ML19296D783
| ML19296D783 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1977 |
| From: | UNITED ENGINEERS & CONSTRUCTORS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19296D782 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003130188 | |
| Download: ML19296D783 (33) | |
Text
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NOTE: Only Sections 16V are included here.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Conni'.s ton Docket No. 50-325 License No. DPR-62 Docket No. 50-324 License No. DPR-71 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REVIEW APCSB 9.5-1 ANALYSIS OF SAFE S!!UTDOWN CAPABILITY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 1
a CAROLINA POWER A';D LICHT COMPANY
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R5LEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA
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OCTOBER 28, 1977 J
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,ey PREPARED BY:
UNITEIffyCINEERS AND CdSS'TRUCTORS, INC.
PilILADELPHIA, FENNSYLVANIA J
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INDEX s.
SECTION I - CENERAL (Book No. 1)
A.
Introduction B.
C rit eria C.
Preparation of the Report D.
Systems and Components Reviewed SECTION II
.g. MAL SIRITDO'.C? (Book No. 1)
'A.
Criteria B., Cables Required for Safe Shutdown C.
Arcas k'here Opposite Division Raceways Cross D,
Analysis and Rec.ommendations to Meet Separation Criteria E.
Drawing List SECTION III - REMOTE SHUTD0's'N (Book No. 2)
A.
Criteria B.
Cables Required for Safe Shutdown C.
Cables Routed Through Control Building D.
Analysis and la commendations to Meet Shutdown Criteria E.
Drawing List SECTION IV - LOSS OF REMOTE SHUTDO!?! PANEL (Book No. 2)
A.
General B.
Analysis and Recommendations to Meet Shutdown Criteria SECTION V - LOSS OF Th'O DIESEL CENERATORS (Book No. 2)
A.
Criteria B.
Equipment Required B'ut Not Available C.
Recommendations for Modifications D.
Diesc1 Generator Capacity SECTION VI - _ RESPONSES TO NRC OUESTIONS (Book No. 2)
A.
Position No. 10 B.
Concern No. 3
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C.
Rcqucst For Additional Information No. 7 D.
Request For Additigtfa1'Information No.- 10 E.
Request For Addition /1 Information No. 11 F.
Request For AdditlinEf Information Nb.' 12 C.
Request For Additiona'l Information No. 16 H.
Request For Additional Informatio.n No.
17 APPENDIX-A.
Normal Shutd'own Drawings B.
Remote Shutdown Drawings C.
4 y.
I,
t SECTION I CENE RAL A.
Introduction On January 1,1977 a report titled "' ire Protection Program Review, 1
APCSB 9.5-1, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2" was l'
submitted to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to respond to the guidelines contained in the Commission's Standard Review Plan 9.5-1.
Subsequent discussions on the report indicated that additional analysis and documentation were warranted in order to assure that there is sufficient separation between equipment and cables of opposite divisions, such that a singic credible fire would not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.
In addition, a capability should exist to safely shutdown the plant upon loss of the control room or cable spreading room due to fire or other cause.
I
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At the Site Visit Exit Review Meeting on May 13, 1977, Carolina Power and Light Company committed to prepare a written report which analyzed the safe shutdown equipment and cables.
This report details i
the analysis and recommended modifications necessary to meet the safe shutdown c riteria.
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Criteria A credibic fire in any area of Carolica Power and Light Company's Brunswick Steam Electric Plant should not prevent the safe shutdown of either Unit No. I and/or Unit No. 2 to cold shutdown conditions, d
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Preparation Of The Report c
The preparation of this report preceededlntwh116tlihsqe 1.
Deterpination Of The Recuired Shutdown Svstems a
A review was instituted by the various engineering disciplines to determine which systems were absolutely required to safely
' shutdown the plant.
The required systems we re determined to be as follows:
a.
Electrical Distribution (ED) b.
Diesel Generators (DC) i c.
Ventilation Systems (VA) d.
Service Wate r Sys tem (SW) c.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (E51) f.
Residual Heat Removal System (Ell)
)
g.
Automatic Depressurization System (B21)
Each system was then reviewed to determine which components
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were necessary to perform the shutdown functions.
A brief discussion of the shutdown systems and their major components will follow in Section 1, Part D.
2.
Determination Of Cables Connectinn Ecuierent Each system and its associated components were individually reviewed to determine the interconnecting cables necessary for safe shutdown.
