ML20033D367

Partially Deleted Secy Paper,Advising Commission of Directors Denial of 10CFR2.206 Petition for Enforcement Action

ML20033D367
Person / Time
Site:	Marble Hill
Issue date:	07/24/1981
From:	Malsch M NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
To:
Shared Package
ML18058B973	List: ML18058B972 ML20030B346 ML20031C827 ML20032A269 ML20033D367 ML20033D368 ML20033D369 ML20033D370 ML20033D371 ML20033D372 ML20034H176 ML20034H184 ML20034H207 ML20034H244 ML20034H247 ML20034H249 ML20034H251 ML20034H258 ML20034H273 ML20034H334 ML20034H484 ML20034H538 ML20034H550 ML20034J038 ML20034J051
References
FOIA-92-436, TASK-AINV, TASK-SE 2.206, SECY-81-445, NUDOCS 8201070023
Download: ML20033D367 (36)

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i SECY-81-445 July 24-, 1981__

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ADJUDICATORY ISSUE (Notation Vote) l i

For:

The Commissioners From:

-Martin G. Malsch Deputy General Counsel

Subject:

PSVIEW OF DIRECTOR'S DENIAL OF 2.206 PETITION Facility:

Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

Purpose:

To advise'the Commiss~ ion of the" Denial j a petition for enforcement -action artd y',

[to recommend

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Review Time 2xpires:

August 5, 1981-Discussion:

On April 14,-1981, Save the Valley (STV) filed a petition with the Commission to review the Director'of Inspection &

Enforcement's order allowing re m ption of construction at Marble Hill./

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Contact:

Marian Mem, OGC X41493 lnformation in this record was deleted in accordance with the freedom of Information Act, exemptions

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ti STV's petition challenges 1the Director's'.-

j order for the followingLreasons:.

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(1)

An independent engineering consultant to the.NRC.has not-issued a final 1 report on the-existing ' concrete at Marble Hill; (2)

Contrary to an alleged commitment-J by Region III, STV has not,had an l

cpportunity'to review and-comnent _

on the consultant's_ final' report to NRC before' resumption of l

construction; i

The interim report _ prepared by'the (3) i consultant to the applicant does

'l not satisfy NRC's criteria-fori f

testing the-quality of concrete at, j

Earble-Hill.because:of-alleged statistical-inadequacies in the

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consultant's: methodology;.and-a.

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(4)

The Director permitted the i

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resumption of work without first briefing the Commission in accordance with the Commission's Order of March 13, 1980.

In response to the first two points, the Director explained that contrary to STV's impression, the preparation of the consultant's final written report was not a precondition to resumption of construction.

The independent consultant has prepared interim reports and orally transmitted comments on the licensee's quality assurance program to I & E.

Based on these reports and NRC's own inspections, the Director was satisfied that the Public Service Company of Indiana's program met the terms of the Graduated Rescission of-Order dated August 15, 1979.

According to the Director, the NRC had never agreed to give STV an opportunity to review and comment on the consultant's report prior'to resumption of construction, although the report will be made available to STV when issued.

Thus STV's understanding simply conflicts with the commitment made by I'

& E representatives.

STV's third and principal concern is that the test program devised by Sargent

&_Lundy (S&L) engineers does not satisfy.

NRC's structural integrity criteria for 95% reliability with' a 95% confidence factor.

In a March 20, 1981 letter-to STV's technical advisor (referenced in the Director's decision), the Director of Region III addressed STV's specific concerns, including the criticism that S&L's methodology does not account for human and technical error when used in making determinations of 95% reliability and 95% confidence.

The letter notes

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4 4-that to minimize the potential for error, the S&L-methodology is " supported by photographic records, evaluation by drawings, review of placement records, evaluation of concrete cores, and the involvement of three separate organizations in the evaluation process.

In addition, the NRC staff has invited STV's technical advisor, Dr..

Cassaro, to meet with them at NRC's expense to further discuss their

' differing interpretations.

Since Dr.

Cassaro declined the offer, the staff plans to provide. hip with a further written response.l In any event, we

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e Finally, STV believes that the Director failed to brief the Commission prior to permitting resumption of construction as the Commission's March 13, requiredby/~~~

1980 order.

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Recommendation:

b N.% y Martin G. Falsch Deputy General-Counsel' Attachments:

1) STV's April 14 Petition

2) Director's Decision DD B1-10

3) March 20, 1981 letter, Keppler to Cassaro

4) STV's July 10 Addendum Comissioners' coments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Wednesday, August 5, 1981.

