted very ics limits on the amount of j

radioactivity to be stored in each container and committed to installing a j

i drum restraint system. The restra'nt system consists of heavy metal, grates-placed over a section of drums, with the grates anchored to the concrete slab. The restraint system would likely keep any drums from being carried l

offsite under all meteorological conditions except for the most severe postulated tornaco.

~

The NRC staff had considered the potential impact if a drum (or drums) of 1.LRW stored temporarily in the ; _vilion were carried offsite by a tornado.

j In tnis unlikely event. the radiological consequences of such an event t

are not likely to exceed the 10 CFR Part 20 annual exposure limit of 500 t

Even in the most conservative case with a member of the public in direct mrem.

contact with the surface of a drum with.the highest allowable dose rate of i

700 mrem /hr, it is -unlikely the duration of the exposure-in such close contact

?

would de sufficiently long to exceed the 500 mrem limit.

In practice, most drums to be placed in the s:crage facility will not have the c.aximum 700 mr'em/

hr dose rate on contact.

In addition, containers of waste are required to be

\\

labelled as containing radioactive material and such labelling, when seen by members of the public, is expected to cause a person to increase his (her) distance from the containe. In the unlikely event a container or containers are carried offaite by a tornado, efforts to recover the container {s) will be initiated as quickly as possible by utility and local and state officials, limiting the f

time any member of the public might be exposed to radiation from the container (s).

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a If a container were to rupture, the pessible exposure to a rember of the-public would likely be even less than the case where the container remained

~

i n ta ct. The type of waste to be stored in the temperary facility is dry j

trash that is usually relatively uniformly contaminatad with radicactive material. Thus, if the waste is scattered, the pessible direct exposure from any one piece or several pieces of the waste is likely to be smaller than from a fuli container.

Inhalation deses from a ruptured. container would be srall because of the small fraction of respirable sized particles of radio-j active raterial released from the container and the dilution in air that w:vid o::ur be:-een the point cf container rupture and the treathing :ene of a downwind individual.

Eased en the above, we have reevaluated the safety aspects of tempcrarily i

storing LLEW in the existing pavilion on the Browns Ferry site and partic'ularly the effect on public health and safety-from potential. tornadoes striking the '

l building. We have' concluded that although the. pavilion and drum restraint sys:e are not ce:igned to withstand the most severe potential fornaco~es that ~

might strike the temporary LLEW storage facility, the potential hazard to public health and safety from drums of waste being carried offsite and/or-their contents being dispersed would be small. Ar. discussed above, the storage of LLEW in the pavilion is intended to be a temperary reasure until-the waste can be shipped to a licensed disposal facility.or stored onsite in NRC approved longer-term storage facilities.

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, l Considering inat the probability of a tornado with wind speeds greater i

than 95 rnph striking the Browns Ferry.. site is in the order of once every 20,000 years, the restrictions on the type and activity levels of LLRW that can be stored in the pavilion, and our evaluation of the potential conse-quences to public health and safety if a tornado were to strike the temporary i

storage facility, I have concluded that the issuance of the amendments authorizing TVA to temporarily store LLRW in the onsite pavilion was a reasonable and safe action and that there are no safety reasons for modifying our previous dete mination.

Based on the foregoin; discussion, I have determined that there exists F

no basis for reconsidering the issuance of Amendment Nos. 60, 55 and 32 'to Facility Licenses Nos. CPR-33, CPR-52 and DPR-65. The request of Messrs. Thomas W.

i Paul, Stewart Horn and David Ely, on behalf of the Huntsville Chapter,' Safe Energy Alliance of Alabama, is hereby denied.

A copy of nis deter =inatien will be placet in the Comissien's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D. C.

20555, and at tre

~

Local Public Ocmn Room for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant located at tne Athens Public Library, South and Forrest, Athens, Alabama 35511. A copy of this document will also be filed with the Secretary of the Cornission for its review in a :ordan:e with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Comission's regulations.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Cornission's Rules of Practice, this decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of issuance, unless the Commission on its own motion institutes the review of this decision within that time.

YMNW m

Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGUI.ATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 60 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR 33 AMENDHENT NO. 55 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-52 AMENDMENT NO. 32 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-68 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS NOS.1, 2 AND _3 DOCKET N05. 50-259, 50-250 AND 50-295 1.0 Introduc tion By letter dated January 21, 1980, and supplemented by letters dated Februa ry 25, 1980 and March 13, 1980, the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee or TVA) requested amendments to Facility Operating License hos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry huclear Plant, Units Nos. 1, 2 and 3.

The proposed amendments would authori:e TVA to temporarily store low-level radioactive waste onsite in~ an existing covered pavilion that is situated outside. the security fence,.~

as presently located, but inside the site exclusion. area.

The total amount of low-level waste which.TVA proposes.to store in the building

~

would contain less than"1320 curies of total actisity'. '~The authori-

~

zation was requested for a period of time not to exceed two years.,

in their application, TVA proposed nodifications to the building and to the fencing surrounding the building to make it a restricted area;-

TVA also proposed various conditions and restrictions they would implement with respect to storage of low-level waste in the building.