Those cables which were required for Remote Shutdown (shutdown outside the control room) were also noted. The cables were then inputted to the UE&C Computerized Conduit and Cable Schedule Program (CASP) and a listing of each cable required for ypypal Shutdown (control room available for shutdown) and/or Remofe Shutdown with 'its associated route was outputted.
Also b4Tp raceways and trays fo,TItted was a listing of the various conduits,
ntaining the safe shutdown cables.
The computer listing of the cables is contained in Section II, Part B, for the Normal Shutdown Cables for Unit No. I and Unit No. 2 and Section III, Part B for the Remote Shutdown Cables for Unit No. 1 and Unit No. 2.
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3.
Physical Location of Equipment and Racewav Routing A set o f physical. d rawings we re marked to show the location of the previously determined components and to add the conduits and t rays connecting these components.
Division I components, conduits and trays are marked in " red" and Division 11 components, conduits and trays are marked in "g re e n".
Reproductions of the Normal Shutdown components and raceway arrangements are shown in Appendix, Part A and the Renote Shutdown components and raceway arrangements in Appendix, Part B.
4.
Review of Normal Shutdown Cables for Physical Sepa ration Review of the physical drawings determined there are areas whe re opposite division components, conduits and t rays were located or routed in the same fi re ~a rea.
Also the re are areas where a fire in a cable tray could af fect cables of opposite divisions.
A list of the potential problem areas can be found in Section II, Part C.
Each cable or equipment in an opp alte division area was analyzed to dete rmine the ef fects of a fire and recommendations are then made as follows:
a.
Protect the Raceway through which the cable is routed from the effects of the fire; or b.
Relocate the cable away from the hazard; or c.
Provide fire suppression equipment in the area; or d.
Leave as is as a fire will not adversely affect the proper operation of the component or system.
The analysis and recommendations are listed in Section II, Part D.
5.
Review of Remote Shutdown Cables for. Doe rability of Svstems With Cables Routed Throuch Control Room or Cable Screadine Rooms Review of the physical drawings determined many cables required
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for Remote Shutdown are routed through the Control Room or Cable Spreading Rooms and would be af fected by a catastrophic fire in these areas.
A list of thejpfoblem cables con.be found in Section III, Part C.
Each ed61e was analyzed to determine the effects of a fire and recomped6ations were then made as follows:
a.
Provide means of isolating the cable such that the system circuitry would not be affected and provide. local control capability; or g
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Review of Remote Shutdown Cahics for Operabilitv of Svstems With Cables Routed Throuch Control Room or Cable Spreadine l' o oms (Cont'd) l b.
Reroute the cab}c away from the fire area; or c.
Leave as is as a fire will not adversely af fect the proper operation of the component or system.
The analysis and recommendations are listed in Section III, i
Pa rt D.
1 6.
Responses to NRC Positions, Conce rn s, Etc.
Additional reviews were made to assure that the following conditions would.not prevent safe shutdown of the plant:
4 a.
Loss of two (2) Ofesel Generators due to a fire in the D-G Building Basement b.
Loss of the Remote Shutdown Panel due to a fire Loss of a Core Spray Pump Room or an RHR Pump Room c.
- 1 Recommendations are made to resolve problems discovered during this review.
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D.
Systems and components Reviewed Below is a brief discussion of the various systems required for safe shutdown and the components of these systems necessary to effect t h,e safe shutdown.
1.
Elcetrical Distribution Svsten (ED)
.The Electrical Distribution System is required to power the various pumps, valves, controls, instruments, etc., which are required to riafely shutdown the plant.
The Electrical Distribution System can be powered either from the normal d
BOP ouses, or in case of loss of the BOP buses, from the Diesel Generators.
Included as part of the ED System are the four (4) 4160 volt switchgear emergency buses ; the four (4) 480 volt emergency unit substations; the 480 volt l
motor control centers in the Diesel Generator Building, the Service Water Building, the Control Building and the Reactor Building; the 208/120 volt 3$ distribution panels; the 125/250 volt batteries and chargers; the DC switchboards and motor control centers; the 125 volt DC distribution panels
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and the RPS motor generator sets.
A simplified single line of
_I the ED system is'shown in Figure I.D.1 The major components of the ED system required for safe shutdown
-j are as follows:
a.
4160 volt switcheear 1.
Bus E1 - Division I - Diesel Generator Building
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2.
Bus E2 - Division II - Diesel Generator Building 3.
Bus E3 - Division I - Diesel Generator Building 4.
Bus E4 - Division III - Diesel Generator Building b.