Comission Staff Office coments, if any, should be submitted to the Comissioners NLT July 30, 1981, with an information copy to the Office If the paper is of such a nature that it requires of the Secretary.

additional time for analytical review and coment, the Comissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when coments may be expected.

DISTRIBUTION:

Comissioners Comission Staff Offices Secretariat 5

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f BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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DOCKETED q.

g, L5NRo Commissioners, Joseph M. Hendrie, Chairman, APR 2 21981

• Peter A.

Bradford f

Victor Gilinsky L

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tw IN THE MATTER OF PUBLIC SERVICE OF INDIANA, MARBLE HILL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, DOCKET NOS. STN 50-546 AND STN 50-547 SAVE THE VALLEY'S PETITION TO THE COMMISSIO!;ERS TO REVIEW THE NRC MARCH 27, 1981 ORDER TO RESUME CONSTRUCTION AT MARSLE HILL Comes now Save The Valley, by its attorney, and for cause of Save The Valley's Pe tition To The Ccmmissioners To Review The NRC i: arch 27, 1981 Order To Resume Construction at Marble Hill, states:

1.

That on or about March 27, 1981, the NRC acting by and

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through V1: or Stello, Direc:or of Inspec tion and Enforcement, Washington, D.

C., (hereinafter called Director), 1;fted the August 15, 1979 Order Confirming Suspension of Construe:1on to :he Public Service Company of Indiana.

2.

That there has been approved by the Direc ter in cohjanction with Save Tne Valley, the petitioner herein, an agreement to allow an independen examination of the existin6 concre:e a: "arble Hill and an examination of the report submitted by the licensee aq prep 5. led by Sargent & Lundy, Repor SL-3753, 11-20-79,

" Evaluation of In-Place 4

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Concrete, Marble Hill Generating Station, Units 1 & 2"; at the conclusion of the review, the consultants were to provide " written findings and conclusions which address the adequacies of_the licensee's investigation and repairs relative to problems found in the field after concrete placement," and will " provide written findings and conclusions" addressing the adequacy of the repaired structural or expected strength reduction," Scoce For Civil-Struc tural Consul tant Suoport On Marble Hill dated May 1, 1980 The NRC, Division of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C.,

attached hereto and entitled Exhibit "1".

3.

That the NRC, Divisicn of Inspection and Enforcement, Chicago, i

advised orally that a written report of the independent engineers would be submitted to Save The Valley; that Save The Valley's engineering P

c onsul t an t would be privileged to comment thereon, either by mail or personally in Washington, D'C.,

at a meetind of the independent eng'ineers '

the Save The Va11e engiheering consultant ~ (presumably with a Save The Valley representative) and~the'URC.

4 That to the petitioner's knowledge, :here has been provided no written findings and conclusions which address the adequacy of the licensee's investigation and repairs relative to problens found in the field after concrete placement; to the peti:ioner's knowledge, the' consultants have not provided signed written findings and conclusions which address the question of adequacies of the repaired structures or expected strength reduction and have offered no findings concerning porosity in said concrete.

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That the petitioner questions whether Victor Stello, the

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i Director of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C., has abused his discretion in lifting the August 15, 1979 order confirming suspension of construction without having complied !with subparagraph four (4) herein.

f 6.

That the NRC Division of Inspection and Enforcement, has stated further that Report SL-3753, _suora, should _ include therein as its criteria that the concrete quality of internal concrete in structures at Marble Hill shall neet the structural integrity criteria of 95%

reliability and 95% confidence level; that on or about March 4, 1981, P

the Save The Valley engineer submitted Exhibit "A"

to the NRC, Region III with copies to the Director and the two independent engineers; said Exhibit "A" questioned whether the NRC had actual reason to believe that said tes t criteria had been met and/or exceeded.

That on March 26, 1981, the petitioner responded to a letter ~of' Victor Stello dated March-20,-

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1981 and also enclosed as Exhibi t' "B".

7.

That as part of a certain March 13, 1980 Memorandum And Order by the NRO, the Commission ordered the Director to "brief the Commission l prior to lif ting the order suspending construction at Marble Hill". and, "in any e ven t no t ( to allow resumption of cons truc tion) earlier than five (5) days after the briefing".

8.

That Save The Valley has standins and a cognicable interest of i

Save The Valley has been adversely affected by the actions of the Director, on March 27, 1981, and prior thereto if a briefing has been held before the Commissioners and no notice given to the petitioner herein of said briefing.

