ML20010H135
| ML20010H135 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/1981 |
| From: | Snell J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8109230719 | |
| Download: ML20010H135 (18) | |
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n MEMORANDUM FOR:
B. J. Youngblood, Chief, Licensing Branch No. 1. DL FROFi:
J. Snell, Project Manager, Licensing Branch No. 1. DL
SUBJECT:
FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH COMMONWEALTH EDIS0N COMPANY -
BYRON DATE AND TIME:
September 21-25, 1981 1:00 pm LOCATION:
Westinghouse Offices 4901 Fairmont Ave.
Bethesda, Maryland PURPOSE:
To discuss the Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch review of Byron Station and to resolve ist.ues listed in the agenda, enclosed.
PARTICIPANTS:
NRC Staff K. Kiper, P. Bender, T. Dunning, J. Mech (ANL)
Comonwealth Edison Company T. Tram, et al.
b J. Snell, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Agenda Items cc: See next page.
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Mr. I.ouis 0. Del George Director of Nuclear Licensing Connonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 ccs:
Mr. William Kortier Mr. Edward R. Crass Atomic Power Distribution Nuclear Safeguards and Licensing DivisioI Westinghouse Electric Corporation Sargent & Lundy Engineers P. O. Box 355 55 East Monroe Street Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Chicago, Illinois 60603 Paul M. Murphy, Esq.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III Isham, Lincoln & Beale Office of Inspection and Enforcement One First National Plaza 799 Roosevelt Road 42nd Floor Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Chicago, Illinois 60603 Myron Cherry, Esq.
Mrs. Phillip B. Johnson Cherry, Flynn and Kanter 1907 Stratford Lane 1 IBM Plaza, Suite 4501 s
Rockford, Illinois 61107 Chicago, Illinois 60611 Professor Axel Meyer Deoartment of Physics Northern Illinois University DeKalb, Illinois 60115 C. Allen Bock, Esq.
P. O. Box 342 Urbanan, Illinois 61801 Thomas J. Gordon, Esq.
Waaler, Evans & Gordon 2503 S. Neil Champaign, Illinois 61820 Ms. Bridget Little Rorem Appleseed Coordinator 117 North Linden Street Essex, Illinois 60935 Kenneth F. Levin, Esq.
Beatty, Levin, Holland, Basofin & Sarsany 11 South LaSalle Street Suite 2200 Chicago, Illinois 60603 s
ENCLOSURE 1 AGENDA ITEMS FOR MEETING (S) WITH CONONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ON BTNUN/BRAIDWOOD STATION 5' INMRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Following is a list of items for discussion at meetings with the applicant to provide the NRC staff with information required to understand the design bases and design implementation for the instrumentation and control systems at~ Byron /
Braidwood Stations. The applicant should be prepared to use both simplified and detailed instrument, control, and fluid system schematics at the meetings in explaining system designs and to provide verification that design bases and regulatory criteria are met.-
1.
Provide an overview of the plant electrical distribution system, with emphasis on vital buses and divisions of redundancy, as background for addressing various Chapter 7 concerns.
2.
Sumarize the status of those instrumentation and control items discussed in the Safety Evaluation Report (and supplements) issued for the construction permit which required resolution during the operating license review.
3.
Based on your identification of SNUPPS as functionally similar to B/B for each FSAR Chapter 7 section, and on the assumption that Ceco has followed our SNUPPS review in this area, sumarize and describe any design modifications, FSAR amendments, procedural / test changes, etc., that you have made, will make or that are under consideration as a result of the SNUPPS review process.
4.
Identify and discuss significant safety-related design differences between Byron /Braidwood and the referenced SNUPPS plants in the Westinghouse scope (i.e., use of P-9, loop stop valve interlocks, etc.).
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5.
Identify any plant safety related system or portion therof, for which the design is incomplete. Provide rationale. (Due to Regulatory Guide 1.97, NUREG-0737, etc.).
6.
Identify and describe Byron /Braidwood design modifications / changes in response to related TMI Action Plan Items (.II.D.3, II.E.1.2, II.F.2, II.K.3.1, II.K.3.9, 11.K.3.10, II.K.3.12). Indicate any areas of non-compliance with NUREG-0737 requi rements.
7.
Appendix A (Referenced in Table 7.1-1) addresses application of Regulatory Guides. In many cases, it is not clear that thedesign conforms to the guidance of the regulatory guides or if exceptions are taken. The following connents are applicable.