2.0 Discussion Prior to submission of the subject application for amendments, a meeting was held with TVA on January 16, 1980 to discuss the. licensee's intentions ar.J considerations for onsite storage. After gleaning the initial information, the staff requested that TVA provide, with the proposed license amendment, supporting information and limiting conditions on duration of storage, maximum curie quantitie'. container.

dose rate criteria, access control, fire and weather protei tion, occupational exposure control considerations, monitoring ated inventory controls, and contingencies for volume minimization, decon. amination, 8

and decommissioning.

Infornation was also requested as to TVA's proposed long-range plans and the integration needed prior to the proposed termination date of the tempurary storage authorization.

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3.0 Evaluation The licensee's radiological assessment addressed both the liquid and airborne release pathways for normal and potential accident conditions.

The licensee's conclusion was that normal release would be within 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, guidelines and that all potential accident release consequences offsite would be below 10 CFR Part 20 dose limits.

The staff conducted an independent review and analysis of the potential radiological hazards and concluded that waste storage facility releases would be nonexistent during normal operations and minimal under accident A comparison of the staff's and ifcensee's assumptions, conditions.

radiological dose consequences, and dose rate projections is listed in The following is a detailed review of the staff's Tables 1, 2, and 4.

findings.

3.1 Radioactive Release Considerations The staff does not expect airborne or liquid releases-under normal opera-tiens because of the following analyses: A hypothetical mechanism for potential releases during normal operations from the proposed waste storage structure would be cue to external water (i.e., rain) entering the storage area and transporting radioactivity to the environment.

The proposed storage facility will be protected from the weather ky a roof and sheet plastic cver the waste containers.

Additionally, the containers (i.e., 55-gallon drums and metal boxes) will-be sealed and painted to reduce external corrosion, and only dry' waste will-be con-Consequently, the staff would expect the cortainer sidered for storage.

integrity to be maintained under normal conditions for the intended two 4

If water should enter the storage area, it will be year storage period.

collected and retained within the 8-inch curbs and sump with the pro-vision for sampling and processing (if contaminated) through the Since surface contaminants on storage existing plant radwaste system.

containers will meet existing DOT shipping requirements (i.e., 49 CFR Part 173.397), normal airborne radioactive release is not considered Based on the above, it is concluded that normal to be significant.

release from the proposed storage facility would not be expected and, therefore,would have no significant impact on the expected effluent releases from the facility.

3.2 Accidental Release Considerations l

The staff determined that accidents involving releases are unlikely and the risks minimal because of the type of metal containers, material I

being stored, the storage time considered, the anticipated weather and potential flooding conditions, and the protection and controls being The following considerations were analyzed in developing-provided.

the staff's position.

~

. Flooding and other accident mechanisms for transporting the total Curie content via liquid pathways were determined to be highly improb-able, since the proposed storage facility is at an elevation of 590 feet compared to the 100-year design basis flood ? lain of 574 feet.

In addition, it was determined that should an unspecified event occur causing complete degradation of container and sump integrity, with 100% of the total radioactivity being re! eased via a liquid pathway from the storage area, the dose consequence at the site boundary would be insignificant and the maximum radionuclide concentration at the nearest public water supply would be <1.0% of the MPC 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, limits.

The airborne releases created by an accidental fire were determined to be the worst possible dose consequence scenario. The licensee, in its assessnent, assumed all stored waste was consumed in the fire and approximately 1% of the total radioactivits

ored (s 13 Curies) was released to the environment.

The licensee approach appears to be conservative in assuming that all the trash burns and marginal with regard to the fraction of radicactivity released.

When considering the proposed fire protection (i.e., external fire retardant materials, fire watch and firr hydrants) in conjunction with sealed steel drums and boxes, it would be difficult to speculate that more than a few of the waste drums could be completely consumed in any hypothetical fire. The staff's analysis assumed conservatively that only 10% of the drums and their content would be consumed. However, when consider-ing the potential for radioactive release, it was assumed that 100%

.of the radioiodine and 10% of the remaining radionuclides were released to the environment.

The composition of the stored waste was also considered to have undergone radioactive decay for a period of greater than one third the intended storage period (i.e., a 9 months).

The expected doses from a hypothetical fire scenario are shown in Table 2.

When considering the low probability that the fire would occur with the maximum activity (1320 Curies) being stored in con-juncticn with the low probability of a fire occurrence, the risk associated with this low dose consequence event is considered minitel and acceptable.

3.3 Dose Control Onsite/Offsite A comparison was made of the projected security fence and site boundary dose rates (shown in Table 3). The proposed limits of 1320 Curies in the storage structure with 0.5 Curies per drum and <700 mr/hr on the surface of the container will assure that, under the croposed design configuration with shielding walls and fence locations, the limits of 10 CFR Part 50 and 40 CFR Part 190 will not be exceeded. Access to the t

waste storage structure will be restricted by means of a fonce and a locked gate or guarded when access is needed by plant personnel.

Since all entries in the waste storage structure will be supervised by Health Physics personnel, there is reasonable assurance that occupational doses will be controlled in a safe and well administered manner.

, ~ ~

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Licensee ALARA dose control considerations applicable to the handling

~

of the drums in preparation for transport and placement in the temporary storage facility are being incorporated in the plant waste storage procedures. Additional ALARA ;rethodology is being proposed in the con-struction of shield walls around three sides of the storage structure.