480 volt uni tIu'5's tations
,s 1.
SubstatiorrJI'- Division I *- Diesel Generator Building 2.
Substation E6 - Division II - Diesel Generator Building 3.
Substation E7 - Division.I - Diesel Generator Building 4.
Substation E8 - Division II - Diesel Generator Building e
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Electrient Distribution System (ED)
(Cont'd) c.
480 volt motor control centers 1.
MCC ICA - Division I - Control Building 2.
MCC ICB - Division II - Control Building 3.
MCC 1PA - Division I - Service Water Building 4.
MCC IPB - Division II - Service Wate r Building 5.
MCC IXA - Division I - Unit 1 Reactor Building 6.
MCC IXA Division I - Unit 1 Reactor Building 7.
MCC IXB - Division II - Unit 1 Reactor Building 8.
MCC IXB Division II - Unit 1 Reactor Building 9.
MCC 1XC - Division I
-Unit 1 Reactor Building
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MCC IXD - Division II - Unit 1 Reactor Building b\\g 11.
MCC 2CA - Division I - Control Building.
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MCC 2CB - Division II - Control Building
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MCC 2PA - Division I - Service Water Building 14.
MCC 2PB - Divicion II - Service Water Building 15.
MCC 2XA - Division : - Unit 2 Reactor luilding 16.
MCC 2XA Division I - Unit 2 Reactor Building 17.
MCC 2XB - Division II - Unit 2 Reactor Building 18.
MCC 2XB Division II - Unit 2 Reactor Building 19.
MCC 2XC - Division I - Unit 2 Reactor Building 20.
MCC 2XD - Division II - Unit 2 Reactor Building 21.
Diesel Generator Building 22.
MCC DGB - Divistcn ' 1 - Diesel Generator Building.
4 23.
MCC DCC - Division I - Diesel Generator Building 24.
MCC DCD - Division II - Diae.el Cencrator Building e
I.D.2
1.
Elce t rical.Ns t ribut ion Svs tem (l'D)
(Cont'd) d.
208/120V, 30, AC Distribution Pancis 1.
Dist r. Panel I A (1106) - Division I - Control Building
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2.
Distr. Panel IB (1107) - Division II - Control Building J
3.
Distr. Panel 1AB (H08) - Division I
. Control Building 7
j 4.
Distr. Panel IC (IlYO) - Division I - Control Building 5.
Distr. Panel IA-DG (H32) - Division I - Diesel Gene rator Bldg.
6.
Distr. Panel 13-DC (1133) - Division II - Diesel Generator Bldg.
7.
Distr. Panel IB-RX (1110) - Division II - Unit 1 Reactor Bldg.
8.
Distr. Panel.1AB-RX (H11) - Division I - Unit 1 Reactor Bldg.
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Distr. Panel C71-P001 (HY4) - Divisions I & II - Control Bldg.
10.
Distr. Panel 1D (llY1) - Division II - Control Bldg.
11.
Distr. Panel IES (HCO) - Division I - Control Bldg.
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12.
Distr. Panel IE6 (HC3) - Division II - Control Bldg.
13.
Distr. Panel V9A (HC9) - Division I & II - Control Bldg.
14.
Distr. Panel 2A (H06) - Division I - Control Bldg.
15.
Distr.
Panel 2B (H07) - Division II - Control Bldg.
J 16.
Distr. Panel 2AB (H08) - Division I - Control Bldg.
17.
Distr. Panel 2C'(HYO) - Division I - Control Bldg.
18.
Distr. Panel 2A-DG (li')S) - Division I - Diesel Generator Bldg.
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Distr. Panel 2B-DG.(HQ7) - Division II - Diesel Generator Bldg.
20.
Distr. Panel 2A-RX (1109) - Division I - Unit ~2 Reactor Bldg.
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21.
Distr. Pane,l' h-RX (!!10) - Division II - Unit 2 Reactor Bldg.
1 22.
Distr. Paner 32A (IIW8) - Division 1 - Control Bldg.
.e 23.
Distr. Panel 32B (l!W9) - Division II - Control Bldg.
24 Distr. Panel C72-P001 (IIY4) - Divisions I & II - Control Bldg.
Dist'r. PancI 2D (llY1) - Division IT - Contro,1 Bldg.
25.
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Electrical Distribution System (ED)
(Cont'd) 26.
Distr. Panel 2E7 (HCO) - Division'I - Control Bld),.
27.
Distr. Panel 2E8 (HC3) - Division II - Control Bldg.
