ML20028D815
| ML20028D815 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/25/1982 |
| From: | Jamarl Cummings NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA) |
| To: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20027A771 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8301190489 | |
| Download: ML20028D815 (12) | |
Text
.
t!l.iTED STATES NUCLE AR.REGUL ATORY COMMISSIOT,
..f f
,5 W ASHir.G T O N. D. C. 70555
~,?
~
?
v,
=
May 25, 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino s}
s FROM:
James J. Cummings, Director
,,,,g.,,,,,9 Office of Inspector and Auditor SUEJECT:
QUESTIONS CONCERNING NRC'S HANDLING OF THE HAYWARD TYLER PUMP COMPANY INSPECTION / INVESTIGATION
~
Reference Haller's memo of May 19, 1982.
The referenced memo furnished questions from Commissioner Gilinsky and Leonard Bickwit, OGC, concerning NRC's handling of the Hayward Tyler Pump Company inspection / investigation.
Attachment A provides responses to'the questions submitted by Commissioner Gilinsky and Mr. Bickwit.
In responding to these questions I have reviewed infomation contained in the OIA report, Commission hearing transcripts of March 19, 24, and 25, 1982, and transcripts of hearings before Congressman Markey, Chaiman, Subcommittee for Investigations on April 5, 1982.
Attachment:
As Stated
/
9 0301190489 830104
\\
/'
PDR COMMS NRCC 9h >
CORRESPONDENCE PDR
QUESTIONSSUSMIkTEDBYCOMMISSIONERGILINSKY OUESTION 1:
Did Collins know in advance (l) that Seyfrit was flying to Washington on February 24 to meet HTPC's law fim and (2) what documents he was going to give them? If not, when did he find out?
ANSWER 1 (1):
Interview of John Collins:
(Source:
OIA Report, page 9)
" Collins said that there were two purposes for releasing the draft reports. The first was to eliminate the 10-day period for review of reports by vendors for proprietary data.
Thp second purpose was to advise HTPC of NRC's findings in more detail to assist HTPC in taking the necessary corrective action.
At the February 12 meeting Region IV personnel agreed to meet with HTPC representatives on February 24 in Washington, D.C."
Testimony'of John Collins:
(Source: Hearings ~Before Congressman Markey)
Markey asked Collins if he knew that Seyfrit planned to meet with Rowden on February 24.
Collins replied that he did.
Markey then asked Collins if he instructed Seyfrit to do so and Collins said that the meeting had been set up as a result of the February 12 meeting with HTPC representatives. Markey then asked Collins if he was aware that Seyfrit was planning to release the reports and Collins replied that he was not.
OIA. COMMENT:
1.(1);
Mr. Collins knew in advance that Mr. Seyfrit was flying to Washington to meet with HTPC lawyers on February 24, 1982.
ANSWER 1 (2):
l Testimony of John Collins (Source:
Hearings Before Congressman Markey) l l
Markey asked Collins if he was aware that Seyfrit was planning to provide Rcwden a copy of the final inspecticn report.
Collins re:: lied that he was not aware of this.
Markey then asked Collins when he found out that l
Seyfrit had furnished a copy of the inspection report at the February 24 meeting.
Collins replied that he believed it was durinc the OIA investigatior
.+en GIA investigatccs inferred ric cf tr.at release.
a rkey further d.ed Collins
^t".:r he had r;. Ho, led;e wht::e.er whef er Seyfrit had released the reports.
Collins replied that he did not.
ATTACHMENT A 1
. ANSWER 1 (2):
Testimony of Karl Seyfrit:
(Source:
Hearings Before Congressman Markey)
Markey asked Seyfrit if he had obtained permission from his supervisors to release the reports on February 24 to HTPC representatives.
Seyfrit's reply was that he had not received permission to release the reports.
Markey also asked Seyfrit for the reason he released the report to Rowden at the February 24 meeting in Washington.
Seyfrit replied with words to the effect that it was the same report - with no changes - that was provided to HTPC representatives at the Feoruary 12 meeting in Region IV.
Interview of Karl Seyfrit:
(Source:
OIA Report, page 25)
"His next significant involvement with this case was to attend a meeting on February 24 in Rowden's law offices in Washington, D.C. He believed this meeting took place from around 10 a.m. until noon. He said the attendees at the meeting were himself, Potapovs, Rowden, and some other attorneys from his firm and.several people from HTPC/ Indian Head.
Seyfrit said at the February 24 meeting he provided Rowden with a copy of the final inspection report and its transmittal letter (Exhibits 9 and 25) with the dates and signatures deleted.