The licensee is also proposing steps in decontamination of the waste storage drums prior to storage.

Based on the above proposed conditions, it is concluded that dose rates at the site boundary, security fence, and within the warehouse areas, due to the proposed waste storage, would have no significant effect on the health and safety of the public or operating personnel.

4.0 Environmental Considerations We have determined that these amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or an increase in power level and will not significantly increase the total amounts of effluents or the potential for accidental releases of radioactivity to the environment. We have, therefore, determined that these amendments will not result in any significant environmental impact.

Having made this determination, we have further concluded that these amendments involve an action which is' insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact, and pursuant to 10 CFR l

651.5(d)(4), that an anvironmental impact statement, or negative declaration and envirormental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the. issuance of these amendments.

5.0

~ Conclusion We have concluded based on the considerations discussed above that:

(1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reason-able assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities 1

will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and saf ety of the public.

Dated:

March 17,1980

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TABLE 1 MAJORASSUMPTIONSFORRADIOLOGICilASSESSMENT General TVA HRC Type of Waste Dry Trash Misc. Dry Trash Max Activity total 1320 Ci 1320 Ci-Per Container 0.5 Ci 0.5 Ci Isotopic Breakdown

77% Zn-65 20% Zn-65 6% I-131 3%'I-131 4% Co-60 16% Co-60 4% Cr-51 43% Cr-51 3% Cs-137 6% Cs-137 3% Cs-134 6% Cs-134-Dose Rate on Each Drum 700 'mR/hr-contact Same Accidental Release To River Leach Fraction 100%

100%

Distance to River 400m 400m 0

8 Leach Rate Volume, cc 1.4.x.10 1.4 x 10 Dilution Factor 1.8 x 10-5 1 x 10-5 9

A'cidental Fire 1 31 c

Fraction Felease 0.01 0.01 f95 2 i ?' '

-3 3

Met X/Q 3.4 x 10 c/m 1 x 10 i

Distance to Site Boundary 600M 600M

The staff's isotopic distribution is based on historic data from the licensee's-solid waste shipment reports.

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,g TABLE 2 RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT / DOSE CONSEQUENCES FOR ACCIDENTAL RELEASES Licensee Cornis sion Accidental Release to River (via groundwater)

< 1% MPC

< it MPC Accidental Fire 7 mrem (whole body) 18.0 mrem (whole body)

Si te Air Subm. Dose 100 mrem (WB) 90 mrem (WB)

Boundary Inhalation Dose 100 mrem (bone) 70 mrem (bone) 1420 mrem (lung 1600 mrem (lung) 1000 mrem (thyroid) 900 mrem (thyroid) 1 6

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. TABLE 3 COMPARISON DOSE RATE PROJECTIONS FOR ONSITE STORAGE m --

Dese Rate Projection Licensee Commission At Security Fence 500 ft north 0.6 mR/hr 0.02 mrem /hr-260 ft east 0.6 mR/hr

<0.01 mrem /hr 260 ft vest 0.6 mR/hr 0.2 mrem /hr At Site Boundary Direct Exposure 3.1 mR/yr

,2.2 mrem /yr-l Plant Effluents s5.0 mrem /yr Total

7.0 mrem /yr 40 CFR 190 limit - 25 mrem /yr from all ~ fuel cycle sources.

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400 Chestnu: 5::ee: Tower II January 21, 1980 E:. Earold R. De::en, Director Office of Nuclear Eeactor Regulation U.S. Nuclea.: Regulatory Cc

'ssie:

Vas~ ming:ce, DC 20555 Dee.: %:. Denton:

S :he Ma :e: of the

)

Docket Nos. 50-259

!a=:essee Valley Authority

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50-260 50-296 3 acccrdance with 10 CTR Par:s 5C.59 and 50.90 ve are requesting a:

amend:en: tc license nu:bcrs D?E-33, LFE-52, and !?E-55 for the cperatie cf 3::s s Te::y ';uelea: Plan u:i:s 1, 2, and 3. The :equested a:end:en:

vould a.11cw ~7A to store Icv-level radioactive trash casi:e 1: as a ount.

=et to exceed 1,320 curies to:al. Leta11ed inferra:i:: demonstrating

he acceptability of the ;;cpesed vt.s e s::: age f a:ility is enciesed.

Tne infor:.a:1cn previded incer. crates concerns expressed by ze:bers of 7en s:af f in a tee:ing c,atuar7 6, 1950. We reques: y ur approva". ef this re uested license a=end:en: Es seen as possible.

5 a :::da :e vi h the reenire e::s :f 10 CTR Par: 170.21, we have za:e

'-d

- 's prepesed aren::e:: :: he Class 1-*

f:: uni: 1 and Class f:: ::1:s 2 and 3.

2.ese citss.#::sticus are based en -ha facts tha:

-he';;;;esed a:end=c=: f:: uni: L 1:vcives a single safety is' sue which f:es ::: 1.v:"ve a signifi:ar: ha:tri censide:stien and the ; pese:

t:e::. e s f:: uni: 2 ::d 3 are :.;~.1:a:es of the uni: 1 pre;: sed t endre::.