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9.. That, further, Save The Valley's interestLhas been adversely

- i affected by theJfact that the Director has ; granted a resumption of work order _ without having received' the signed written findings and

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. conclusions of the indepen' ent engineers; further, the Director of j

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Inspection and Enforcement has made said order allowing resumption of t

concrete - placing before allowing 'Save ' The Valley's engineer time to

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review the independent engineers' final written report.

j 10.

That 20 days have not elapsed since the date of the Director of Inspection and Enforcement's decision.

l For the above reasons, Save The Valley respectfully requests that

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t the 'IGC Commissioners _ review the March 27, 1981 decision _of Victor

.Stello, to determine if he has abused his discretion under 10 CFR 2.206

t (c)(1) and other relevant sections of the CFR, and 'for. all other - proper _

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relief in the premises.

RESPECTFULLY SOSMITTED,

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SAVE THE VALLEY, PETITIONER f

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A1. b BY:

3 THORAS H.

DATTILO _ ATTORNEY FOR-SAV TliE VALLEY, PETITIONER CATED: APRIL 14, 1981.

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MEMORANDUM

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Cor.missioner Bradford in re Public Service _ Company of Indiana, I

Memorandum And Order, dated March 13, 1980 in his dissenting opinion.

stated:

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The quality assurance and quality control (CA-QC) program is supposed to assure that the plant is built

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according to its design.

If the QA-QC program fails, the plant becomes a potential threat to the public health and safety, for NRC's regulatory decisions asrume the plant is

. NRC does not normally built according to its design.

monitor nuclear power plant construction in great detail.

Instead, NRC relies primarily on the licensee and their contractors to assure the QA-QC program is working.

7 AIC 7, 11 (1974)

(T)he NRC has found it difficult to support a civil penalty sanction for QA-QC violations because of the general nature of construction permit and QA program requirement.

The Director of NRC's Division of Inspection and Enforce-ment has properly suspended safe'ty-related construction at the CMarble Hill) site pending the licensee's submission of a 1.ew l

CA-QC program which will be judged according to certain stated criteria.

The issue is whether the inspection efforts in this case and the Director's judgment about the proper remedy should be examined in an evidentiary proceeding.

Given the seriousness r

of the problems uncovered at the site and their possible signi fic ance to the safe operation of the plant (a hearing) is potentially helpful to us as a supplement to our own enforcement effort.

Additionally, it would allow interested citizens to participate in assessing and determining the risks they are i

being told to live with.

(A)t Marble Hill, events have given citizens some basis for concern about the licensee (>s)-

commitment to their safety and about the sufficiency of NRC surveillance.

Commissioner Eradford further stated in Wisconsin Electric power como any, Docket No. 50-266 in an Order dated May 12, 1980 in dissent in conjunction with Commissioner Gilinsky the following concerning the levels of illusion involved in the NRC's application in denying hearings The (NRC) agency so misstates history that it is i

clearly either incapable of giving an accurate accoun.

of its own past doings or else its legal positions are

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being chosen after the desired result has been decided.

the Commission's Pell Mell Retreat from meaningful public inquiry in the twisting be tween here and Marble Hill so " suggests to the staff and the outside world that the agency is run by people living in fear of (T)he message can only be that their own citizenry.

the NRC's priority in citizen involvement is a relatively low one."

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This (dissenting) opinion (vould) (allow) a hearing to a group able to make a reasonable showing that the action taken by.the staff had failed in some important respect to remedy a particular safety concern.

The petitioner herein analogizes the present fact situation with the stated comments of Commissioner Bradford with their relevance

-toward the present Marble Hill state of facts.

The NRC Director of Inspection and Enforcement has, albeit gratuitously, provided for an independent examination of concrete in conjunction with the petitioner under certain stated criteria.

The Director has made a present judgment dated March 27, 1981, which on the surface would manifest that the NRC wanted a desired result, that result being the same as its prior interpretation in initially approving Report SL-3753 soon after November 20, 1979.

Has the stated criteria of 95% confidence with 95% reliability '

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been met and/or exceeded?

The petitioner. contends based on statistical said criteria has not been. met and/or sufficiently

'o evidence that explained to assure the NRC and the people of Southern India.a a.d Northern Kentucky that the plant is built according to its design and that the concrete is a potential threat to the public health and safety of the area.

The NRC 's independent consultants were to provide written findings and conclusions; they were to provide an independent assessment of the type and extent of defitiencies in et

re te construc tion; they were to 6.