R.G.1.22 - It is noted tr at the commitment
..nply with the intent of the requirenent of this guide are provided in Sections 7.1.2.6 and 7.3.2.2.
Since
+'t referenced sections make no mention of the R.G., conformance is in question.
d R.G.1_47 - Compliance is noted as discussed in Section 7.5.
However, if exceptions are taken it is not clear and no mention of conformance is provided.
R.G.1.53 - Compliance is noted as discussed in Section 7.1.2.11.
Same comments i
apply as noted for R.G.1.47.
R.G.1.62 - Commitnent to comply is noted as given in referenced sections which do not address this R.G.
R.G.1.75 - Same comment applies as noted for R.G.1.62.
R.G.1.118 - Compliance noted as with the intent of R.G.
The above sections of Appendix should be revised. As an example, R.G.s 1.97 and 1.105 are addressed to indicate conformance with these guides and
-3 exceptions are clearly noted.
In that these statements do not limit or qualify conformance to " intent", a question does not arise as to its meaning.
8.
Describe how the separation criteria for protection channel circuits, protection logic circuits, and non-safety related circuits complies with R.G.1.75.
Indicate the separation method between these circuits. Discuss a typical example for each type circuit to include an intra-panel wiring circuit.
9.
Ccncerning the provisions of R.G.1.75 and IEEE Standard 384-1974, relative to overcurrent devices, provide specific information where these devices are used and provide the basis that this design does not compromise protection channel independence.
- 10. Describe the implementation of the bypassed and inoperable status indications provided for engineered safeguards features and compliance with R.G.1.47.
Discuss types of status displays and alarms. Discuss computer utilization and software verification and validation techniques.
11.
Describe design compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.22 (Periodic Testing of Protection System Functions).
Identify equipment not tested at full power, with basis for each. Confirm adherence to Regulatory Position D.4 of this regulatory guide.
- 12. Describe compliance with Regulatory Guida 1.118, especially Position 6.3.4 i
(Response Time Testing).
Indicate whether technical specifications include RTS and ESFAS response times for each reactor trip function.
Indicate whether testsinclude all components, from sensor to operation of final actuation device.
end describe methodoloay used for a typical response time.
Identify areas of non-ccmpliance with basis for each.
Indicate test frequenc/.
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13.
Describe design compliance to BTP ICSB 26 (Safety Grade anticipatory trip).
Provide detailed examples of conpliance to include testing.
Indicate any cases where perturbing test variable is not practicable with alternate test method used.
- 14. Confirm that the interface requirements specified in WCAP-8584 (FMEA of ESFAS) have been met and include statement in FSAR to this effect.
- 15. Discuss use of microprocessers, telemetry systems, multiplexers or computer systems which interface directly or indirectly with safety related instrumentation and control systerm:.
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- 16. Using detailed system schematics, indicate the extent to which the RTD bypass loop flow alarms in different loops are independent of one another. This should include consideration of power supplies and verification of the RTD bypass loop flow.
- 17. Describe your method to trip reactor following turbine trip.
Indicate P-7 setpoint.
(Note that SNUPPS uses a P-9 interlock to block reactor trip in this case). Discuss your response to NUREG-0737 Requirement II.K.3.10.
- 18. Describe design criteria and tests performed on the isolation devices in the NSSS and Balance of Plant. Address results-of analysis or tests performed to demonstrate proper isolation between separation groups.
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5-19.
As discussed in Section 7.2.2.3, isolated output signals from protection system channels are utilized to generate a control signal to automatic control systems, such as rod driva system, pressurizer pressure and level control, and others. The control signal is derived by auctioneering the redundant protection system channels to select the high or low signal, whichever is chosen, based on consideration of safety in case of a failure.
Discuss what steps are taken to prevent unnecessary control action during
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the testing of protection system channels with a signal from a test source.
- 20. Indicate whether the reactor coolant pump breakers are designed and qualified to meet all criteria applicable to equipment performing a safety. function.
If not, provide the basis for determining that tripping the pumo breakers on underfrequency is not a safety function.
- 21. Discuss the diverse features of the undervoltage and shunt trips of the reactor trip breakers. Indicate if they can be tested independently.
22 Provide an analysis indicating the time between reaching each high pressur-izer level alarm setpoint and filling the pressurizer with water assuming failure of the level channel used for control in the low direction. Since only two out of three logic is used for the high pressurizer level trip and the level control signal is taken fror.: one particular channel, the remaining J
two channels do not meet the S.F.C.
