ML20009A912

LER 81-006/01T-0:on 810621,spray Additive Isolation Valve 1-831A Found Shut.Caused by Failure of Operator to Position Valve Correctly After Surveillance Testing.Valve Repositioned & Locked Open

ML20009A912
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	07/03/1981
From:	Fay C WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20009A911	List: ML20009A910 ML20009A912
References
LER-81-006-01T, LER-81-6-1T, NUDOCS 8107140467
Download: ML20009A912 (2)

Text

NRC FORM 366 U. S. NUCLE AR REEULATORY COMMISSION (7 77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

' CONTROL BLOCK: l l l l l lh (PLEASE PRINT CR TYPE ALL KE2UIKED INFO"MATl!N) 0 1 7 8 lW 9 l LICENSEE I l P CODE l B l H l 1 l@lb0 l 0 LICENSE 14 l -l 0NUMBER l 0 l - 0 l 0 l 0 26l -l 200 l O l@ TYPE LICENSE l l@

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80 NUMOER EVENT DESCRIPTICN AND PROBABLE CONSEOUENCES h O 2 l During normal operation, while performing periodic spray system valve l O 3 l lock check, valve 1-831A (spray additive isolation valve) was found l O 4 l shut. This condition would have prevented automatic NaOH injection. in 1 0 3 l the event of containment spray operation. This is a violation of l O s l Technical Specification 15. 3. 3.B. l.d. Both trains of containment spray 1 0 7 l were operable at all times. This event only affected the spray additivq.

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33 34 35 36 31 40 41 42 4 ~, 44 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h i O l Subject valve was immediately repositioned and locked open. Investi- 1

[Tri-] l gation revealed that the valve had been shut for four days since i

, 7 l completion'of Technical Specification surveillance testing of NaOH l i 3 l addition valves. The operator signing for the work failed to position ,

, 4 l the valve correctly. Increased operator awareness will prevent l 7

8 9 recurrence of problems of th s tyg . 80 ST S  % POWER OTHER STATUS DISCOV RY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION i s W@ l 0 l 8 l 0 l@l N/A l QJ@l Periodic valve position check l AfTIVITY CO TENT l'FLEASED OP RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTiVITV LOCATION OF RELEASE 1 6 @ [ Zj@l N/A l l N/A l PERSONNEb EXPOS ES -

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 81-006/0lT-0 Wisconsin Electric Power Company Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Docket No. 50-266 ,

At 0245 hours0.00284 days <br />0.0681 hours <br />4.050926e-4 weeks <br />9.32225e-5 months <br /> on June 21, 1981, during normal operation and while conducting PC-9 Part II, " Spray System Valve and Lock Checklist," valve 1-831A (spray additive isolation valve) was found locked shut. The valve was immediately repositioned and locked open.

. Valve 1-831A is the spray tank additive isolation ,

valve, and operation with it shut would have prevanted auto-matic sodium hydroxide injection into the containment spray system in the event that spray system operation was initiated.

Operation in this mode is prohibited by Technical Specification 15.3.3.B.l.d.

Investigation revealed that the last operation of valve 831A had occurred on June 17, 1981, during TS-29,

" Technical Specification Surveillance Testing of Sodium Hydroxide Addition Valves. " The procedure clearly states the importance of valvo 831A to the operation of the system, and

- the system restoration portion of TS-29 requires that it be locked open. The operator inadvertently locked the valve shut.

1 All operators are.being reinstructed in the .importance of maintaining proper valve lineups, with special emphasis on

! safety-related systems and where valve position indication is

not available to control room personnel. It has also been restressed that the precautions and notes written in procedures

have been placed there for the benefit of operators, and that

! they should be read by all affected personnel prior to execution of the procedure.

(

Both trains of containment spray were operable at

, all times during the period that 831A was shut. If spray

! additive flow had been initiated, the control board indications

, of zero additive flow rate and unchanging additive tank level would have shown operators that a problem existed which could i easily have been narrowed to one of two manual isolation valves.

The Emergency Operating Procedures require that operators verify correct operation of the spray system and specifically that the NaOH addition has been made.

1 This event is being reported in accordance with Technical Specification 15.6.9.2. A.2. The event was reported on the Emergency Notification System at 0 304 hours0.00352 days <br />0.0844 hours <br />5.026455e-4 weeks <br />1.15672e-4 months <br /> on June 21, 1981. The Resident Inspector was notified at a later time.

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