ML20010D235

Forwards LER 81-015/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20010D235
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	08/17/1981
From:	Parker W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20010D236	List: ML20010D235 ML20010D237
References
NUDOCS 8108240117
Download: ML20010D235 (2)

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3 w zo A B Vice P EsecrNT TELEPMONE- AaEA 704 sv t.- e coverio,. August 17, 1981 372-4o83 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director h &

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 ,,7 h L: ,,,

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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-287/81-15. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Speci-fication 6.6.2.1.a(3) which concerns operation less conservative than the least conservative aspect of a LCO and to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(3) which concerns a shutdown required by a LCO and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public. My letter of August 3, 1981 addressed the delay in the preparation of the report.

Ve truly yours,

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N W 'Lb. k

• William O. Parker, Jr.

JLJ:ls Attachment cc: Director Mr. Bill Lavallee Office of Management & Program Analysis Nuclear Safety Analysis Center U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 10412 Washington, D. C. 20555 Palo Alto, California 94303 Mr. Frank Jape NRC Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station

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DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 3 Report Number: R0-287/81-15 Report Date: August 17, 1981 Occurrence Date: July 18, 1981, and July 20, 1981 Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: "B" LPI Pump Out Of Service Past 24 Hour Limit Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100% FP Description of Occurrence: At 0620 hours0.00718 days <br />0.172 hours <br />0.00103 weeks <br />2.3591e-4 months <br /> on July 17, 1981 the 3-B Low Pressure Injection (LPT) Pump was removed from service to correct a high vibration problem on the motor. At 0838 hours0.0097 days <br />0.233 hours <br />0.00139 weeks <br />3.18859e-4 months <br /> on July 18, 1981 the 3-B LPI pump was returned to service after the replacement of both motor bearings and satisfactory completion of post surveillance testing. At 1155 hours0.0134 days <br />0.321 hours <br />0.00191 weeks <br />4.394775e-4 months <br /> on July 20, 1981 while attempting to perform an Engineered Safeguard (ES) periodic test, the 3-B LPI pump failed to stat t. The cause of this failure was determined to be the incorrect positioning of the spring charging motor switch for the 4160V LPI pump supply breaker, thus resulting in personnel error. This switch was correctly positioned and the pump restored to operable status. The problem with the pump motor bearings involved a "... shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation" and is reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(3). The problem with the spring charging motor switch constituted operation less conservative than the least conservative aspect of an LCO in that the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time limit specified in the Technical Specifications for LPI train inoperability was exceeded and is repor able pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(3).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The Unit had to begin reducing power 10% per hour because the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> limit permitted by Technical Specification 3.3.2.b expired. The cause of the failure of the pump to stact was determined to be personnel error concerning the incorrect positioning of the spring charging motor switch for the 4160V LPI pump supply breaker.

Analysis of Occurrence: During the period of time that the 3-B LPI train was inoperable, both during the motor repair work and the time that the switch was mispositioned, the "A" LPI train was operable. Although the 3-B LPI pump was inoperable for a period longer than that permitted by the Technical Specifications it is considered that this did not represent a significant increase in risk to the health and safety of the public.

Corrective Action: The pump motor bearings were replaced, the motor and pump were aligned and recoupled and a post maintenance verification test successfully com-pleted.

The person involved has been counselled concerning his actions ta this event. He has been instructed not to operate plant equipment without procedural guidance and Operation's knowledge and permission.

T!e procedure utilized to return these type breakers to service will be revised to include verifying the position of the spring charging motor switch.

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