The analysis should ir.clude maximum charging flow including the effects of automatic start of back-up charging pumps if this is a consequence of the cor. trol measurerrent failure. Also, indicate the time g
between reaching each htgh pressurizer level alarm setpoint and filling the pressurizer with water assuming failure of one of the remaining protection channels.
y, 23 Provide an analysis indicating tire time between reaching each high steam generator level alarm setpoint and filling the steam generator with water assuming failure of the level channel used for control in the low direction.
Since only two out of three logic is used for high steam generator level, the remaining two~ chantiels~d6~not meet the S.F.C.
Assumei that"the isolction function does not occur. The initial plant power level resulting in the most rapid steam generator filling should be assumed. The applicant should also be prepared to discuss the probable consequences of. filling.the. steam generator and causing water to flow into the steam piping and the consequences
~ of a steam generator level control channel failure.
24.
Identify where i'nstrument sensors or transmitters supplying information to more than one protection channel am Tocated in a consnon instrunient line or connected to a cournon instrument tap and discuss likely failures and effects on protection system operation. The intent of this item is to verify that a single failure in a conmon instrument line or tap (such as break or blockage) cannot defeat required protection system redundancy.
25 Icentify where instrument sensors or transmitters supplying information to both a protection channel and control channel or to more than one control channel are located in a common instrument line or connected to a coninon instrument tap or to a coninon power source. The intent of this item is to verify that a single failure in a coninon instrument line, tap, or power source can neither defeat required separation between control and protection nor cause multiple control system actions not boJnded by analyses contained in Chapter 15 of the FSAR.
For control systems, the discussion can be limited to channels used for control of reactivity, reactor coolant pressure, reactor coolant temperature, reactor coolant flow, reactor coolant inventory, secondary system pressure, steam generator feedwater flow and steam generator steam flow. Note these concerns were previously addressed in an NRC letter to you requesting additional information, dated ApN1 30,1981.
26 Describe the design bases used to insure that control system failures will not result in plant transients more severe than the bounding transients contained in Chapter 15 of the FSAR. The intent of this item is to verify that single credible failures within control systems (such as power supply or sensor failures) will not result in a multiple control system malfunctions initiating transients more severe than the bounding transients contained in Chapter 15 of the FSAP.
27 Discuss how lead lag constants used in the RPS and ESFs are determined, verified,.
and maintained.
1 28 Discuss design features which insure that the blocking of the operation of any protection function act'ator circuits is returned to normal operation after testing. Indicate whether raliance is placed upon the operator doing this and ther, observing test lights in the safeguards test racks, or if there are more positive means to insure that systems are re' ened to normal operation.
Provide a list of conditions resulting in a gereral warning alarm.
- 29. Provide and describe the following information for NSSS and 809 safety related setpoints:
(a) Provide a reference for the methodology used. Discuss any differences between the reference methodology and the methodology to be used for B/B.
(b) Verify that environmental error allowances are based on the highest value determined in qualification testing.
(c)
Identify peotection channels where the Technical Specification setpoint, with allowance for channel statistical error, falls within 5% of the instrument range limit or within 5%
of the range between level measurement taps. For those cases specify the remain-ing margin to the end of the range.
(d) Document the environmental error allowance that is used for each reactor trip and engineered safeguards setpoint.
(e) Identify any time limits on environmental qualification of instruments used for trip, post-accident monitoring or engineered safety features actuation.
Where instrumnts are qualified for only a limited time specify the time and basis for the limited time.
(f) Address the effect of test equip,ce.t accuracy on setpoint errors.
(g) Insure that protection system lead, lag, and rate time constant setpoints are included in plant Technical Specifications.
(h) As an example, derive the setpoint(s) for the low-low S.G. level trip.
Identify and justify any shortcomings in this technique.
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- 30. Describe how you evaluate the effects of high temperatures in reference legs of J
steam generator water level measuring instruments subsequent to high energy breaks. Identify and describe any modifications planned or taken in response to IEB 79-21.
- 31. Identify any sensors or circuits used to provide input signals to the protection system which are located or routed through non-seismically qualified structures.
