ML20005A292
| ML20005A292 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek, Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 06/26/1981 |
| From: | Avery L, Stephen Fleger, Kane R ESSEX CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005A290 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8106300163 | |
| Download: ML20005A292 (217) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. I IO I HUMAN FACTOk5 EVALUATION OF THE STANDARD NUCLEAR UNIT POWER PLANT SYSTEM (SNUPPS) Prepared for: Nuclear Projects, Inc. I 5 Choke Cherry Road Rockville, Md. 20850 Prepared by: Larry Avery
,I Steve Fleger Richard Kane Candace Krick Carol Kain j James Bathurst
! Cliff Baker Thomas B. Malone Linda Price Kenneth Mallory Essex Corporation 333 North Fairfax Street Alexandria, Virginia 22314 i
- I kSS5hfl5' u .1119 1 6 1981 2
'l SNUPPS I %Iobsoo/Ns _
, ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS l The authors would like to gratefully thank the following people for their l contributions: iI e Frances Piccione e Thomas Harding e Al Strong e Mark Fall e The Graphics Department e The Production Staff e William Steele, Consulting Engineer I : I I I l l I .
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l I [ TABLE OF CONTENTS l. !I Page Executive Summary 1 1.0 Introduction 1 1 1.1 Background , 1 1.2 Objectives 2 1.3 Scope 3 ! 1.4 Constraints on the Evaluation Effort 4 2.0 Approach 4 2.1 Data Collection I 2.2 Data Reduction 6 8 I l
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2.3 Computer / Operator Interface 2.4 Special Studies 8 2.5 ESF Status Panels 9 3.0 Results 10 4.0 Recommendations 11 I I I l I I I
I LIST OF APPENDICIES lI Appendix A - Human Engineering Finding Summary Appendix B - Evaluation of Computer System Man / Machine Interface Appendix C - Special Studies C Annunciator Prioritization C Plant Status Monitoring C Control and Display Enhancement Appendix D - Monitor Light Boards D ESF Status Indication Evaluation D Permissive / Blocked / Partial Trip Status Panel Appendix E - Results of an Evaluation of the General Atomics Radiation Monitors Appendix F - Demarcation of the Control Panels I Appendix G - HEER Files I I I I I I I l I I '
I EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
From September 1980 to February 1981, the Essex Corporation of Alexandria, Virginia performed a human engineering evaluation of the Standard Nuclear Unit Power Plant Sys:em (SNUPPS) for Nuclear Projects, Incorporated. Data were collected from I two sources: the Westinghouse simulator at Zion; and the as-built control boards at the
'l Callaway site. The evaluation employed human engineering assessment techniques developed by Essex Corporation specifically for power plant control room design reviews.
These techniques were developed while writing NUREG/CR-1580 for the NRC and subsequently were refined during control room reviews for other utilities. The objectives of the evaluation were to: e Identify facets of the control room design that were at variance with NUREG/CR-1580 e Recommend potential backfits for each of the design facets L identified e Categorize the identified problems in terms of criticality and need for backfit e Provide design guidance for areas that could not be evaluated due to the state of development of the control room. .I Primary human engineering problems identified during this evaluation pertained to: e ESF monitor !!ght boards e Mimic design, especially on the ESF control panels e Prioritization of annunciators I e Functional grouping of controls and displays e Visibility from the Operator's Control Console to the main control boards e Mirror imaging of redundant channels on the ESF control board e Demarcation and summary labels e Abbreviation and terminology in labeling. Although some of problems identified were not inherently critical, their cumulative effect could degrade control room operability. Essex's recommendations are to implement the suggested backfits, thereby increasing both the s .aty and reliability of the SNUPPS control room, and to bring the control room in line with established principles of human engineering. I
I
1.0 INTRODUCTION
I 1.1 Background Or. 28 March 1979 the Three Mile Island (IMI) accident occurred. One of the major centributing causes of the accident has been identified as operator error induced by the design of the cor m (NilREG/CR-1270). This fact has created concern in both I governmer.t agent v es regarding the impact of nuclear power station control room design on operator performance. In an effort to improve control room design, those. concerned have turned to Human Factors Engineering (HFE). Human factors engineering, as a discipline, seeks to reduce the chances of an I operator error, thereby increasing the efficiency of a system. This is done by designing the interface between the man and machine to fit the limitations of the operator rather than expecting the man to adapt to the interface. The more complex the system interface, the greater the necessity for a sound human-engineered design. Given the complexity of a reactor interface and the unsequences of an error to human safety and plant reliability, maximizing effective operator use of this interface is crucial. Recognizing this need, Nuclear Projects, Incorporated, has contracted with the Essex Corporation to perform a human factors engineering review of the Standard Nuclear Unit Power Plant System (SNUPPS) being built at the Callaway and Wolf Creek sites. This report details the methodology and findings of this review. I e 1.2 Objectives The objectives of the human factors engineering evaluation of the SNUPPS control I room were to: Identify aspects of control room design that were at variance with I e human hctors engineering design principles as identified in NUREG/CR-1580 Prioritize these finoings using an importance scaling that provides I e guidance on the criticality of the finding e Identify potential remedies (backfits) for'the more important findings I ,I l ~ l
l I I e Document the results of the evaluation in a manner that allows for immediate access to the data. 1.3 Scope The control room at Callaway-1 was not complete at the time of the Essex review. Certain components were not installed and the design changes to be incorporated due to post TMI requirements were not finalized. Therefore, the Essex effort was limited to the Callaway-1 control boards as built and designed on November 21, 1980, and those characteristics of the Zion, Illinois, simulator that were definitely to be incorporated into the Callaway-1 control room. Information sources used for the evaluation included, but were not limited to, the following sources: e FSARs I e Standardized Valve Nomenclature List - Rev. O e Predures obtained from the simulator and SNUPPS e System specification, Section 3 - SNUPPS BOP Functional Description e System Specification, Section 4 - SNUPPS BOP Operator Function I Summary e Color Coding Conventions for CRT e BOP Computer System Displays. Other documents are identified in the body of the report. The HFE effort included: e Evaluation of the present control room controls and displays (Callaway-1) e Evaluation of those controls and displays contained in the SNUPPS simulator that are relatable to the Callaway control room ~I e Study of three special areas - annunciator prioritization, safety state status monitoring, and control / display enhancement e Evaluation of the operator interface with the computer system er Documentation of results and recommendations for correcting the discrepancies. I I 2 I i
I 1.4 Constraints on the Evaluation Effort There were three difficulties in performing the SNUPPS control room evaluation. The major problem, and a potential source of inappropriate data, was the differences between the two sources of data. These sources were the Westinghouse simulator at Zion,
. Ilhnois, and the actual control boards at Callaway. While very similar, each of these reflected a higher evolution of the control room concept. Therefore, some distinct differences between component types and locations existed.
The second r.oblem was induced by the stage of construction of the control room. Given its incompleteness, certain future components and control room environmerd factors could not be addressed. These environmental factors included, but were not limited to: I e Ambient illumination e Ambient noise lI e Workspace design e Protective equipment. The third difficulty was encountered in acquiring information specific to the SNUPPS control room. While all PWRs respond similarly as systems, control rooms and their associated equipment vary greatly. Typically, a major source of information is the operators responsible for the reactor. The operators for the SNUPPS utilities, while very well trained and helpful, had gaps in their knowledge due to lack of experience and training on specific equipment. These factors all contributed to the lack of a complete library of information. The management of SNUPPS made every effort to provide t'ie necessary information but, given the short term of the contract, could not provide all information needs. The resultant evaluation is therefore based in part on assumptions made by Essex staff. I I I } I
I 2.0 APPROACH I The human engineering evaluation of tne SNUPPS control room design consisted of two basic phases: data collection and data reduction. Data collection was accomplished I by methodologies that compared features of the control room design with principles of human factors engineering as delineated in NUREG/CR-1580, " Human Engineering Guide to Control Room Evaluation." Data reduction involved identifying potential errors associated with design features found to be at variance with the criteria in NUREG/CR-1580, assessing the magnitude of the e ffect of these errors, and assigning a priority rating based on this information. In addition to these two phases, Essex examined the computer / man interface, performed a series of spcecial studies and a detailed examination of the ESF Status Panels, and documented the differences between the simulator at Zion and the mockup of Callaway Unit 1. Tne methodologies used in the evaluation are summarized below: I 2.1 Data Collection The data collection phase involved applying the following methodologies: I o Procedural walk-throughs and task analysis e Operator questionnaires e Comparison of the control room to generic problems e Control room surveys e Checklists. Procedural Walk-Throughs and Task Analysis - The following procedures were videotaped at the SNUPPS simulator at Zion: , o E-0 e E-01 e E-02 I e E-03 e E-09 leading into E-05 .I I . I I
I i e GEN-0-01 e GEN-0-02 l e AE-0-01. I Each procedure was taped twice, once with a full complement of operators without any interruptions and once with one operator explaining each step. The video tapes were then used to support the task analysis. The task analysis is a technique, using procedures, that identifies what information is required for an operator task and what control actions are necesrary to implement that task. Instances of poor control / display relationships, lack of necessary information and inadequate presentation of information all can be identified from this analysis. Operator Questionnaire - Questionnaires were administered to prospective operators from the Wolf Creek and Callaway plants. The questionnaires elicited comments on various facets of control room operation (e.g., annunciator, procedures). Comparison of the Control Room to Generic Problems - The simulator control room was examined against a list of HFE problems that consistently have been found in previously examined control rooms. Control Room Survey - The surveys provided general information on the control room, enabling the evaluation team to become familiar with the essentials of the operator / system interface. The specific surveys used were as follows: e Confusion survey e Generic CR review ' e Design conventions e Research survey e obstructions survey. Given the stage of control room construction, some areas normally addressed by a survey (e.g., ambient noise, ambient .'ighting) were not performed. Human Factors Engineering Checklists - The checklists were used to address the ; control room on a panel and component level. These checklists consisted of staw ments I I 5 E
I drawn from NUREG/CR-1580. Each component (control or display) was evaluated for
- compliance with the criteria contained in the checklist, and instances of noncompliance were noted. The checklists were administered using photos from the simulator and a photo mosaic of the Callaway I control boards, and spending a week at Callaway.
Specific checklists used included those on: e Rotary selector switches e Pushbuttons e Levers e Counters e Process controllers e Simple indicators e Legend lights e Protection displays e Vertical / horizontal meters e Circular meters e Trend recorders e Annunciator and warning lights. > Samples of these checklists are included in Appendix G. 2.2 Data Reduction Data reduction was done in two basic steps. The first step consisted of completing a ' Human Engineer.3 6 Finding report (HEF). This report listed the components found to be at variance witn the criteria in NUREG/CR-1580, what the variance consisted of, and vihat type (s) of error the variance might precipitate. The second phase, establishing priorities for the items found to be variant, involved i completing the form illustrated in Table 1. From this form a priority rating was ' determined for the HEF. A rating of I and 2 indicated a safety relation, while a rating of 3 and 4 indicated a reliability relation. A rating of five indicated that, although something was at variance with NUREG/CR-1580, it had little impect on plant safety or reliability. I l I ' il l l l
s [ TABLE 1. HEF PRIORITY SHEET , I HEF NO. (
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A. Questions
- 1. lf an error occurred, could plant safety by jeopardized or degraded?
- Yes enter a "1"In Question 1
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- No enter a "0"In Question 1
- 2. lf an arror occurred, could plant reliability be reduced?
- Yes enter a "1"In Question 2
- No enter a "0"In Question 2
- 3. Would the plant's response to the error both
- a. Provide the operator sufficient time to correct it and I b. Provide a positive warning (e.g. alarm) that the error has been committed?
- Yes enter a "0"In Question 3
- No enter a "1"In Question 3 B. Prioritization Formula 1 2 3 Priority Type X = 1.0 Safety Related I
1 1 1 X 0 = 2.0 Safety Related 0 1 1 = 3.0 Reliability Related 0 1 0 = 4.0 Reliability Related 0 0 1 = 5.0 Performance Problerrt I C. Priority Question I 1 2 3 Priority I I 7 I I
4 I 2.3 Computer / Operator Interface Essex evaluated the Interface between the operator and the computer. This , interface consisted of keyboards, CRTs and the CRT display. The evaluation was based on the following documents: e Honeywell Power Generation Planning Guide e Bechtel Specification No. 10466-3-106, Appendix D ~ e SNUPPS, BOP Computer System Displays e Bechtel Drawing CRT Display Conventions,3-06300
* " "*Y**' "' " Vid* (""V-2) Display Subsystem APVB-3-T E
;E e Honeywell Process Video (HPV-2) Display APVA-T e Honeywell System Specification, Section 5 - SNUPPS BOP Hardware Description 51001915 /
e Honeywell System Specification, Secticn 3 - SNUPPS BOP Functional Description 51001913 .! e Honeywell System Specification, Section 4 - SNUPPS BOP Opsator Function Summary 51001914. Details of this evaluation are contained in Appendix B. 2.4 Special Studies Four special studies were conducted by Essex personnel in the course of the control
! room evaluation. These special studies were on the following topics:
e Annunciator Prioritization - Various methods for prioritizing annunciators and for enhancing the current SNUPv5 method were discussed. e Plant Status Monitoring - Various approaches to fulfilling the E requirement for a safety parameters display system were examined i5 and guidance was provided for assuring that displays conformed to human engineering principles. iE . Control and Display Enhancement - Various methods for enhancing
- 3 the current control boards and components were explored.
l Details of these studies are contained in Appendix C. I 8
I 2.5 ESF Status Panels A detailed evaluation of the ESF status panels was undertaken, using the following documentation: e FSARs e System Description Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, 10466-3005A, Rev. 5 e Technical Specification for the Status Indicating Systems for the Standardized Nuclear Unit Power Plant System, 10466-E-094(Q), Rev.3. This evaluation examined the actuation logic, the inclusion or exclusion of indicators for various devices, and the placement of these indicators within the matrix. Details are contained in Appendix D. I I I , 9
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I 3.0 RESULTS I Results of the HFE evaluation of the SNUPPS control room concept indicated that
- design problems existed. While efforts were made to incorporate useful operator aids such as computer-driven CRTs and mimics, these aids did not always conform to human factors engineering principles. This lack of conformance tends to negate the purpose of the aides, to reduce operator error. Therefore, the impact of these operator aids on improved plant safety and reliability is not very strong. The control room was found to be at variance with a number of the criteria contained in NUREG/CR-1580. Detailed results of the evaluation are presented in the following appendices:
e Appendix A - Summary of Human Engineering Findings e Appendix B - Results of the Computer / Operator Interface Evaluation e Appendix C - Special Studies e Appendix C Annunciator Prioritization e Appendix C Plant Status Monitoring e Appendix C Control and Display Enhancement e Appendix D - Monitor Light Boards e Appendix E - Results of an Evaluation of the General Atomic Radiation Monitors e Appendix F - Demarcation of the Control Boards e Appendix G - HEER Files. l l 10 1
I 4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS Based on the HFE evaluation, Essex has formulated the following recommendations regarding the Human Engineering Findings: l o Priority 1 and 2 findings have an impact on safety and require resolution. e Priority 3 findings ! ave a significant impact on plant reliability and should be resolved. e Priority 4 findings also have an impact on plant reliability. While the impact is not as dramatic as Priority 3 findings, resolvement should be done to minimize unscheduled downtime. e Priority 5 findings should be corrected to enhance the general control room design and to maintain consistency.
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} l f I t l 1 i APPENDIX A i 1 l i HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
l ! l t i ) 1 I i 14 i 4 i I i l l l i I t' i d 4 lI 1 1 1 i I i k 1 )I l l. 13 1 i i
l l I The following appendix presents a summary of tne human engineering findings (HEF) of the SNUPPS control room review. The summary represents the HEFs of Priority 4 and higher. They are grouped in the following categories: o Control Room - those that are generic to all or most control panels e Control Panel - those that are specific to each panel. I I. I I I I I 1 A-1 l I
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SUMMARY
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* " " " " LOCADON N NG RECOMMENDED BANN NM NUMBER NUMBER EM DESCRIPDON 1 142 Annunciators: RLO14 There is no prioritization Provile a prioritization 1 RLOl6 of alarms; by location, schame using color, ALL but FIRST OUT RLO18 color, or other schemate.. location or other RLO20 appropriate method.
RLO22 (See Appendix C-1) RLO24 RLO26 2 152 Annunciators: RLO14 The character height-to- 1. Re-engrave the alpha- 1 RLOl6 width ratio is 7.3, while numeric to make the ALL RLO18 the recommended height-to characters conform to RLO20 -width ratio is between the 1:1 to 3:5 or 5:3 RLO22 1:1 - 5:3 ratio. RLO24 2. RID 26 Install new annunci-ator windows that utilize characters
>> whose height-to-width O ratio is between 1:1 to 5:3.
3 153 Annunciators: . \' RLO14 The stroke width of the 1. Re-engrave the alpha- 1 RLOl6 characters is .04 inch. numerics so the ALL RLO18 The maximum recommended character stroke widtt RLO20 viewing distance for a is equal to .058 inch RLO22 stroke width of .04 inch or RLO24 is 8 feet. At the 12 2. Install new windows RLO26 foot viewing distance, that utilize character the stroke width should stroke widths of be 1/6 the character approximately .058 height, or approximately inch.
.058 inch.
4 141 Annunciators: RLO14 Annunciator windows are Provide physical interlock 1 RLOl6 not keyed or coded to or enscribe a location ALL RLO18 prevent inadvertant inter code on the window. RLO20 -change RLO22 RLO24 RLO26 PAGE 1
m ama e sus man sus amm aus e muu ens M EER APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
NUMBER NUMBER ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY 5 37 Pushbuttons: ANNUNCIATOR TEST RLO15 The order of Annunciator Reconfigure controls so 1 ANNUNCIATOR ACKNOWLEDGE RLO19 Controls is inconsistent that they all are in the from one panel to another same order and separate FIRST OUT ACKNOWLEDGE RLO25 The panels have the the Annt.nciator Acknow-FIRST OUT RESET RLOO5 f 11 wing order- ledge from the First Out Test, Acknowledge on Controls. Shape coding FIRST OUT TEST RLOO3 RLO15; Acknowledge, Test of the handles would on RLO19 & RLO23, lessen the chances of F'est out pro in the making the error of following order- hitting the test functioi, Acknowledge. Reset, Test when trying to acknow-on RLO19,* Ack:.awiedge, ledge mad looking at the Test, Reset on RLO25 annunciator panels at On RLOO5 the order is the same time. First Out Acknowledge, First Out Reset and f u Annunciator Acknowledge 6 51 Mimic Lines: RLOO1 The mimic lines are all Replace with mimic lines 1 RLO17 the same size, regardless that discriminate ALL MIMIC LINES EXCEPT RLO18 of the size of the line. visually by size between ELECTRICAL R1019 This makes it very diffi- primary and secondary. RLO20 cult to distinguish lines. RLO23 primary injection path-RLO24 ways from test lines, etc 7 43 Mlaic Lines RLO13 There are instances of Examine all mimics and 1 RLO14 mimic line flow' arrows verify direction of flow-' RLO15 indicating the wrong correct any errors. RLOl6 direction of flow. RLGl? RLO19 RLOO1 PAGE 2
uma man he aus num uma sum num num uma sum num aus num muu num sem APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
9 ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 8 52 Mimic Lines: RLOO1 There is an inconsistent Use consistent color 1 RLO13 use of color coding for coding throughout contro l ALL PANELS RLO14 the mimic lines. There room. Suggest the WITH MIMICS RLO15 are nine different colore following: RLOl6 for water and four RLO17 different colors for Blue = Water RLO18 electricity. Some colors Red = Steam (should this RLO19 are used for different be used) RLO20 elements (i.e., grey = Green or Yellow = RLO23 electricity and water, Electricity-use differ - RID 24 orange = electricity and ent naturations of the water). color to code differen ; voltages. The higher the voltage, the darke - the color. f 4.- 9 191 Mimic: CCW RLO19 The above component groupe 1. Redesign to eliminate 1 ESW RLO19 are mirror imaged. In the mirror innging, or DIESEL GENERATORS RLO15 the case of the CCW and 2. S p o the contro is TD AUX FW CONTROLS RLOO5 ESW Components, the
, mirroring ical.
is not ident-This Creates vide tactual and transference of training visual feedback of th , difference. problems. 10 15 Demarcation Lines All Panels There exists a general Employ demarcation lines 3 lack of demarcation usago where appropriate - to visually isolate brown lines would provid< r separate system components good contrast with panel or to enhance existing surface. relationships between (See Appendix H) components contained within the same system. i a l 11 5 Labels All Panels There are no functional Provide system and 3 or system summary labels functional group summary employed on the control labeling. hoards. PAGE 'i
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SUMMARY
l NUMBER NUMBER ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY 12 36 Labels: All Panels The practice of color Use only one color for 3 coding labels by trains labels (e.g., black All labels colored red, creates a christmas tree characters on a white yellow, white, or blue. effect that increases background). The train visual search times. can be conveyed by a The information, while colored dot located on important at times, is the label. not needed frequently enough to be displayed in such a dramatic mannei Color coding should be used to relate systems and functional groups together.
> 13 35 Labels All Panels The engraved surfaces of Fill the etched surface 3 \^ the labels have no c. lear with a clear filler.
filler to pre.'ent the buildup of dirt and grime in the etched surface over time leadin6 to a reduction of legibility. 14 48 J-Handle: All Panels The J-handle controls havt Decrease the return force 1 a spring tension for of the controls to ALL IN CONTROL ROOM WITH return to center that is eliminate the excessive SPRING LOADED RETURN TO excessive. If the return action. CENTER. operator releases the handle when it is ' an extreme position, t i.e handle will spring back with such force that a flag and position mis-match will ensue and the possibility exists for act3vation of the opposite function. oAce 4
ama muu aus num ran sum num man oma amm uma sus seu amm amu amm amm i APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 15 3 Hagan Process Controller: The magnitude of the 1. Change control display 4 , scale reading increases movement relationships BTRS DEMINERALIZER as the pointer movas by replacing controll er BYPASS CONTROL BG HC-387 RLOO2 from right-to-left .athea with a scale which than the conventional increases from left-movement from left-to- to-right as control right, is rotated in a clockwise directiogor RHR HX A FIDW CONTROL RLO 7 The CLOSE/OPEN positic,n EJ HIL-606 convention is also 2. Replace controller violated. The OPEN with a conventionsa RHR HX B FIEW CONTROL RLO 7 position is to the left model which does not EJ HIL-607 of the center, and the v'iolate plant con-CLOSE position is to the vention and populatio l
- OIARGING HEADER FLOW RLOO1 right of the center. stereotype, or CONTROL BG HC-182
- 3. Shape code the knobs to provide tactile
? as feedback about the difference of the control and address through training. Use labeling (arrows) to indicate direction of motion, or
- 4. Rewise and relabel control so the CIDSE position is to the left of center, and the OpEN position is to the right of center.
16 95 Process Controllers: All Panels The 0 and 100 marks on Include open and closed 3 process controller labeling on the scale, scales are not labeled as to which is full open and which is full closed. PAGE 5
APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
S ""^ Y "F NUMBER NUMBER M DERMION W ADON RNDING HECOMMENDED MM PRORM 17 192 Process Controllers: All Panels The display covers are 1. Install glare-free 3 Vertical Meters subject to glare from the cover, or ambient lighting. (Data Horizontal Meters from Simulator) 2. Use indirect lighting, diffusers, many low levt.1 light sources as op,wed to a few bright sources. 18 143 Vertical Meters: During emergency proce- 1. Add a redundant indi- 2 REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE RLOO2 dures ?.he operator is re- cator for Rx coolant quired to compare the two pressure on R1026, or STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE RLO26 meters but they are lo-cated on panels separated 2. Insure that this task by about 25 feet. This is performed by two taxes short terc: memory. operators. Is PA G F __ __. f2__
m m e e ama m - e e APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
HEF NUMBER NUMBER ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDFD BACKFIT PRIORITY 19 23 Vertical or Horizontal All CR 'lhe vertical and horizont- Incorporate coding on the All with the exception of al meters lack any coding meter scale face (not to indicate the tole'ance bezel or clear cover) for Vertical Meter: RLOO6 zones or set points. those meters where toler-Therefore, the operator ance zones will enhance THRUST BEARING WEAR has to rely on memory to the operator's use; DETECTOR TEST supply him with knowledge Horizontal Meter: RLOO5 when a parameter is be- Those meters critical to 1 ginning to degrade. safety (ex.. CTMT Temp, THROTTLE STEAM PRESSURE CST Level, Rx Coolant INTERMEDIATE PRESSURE Press, etc. Those meters critical to 3 reliability. All others. 5 20 33 Vertical and Horizontal All Panels Displays are designed so Meters are designed so th* 3 Meters that failure of the dis- if the meter should fail play or display circuit it is not immediately ap-
> is not immediately ap- parent to the operator.
k parent to the operator. Redesign so that failure of or loss of power to the meter causes the pointer to fall off scale 21 112 Simple Indicators and Cut- All Panels Single filament incandes- 1. Incorporate lamp test ar 2 ler-Hammer Pushbuttons cent tips are used with-with Integral Lights out the means to test for 2. Use dual filament bulbs bulb or circuit failure. 3. And given the estimated 21,000 lifetime of the bulbs in the Cutler-Hammer Contro11, pro-vide administrative pro cedures to cbange bulbs at a regular interval. 22 99 Cutler-Hammer Pushbuttons All Panels Lamp replacement requires Insure an adequate supply 1 with Integral Lights the use of a.special tool of and ease of access to srecial tools. PAGE 7
APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION NUMBER NUMBER 23 155 Operator Control Console RLOO2 The console is too high Given the impossibility of 2 to provide the 5th % changing the console RLOO6 height, insure that the operator with visibility over to the Main Control operator can use the CRT Consoles. to obtain information flat cannot be seen fr a the operator control console and the BOP Consoles.