Seyfrit said he did this because he wanted to show Rowden that there was no significant changes since the draft report was provided to them on February 12, therefore inducing'them to give their proprietary release at that time.
Seyfrit said that in his mind release of this report was no dif.ferent than releasing the drafts on February 12."
OIA COMMENT:
The question as to whether Collins knew Seyfrit was going to release the reports on February 24, 1982, to representatives of the HTPC was not asked of Collins by OIA, however, in Collins testimony before Congressman Markey he clearly states he was not aware that Seyfrit was going to release the reports and did not find out they had been released until OIA investigators informed him.
QUESTION 2: What evidence is there that Collins told Dircks, Stello, and Case on February 18 that he had already released draft documents to HTPC? In particular, what does Case say?
M3'.:ER 2:
ind Reintervie<; of v'chn Ccliins:
(Scurce:
01A Report, ;: age 16)
"During the February 18, 1982, meeting Collins recalled that he distributed cooies of both the inspection and investigation reports, as well as a briefing prepared by him, to all attendees.
According to Collins,
{
3_
during his briefing he informed everyone at the meeting that both the inspection and investigation draft reports had been provided to HTPC representatives.
He recalled that there was no reaction by anyone at that meeting to this revelation.
Collins advised that during the meeting some concerns about doing more investigation were raised and, because of those concerns, he called Karl Seyfrit in Region IV after the meeting.
Collins said that he alerted Seyfrit not to release the reports."
Interview of William J. Dircks:
(Source:
OIA Report, page 52)
"In response to questions regarding whether Dircks was aware of any meetings between NRC personnel and HTPC people prior to February 18, Dircks responded that he did not think he was aware of the February 12 meeting in Region IV.
Dircks also stated that he did not believe he was aware that " paper passed," meaning that the draft inspection or investigation reports had been released to HTPC.
In support of this Dircks explained that he had talked with Stello who also did not remember Collins' advising anyone at the February 18 meeting that the draft reports had been released.
Another contact with Ed Case also resulted in Case's responding that he did not recall Collins' mentioning releasing the reports.
Dircks recalled that during the specified meeting Collins handed out copies of the inspection and investigation reports for review and discussion.
At the conclusion of the meeting all of the reports were handed back in order that further actions could be taken."
Interview of William'J. Dircks':
(Source:
OIA Report, page 52)
"Dircks explained that the meeting on February 18 was not a very long meeting and that if Collins had stated that Region IV had met with HTPC representatives on February 12 and released the draft reports, then "we (Dircks, Stello, and Case) missed it."
On the contrary what was resolved at the meeting was that neither of the reports should be issued and that i
information was conveyed to Collins.
In support of that Dircks stated that the consensus was that the inspection report should not be issued because of the potential for affecting the results of the investigation.
Dircks added we were also aware of previous OIA criticisms of premature release of NRC investigations."
Interview of Victor J. Stello: (Source:
OIA Report, page 61)
" Returning to the March 5 meeting Stello explained that it was at this tire he first recalls Collins infor.ing him that the reports had already been released at an earlier nee:ing with nTPC cnd that the reports had
.xe. :eleased then for pr:prie w j review.
Cc11 ins aisc told Stello that he, Collins, had brought this information to the attentien of everyone at the February 18 meeting.
As Stello recalls his response to Collins was that he did not recall any information regarding the release of the reports to the company at the February 18 meeting, however., he was not going to " debate it."
Stello stated that he advised Collins that at the time of the February 18 meeting, his, Stello's, " sensitivity was such" that anything suggesting release of the reports would have l
been questioned, especially regarding release of the investigation report."
4 Interview of Victor J. Stello:
(Source:
OIA Report, page 61)
"Stello then returned to his recollection of additional conversation which took place at the February 18 meeting.
Stello explained that one of Collins' concerns was getting the information to the vendor so that corrective action could begin.
Collins then questioned as to how does NRC convey information to the licenset or vendor concerning identified problems if the reports were not released?
In response to this Stello explained to Collins that the region should "use an exit interview" however they should not release the report."
Interview of James Sniezek:
(Source:
0IAReport,page59)
"During the same period Sniezek added that he had no information that
" drafts" were released to representatives of HTPC.
Sniezek explained that he was aware of earlier meetings between Region IV and HTPC representatives but was unaware that any documents had been exchanged.
Sniezek re-emphasized that during the February 18 meeting with Collins and EDO, he did not recall any statements by Collins which indicated that draft reports had been released.
Sniezek then stated that he also could not say that Collins "did not say that."