This should include sensors or circuits providing input for reactor trip, emergency safeguards equipment such as the auxiliary feedwater system, and safety grade
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interlocks. Verification should be provided that the sensors and circuits reet IEEE-279 and are seismically and environmentally qualified. Testing or analyses nerformed to insure that failures of nonseismic structures, mountings, etc. will not cause failures which could interfere with the operation of any other portion of the protection system should be discussed.
32.
Identify all Engineered Safety Features. Provide a discussion of ESFAS response times a) citing specific response times for each, b) defining specifie beginning and end points for which the quoted times apply and, c) relating these items to the total delay for all equipment and to the accident analysis requirements. Provide a table itemizing ESF displays and describe salient points.
- 33. Describe design compliance to IEB 80-06 concerns.
Indicate and describe modifications to correct any deficiencies identified. Note this concern was previously addressed in an NRC letter to you requesting additional information, dated April 30, 1981.
- 34. Discuss whether the motor-operated valves in the safety injection pump lines from the refueling water storage tank receive an automatic signal following SIS initiation.
- 35. For main steam and feedwater line valve actuation, describe control circuits of isolation valves and include both automatic and manual featums.
Indicate whether any valve can be manually operated and whether each valve actuation I
level is alarmed in the control room.
Indicate specific interfaces with the safety system electrical circuits.
- 36. Describe automatic and manual design features permitting switchover from injection to recirculation mode for emerger.c/ core cooling to include I
protection logic, component bypasses and override, parameters monitored and controlled, test capabilities, operator flexibility. Discuss design features which insure that a sin 51e failure will neither cause premature switchover nor prevent switchover when required. Discuss the reset of Safety Injection Actuation prior to the automatic switcnover from injection to recirculation and the potential to defeat the automatic switchover function. Confirm whether the low-low level refueling water storage tank alarms used to determine the time at which containment s. pray is switched to the re:irculation mode are safety grade.
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- 37. Describe the interface between the radiation monitoring system (RMS) and the ESFAS for containment ventilation and fuel building isolation to include the use of non-safety grade equipment in the RMS and ESFAS.
- 38. Discuss the redundancy of the spray additive tank isolation valves which are closed on low additive tank level. Describe how the transmitter used to close the spray additive tank valves are monitored.
Indicate periodic test require-ments for the I&C used.
- 39. Describe the design features used to provide direct indication of pressurizer and stean' generator safety and relief valve positions in the control room.
40.
In the event of a boron dilution transient, describe the operation of the detection system and the interface arrangement with the protection system for valve actuation. Indicate if source range and intermediate range detectors are qualified both environmentally and seismically. C6nfirm qual.ity of nuclear detectors. is Category I.. Note Table.3.2-1.. Item 50 entry.
- 41. Using detailed system schematics, discuss the bypass, bypass interlock, and test provisions for containment ventilation isolation and control room ventilation isolation. The discussion should indicate those design features which insure that the safety function is not defeated during system test and that portions of the system are not inadvertently left in a bypassed condition after test.
42 Describe method of providing redundancy for items of equipment in certain ventilation systems such as Cable Spreading Room, Exhaust Isolation, Control Room Exhaust, Isolation and Control Building Outside Air. prepare a list of Ventilation Isolation Control System actuated equipment and indicate number of actuation channels for each.
43 Using detailed system schematics, describe the sequence for automatic initiation, operation, reset, and control of the auxiliary (or emergency) feedwater system. The following should be included in the discussion:
a) the effects of all switch positions on system operation.
b) the various effects of single power supply failures.
Include the effect of a power supply failure on auxiliary feedwater control after automatic initiation circuits have been reset in a post accide..t sequence.
c) any bypasses within the system including the means by which it is insured that the bypasses are mmoved.
d} initiation (and annunciation) of any interlocks or automatic isolation signals that could degrade system capability.
e) the safety classification and design c'iteria for any air systems required by the auxiliary feedwater system. This should include the design bases for the capacity of air reservoirs required for system operation.
f) design features provided to terminate auxiliary feedwater flow to a steam generator affected by either a steam line or feed line break.
g) system featuras associated with shutdown from outside the control room.
h) logic circuits used to transfer pump suction from the Condensate Storage Tank to the Essential Service Water System including verification that all equipment used for this function is seismically qu&lffied.
- 1) design features to insure that no single failure can result in an open flow path from the Essential Service Water System to the Condensate Storaga Tank.