- 1. Relocate controls 4 24 4 J-Handle Rotary's: Controls are located in an inaccessible position making them accessib1 - 1
/
RLO14 for operators whose to the 5th percentile CAL-BLAND-1 BUS B operator, or PCB V45 height is less than 5'4" 13.8 KV SOURCE SELECT SW RLOl6 2. Provide slip resistan ' PA IIS-7 stool. Pushbuttons: > 2 RLO20 $ CONTAINMENT AREA RADIATION LEVEL SH RI-2 CONTAINMENT AREA RLO2O RADIATION LEVEL S!! RI-1 BIT TO BORON INJ SURGE RLO18 TANK ISO VALVE EM IIIS-8870A BIT TO BORON INJ SURGE TANK ISO VALVE EM IIIS-8870o l 4 8 PAGE
APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGfNEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 25 J54 Labels: All Panels Spacing between character: ; Revise labeling such 2 words and lines on that: ALL engraved labels is
- 1. The minimum space inadequate resulting in between characters reduced readability due is one stroke width.
due to the difficulty in separating individual 2. The minimum space characters from their between words is the backgrounds. width of one charact er.
- 3. The minimum space between lines is 1/2 the character height
- 4. The stroke width is between 1:6 - 1:8 for white characters on a dark background I
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o 26 29 Labels All Panels Impossible to different- Re-engrave or otherwise 4 inte the letter I from modify labels so the the numeral 1. Both letter I can be visually letter and numeral are distinguished from the represented by a vertical numeral 1. slash. 27 149 Vertical Meters All Panels The heights of the inter- Modify or replace with 4
- mediate and minor gradu- scales whose intermediat ?
ation marks are less thar and minor graduation 0.16 and 0.19 inch marks are at least .16 respectfully. and .09 inch, respectful ly. 28 150 Vertical Meters The meter scales begin Label the bottom gradu- 4 with an unnumbered major ation mark with the BOPON INJ SURGE TK TEMP RLO18 graduation mark, appropriate number. PZR DISCHARGE TEMP METERf RLO21 PZR RELIEF TANK TEMP RLO21 RC LP 1, 2, 3, 4 TAVG RLOO4 LETDOWN HIGH PRESS RLF RLOO2 VLV OUTLET TEMP PRESSURIZER METERS RLOO2 PAGE 9
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- mN-APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RELOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 29 195 Trend Recorders All Panels The label describing the Remove the labels 4 parameter related to its from the door and place pen color in located on the panel surface. in the recorder window. This obscures part of th< - paper; they lack permanei t attachment and can not be read with the door open. Chart Recorder: On chart recorders, the Replace label with one 2 30 11 the label order of color which reads pen order of STEAM GENERATOR A RLOO6 is red-green-blue, while color as blue-green-red. STM/FW FI4W & LEVEL the actual pen order of AE FR-510 color is blue-green-red. STEAM GENERATOR B f STM/FW FLOW & LEVEL AE FR-520 STEAM GENERATOR C STM/FW FIDW & LEVEL AE FR-530 STEAM GENERATOR D STM/FW FLOW & LEVEL AE FR-540 RHR HX INLET / OUTLET RLO1? TEMPERATURE EJ TR-613 RHR HX INLET / OUTLET TEMPERATURE EJ TR-612 RCP A SEAL LEAKOFF & INJ RLO22 FLOW BG FR-157 RCP B SEAL LEAKOFF & INJ FLOW BG FR-156 RCP C SEAL LEAKOFF & INJ FLOW BG FR-155 RCP D SEAL LEAKOFF & INJ FLOW BG FR-154 OVER PWR/OVER TEMP AT RECORDER SE TR-411 PAGE in
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- .. 7 I i r T7 r- l r- U l APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY ITEM DESCRIPTION NUMBER NUMBER 31 19 Pushbuttons RLOO1 These pushbuttons are a 1. Rewire and relabel 3-RLO17/18 RLO17 reversal of plant conven- controls so that the RLO18 tion and also violate CIDSE pushbutton is 3-RLOO1/ 021 RLO21 population stereotypes. on the left, and the OPEN pushbutton is on The functional swith the right, or positions on these push-buttons are OPEN/CLO E 2. Guard controls, or rather than CIDSE/OPEN.
- 3. Provide shape coding to inform operator of difference.
32 122 Labeling of Annunciators, All Panels There is an inconsistent Standardize the use of 3 Controls and Displays use of abbreviation in terminology. The labels the CR. Some abbrevi- on the panels should be ations have multiple consistent with the y meanings and some terms Annunciators. e [ have different abbrevi-ations. 33 200 Computer System RLO20 The CRT Displays can be 1. Provide software inter- 3 RLOO3 effected by both key- locks to inhibit the-boards. This means that operators ability to an operator on the RLO20 effect all CRT's from panel can disrupt and one keyboard, especially lose data on the CRT's the RLO20 keyboard , or on RLOO3. 2.Use rigid administrative procedures to control. 34 201 Computer System CRT RLOO3 The blue and magenta Modify the software to 4 LO20 daracters are Mficult remove these colors from Color of Characters to read due to poor con- use, trast with the screen background. The color coding on the Standardize the color 4 35 202 Computer CRT RLOO3 RLO20 CRT displays is not coding conventions. consistent, one color may (See Appendix G) be used to convey differ-ent types of information. PAGE 11
unus uns ums num uma seu iam suus ums umm 3 l sums APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
HEF LOCATION F:NDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY ITEM DESCRIPTION NUMBER NUMBER - Computer System Printer None There is no prirter. Incate a printer in the 3 36 204 for hard copy informatim CR that has adequate located in the CR. This noise shielding. deprives the operator of useful informat.le;n. 37 6 J-Ilandle Controls RLO13 The .T-!!andle controls 1. Replace J-Ilandles with 3 RLO15 lo;ated at the Icwer a rotary control, or RLO19 edge of the panels are RLOO1 subject to inadvertant 2. Install a guard rail activation by an to keep the operator' s operator's body. body away from the panel. s 38 12 Indicator Lights: RLO25 The jacking gear indicator 1. Relocate indicator 3 lights anti vertical lights and vertical [ MN TURB TURN GEAR indicators associated indicators on panel ENGAGED AC ZL-30B with the chest /shell adjacent to respectiv = warming controls are controls, or MN TURB TURN GEAR IDCKED OUT AC ZL-30K located on remote panels (hpproximately 8 feet 2. Install redundant Vertical Indicators: RLO24 away), preventing a indicators on panel visually close associatic n RLOO5 or ELOO6, 1ST STG PRESSURE AC PI-505 between the displays and adjacent to respectiv .= their respective controlt . controls. IST STG PRESSURE AC PI-506 Legend pushbuttons: RLOO5 CIIEST/SHELL WARMING OFF CIIEST SIIELL DECREASE INCREASE l ___ PAGE 12
I uns aus aus uma uma em man mum num uma amm seus sus man am APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
NUMBER NUMBER ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY 3B 133 Vertical 8s Horizontal Vertical and Horizontal 1. Iower the displays RLO14 4 Meters: RLOl6 meters are located to a visually more RLO26 greater than 70 inches accessible position above the standing sur- for the 5th percentil
- face (between 75-84 in). operator (41-70 in, above the standing surface), or
- 2. Provide s tep-ladder, or
- 3. Install larger n>wters or
- 4. To aid readability, shim the displays forward so the top half of the displays are propped out and
[ downward. 5 40 205 Vertical Meters: The size and contrast of Replace the scales with 4 MFW PMP TURB BRG OIL RLO26 the scale markings is scales that incorporate inadequate for viewing darker and larger MFW PMP BRG OIL from the RLOO5/006 markings. STM SEAL SYSTEM INLET benc%oard. PRESSURE STM SEAL SYSTEM EXHAUST VACUUM All on panel with one RLO24 . exception. 41 139 Multipen Trent Recorders All Panels Many of the 2 and 3 pen Modify the meter to bring 4 recorders have one pen the pointer to within that is mounted below 0.06 inches of the scale, and/or behind the scale, making trending difficult due to parallax. PAGE l '1
APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
l
SUMMARY
HEF LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY ITEM DESCRIPTION NUMBER NUMBER 42 157 Punhout. tons RLO17 These represent controls 1. Examine the necessity a for continuous pres-
- that require continuous CCW TO RHR HX A pressure to operate sure and change if rat her than momentary. not necessary.
CCW TO RHR HX B There irt no way to visually distinguish thit 2. Label or code to pro-need. vide the operator with this information 43 166 Pushbuttons and Simple RLO23 Two different control dis- Convert all the controls 4 Indicators play groups are used for to the Cutler-Hammer essentially the same func- controls wAth integral FEEDWATER HEATER 150 tion. Some feedwater lights. VALVES heater ISO valves and FEEDWATER HEATER STEAM steam line drains have a control with integral LINE DRAINS
>> lights for the ISO valve; ,L others have separate indi-La cator lights placed above the drain line indicators, causing poor control-dis-play relationship. Differ-ent-shaped controls con-vey information to the op-erator which is not useful thus creating visual clut-ter and confusion and lend ing itself to operator error.
44 82 Process Controllers: RLOO1 Process controllers have Remove the labels which 3 RLOO2 redandant and confusing appear on the controller ALL HAGAN FULL STATION RLOOS labels. above and below the CONTROLLERS AND HALF RLOO6 vertical scale. STATION CONTROLLERS RLO17 RLOO1 The long hand on the dial Redesign circular scale 3 45 83 Process Controllers:
'with a shorter pointer RLOO2 of the potentiometers ALL HAGEN FULL STATION RLOO5 covers the numbers. that will not obscure CONTROLLERS WITli RLOOG the graduation marks, PCYrENTIOMETERS RLO17 and with the numerals appearing on the outside of the indicie marks.
PAGE 14
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seu num nas amm mun sus aus mas sus sus uma muu amu num aus APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBEM 47 199 Computer System RLO20 T;.e keypad is arranged in Rearrange in a telephone 4 s calculator type matrix style matrix. Numeric Keypad RLOO3 rather than a telephone type matrix. 48 197 Computer Keyboards RLO20 The red, green and white Regroup to provide color 4 coded keys are not grouping and within the Special Function Keys RLOO'l grouped together or in color grouping, order functional sequence. by function or alphabetically. 49 185 CRTs: RLOO3 1. The two CRTs on RLO20 Re-position RLO20 CRTs 4 are 1 cated between with respect to dis-CONTRAC CRTs RLO2O tance from standing sur-76-91 inches above the standing surface. This face. provide hoods for location exceeds the shielding CRTs from
> recommended height for CRT displsvs, which ambient lighting or glare.
J. N is between 41-70 Distribute four CRTs inches (and preferably around panels to permit 50-G5 inches) above accurate reading of at the standing surface. least one of the CRTs
- 2. Reading the CRT screens screen contents from from far right or far any operating position left ends of control within the control room.
boards is impaired by Provide training and distance, viewing written procedures angle, ambient lighting ennhasizing use of CRTs and glare. for 2-man operation within an integrated communications strategy. 50 203 Computer CRT Disolay- RLO20 The symbols on the CRT Standardize the symbology 4 p% ids are not identi- or provide a legend RLOO3 indicating what each cal to the symbols used for the PAID. symbol is. 51 110 HAGAN FULL STATION All pa.e's The scale numerals are Relocate the numerals on 4 PROCESS CONTO.0LLERS placed such that the the periphery of the pointer obscures the scale so that the numerals. pointer does obscure the numbers. PAGE 15
F amm num aus ass sus som aus num aus ums num uma asu muu nas uma mas i l t APPENDlX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
HEF FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION NUMBER NUMBER 52 127 Process Controllers All Panels The vertical demand signal Add numarals to the scale 4 meter scale has 14 minor in appropriate places to HAGAN FULL STATION marks between the number- minimize the number of ed marks. The maximum minor, unnumbered marks, is nine. I 53 75 Pushbuttons - Cutler All Panels The width of the off 1. Replace with control 4 l Hammer with 3 or 4 pushbutton is much too that has adequately l Functions. narrow, . making it dif fi- sized pushbuttons, or cult to activate without activating the primary 2. Replace with a push-functions. button where the small section is higher than the large - section.
.L 54 140 Trend Recorders All Panels The scales on many of the Install new scales with 4 00 trend recorders have intermediate marks intermediate markings shorter than the major the same height as the marks.
major markings. 55 78 Vertical Displays: RLOO2 Functional labeling Incorporate into the 4 ALL VERTICAL DISPLAYS RLOO3 (measurement variable - horizontal display label RLOO4 PSIG, etc.) on scale fact the variable that is RLOO5 is oriented vertically, being measured, itLOO6 from top-to-bottom rather RLO15 than horizontally from Example: RL0l6 left-to-right. RLO17 PZR RELIEF TANK RLO18 PRESSURE - PSIG RLOl9 AB P1-469 ItLO20 f tLO21 ltLO23 ltLO24 llLO25 IllD26 PAGE m
7 7. _ _ ,_ ,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - l APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY l NUMBER NUMBER t 56 58 Vertical Meters RLOO3 Some vertical meters Add a positive and 4 RLOO4 utilize scales which negative sign above and RLOOS contain both positive below the zero position, RLOO6 and negative numbers, respectively. However, no positive (+) or (-) markings appear on the scale face. 57 14 Telephone / Intercom System CR The telephone / intercom 1. Relocate phones,or 4 system is located in at. area requiring the 2. Provide channel operator to stoop every select function above time he wishes to use thi- phones or horizontal system or select a benchhead, or channel.
- 3. Redesiga CR communis ation s Jstem using:
{
- a. Portable headsets e b. Portable phones with channel select built in handle.
58 28 Labels on some of the RLO13 Labels are located below Relocate labels above 4
! simple indicators RLO14 the indicator lights. indicator lights.
RLO18 To conform with NUREG 1580 as well as with panel and plant standardization, labels should be repositioned above the indicator lights. PAGE
APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
HEF ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATICN FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER J 59 45 Process Controllers: RL001 There is not a glass Provide a rigid trans- 3 cover over the face of parent, glare reducing L'*DOWN HX OUTLET the Et on process con- cover over the dial face. Plu:.SSURE CONTROL BG trollers. The cover has PK-131 been inadvertantly re-moved. LETDOWN HX OUTLET TO LOW TEMP CONTROL 60 113 Pushbutton: RLOOL This control is used only 1. Guard in a manner 3 when the reactor cooling that would preclude REGENERATIVE HX TO PZR pumps fail. The control the operator from AUXILIARY SPRAY BG HIS- is located near other activating this con-8145 similar controls and trol, or lends itself to substi-tution error. 2. Shape code to provide the operator with y Tactile feedback that e
$ this control is dif-ferent.
PAGE 1R
um uma uma uma sus seu num m APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PPIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 61 8 Pushbutton: RLOOl Seal water outlet isola- Relocate leakage flow 4 tion values are located indicators to a more RCP A SEAL WTR OUT ISOL on panel RL001, while the accessible location BB HIS-8141 A leakage flow indicators (i.e. panel RLOO2). are located on panel RCP B SEAL WTR OUT ISOL RLO21. BB HIS-8141 B RCP C SEAL WTR OUT ISOL BB HIS-8141 C RCP D SEAL WTR OUT ISOL BB HIS-8141 D Vertical Indicators: RCP A SEAL AP BB PI-153A RLO21 d RCP B SFAL AP BB PI-152A RCP C SEAL AP BB PI-151A RCP D SEAL AP BB PI-150A 62 46 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE IN- RLOO2 There is no indication of Incorporate an instrument 1 DICATION pressure between 700-1700 that measures this range PSIG on the RL001 panel. on the RLOO2 panel. 63 73 Labeling: RLOO2 The label "IMMEDIATE Append as recommended. 1 BORATE FLOW" should be IMMEDIATE BORATE FLOW BG changed to read " EMERGENCY F1-183A BORATE FLOW," as the re-vision conveys a clearer and more precise termi-nology. I PAGE 19
m seu uns aus sum um ( APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED 8ACKFIT PRIORITY ITEM DESCRIPTION NUMBER NUMBER The OFF position is lo- Revise circuitry and-re- 3 64 91 Rotary Controls RLOO2 cated on the right of the label so the OFF position BTRS CONTROL SW BG HIS-27 control instead of in the is centered between DI-center. LUTE and BORATE. Also, DILUTE BORATE provide a simple indi-Also, there is no indi- cator light that will OFF catior. in terms of feed" illuminate once dilution back to the operator or boration has been ini-that dilution or boration tiated. has been initiated. RLOO2 This control has a Stop Provide a visuel or tact- 3 65 26 Rotary Controlt ual reference that the position, a Run position, REACTOR COOLANT M/U WATER and a Pull to Lock posi- control has been activat-CONTROL BG HIS-26 tion. There is a stop ed by: provided at the Run posi-tion that lets the oper- 1. Engra' ring a line on
),
e ator know he has activat- the control face at ed the control. However, the position identi-
$$ the operator does not fying the exact point know how far he must con- of component activa-tinue in the Stop posi- tion . or i tion to adequately acti-vate the control. There 2. Providing a detent at are no simple indicator the stop position lights associated with which provides tact-this control that would ual feedback that the either indicate Running control has been en-or Stop. gaged, op
- 3. Installing a simple indicator light cue-ing the operator to component status.
FACE 20
APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
HEF LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY ITEM DESCRIPTION NUMBER NUMBER 66 22 Counters: RLOO2 There are no units of Add to labeling the 3 measurement provided on measurement what the COMBINED M/U & BA FLOW the counter labels (eg.X1 counter is reading in, TOTALIZER or X10 GALLONS). plus add a decimal point. BORIC ACID COUNTER BORIC ACID TOTALIZER COMBINED REACTOR M/U & BA COUNTER 67 20 Counters: RLOO2 The boric acid totalizer Relocate the Boric Acid 3 is located over the com- Totalizer over the Boric BORIC ACID COUNTER BG FY- bined Reactor M/U & BA Acid Counter and the com-110B counter. The Combined bined M/U & BA Flow to-M/U & BA Flow Totalizer talizer over the combined f BORIC ACID TOTALIZER BG is located over the Boric M/U and BA counter. bJ FY-110BB Acid Counter. These bd counters are not related, COMBINED REACTOR M/U & BA and the totalizers lo-COUNTER BG F Y-lllB cations should be revised. COMBINED M/U & BA FLOW TOTALIZER BG FY-lllBB i PAGE 21
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SUMMARY
I
SUMMARY
HEF LCCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY ITEM DESCRIPTION NUMBER NUMBER 79 169 PuMx2ttm : RIIDS This critical control is Guard the ocntrols to Irevent 2 located in .a position th t inafvertet acttntion. Imds itself to inadvertant
'ID AUX W PJ4P TATP/REET activation, especially It IGS-332 given the fact that operators tad to lean over the puel to access ccntrols ard rt displays cn the back vertical in uds.
80 158 T ashbuttms FIIDS 'Ihe pushbuttm has an Determine which function 2 integral label that reads the antrol provides, trip or E#N#N Trip, which is confusirg reset, and label pusMx2ttcn given the Trip /Peset accordirgly.
'> label.
Ci 83 132 J-Ibndle: RIDOS 'Ihe STEN 4 IU4P mJr7 1. 'Ihe Steam Ibader Pressure 3 STEN 4 Inp mir7 SW AB US-500Z cn panel Control should be switched SW AB US-500Z RIDOS selects the made for with the tw> vertical the STUtt HEADER PRESURE displays cn Panel RIDOS - CITTFDL. 'Ihe select switch M1in Stean Header Press is not located adjacent to and the Stean Dtrp Dmard,or the process ccntroller, resultiry in a pcor 2. Use Dmarcation lines to smuentional association indicate the relationship. between associated ccntrols. 82 97 Pushtutten: Only cne of the pushbuttms Replace pushbuttcn labeled 3 m this cmtrol is us(d ard IDCKOUT with a pushbutton MEW TURBINE A IDCN17r 'IRIP/IYST RIDOS is labeled ID aat7r. labelai T3T. ', MFW 'IURBINE B IDCIT17T 'IRIP/IEST 110 wever, the pushbuttrn is really usal to test the Iockout trip ard should be labeled 'IEST not lockout. PAGE __25
i amis seu ses ame uma sus sua uma seus sua sus imus mas aus use sus em APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 83 177 Pushbuttms: RIDOS %e turbine trip and overspeed %e trip portim of the MFW 3 cmtrols are placal adjacmt PtNP 'IURBDE A/B 1RTP MFW PtNP 'IURBDE A 'IRIP REsgr to each other. RESEr Cbntrols should be FC HIS-18 red to provide a method for
%e cxmtrols are extranely the operators to distirguish MW PtNP 'IURBDE A OVERSPD similar in appearance and between the two cxmtrols.
TEST /RESEr FC 1115-19 could be easily ccnfusal. MFW MNP 'IURBINS B TRIP / RESET MFW PtNP 'IURBDE B OVERSPD 'ITET/REEEr FC HIS-119 84 10 Imgend Light Pushbuttms: MAIN TURBDE DC PNEI, RIDOS It is difficult if not Visually isolate legend pish- 3
> AC XX-1 impossible to distinguish buttons frm Icgend lights b
Co the legend pushtuttms frm the legend lights on the by:
- 1. Addiry danarcation lines
- or
"* 2. Altering legend plate design.
a) tactually b) visually-use datarcation on legend plate. 85 54 circular Meters: RIDOS NLsbers are placed on the Redesign the meter face so 3 sane side as the pointer that the scale values are not NFW MNP 'IURBDE SPEED causiry the pointer to obscure obscured by the pointer. FC SI-33 the value. MFW PLMP 'IURBDE B SPEED FC SI-I33 PAGE 26
sus see sus muu amm uma mas sum uma sus sua mas seu nas mus-eas-am CM' APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
l
SUMMARY
HEF LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDEIJ BACKFIT PRIORITY l ITEM DESCRIPTION NUMBER NUMBER 86 32 Vertical Meters: FIDOS Pointers are cn the see 1) Replace vertical id.icators 4 - side of the scale as the with displays which inave CV SIGE PRD%RY S'INOBY ntrbers, obscuring ntnerals, ntrnbers placed cufEide IV SIGE PRIMARY SUNX3Y and makiry indicator readiN graduation marks to avoM difficult having ramnbers coversi by tte pointers, or
- 2) Aljust pointers so "here is a gap no greater than 1/16 of an inch betwxm the tip of the pointar and the nutters on the scale face.
a PAGE "7
APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
NUMBER NUMBER ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY 87 17 Rotary Controls: i R1006 These controls are not di- Use demarcation lines to 3 rectly below their asso- help make visual associ-STM GEN A LVL SEL SW AE ciated trend recordes, ation clearer. LS/519C but directl** below an Aux Feedwater vertical STM GEN B LVL SEL SW AE indicator, predisposing LS/529C them to inadvertent asso-ciation with the vertical STM GEN C LVL SEL SW AE indicators. LS/539C STM GEN D LVL SEL SW AE LS/549C
?
u i i I 28 PAGE 1
m a s ses em e
~
nas aus seus uma mas see uns num encT m M APPEND!X A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
"F NUMBER NUMBgg ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY 88 80 Simple Indicators: RL906 The STM GEN A DUMP CTRL Center the first label 2 AT SHUTDN PNL LABEL is over the green and red STM GEN A STM DUMP TO placed in such a manner indicator lights and the ATMOS VLV POS that it can be associated second label over the with simple indicators white indicator light.
STM 'TN A STM DUMP CTRL that it does not apply to. AT SHUTDN PNL Only the white light goes STM GEN B STM DUMP TO with the second label. ATMOS VLV POS The green and red lights go with the first label. GTM GEN B STM DUMP CTRL AT SHUTDN PNL STit GEN STM DUMP TO ATf0S VLV POS f STM CEN C STM DUMP CTRL g AT SHUTDN PNL STM GEN D STM DUMP TO i ATHOS VLV POS STM GEN D STM DUMP CTRL AT S.1UTDN PNL 89 42 Trend Recorders: RLOO6 These trend recorders Incorporate labeling to 2 Imeasure STM/FW flow, and delineate which scale
-STEAM GENERATG9 A STM/FW level. There are two measures what varible.
FLOW + .*.EVEL AF FR-510 scales 0-100 and 0-5. The 0-5 scale measures
-STEAM GUNERATOR B STM/FW STM/FW flow and the 0-100 FLOW + LE7EL AP FR-S?O scale m?asures level.