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3 provide an independent assessment of needed repairs or remedial 4

actions and independent conclusions.regarding capabilities-of affected structures to perform the intended design functions.

The Director has, in our opinion, abused his discretion in allowing a resumption of work, allegedly based on the NRC's position prior to the tendering of said above written documentation to the public and to the affected STV engineer.

See Task Order No.

2, Objections-Of Tasks, Page 1 of the NRC, Division of Inspection and Enforcement included herein and made a part hereof and entitled Exhibit "C".

This action is not intended to delay the proceedings; has the Director made the resumption order effective immediately, in essence frustrating any attempts by Save The Valley to appeal or thwart his decision.

Shafly v.

NRC, Mo. 80-1091 (D.C. Cire. Ct.), November 19, 1980, as reported in ERC, 12-5-80, page 1185..

Concerning 10 CFR, Sec. 2.206(C)(1), within 20 days af ter the date of the Directors' decision, ur. der this section that no proceeding will be instituted or other action taken in whole or in part the Cor. mission may on its own motien review that decision in whole or in part to determine if the Director has abused his discretion.

This review power does not limit in any way the Commission's supervisory power of delegated staff actions.

7.

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If the Director has granted the original Section 2.206 request of Save The Valley for the purpose of not allowing any further review thereon, then the Code of Federal Regulations' letter and spirit, in our opinion, has been violated.

It is obvious that the original Order of August 15, 1979, grantind a hearing, was a sham.

See Bradford dissenting opinion, in Wisconsin Electric Power Comoany, Docket No.

50-266, dated May 12, 1980, supra.

Likewise the grantins of a Section 2.206 Motion of Save The Valley without a firm commitment on the part of the Director to carry out his stated objectives may be considered to be less than acceptible.

For the above reasons, the petitioner respectfully requests the NRC Commissioners to review in whole and in part the actions of the Direc tor en 1' arch 27, 19E1 to deternine whether or not he has abused-his discretion; and to rescind the Director's March 27, 1981 resumption of work order, and for all other proper relief in The, premises.

SAVE THE VALLEY, PETITIONER BY:

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THO:MS M.

DATTILO, ATTORNEY F O R S A'. E IiE VALLEi, PETITIOUER 311 EAST MAIM STREET MADISON, INDIANA 47250 PHONE: 812-265-6355 DATED: APRIL 14, 1961 6.

i CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Petition has been mailed to the following:

Peter A. Bradford, NRC, Washington, D.C.

20555, Certified Mail Joseph M. Hendrie, imC, Washington, D.C.

20555, Regular U.S. Mail Victor Gilinsky, imC, Washington, D.C. 20555, Regular U.S. Mail

'ohn F. Aher se, imC, Washington, D.C. 20555, Regular U.S. Mail James Keppler, MRC, Roosevelt Rd.,

Glen Ellyn, Ill., Reg. U.S. Mai:

James Pope, Public Service Co. of Indiana, 1000 E. Main St.,

Plainfield, Indiana 46168. Regular U.S. Mail NRC Docketing Section, Washington, D.C.

20555, Regular U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this 14th day of April, 1981.

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DATTILO

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SCOPE FOR CIVIL-STRUCTUPAL CONSULTANT SUPPORT ON PARBLE HILL The scope of the work to be completed by a civil-structural engineer or group will include a review of the deficiencies which were found through visual observation such as the local honeycombing and voids to ascertain that significant deficiencies were detected.

The effort will also involve a review of the other techniques used to locate voids, discontinuities, etc., to determine if

. all significant deficiencies have in all probability been detected.

These techniques included coring and pulse echo.

The repair procedures and repairs l

made as a result of the findings of the investigations are' also to be reviewed for adequacy.

The main basis of the consultant's review effort will be the report submitted by the licensee and its references as prepared by Sargent &.

Lundy, Report SL-3753,11/20/79, " Evaluation of In-Place Concrete, P.arble Hill Generating Station, Units 1 and 2."

At the ccnclusion of the review, the consultant will provide written finding's and conclusiens which addres's the adequacy of the licensee's investigation and repairs reiztive to problems found in the field after concrete placement. The consultant.will also need to provide written findings and conclusions which address the question of structural adequacy of the repaired structures or expected strength reduction, if such is the case.