7:e :4ci::stee fer 54,500 (5/.,000 f:: uni: 1

.d 5500 fe: ::::s 2 and 2)-

is ietzg ed to the NRC, A::at::.::: L :ensi:M ee Manage:en: Eranch.

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m Yery ::ul ycdbs, TT.lciESSIE VALLET AL70RITY L". M. Mills, Nanager

uclear Regula: ice and Safe:y

!ubsc :.hed and sver to befcre

.a this day of 1950.

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PLAN FOR TDf?CRARY ONSITE STCRACE OT LOV-LEVEL RADIC/,CTIVE WASTE J

BRD'*NS TERRY NUCLT).R PLANT UNITS 1, 2. AND 3

.u January 1, 1980

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TA?LE OF CONTE:.75 I!TRCDUCTION 6

II.

NEED TOR ONSITE STOMCE III. CABLE '.JAREHOUSE A.

Existing Structure E.

Structural Modificatiens C.

Restrictions on Use of the Structure i

IV.

CENERAL CONSIDERATICNS b

A.

Cri:eria B.

Operation:

I.

Radwaste Volune Redue:icn D.

?hysical Security E.

Centainer Integri:7 1

T.

Spontaneous C:nbustien C.

Design Basis Eve:: for Dru Res::ain:s E.

Structural ~ Design of Cable Varehouse I.

AI.AM Considera:icas V.

MDICLOGICAI. ASSESSMES!

A.

Assunptiens/Eesults 3.

Gene r a l Cb s er i a t ier.s / C::.:12s i:ns

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S:atenent of ~n:er.:

3 Guidel:.ne Cri:eris C.

Subsequent Use f Area A;;er. dix A - TVA ?lsn fe Fe: anet: S::: age / Disp: sal f El'Leta-leve; Eadicac:1ve Was e Cetera:ed by "TA Nuclea: Plants P

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4 INTRCOUCTICS The-Tcnsessee Valley Authori:y (T!A) hereby p:cposes to a end operating license numbers DPR-33, LPR-52, and DPR-68.f or 1:cens Terry Nuclear i

Pla=: units 1, 2, and 3 to allow the storage of low-level radioactive

. trash genera:ed in the rcutine opera:ica of the f acility.

The trash vill be stored ensite in a varehouse designed initially for storage of electrical cable. Provisions being made to adequa:ely isciate the low-level trash and its asseciated radioactivity from the enviren-ce:t are described herein. Because the cable varehouse is outside the existing restricted area boundary provisicas vill be made to provide an adecuate level of physical security.

These p:cvisions are also described herein.

-IE..D.. T.O. R OUTSIDE STCRAGE N

A :he present time the icv-level radicac:ive :: ash being ' generated a[ the 1: ves Te::y Suelea Plan: is being stored :e:porarily in the plan and in ::ailers ensite v.:hir. :he restricted area bcuncary. The radicactive resins tad highe: level :: ash centinue te be shipped to the licensed dispcsal facility a: Earnwell, South Carclina. The need for te=pc:ary s:erage of trash has cc=e as a result cf a severe cu: back is T'iA's allocation of radioactive vaste shipmen: :o the Earnwell burial si:e.

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A.

Existier 5: u::ure The cable vareneuse :ensis:s cf a : Overed ::nc c:e fl0c slah (200 f eet by 50 f eet)', vi:h a peri =ei~e: ~f ence and.lo'ading. dock.

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~here are paved :: ads in:: :he area. The :able varehouse is a

ensi:e, :u: cc:s:de the exis:ing secur ::. area f.see Figure. *.).

1.

5:::::::a1 Modificati:ns 1.

The vcoden su:s: uc:gre of the :cci an: : le=ns vill be ccvered vi:h a fire re:ardan: coating. The coatings under censideratien are:

t PPG 42 Speed Eide Cilnan 110 - Tiare Chek Albi 107A These coatings have been :ested in ac:c: dance vi:h ASTM 154 fer flate spread, fuel cen:ributed, and smoke develcpmen as icilevs:

i Tiame Spread - 15 Fuel Contribu:ed - 15 Sacke Develop:en: - 15 i

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. i 2.

A (vatertight) concrete cutb eight inches high and six inches thick vill be poured around the entire cable vz:ehcuse This curb will be bonded to the concrete floor slab area.

by means cf an epoxy sealer. This curb is needed to c:ntain any rainf all and water fro: potential fire fighting operations.

C.

Restrictions en L'se of the Cable arehouse 1.

The cable varehouse vill be used fer the storage of lev-level cespactible/nencoepactible trash cnly. Co pactible/ncaccm- ~

pactible trash vill be basically cceposed of the folleving caterials:

l 1.

Paper, including blotter paper 2.

Plastics 3.

Respirater cartridges 4

? otective clothing 5.

Laborate y equip ent (vials, glassware, plastic tettles) 6.

Tape and rope 7.

Piping and valving B.

Scaffolding and ladders

)'

9.

EIPA filters 10.

Mep heads t

11 Cther veed and snail netal objects.

2.

The total a:tivity of vaste stcred in the cable vareh: se

~j vill not ex:eed 1,320 curies'.

3.