Scales are not labeled as
-STEAM GEN 2.RATLR C STM/FW such.
FLOW + LEVEL AP FR-530
-STEAM GENERATOR D STM/FW FLOW + LEVEL AP FR-540 PAGE 29
aus age mus aus ama aus ame use sus sum uma mas same sus eau sum APPENDIX 4 HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
HEF LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY ITEM DESCRIPTION NUMBER NUMBER 90 96 Legend Light: RLOOS The label script is bare- Engrave deeper and fill 3 ly readable due to in- with a contrasting pig-TEST INTERLOCK LOSS OF adequate engraving depth ment. PWR PRESS SIGNAL and lack of contrasting color for the script. 91 196 Leoend Light: RLOO6 The closed indicators are Reverse the light lo- 4 located above the cgen in- cation so that open is STrAM DUMP VALVE POSITION dicators. This violates above the close. LIGHTS population and plant con-vention. 92 41 Vertical Display RLOO6 This scale is inappropri- Peplace current scale 3 ate to measure vars. The with more appropriate VARMETER MA J1-4 way it is now the zero is scale, it the bottom of the sca*.c and the only way the oper-y ator can tell if it is e. lesding or lagging is by M raising or lowering the AC Auto Voltage Regulator BKR snd watching to see if the pinter lowers or raiser. It would be ap-propriate to have the zerc in the middle so you could monitor a lagging or lead-ing by the pointer above zero or below. 93 114 Rotary Control: RLOO6 The handle on this control 1. Replace handle with 4 obstructs both the posi- smaller handle. MAIN GEN VOLTMETER PHASE tion labels and the point- 2. Extend pointer and SELECT SWITCH er due tc its size. relocate position labels to the periphery. PAGE
- l APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
l ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRICRITY NUMBER NUMBER 94 106 Horizontal Meters: RLOl3 The horizontal indicators PrGvide appropriate 4 are missing identifica- labeling above the pro-CIRC WTR PMP A/FDR BKR 152 tion labels. spective meters. PB 12103 SERV WTR PMP A/FDR BKR 152 PB 12104 CIRC WTR PMP B/FDR BKR 152 PB 12203 SER7 WTR PMP B/FDR BKR 152 PB 12204 CIRC WTR PMP C/FDR BKR 152 y , PB 12203 9 d SERV WTR PMP C/FDR BKR 152 PB 12303 INTAKE PUMP A/FDR BKR 152 PB 11704 INTAKE PUMP B/FDR BKR 152 PB 11705 INTAKE PUMP C/FDR BKR 152 PB 21802
=
PAGE_ .::1_
EEE m mee sus num sum une sus em aus mas em erz se see em m m' APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
HEF FINDING RECOW.MEPi")ED BACKFIT PRIORITY ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION NUMBER NUMBER 95 156 Horizontal Meter: RLO14 The scale an. indexed in Change instrument to 3 feet above sea level read in actual basin COOLING TOWERS rather than actual basin level. level. BASIN LEVEL CTl BASIN LEVEL CT2
?
W-PAGE 32
ses sus ses sus num een aus sus sus sus sus aus ans mes mas mas som sum em APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
HEF LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY ITEM DESCRIPTION NUMBER NUMBER 96 105~ RLO14 The Legend Plates are not Etch a code on each 3 Legend Lights keyed or coded to prevent Legend Plate that DEMINERALIZER TRAIN A inadvertant interchange significies position. during bulb replacement. DEMINERALIZER TRAIN B 111 RLO14 The two labels are Simplify labeling to 3 97 Labels. ' reduce ambiguity. located side-by-side. ESF XFMR INBOl This arrangement of labe's UNIT 2 is confusing and results in uncertainty as to what XFMR XpB 218 AND the indicator represents. MISCELLANEOUS TRANSFORM- It appears to refer to ERS unit 2. 98 174 Process Controller: RLO14 The process controllers Reverse the position of 3 y* are rdered #2, #1 from the process controllers BLOWDOWN VALVE #2/ e t right. The or reverse the ccoling k$ CONDUCTIVITY RATIO / AUTO-MAN CONTROLLER horizontal meter is tower order of" the ordered CT1, CT2 from Top horizontal indicators. BLOWDOWI VALVE #1/ the standard control-CONDiiCTIVITY RATIO / AUTO- display sequence. The MAN CONTROLLER sequence should be 1,2, left t right and 1,2 Top Horizontal Meter: to Bottom. COOLING TOWERS BLOWDOWN FLOW CT 1 BLONDOWN FLOW Cr 2 99 103 ELO14 The association between 1. Relocate the horizon- 3 Procese Controllers: the controller and its tal indicators below related display is not their ammciated contnil, or PLANT BYPASS VALVE / MANUAL CONTROLLER [*"fng oo p{,ar 9 r horiz al
- 2. Functionally group related controller and WATER TREAT PLANT / INLET meter associated with the i" VALVE / AUTO-MAN FLOW CONT plant Bypass Valve is s dema ca n nes.
located to the right of the controller, while the Water Treat Plant Inlet Flow meter associated with the Inlet Valve is located to the left of the controller. PAGE 33
me hiiss sum - man mas age sus em he see mas - man men m m APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESORIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 100 RLO14 The characters used in Relabel control position 4 30 J-Handle Controle: identifying control with a smallar front. CAL-BLAND-1 BUS B PCB v45 position (TRIP CLOSE) tre larger than the TIE-43 TIE PCB V43 characters used in identifying the control. START UP XFMR 1 BUS A PCB V41 1 CAL-BLAND-2 BUS A PCB V51 27 Simple Indicator Lights: RLO14 Indicator lights are For Accessing Bulbs' 4 101 mounted rather high for SFCD XFMR B/ BUS the 5th percentile 1. Move indicators to B SWITCHER /V25 operator, exceeding the point within reach y> recommended location of of 5th percentile La CAL-BLAND-1/ BUS B 70 inches above the operator, or O' PCB/V45 standing surface.
- 2. Provide a slip -
CEN 1/ Bus B PCB/V55 resistant step stool. START UP XFMR 2/ BUS B PCB/V75 CAL-MTCY-2/ BUS B PCB/V85 102 131 Process controllers: RLO14 The horizontal meters on Add numerics te scale 4 the process controllers BLOWDOWN VALVE f2/ lack: CONDUCTIVITY RATIO / AUTO 1. Numbered indicies and MAN CONTROLLER 2. Indication of functi n r Process BLOWDOWN VALVE #1/ * "E *" ** I CONDUCTIVITY RATIO / AUTO * ** *
- MAN CONTROLLER PLANT BYPASS VALVE / MANUAL C0!.iROLLER WATER TREAT PLANT / INLET VALVE AUTO-MAN FLOW CONT PAGE 34
APPENDlX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION 1.OCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 103 ' 55 RLO14 Pointer is positioned at Reposition pointers so 4 HORIZONTAL METERS: the top of horizontal they're located below scales making it difficult meters at the bottom of ALL to see from normal the scale. operating position. 104 190 HORIZONTAL WETERS: RLO15 There is a discrepancy in Investigate disparity 1 meter labeling between one and either relabel the DIESEL GENERATOR of the meters for the D.C. Amp meter in train NE01 D.C. AMPS Diesel Generator NE01 and A as Field Amps, or the Diesel Generator NE02 relabel the Field Amps D EL GENE R train. Similarly posi- meter in train B as D.C. tioned meters within the Amps, two trains are labeled differently. This discrepancy should a be investigated, and the d .eter which ie incorrect-ly labeled should be relabeled. 105 70 J- HANDLES: RLO15 These alternate breakers Protect against inadvert- 2 are not differentiated ent activation by: 4.16 KV BUS NB02 from their adjacent normal -shielding the control BREAKER 152 breakers, and as such, are with a transparent NB0109 NB HIS-3 vulnerable to accidental plexiglass cover guard activation. -providing the control 4.16 kV BUS NB02 with an interlock so BREAKER 152 that extra movement NB0212 NB HIS-5 (i.e., pull to activate: is required to engage the control. PAGE 35
APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 106 67 J-Handle: RLO15 These controls are Resolve the confusion as 4 designed with the numeral to what the number "1"
-DG NEC1 SYNC "1" occupying the central stands for and either:
Transfer SW position between OFF and 1. Relabel the central NE IIS-27 ON. The numeral "1" does position to convey more not convey any meaningful meaningful information
-DG NEO2 SYNC XFER information to the to the operators, or SW NE IIS-28 operators. 2. Remove the confusing numeral if it's deter-
-4.16 KV BUS NBO1 mined that it doesn't BLR 152NBO109 belong there.
SYNC NB liS-7 t
-4.16 KV BUS NB01 BKR 152NB0112 !
SYNC NB IIS-6 i i
-4.16 KV BUS NB02 t y BKR 152NBO209 4 SYNC NB IIS-8 os
-4.16 KV BUS NBO2 i BKR 152NB0212 -
SYNC NB liS-9 ! 107 16 IIorizontal Meters: RID 15 The meters are arranged Provide labeling adjacent 2 t in a matrix that lends to each meter that ! DIESEL GENERATOR NE01 itself to confusion. The identifies it. only method for differen-KILOWATTS tiating meters is by the KILOVARS labels on the meter scales . I!ERTZ The labeling on the scale D.C. AMPS face is not very visible. , AMPS KILOVOLTS i , I DIESEL GENERATOR NEO2 , KILOWATTS KILOVARS IIERTZ FIELD AMPS AMPS KOLOVOLTS PAGE 3G
APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 108 59 J-HANDLE: RIA15 This breaker is located in 1. Relocate breaker to 4 the lower left hand corner t 4.16 KV PB03-PB04 TIE on panel RLO15. Its e nr en is BKR ammeter is located in the corresponding ammeter 152 PB0401 PB HIS-5 lower right hand corner. The distance between the (which reads 4.16 KV PB03-PE04 BUS TIE AMPS two is about 4 feet but PB 11-2). is conaccted by a mimic line. 2. Code the control and the display by color or some other distinctive visual code. RLO15 The breakers come from Change the "OFFSITE 3 109 167 J-HANDLE: ESF XFMR XNB01 but the POWER" label which is labeling on panel RLO15 at located at the beginning f 4.16 KV BUS the beginning of the of the breaker mimic on y NB02 BREAKER 152NB0212 NB HIS-5 breaker mimic is vague as Panel RLO15 to read to the origin of the "FROM ESF XFMR XNB01." 4.16 KV BUS NB01 mimic. BREAKER 152NB0112 NB HIS-2 i l PAGE 37
usuu aus sur uma num APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 110 60 J-Handles: RLOl6 The intentional or acci- 1. Affix a cautionary 3 dental tripping of these label to the control 4RO V XPGl9-LC two breakers would result explaining the consequen-in a reactor trip. Given ces of tripping the PG19 BREAKER the criticelity of the breakers, or 52 PG1901 PG HIS-16 results of an inadvertant trip and the similarity of 2. Protect breakers 480 V XPG20-LC these controls with against inadvertant adjacent controls, they actuation by: PG20 BREAKER should be guarded. a) Recessing, shielding 52PG2001 PG or otherwise surround-HIS-18 ing the control by a physical barrier. b) Incorporating an interlock into the control so that extra [ movement (e.g. pull
<> to engage) is O required to trip the breaker.
c) Shape coding the control handles. 111 65 J-l andle Labels: RLOl6 The label is wrong and Relabel control as 3 should be rewritten to suggested XMR01 to XNB01 read XMR01 to XNB02 BREAER 252PA0201 BREAKER 252 PA0201 NB HIS-1 PAGE 38
i n o u -o oL o o o .o 'o o o o n_ o o v APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 112 63 Mimic Line RID 16 Sere should be a sectfm of Install missing mimic line 3 gray mimic line connectirg the 480 V xm20-IOG20 BREAKER 52N2001 m IIIS-18 J-Ilandle Cbntrol to the 480 V If m 19-PG20 TIE BKR 52 ml416 PG HIS-17 J-Hardle Control. 113 66 Mimic Line RID 16 Mlmic Line is missiry Install the missirg mimic 3 between the 13.8 KVPAO2-XPBO4 line. Breaker 252PA0208 PB HIS-2 J-Hardle control and the 13.8 KV BUS to XD4R XPDO4 AMPS PB 11-2 vertical indicator. e
$ 114 69 Transfcrmer Mimic for J-Handle Breaker control RID 16 %e transfamer mimic is upside down. % e gray 480 V Reverse transformer mimic as stggested.
3 mimic should be on the bottm, 480V Xm25-ID FG25 BREAKER and the black 13.8 KV mimic 52 m2501 PG ltIS-24 should be cn the top. 115 183 Main control Daard: RID 17 %e ESP Cbntrol panel has 1. % e panel should be 1 ESP COTTROL PANEL RIDl8 sWficant problerns in mirror redesigned as the problens imagirg. %e RHR mimic is are to great to be truly mirrored between A train corrected. ard D train but the vertical meters are not. %e CDfr 2. % e problens can be spray mimics are mirror imaged, lessmed a little by he SI mimic is not mirrored. c mplete mirroring of m e accumulator mimics 1>ok RID 17, the use of like they are mirrored but functimal dmarcation aren't. No other campcnents lines, or backgr mrd on RID 18 are mimical. his coloring. mirroring creates performance probl m s alone, but the incmplete mirror irraging magnifies the prcble. I PAGE 39 L
l seu som e use sua sem aus mas seu aus uma num sun-mus-m m m-APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
l
SUMMARY
HEF ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 116 178 Mimic Line nn. Line terminatim labels % e mimics should be reviewed 1 Terminaticn Iabels: for these mimics provide the to determine :nore appropriate operator with inaccurate labels. Suggestions are: NI1H MIMIC: RIOl8 infomation. In s m e cases
- IO XIIMJIA'ICR A,B,C,D the label says where the 'lb m-lators = Accum11ator line is going when it should j SI MDtIC: RID 17 say where the line is eming 'Lb Safety Injecticn 'Ibst Line=
, - FIO4 SAFETY DU RNP A fram, and vice versa. In 'Ib Acctzs Inj discharge Icop l sczne instances the labels 3
- IO RE2TELDU m'IER S'ICEACE are wrong.
'DWK 'Ib Acetzn Injectim Discharge =
'Ib Acctzu Inj Discharge Icop 1.
RHR MIMIC:
'IO SAFLT? DUECTICH 'IY:ST LDE 'Ib refuelirg water storage tank = renove as is not
'IO XIIMJIA'ICR DU DISCIRRGE really necessary
- IO SAFCIY DUELTICN RMPS e
F un Safety Inj Pung A - to
$ the destination
'Ib Safety Inj PLx!ps - Fran the source, 117 94 Pushbutten: RID 17 'Ihe two pushbuttms en each Resolve disparity cmcerning 1 BN HIS 88128 ccntrol are not labeled making pushbutten function and provide CIBCUIT/IAMP 'IEST BN HIS 8812In it difficult to identify clear, unzbiguous control which pushbutton is for lanp labeling by:
test and which pushbutton C T TEST BN HIS 8812AA is for circuit test. Also, 1. Engraving ocntrol functicn there is sczne ocnfusion as to in each pushbutton, or what this control is used for.
- 2. Providing functional labelire above and below the apprtpriate pushbuttcn, respectively.
4 i PAGE "
M M M EMI man ad amm nas seu num num aus uma e sus e APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
HEF LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY ITEM DECORIPTION NUMBER NUMBER 118 102 Sinple Indicator Lights: MD17 'Ihese irdicator lights are 1. Relocate irdicator lights I located to the right of their above their respective
-SI ICIUM4 'IO IMSR ISO VLV associated cmtzols rather crmtrols ard affix IVSITIO4 R4 ZIc8813 than above th m. Also, the id m tification labels above id m tification labels are irdicator lights, or
-SI NX1M INJECTIOi ISMATIGI VLV POS D1 ZL-8835A located beloW rather than a W the lights. 2. Use d e arcation lines to
-SI fue B IUr IE ISO vLv make relationship apparent.
IOSITIGI Di ZIe8802BA
-MR 'IO NXIN IMJ IIXP 3C4 VLV POS EJ ZL-8809 m
-MB/SI IDF IE RIEIIC VLV POS EJ ZIc8840A
-SI RNP IUP IE ISO VLV POSITIQ1 FM ZIc8802AA
-MM 'IO AOCLM IMJ IIXP 18,2 VLV f
# IOS EJ-ZL 8609AA EJ-ZL 88091 AOCLMJIA'IOR DNK B OLTPIFP RID 18 VLV POSITIOI EP ZIr88091%
AEIMJIA'IOR DNK D OLTTIrr VLV POSITIOi IP ZIr8808DA MIIMJIA'IOR DNK A OLTIIDF VLV POSITIO3 EP ZIc8808AA ACCLMJIATOR DNK C ULTTIFF j VLV POSITIO4 EP ZIe8808CA l r I i i i PAGE 41
, APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
su""^ Y EM DEmimON LOCADON NM REOMNMDBM M NW NUMBER NUMBER 119 2 Legend Light Patrix RLO18 These redundant displays Correct the problems I have significant problems. identified as suggested ESF system status The major problems are: in Appendix D-1 or other Indication SA-166-Y 1. Lack of identical suitable method. and SA-066-y layout between matricies .
- 2. Inconsistent use of abbreviation
- 3. Inconsistent logic used in the NSSS monitoring system Details are in Appendix D-1 y
120 184 Mimic-Accumulators RLO18 These mimics have lines Review the P&ID's to 1 that terminate without a determine destination label indicating desti- of all lines and label nation. accordingly. 121 72 3-Handle: RLOl8 The control label has Relabel with Phase A 1 Phase B isolation when it CONTAINMENT is really Phase A. ISOLATION . PHASE E l SBHS-47 l 1 J PAGE 42
tr rm u. i e > x rm rm rm . rm 'r a . cm. .r m .ra rm cm ca va c-APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
HEF LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIOftlTY ITEM DESCRIPTION NUMBER NUMBER 122 50 Pushbutton Guards: RLOl8 The Cuarding Mechanism 1. Redesign the Guard so 2 for these controls con- that it stays permanently CONTROL BUILDINC sists of a plastic cover attached and can't be
' VENT ISOLATION B that is removed to lo s t . or 7UEL BUILDING VENT a e pe a at ,
ISOLATION B attached and will be depth to preclude inadvertent easily lost. activation. CONTAINMENT PURCE ISOLATION B AUX FEEDWATER ACTUATION B TO AUX FW PUMP ACTUATE y CONTROL BUILDING VENT e ISOLATION A 4:- FUEL BUILDING VENT ISOLATION A CONTAINMENT PURCE ISOLATION A AUX FEEDWATED ACTUATION A 123 189 vertical Indicstors: RLOl8 , Containment pressure is Replace the PSIA meters 1 measured in PSIA on the with PSIC meters. CTMT ATMOS PRESSURE above meters. For all CN PI-935 other indicators, pressure is measured in CTMT ATMOS PRESSUPt PSIC. CN PI-937 CTMT ATMOS PRESSURE CN PI-934 CTMT ATMOS PRESSURE CN PI-936 PAGE
APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER l 124 100 Trend Recorders: RLOl8 Inconsistent labeling be- Standardize labeling of 1 tween trend recorders an components within trains RHR HX Inlet / Outlet RLOl8 and their respec- changing: a) numerals to , RHR Pump 2 ve e n r a n 017. letters; or b) letters to l Temperature EJ TR-613 RHR XX 2 Numbers (l&2) are used numerals so that a con-for component identifi- sistency is maintained.
"* I "" " **I"" "
I RHR HI Inlet / Outlet trend recorder, and l RHR Pump 1 letters (A&B) are used f r component identifi-i TEMPERATURE EJ YR-612 **EI " "I I" "#8I"* "" RHR HX 1 their respective controls. Nomenclature should be consistent between hard-ware. j, There should be a check valve logo on the mimic as l line leading to the re-actor coolant system which serves to separate the " BORON INJ TANK EM i HIS-8801B" and " BORON INJ TANK EM HIS-8801A" from the " SIS TEST LINE ISO VALVE EM HIS-8843" and " SIS TEST LINE ISO VALVE EM HIS-8882". l PAGE 44
m m m sun mug MmF mTs Cass N EEE MBE~ , Ene C WM] APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
HEF ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 125 71 J-Handle: RLJ18 These controls are Lower the controls on 2 BORON INJ 1 cated about 66 inches the board to within 57 RECIRC PUMP off the floor. This ex- inches. B EM-NIS-2 ceeds the maximum allowed for emergency controls of BORON INJ 57 inches. RECIRC PUMP A EM-NIS-1 126 145 Process Controller RLO18 This controller is iden- Relabel label to read 3 tified as a isolation 7ent Valve N2SUPPLY CTMT ATMOS ISO valve when it is really VLV EP #C-943 a vent valve p 127 119 Process Controller: RLO18 This process' controller relates to two separate Install a label that specifies that the control 3 e N Ny SUPPLY CTMT mimic loops but visual interfaces with accumu-ATMOS ISO VLV connection is poor, due Lators A and C. EP HL-943 t a mimic line that ter- Example: TO ACCUM A and C minates wit hout a label specifying where it goes. i
~
i '5 PAGE i
APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
HEF LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY ITEM DESCRIPTION NUMBER NUMBER 128 68 Trend Reccrders: RLO18 For the trend recorders Adjust pointer so that 3 on panel RLO18, the it extends to, but does RHR HK INLET / pointer totally obscures not obscure the shortest OUTLET TEPP EJ TR-613 the shortest graduation scale graduation marks. marks on the face of the RRR HI INLET /0UTLET scale. TEMP EJ TR-612 For the recorders RCP A SEAL LEAKOFF RLO22 identified on panel
& INJ/ FLOW BC FR-157 RLO22, the pointer totally obscures all RCP B SEAL LEAKOFF graduation marks along
& INJ/ FLOW BG FR-158 wit h the numerals.
PCP C SEAL LEAK 0FF
& INJ/ FLOW BG FR-159 b RCP D SEAL LEAKOFF C' & INJ/ FLOW BC PR-160 t
l PAGE 46
um sur aus aus sus a ses num aus sus men ums ama num sum uma uns e APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY ITEM DESCRIPTION NUMBER NUMBER RLOl8 1) Provide a yellow and 4 129 124 Pushbutton: This pushbutton is associated with all accum red identification ACCUMULATOR TANK label to serve as a tanks but is located such FILL LINE ISO that it can be inferred visual cue to remind VALVE EM HIS-8888 that it applies only to operators that this B&D trains. control effects both trains, or
- 2) Extend a red mimic line from the pushbutton to the label which reads "10 ACC1MJLA10R TANKS," or
- 3) Append above label to read TO ACCUMULATOR TANKS B&D A&C
> 130 186 Simple Indicators: The arrangement of in- 1) Relocate the indicator 2 dicators is not consistent lights above their re-fp. RLOl9 @ CCW PUMP B RESET from application to spective controls or EG 2L-21 application. The above move lights closer, or indicator lights are ** **** " "**
CCW PUMP D RESET placed to the right or I # "I'"'I " "I"*I "' EG 2L-23 left of their associated # control rather than above CCW PUMP A RESET it. 3) Address through training. EC 2L-22 CCW PUMP C RESET EC 2L-24 PAGE 47
um m nas som en mas mas sus me asus aus aus aus use sus e i APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
HEF ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING NUMBER NUMBER RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY 131 173 Mimic Lines: RLO19 The mimic line intersects 1. Shorten the latel 2 the s'ove labels, imply- plates to allo- clear ing a manection when. space for the *1mic Intersectia. at labels for following: there is none. Line.
- 2. Inscribe the Mimic L*ne CCW TO RCS " * * *
- ISOLATION VALVE EC MIS-71 ,
ESW A/ SERVICE WATER CROSS CONNECT VALVE EF HIS-25 ESW TRAIN B RAD MONITOR ISO VLV EF HIS-88 b O ESW A TO CCW HX A EF HIS-51 132 107 Permissives/ blocked / RLO22 The legend labels or the 1. In c r e s o r. label size 1 partial trip status indicators are 0.125 panel inches high, much too 2. Investigcte use of a small for reading from magnifying screen. the operators console. 133 90 Vertical Display RLO21 The labeling is on one The "PZR RELIEF TANK" 4 (Labeling): RLO22 line with the flow, etc.. letterinR should be on a second line. This larger than the level, PZR RELIEF TANK tends to create the etc. lettering.
- LEVEL impression that only one
_ PRESSURE of a string of three is
- TEMPERATURE flow, rather than all of them being flow.
REACTOR COOLANT LOOP FLOW The " REACTOR COOLANT LOOP" lettering should appear an a separate label that is centered above the 4 flow indicators with the sord " FLOW" centered above each indicator or, FLOW should be moved up to the same line as reactor
-oolant loop.