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March 20, 1981 I

Dr. Michael A. Cassaro Professor of Civil Engineering University of Louisville Louisville, KY

Dear Dr. Cassaro:

This is in reply to your letters of September 26, 1980'and March 4, 1981, expressing your concerns and evaluation of the Public Service company of Indiana (PSI) Report entitled " Evaluation of In-Place Concrete - Marble-l Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units.1 and 2".

L'e understand your-principal concern to be that the test program devised by Sargent'and.

Lundy (S&L) engineers and conducted by the Portland Cement Association (PCA) does not satisfy the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC)-criteria for 95% reliability with 95% confidence factor.

b The.NRC has reviewed your concerns and concludes that the required reli-ability and confidence can be demonstrated by the methodology described in.

l the S&L revised report. The NRC's basis for this conclusion is outlined-in Attachment "A" to this letter which ~ addresses your major. concerns and-l considerations and is summarized as follows:

1.

The methodology you recommend (MIL-STD-105D) is intended primarily-for controlling production quality. The assessment at Maible Hill-i does not involve production. Testing was performed for thef purpose of evaluating concrete consolidation at different locations containing various configurations of concrete and embedded reinforcing steel.

i 2.

k'hile MIL-STD-105D would require more samples, it would afso allow more defectives, whereas the S&L methodology allowed no~defectives in the first test samples.

If a defect were to be found in the first j

59 tests, the S&L program requires an increase in the sample size.

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3.

Both MIL-STD-105D and the S&L methodology are based on the same concept; however, their use for a given problem requires engineering; judgment. The S&L program combined the conceptual model with engi-neering judgment to obtain conservative results.

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MIL-STD-105D does not account for human error. The S&L methodology requirement of 95% reliability and 95% confidence is supported by j

photographic records, evaluation by drawings, review of placement records, evaluation of concrete cores, and the. involvement of three separate organizations in the evaluation process..This bas minimized j

the potential for errort.

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March 20, 1981 Dr. Michael A. Cassaro 5.

It is our opinion that the total volume of concrete as it relates to l

locations of potential non-consolidation was accounted for by the S&L program.

Moreover, a conservative bias was introduced based on engineering judgment in that the samples were representative of all structures with the exception that more examinations were conducted in " congested" areas than a purely random sample would have provided.

i 6.

With respect to your concern that defectives were overlooked, the purpose of the S&L methodology was to identify internal concrete consolidation problems. To that extent, the external and known conditions are not considered to have an impact on the methodology used by S&L.

7.

Another consideration, which has a conservative influence, is that all defects found prior to (or af ter) the subject test and evaluation program have been or vill be repaired.

This reduces the numbers of defectives in the lot (total volume of concrete).

l As you know, microseismic testing is but a portion of the overall program by which NEC instructed PSI to. verify the adequacy of existing concrete construction at the Marble Hill site.

This verification consists of four distinct facets as follows:

A.

Exa=ination of Concrete Patches:

All concrete patches placed prior to the suspension of construction will be removed for further examination (destructively evaluated) and repaired in accordance with approved i

procedures.

B.

Volumetric testing: The. interior of the concrete was tested by a i

nondestructive (microseismic) technique.

The number of samples to be tested was derived from probabalistic considerations, and test locations were established using engineering judgment to ensure coverage of all types of structural elements.

A sample of the i

nondestructive test results was further examined and verified by destructive testing.

The destructive testing involved removal of concre,te cores and line drilling for direct examination. The report of this portion of the verification program is the subject of your letter.

C.

Surface Examination:

All accessible concrete surfaces will be examined i

for defects.

.D.

Record examination:

Previous testing results (all record types) for I

the existing concrete, as well as handling and placement records, have been examined.

Previous NRC inspection findings have also been reviewed.

In our opinion, the evaluation of all four facets of this program vill com-prehensively determine the adequacy of all previously placed safety-related concrete.

Unsound concrete vill be repaired as necessary.

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Dr. Michael A. Cassaro 3~-

-March 20,1981

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l As noted above, NRC is not' relying' solely on the microseismic sampling examination to demonstrate the quality of the concrete-at Marble Hill.

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There are three other separate evaluations, one.of which includes substan-tial destructive examination.