All containers ci vaste s.iich vill be stered. in tr.e _catie

~~

varehcuse vill be ren ved bef ore August 1,19E1.

4 No voeden b:xes :: other cc=bustible hexes vill be plated in this ste:rge ic:ati:n.

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CENEMi. CCN5!OIMTIONS A.

Criteria The following criteria apply to the ensite storage of lev-level' radioactive trash 'in the cable vareheuse.

i 1.

Contaminated cc pac:ible trash vill be packaged in 00! 17E steel 55-gallen dru=s (minimu= vall thickness, 0.0428 inches).

If other centainers are needed, cetal boxes vill be cen-structed. Nencompactible t ssh will be packaged in =etal boxes fabricated from steel pla:e (0.042S inches mini =u=

thickness).

Fireprotec:icnvillbeprevihedbyexistinghydrants 2.

in the area. Manual firef.ighting vill be used to extinguish any fires.

A reu:ine icving fire watch sur-veillance of the ta:porary s::: age area vill satisfy the necessa:/ fire detection req:f recen:s.

3.

Monitoring vill censis: ef daily surveys by Health Physics that include surf ace centacinatien determination, as appropria:e, and radiati:n dese ra:e reas; e:ents.

Ne airberne radiati n sa pling is required.

4 The i=cedia:e area sur::unding :he cable varehouse vill be designa:ed a cen:::11ed ac:ess area.

The area vill te enciesed and signs pes:ed ne:ing Ecalth Physics access rec.uirerents fe: eh::ance in:: the area.

A :ess :o all areas in :he vicini:y Of.5:::4d was:e vill be.cen:::11ed as necessary to ensure c:epliance vi:h il CF?, 20 previsions f.

Liquid reietses f::: vi:hi: the curted area vill c:nfer= ::

10 CT? 10, Appendix I, Table 1, clumn 2, fe: unrestri::ed areas. These lici:s are 1 x 10 s C1/=1 fe: g: css te:a-istra activi:y :: an >20 ra i: less than 1.0.

n 6.

All dru=s selec:ed fer s:crage a "the cable warehouse vil; be li:1:ed :o a naxi=u: centact dose rate of 700 =re: per hour. No shielding ex:ernal to the drum vill be used to meet these limits.

7.

The activi:y of ea:h :ettainer vill be limi:ed to no mere than 0.5 curies and :he te:11 licit for the s::: age area vill not ex eed 1,110 curies.

Only a small number of druns are expec:ed := have a centent activi:y of 0.5 curies.

The average activity per dur: is expec:ed te be less than 0.1 curie.

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i 8.

Re vable radioac:ive contaminatien en the surface ef cen:ainers shall be lizi:ed :o the levels specified in 49 CyR Part 173.397.

All centainers will be dec:n:a:ina:ed to less than these levels before s:crage.

'ich :hese 1 v values for permissible levels of surf ace contamination, the Eeneration of ceasurable at bcrne radicactivi y abeve back-g cund has a very low p:chability and :he generation of hazardous airborne radica::ivi:y levels a zuch 1cuer p :babili:y s:ill.

Since :he only acnaccident circumstances unde which the generation cf zeasurable radicactivity concen::atic:s can be pcstulated are the removal by at: currents of contacina:icn fre: the surfaces of the vaste centainers :here is no need fc:

airborne radioactivity reni:cring.

9.

All containers of trash placed in temporary storage in the cable varehouse vill be held secure a: all :i=es by zeans of an installed restrain: syster.

This syste: vill held all c:ntainers secure during all severe envirenzen:a1 ccndi:1 ns up to and including the design basis even: for this vaste stor are f acility.

(See sec:icn IV.C., " Design Basis Ive...

t for Dru: Restraints").

t B.

0: era: dens t

1.

Movement of Centainers - The drums and ze:a1 boxes cen: mining the ::ssh vill be acved in:: :he vareheuse vi:h a ferklif:

cf :he grabber design. Cnly one drum c: cen:ainer v:11 he

ved a: a :ine.

The cen:21:ers will be s:cred in ac::: dante vi:h General Criter:a Sunber 9.

2.

leva:e :ng Of Area - Any accu:ula:::n of va:er vithin :he curbed area vill be re cved by ze:ns cf a p:::able.sa:p punp. The ac:ivi:7 ef the water vill ie ren;:: ed bei::s deva:ering opera:::ns.

Any radica::ive 11:c;d tha: encea:s the lin::s cf Cener ~ C:::eria Nurber i c;11 be transp:::ed c :he E dvaste Euilding f : pr: cessing.

(See General Cri:eria Sunber 6) ie 3.

Recedial Actions (Cleanup) - The conten of the containers :=

be stcred in the cable warehouse vill be restricted to Icv-level radicac:1ve vaste ei:her in the fer: cf nonce:;actible i

loose za:erial/ :ssh c: cc pactible trash.

(See se:: ion 111.C.)

In addi:1en, :he radicactivi:y cf each c:n:ainer vill be 11=1:ed to 0.5 curies.

(See se:: den IV. A., Criteria Nuiber 7)

In the event tna: a c:ntainer is pune:ured, crusned, cracked c: opened, and turned over during ::ansit c: while in s::: age

he cen:en:s should no: be released. ?nnetured drums vill be repaired u:111:ing exis:ing plant ;:::edures. EcVever, if se e cf the contents are' released i: vill be ecliec:ed, i

packaged, and stored.