PAGE 48
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APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 135 9 Legend Lights: RLO22 1. Legend plates are not keyed 1. Code legend plates 'l PERMISSIVE / BLOCKED or coded to prevent for visual reference as to PARTIAL TRIP STATUS accidental interchange durini correct position.' SA-0682 maintenance. The matrix is 2. See Apprendix D for particularly vulnerable recommendations. during bulb removal since plates are not locked into position. A slight displace-ment of the grid from ver-tical during removal will result in a radical alter-ation to the indicator order.
- 2. The Display is extremely dif ficult to use as designed now. See Appendix D for p details, u
bJ 136 44 LED Display; RID 22 To have an adequate view 1. Angle the right side of the 1 DR PI of all rod position display towards the operator e in<ators, the operator position at RL00162 to make must leave his position all the rod positions at RLOO3 and move to RLOOS. visible, if seismically possible , or
- 2. Address through admin-istrative procedures and training.
4 .l i I s PAGE 50 i
men m immi m m m EEE agg m uns ulu m sus e umu uma sum uns e ' APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 137 147 Trend Recorders: RLO22 1. The bottom scale on the Raise the bottom scale 4 RCP A,B,C,D, SEAL LEAKOFF recorder obscures the top and adjust the pointer to be AND INDICATOR of the paper, placed in front of the scale.
- 2. The Pointar on the bottom scale is behind the scale, 138 193 J-Handle: RID 23 The Controls are arranged Rearrange the conttols in the 4 RHR PLMP ROOM SUMP in the following orders following order:
PUP.P B LF HIS-5 B A A B RHR 7tHP ROOM SUMP D C C D PUMP A LF HIS-6 This violates population or arrange the CTMT Sump RHR PLHP ROOM SUMP, sterotype and im not Pump Controls A-D from left PUMP D LF HIS-19 organized in a proper to right. The RHR Pump RHR PUMP ROOM SLMP sequence for smooth operatio i. Room Sump Controls can then PLMP C LF HIS-20 be placed A-D from left to right underneath the C UT Sump Controls. PAGE 51
APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
HEF FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY ITEM DESCRIP110N LOCATION NUMBER NUMBER The Air Compressor C Indicator Move the Air Compressor 4 139 38 Simple Indicator Lightet RIA24 AIR COMPRESSOR C KA QL-1 Lights are located over the C Indicator Lights to the Air Compressor A Reset %ntrol, place where the Air l AIR COMPRESSOR B KA QL-2 The Air Compressor A Indicator Compressor A Indicator s are located to the Wts are m ad AIR COMPRESSOR A KA Q1.-1 right of Air Compressor B vice versa. Lights. l 140 117 vertical Meters: Rw24 1. The vertical meters are off- The following controls and 4 Simple Indicators: Rw24 set to the lef t of their displays should be moved to MAIN SIM RHTRs associated controls by about the left (where RHTR A 6 to 12;' displays and MN SIM to MSR I" *** ** " "I
- 2. The simple indicators are ~**** ** '#'
offset to the left and * ^ 0 trranged in a 2x2 matrix rather -J-Handle AC PS-505Z
> than being located under their The RHTR vertical meters b associated vertical meters. should be shifted to the 4r 3.The vertical meters are right and the main STM to MSR labeled in an inconsistent indicators should be placed manner. under the appropriate vertical meter.
The labeling for the vertical meters should be standardized , PAGE 52
e e e e e e e e e APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 141 116 Pushbuttons: RID 25 Controls are functicnally 1. 'Ihey should be groupal 4 MN S'Dt/fW ISO VLV ACCLM ORICE ard sequentially related but together and denarks! to TEST AB HS-66 are not grolpal together. precitde any association
'Ihey are placed next to with a spccific steam PN SDt/fW ISO VLV MIXH QRICE " sensitive" pushtuttons used loop , o r TEET AB !!S-68 only in a shut-down or energency situation, ard can 2 Use denarcation lines to separate out of gteam PN SDi/fW ISO VD7 EXDCISE be associated with the PRPI ^# N*
NmWIE AB 11S-70 SD4 loops or S'D1 gevrators what they ocntrol valves MN SDt/fW ISO VLV EXEICISE across all the stean loops. NmRTE AB IIS-73 142 130 J-thndle ard simple indicators RID 25 h labeliig between the Relabel to make the 3 for train turbine lif t pinps J-Itardlen and their associated relationship clear. irdicators does not imply the Example: NN 'IURDINF, OIL
> the relatio tship. h main LIPT PLMP 1 FOR BFARI!C 3.
g turbine Oil Lift Pump Lights u tabel does not imply which bearirn it is associated with. .i PAGE 53
APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 143 170 J-Hardle RIO25 J-Hardle control settirg Rewire and relabel mntrol so 4 tRIN 'IURBI!E values do rut ircrease with a that the sapence of activa-
'IUIUmn GER !CIOR clockwise rotation; 'Ihe tion frm left to right is JC IIIS-30C/PG13 RAP 2 sequence is fran S t o p , Run S'ITP, RUN (Slow Speed), PUN (Fast Speed), to Ttun (Slow (Past Speed).
Speal) 144 187 J-Itardle RID 25 "MMD" label cn control Permanently affix " NMO" label 4 MN 'IURBDE setting is a decal ard to control by enravirq or LIrr PtNP therefore subject to easy etchirq label into control BEARDU 3 renoval. surface and fillirn with a 4 black pigrnent. - 5 6 7 -
> B m
10 i 1 i i j PAGE M
l APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER I45 88 Trend Recorders: RID 26 The labelirg for the 2 pointers Change the labelirg m the 2 en each recorder inconsistently Trml Recorder face to
^ refers to train A&B as 1&2 SG A, SG B, SG C, 9' D.
AE m-50 respectively. S1 TAM GE2ERAM C & D WIDE Examples: ME N AE W503 gg 7p y g_,9y gyg gg) STEN 4 GENERA'IOR A & B PRESSURE 7B PR-514 SITN1 GENERA'ICR PRESSURE AB PR-555 146 39 Trend Recorders: RID 26 'Ihese displays nust be read 1. Increase the size of the 2 while operatirq a control on scale characters to N N 70RS A & B M the RID 06 panel. h viewing 0.65 inches.
> distance is approximately 2. Move the RIDO6 console b
N S'IEN4 GE2ERATORS C & D WIDE O feet. hheWt is .25 inches. For effective cle M h M6 ccmsole.
## readiry frm that distance 3. Incorporate steam
"
- 9 * * ## #
SITN1 GENERA'IORS A & B inches. 1he problem is level and pressure N further cmpoundal by indicators into the RICO6 STEAM GENERATORS C & D se pah W. N wide rarne levels on one trerd recorder. 'Ihis makes reading se paw vertical Displays: (B and D) difficult as the SIEAM GENERA'IOR pointer is placed below and A, B, C, D, LEVEL recessed behird the scale. SIEAM GENERA'IOR A, B, C, D, PPJE9JRE PAGE 55
I e e sum m sun m APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
NUMBER NUMBER ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY 147 194 Nerd Recorders: RID 26 These are groupal so that all Ctrnbine each separate ST4 4 S7T/M GDERATER A & B WIIE the ST4 Gmerator A Trend reator IcVel ard Pressure gg m infortnation is not grouped m the sane recorder ard with the other ST1 Generator group with the appropriate STUN GDERATOR C & D WIDE A information, etc., You have Cbntrols and Displays. MGE IIVEL SD1 Generator A level in with SIUN GE2 ERA 10R A & B NE ST4 Generator C Displays etc. SIUN GDERATCR C & D PRESSURE Y IS PAGE "
muu uno mas num ums seu num num - uns uma e APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
HEF ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY NUMBER NUMBER 148 115 vertical Meters: Ino26 h vertical meters are Group the 'nzrb A meters 3 I MFW PtNP 'IURB A 'IURB BTG OIL arranJa! in the follcning above the 'Ibrb A Controls PRESS M PI-64A
* ^ , sh
'Ibrb B Turb BIG Oil, ' th ' nab B Centrols.
PISS m 6.A associatal ccntrols for Amp A I
" * *C 1"
- MEW PtNP 'IURB A PtNP BIG OIL 6 N PI-6M the 'IUP3 BIG Oil Press Meters and tM Cbntrols for 'Jbrb B MEW MHP 'IURB B REP BFG OIL PRESS E PI-168A ess, m % a y functicnal groupin; of 'nzrb A displays with ocntrols, and
[ 'nzrb B displays with controls. f i . 1 PAGE 57 i
i APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING FIND'NG
SUMMARY
SU""# ITEM DESCRIPTION LOCATION FINDING RECOMMENDED BACKFIT PRIORITY uUMBER NUMBER 149 47 J-Handle RID 27 J-lhndle control violates Relabel and rewire the 3 gg g g gg directimf-covenent cmtrol to convert it to the MA ItS-7 sweoW. follwW dhWm of activation, Functim Omtzel Actim m right, clockwise , off leftscountercloc) wise raise right, clockwise lower left; counter-clockwise 150 123 Ibtary Omtrol RID 27 The handle is removable in Redesign so that the 3 either ON or OFF position < handle can be removed 2C OM MY ME This creates a confusing only in the OFF position e MA HS-7 situation where the oper-
- ator cannot visually ver-
$ ify the switch position 4
l l l PAGE- 58
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i APPENDIX B EVALUATION OF COMPUTER SYSTEM l MAN / MACHINE INTERFACE ! I I I I I I I lI
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1.0 BACKGROUND
The SNUPPS computer system contains equipment located in the computer room, turbine building, electrical penetration-separation groups, and the control room. The Balance of Plant (BOP) System communicates, via data links, with the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) and with an off-site computer. The BOP system provides the primary computerized plant interface for the operator and supports process data acquisition, alarm ~ng, logging, point maintenance functions, and appropriate data links with the NSSS and off-site computer facilities. A variety of sensors, contact inputs / outputs, analog outputs and counters are supported by the BOP system. Processing capabilities include: e Validity checking of sensors, equipment e Linearization e Zero clamp I e Calibration correction e Conversion of internal units to engineering units e Process alarm testing (contact cutout, process limits, significant limits, deadband) I e Point / alarm status establishment e Process or validity alarm initiation e Value status establishment. I The SNUPPS BOP system comprises two TDC 4500 computers. Either computer may (at any given time) assume the function of the on-line BOP computer. Concurrently, I the other computer will assume the backup BOP computer function. The two BOP computers, the NSSS computer are utilized to meet the computational requirements of SNUPPS. To efficiently convey the required data between the various computers, three dissimilar data links are used: e Asynchronous serial link between NSSS and on-line BOP e Asynchronous parallel link between backup and on-line BOP e Synchronous serial link between on-line BOP and off-site computer. B-1 I
I I' These communication links allow passage of various types of data to the printer or to color television monitors, for review by the CR operator. Alphanumeric characters, punctuation marks, format syinbols, and graphic symbols are used to represent the plant process information, including: e Data base initialization e Value/ status and calibration for analog and calculated addressable points e Alarms e Digital point changes e Nuclear performance calculations e Data link disable / failure I e Peripheral device status. Information can be entered on the display monitor by either the computer or the keyboards. The displays can have almost unlimited format and content. . Textual and numeric information can be displayed as well as schematic representations of the process or control system. Using a keyboard, the operator and the computer can exchange information quickly and effectively. The operator may request information from the computer, transmit information to the computer. Specialized computer functions and CRT outputs fcr any of the four CRTs are initiated by the operator through either of the two keyboards. Some printer outputs are automatically generated, whereas other.s are on a " demand" basis and are keyboard-initiated. These hard copy outputs are generated on the operator's printer, which is not located in the control room itself. This evaluation summarizes the human factors aspects of the Honeywell Process Video (HPV-2) Display Subsystem components which the control room operator uses either to input commands or data to or receive (output) data from the computerized data system. These components include the four CRTs, two keyboards, and the display formats that are generated as part of this subsystem. The Terminet printer used to obtain 1I hardcopy of various computer outputs is not located in the control room itself; therefore, the human factors review of its operation and capabili*ies will be relatively krief. B-2 I 4 1
I 1 2.0 RESULTS ! l 2.1 Keyboards Two Aydin Model 5115 keyboards are provided. One of these is positioned for standing operation below the two rack-mounted CRTs on the RLO20 panel; the other, suitable for seated operation, is positioned below and in front of the desk-mounted CRTs (on the RLOO3 panel). Both CR keyboards are functionally and physically identical, enhancing operator performance using either one. Standard keys are the alphanumeric keys, punctuation keys, cursor control keys, color switch keys, edit function keys, transmit data keys, and a 10-numeral key pad. In addition, a 45-key function code panel is flanked on either side by large ENABLE keys. The operator can tramit a function code to the computer by pressing the desired function key. The computer software recognizes the function code as specifying that a predetermined system function is requested by the operator. Each keyboard is vertically divided into three areas, each of which holds two horizontal groups of keys. Each of the six key groups is clearly and easily distinguishable from the others. The key labels are visible and legible, both from a seated and a standing position. The keys are easy to operate and give distinct tactile feedback when actiuted. The upp-r third of the keyboard contains a 45-key function keyboard (three rows with 15 keys each) flanked by two large ENABLE keys and a group of four channel selector keys. The function keys are color coded by function: e Grey - ENABLE keys e Red - operator functions e Cyan - log functions I e Green - point function e Blue - menu list functions e Yellow - maintenance function e Magenta - display suinmary function e White - engineer functions or unlabeled (unused) keys. B-3
I The color coding is an excellent concept and would be immensely valuable if carried to its logical conclusion, i.e., couping ali keys of the same color together, thereby combining coivr and position coding to reinforce the operator's memory for key functions. At present, the magenta keys are all physically adjacent, as are the cyan, the blue, and the yellow keys; the green and red keys are somewhat randomly distributed. The keys, color, and functional group are listed in Figures 1-3, in order from left to right, beginning with the topmost row. Appendix A in the SNUPPS BOP Operator Function Summary lists each function key with its selectable scitware options, required operator input data, and error messages. The four-channel select keys are white with black labels and numbered in logical sequence (1-4) from left to right. These keys allow the operator to designate which of the four CRTs will serve as the output device for data being entered at the keyboard or retrieved from the computer. Software functions also are available to permit the operator to designate the output device. The middle third of the keyboad contains a bank of color-coded edit function keys and a set of five carsor controf keys. Except for the DC POWER button (which illuminates when pressed to activate the keyboard), the edit function keys are used, not by the control room operator, but by technical personnel, for quick and easy modification of displayed information and screen display formats. The cursor keys are grey with white labels and provide the capability to move the cursor up, down, left, right, and to the home position. Pressing two of the keys at the same time will move the cursor at a 45 angle in the direction of the two keys. The home key moves the cursor to the first character position on the first line of the display. The lower third of the keyboard contains a display data keyboard and a number pad, both containing grey keys with white labels. The display data keys allow for the transmission of a total of 128 display symbols. Of these 128 symbole,64 are alphanumeric dDd punctuation characters, 4 are tab, cursor, and selective characters, and 60 are special l graphic symbols. The keys are positioned in - standard QWERTY arrangement, with 1 SHIFT LEFT and SHIFT RIGHT keys provided to activate either of two uppercase characters for each key. (Lowercase character is standard QWERTY capital letter or digit.) B-4
t The number pad is arranged in calculator fashion, with numerals 7,8, and 9 at the ' top, rather than in the recommended telephone-set fashion (numerals 1, 2, and 3 at the top). I I !g I I I l 1 1 1 B-5
i-I FIGURE 1 First (Top) Row of Keys I Key Color Functional Group Blank White None Blank Wnite None Post event review Rea Operator Trend pen select Magenta Display summary Pen summary Magenta Display summary Decimal point display Magenta Display aimmary I Summary display Magenta Display summary Bar chart Cyan Log Group display Cyan Log Operator log Cyan Log Operator log summary Cyan Log Demand Log Cyan Log Repeat log Cyan Log Point summaries Green Point I I I .I e.e 1 I
l FIGURE 2 Second (Middle) Row of Keys Key Color Functional Group X/Y plot White Engineer i Build point log White Engineer Build page White Engineer Video trend Operator I Print region Red Red Operator Major equipment log Red Operator Four blank keys White None NSSS demand Blue Menu list System index display Blue Menu list Alarm review Red Operator Alarm CRT select Red Operator Alarm acknowledge Red Operator I I I I I I 8-7 I I
I FIGURE 3 Third (Bottom) Row of Keys 1 I Key Color Functional Group Blank White None Point display Green Point Point print Green Point Point trend Green Point inset t value Yellow Maintenance Delete point Yellow Maintenance I Alarm ignore Yellow Maintenance Point restore Yellow Maintenance Restore peripheral Yellow Maintenance Restore process I/O controller Yellow Maintenance Device test Yellow Maintenance Point calibration Yellow Maintenance Change time /date Red Operator Blank key White None Repeat Red Operator I .I I I I e-s I I
I I Operator keyboard functions and activities are discussed in detail in the SNUPPS l BOP Operator Function Summary (Pub # 51001914). 2.2 Display Screens Two 25" CONRAC Model 5111 CRT screens are rack-mounted side by side in a fixed position on the RLO20 panel, with no provisions for adjusting the screen orientation about either the horizontal or vertical axis. The bottom edges of the screens are approximately six feet from the floor, producing some difficulty in reading characters near the top or I bottom of the screen when standing at the rack-mounted keyboard. For accurate reading of the scrun contents of these CRTs, the best position is in a star. ding posture directly in front of the Operator Control Console (OCC), between the OCC and the RLO20 panel (thus blocking the view of an operator seated at the OCC, in front of the twa 19" desk-mounted CRT screens in the OCC). As one moves either to the right or to the left of the rack-mounted CRTs to operate controls on the RL0ll, RLO26 or RLO28 panels, accurate reading of the screen contents is impaired. This is aggravated by glare, ambient lighting, and the lack of easily accessible controls to adjust contrast, brightness, or color. Two 19" CONRAC Mode! Sill CRTs are mounted in a fixed position side by side on the extreme right end of the OCC (panel RLOO3). The screen contents of these CRTs are easily read by an operator in either a standing or seated position directly behind the OCC. I As one progresses to the extreme left end of the OCC (panel RL001), screen formats are increasingly hard to read. Seven colors (magenta, blue, white, green, red, yellow, and cyan) are used for display characters. A!! colors are distinguishable from a distance of two feet or less, although characters in magenta or blue are more difficult to see or read at greater distances. One operator can control the output to all BOP CRTs from either keyboard allowing for one-man operation. However, an operator standing at the rack-mounted keyboard cannot read the contents of the desk-mounted CRTs, and an operator positioned at the desk-mounted keyboard cannot easily read the screen contents of the rack-mounted CRTs. When two operators are using the keyboards simultaneously, the potential exists for one operator's requested CRT displays to be erased, inadvertently or otherwise, by the B-9
I I other operator. As yet, no integrated communications strategy and operating proceoures have been developed or documented for operator use of the computer system devices in I the control rcom. I The CRTs use a scanning rate of 50 frames per second, with 357 scan lirm per field, at a horizontal scan rate of 17,850 lines per second, in a noninterlaced field scan mode. The 48 display lines used 336 of the 357 scan lines. The remaining 21 lines are used at the I upper and lower display edges and in the vertical fly-back. Preset controls for contrast, brthtness, and color are enclosed within the chassis and are not accessible to the plant operator. Each display is formed by a matrix of 80 character positions on each of 48 display lines, to produce a total of 3,840 standard size character slots. Large size character slcts are made up of two character positions by two display lines to form a matrix of 40 by 24, for a total of 960 large size character slots. Each standard size character position on the display consie,ts of a matrix of 7 vertical scan lines by 7 horizontal bit positions. Alphanumeric characters are displayed within the character position on a 5 by 3 matrix, while graphic characters are displayed in the full 7 by 7 character position matrix. Each large size character position on the dinlay consists of a matrix of 14 scan lines by 14 bit positions, i ith the display character being displayec' within a matrix of 9 scan lines by 7 bit posi'.nons. A blinking underline marker called the cursor is always present on the screen. The cursor indicates either the position at which the next entered character will be displayed, or the location from which a character will be read for a transmit operation. The cursor may be controlled by the operator from the keyboard and can be moved to any position on the screen witnout changhg any of the displayed data. Color signals are carried to the CRT on three cables, one each for red, green, and blue outputs. The seven available colors (white, yellow, magenta, cyan, red, green, and blue) are derived by switching the three outputs on or off, in combination, to produce the desired color. The use of pure blue for character display rarely produces a satisfactory character appearance because when the CRT is adjusted to produce a pure white, the B-10 I I
1 1 I l
- I brightness and contrast of the blue video is so low that the character may not easily be seen.
!I All characters are upright (not slanted), and there is no problem in distinguishing the letters "O" and "I" from the numerals "0" and "1." The following character dimensions are I utilized for 19" and 25" CRT screen displays of standard size characters: 19"(48.26 cm) Display 25"(63.5 cm) Display Position / Graphic Height .20" (.50 cm) .27" (.69 cm) Width .18" ( 46 cm) .24" (.61 cm) Alphanumeric Height .15" (.38 cm) .20" (.50 cm) W'dth .13" (.33 cm) .17" (.43 cm) For large size characters, the following dimensions are used: 19"(48.26 cm) Display 25"(63.5 cm) Display Height .40" (! cm) .54" (1.38 cm) Width .36" (.92 cm) .48" (.86 :.T.' Alphanumeric Height .27" (.69 cm) .36" (.91 cm) I Width .18" (.46 cm) .24" (.61 cm) There are 60 graphic characters available for use in building shape coded symbols (e.g., pipes, shapes, lines, tanks). Twenty-three of the characters are made of I dot wide strokes,19 of 3 dot wide strokes, and 18 symbols of general use (e.g., arrows, hollow square, solid square). 2.3 Display Formats The Honeywell SEER, VIEW, and RTMOS permit real-time definition and mainte-nance of screen display formats. Plant process data can be displayed within the predefined formats on the CRT screens. These software modules provide a set of powerful and flexible tools for developing CRT displays. A wide variety of features is asailable: e Single or multiple pages e Standard or user-defined title or text blocks on every page B-11 I .I
I I e Alphanumeric text , I e Graphic, point value/ quality, or point description / engineering value data e Conditional attributes (e.g., open/ closed, on/off) represented I according to analog alarm status, digital point status, analog / digital conversion (levels, flow, etc.) e Attributes such as color, blink status, intensity, video status, character size, orientation, and data refresh rate, that can be associated with any display item for enhancement of critical information e Eight-color coding scheme: magenta, blue, white, green, red, yellow, cyan, orange I e One hundred twenty-eight characters including graphic and punctuation symbols, mathematics, engineering, and power symbols, and Greek letters E e Predefined displays for group, page, point, alarm, video trend, bar 3 graph, and summary displays e Graphic symbols for use in constructing displayed process lines, pumps, valves, breakers, and other devices or equipment e Bar chart display for up to 10 operator-designated sets of points and scale limits per display page 'g e Vertical video trend display for up to four uniquely colored, operator-selected points and trend limits, base, and interval with optional , shading e Point summary displays, including summaries of out-o f-scan analog / digital values; analog, digital, and composed points in alarm; analog / digital values that have been manually inserted in the data I base; field association comparison; point / status internal addresses; point status /value and limits data e Trend summary displays for decimal points, analog trend pen points, I or operator log points e Point maintenance functions allowing the operator to substitute temporary values for inputs, calculated values, or constants (thereoy I suspending normal scan); to remove analog input, composed value, contact input, or composed contact from alarming; or to restore l points to scan or alarm. The operator's keyboards are used for operator requests to the computer. Console operation is in conversational mode and uses the conversation area of the screen for operator input and computer responses. In this mode, the computer asks for one item of B-12 I I
I I data at a time, accepts the input, and validates it before proceeding to the next item. Invalid operator input causes an error response. When a Point ID as needed for a request, the computer displays the point's descriptive name after the operator has entered the Point ID. If no console input is received within a fixed time period, or if the operator I enters an abort request, the request is aborted and the conversation area returned to its former status. A function request in process may be restarted or aborted in favor of another function by pressing the desired function button. Selected functions, such as the NSSS Operator Console Requests, are initiated via menu lists that display the available functions or parameters for each menu. Included on the display line for each function are the parameters or range of parameters required to initiate the function and an identifier for the operator to use in selecting the desired function. When the desired function is selected, the function line and its associated parameters are highlighted to aid the operator's scanning activities. Video operations are generally divided into two parts: the initial honoring of the request, at which time the entire data required is displayed; and a cyclic updating of values. If the operator is making a request, the updating will skip cycles for that screen only until the format is stable. Video demand functions preempt the current demand screen without the operator having to cancel previous requests. I Page-forward and -backward capabilities are provided to permit operator review of data for a function extending over multiple screen images or "pages." A page is defined as that group of items that can fit in the area of the screer, used by the function selected. .I Color coding for computer / operator interaction is as follows: o Computer questions - yellow e Operator responses - green e Error messages - cyan e Acknowledge / verification messages - green. Color coding for demand displays is as follows: e Points in normal status - green e Analog points in alarm - yellow e Digital points in alarm - red B-13 j I I
l l I
i I e Out-af-service / failure messages - cyan e Message types (headers, etc.) - white.
