05000287/LER-2016-001, Regarding Reactor Building Cooling Unit Inoperability Exceeds Technical Specification Completion Time

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Regarding Reactor Building Cooling Unit Inoperability Exceeds Technical Specification Completion Time
ML16250A009
Person / Time
Site: Oconee Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/26/2016
From: Batson S
Duke Energy Corp
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ONS-2016-077 LER 16-001-00
Download: ML16250A009 (6)


LER-2016-001, Regarding Reactor Building Cooling Unit Inoperability Exceeds Technical Specification Completion Time
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
2872016001R00 - NRC Website

text

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ONS-2016-077 August26,2016 Attn: Document Control Desk U. *s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-27 46 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)

Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 Docket No. 50-287 Renewed License Number DPR-55 10 CFR 50.73 Scott L. Batson Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Duke Energy ON01VP I 7800 Rochester Hwy Seneca, SC 29672 o: 864.873.327 4 f. 864.873. 4208 Scott.Batson@duke-energy.com Subject: Licensee Event Report 287/2016-001, Revision O - Reactor Building Cooling Unit lnoperability Exceeds Technical Specification Completion Time The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) describes the discovery of an inoperable Reactor Building Cooling Unit (RBCU) at Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Unit 3. It was determined that the inoperable condition had existed longer than the time allowed by the Technical Specification (TS) applicable to the RBCU. It was also determined that Unit 3 had entered the Modes of applicability while the inoperability existed which is prohibited by TS 3.0.4. These conditions constitute an "operation or condition prohibited by Technical Specifications" as described by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), thus requiring an LER to be submitted.

There are no regulatory commitments associated with this LER.

If there are questions, or further information is needed, contact David Haile in ONS Regulatory Affairs at (864) 873-4742.

Sincerely,

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Scott L. Batson Vice President Oconee Nuclear Site Enclosure LER: Unit 3 Reactor Building Cooling Unit lnoperability Exceeds Technical Specification Completion Time

ONS-2016-077 August 26, 2016 Page 2 cc:

Ms. Catherine. Haney Administrator Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257 Mr. James R. Hall, Project Manager (ONS)

(by electronic mail only)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 0-881 Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. Eddy Crowe NRC Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station INPO (Word File via E-mail)

ONS-2016-077 August26,2016 Page 3 bxc:

ONS Site:

Site PORC Members Director, Organizational Effectiveness: D.M. Hubbard RA MGR: C.J. Wasik RA: Commitment lndex/P Metlef#

LER Book*

ONSCommunications@Duke-Energy.com EPIX Cord: S.F. Hatley NSRB/S. Harry/EC06L*

ONS Document Management and Information Services (Master File)*

Site Sections drive: \\SA\\ONS LERs\\2016 (PDF copy)

ELL/EC27F*

GO and other sites:

Nuclear Reg Affairs: M.C. Nolan*

NGO/SAA: B.C. Carroll NGO/SA: S.B. Thomas LEGAL: D.A. Cummings*

Site Regulatory Affairs Managers:

C. Fletcher - CNS J. Robertson - MNS L. Grzeck - BNP J. Caves - HNP A. Pila - RNP

  • Hardcopy (All others by E-Mail Distribution)

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 1013112018 (11-2015)

, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not (See Page 2 of form 366 for required number of digits/characters for each block) required to respond to, the information collection.

3. PAGE Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3 05000287 1 of 3
4. TITLE Unit 3 Reactor Building Cooling Unit lnoperability Exceeds Technical Specification Completion Time
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR ISEQUENTIALIREV MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NO.

NA 5000 06 28 2016 2016

  • 001 00 08 26 2016 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NA 5000
9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

D 20.2201(b)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 1 D 20.2201(d)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

D 20.2203(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(4)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(iii)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(x)

10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(A)

D 73.71(a)(4)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.36(c)(2)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(B)

D 73.71(a)(5)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) tJ 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(C)

D 73.77(a)(1) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(D)

D 73. 77(a)(2)(i)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

~ 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)

D 73. 77(a)(2)(ii)

.."*.. '*, >,,r.:.*.. " ~*

D 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(C)

D OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in

6. LER NUMBER I

SEQUENTIAL I NUMBER 001 REV NO.

00 EXPIRES 10/31/2018

3. PAGE 3

OF 3

Therefore, entering a Mode of applicability (Modes 2 and 1) with the 3C RBCU inoperable is prohibited by TS 3.0.4, and the span of a 45 day inoperability is prohibited by TS 3.6.5.

During the 45 day span, the other two RBCU trains remained operable. Also both RBS trains remained operable, except for two occasions when a RBS train was declared inoperable to facilitate pump and valve testing. The duration of each RBS inoperability was less than the 24-hr Completion Time allowed by TS 3.6.5, Condition C which applies to the inoperability of one RBS train and one RBCU train.

CAUSAL FACTORS The cause is attributed to human error in the technician's improper application of the configuration control process.

A contributing factor was that a recent change to the maintenance procedure for this activity did not integrate the maintenance standard for configuration control.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediate The 3C RBCU terminations were restored and returned to service.

Result of Cause Analysis

1. The technicians involved received remedial training/counseling from supervision.
2. A procedure change has been initiated to enhance configuration control for the lifted lead aspects in the maintenance procedure for this activity.

SAFETY ANALYSIS

A probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) evaluation was conducted for the period of RBCU inoperability to determine the significance of this event. The Oconee PRA model credits the 3A, 3B and 3C RCBUs to operate on low speed for containment heat removal. The analysis considered internal events, high winds, flood and fire risk. Due to the multiple failures of other equipment that must occur in order for an 3C RBCU failure to be of any consequence, the PRA analysis determined that the increase in core damage and large early release frequencies due to a failure of 3C RBCU are negligible. Therefore, the risk impact associated with this event report is well below any risk significance threshold.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Similar events for the preceding three year period:

.LER 270/2015-001, reported a valid Emergency Feedwater actuation, due to a personnel error with the improper positioning of an electrical sliding link. No other LERs were found to be caused by similar personnel errors.

Energy Industry Identification System (EllS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

NRG FORM 366 (11-2015)