If the container is irreparably da: aged 8

l 1: vill be cut up znd pack:;ed as 1:v-level radioac:1ve was:e.

The area cf the f1 c: virh v..1:h :he release: :: ash was in contact vill be sent:: ed fe: activity and appropriate reasures taken to decentaminate the area.

a 5_

r C.

Radcaste Velute Reducti:n i

The following iters describe the acti ns curren:1y i=plenented and prepesed fe radvaste volune reduction ai 3:cens Ter:y Nuclea: Plan:.

I 1.

Sene cutage generated trash is curren:1y ceni:cred by Eealth Physics persennel and separated into centaminated and ncncentarinated ca:egories.

2.

Scee voeden scaffeld boards are being replaced with aluminu:

scaffolding.

3.

Under censideration are such things as collection of all new ion ex hange resin bags in special vire nesh baske:s; pla:esen:

of trash cans with green inser: bags fer clean trash and cans with yeller insert bags f or conta=inated trash; and use of seps vitt de:achable : p heads and reusable handles.

D.

Th'sical Securi:y 1.

Access to the cable vareh use vill be res:ricted by : cans of a fence ei h: fee: in height consisting of a nine gauge E

tw:-inch nesh vi:h a seven feo: chain link fabric at: :hree 5:: ands cf barbedvire inclined cu:vard. Access to the area v 11 he th::u;h ene gate vni:r vill be kep: Iceked c:

guarded when ac:ess is needed by plan: persennel.

2.

Regular periodic security che:ks of the area sur:cunding by Publi: Saf e:y Serc :e (?SS) cift:ers wh: pat:01::te si:e 1-hec s a day.

3.

When plan: pers: ne' are vi:hin :he securi:y fence f::

nat::ing :: ;t:_a;e s::: age, :he Heal:h ?hysics :e::nizian shall be respensii'e f:: rain:sinin; radiclorical safety du::ng :pe:a:::ns :nside :ne s::: age a:es.

4 PSS ef fi:e s vill unicek the se:::::f area f : persennel en::ance, lock the area a: the end of disposal cperatiens, and main: sin con :e1 of all keys to the area.

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E.

Centaine: Integri:v i

The =aterials which vill be stored in the cable vareheuse,'lis:ed-In secti:n III, item C.1, are nonagressive vi:h respe : :o cc:: sic:

attack en trash centainers. Eevever, se:e of these =aterials (e.g., mop heads and blotter paper) can be vet at the ti=e of packaging. Absorbent ca:erial such as diate=aceous ear:h vill be added to packages con:ainis.g vet vaste.

If we: :: ash is packaged, the cc esion at:ack iJem this vet trash will be negligible due to the limited cen:act with the internal surf aces of the containers and th( small a=ount of meisture present.

All external surf aces of :he dru:: and ze:al boxes are painted :o prevent external cer:csien a::ack. However, va:er dees a::ack ild steel, at a corrosion ate of 0.002 :o 0.02 inch per. year at a

e perature ef 77*F.l*,

Thus, if :he pain; bec::es scraped away in scell areas and the containers c:n:inueusly exposed to :cisture, the vall thickness is sufficien: to ensure cen:aine: in:egri:y in excess of :-: years. The c:ntainers are n:: continueusly expcsed to coisture during :he storage period, thereby significantly decreasing the rate cf cc :csien a::ack.

3ased en the abcve discussien, the radvas:e c:c:aine; integri:y is more than adecua:e !c: the pr:pesed 15-::n:h :e:perary s:c:rge period.

'Jhen the ::n:ainers are ::ansf erred := per:anent ensi:e t

s::: age ' f at:lities, :ney will be inspected for f atigue. failure, t

and da: age.

I'. A is~ s:ill-evaluating :he ep:icum :.a: trials and

entainer design f:: 13ng-:er storage of Icw-level radica::1ze

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.Seentaneous Combustien TVA has evaluated the potential for spentanecus combustien in the icw-level vaste trash cen:ainers. This evaluation assessed the potential fer spentaneous -ignition :from two standpoints:

K 1.

Heat. generated due to the radicactivity Jf'the stored trash, and~

b 2.

Spontaneous heating due to the content of the stored trash, e.g., oil-or grease-seaked rags or ' clothing.

The heat generated by the icv-level of radioactivi:yf contained in the trash is negligible.

^

The spontaneous' hea:ing phenomenon associa:ed with oily rags or clothing, etc., applies enly :c :hese liquids coming dire::1y fro a living source, i.e.,

animal cils. Mest flammable liquids are not subject to spentanecus heating.

r The types of fla= able liquids which =ay be present in the stered 3,

~

trash, in the fer= of oily rags or clothing, would generally be petroleu= p cdue:L such as lubricating oils' c ' grease uznd. are g _.-

not subjec: ce spet:aneous hea:ing. There may be se:e pe:ential for the stcrage c s:all quanti:1es ef rags c: :1::hing c:n:atina:ei.

with paint c ::ain ng drying cils c :=rpen:ine, which a:s ra:ed i

3

.cVever, ~ -he' :en.,igura: :n -

cerate an,.:v ha:a d, respec:ive.y.. r cf the s:: red trash, i.e.,

c :pacted in sealed dr;=s, is such '::1:.