Screen display formats for some 25 plant subsystems have been developed. Ten of l
the subsystems have multi-page display formats; the other subsystems have single-page i screen displays. These dispMya are accessible by pressing the Plant System index function l
key and then entering the pag system Title - top center line I o Subsystem Code - centered below Subsystem Title o Engineering Units - bottom line e Operator Precautionary Messages - bottom center of screen.
The cursor is clearly distinguishable from all other characters and blinks continuously. Cursor positioning movements by the operator are minimized by software features and keyboard TAB, REVERSE TAB, and PAGE keys. As data are entered on the keyboard, they are displayed on the screen.
The system provides extensive flexibility to the operator in controlling the amount and complexity of information displayed by choosing specific display frames (although specific subsystem display formats are predetermined during display construction), or by using the specialized func ion keys to request associated information displays for bar charts, video trends, po nts, logs, alarms, and so forth, for operator-designated parameters.
Standard symbols have been developed to represent the location, configuration, and status of 11 devices (valvea, darrpers, transformers) and 18 pieces of equipment (pumps, fans, steam generators, heat exchangers, turbines, tanks, and so forth) in the subsystem B-14 E
I I display farmats. Some of these symbols are identical to those used in the SNUPPS P&lDs, while others are similar, and several do not appear on the P&lD symbol legends a t all.
I The symbols are all sufficiently unique to facilitate rapid operator identification of the respective device or component and its status.
For electrical breakers only, color coding is used to indicate closed (red)/ locked out (green) status. For process lines and in-line equipment in the subsystem screen formats, I the following color coding conventions are observed:
e Cyan - flowing liquid fluid I e Magenta
- pressurized steam I energized electrical systems e White - operating ventilation air e Blue - pressurized hydrogen and nitrogen containing lines and I enclosures e Green
- aonflowing liquid fluid I - nonpressurized steam or gas
- deenergized electrical systems e Yellow I - active process line with undefinable actual status due to lack of computer-based information
- equipment outline such as tanks, heaters, etc., when no other behavior is specified.
Alphanumeric information on the subsystem screen formats is color-coded as follows: e White
- date and time
- parameter values within normal limits e Red - parameter values in alarm condition I e Black on yellow background - static, nonvariable data (titles, equipment labels, engineering units, parameter identifiers prefixing parameter values, last revision date, other notes).
The use of the varied color coding conventions tends to place a burden on the operator's memory and contributes to stimulus overload in emergency situations, rather than facilitating search and scanning behavior. The computer software has capabilities B-15 I E
I I for associating altered color, blink status, or video status with alarm conditions in device status (open/ closed, on/off, digital point status, analog alarm status, or ana!ng/ digital I conversion of levels, flows, etc. . Utilizing more of these capabilities rather than relying so heavily on color coding techniques would enhance operator performance. l I The operator's videos are partitioned into two 24-line reb ions vnd a full screen 48-line region. The upper 24-line region is primarily intended for operator communi-I cations. When not in use, however, the operator communication area may be used to present point or group displays, point trends, bar charts, summaries and half page schematics. The same displays are also applicable to the bottom 24-line region. The full screen region permits display of f"Il page schematics. The Alarm Video is divided into two regions. The top region is for primary alarms, while the bottom is for secondary alarms. Additionally, the lower 24 lines of the Alarm Video may be used for operator communications when the video is not being used to display alarms. The following are considered to be primary alarms: e Analog sensor failure e Analog sensor reading unreasonable e Process limit exceeded e Significant limit exceeded e Contact group validity failure e Abnormal equipment status as detected by a digital change of state e Peripheral failure e PIU Failure e Highway Failure e PIU Board Failure e NSSS function acknowledgements (advisory message) e Backup computer failure. A maximum of nine primary alarms may be displayed on one page at a time. These primary alarms are displayed in double size characters, on the top 24 lines of the screen. . The following are considered to be secondary alarms: B-16 I l I l
I e Analog validity \ ~ e Analog sensor reading unreasonable e Abnormal equipment status e Digital group validity e peripheral failures ; 1 e PIU failure l e Highway failures l e PIU board failure o Returned to normal e NSSS function acknowledgements (advisory message) e Post event review advisory message. A maximum of nine secondary alarms may be displayed on one page at one time. These e,econdary alarms are displayed, using small size characters, on the bottom 24 lines of the screen. The alarm display, whether for primary or secondary alarms, contains the following e Time of alarm e Point / alarm status I e Point ID e Point name e Point value (or status if contact) I e Value status e Engineering units (if not contact) e Violated limit (if not contact) Formats for alarms and other operator messages have been developed that include certain data fields appearing in standardized positions within the message. These data fields include: e Time - HH:MM (messages) or HH:MM:SS (alarms) e Message type - one of 32 6-character symbols specifying reason for message e Point / alarm status - one of 32 4-character symbols documenting point status I I l
--.- -. .,. g w- -
I I e Point ID character symbol identifying process variable o Point name - alphanumeric descriptor identifying process variable e Point value, increment or limit - numeric data preceded by i 2-character alpha code indicating increment or limit I e Value status character alpha code mnemonic indicating quality of value o Engineering units - one of 128 6-character codes defining meaning of value e Alphanumeric message - general information e Computer cycle time or (optionally) millisecond time e Equipment status - one of 128 6-character symbols indicating I e equipment status Contact status - 0 (open) or 1 (closed) state of digital equipment contact. The various symbols utilized to represent the data fields conform to population stereotypes, use mnemonic codes or abbreviations, and conform to HFE recommendations for lengths of character strings. A variety of video display capabilities are provided to assist the operator in monitoring plant data: e Group displays - for displaying values of more than one point at a time e Point displays - for displaying value of any point I, e Page displays - for displaying alphanumeric pages (including point values and status) e Alarm review - for displaying alarms in sequence of occurrence (most recent alarms are displayed first) e Primary alarms - process limits, digital status, data link failure Secondary alarms - analog validity, digital validity, peripheral I e e failures, process 1/O failures Summary displays - point summaries e Video trends - allows operator to select up to four points for trending on video at one time (each trend is assigned a unique color) e Bar charts - operator selects points and point limits to be displayed e NSSS function acknowledgements B-18 I I !
I . i I e Operator advisory messages. I 2.4 Hard Copy Capability No hard copy device is planned to be immediately accessible by the operator in the control room. However, an extensive output capability is provided on the operator's printer. If the operator's printer were located in the control room and were provided with I adequate acoustic shielding, the printed outputs would enhance the operator's monitoring and diagnostic performance. These printed outputs are briefly summarized below. A number of periodic logs of point values and status are produced on the operator's printer. These logs include the following: e Plant alarms e Operator messages I e NSSS function acknowledgements e Summaries e Sequence of Events. I I I I l I I e.1, lI
I
3.0 CONCLUSION
S AND RECOMMENDATIONS I This section summarizes the human factors rpcts of the Honeywell Process Video Display Subsystem components used by the control room operator for inputting data to or receiving (outputting) data from the SNUPPS computerized data system. In general, the equipment is accessible, well designed, and easy to operate; the software provides an intensive and flexible set of capabilities for designing output display formats used to present a variety of types of information to the operator. The system may be comfortably utilized by a single operator, although two-man operation is also feasible. Those aspects of equipment or display format that should be modified to I enhance operator performance are highlighted in the paragraphs below. It would also be desirable to include written guidelines for using the computer system under a comprehensive or integrated communications strategy. 3.1 Keyboards The numeric key pad is arranged in calculator style (numerals 7,8, and 9 at the top) rather than in the recommended telephone-set style (numerals 1,2, and 3 at the top). The 45-key function keyboard contains various color coded function keys. The green (point function) keys, the red (operator function) keys, and the white (engineer function or unlabeled) keys are not g ouped by color, but are somewhat randomly distributed. Grouping of all keys of one ':olor has been followed for the magenta, cyan, blue and yellow keys; this grouping procedare should be extended to include the green, red, and white keys. The 45-key function keyboard contains yellow (maintenance function) and white (engineering or unlabeled function) keys that appear not to be intended for use by CR operators. A software or mechanical lock-out should be provided for these keys if they are not intended for CR operator use. i The four channel-select keys on each keyboard allow an operator at either keyboard l 1 to designate any of the four CRTs as output devices. While this flexibility is l B-20 l
I advantageous, during 2-man operation one operator might inadvertently or purposely designate as an output device a CRT currently displaying data of value to the other operator, thus erasing such data. It is suggested that software functions be developed which retain output flexibility but which require one operator to take a moment to verify that the designated CRT screen does not contain data valuable to the other operator. An operator positioned at the rack-mounted keyboard cannot see the OCC-mounted CRTs. Training and written procedures should emphasize that an operator positioned at the rack-mounted keyboard should not designate either of the two OCC-mounted CRTs as output devices for his own viewing. 3.2 Display Screens Specifications for the control room CRTs indicate that brightness, color, and contrast are preset at the factory and that easily accessible controls are not provided. it is recommended that controls for brightness, color and contrast be made available not to casual observers but to CR operating personnel. Such controls would ensure that screen contents are maximally visible and legible, despite any " drift" that might occur over time. The rack-mounted CRTs are positioned so that lower screen edges are approximately six feet above the standing surface, impairing character legibility at the lower and upper edges of the screens. Visual displays mounted on vertical panels should be placed perpendicular to the operator's line of sight if possible, preferably between 41 and 70 inches above the standing surface. Displays to be read precisely and frequently should be placed in an area 50 to 65 inches above the standing surface. For both sets of CRTs, reading of screen contents is increasingly difficult as an operator moves to operate controls on the RL 011, RL 026, RL 028, or RL 001 panels (i.e., the far right or far left end of the boards). This condition is aggravated by ambient lighting, glare, and the lack of easily accessible controls for adjusting contrast, brightness or color. An obvious comment concerning the CRTs is that an operator positioned somewhere between the RL 011 and RL 028 panels may be able to read RL 020 CRT contents but canr.ot read the contents of the RL 003 CRTs. An operator positioned somewhere B-21
i I ; I between the RL 001 and RL 003 panels can always see any of the four CRTs, but probably cannot read the contents of the RL 020 CRTs, and even the detailed contents of the RL 003 CRTs may not be legible. 3.3 Display Formats Standard symbols have been developed to represent the location, configuration and status of 11 devices (valves, dampers, transformers) and 18 pieces of equipment (pumps, fans, steam generators, heat exchangers, turbines, tanks, etc.) in the 25 plant subsystem display formats. Some of these symbols are identical to those used in the SNUPPS P & ids; others are similar, and several do not appear in the P & ID symbol legends at all. While the symbols are all sufficiently unique to permit rapid operator identification of a device or component and its status, overall operator performance would be enhanced by using display format symbols as similar as possible to those used on the SNUPPS P & ids. Any symbology chosen should be used consistently throughout the CR operating procedures, written materials or visual display formats. Display format color coding conventions vary according to the type of information displayed. Different color codes are used for the three major categories of displayed information. These categories are: e Computer / operator conversations e Demand displays e Plant subsystem displays. Within the plant subsystem displays, color coding is used in different ways to depict three types of information: e Electrical breaker status e Process lives and in-line equipment e Alphanumeric information. The use of the varied color conventions tends to place a burden on the operator's memory and contribute to stimulus overload in emergency situations, rather than facilitating visual search and scanning behavior. The computer software has extensive capabilities for associating altered color, blink status, or video status with alarm B-22 I
L [ conditions in device status. Utilizing one or more of these capabilities instead of relying so heavily on color coding techniques would enhance operator performance. Using one coding technique (such as video status, blink or a particular color) to indicate only one ( status, level or condition (such as on/off or alarm status) would improve operator performance. Whatever coding techniques are selected for indicating critical information should be used consistently throughout the system to represent one type of condition. For example, if reverse video is used to indicate analog alarm status, then it should never be f used to indicate digital values within normal limits. When choosing colors for CRT display formats, magenta and blue should be avoided Using pure blue for character display rarely produces a satisfactory appearance due to the { CRT's engineering characteristics. When the CRT is adjusted to produce a pure white, the brightness and contrast of the blue video are so low that the character is not easily [ visible. Magenta characters may be visible but legibility is reduced. This condition is aggravated due to ambient lighting, glare, and lack of controls to adjust brightness, color b or contrast. { 3.4 Hard Copy Capability Although extensive output capability is planned on the operator's printer, timely use [ of these outputs by CR personnel, particularly under emergency conditions, is unlikely. , Current planning does not include a hard copy device located in the CR and immediately accessible by CR operators. Providing an operator's printer with adequate acoustic { shielding in the control room itself would enhance the operator's monitoring and diagnostic performance. [ [ [ [ [
, B-23
[ [
1 I l 1 I I APPENDIX C SPECIAL STUDIES i C-1 ANALYSIS OF ANNUNCIATOR PRIORITIZATION CONCEPTS C-2 PLANT STATUS MONITORING ' C-3 CONTROL AND DISPLAY ENHANCEMENT I i d I i I . I I I i I I
. . - , - . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . - . _ -._..-m. _- _ ..- . --- -
I , l I
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l i a j APPENDIX C-1 ANALYSISOF ANNUNCIATOR PRIORITIZATION CONCEPTS 4 4 1 I l 1 4 i a
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I 1.0 OBJECTIVE: to identify and evaluate alternate concepts for SNUPPS annunciator ,, prioritization.
2.0 METHOD
the approach to this study began with an analysis of requirements associated with annunciators, proceeded through an evaluation of alternate design concepts, and ended with a description of the selected option. 3.0 RESULTS 3.1 Requirements Analysis An annunciator system must: ! e immediately attract the attention of a busy or bored operator e Adfise the operator of the location and nature of the problem I e Advise the operator as to the priority of the problem o Not interfere with the operator's continued attention to other duties e Not alarm spuriously e Not f ail. Coerator functions associated with the annunciator system are: e Detect a problem o Identify the problem e Determine that the problem warrants immediate attention e Determine that the problem indication is valid e Identify the system involved e Diagnose the problem -isolate the cause I o Decide on a course of action e Take action e Verify the action. I I I C-1.1 m
I M M M M M M M M WM M M M M M M Conditions Affecting Function System Requirement Operator Performance o Detect a problem e i..dication is attention-getting but not start- e operator location with respect to the indi-
. ling cator e unambiguously indicate a system level e confusion of units where two units share one problem room o display a problem indication at all possible e masking of auditory signal and density operator locations s number of annunciators
.e ond problem on same iridicator rings e s;'atial distribution of annunciators o identify the problem o indicator labeling / markings must be immedi- e contrast of labeling and background ately readalole by an operator at any location o brightness distribution of the window e labeling / markings must unambiguously indi- e glare from overhead lighting n cate the cause of the problem e size of labeling e auditory signal should unambiguously identify h the room and the panel e number of illuminated annunciators o Determine that the problem e problems should be prioritized from "immedi- e ongoing activity - workload warrants immediate ate response required" to " deferred action e clarity of decision rules attention OK e discriminability of different signals e priority should not vary with operational mode o Determine that the indica- e when an annunciator activates, it should indi- e false alarm rate - nuisance alarms tion is valid cate that a problem is detected . arrangement of annunciators and associated e annunciator location should facilitate check displays reading of displays e clarity of decision rules o identify the system wished e annunciator location should facilitate e annunciator location with respect to system (desired) problem identification panes
M M M~ M~ M W M M M M M M M M M M' Conditions Affecting Function System Requirement Operator Performance o Diagnose the problem and e annunciator position facilitates identification e number of annunciators simultaneously acti-isolate the cause of affected component, subsystem, train and vated for the same problem system e annunciator location e annunciator label should identify the system' e first-out indicator array location component, condition and nature of the problem e annunciator location should facilitate reading appropriate displays e annunciator coding should clearly indicate the first-out condition causing a reactor trip e first-out indicators should be readable at any location in the room c2 ,' o Decide on course of action e annunciator labeling must indicate nature of e clarity of decision rules the problem o procedures should include decision criteria e annunciators include permissives indicating legal and illegal actions o Take action e activate controls e control / display arrangements e monitor displays o Verify the action e annunciator activation should include an indication of problem cleared e problem-cleared indication unmistakably dif-ferent from new problem indication e positive action for operator to remove cleared annunciator
I I 3.2 Design Options
~
Based on these requirements, a number of annunciator sys'.em characteristics i were identified. Alternate design approaches for each characteristic were I developed. Advantages and disadvantages of each design option are discussed below. Characteristic: Priority Coding Option 1 Color and Location
Description:
coding immediate response annunciators - red and placed at the top of an array; 2nd order annunciators - amber or yellow and located on second line; 3rd order (deferred action okay)- white and located on third and/or fourth line; permissives - blue and located I on fif th and sixth line Advantage 3 e onambiguously indicates order of priority e allows operator to respond rapidly when he needs to, and to attend to other pressing problems for lower priority display activations Disadvantages e unsymmetrical array - many more third-level I e annunciators than first- or fourth-level contrast of black label on red panel could degrade readability e reduces options for indicator grouping within an array Option 2 Color, Location and Coded Auditory Signal
Description:
same as Opt 5n 1, except that the auditory signal accompanying light activation is coded (by fre-I quency or type of tone) to ir.dicate priority Advantages I e operator doesn't even need to visually acquire the annunciator to establish the priority level Disadvantages e requires memorization of auditory signals e operator must differentiate signals for a 2-unit room e signals must be clearly discriminable - shouldn't lead to judgment of a third-order priority when in fact it is an immediate-response priority e signals can be masked by voice communication, I ambient noise, other signals ! C-1.4
I I Option 3 Color Coding Alone I
Description:
color code described in Option 1 above Advantages l e allows more flexibility in grouping indicators e enables rapid determination of priority Disadvantages e slower reaction time than Option 1 e aging can change spectral composition of win-dow - making a white window appear yellow e places a burden on operators who confuse color { easily 1 j Option 4 Location Alone
Description:
window all white and located as in Option 1 Advantages e no color problems Disadvantages e potentially misreading a second-order problem as a third-order I Option 5 Flash vs. No Flash or Different Rate
Description:
with either color, location, or color and location coding, problems of the first and second order flash, problems of the third order don't flash or flash at a different rate Advantages e rapid judgment that immediate action is not required I Disadvantages e confusing a newly lit, nonflashing window with one already acknowledged e requires memory for different rates e discriminability of different rates Characteristic: Panel Identification Option 1 Central Master Warning Array
Description:
at a central location, a matrix of lights' indicates location of relevant panel Advantages e facilitates rapid selection of panel I 1 C-1.5
( ( l l I Disadvantages , e central location may not be optimal depending on ; operator location ) e still need to acquire panel to determine priority Option 2 Color Coded Central Master Warning Array
Description:
same as Option 1, except that lights ir.dicating panels are color coded to indicate problem , priority 1 Advantages e immediate centrally located indication of problem priority I . e no panel scanning required until priority is estab-lished e can be seen from any point in the control room Disadvantages e color problems - operator vision and window aging e treatment of panels not in the control room
.,, tion 3 Local Indicators I
Description:
a light over each panel and array of annun-ciators which illuminates to indicate that the problem is at this panel Advantages e operator needn't scan each array Disadvantages I e operator does need to scan the panels e does not indicate priority until the individual window is acquired Option 4 Local Indicators - Color Coded
Description:
same as Option 3, except that three color I coded lights indicate priority at each panel Advantages e determination of priority sooner than in Opt ion 3 e focuses attention on the afffected panel Disadvantages e christmas tree effect - too many lights Op_ tion 5 Coded Auditory Signal I
Description:
with any of Options 1 through 4, an uuditory signal dif ferentiated by intensity or frequency to indicate, panel number I C-1.6 i l
I I Advantages e reduces time to acquire the panel l Disadvantages ; y a requires memory e discrimiriatien of signals e raaskii.g of signals c problem of two units in one room Characteristic: Annunciator Relationship to Associated Panel Option 1 Color Coding
Description:
annunciators or annunciator borders are color coded to match colors of associated display back-grounds Advantages ' e facilitates correlation of annunciator and display Disadvantages I e interferes with other color coding options e could result in a visually noisy panel Option 2 Mirrored Location Descriptior.. annunciator located in an array to corre-I spond to display location on tha panel Advantages e simplifies asswiation of window with display I - Disadvantages e if several displays scatiered over the panel are 4 associated with a window - taw best to arrange the window in the matrix Option 3 Integrated Annunciators / Displays
Description:
as an annunciator illuminates, a jewel light illuminates next to the associated display (s) _Advantam
.I e immediate and accurate correlation Disadvantages e difficult to implement for an existing board Option 4 Annur ciator Mimic
Description:
a mimic diagram depicts the spatial rela-tionships of annunciators I C-1.7
I I Advantages - e easier to see relationships Disadvantages e too busy e not evident that the approach is even feasible, much less manageable I Option 5 Hierarchical Arrangement
Description:
indicators for system, subsystem, train,
- component and element in hierarchical order Advantages e readily identi'y component Disadvantages e too much information e interferes with other position coding options Option 6 Label / Symbol Link
Description:
annunciators and related displays linked by labels, symbols or connecting lines Advantages I e facilitates correlation Disadvantages e connecting lines could be confusinh e symbols may require memory Characteristic: Grouping of Windows Within an Array Option 1 Grouping by Similarity
Description:
in this arrangement, windows are oriented vertically when elements are the same and parameters differ, and horizontally when elements differ and para-meters are the same Advantages , 1 e easy to relate annunciators to elements or para-I meters Disadvantages l e interferes with other position coding options e arrays tend to be asymmetrical in that numbers of items vary Option 2 Grouping by Priority Alone
Description:
windows prioritized vertically by order of l priority, arranged horizontally by importance within each order C-1.8
I Advantages e additional priority indication Disadvantages e not clear whether or not the horizontal ordering makes sense Option 3 Grouping by Priority and Similarity
Description:
windows arranged vertically by priority and horizontally by similarity 1 Advantages e reduces confusion Disadvantages l e need to demarcate similarity groups I 3.3 Selection of Most Effective Option Given the present SNUPPS design, the most viable option is to use color and location. The aarms could be divided into four levels: e Level One (First Order)- First-out and those alarms that could lead to potential plant, environment or personnel safety hazard. These should be red. The first-outs should remain where they are, but their section of the window matrices should b demarked and labeled. The other Level One annunciators should be iocated on the top row. e Level Two (Second Order)- Those alarms requiring immediate action to prevent equipment damage or a reactor or turbine trip. These should be amber or yellow and located on the second row. e Level Three (Third Order)- Those alarms that indicate out-of-I tolerance conditions or are advisory. These should be white and located on the third and fourth rows. e Level Four (Fourth Order)- Those alarms that are general I information or permissives. These should be light blue and located on the last two rows. 4.0 REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH Additional research is required to:
- 1) Select auditory signal characteristics
- 2) Select color contrast ratios -labels and backgrounds I 3) Select methods of indicating
- new problem detected l
l
- problem acknowledged C-1.9 1
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[ -
- problem cleared in the system second problem det cted
- 4) Criteria for false alarm rates
- 5) Criteria for number of displays illuminated simultaneously I 6) Criteria for selection of parameters for annunciation
- 7) Criteria for grouping of indicators within an array
- 8) Methods for correlating indicators with displays
- 9) Criteria for locating individual indicators within an array I
I I I I I I I I I I I I , c.i.io
I - i I i e I I APPENDIX C-2 PLANT STATUS MONITORING (SPDS) 4 ,I i I 1 I b i i 1 i I I - 1 E 1 l I
I I l 1.0 SPDS PROBLEM DEFINITION The concept of a plant safety panel designed to present an integrated display of operating data related only to fundamental plant safety, is one of several NRC requirements resulting from the accident at Three Mile Island. The Safety Parameter Display System, as it is more commonly recognized, is envisioned by the NRC as an operator aid designed to assist control room personnel in evaluating the safety status of the plant. The primary objective of the system is to present a continuous indication of plant parameters to key personnel, in the hope of preventing unsafe plant conditions. Recognizing that this information must be presented in the most efficient manner
. . possible, the NRC, through NUREG 0696, stipulates the need to incorporate human factors engineering (HFE) principles into the various aspects of SPDS design.