4'4.. The information in Section 10.4.9 on the auxiliary feedwater system does not specify the criteria applied in the design of the control and instrumentation systems for the moduluting level contml valves. Describe the instrumentation and controls, identify the power sources used for each of the valves, and provide an analysis to show that no single failure can prevr.nt supplying auxiliary feedwater when required.
i 4S. As described in Section 10.4.9, the Essential Service Water (ESW) System is j
used in emergencies to supply water to the auxiliary feedwater motor-deiven punps.
Discuss ESW initiation and describe the type and qualification of l
the initiating instrumentation and control equipment and circuits.
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4$.
Using detailed system schematics, describe the sequence for periodic testing of me a) main steam line isolation valves.
b) main feedwater isolation valves.
c) main feedwater control valves (ssfety features).
d) auxiliary feedwater system.
e) steam generator PORV.
f) pressurizer PORV.
The discussien should include features used to insure the availability of the safety furetion during test and measures taken to insure that equipment cannot be left in a bypassed condition after test conpletion.
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4f. Describe the capability of achieving hot or cold shutdown from outside the control room including:
a) list of qualified displays, location and basis for selection.
b) description and location of remote shutdown panel or equivalent.
c) description of required controls.
d) description cf isolation, separation, and transfer / override provisions.
Discuss typical transfer scenario.
e) description of any communications system required to coordinate operator actions, including redundancy, separation, and environmental qualification for local environment.
f) description of control room annunciation of remote control or overridden status of devices under local control.
g) description of any auxiliary systems essential for remote shutdown capability.
h) description of distinct control features to both restrict and'to asstre access, when necessary, to the displays and controls located outside the control room.
i) testing oaring reactor operation and parameters tested.
j) means for ensuring that coldshutdown can be accomplished before Technical Specification limits on hot shutdown are exceeded.
- 12.-
48 Concoming safe shutdown from outside the control room, discuss the likelihood that the Auxiliary Feedwater System will be automatically initiated on low steam generator level following a manual reactor trip, the capability of resetting the~ initiating logic from outside the control room will be needed.
Describe method of controlling normal feedwater from the Remote Shutdown Panel or some local control panel.
49 Concerning safe shutdown from outside the control rocm, discuss the likelihood that emergency core cooling will be automatically initiated following a manual reactor trip initiated during a temporary evacuation of the control room.
Include scenario 2ere the reactor coolant system is cooled to the point that the pressurizer empties during the time interval between nnnual reactor trip and the time an operator can take control of auxiliary facdwater outside the control room. Analyses and operating experience from plants similar to B/B may t'e presented during the discussion. Based upon the likelihood of emergency core cooling actuation following a manual reactor trip, discuss the capability for resetting the equipment outside the control room.
50.
Describe tests to verify the capability of maintaining the plant in a safe shutdown condition from outside the control room.
Indicate frequency.
- 51. Provide a table showing safe shutdown display information and identify safety grade items.
- 52. Ciscuss tht. plans and schedule for complying with Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2.
Descrh the conformance of the present design.
53.
Identify any safety related components which share the same bypass and inoperable status window or alarm.
t 54.
Identify any deficiencies from the issues addressed in IE Bulletin 79-27 and describe corrective actions.
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Identify all water system effluents that are not automatically isolated by a high-containment-pressure containment isolation signal and that flow directly
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- to the environment from containment. Indicate whether a pathway exists for unmonitored discharge.
Indicate whether any radioactive discharge can be isolated once detected without interruption of any safety related functier.s.
56, Describe 1.41peration of the interlocks used for isolation of the seismic qualified portion 4f the component cooling water system. This discussion should include reference to the fluid system schematics in indicating which specific valves are used for the isolation function. Discuss whether reduridancy of instrumentation is within each component cooling water train or is accomplished by having one interlock for each train.
57 Describe the operation of the circuits used for isolation of essential service water to the air compressors. Discuss periodic testing and indicate which components (including sensors) are located in seismically qualified structures.
58 Regarding component cooling water pumps, discuss (a) circuits which auto-matically start a pump in a CCW train on low pressure in the pump discharge, and (b) circuits which automatically start a pump in the operating train on a safety injection signal.
Include subsequent operator control of the pumps.
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- 50. Regarding the ultimate heat sink, discuss the design criteria for the I&C (i.e., indications available, testability, and automatic switching). Also discuss the interface with the bypass and inoperable status pnel. Discuss differences between Byron and Braidwood.