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insufficies: exyge: is available :s centrib~ute :: the enidatic:-

r.. cess, and':heref::c, ::: bus:ict d:es, n::.oc.:ur.

g lasedentheab:ve,vecc$clude:h:: spen:anecus ::: bus:1:n d:es ::-

represen: a signif::an cen:ern.

t D.

Desi:n Easis Iven: 7:: :::: les:: sin:s t

[

1..

To: purp:ses :f :e:perary s::: age af 1:!-level radisae:1ve p

waste in the.:able varehouse a: the 3::wns Ferry Nuclear -

Plant :he folleving event vith its associated frequency of r

recurrence has been used. as the design basis event:

3asic Wind - vind veicci:y of 95 miles per hour

- 100-year recurrence f:e uency t

k 2.

The p;chabili:y :f a ternado with maxi =um vind speeds higher than :he 95 ziles per hour valua striking the plan: 1: any ene year is * :s 10~'.

!b s is considerec to be small enough :c be neglec:ed.

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-S-E.

Structural Desien ef Cable L'arehouse The cable stcrage vareheuse was designed to withstand the folleving seve:e envirenzental events:

Design vind - 80 =iles per hour Snew loading - 20 inches These events are equal to or greater than the requirenents as specified in the International Ccnfe:ence of Building Officials, Uniform Building Cede,1976.

We do not anticipate that a f ailure of the cable storage varcheuse c its superstructure vill result in unacceptable da age to the drums and metal bcxes tha: vill be in's::: age.

I.

A1. ARA Considera: ions i

ALA?.A censidera:io:s appli:able tc the handling of the dru s in prepa:atien for transpo:: to, and place =ent in the terperary s:crage f acili:y are covered in appropriate plan:

I instructions. Since the te=porary sterage f acility is Icca:ed in a va:eheuse area in which access is required fer Oc a1 opere:1cn cf :he plan:, it was decided tha: 1E-inch-thick cenc:e e t!::k shield valls shculd be erected :n the (tss.ned) south and eas: sides of :ne s::vc:ure.

These alls vi'.1 he erec:ed c:: currently vi:h the 5:crage cperatien. This tizing is ac:ep:able ' sin:t :he dese rate f re: :he initial s erage vill be but a small f:te::en cf tha: ef the fi'_ led fa:ili:y and :he : ens::2::1:n :ine f:: the val".s is les s :han a cen:h hence the va*1ssvi.. be in place uten :ec,us:en,.

I: vas en:*:se the other two fa:es of the f t:1~.1:7 decided ne: ::

vi:h s :ils: shieli valls because, in :hese directiens, :.,e revised f en:e *.: cati:n precludes en: 7 :o a:eas vnere radia::. le"e'.s V:L '. : be signift:an:. *: vas;also judged tha: ette :f ac: ass i:: ; ating drums in s::: age a, ve as f::

ene:gency a::izns su:h as fi:e figh:ing outseighed t;.e ;ttn f:c a shield vall.

To achieve dcse rates of 10 CyR 20 (0.6 =re=/hr), a securi:v fence vill be located approxt:ately 500 fee: to the north et and app;cxina:ely 160 feet to the east and vest of the cable vareheuse s::2cture. When the new shield vall is erec:ed, there is ne need :: :Ove the existing security fence on the south side cf the 5: ucture.

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V.

RADIOLOGICAL - ASSESP.EC A.

Assue :icns/Results

-t 1.

The p cposed.radioat:ive :: ash te:perary s:c: age f acility j

is located approx 1:a:ely 575 =eters f c the closest unshielded boundary.

The dose ra:e expected at the distance frc= the (c::ple:ely filled) te:perary f acility is abou 4 x 10-4 =re per hour. This dose rate was calcula:ed using the point-ke rnel-w1:h-buildup app;cxima:icn. Note tha:

l this app:cach includes the contribu:1^m frc: scattered radiation (the so-called skyshine) because the buildup f actor is the ra ic of :he dose ra:e. e: a peint embedded in.

an inf ni:e cediu: due to a pein: seur:e 1:. :he sare medium, as de:er=ined by a rigorous ze:hed which ::ca:s all significan:

I applicable physical pnenenena to :he dese rate, at :he sa=e t

pein: and f:ce the sa:e seur:c, due to :he un::111ded flux only. Because of the large distan:e invelved, it is reasonable :o assu:e the facili v. is errected in a semi-t infinite ecean cf air, enus caking the buildup hype hesis

~

applicable.

1

.i 2.

The assumptions used in the radielegical assess:ent ef the s:orage ef le.-level radica::ive :: ash in the cable varehouse are su :ari:ed in !aile V-1.

l

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3.

The results cf the radi:1cgical 'assesszen: are sue:arized.

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General Cbservations / ~ ::' usions.,.

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i 173ed :n the assess en: results :ne f:ll: wing chserta:icns and conclusi:ns can :e za:e.

[

1.