Volumes of research have been published on the subject of memory, although little, if any, of this research deals specifically with the unique demands placed upon the nuclear reactor operator. We do not have to delve very deeply into the literature before realizing that the storage capacity for a defined amount of information will be the same regardles: of where the information originated; whether the task involves monitoring displays in a auclear power plant or in an airplane cockpit, the demands imposed upon short-term I memory during stressful emergencies will evoke similar response patterns. During a plant transient, hundreds of displays simultaneously compete for the operator's attention. Hence, the incessant beckoning of these displays will overload the cognitive faculties of even the most intelligent and qualified operators. _ To aid the operator in assessing p! ant status, the parametes deemed most relevant for plant safety should be identified and presented in a dedicated area which is visually accc;sible from the primary operating position. Once the informational requirements have been identified and the panel location selected, a specific display medium must be chosen. According to a recent utility survey conducted by EPRI, 88 percent of the utilities plan to support SPDS functional requirements with a common, computerized data system. This implies the need for a display interface to facilitate the transfer of information between the computer and the user. The most efficient display presently ~ used to satisfy this pivotal function is the CRT display. I I C-2.1
The key to mitigating an emergency which may arise within the plant is speed and accuracy. Although the CRT display may seem to be a panacea, a plethora of potential problems plague this particular interface. Recent research indicates that 35 percent of an operator's time is spent scanning displays. This task represents the single greatest l factor accounting for operator time. Since the goal of human factors engineering is to maximize efficiency and minimize operator error, special attention should be given to the way in which information is presented. An effective user interface is essential to I facilitate the information transfer between the CRT screen and the human operator. Sound HFE recommendations rooted in empirically derived psychological principles must be made regarding the acquisition, organization, enhancement, and transfer of displayed data. During the p st stveral months, Essex has actively researched the SPDS concept proposed by other utisities. The remainder of this section contains discussion of the various design strategies we have reviewed. Included will be an analysis of the advantages and drawbacks inherent in each of the proposed methodologies, a recommendation for a minimum SPDS parameter set, an ex tmple SPDS display format and a note on human engineering evaluation of the display design. I I I I I l I 1 .I u C-2.2 E
I 2.0 SPDS DISPLAY FORMATS I Several approaches to the SPDS were presented at the recent EPRI-sponsored Conference on Computerized Operator Support Systems. A generic categorization of display formats discussed is given in Table 1, described below. Definitions and examples of the formats precede the table. Some of these formats are vendor / organization-specific at present. A particular organization's approach may include one or more of the formats, usually not on the same display page. In the SPDS application, dedicated pushbuttons are I commonly used to access different display pages. Features which can be used with the different formats are being considered or incorporated. These features include split screen, color coding, graphics, blinking, size coding, and various other display coding and enhancement techniques to facilitate data organization and rapid problem detection and diagnosis by the operator. Some SPDS concepts incorporate an alphanumeric or graphical fault diagnosis prompt which results from a computer weighting of variables which affect parameters that have exceeded set limits. For example, this prompt might display histogram bars of varying heights, where the height of each bar represents the probability of a certain fault. The matrices in Tables 1 and 2 provide a rating of the different generic formats, based upon a subjective human factors evaluation. In Table 1, each display format is rated according to whether it possesses (relative to the other formats) the performance features listed at the top of the matrix. For simplicity, a yes/no rating was used. The features are worded so that a filled cell indicates a desirable feature and an empty cell indicates the (relative) lack of that desirable feature. Table 2 lists the same display formats and features as Table 1, but a numerical ranking is used. The ranking procedure used is as follows. For each feature listed at the top of the matrix, each of the seven display formats was assigned a rank of I-7 (e.g., in column #3, " Monitoring and Detection," the Reference,l.ine and Histogram display format was judged generally best, and thus was assigned a rank of I on that feature). Where e tie occurred, the tied formats , were each assigned the average of the ranks they would otherwise have received (e.g., the . three occurrences of a rank of 2 in column #2, " Diagnosis," resulted from averaging the ranks 1,2, and 3). Before a rank was entered into its cell, it was first multiplied by the weighting factor for the feature being considered. In the example: already given, in each case, the weighting factor was 1; thus, the value of the rank did not change. In the last two columns, where the weighting factor was .5, the features listed therein were C-2.3
1 subjectively considered less critical than where the weighting factor was 1. Of course, different weightings can be used to reflect different criticality judgments, and totals . different than those given would reflect those weightings. The lower the total and overall ;
, rank, the better the format is judged to be. 1 il !I i
II .
!I II
- I i
il !I lI lI 1 i I !I !I d C-2.4 i
I . l SPDS GENERIC FORMATS
- 1. Reference Line & Histogram - This is a display of a single line on the screen. Points along
.Ne line represent variables at a criterion value. Variable labels reside at the side of the display. When a variable falls below or rises above the criterion value, the display takes the I appearance of a histogram with bars on either side (i.e., below or alMe the criterion value).
I - VARIABLE Sim. Gen. Pressure 4 i Stra. Gen. Level o l I Pressurizer Pressure
...etc.
1 o W I - O l I 4 >
- 2. Histogram & Reference Lines - This is a display of a histogram where the bars represent the values of labeled variables. Superimposed on the display are two parallel dashed lines defining the acceptable upper and lower limits of the posillon of the top of each histogram I bar.
lihtill11--- wwww g % % ,, ...etc. E I I
l I l I l 8 3. Octagon & Reference - This is an octagonal figure in which each of the 8 points of the l figure represents the value of a given parameter. Actually, two octagons are used, with the
- I actual parameter values (solid Ilne) superimposed over a reference octagon (dashed line).
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- 4. NSAC Safety Panel - This is a function oriented display with several pages. Each page is
, dedicated to monitoring a particular function (e.g., reactivity control, sufficient coolant I
inventory, containment integrity, etc.). Graphical representations of important variables contributing to the particular function are on each page. P I - l 1 - I PRIMARY COOLANT INVENTORY A "inin fg
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- 6. Piping & Instrumentation Diagram - This is a two dimensional sketch or abstraction of the I physical system components.
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,3 Purno j I 7, Hardwire - This refers to a consolidated grouping of hardwired displays; not computer driven l CRT displays. ^ j E , C-2.8 .
y . . . . _ _ - _ . _ . . lI TABLE 1 DISPLAY FORMAT FEATURES l FEATURE o e r 3
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DISPLAY FORMAT [; h' b f Ef l
- 1. Reference une & Histogram y y y y y y
- 2. Histogram & Reference Un X X X X X X I 2. Octagon & Referenc*
X X X X i I
- 4. NSAC Safety Panel y I y r
- 5. Tabled Reference & Actual Val" X X X X 7 I 8. Piping & Inetrumentation Diagram y y y ;
I 7. Hardwi'* X X 7 X I 1 I I C-2.9
- TABLE 2 DISPLAY FORMAT FEATURE RANKINGS
- I FEATURE & WEIGHTING FACTOR l 1 1 1 1 1 1 .5 .5 I -
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-I lg 33gj 3 z ! je DISPLAY FORMAT 8 E
5 a 3 k is I I: d 3 EE d Total Rank
- 1. Reference Line & Histogram 2 2 1 2 2 5 3 1.5 16.5 1
- 2. Histogram & Reference Lines 2 2 2 2 2 5 3 1.5 19.5 2
- 3. octagon & Reference 4 7 3 2 2 5 3 1.5 27.5 3
- 4. NSAC .tefety Panel 7 2 5 5 5 1 2 1.5 28.5 4
- 5. Tabled Reference & Actual Values I 6. Piping & Instrumentation D(agram 4 4 5 7 5 5 1.5 1.5 33 6 I 1. H.-
4 6 7 6 7 2 1 3.5 36.5 7 I I ' " - - ""'-"-~"**'"-'"'""'"'"'"~~"-''' I C-2.10
il - 3.0 SPDS PARAMETER SET Listed below is the minimum PWR SPDS parameter set recommended by Essex subject matter experts. I Radiation Monitors e Area e Main Vent e RCS I e Steam Generator e Containment Steam Generator e Level I e Pressure e (Feedilow - Steam Flow) Containment e Temperature o Pressure e Hydrogen Level Pressurizer e Level e Pressure Reactor Coolant System e AT e Core Exit Temperature e RCS Pressure l P.od Bottom Indication Power Range Indication I
- I
'I C-2.I1 ,I
n I 4.0 SPDS DISPLAY FORMAT - EXAMPLE I Figure 1 presents a proposed computer-driven single page SPDS display as submitted to Essex by a utility for human factors input. A 19" color graphics CRT is the planned mcde of display. Figure 2 presents Essex's revision of the display format. While elaboration of the details and dynamics of each display is not presented here, an examination of the two figures will reveal a regrouping and reformatting of information to simplify the display. These changes were made with the goals of reducing detection I time for abnormal conditions and improving operator information extraction. Other recommendation areas included coding methodologies, coding consistency (within the display and between the display and the control room), display resolution, and parameters to be monitored. Further evolution of the display is expected as the SPDS parameter set undergoe: final revision and as hardware input is received. For more details on this display, contact Essex Corporation. I I I.- I I I I , I . lI l C-2.12
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FIGURE 1. A UTILITY'S SPDS INPUT TO ESSEX (SEE FIGURE 2).
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LOOP 1 LOOP 2 LEVEL PRES F FLOW" LEVEL PRES S FLOW FIGURE 2. ESSEX REVISION OF SPDS DISPLAY.
5.0 A NOTE ON SPDS DISPLAY DESIGN EVALUATION The ultimate measure of the effectiveness of an SPDS display design, in a given : context, will be its contribution to use performance during normal and abnormal operating conditions. But deficiencies should be corrected before implementation if at all possible. Af terwards, awareness of design deficiencies may come as a result of a disaster and may be costly to remefy. Thus, we must consider approaches to a human factors evaluation of the SPDS display design before it is implemented. Common evaluation approaches are depicted in Figure 3 in a relationship to time and cost and the degree to which the resulting data would generalize to performance effectiveness. While the figure is a general and somewhat arbitrary statement, it is hoped that it will serve a useful purpose in considering trade-offs involving display effectiveness, evaluation time and cost, and the SPDS implementation schedule. As is illustrated on the lef t side of Figure 3, an answer to the questio, about display effectiveness can be tound by eliciting ratings of displays from appropriate groups (e.g., human factors specialists or proposed system asers). While the results will provide opinion ratings, they may not necessarily reflect what actual user performance wou!d be like on a given display. A process that would produce performance measures is shown on the right side of the figure. This quasi-experimental approach involves utilizing a simulator to evaluate different dynamic display concepts using "real-world" scenarios. The performance measures recorded could very closely relate to those that might be used to judge real-world operational performance. Some example performance measures are given in the figure. If realistic scenarios were utilized in this type of study, the results should generalize very well to the real world. This type of study is labeled " quasi-experimental" to reflect the f act that in applied settings, constraints of ten prohibit exercising complete experimental control over extraneous variables. The advantages of performing research under conditions closely matching those to which the results will be generalized are thought to mitigate the quasi-experimental nature of such applied work. Just as the performance data generated by the quasi-experimental approach is expected to better relate to operational performance than that generated by the first l I approach described, so too are cost and study time expected to be greater. The latter approach would require tnat displays be programmed, scenarios selected, on-site data collected within simulator schedule constraints, etc. Of course, other design evaluation C-2.15
r l approaches can be imagined. Another approach is depicted between the two that have already been described in the figure. It is somewhat intermediate in complexity, cost and generalizability to operational performance. Many other approaches are possible. l l
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l I l C-2.16
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r_7 I i I 3 i I Data's l GeneralizabilNy I I l Time A Few i I to Display . i l (Cost) Months- , g l Performance g l g Effectiveness g i i llll o l i i s S Several Weeks I,lr g l f l I i I [ l I l I l"' ' Ratings by Human Factors Experiment usig static representations of Quasi Exportment using practiced users, Example Experts and/or system users. proposed dynamic displays. Vary content, concurrent task loading and proposed approach: format, coding, etc. dynamic displays in simulator scenarios.
. Very content, format, coding, etc.
Compare control panel with SPDS. Subjective: Ratings, Objective: Time to detect problem, time to Could record the same types of data es Example listed for the experiment using static data: Comments and suggestions. Identify problem, time to diagnose, accuracy of identificationidlagnosis, etc. Subjective: user display (s). Since the quasi-experiment comments and suggestions. would run at real time, the results should more accurately generalize to en operational setting than would those from
- the experiment using static displays.
FIGURE 3. SOME EXAMPLE APPROACHES TO SPDS DISPLAY DESIGN EVALUATION
, . - _ - , - - , - - - - - - - - - - - , --n, .. -- --,,- a l '.
I APPENDIX C-3 CONTROL at DISPLAY ENHANCEMENTS l I , I I I ~ .
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This appendix addresses SNUPPS control and display design features which may be enhanced (in terms of operator reliability and acceptance of design) by a variety of means. These enhancements have ny necessarily been driven by specific human engineering discrepancy reports, but do relate to existing problems. Both general and specific recommendations are provided. The specific types of control / display enhancements addressed in this appendix are: e Integration of Display Parameters, based on operational and task require-ments (for example, comparisons of steam flow and feedwater flow to and from steam generators) e Integration of Controls, based on use (for example, combining control functions that are always used concurrently) I e Means to Reduce Problems of Mirror Imaging, in accordance with specific incidences of rairror imaging in the SNUPPS control room o Potential Use of Green Board, or related design practices in the SNUPPS control room, to filter and summarize information for the operator. Other considerations (control / display enhancements) are addressed as part of the above. Control rearrangements are dealt with, in part, under mirror imaging and control integrations. Specifically not addressed as part of this appendix are (1) miniaturization, and (2) means to highlight critical information on video monitors. Miniaturization has not been addressed since the its purposes are to: lessen the physical dimensions of the entire control space; reduce visual search; and reduce control room traffic. Given that the _ SNUPPS control room is already well into the construction phase, the potential gains of miniaturization cannot now be realized. In addition, some tendency towards miniaturization is evident at SNUPPS in the use of smaller breaker controls and valve controllers. Means to highlight information on video monitors is addressed in Appendix D,
" Evaluation of Computer System Man / Machine Interface".
The following discussions deal with specific areas of control display enhancement. I I : l l C-3.1
2.0 DISPLAY PARAMETERS WHICH COULD BE INTEGRATED OR JUXTAPOSED I Since displayed values in nuclear power plants frequently must be directly compared to one another, displays should be designed and positioned to facilitate this direct comparison without need for short-term memory or higher levels of information processing. The following is an example of such a design: Layout of the OT AT and OP AT set point trend recorder and loopwise hot / cold leg recorders (RLO22) can be rearranged to better present t'he information, based on I operational requirements. Movement of OT A T and OP oT is recommended since:
- 1. When relocated, they are more visible from the related displays on panel RL002
- 2. They relate more closely to the loop hot / cold leg recorders in terms of power
- 3. Visual search and acquisition time will be reduced, since the difference between hot and cold leg temps is an indication of power and A T.
Movement of loop hot / cold leg recorders is recommended since:
- 1. Rx coolant displays on this plane are well arranged vertically for each loop, except for hot / cold leg temp recorders, which are presented in the order 2, 4, 1, 3
- 2. Display selection errors will be reduced Current layout is shown on Figure 1. A potential rearrangement is demonstrated in Figure 2.
One issue regarding information integration on displays deals with providing system tolerances on scale surfaces. This information currently is provided in tech specs, PLS documents, and so forth.' This requires recall tasks or referencing on the part of the operator. The following diagrams (Figures 3 & 4) demonstrate two ways this information can be presented directly to operators. ; In addition, for parameters in which set points " float" with other system variables. (e.g., over power), dual pointer scales may be employed eather than multiple display units. ; Those parameters listed in reference to Figure 5 are also appropriate here. Set point ! information can also be engraved directly onto annunciator tiles. l C-3.2
FIGURE 1 LAYOUT OF HOTICOLD LEG TEMPS AND OVERPOWER SET POINT RECORDERS REMOTE LOCATION FROM LOOPS 1-4 HOT LEGICOLD LEG TEMP RECORDERS SEAL SEAL SEAL SEAL INJ INJ INJ INJ l FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW 1 RCP A RCPB RCP C RCP D a [ A
' r LOOP 2 LOOP 4 LOOP 1 LOOP 3 RCP OTAT PRZR NEUT NEUT opay O
C LEG TEMPS LEG TEMPS LEG TEMPS LEG TEMPS PRESS WR PRESS FLUX FLUX W SP REC O - b RCP1 RCP 2 RCP 3 RCP4 b : k k i ! ! $ k 2 - BA [ j j j
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FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW MISLEADING LAYOUT
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FIGURE 2 RECORDER REARRANGEMENTS SEAL SEAL SEAL SEAL INJ INJ INJ INJ
' ' IT RCP PRZR NUET NUET HC HC C HC OPAT PRESS PRESS FLUX FLUX LEGS LEGS LEGS LEGS Q
u 4- nur . ,,or a n6P 3 RCP4 _ E 1 E E 5 5 i
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_~ 5 _ L a OVERPOWERlOVERTEMP SET POINT RECORDER MOVED, HOTICOLD LEG TEMP RECORDERS REARRANGED j BA STORAGE TANK LEVEL MOVED TO CVCS AREA i j
l SET POINT INFORMATION CAN BE PLACED DIRECTLY ON DISPLAYS: 1 l RWST LEVEL I _
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20 10 is i LOW EE - g bis ^mR = , LABEL DETAILING SIGNIFICANCE I. OF REGION NOTE 1: WHEN INTOLERABLE LIMIT INDICATES A TRIP SET POINT, REGION IS RED. IF SIGNIFICANCE IS AN ALARM ONLY, REGION IS YELLOW NOTE 2: POINTER MUST OFFER HIGH CONTRAST WITH ALL COLORS USED.(RED POINTERS OVER RED BACKGROUND FIELDS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE). g EME neem
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GREEN FIGURE 4 C-3.6 I
I COMPARED PARAMETERS, e.g., LOOP AT AND CPAT, ETC., CURRENTLY DES 12NED:
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OP OT AT AT T SP AT SP AVG
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~F i T T SCALES jl OTHER DISPLAYS INCLUDE STEAM FLOWIFEED FLOW; PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND T AVG; LOOP HOT AND COLD LEG TEMPERATURES; MAKEUP AND LETDOWN; STEAM GENERATOR I
LEVEL AND SET POINT; FIRST AND SECOND STAGE REHEATER STEAM FLOWS; 4 AND RANGE DETECTORS 1 i FIGURE 5 C-3.7 i i
I l 3.0 CONTROL INTEGRATIONS , I A fundamental principle of human factors engineering design is sim: 'ity of operation. Simplifying operational tasks reduces performance times and training requirements, increases reliability and provides other benefits (fatigue reduction, g o enhanced vigilance, etc.). One way to simplify a variety of tasks is to reduce or limit the number of components on the control boards. In the SNUPPS (and other) nuclear control rooms, this is not always possible due to separation requirements, redundancy of systems and so forth. Essex has, however, identified instances where approximately 30 controls can be I eliminated from the control room by integrating controls into single units. However, since a I test, calibration and normal operating procedures were not analyzed, some of these switch integrations may not be feasible. SNUPPS personnel must examine each instance to make appropriate redesign decisions. Following are 12 instances where Essex believes that control functions may be integrated.
- 1. ESW A return from LCW Hx A EF HIS 59 and ESW A TO CC HxA EF HIS 51 Can be integrated into an HxA isolation control:
ESW SPLY AND DISCHG FOR CCW Hx A ISOL EF HIS 59
~
EF HIS 51
- 2. ESWB RETURN FROM CCW Hx A EF HIS 60 l
and ESW B TO CCW Hx B EF HIS 52 C-3.8
.I Can also be integrated to: ,
ESW B SPLY AND DISCHG FOR CCW HxB ISOL EF HIS 60 EF HIS 52
- 3. HYDROGEN ANALYZER A DISCHARGE ISOLATION GS HIS 17 and HYDROGEN ANALYZER A DISCHARGE ISOLATION GS HIS 18 l
Can be integrated: j H2ANALYZEi . A ' DISCH ARG E l':OL l GS HIS 17 GS HIS 18 l 4. HYDROGEN ANALYZER B DISCHARGE ISOLATION i GS HIS 8 and HYRDOGEN ANALYZER B DISCHARGE ISOLATION GS HIS 9 Can be combined as: HYDROGEN ANALYZER DISCHG ISOL GS HIS 8 i GS HIS 9
- 5. HYDROGEN ANALYZER B INLET ISOLATION C-3.9 u
I GS HIS 3 , and I HYDROGEN ANALYZER B INLET ISOLATION I GS HIS 4 j and HYDROGEN ANALYZER B INLET ISOLATION GS HIS 5 Can be integrated as: H2ANALYZER I INLET ISO GS HIS 3 GS HIS 4 GS HIS 5
- 6. HYDROGEN ANALYZER A INLET ISOLATION GS HIS 12 and GS HIS 13 and GS HIS 14 Combined to:
H2ANALYZER A INLET ISOL GS HIS 12 GS HIS 13 GS HIS 14
- 7. MN turbine lift pump controls (seven of.them) can all be integrated into a I single control
- 8. MN FW PUMP TURB A STEAM DRAINS (seven controls) can be integrated into a single control C-3.10 m -
1 l B
- 9. MN FN PUMP TURB B STEAM DRAINS (seven controls) can be integrated into g
E a single control CONTAINMENT COOLER DRAIN VALVES (four controls) can be integrated I 10. into a single control 1st STAGE REHEATER I 11. STEAM SUPPLY AC-HIS-189 and 1st STAGE REHEATER STEAM SUPPLY AC-HIS-32 Can be combined .
- 12. MN STEAM DRAIN TRAP BYPASS VALVES (five controls):
AB HIS 23 AB HIS 50 AB HIS 51 AB HIS 52 AB HIS 53 Can be combined Many other potential combinations were examined but ruled out by virtue of train separation requirements and observation of operational requirements. I . I . C-3.11
a I 4.0 MIRROR IM AGE LAYOUTS Many instances of mirror imaging exist at the SNUPPS control room, including: e AUX FW PUMPS l I e COMPONENT COOLING WATER
~
e ESSENTIAL SERVICE W ATER e ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS e ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION From a human factors perspective, mirror imaging is a highly undesirable design practice, for the following reasons: e Visual search times increase e Control and display substitutions (selecting incorrect controls and displays) increase e Confusion increases due to increased memory and information pro-cessing requirements e Task execution times increase e Operational sequences and task networks become more complex. Further, mirror image designs at the SNUPPS plant are not complete mirrors. That is, one-to-one mirrored components do not correspond in function (e.g., reference ECCS system (A) "SI PUMP B DISCH HOT LEG ISO VLV," and (B) "Si PUMP A RETURN TO RWST ISO VALVE"). Furthermore, on many layouts, the center portion of the design is not mirrored; rather only the extremities are mirror imaged. Within a mimic, for example, only ti.e extremes (left and right) are mirrored (safeguards, for example). In addition, mimics lack positional consistency, that is, a one-to-one correspondence does not always exist. Fintily, mirror imaging is unreliable in that only portions of redundant systems are mirrored. For example, accumulator controls appear very definitely t be mirrored, but are not. Given these design practices at SNUPPS, the problems with rnirror images noted before are very much magnified. The best way to address mirror imaging problems is to avoid or eliminate them in control spaces. Where this cannot be done, error rates and operational effects for each incidence must be examined to identify backfits.
. Potential methods to reduce the effects of mirror image design are:
o Procedural changes e Increased training C-3.12
I e Panel cosmetic changes e Panel redesign. Each is discusse.d below. Procedural Backfits. It is indeed possible to specify poor HFE designs, in notes and cautions, as part of procedure design. This approach is inadequate for addressing problems of mirror imaging, however, since: e Much of what takes place in CRs (in terms of control and display use) is not procedurally bound but rather is directed by training and experience e During application of E-Os, ROs work the boards while the SRO directs activities from procedures. Therefore, cautionary information is not presented directly to the operator working the boards. Further, immediate operator actions are learned (memorized) behaviors, not directed by E-Os. o Procedures are already large documents, somewhat complex and inclined to induce error. Contributing to their complexity and unreadability is to be avoided. I e Procedures are essentia", (forced) aids to memory, means to " check-list" CR a'ctivities, and wurces of complex information. They are not intended to illustrate poor design, thereby obscuring the information they were meant to present. Therefore, procedures fail to address the problems of mirror imaging because:
- 1) the information may not reliably be imparted to operators; 2)if imparted. most errors induced by mirror imaging will not be alleviated; and 3) presenting additional notes and cautions will tend to obscure other procedural information.
Training. ROs and SROs receive essentially two types of training, conceptual (cognitive-information processing, model development) and perceptual-behavioral. Mirror imaging problems can be discussed in relation to both, bu: .nore directly to perceptual-behavioral training (conceptual in terms of incidentally learned rules, e.g., "to find the other component - go dowr, 3 displays, then right 2, and begin search"). Operator 1 behavior training is performed c T the SNUPPS simulator and represents little more than training on using complex stimulus-response networks, partially mediated by conceptual , learning (mediational responses) and procedure design. In mirror image designs, the l l stimulus requires a discrimination reversal (from one side or the other of the mirror), which complicates the discrimination and is apt to cause errors (perhaps due to response persistance, inadequate search, a breakdown of response mediation, and so forth). C-3.13
I Training assessments on simulators in power plants are based heavily (almost 1 I exclusively) on analysis of outcomes, that is, whether simulated accidents and situations were successfully mitigated by operator activity. This means that each operator develops his own strategy for dealing with the difficult design. Little control can be applied to this type of learning. At the SNUPPS plants, the mirror image designs are so unreliable and change so much from application to application that operator rule development is very much compli ated, is dependent upon long-term memory retrievals, and requires high levels of information processing. Uniform rules (" Remember, this side is exactly the opposite of the other") simply do not apply. Othe'r rules probably will be developed (e.g.," Don't trust this console"). These other rules may not be totally unreliable during low stress periods, but will be highly unreliable where time, operator attention, recall and processing are limited. Problems with addressing mirror imaging at SNUPPS via training programs, therefore, are: Mirror layouts at SNUPPS are so different in design and so unreliable I e in terms of component positioning that strategies for accurate component localization would be highly complex. Learning objectives would be difficult to identify. Adequacy of training would be difficult to assess. e Much of any learned strategies would be lost under high stress and time-constrained periods, : mce strategies would require access to long-term memory, extensive sensory input, and extensive informa-tion processing, all of which of ten fail (except sensory input) during high stress periods. Panel Redesign and Cosmetic Changes. Panel redesign and/or cosmetic changes represent the most promising means to resolve mirror imaging problems. Following are discussions of each incidence of mirror imaging with recommendations for each. A) Aux FW Pumps.' This layout (see Figure 6) appears to be a mirror image design but is not for the motor driven pumps; for the turbine driven aux feed pump, only the loop 2 and 3 steam supply valves and ESW supply valves are mirrored. The following recommendations regarding these problems are ranked in order of preference.