Interview of Edson Case:
(Source:
OIA Report, page 65)
" Case said that in connection with the discussion of how to alert the licensees of NRC's findings, Collins gave him (Case) "some impression" that Region IV had already either talked to HTPC, or shown HTPC copies of the reports, or provided HTPC with copies of the reports.
Case could not recall any'further details about what Collins said which gave him this impression, except that he was sure that Collins was not explicit in whatever he said.
Case added that, given the very clear instructions Dircks and Stello gave to Collins about further investigation and delaying i
the release of the reports, he believed it was " incumbent upon Collins to bring up explicitly the fact that he had already released the draft reports to HTPC.
Case said his next association with the HTPC case occurred at a Regicnal
- &inistrators' eeting about two weeks ago which was also attended by Dircks, Stelle, and the office directors.
Case recalled the cuestion arisirg at that time as to how HTPC got copies of Re; ion IV's reports.
l
- m said he did c:: partici; ate in the discussi n en the point, but he j
did rention to Stello his inpression about what Collins may have alluded tc on February 18 regarding release of these reports.
Case said that l
Stello's reaction to this comment was that he did not get the same inpression."
l I
i
5-Testimony of Edson Case:
(Source:
Commission Hearings, March 25, 1982, page18)
On March 25, 1982, in Hearings before the Commission regarding HTPC, Case advised that he could not recall Collins specifically asking to release either the inspection report or the investigation report.
In addition, Case did not recall Stallo specifically denying this request.
Case stated he could not recall this part of his interview with OIA investigators.
Testimony of John Collins:
(Source: Hearings Before Congressman Markey)
Markey asked Collins if he advised Dircks at the February meeting that the documents had been released.
Collins replied that he thought that he had mentioned it at the meeting, but apparently no one at that meeting recalled it. Markey then questioned further and asked Collins whose memory did Collins think was more accurate.
Collins replied that he did not care to challenge the point and added that if everyone at the meeting said he did not mention it, he guessed he did r.ot tell them.
DIA COMMENT:
The evidence that Collins told William Dircks, Victor Stello, James Sniezek, and Edson Case that he had released the draft report to HTPC is Collins' personal statement to OIA investigators. Collins claims he informed them 18, 1982 meeting at NRC Headquarters.that the HTPC at the February inspection / investiga' tion reports had been provided to HTPC representatives.
However, the weight of this evidence is not supported by the statements of Dircks, Stello, and Sniezek, who said, in each instance, they did not
' recall Collins so informing them.
OIA investigators specifically addressed this point in interviews of Dircks, et al. However, with the possible exception of Edson Case, no one in atteiidance recalled Collins informing them he had issued the report to HTPC representatives.
QUESTION 3:
Establish the truth and accuracy of the account in Gamble, Resner and Sinclair's April 20th memo to Cummings relating to Collins' contradictory statements.
If the account is true, what is Collins' explanation?
I e -
^
Contradictory Statements:
(Source:
Gamble April 20 Memo, page 9)
"III. Accearance of Contradiction in Collins' Statements A. OIA's Interview of Collins on March 9,1982 When Collins was interviewed by OIA on March 9 there were several statements he made, or attempted to make, which were either not correct or misleading.
The first misstatement was Collins' denial that the investigative report or its transmittal letter had ever been signed (OIA report at page 10).
Collins withdrew from this position when the signed copy of this report and transmittal letter were placed before him during the interview.
Collins' second misstatement was his denial that the inspection report had been signed (OIA report at page 11).
Similarly, Collins withdrew from this po.,1 tion when a copy of the signed inspection report was displayed to him during the interview.
Collins' third misstatement however was more significant.
Collins' rationalization for saying that the inspection report had not been signed was that he meant the report was not yet in final fann.
He explained this by stating that all reports are signed by his subordinates before they come to his office; he considered a report to be in final Collins form only when he signed the transmittal letter for the report.
was then asked whether he had ever signed the transmittal letter to the inspection report.
Collins displayed to the OIA investigators a copy of the transmittal letter thct hcd-n0t been Eigned (OTA report, Exhibit 10) and stated emphatically that he had never signed the transmittal letter to the inspection report.
It was only later that day, upon reviewing a file in Seyfrit's possession, that DIA obtained a copy of the transmittal letter which Collins had signed on February 18 (01A report, Exhibit 25).
The fourth problem with Collins' interview was his omission of a fairly significant facc, to wit, the February 25 meeting between the E00 and Rowden. As of the time OIA interviewed Collins, OIA was totally unaware that the Dircks/Rowden meeting had occurred.