Based on all of these' actions, the NRC has concluded that the. quality of the in place concrete at Marble Hill has been i

adequately assessed by the method described in the Sargent and Lundy report.

i To this. extent NRC requirements have been met.

l l

We believe this letter. addresses your concerns. However, we would be pleased to arrange a meeting with you, Dr. Alexander and our technical staff to discuss any areas of further concern on your part'regarding this matter.

i Sincerely, i

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James G. Keppler i

Director

Attachment:

As stated

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cc:

Vanda B..McMurtry t

Congressman Hamilton's Office Mr. W. Shields, PSI ~

J. Sniezek, IE:HQ l

J. Lieberman, ELD

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R. Hamm, NRC Consultant

.l A. Parme, NRC' Consultant j

C. Nammerer, CA l

D. V. Hayes, RIII l

C. C. Williams, RIII J. J. Harrison, RIII E. R. Schweibinz, RIII PDR

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NSIC TIC Central Tiles Reproduction Unit NRC 20b 5

Save the Valley Mr. Dattilo, Esquire J0HH /2. GA-t L

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4 ATTACEMENT A Summary You contend that the statistical model used to test Marble Hill concrete quality in S&L Report No. SL-3753, Evaluation of In-Place Concrete, does not provide the confidence and reliability levels imposed by the NRC.

The S&L sampling model is described in Report No. SL-3753 Volume 1 Section III.

NRC believes that the testing method used by PSI has demon-strated the imposed levels of reliability and confidence as indicated by the following specific responses to your comments:

1.

Comment "The total volume of concrete was not accounted P. 2, line 11 for in the sampling plan".

Response

The sample size was based on the population size (i.e., the total volume of concrete) as it relates i

to locations where combinations of concrete and reinforcing steel could affect consolidation.

Since the population size was very large (assumed to be infinitely large), Eq. 2 established a limit i

of 59 tests without encountering a defective to achieve 95% reliability with 95% confidence factor.

2.

Comment "Nor could a standard multiple sampling plan be i

p. 2, line 12 devised using Equation (2) only".

Response

Equation 2 results in different sample sizes for j

different numbers of defectives. These numbers' ~~

are given in Report No. SL-3753, Table III-1.

If one defective was observed in the first sample of 59 test areas, the test plan required that 93 areas be tested.

The fact that the first 60 areas tested did not have any defects attests to the' quality of i

the in place concrete.

The. acceptance criteria of 95% reliability with 95% confidence was met.

Hence, i

there was no need to proceed to subsequent levels of testing.

A " defective" is the existence of unacceptable internal voids or honeycombs or other 7

consolidation condition as confirmed by additional examination, i.e.,

drawings review, destructive evaluation (cores from the concrete), and analysis.

3.

Comment

" Influence of instrument error and human error on

p. 2, Item I statistical approach".

Response

Pulse-echo testing has been successfully utilized for in place concrete examination in the past at nuclear and fossil plants. The testing procedure was also qualified at the Marble Hill site in the

t presence of an NRC inspector.

Qualifications entailed the identification and subsequent destructive confirmation of conditions adverse' to concrete quality.

In every instance, the microseismic results agreed with destructive confirmations.

The pulse-echo testing detects discontinuities in the in place concrete. The presence of rebars, conduits, and pipe sleeves could also be recorded as discontinuities.

Additional evaluation was always necessary and it was always done.

In all the qualification tests done, the testing procedure has not failed to detect a discontinuity I

if one was present.

At Marble Hill, if a discon-tinuity was indicated by the pulse-echo testing but could not be explained by studying the drawings and available data, a core was taken.

Because of the instrument's high sensitivity to discontinuities and because of the grid system used, it is extremely unlikely that " solid" concrete would be indicated where.a void exists. The pulse-echo technique will find discontinuities. The techniques' limitation is the inability to exactly quantify or characterize the discontinuity found.

Because of this, photo-graphs of the electronic indication, construction drawings, and concrete cores were used to confirm any indication. Hence, the reliability of pulse-echo testing results,as far as ~ detecting discontinuities.

. n.

in concrete is concerned, is greatly enhanced, t

In the interest of further clarification, the testing of-concrete at Marble Hill was done in three stages:

Pulse-echo testing (photographic records); review of drawings and construction records for correlation with pulse-echo' test data, and finally, coring..This sequence of actions has significantly assured that the r

results of the testing are accurate and that human error has been minimized to the extent feasible.

Once the measuring technique and evaluation methodology were established, the testing program was based on the conservative assumption of an-infinite population size.

No qualification of

" human and instrument error" was considered necessary because the potential for such errors was minimized by independent reviews and evalu-ations which confirmed that the indications were not defects.

m

We recognize that the sampling program recommended by you also de-

-t include the uncertainties-introduced by ' -

3nd instrument errors.

With regard to Mr. Muenow's qualifications, he is an internationally known authority in this field with a degree in civil engineering and more than twenty-five years experience.