- 1. Completely redesign the layout of the AUX FEED system in a manner that does not create the illusion of mirror imaging (see example in Figure 7).
- 2. Rearrange components in AUX FEED to eliminate all incidences of mirror imaging, and move PUMP B breaker control to the left, so as to be positioned C-3.14 i.
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l l as PUMP A breaker control, thereby reducing the appearance of mirror I imaging. Also, add lines of demarcation to visually break up respective pumps (see Figure 8).
- 3. Demarcate as shown in Figure 6, and provide switch guards over steam supplies and ESW supply for the TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEED PUMP. This solution to the mirroring problems is not highly regarded since it only partially ameliorates the problems and introduces others (e.g., limiting switch access).
B) Component Cooling Water. This particular system is arranged, left to right, as follows:
- l. Train B component cooling supply functions
- 2. Component cooling (CC) isolation
- 3. CC to rad waste
, 4. Train A component cooling supply functions.
Only the two outboard sections (Trains B and A supply) are mirrored (see Figure 9). CC is also heavily mimicked. In addition to being mirrored, which is demonstrably poor design, the mimicked portions of CC are segregated by nonmirrored (or nonmirrorable") functional groups, increasing the level of difficulty and unreliability of use. The following are means (ranked in order of HFE preference) to reduce or eliminate these difficulties:
- 1. Redesign the CC system layout such that:
- a. mirror imaging is eliminated
- b. functional groups are maintained and visually distinct
- c. mimics are maintained and enhanced.
Figure 10 contains a concept whereby this can be done. Note that the details of layout are not accurate in Figure 10, which is only provided to demonstrate a good HFE design concept that does not contain mirror images. Each train of CC supply is identical in layout.
- 2. Identify groups by mer.ns of demarcation or background ccioring. Given that CC is heavily mimicked, lines of demarcation may add excessively to visual clutter. However, background coloring increases the number of color m.ean-g l5 ings m the CR, a situation which is also to be avoided.
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I I ; Of the two approaches discussed above, the first is highly favored since it fully addresses the mirroring problems and introduces no others (demarcation lines will not interfere with mimic lines if designed properly). The background coloring (or demarcation) of the existing layout contributes to visual clutter and only serves to enhance the areas of mirror imaging, as an aid to the operator, rather than eliminating mirror imaging. C) Essential Service W7ter. This system is completely mirrored, without any of the additional difficulties of the system discussed previously. Means to reduce the problems of mirror imaging include: 1) redesigning the A&B trains to run lef t to right in identical layouts (as recommended for component cooling); and 2) background code, via color, as recommended for CC, each train of ESW. Again, a rearrangement with demarcations is preferred over demarcation or background coloring alone. D) Engineered Safeguards. Probably the worst instances of mirror imaging in the SNUPPS CR, from a human factors viewpoint, is the engineered safeguards panel. This panel is a sort of a cross design with both mirror imaging and identical design layouts I being employed (see Figure 11). The following are true in relationship to the safeguards panel: o Controls for RHR and SI are mirrored, but the displays are not e Containment spray, RHR, and Si are basically mirror imaged, while Phase A & B isolation and accumulator controls are not e Of the four accumulators, B and D are grouped in a mimic design, as well as A and C. These two groups are not mirrored with regard to one another, but the two accumulators within a group are mirrored (see Figure 12). e All of engineered safeguards systems are mimicked I e Functionally correspondant controls and displays are separated up to five feet due to the mirror image design. Operationally, this panel will be low-use, and learning of component locations will be long-term. During periods of time constraints and high operator stress levels, the following i error types may be induced by the mirror image design: e OMISSIONS - failure to activate a control or reference a display I e SUBSTITUTIONS -operating the wrong control or reading the wrong display e TEMPORAL - tat <ing too much time to locate controls and displays. The following recommendations are made regarding backfitting this panel: ! I C-3.21
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RECOMMENDED l C-3.23
I 1. It is highly recommended that the panel be redes?gned without incidences of _ mirror imaging, since: e it is a low-usage panel, and learning will be long-term o It is a highly important panel e There is a high likelihood of operator error in using this panel e Little can be dorie to ameliorate panel problems without extensive redesign; good alternative backfits just don't exist. j During redesign, system components (e.g., all accumulators, containment spray) could be colocated. Using mimics would then be a recommended practice. A left-to-right operational orientation should be employed, that is, 51, accumulators, containment spray, RHR, etc.
- 2. An alternative backfit, which is recommended only as an intarim measure to complete redesign, is as follows: ,
a) Remove all instances of "part mirroring" from tiie boards, i.e., change some components such that systems are reliably and completely mirrored b) Identify the following groups: e SI I o RHR e Containment spray e Accumulators o Phase isolations by background coloring on the boards. Demarcation lines are not highly recommended, since mimics and demarcation lines would be more difficult to use. Also, provide summary labelling for each system (see Figure 13). Again, it is pointed out that Recommendation 2 above is made only as an interim to I implementing Recommendaticn 1. 1 I I C-3.24
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I I 5.0 GREEN BOARD CONCEPTS ,l
" Green board" design control rooms philosophies are such that all subsystem and component status indications are designated by the color Green (indicator lights, etc.)
when these functions are within programmed limits for a 1 operational situations (for nuclear power stations - start-up, full power, S.I., recirc, and s) forth). This approach is typically applied to aerospace and military systems to indicate system readiness and/or availability. These applications usually are designed for specific operational conditions (e.g., fire control, launch, etc.). A similar approach is provided at SNUPPS in the safeguards status panel, indicating " lineup" for safety injection, containment spray actuation, FW isolation, etc. However, a true green board design would cover the entire control room, for example, any time a red, yellow, or any other color light appears, a component or function is out of tolerance. The chief benefits of a green board philosophy are:
- 1. Very high probability of detecting out-of-sequence / tolerance functions. This is due to:
- a. Vastly reduced operator memory requirements (specifically long-term memory, which is relatively unreliable during low stress periods and very unreliable during high' stress periods)
- b. Greatly reduced perceptual requirements. Pattern recognition is time-consuming and subject to errors. Color discrimination dealing with uniform backgrounds and few color figures (e.g., the nongreen out-of-tolerance function) is nearly immedia:e and errorless.
- 2. Diagnosis of the problem (out-of-wlerance function) is more reliable since information processing requirements are practically eliminated. (Perceptual processing is reduced, memory recall is reduced, paired comparison of observed status and design status are eliminated.)
- 3. Operational response to out-of-tolerance condition is more immediate (problem is self-localizing) and accurate (control / display selection errors are I reduced).
A green board philosophy is applicable to nuclear power plant control room design; I however, it would require a great deal of engineering of circuits to achieve a green board for all operational modes and postulated accidents, and would disrupt nearly all current ,I C-3.26
industry design standards (for valve status, etc). Problems with employing green board design philosophies in nuclear power plants are: o Cost, complexity, and reliability of processing equipment which would be required to drive controls and displays e Disruption of current industry design philosophies e The extreme number of design basis plant conditions e Problems with indicating out-of-service systems and functions. These are not, however, insurmountable problems. For existing plants, backfitting to a green board design would be excessively costly and time-consuming; since all plant control room logic would need to be redesigned, control electronics complexity would I increase dramatically, and many plant functions could not be represented using green board design (nonbinary functions such as T-avg, power ranges, etc.). I For existing plants, backfit to a complete green board concept would not be economically feasible. Alternatives do exist in the form of status boards and summary I indications. Specifically, these would be:
- 1. Summary boards for the immediate operator actions for the following proce-dures
- a. GEN-O-01 RX trip
- b. GEN-O-02 Turbine trip
- c. E-O Diagnostics
- d. E-05 Station blackout These summary boards would establish the status of each set of emergency procedures. Redundant indications for appropriate system lineups per emer-gency procedure would be colored. See Figure 14 for example.
- 2. Provide summary information, related to procedures and system conditions, using SPDS type CRTs, color coding system lineup red / green.
- 3. Expand current status panel to incorporate other design basis lineups.
I The requirement does exist, however, to reduce and summarize information for the - per t rs f the SNUPPS plants. Assuming green board redesigns are eliminated as an E l5 alternative, other means of achieving this end are necessary. l l l C-3.27
1 i AURE 14 . EXAMPLE PROCEDURAL AID , i Ra TRIP CHECKS i i RODS BOTTOM I TURB TRIP PRZR l'E PRESS - NORM 'g h REDIGREEN INDICATIONS PRZR OF SYSTEM STATUS. GREEN INDICATES LEVEL SYSTEM APPROPRIATE RESPONSE Il NORM
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v 6.0
SUMMARY
With regard to the Control / Display special studies, the following summarizes many e of the findings for the SNUPPS control room: e Many instances exist where displayed parameters can be juxtaposed to directly provide system comparisons, which will aid in decisionmaking e Several groups of controls can be integrated to permit one operation to initiate a sequence
- The problems and incidences of mirror imaging at SNUPPS are excessive. For some panels, current implementation of mirroring board layouts may be (operationally) debilitating. Several means to reduce the effects were suggested on a case-by-case basis.
These ineans to address the problems include: Panel redesign
- Functional demarcation lines l
- Color coding of mirror imaged systems i e Given the state of design of the SNUPPS control room, addition of
! a complete green board design philosophy would be highly expensive. However, special areas of the control room could be I designated and designed as " green board areas" to aid in the diagnosis and mitigation of plant accidents. In conclusion, many human factors engineering design practices at SNUPPS, which may or may not be even traced in discrepancy findings, do not contribute to the efficiency and reliability of plant operations. Indeed, some design practices will interfere with safe ! operations. Commitment to implementing some of the backfit suggestions in this l appendix will enhance system availability, reliability and safety by enhancing system operations. l I C-3.29 .
'I . I l APPENDIX D MONITOR LIGHT BOARDS APPENDIX D-1 ESF STATUS INDICATION EVALUATION APPENDIX D-2 PERMISSIVE / BLOCKED / PARTIAL TRIP STATUS PANEL lI : I I I I l
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I I I APPENDIX D-1 , l ESF STATUS INDICATION EVALUATION 1 I 1 1 I i l 1 i a I I t
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Given the surfeit of information impinging on the sensory capabilities of a nuclear reactor operator, providing assistance in processing this information is crucial. This is ) especially true in the cases of availability and actuation of the engineered safety systems. NUREG 1:47 requires that the operator have a system that alinws him to monitor the status of the engineered safety features. To adequately perform this function, the monitoring system should provide the operator with only that information required to determine whether: 1) a required safety system will be unavailable due to intentional bypass or malfenction; and 2) a safety system has activated when required. The information should be presented in a manner that does not require interpretation. The operator should be able to make an immediate assessment. The SNUPPS control room utilizes such a system. Early in the HFE evaluation it was apparent that certain problems existed in this system. This report details the review of the SNUPPS system. This review is based on the following documents: e SNUPPS FSARs
.g e Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, System Description, g Bechtel #10466-3-00SA, Rev. 5 e Technical Specifications for Status Indicating Systems (SNUPPS),
10406-E-094 (Q), Rev. 3 e Standardized Valve Nomenclature List, Rev. O. Part of the evaluation is based on a key assumption made by Essex personnel, namely, that Train A and Train B are completely redundant. This implies that even though both trains would normally activate, the loss of one train would not impede the completion of the safety function. Therefore, the compliment of components monitored should be complete-ly redundant. This implies that a component that is on only one train may be monitored unnecessarily. D-1.1
2.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The SNUPPS system consists of three Monitor Light Boards. These are located on RL018. The specific nomenclature is as follows: e ESF System Status Indication SA066X - Group 1 (Train A) e ESF System Status Indication SA066Y - Group 4 (Train B) e ESF System Status Indication SA0662 - Group 2 SA066X and SA066Y are a 15 x 20 matrix. SA066Z is a 4 x 2 matrix. The larger matrices are divided into systems (e.g., SIS, AFAS). Each system has a system level light that activates white when all actuation conditions are met. If conditions are not met, the system level light should be amber. The operator should be able to determine the cause of an amber or an unlit system light by examining its component level lights. The system level light can be lit amber manually from the RLOO2 panel. I I 'I I D-1.2 !I
l 3.0 RESULTS Results are organized by safety system. Certain problems are consistent throughout all the systems displayed. These generic problems include the following:
, Windows redundant to both Train A and Train B are not located in the same positions within each matrix. This creates difficulty in both pattern and location recognition. The specific items are identified in the system level results.
e Many window labels contain only component names and not the component engineering number. This increases the difficulty in locating specific components on the control room boards or in the field. Also, some of the names are r. t chosen from the standard valve nomenclature list or are not well chosen. Details are contained in the system results. e The NSSS Monitoring System has windows on ths ESF status panels (SIS and CIS$A) that do not compliment the ESF panel concept. This problem is discussed in the SIS section. e The amber color for a bypassed component or system is difficult to discriminate from the white condition. The documentation available to Essex did not answer all the questions posed. Since some of these questions signify potential problems, it is recommended that SNUPPS make every effort to resolve all the questions raised. 3.1 Safety injection System (SIS) The SIS partion of the ESF status panels is the largest and most complex. It also contains most of the NSSS indications. The potential problems are noted below. 3.1.1 NSSS Monitor Subsystem This system is composed of windows that monitor not only SIS and containment spray but also cold and hot leg recirculation. These windows behave contrary to the other windows. According te system description, the windows will light white when not in their normal mode and wili remain unlit when in their normal mode. This requires that the operator remember: 1) which windows are part of the NSSS system; 2) that a white light could indicate an abnormal condition; and 3) that a window out of phase with its surrounding windows is a problem. This memory recuirement E 2xtreme, especially given i the inconsistent manner in which these windows behave relative to the remaining SIS windows. The fact that there are unlit windows during SIS will confuse the operator l l D-1.3
I tr:m:ndously, opecially if SIS is not tvailtbla due to c:rtdn c mponent failurcs. Recommendations for correcting this situation are as follows: e Have the windows respond in a consistent manner. If they are in . proper condition for SI, they should be lit. Therefore, at the initiation of 51, all windows in the SIS grouping will be white. During changes of mode (i.e., Hot Leg Recirc and Cold Leg Recirc), the system should recognize correct component conditions and continue to show the windows as lit unless something is wrong, in which case an amber light should appear. e The windows for Hot Leg and Cold Leg Recirc should be grouped in separate subsystems and demarked in a manner that indicates to the operator that these are semi-independent subsystems from SIS. A subsystem level light would also help, (i.e., for Cold Leg Recirc, Hot Leg Recirc). e Cor ponents that require a man'ial change of state (e.g., 51 PMP A RET TO RWST EMHV8814A) should flash to indicate this requirement to the operator. 3.1.2 Windows Without input to System Level Window Certain windows in the SIS group have no input to the system level light. These are as follows: Train A Train B I BNHV8812A EMHV8814A EMHV8807A BNHV8812B ENHV8813 EJHV8804B BNHV8806A EMHV8807B EJHV8716A BNHV8806C EJHV8716B These should be reviewed to determine whether they should have an input to the system level light or whether they should be a separate group from SIS. 3.1.3 Conflicting Redundant Valves The following redundant valves are in conflict with each other, as some have an input to the system level light but others do not: e EMHVi?i4A has no input when EMHV8814B does i e EMHV8804B has no input when EMHV8804A does. These should be reviewed to determine whether both should have an input to the system level light. D-1.4 l
3.1.4 Lack of Redundant Layout of Matrices Train A and Train B are redundant but the physical layout of their window matrices is not the same. This causes significant learning problems for the operator. Suggested I layouts are shown in Figures 1 and 2. These figures contain only the component number. 3.1.5 Lack of Component Numbers As has been identified in previous paragraphs, many windows lack component numbers. These are supplied in Figures 1 and 2. Related to this are the following valves, which seem to have incorrect names on the simulator, according to the specification: e E3HCV 606 e E3HCV 607 e EMHV 8809A e EMHV 8809B. 3.1.6 Potential Improper Group Assignment of Valves Valves in the NSSS system have been assigned to specific groups (1 through 5) that I change state according to the mode (e.g., SIS, Hot Leg). There appear to be inconsis-tencies between some group designations in the System Description and Specification and the implication in the FSAR. Specifically, valles E3HV8716A and B are identified as NSSS Group 2, which is open for SIS and closed for Hot and Cold Leg Recirc.; but the l FSAR (Figure 6.3-2) implies that these valves are open for SIS and Hot Leg Recirc., and closed for Cold Leg. Also, valve EMHV8835 is identified as NSSS Group 5 but the FSAR indicates that it should be part of Group 1. These inconsistencies in the various documents should be investigated and resolved. 3.1.7 Potential Removal of Component Windows Based on the assumption regarding redundancy made in paragraph 1.0, the following components should be reviewed to determine whether they are necessary for SIS or whether they should be removed as they are monitored on one train only: e EMHV8883 BORON IN3 RECIRC PUMP TO BIT ISO VALVE e EMHV8835 SAFETY INJECTION COLD LEG ISO VALVE
- D-1.5 1
I
/ I S I S I GLHZ85 GLHZ87 e o e e a MG01A MG01C GFHZ30A GKHZ150 PALO1A PEF 01A e e
- SGL11A GFH2308 GKHZ153 GLHZ80 SGF02A MF01C I - - - - -
EFHV42 EGHV69A GFHZ32A GLHZ155 GLHZ81 PJE01A EFHV23 e e e e o e EFHV24 EFHV45 EGHV698 GFHZ328 GLH213 GFHZ101 e e e o e e e . I GFHZ103 e EFHv31 e EFHV49 e EGTV29 CGG02A e GLHZ32 e SGLISA EFHYS1 GFHZ11 GGHZ15 GLHZ69 CGNO3A CGM 01A EFHV33 EFHV59 GFHZ14 GGHZ40 GLHZ71 CGNO3A GMHZ9 EFHV37 -I e o e e EFHV65 GFHZ20 GGHZ41 GLHZ73 SGN01A GTHZ26 EFHV41 e e e o EFHV87 GFHZ22 GGHZ42 GLHZ75 SGN01C GTHZ28 LFHV106 EJHV8811A BNHVB812A PEV01A SGL10A EJHCV606 EPHY8808A EPHV8802A I EMHV8814A EMHV8814B MM01A SGLD9A EMHV8923A EPHVB8080 EMHVB821A EJHV8804A EMHV8807A PBG05A SGL'2A BNHCV8800A BGLCv112B EJHV8809A BNLCV1120 BNHV8836A MM32A EMHV8803A BGHV8110 BGHV8106 EJHV8716A FMHV8883 EMHV8870A EMHV8801A e-..-- I FIGURE 1: SUGGESTED LAYOUT OF SIS, TRAIN A D-1.6
I . I . . I . . S I S GLEZ86 GLHZ88 I PALO1B PEF 018 PEG 01B PEG 010 GFHZ31A GKHZ151 SGF028 PEF 010 SGL118 GFHZ318 GKHZ152 PJE01B EFHY25 EFHV40 EGHV70A GFHZ33A GKHZ154
- I GEHZ102 EFHV28 ETHV46 EGHV708 GFHZ338 GLHZ14 I
GEHZ104 EFHV32 EFHV50 ESTV30 CGG028 GLHZ33 SGLISB CGM 01B EFHV34 EFHV52 GFHZ12 GGHZ21 GLHZ70 CGNO3B GMH219 EFHV38 EFHV60 GFHZ13 GGHZ43 GLHZ72 CGNO3B I GTHZ27 EFHV39 EFHY66 GFHZ21 GGH244 GLHZ74 SGN01B GTHZ29 LFHY105 EFHY88 GFHZ23 GLHZ62 GLHZ76 SGN010 BNHV88118 BNHV88128 PEJ018 3GL108 EJHCV607 EPHY88088 EMHY88028 BNHV8813 PEM01B SGLO98 FMHV89238 EPNV88080 EMHV88218 I BNHV88048 EMHV8807B PBG058 SGL128 BNHCV88008 BGLCV112C EJHY88098 BNtCV112E BNHV8806B PEM028 EMHV88038 BGHY8111 BGHY8105 EMHV8840 BNHV87186 EMHY88708 EMHV88018 EMHV8924 EMHV8835
. Same locat.n as sendetw FIGURE 2: SUGGESTED LAYOUT OF SIS, TRAIN B l
l D-1.7 lI
I I e EMHV8924 RHR HX A/CVCS TO S1 PUMP A UPSTREAM 150 I e EJHV8840 RHR/SI HOT LEG RECIRC ISO VALVE 3.2 Containment Isolation System (CIS$A) The CIS$A system also contains elements of the NSSS monitoring system. The I recommendations for th- SIS system (para. 3.1.1) apply here also. The other problem creas are given below. 3.2.1 Fire Protection System Valves Valve KCHV253 and KCHV254 are identified'by the FSAR (Figure 6.2.4-1) as being actuated by CIS$A. These valves are not monitored by the ESF status panel. If these are necessary for CIS$A, then they should be monitored by this system. Further review of this problem is recommended as this could be critical information to the operator if CIS$A became unavailable. 3.2.2 Monitoring of inappropriate Valve Valve HBLCV1003 (on Train A) is monitored by CIS$A but, according to the F5AR (Figure 11.2-1), this valve is not actuated by any ESF function. The correct valve appears I to be HBNV7176. This should be corrected on the MLB and in the documentation. 3.2.3 Redundant Layout and Component Numbers As in SIS, the redundant features of Train A and Train B are not laid out consistently. Also, many components lack numbers. Figures 3 and 4 provide recom-mendations for correcting this. 3.2.4 Potential Removal of Component Windows Based on the assumption that Train A and B are redundant, the following valves should be reviewed for possible removal from the ESF status panels: e EMHV8888 ACCUMULATOR TANK FILL LINE ISO VALVE e EPHV8880 CONTAINMENT N2 SUPPLY 150 VALVE I D-1.8
I I I .I
- I CI S$A I
I BGHV8160 ENHV1 GSHV13 KCHV253 I BGHV8112 GSHV20 GSHV14 EMHV8881 I SJHV6 BBHV8026 GSHV18 EMHV8964 l . SJHV13 LFFV95 GSHV3 I SJHV19 GSHV8 I EJHV8890A KAFV29 HBHV7126 EMHV8823 EJHV8825 HBHV7176 EMHV8824 I FIGURE 3: SUGGESTED LAYOUT OF CISGIA, TRAIN A I m., g
I I . I I ' Cl SSA I I BGHV8152 ENHV7 GSHV4 KCHV254 BGHV8100 GSHV21 GSHV5 EMHV8843 I SJHV5 BBHV8027 GSHV9 EMHV8871 I SJHV12 LFFV96 GSHV12 SJHV18 EPHV8880 GSHV17 EMHV8888 I EJHV8890B . HBHV7150 I BLHV8047 dBHV7136 ll l FIGURE 4: SUGGESTED LAYOUT OF CIS0A, TRAIN B I m.m
!I e BLHV8047 I REACTOR M/U WATER CONTAINMENT ISO e KAFV29 RX BLDG INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY 3.2.5 FSAR Confusion Paragraph 7.3.1.1.3 of the FSAR states that ". . . the H2 mixing fans automatically start. . . on receipt of CIS." Figure 9.4-6 (Sheet 1) of the FSAR indicates that only SIS I starts these fans. This discrepancy should be resolved.
3.3 Containment Isolation System - Phase B (CIS$B) The only problem identified for this system concerns the lack of redundant layout.
.I It is recommended that the Train B windows be located identically to those in Train A.