The value cf <1 pe :en: ef M?Cv Maxinu: Perzissible C ncentra:1::.

t f:: the eantru rz:::nuclide ::::en::::::n a: the nez:ss:

publi: va:e: sepply f::: an at:iden:a; re' ease of at:iaz :7 ::

the river via E::undva:e is an a eptably s:all f rat:1cn of :he M7Cw.

2.

The value ef 3.1 ::e:/yes: fc: expesure to the neares:

h unshielded si:e beundary fr:: di:ect radia:1en shine is a very stall fra::1:n f :he ;C CyR 1.0 lizi: (25 ::e:/yes:';.

-'e believe :ha: this fra::icn is ac:ep:aily stall.

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DECCd :5SICNING A.

State en: cf Inten:

l' 1.

Af ter all centainers of radioactive :: ash have been recoved i

and the structure is no lenger needed as a radvaste s:erage I

?

area, the cable varehouse vill be decc==issioned in accordance vi:h the guidelines presented in section V1.E. below.

l r

2.

In general, we anticipate that acceptable decentacinaticn of the cable varehouse, te perary caste s::: age area, to be perfor:ed as par: cf its decc==issiening vill no: be difficult.

c

(

3.

Geddeline Criteria 1

Since there are ne spe:ific ree,uire:en:s or guidelines fer the dece==issioning cf a te=perary radioactive vaste st rage fa:111:y, TVA has developed these preser:ed belev.

We

[

believe these guidelines are reasonable and fully acceptable.

(a) TVA vill r.ake a reasonable effort to elizinate residual conta=1:s ien.

(b) 5 radica:::ve surfa:e vill be ::vered by pain:ing, plating, c: ::ha: ce: hod until :: is kncun tha:

n:azina:ien levels, :o be de:errined by a survey and documented, are belev a ress: nab'y tchievable li=i:.

(c) TVA vill use :he ;i=d.:s presente:. in.a..:Ae. c.,

e A

05NI; Regu;t:::: Ce::e 1.3c as ruideline5'-

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C.

5;:secuen: Tse Of Arez Ief:re re" ease cf :he precises f:: unrestrie:ed use, TVA vill take a ccs;:aher sive survey establishing :ha: the leve" cf residual cen anina:1:n is as leu as :casonably achievable.

i A report describing the survey and its results vill be filed vi:h the Direc:ct, Cifice cf iu: lear Eeae:c: Re gula t ien,

U.S. : uclet: Regula:: y Cc= ission, v:th copies :: :he Dire::c:, Office :f 1:spe::ien and Infer:ezen: Eeadquarters and :: the Oire::::, legion :1 O!E cffice. The survey reper:

vill te filed a: leas: 30 da: s bef cre the planned da:e cf abandenzen: ci :he ter;cra y s:crsge area.

2.

7?A plans to use :he cable varehouse and sur:cunding area fe:

cther pla:: cpera:icts f ell:ving abtnd:::en:.

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..I TVA PIAN FOR PIF$.NENT STOPACE/ DIS?CSA1.

uz. _ r..s. w n C. \\ ;..,. :.. e CF A,.,

GENT.RATID EY TVA NUCI.?).R P1).N!5 I

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i The plan f or providing s:crage f or all low-level radicactive vas:e f c:

all TVA nuclear plants has the f clieving three key points

1.

Design and construct.tenperary ensite storage facilities, if required.

i 2.

' Design and construct per:Anent (life of the plan:) onsite low-level radioactive vaste storage f acili:1es at each nuclear plant si:e.

3.

Design and ccnstrue: Icv-level radicac:1ve vaste volume I

redue:1on/selidificatien facili:ies at each nuclear plant site.

~

The recent cutbacks in s::::ge space alloca:icas and the very real j

pessibili:y of complete elesure cf all ce=rercial disposal facilities i

i requires insediate actien to ensure centinued plant operatien. The actices j

i ve'are taking are based en ;;evieus studies.

Ter future plants beyer.d 3:evas Ferry, Sequeyah, and 'Ja::s Sar, we intend to inplenen: ensi:e s::: age, as required, and v:*ure re:uction te coincide vi:h plan: need~da:es.

Our ul:iza:e objective is : previde for the stcrage of all icv-level

ad::a::ive vas:e geners:a: by em:

f T7A's eclear plants and :c pt: vide i

.is ste:zge th::rgh :he plen: '. fe.

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Talete V - 2 SittitlAftY tilt it Alil ui.8 w;l t:AI. ASSESNtil fir rol:

lilE TI tiremAltY STOlt ACE OF l.0W-I.FVEl. WASTF. IN Till?, CAnl.F. SToltACE MAltt'ItollSE AT nitutJNS l'EltRY Nt!Cl.EAll Pl. ANT Releene thering Norma 10peration impacts will be within Appendix I criterin on tiso!Vesult'of releases during normal operations.

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Accidental Helenne to Nlver (via Eround water)

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Site llonnanry Inlinlation Itune a t Site 100 res em (uluele liaily) ~~

Doundary 100 carem (Initi. !

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t l>1rcet Itnellat inn Dose linie at Secta r i t y 0.6 init/hr Fence Direct 1.mpornerc nt clonent 3.1 mie=/yr unishielited ~ p i t e lueuentary (40t.TRI'Jo I.imit - 25 mrom/yr)

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ML20034H334

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