60 Using detailed system schematics, describe the power distribution for the accumulator valves and associated interlocks and controls to include the bypass indicator light arrangement. Using detailed system schematics, discuss the degree of redundancy in the logic for the Low Temperature Interlocks for RCS Pressure Control. It appears from Figure 7.6.6 that a high failure of either auctioneer used in the system will defeat the safety function of the system.
61 Describe the electrical power supply arrangement, air supply design features, and any interlocks associated with control and operation of the steam generator power operated relief valves.
62 Identify and describe the design features which ensure that tne RCS pressure is safely controlled during low temperature operation to include parameters utilized and monitored for alarm indication. Also indicate administrative measures which enhance safety in this area.
- 63. Using detailed system schematics, describe the sequence of operation of the Residual Heat Removal System Isolation Valves to include the effect of various single failures in power supplies for the valves and the valve controls.
Indicate any single instrument bus fallures which could cause inadvertent closure of RHR suction valves in both trains during a time when the system is in use for decay heat removal. Describe how you will ensure proper operation of RHR isolation valves in the event of interlock or power failure.
Identify testing planned for this area.
64..
Identify and describe features of the RHRS motor operated isolation valve interlocks designed to prevent over-pressurization of the RHRS to include separation or independence measures. Discuss and confirm compliance with ICSB BTp No. 3.
65. Discuss the method of redundantly tripping the turbine following receipt of reactor protection signals requiring turbine trip.
66 Using detailed schematics, verify that no single failure will preclude reactor coolant system le':down capability.
67. Describe the design features used in the rod control system which l
- 1) Limit reactivity insertion rates resulting from single failures within the system, and i
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- 2) Limit incorrect sequencing or positioning of control rods. The discussion should cover the assumptions for determining the maximum control rod withdrawal speed used in the analyses of reactivity insertion transients.
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- 68. Discuss your response to IAEB 79-22 regarding the. effects of a high energy line break outside containment on the rod contml system and include the effects on sensors and circuits providing sign 61s for rod control. Verify whether the Westinghouse generic analysis concerning this matter is fully applicable to the Byron /Braidwood Stations. Provide assurance, based on engineering review, that harsh environments associated with high energy line breaks will not cause control system malfunctions which could result in consequerces more severe than those of Chapter 15 analysis or beyond the conservative capability of operators or safety systems. Note this concern was previously addressed in an NRC letter to you requesting additional infermation, dated April 30, 1981.
- 69. Discuss the recent Westinghouse gener.ic deficiency regarding volume control tank level and its applicability to B/B.
- 70. Describe features of the B/B environmental control system which insure that instrumentation sensing and sampling lines for systems important to safety are protected from freezing during extremely cold weather. Discuss use of environmental monitoring and alarm systems to prevent loss of,or damage to,
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systems important to safety upon failure of this environmental control system.
Discuss electrical independence of these systems.
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MEETING NOTICE DISTRIBUTION 7dbbkSt3Ilf2" J. Stolz S. Hanauer NRC POR ggpy 4. g P. Collins Local PDR D. Vassallo TIC-D. Ziemann NSIC T. Murley TERA F. Schroeder
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D. Eisenhut gi I
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M. Ernst t_
T. Novak R. Baer
- 5. Varga "A *** =eseum E. Adensam g{%
T. fppolito
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A. Thadani
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sM(E R. A. Clark ACR'; (16)
N. Hughes Attorney, OELD R. Tedesco OIE (3)
J. Youngblood OSD (7)
A. Schwencer Project Manager JSnell F. Miraglia Licensing Assistant _M. Rushbrook J. R. Miller Receptionist G. Lainas D. Crutchfield J. LeDoux, I&E W. Russell J. Olshinki I&E Headquarters R. Vollmer R. Bosnak I&E Region I I&E Region II F. Schauer R. E. Jackson I&E Region III I&E Region IV G. Lear W. Johnston I&E Region V S. Pawlicki NRC
Participants:
V. Benaroya Z. Rosztoczy KKiper W. Haass PBender D. Muller TDunning R. Ballard Jitech (ANL)
W. Regan V. Moore D. Ross P. Check bcc: Applicant & Service List
- 0. Parr F. Rosa W. Butler -
W. Kreger R. W. Houston F. Congel W. Gammill L. Rubenstein T. Speis M. Srinivasan B. Grimes S. Schwartz F. Pagano S. Ramos
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J. Kramer