3.4 Containment Spray Actuation System (CSAS) The only problem identified for this system is that the RWST SUPPLY TO CTMT SPRAY PMP valves do not incorporate numbers. it is recommended that the following numbers be added: e BNHV3 to Train B e BNHV4 to Train A. I I 3.5 Control Room Ventilation Isolation System (CRVIS) l The following paragraphs detail the problems associated with CRVIS. l 3.5.1 Incorrect Assignment of Components The LOWER CABLE SPREAD ROOM 150 DAMPERS, GKHZ59A and B, are located on Train B when the FSAR (Figure 9.4-1) indicates that they should be on Train A. It is recommended that where the error lies be determined and cor.ective action be taken. I 3.5.2 Damper Indications Without Function The CHASE AND TANK AREA DAMPERS, GKHZil3A and B, are on Train B but do not appear in the FSAR. This indicates that they have been deleted from the plant design and therefore should be deleted from the ESF status panel. i I D-1.l l
I 3.5.3 Lack of Redundant Layout and Component Numbers Figures 5 and 6 provide suggested layouts for CRVIS and provide component numbers. 3.5.4 Potential Removal of Component Windows Based on the assumption that Train A and B are redundant, the following compo-nents should be reviewed for possible removal from the ESF status panels: e GKHZ55A UPPER CABLE SPREAD ROOM SUPPLY e GKHZfir UPPER CABLE SPREAD ROOM EXHAUST e GKHZ59A LOWER CABLE SPREAD ROOM SUPPLY e GKHZ59B LOWER CABLE SPREAD ROOM EXHAUST e GKHZ122A CONTROL BLDG ESF SWGR RMS 1&2 SUPPLY CMPR e GKHZ122B ESF SWGR ROOM 1 EXH ISO DAMPER e GKHZ123A ACCESS CONTROL SUP SYS BOOSTER COIL SUPPLY e GKHZ123B I CHANGE AREA TO CONT BLDG EXH FANS ISO e GKHZ98A CONTROL BLDG SWGE RM 4 SUPPLY DMPR e GKHZ98B CONTROL BLDG BATTERY RMS EXHAUST DMPR I 3.6 Fuel Building Ventilation Isolation System (FBIS) 3.6.1 Components Not Monitored l l The EMERGENCY EXHAUST FANS CGG02A and B are actuated by FBIS and SIS. Only SIS monitors these fans. If they are necessary for FBIS to occur, then they should be monitored under FBIS also. 'I 3.6.2 Inappropriate Nomenclature Dampers RZ36 and RZ37, HZ40 and HZ43, and HZ42 and HZ62 have different I nomenclatures in the FSAR, ESF status panel system description, and the matrix at the ! simulator. HZ42 and HZ62 are labeled differently between trains. These two are D-1.12 I ~
I
- I .
I
- I CGK03A SGK05A HZ19A SGK04A CGK04A HZ160
)l HZ19B HZ29A HZ75A I HZ19C HZ29B HZ75B j
i HZ190 HZ13A HZ172A Il i
< HZ59A HZ13B HZ172B i .
l HZ598 HZ13F HZ174A lI HZ130 HZ13G HZ174B II LAMP HZ13E HZ13C HZ13H TEST I FIGURE 5: SUGGESTED LAYOUT OF CRVIS, TRAIN A I
, m.o
I .l I I IS CGK03B CRV SGK058 HZ30A SGK04B CGK04B HZ161 I - HZ30B HZ40A HZ83A HZ98A I HZ30C HZ40B HZ83B HZ98B HZ300 HZ184A HZ122A HZ173A I HZ55A 'HZ184B HZ122B HZ173B I HZ55B HZ184C. HZ123A HZ175A HZ57A HZ1840 HZ125B HZ175B lI HZ578 HZ184E HZ123C
- I FIGURE 6: SL'GGESTED LAYOUT OF CRVIS, TRAIN B g
4 I m.m
1 I monitored under both SIS and FBIS but have different labels in the two systems. This
]
nomenclature should be standardized in a'l sources. 3.7 Main Steam Isolation System (SLIS) 3.7.1 Inconsistent Order The MAIN STEAM LOOP LOW POINT DRAINS are ordered 3,2,1,4, while the MAIN STEAM ISO VALVES and BYPASS VALVES are ordered 4,1,2,3. The order of these should be consistent, preferably 1,2,3 34. Also, ^4 TEAM LOOPS should be identified with the same nomenclature as are the steam generators, i.e., A,B,C,D. 3.7.2 Lack of Valve Numbers The LP 2 WARMUP STM TO AUX FW PMP TURB and LP 3 WARMUP STM VALVES (on Train A) lack component numbers. These are ABHV48 and ABHV49, respectively. 3.7.3 Potential Rernoval of Component Windows The valves mentioned in 3.7.2 should be reviewed for necessity of display on the ESF status panels. m 3.8 Containment Purge Isolation System (CPIS) No problems were found in this section. I 3.9 Feedwater Isolation System (FWIS) The following main feedwater control valves and bypass control valves are closed by
':WIS but are not monitored on the ESF status panels:
e AEFCV510 e AEFCV520 e AEFCV530 e AEFCV540 e AEFCV550 e AEFCV560 o AEFCV570 e AEFCV580 I D-1.15
I These should be reviewed to determine whether they should be monitored on the ESF status panels. 3.9.1 Feedwater Isolation Valve Order The FW isolation valves are ordered A,B,C,D. While this is the preferred order, this is not the same order as the MAIN STM ISO VALVES (see paragraph 3.7.1). To facilitate operator recognition and use of the ESF status panels, the order of presentation of the primary cooling loop should be consistent. It is recommended, therefore, that the A,B,C,D order be applied throughout the ESF status panels. 3.10 Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System (AFAS) AFAS is monitored on all three panels (SA066X, SA066Y, and SA0662). 3.10.1 Inclusion of Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation System (SGBSIS) The SGBSIS is embedded in the AFAS system (SA066X and Y). This subsystem can be actuated independently of AFAS and therefore should be a separate group. The system description discusses a component level window labeled SGBSIS but none is present on the simulator or in the specification. It is recommended that the SGBSIS be separated out I into its own group, as suggested by the system description (see paragraph 3.4.3.3j). 3.10.2 Loss of Suction Pressure (LSP) Subsystem The system description (paragraph 3.4.3.31) indicates that the following components I do not respond to an AFAS signal, though they do input to the AFAS system level amber SEP. GROUP 1 (SA066X SEP. GROUP 4 (SA066Y) ALHV30 l I ALHV31 ALHV32 ALHV35 ALHV" ALHV34
.ALHV36 EFHV25 EFHV23 EFHV26 EFHV24 PEF 01B PEF 01A EFHV66 EFHV65 The system description goes on to say that these should be grouped under a subsystem window light for LSP because they respond to a specific LSP signal. The specification and I D-1.16 I
the example at the se .ulator do not reflect this subgrouping. It is recommended that this subgroup window be incorporated into the matrices. Also, the essential service water components, while indicated as part of this system, are monitored only under SIS. It is recommended that these be examined for inclusion in the LSP subgroup. 3.10.3 Auxiliary Feedwater Supply Valves Valves ALHV9 and ALHVil (Train A) are monitored by one window. It is recommended that they be monitored by separate windows to facilitate fault diagnosis. 3.10.4 Lack of Redundant Layout The AFAS, like most other sections of the ESF status panels, lacks a consistent layout from Train A to Train B. Given the questions raised by the lack of SGBSIS (paragraph 3.10.1) and LSP (paragraph 3.10.2) subsystem level windows, a layout has not been suggested. These issues need to be resolved first. 3.10.5 Potential Removal of Component Windows Based on the assumption that Train A and B are redundant, the following component should be reviewed for removal from the ESF status panels: o ALHV36 CST TO TD AUX FW PUMP 3.10.6 System Level Window on SA066Z The AUX FW ACTUATION SYSTEM light is one window. To maximize readability, it should be two windows, as are the system level windows on SA066X and SA066Y. 3.11 CLASS 1 ELECT The breakers are grouped according to voltages. This does not reflect any source / load condition or relationship. Figures 7 and 8 provide suggested layouts for the Callaway site and Figures 9 and 10 provide suggested layouts for the Wolf Creek site. I l I D-1.17 lI l
I ; I i! I I CLASS 1 . l ELECT I NB0109 NB0112 NB0111 KKJ01A I NB0116 NB0110 NB0113 NB0106 l NG0301 NG0101 NB0117 I NG0306 NG0106 NG0705 'I NG0307 NG0107 lI I . I .I
! FIGURE 7: SUGGESTED LAYOUT OF CLASS 1 ELECT FOR CALLAWAY, TRAIN A I
D-1.18
I I . I. CLASS 1 'I ELECT q I l NB0209 NB0212 NB0211 KKJ01B NB0210 NB0213 NBC208 NB0216 I NG0401 NG0201 NB0217 I NG0406 NG0206 NG0805 NG0407 NG0207 I-I 'I . I I FIGURE 8: SUGGESTED LAYOUT OF CLASS 1 ELECT FOR CALLAWAY, TRAIN B I D-1.19 L
I I I I CLASS 1 I ELECT ! I NB0109 NB0112 NB0111 KKJ01A I -
~
NB0110 NB0113 NB0106 NB0116 NG0301 NG0101 NB05E I NG0306 NG0106 I l NG0307 NG0107 I I . I I I FIGURE 9: SUGGESTED LAYOUT OF CLASS 1 ELECT FOR WOLF CREEK, TRAIN A I D-1.20
I l I L f I I CLASS 1 l ELECT l l NB0209 - NB0212 NB0211 KKJ01B l NB0210 NB0213 NB0208 NB0216 NG0401 NG0201 NB06E I NG0406 NG0206 I NG0407 NG0207 I 4 l I! l lI FIGURE 10: SUGGESTED LAYOUT OF CLASS 1 ELECT FOR WOLF CREEK, TRAIN B I
I 3.12 General Comments 3.12.1 Lamp Test A lamp test is to be located on each ESF status panel. The simulator has only one shown. It is recommended that these definitely be incorporated. I 3.12.2 Essential Service Water Isolation - ESW isolation occurs automatically for various causes (system description, paragraph 3.1.2) but is monitored only under SIS, which is not actuated by all the causes that activate ESW isolation. It is recommended that the possibility of separating out ESW isolation windows be explored.
.I Manual Bypass Controls 3.12.3 The system level lights can be put in a bypass condition manually from panel RLOO3.
It is recommended that a method for logging the cause for this manual bypass be developed to keep all shif ts aware of plant status. I i il lI D-1.22 I
l
4.0 CONCLUSION
S .g W The concept of an ESF Status Monitoring System is essential for effective operator performance. The system should provide an operator with the minimum information necessary for assessing the availability of the various ESF systems. This information should be presented in a simple format that minimizes the operator's need to interpret. Given these requirements, the SNUPPS ESF Status Indication Monitor Light Boards are deficient. The major deficiencies are as follows: e The NSSS subsystem behaves in a manner not typical of the other subsystems displayed e The redundant components of Train A and B are not ordered consis-tently e Certain subsystems should have their own subsystem level light, instead of being incorporated within larger sys : ems e The lack of component numbers makes loc iting these components .I difficult e Errors exist in component names and groupings. As the system stands now, it does not adequately perform the function intended. It is recommended that the questions raised in this paper be explored and that the recommendations contained herein be implemented. A further recommendation is that a hierarchical approach be taken: Subsystems should be grouped under a subsystem level light which then imputs to the system level light. The potential exists in the ESF Status Indication System to provide a needed tooi to the operator. Unfortunately, for the intended function to be performed, the present system must be reevaluated and redesigned. I I D- 1.23
1 1 I I l i i l l l l l l l l l i APPENDIX D-2 ! I 'E PERMISSIVE / BLOCKED / PARTIAL TRIP STATUS PANEL l5 t I l i l I l i n - l i I , i i 4 I I I
I
1.0 INTRODUCTION
I 1 I During the initial phase of Data Collection for the SNUPPS control room review, the permissive / blocked / partial trip status panel (RLO22) was identified by operators as being difficult to use. A preliminary look indicated the potential for human engineering problems. Further study was initiated using the following sources: e FSAR, Rev. O i e Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, System Description, 10466-3-005A, Rev. 5 e Technical Specification for Status Indicating Systems for SNUPPS, 10466-E-094, Rev. 3 e Photographs of the simulator at Zion. This report details the results of that study. I R I I I I D-2.1
r , I 2.0 RESULTS The permissive / blocked / partial trip status panel concept is a good one and should be maintained. However, the status panel in its present format is of almost no use in situations where the operator needs to quickly assess the plant condition. To properly use the panels, the operator must be able to associate the trip channel indicators with the bypass and block indicators. An example of how the operatcr would need to search the panel in order to gain information follows. The reactor trip, Source Range High Neutron Flux, is the "first" trip visually encountered on the panel. The two trip channels are located at position @ on Figure 1. The trip channels can be bypassed; bypass indicators are located at position @. The trip can be blocked, position @ , if permissive P6 @ is satisfied. Permissive P6 is satisfied when one of the two neutron flux detectors (intermediate range) is above the setpoint, position @ . As Figure 1 indicates, the operator must integrate information scattered all over the board. This causes a I tremendous load on his short-term memory and information processing ability. The operator cannot use any techniques of pattern recognition. I There appear to be no effective means for relocating windows that would
- measurably improve the utility of the status board. The board represents logic flows.
Therefore, the most effective way to provide this information would be in a mimic. The permissives could be grouped in a status panel and the trip logic could be diagrammed in flow lines. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate how this could be done, Other problems found with this panel are listed below. e Window Color Coding - The present color coding emphasizes the protective channels. This information is of little value to the lE operator. His concern is with how many windows are lit. If color !3 were used, it would convey more information to the operator by coding the trips with one color, the permissives with one color, the blocks with one color, etc. e Window Labeling - The window labeling is 0.125 inches high. This is grossly inadequate for reading from the Operator's Control Console. e Inadequate Monitoring of Instruments - The FSAR (Figure 7.2-1, sheet 7) indicates that two of four instruments in any lvep for Steam Generator Low-Low Water Level and two of three instruments in any loop for Low Steamline Pressure initiate a reactor trip and SIS, respectively. The panel only monitors three instruments per loop in the former case and ordy one instrument per loop in the latter case. D-2.2 I
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SR PR PR PR PR TR P TRIP HiQ HlO HiQ HiQ HiQ HiQ BY PASS BY PASS If PERMIS P6 5 9 q y9 al N a LA BELS SR SR LABELS TRIP A TRIP B l BLOCK BLOCK REACTOR TRIP l l If REACTOR TRIP FIGURE 2. TYPICAL MIMIC - POTENTI AL FORMAT
M I I ; I I PERMIS P6 112 iR PERMIS iR PERMIS P6 SPARE SPARE P6 PERMIS PR PR PR PR P8 214 PERMIS PERMIS PERMIS PERMIS P8 P8 P8 P8 l PERMIS 214 P9 P9 79 P9 P9 PERMIS PERMIS P7 P10 2/4 P10 P10 P10 P10 PRZR PRZR PRZR PRZR PRES PRES PRES SPARE I PERMIS P11 71 3 P11 LO LO P11 LO LO P11 LO LO LO LO PERMIS I P12 T AVE LOOP 1 T AVE LOOP 2 T AVE LOOP 3 T AVE LOOP 4 PERMIS PERMIS TURB TURB I P7 P13 1/2 IMPUL P13 IMPUL P13 SPARE SPARE I h' NJ ' l
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s I I : l FIGURE 3. PERMISSIVE STATUS POTENTIAL FORMAT > I o-2.s I
I Potential Lack of Lamp Test - The specification indicates that the I e panet should have a lamp test but that the simulator is not equipped with this capability. e Potential Mislabeling - In the specification (Figure 5), two windows labeled STMLINE LO P LOOP 1 appear to be additional to those required. It is suspected that these should be STMLINS HI FLOW LOOP 1. e Potential L ck of Adequate Monitoring - The FSAR indicates that steam line isolation is initiated by high steam pressure rate, low steam line pressure and Hi-2 containment pressure. High steam pressure rate is not monitored on this panel, but the possibility exists that it should be. e Potential Monitoring of inappropriate items - It could not be determined from the FSAR why the following items are monitored on the panel: STMLINE AP LOOP l-4 I
- LO FWF SG LO LVL LOOP l-4 LO FWF STM/FWF MISMATCH LOOP l-4
- STMLINE HI FLOW LOOP l-4 I - AUTO Si BLOCK SI ACTUATE.
These should be examined for potential removal. I I D-2.6 l
I 3.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
~
The permissive / blocked / partial tc.,, status panel should provide the operator with an easy way to monitor the automatic reactor protection system logic and make appropriate decisions and control actions. Given the current design, this is extremely difficult. It is strongly recommended that the panel be redesigned. Mimics lend themselves well to logic flows and allow the opei cor to make accurate and timely decisions. PSE&G Salem 1 and 2 plants have incorporated this method. The other questions raised by this evaluation should be resolved and corrected to make this panel an effective operator tool. I I I I l l D-2.7 I
- - - - - _ - _ ___ ,.. - , _ ._ _ - -- -,a., - s. _ -a __m. .___--
I ll I ,I i APPENDIX E RESULTS OF AN EVALUATION OF THE GENERAL ATOMIC RADIATION MONITORS ,I lI l 1 I
I
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The SNUPPS control room design incorporates into the immediate operator environ-ment the process radiation monitoring system. This system is being designed and built by General Atomic Company (GA). As part of the human engineering centrol room evaluation, Essex reviewed a General Atomic system at the factory. This review was conducted by Dr. Robert Kinkade, Mr. Larry Durham and Mr. Charlie Wright of Essex Corporation's San Diego facility. In attendance were Mr. David Phipps of Carolina Power and Light, and Mr. Bud Perkins and Mr. Jim Ward of General Atomic Company. As the specific equipment being developed for SNUPPS was not available, the review was conducted on a system being tested for another GA client. The interface between the radiation monitoring system and the operator consists of two comporents, RM-23 and RM-ll. The RM-23 component review contained twelve RM-23 modules and eight Leeds and Northrup strip chart recorders. The PM-Il component consisted of one CRT terminal and a supporting line printer. According to General Atomic System Manual E-Il5-838 and Bechtel drawing 10466-3-04001, Rev.1, the SNUPPS configuration will consist of the following: e One RM-11 CRT display terrainal, located in the immediate control room (SPO56A) e One RM-Il support printer, located adjacent to the CRT terminal (SPO56B) e One RM-23 cabinet with eight RM-23 modules, located on a back panel (about 25 to 30 feet from the main control room). An assumption is being made (without any immediate means to verify it) that the SPO10-Radiation Recorder Panel wil contain strip chart recorders for the radiation monitoring system. Figures I through 3 illustrate typical RM-23 modules and a CRT terminal. The labeling shown, including pushbutton labels on the RM-23 module, varies according to customer requirements. Complete sets of black and white and color photographs are on file. I I E-1
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I 2.0 RESULTS OF REVIEW I 2.1 Overall System 2.1.1 The light intensity of both digital displays and CRT displays appears to be satisfactorily clear and the displays are legible. 2.1.2 The noise output from the printer could affect efficient CR voice communi-cations and efficient use of the CRT terminal. Noise damping, such as internal (to the printer cabinet) acoustic foam, and/or transparent noise shields over the printer should be considered. 2.1.3 Labeling of all equipment will be a key factor and should be addressed by SNUPPS as early as possible, thereby avoiding A&E recommended labeling that may be unclear or confusing. 2.1.4 GA reports that the system is limited to six grids and six display terminals. From an engineering standpoint these could be significant limiting factors. It also appears that this systems does not address perimeter or outlying radiation monitors. If not, where these monitor outputs are displayed should be considered if CR operators need this information. 2.1.5 Each CRT terminal is reported to be capable of addressing any monitor or grid in the system. Interaction issues need to be addressed to determine the effect of two CRT terminals addressing the system simultaneously. I 2.2 RM-Il CRT Terminal 2.1.1 The reviewed CRT display uses colors to code boundaries, headings and I abnormal values. The co!ars are easily discriminated when both hue and saturation are varied. It is unknown whether the same CRT will be used in the SNUPPS system. 2.2.2 The RM-Il system uses a grid display (schematic layout) to represent monitor locations within the plant. A grid display logo located in the lower right corner of the screen will flash when an alarm condition is found, directing the operator to the correct grid. This grid logo lacks specific grid numbers but resembles the location of the Grid Selection buttons. Labeling of function and selection buttons is not the best, but could be sufficient with proper training. SNUPPS grid assignments and the associated schematic layouts may need to be developed. E-5 I I - -
I 2.2.3 The Lamp Test button only lights those buttons that have an on/off function; however, as these appear to be the only simple indicator lights (or backlight pushbuttons) on the keyboard, this appea-: to be adequate. 2.2.4 The display terminal has a " HEALTH" label near the " POT /ER" label and is reported by GA to represent power to the terminal. However, GA is not entirely sure of this. If true, the label should be changed to " POWER ON". 2.2.5 The " ENTER" function button is located on the left side of the numeric keyboard, the second in a column of identically appearing buttons, and could cause some delay in operating. This is not a time-critical system; however, better location of the I " ENTER" button could improve operator performance. 2.2.6 The brightness control is located right on the front for individual operator use, with the other control buttons (Vertical / Horizontal hold, etc.) located behind a locked panel on the CRT. 2.2.7 There is also a Degaussing button located on the front panel. 'GA says the CRT needs to be degaussed at intervals. With all the automation of this system, it seems logical that this function could also be automatic; otherwise, a preventive maintenance program needs to be included for it. 2.2.8 The " LIT" button converts all function keys to alphabetical keys for system programming. This capability imposes the requirement for a number of buttons that are not used by Control Room Operators. This could cause some confusion; however, this is not a time-critical system. It is recommended that this label be changed to one which is more de criptive of its function, such as "NOR/ ALPHA" for normal or alphabetic. Additionally, all function keys should carry a double label indicating function (under normal conditions) arid the alpha character (when programming function is on). 2.3 RM-23 Cabinet, Modules and Recorders 2.3.1 The RM-23 display / control modules are digital display units that are backup units for safety system monitors only. This is due to the CRT not being seismically qualified. The RM-23's will primarily be used by maintenance personnel cr in the event of an accident that includes failure of the CRT terminal. Rm-23's will require extensive operator training as all failure indications are in numerical cede. I E-6 I
2.3.2 The "ON", " ALERT" and "HIGH ALARM" lights are very small and not very intense. This makes them difficult to detect under normal illuminance conditions. These should be enlarged and their intensity increased if there is any possibility that they must function as primary displays (i.e., primary radiation annunciators). 2.3.3 There is an unequal number of strip chart recorders compared to the RM-23 modules. Different combinations of readings from RM-23 modules (up to 3) will be displayed on these recorders. The rationale for this is unclear at this time. 2.3.4 The strip chart recorders must be read up close. Beyond four feet an observer cannot determine if they are standard scale or log scale. 2.3.5 There is no alarm mechanism to notify the operator of strip chart failure, paper running out, or exhausted ink supply. - 2.3.6 The strip chart recorders can be fully removed from the cabinet once the retainers are loose. Locks should be installed such that they cannot be inadvertently pulled all the way out and dropped when changing ink and paper. 2.3.7 The pen / channel to color on these Leeds and Northrup recorders are different from the majority found in NPP CRs. Based upon a previous recommendation, it is suggested that the sequence be changed to the following: Pen / Channel ~~ Color i Red 2 Green 3 Blue 2.3.8 The status indicator lights located on the RM-23 cabinets between the modules and recorders are reported by GA to indicate which RM-23 module is not in service. The fuel handling area monitors have redundant RM-23's, one set in Unit I and I the other in Unit 4. This option and the reason for the redundancy are unclear at this time. Also, the location of the switch for determining Unit 1 or Unit 4 operation is not known. It is possible that these lights, when lighted, will indicate a deactivated unit. This could be confusing as it establishes a lighted =off and unlighted =on relationship. Alterna-tives to this type of relationship should be seriously considered. 2.3.9 SNUPPS should require that no RM-23 modules be mounted such that the readout and associated "HIGH" a nd " \LERT" lamps are above 70 inches or below 41 inches from the standing surface, if any such modules are to be used as primary displays which must be read precisely and frequently, these modules should be mounted such that their E-7 I I
displays are no higher than 65 inches or lower than 50 inches from the standing surface. I From the drawing in GA System Manual E-Il5-838, it appears that the top of the highest RM-23 module will be mounted about 65 inches off the floor. I l l l l l I I I I l I I l 1I
- I l I E-8 l
i I
I 3.0 RECOMMENDATIONS I Based on the above results, the GA Digital Process Radiation Monitoring System appears to have some human engineering design problems. The above evaluation is based on a very preliminary and cursory review and should not be considered definitive. The CRT displays and the interactive sequences could not be adequately evaluated, nor could the SNUPPS specific configuration. The recommendation of Essex is that the SNUPPS configuration, once operational, be evaluated in detail. ~
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!I 4 II e il 1 APPENDIX F ! DEMARCATION OF THE CONTROL PANELS !I !,I lI lI lI 1 !I 1 !.I I I I
I I . The following figures represent the minimum areas that should be demarcated either by lines or background coloring. These areas should include summary labels. For consistency, other panel areas should also be labeled with summary labels. This will significantly reduce visual search time and memory load. ~I II lI
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FIGURE 4: DEMARCATION ZONES FOR RLO13 AND RLO14, WOLF CREEK L F-5
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a: . FIGURE 6: DEMARC \ TION ZONES FOR RLO17 AND RLO18, SNUPPS F-7
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l l l I I i l t i i I i i 'I a i APPENDIX G 1 i I IIEER FILES 1 i l i
- I i
i l 1 , I i i n !I i 1 4 1 4 1 J I l I
I I The HEER files contain component sheets. Each component reviewed by Essex has a sheet that lists the finding, HEF number, priority, and recommended backfits. The files arranged by panel. Within a panel, each component type is grouped in a lef t-to-right and top-to-bottom order. These files also contain copies of the HEFs and sample checklists. I I I I I ig c-> lI I
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