Mr. Muenow is also the developer of this technology.

His extreme care and_ professionalism in performing the tests was demonstrated to those vitnessing the testing, including the NRC.

Also, the photographs tak4e of the cathode ray tube indications repr'n.ent permanent records, which can be examined by all concerned.

It should be recognized that three other separate organizations participated with Mr. Muenow during these examinations.

Each had a separate responsibility to minimize error during data acquisition and evaluation.

In addition, transducer performance cests were conducted at the beginning and end of each test period to verify equipment signal response.

These. tests would minimize the potential for instrument errors.

4.

Comment

" Random selection not used - defectives overlooked".

p. 4, item 2 Since the testing program was initiated following the concern expressed }y the. NRC over the concrete placement procedures at: Marble Hill,.the question of sampling was addressed using the_ experience gained in nuclear concrete construction. A higher potential for voids exists in the areas of concrete congested by rebar and embedment arrangement than in noncongested areas.

Hence, engineering prudence required that a high proportion of these congested areas be included. At the same time, the placement procedures required that like caution be exercised in the concreting of noncongested areas. Therefore, it was considered advisable to include noncongested tress also to assure a total cross-section of sampling.

~

Since the testing program vas used to qualify the entire volume of in place concrete at Marble Hill, the sample had to be. representative of all structural elements.

The test areas covered the containment, fuel handling building, auxiliary 8

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wa,a

.w building, and turbine room at different elevations.

Various structural elements (i.e., basement, wall, beam, column, and floor slab) were included in the

sample, Such a representative sample could not have been obtained by a purely random sampling devoid of engineering judgment.

Since half of the sample is from congested areas, a conservative bias is introduced into the testing.

The void under the Auxiliary Building slab, referred to in the Report No. SL-3753,Section VII, was one of the reasons for the testing program.

Having been discovered, it could not be included as part of the statistical sampling program.

The program aimed at assessing the quality of the remainder of the concrete.

S.

Comment

" Risks associated with sampling plan".

p. 4, Item 3

Response

We agree with the statement that " acceptance sampling (in this context) is not used at Marble Hill to control quality, but rather to determine whether a desired quality exists".

We further believe that the concrete consolidation quality can be judged by,te. sting.an _ade'quate sapple,

as determined in the biased sampling program dis--

cussed above.

Also, the testing program was aimed at assessing the percent of defects (concrete nonconsolidation); in this sense, past experience has no bearing on the sample size.

We do not share the concern expressed in your state-ment that "it must be considered alarming when a plan detects zero defects where obvious defects exist".

The sampling program did not assure zero defects in the population; but it did require that the frequency of such consolidation defectives be acceptable.

The testing program has demonstrated that there was no unacceptable proportion of voids deep inside the structural. elements.

It should be recognized that in most instances honeycomb will not occur without some surface indication of its presence.

The visible defects were -<n

.namined by the

- pulse-echo testing pro :4:.

These defects were s

thoroughly inspected under the Construction i

b

4 Verification Program.

The pulse-echo testing strictly aimed at examining the concrete con-solidation inside the structural elements.

6.

Comment

" Proposed sampling plan".

p. 5, Item 4

Response

As explained earlier, a conscientious effort was made to test in areas of potential discontinuities; no defective areas were found in 60 tests.

The conditions of testing pass or no pass - met the theoretical concept contained in Eq. 2, and appropriately considered the total volume of the concrete.

We feel that with 95% confidence, the percent of defective concrete relative to internal consolidation is less than 5%.

The purpose of Military Standard MIL-STD-105D is to statistically control the quality of production.

It is intended for circumstances of continuous production; for this reason we do not consider its use appropriate.

In contrast, the entire population of in place concrete at Marble Hill was available for inspection.

Production was not-involved. A representative sample was selected for testing, as per Eq. 2; hence the S&L plan is considered appropriate for the problem under study.

At Marble Hill, an extensive in process testing program of concrete and of con, crete constituents has been and -still is in effect.

We do not consider production testing as being consistent with a plan to test a given quantity of in place concrete.

The program outlined in the subject S&L Report No. SL-3753 addresses.

a fixed quantity of concrete.

Furthermore, while the MIL-STD-105D requires a larger sample size, it also permits a higher number of defectives.

It is based on the same theoretical concept contained in Eq. 2.

