05000270/LER-1981-007, Forwards LER 81-007/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 81-007/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20030C262
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	04/24/1981
From:	Parker W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20030C263	List: 05000270/LER-1981-007, Forwards LER 81-007/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000270/LER-1981-007-01, /01T-0:on 810326,during Periodic Test,Auto/Manual Transfer Switches for B1T-8 & B2T-5 Incorrectly Placed in Manual Position & Not Returned After Test Completion.Caused by Personnel Error.Switches Restored to Auto Position
References
NUDOCS 8108250587
Download: ML20030C262 (2)

LER-1981-007, Forwards LER 81-007/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2701981007R00 - NRC Website

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April 24, 1981

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director f

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- 1.r Re: Oconce Nuclear Station 8

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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-270/81-07. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear St.ation Technical Specification 6.6.2.l(2),

which concerns operation less conservative than the least conservative aspect of an LCO, and describes an incident which is ecuaidered to be of no significance with respec.t to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

My letter of April 10, 1981 addressed the delay in the preparation of this report.

V y truly yours y,

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William O. Parker, Jr.

JLJ:pw Attachment cc: Director Mr. Bill Lavallee Office of Management & Program Analysis Nuclear Safe.ty Analysis Center U.S. Nuc, lear Regulatory Commission Post Office Box 10412 Washington, D. C.

20555 Palo Alto, California 94303.

08250587 810424 R ADOCK 05000270 f ' S, A

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DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 2 Report Number:

R0-270/81-07 Report Date: Apri: 24, 1981 Occurrence Date: March 26, 1981 Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: Portion of Emergency Power System Inoperable Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Hot S.D.

Description of Occurrence: At 1445 hours0.0167 days <br />0.401 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.498225e-4 months <br /> on March 26,1981, daring the per-formance of an Auxiliary Service Water Periodic Test, the auto / manual transfer switches for BIT-8 and B2T-5 (Standby Buss to Main Feeder Buss, Busses I und 2 l

respectively) were incorrectly placed in the manual position and were not re-turned to the auto-position after completica of the. periodic test. This con-dition existed from 1445 hours0.0167 days <br />0.401 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.498225e-4 months <br /> on March 26, 1981 until 1118 hours0.0129 days <br />0.311 hours <br />0.00185 weeks <br />4.25399e-4 months <br /> on March 27, 1981, at which time the auto / transfer switches were discovered to be in the incorrect position and were restored to the proper status.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: This incident is the result of personnel error.

The individual involved incorrectly performed a step in the procedure.

Since the step was incorrectly performed..the. procedure did not address returning the equipment to the proper status after completion of the test.

Analysis of Occurrence: During the period of time involved, on-site emergency i

power was not available automatically through the underground feeder circuit and the standby busses to Unit 2's main feeder busses. On-site emergency power was available through the overhead transmission path and the startup transformer to Unit 2.

Additionally, the underground power path circuit could have been re-stored on a timely basis from controls located in the control room.

Thus, this incident was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action

The immediate corrective action was to restore the auto /

manual transfer switches to the auto position.

The individual involved has been counseled concerning his error.. Appropriat.e disciplinary action has been taken against the individual involved.

l Although it is not felt that the procedure was at fault in this incident, the procedure has been revised to clarify the section involved.

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