Given the extent of our questioning of Collins ar3 our purposes (which were clearly stated to Collins) of documenting s.1 contact between NRC management and HTPC representatives, it appears to be a rather significant omission for Collins to have not made any mention of the Dircks/Rc' den meeting.
As you kccw,18 USC 1001 prcvides criminal penalties for willful and trr..ing false statements and omissions of material facts.
B. Collins' Statement Regarding Crimir.ality During OIA's interviews of Collins, Collins indicated that he felt the allegations in the HTPC case represented potentially criminal actions.
Collins' belief on this score were amplified in his February 23 memorandum Although it to OI A asking for 01A review of potential criminality.
remains to be seen as to what Collins' exact words were, our impression of his testimony at the April 6 Congressional hearing was that Collins was screwhat more equivocal as to his views of potential criminality.
This is an area that should be reviewed upon the availability of the transcript of the Congressional hearing."
7 A.;SWER 3:
Interview of John Collins _:
(Source:
OIA Report, page 10 and 11)
" Collins was then asked whether he was aware that the investigative report had been signed.
Collins' initial reply was that the investigative report has not been signed.
Collins supported this statement by displaying a copy of the cover sheet to the investigation which is marked " draft" and which is neither signed or dated.
(This cover sheet is provided as Exhibit 3.)
Collins was then presented with a copy of the cover sheet to the investigaticn which was signed by Seyfrit and dated February 18 (Exhibit 4). At the same time Collins was presented with a transmittal letter to the investigative report which was a letter addressed to HTPC and signed by Seyfrit on February 19.
Collins was also presented at this time a copy of a transmittal letter dated February 19 to the investigative report which was a memorandum.from Seyfrit to Roger Fortuna (Chief, Investigations Branch, IE (HQ)) dated February 19.
Collins' only reply to these documents was that he was not aware that they were transmitted to Fortuna until February 26.
Collins explained that on that date he was at HQ attending a Senior Executive Seminar.
He recalled that DeYoung called Sniezek who told him about the memo to Fortuna, the attachments to which (Exhibits 4 and 5) indicated the investigative report had been transmitted to HTPC.
Collins believed that Sniezek then called Seyfrit who was back at Region IV, and either Sniezek or Seyfrit called Steve Scott in Document Control at HQ to try to halt distribution of the copies of the report.
Collins explained that IE and Regional policy is that signed investigation reports that involve matters that He are potentially criminal are sent to IE HQ before they are released.
said the normal process, however, is to mail out reports at the same time they are sent to IE HQ for infomation.
Collins said that to the best of his knowledge the signed investigative report in this case was never actually mailed to HTPC even though the transmittal letter, Exhibit was signed.
" Collins said that he nomally concurs in all outgoing correspondence, even if the correspondence is signed by a subordinate of his.
Collins could offer no explanation as to why Seyfrit signed this transmittal letter for the investigative report.
During the interview Collins asked his secretary to retrieve the official file copies for Exhibits 5 and 6.
These official file copies (Exhibit 7 and 8) indicate concurrence only l
l by Herr and Seyfrit.
Exhibits 7 and 8 indicate Seyfrit concurrence (and presumably for signature) were on February 18, even though the date at the top of the letters is February 19.
Collins said that nobody on his offered any explanation as to why these transmittals were signed.
staf#
- oilins said he never asked anycne why they were signed because he felt the pr:-J.c was solved since they were intercepted prior to their disratch l
outside NRC.
n
~8-Collins was then asked when he became aware that the inspection report had been signed.
Collins' reply was that the inspection report had not been signed.
Collins' attention was then directed to the copy of the inspection report attached to his February 23 memorandum to Cummings (Exhibit 9).
Collins then reviewed Exhibit 9 and saw that the inspection report was signed and dated February 16.
Collins quickly replied that what he meant to say was the inspection report was not in final form.
He explained that all reports are signed before they come to him.
He said that the signing of the report merely signifies to him that his staff concurs in the report.
Collins said that he does not consider the report to be a final product until he signs the letter of transmittal for the report.
Collins then flipped to a copy of the draft letter of transmittal for the inspection report,which was also attached to his February 23 memo to Cumings (Exhibit 10).
Collins displayed the signature block of Exhibit 10 to the investigators and stated emphatically that this transmittal letter has never been signed."
2nd Reinterview of John Collins:
(Source:
OIA Report, page 16)
"The discrepancy noted by investigators subsequent to Collins' initial OIA interview focused on his statement concerning finalization of the inspection report.
During interview of March 9,1982, Collins stated that he had not signed the letter of transmittal (Exhibit 10) to signify the finalization of the inspection effort.