However, Eq. 2 as used in the sampling program devised by S&L did not allow for any defectives for a sample size of 59 (60 actually used) to maintain a 95%

reliability / confidence factor; and had a. defective been observed, the sample size would have been-increased to 93 as given in Table III-l of S&L Report No. SL-3753.

We do not regard the basis to consider'one cubic yard of concrete as one unit as meaningful because of the nature of the defects which the program is required to identify.,

o

On the basis of the foregoing, NRC concludes that the sampling methodology used by S&L, and the additional steps taken during data acquisition and.

evaluation, has met or exceeded the specified level of confidence and reli-

ability, i

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PM 8T?D. COP. RESP,0KD.52

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.BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY 'CO:DIISSION g

[f WASHINGTON.

D. C.

5:a 8

COMMISSIONERS, Joseph M. Hendrie, Chairman, f

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' Peter A. Bradford.

N Victor Gilinsky John F. Aherne IN-THE.1MTTIR OF PUBLIC SERVICE COUPANY OF INDIANA, IRRELE HILL -

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT,. DOCKET NOS.-

STN 50-5461AND STN-50-547 SAVE THE VALLEY'S' ADDENDUM TO ITS APRIL 14,-1981 PETITION TO. THE COMMISSIONERS TO REVIEk' THE'

]

NUCLEAR REGULATORY CODIISSION MARCH-27, 1981

{

ORDER TO RESUME CONSTRUCTION AT IMRBLE HILL

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Comes now Save The Valley (STV), by its attorney, and for cause of Addendum to the above ;*ction, states-i 1.

That on or about June 26, 1981. Vic tor Stello, Jr., Director '.

a t

of Inspection & Enforcement, filed his decision.under 10 CFR 2.206 substantially accepting that the Earble Hill, concrete:inithe aggr'ega$c

=..

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I does meet Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) structural integrity

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criteria of-95% reliability and 95% confidence.

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2.

That on or about June 25,19S1, there-was prepared byfAlfred.l L. Parme, Consulting Engineer, La Jolla, California,. and Roland C..

'l t

Hamme, P.E., San Diego, C~aliTornia, a 'certain Review of: the-. Evaluation !

of Concrete at Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units if& 2, j

Report #IE-124, which Report substantially concluded that the Marble.

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Hill concrege meets the NRC requirements of 95% reliability and' 95%

j confidence level.

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f 3.

That said Alfred L. Parme and Roland C. Har.me did not s

include in their evaluation consideration of the effect of the L

slightest possible human error in the determination of R. Muneow; further, it is stated on page 13 of the-report, "As a result of aliscussions with R. Muneow and others whe are reputable, experienced-and pre'ently involved in the field of microseismic testing, we have I

s concluded that the method of non-destructive testing performed at Marble Hill is acceptible.

The interpretations made and equipment used by R. Muneow are at the forefront of the state of the art."

i i

4.

Again, Doctor Muneow's qualifications are not questioned; i

however, the particular task that he performed is an art and not a science and, therefore, cannot be given a qualification rating of 100%.. Taking a qualification rating of 935 and placing said value on R. Muneow, the statistical basis for the NRC conclusion of 95%

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confidence with 95% reliability falls apart.

5.

STV has presented a written critique' o'" the section~

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" Statistical Basis for Testing Program" by Suraj M. Alexander, Ph.D.,

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,P.E.,,

Asst. Professor of Engineering Management / Industrial Engineering -

Speed Scientific School, University of Louisville, addressing this I

statistical determination and concluding without question that the NRC determination is inaccurate, incorrect and even unintelligible; that Professor Alexander is highly qualified in the area of quality f

control with an in-depth background in statistics.

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l

W.ERE FORE, Save The Valley respectfully requests the Commissioner; prior to the time that the 10 CFR 2.206 decision of Victor Stello, Jr.

becomes' the final action of the agency to institute a review of said June 26, 1981 decision, to order the independent engineers to be prepared, to testify before the Commission'in Washingtoc~,.. D&.

to defend their statistical determination of 95f; confidence _ an'd 95%

reliability; the Commission is further requested to order Save The-Valley to present its witnesses personally before said Cor. mission to defend its conclusion that said 95% confidence and 95?f reliability has not been demonstrated by the NRC concerning the iIarble Hill concrete.

RESPECTFULLY SUSMITTED, SAVE THE VALLEY, PETITIONER

/b% Mba BY:

THOl%S M. DATTILO, ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 311 T_AST IMIN STREET V.ADISON, INDIANA 47250 PHONE: 812-265-6355 DATED:

JULY 10, 1981.

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