During reinterview Collins 18, 1982, was shown a copy of the concurrence sheet for the February (Exhibit 25).
letter of transmittal which apparently bore his initials He stated, "he was in error," when he said that he did not sign the transmittal letter for the inspection report.
Collins recounted that he signed the transmittal on the morning of February 18, 1982, prior to departing Region IV to attend a meeting in Bethesda, Maryland.
The l
meeti'ng was requested by Collins previously in order that he could brief his management (William Dircks, Victor Stello, James Sniezek, Edson Case) l on the inspection and investigation effort at HTPC.
Collins recalled that it was his intention to sign the letter of transmittal before he left in order that the report be ready for release pending management l
approval at the meeting.
Collins said he believed headquarters would concur with his finalization of the report."
Interview of John Collins:
(Source:
OIA Report, page 10)
"Dircks further recor ended that Collins provide OIA with a copy of the investigative re;: ort for review of criminal pctential of the finding:.
C:llirs said that the coacern of possible crininality l
9_
centered around the areas of potential falsification of records and the removal of records to prevent access by NRC inspectors.
Collins said that he believed there was a potential for criminality in this case almost immediately upon his first review of the initial allegations."
Testimony of John Collins:
(Source:
Hearings Before Congressman Markey)
Congressman Markey asked Collins if he believed at the outset that there was a potential for criminality.
Collins responded that he did not think he formed an opinion in the beginning, that it was a foregone conclusion there was criminality.
Collins stated he had not formulated that opinion.
Markey then explained to Collins that what he was asking pertained to falsifications of documents and the removal of records from plant offices - that there was a potential for criminality.
Collins responded - absolutely - sure there is a potential for criminality.
Markey then asked Collins if he sent Cummings a memorandum on February 23 advising Cummings of potential criminality.
Collins said that he advised Cummings that based on his review there may be a potential for criminality and would he review it to make a determination.
Markey then states, so at the time (February 23) you still had questions in your mind regarding criminality in the case.
Collins responded "no," that he didn't think he had it fixed in his mind that there was criminality.
Collins then said he did not see any reason for potential criminality and he also said that he was not trained as OIA personnel to review criminality.
He further said that this was the reason he sent it to OIA
.to use OIA's expertise in making a determination.
Markey then commented to the effect that at that time Collins had already released the draft report to HTPC.
Collins replied that he still felt DIA should make their independent finding and OIA may_ or may not have supported him.
Markey then asked Collins why would he release the draft until he had resolved the question of criminality with OIA.
Collins responded that he did not release the draft on instinct but felt that from discussions with his staff there was no area of concern brought to his attention that indicated a real criminality incident or that it should be investigated further.
Collins also said that from discussions with his peers in Washington it was detent.ined a referral to 01A should be made.
Markey then asked Collins why he sent a memorandum if he had already dismissed it in his o.;n mind.
Collins said that he sent the e?.o because he still feit DIA should look at it and that he was only one person making that l
d ste rmination.
Markey then ccmnented that Collins was the or.e releasing tFe : aft re::rt.
Collins then said Cummings' view may be different
'<0- his te:a;se he looks at things differnt thar. he d:es.
Markey said r,;.r;arst::
- at tat that C Ein:..as the One hir" ; ever t"e i-2#t.
Collins then stated that he made the decision to hand over the draf t based on the fact he did not see criminality nor did his staff.
Markey i
l then responded that that was clearly not the import of the memorandum to l
Cummings.
Markey further commented that Collins still had reservations.
I t
that there may have been criminality - that he had not resolved it 100%.
Collins said that in retrospect he should have written into the memo to Cummings that based on hit, decision or on-his review, he didn't see criminality. He further stated that he still would like to take a look at it for that issue.
OIA COMMENT:
There is no question that Collins' initial responses to several questions asked by OIA were either in error or untruthful.
When confronted with information which contradicted his responses Collins readily accepted their incorrectness.
In my view it is also important to note that during my interviews of Collins and Seyfrit I sensed no attempt on their part to be evasive or uncooperative.
Region IV files, which in one instance provided a contradictory document, were readily available and open to 0IA investigators.
In my opinion John Collins was not untruthful in responding to OIA questions.
With respect to Collins' testimony before Congressman Markey on the issue of potential criminality, it should be noted that Collins' action of February 23 - notification letter to 0IA - is consistent with his 0IA interview and consistent with the first part of his testimony before Congressman Markey.
However, Collins' later testimony to Markey is somewhat inconsistent with the above.
It appears that Collins is trying to differentiate between what he believes to constitute crimi.nality and what he is required to do when potential criminality surfaces in investigations, that is, notification to OIA.
5
.