28.
Distr. Panel V10A (HC9) - Division I & II - Control Bldg.
e.
_125/250 Volt Bat teries and Cha rhers 1.
Battery & Charge.r l A Division I - Control Bldg.
2.
Battery 6 Charger I A Division I - Control Bldg.
13.
Battery & Charger IB D'ivision II - Control Bldg.
4.
Battery & Charger 1B Division II - Control Bldg.
5.
Battery & Charger 2A Division I - Cont rol Bldg.
6.
Battery & Charger 2A Division I - Control Bldg.
7.
Battery & Charger 2B Division II - Control Bldg.
8.
Battery & Charger 23 civision II - Control Bldg.
f.
DC Distribution Suitchboards and Motor Control Centers 1.
Swbd. lA - Division I - Control Bldg.
2.
Swbd. IB - Division II
, Control Bldg.
3.
Swbd. 2A - Division I - Control Bldg.
4.
Swbd. 2B - Division II - Control Bldg.
5.
MCC IXDA - Division I - Unit 1 Reactor Bldg.
6.
MCC IXDB - Division II - Unit 1 Reac tor Bldg.
7.
MCC 2XDA - Division I - Unit 2 Reactor Bldg.
8.
MCC 2XDB - Division II - Unit 2 Reactor Bldg.
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125 Volt DC_Distributa$n Panels l
1.
Diser. Panel 1A (HA7) - Division 1 - Diesel Cenerator Bldg.
2.
Distr. Pane'l IB (HA8) - Division II - Diesel Generator Bldg.
I, 3
Distr. Papel 2A (hcl) - Division I - Diesel,Cenerator Bldg.
11 - Die:,el Cenc hator tildg.
4 Distr. I'.inel 21 t ilC2 )
Division I U.4 '
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Electrical Dist ribution Svstem (ED).
(Cont'd) 5.
Distr. Panel 3A (1123) - Division I '- Cont rol Bldg.
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6.
Sis tr. Panel 3B (1124) - Division II - Control Bldg.
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7.
Distr. Panci 4A (II23) - Division I - Control Bldg.
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8.
Distr. Panel 4B (1124) - Division II - Control Bldg.
h.
RPS Motor Gene rator Se ts 1.
M-G Set lA - Division I - Control Bldg.
2.
M-G Set 1B - Division II - Control Bldg.
3.
M-G Set 2A - Division I - Control Bldg.
4.
M-G Set 2B - Division II - Control Bldg.
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RTG Boards - Division I & II - Control Bldg.
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_Te rmi na t i on Cabinets - Division I & II - Control Bldg.
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2.
Diesel Generators (DC)
The four (4) Diesel Cencrators are required *.. power the Electrical Distribution System upon loss Of power f rom the BOP buses.
Included as part of the Diesel Generators are the various auxiliaries which are required to support the operation of the DC's and the various control and metering equipment necessary for operation and monitoring of the DC's.
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Control of the Diesel Cencrators is normally from the control room; however, under conditions of an uninhabitabic control room, control can be trans ferred to the Diesel Generator Building.
The major components of each Diesel Cencrator require l for safe shutdown are as follows:
l a.
Diesci b.
Cencrator 9
1
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Engine Control Panel d.
Generator Control Panel
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Exciter Control Panel f.
Grounding Trans former and Resis te r g.
Potential and Current Trans formers h.
209 Logic Cabinet 1.
RTG Board I
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Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump n
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Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps 1.
Fuel 0.
Booster Pumps
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Crankcase Vacuum Blower 4KV Switchgear Breaker Compartment and Auxiliary Compartment n.
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Auxiliary Jacket Water Pump
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Motor Control Center Starters for Pumps and Blowers 4
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3.
Ventilation Systems (VA) a.
RHR, RCIC and HPCI Roome Venr(Intic, The Rl!R fan coil system is necessary to maintain, at a suitable ambient environment, the follow'ing safe shutdown systems:
- 1) The Reactor Core Isolat i. a Coc.i tng s g t em 2)
The Residual Heat Removal system 3)
The High Pressure Coolant Injection system Each RHR pump room fan unit is made up of an air plenum with cooling cells and a fan.
There are two units located in the RHR areas and they discharge into a common duct.
Control is arranged to let the operator place the control switches in automatic position so fan A-FCU-RB will be energized to start whenever the contact on any of three (3) temperature switches set at 120 F are closed and fan B-TCU-RB will likewise be energized when any of the other three (3) temperature switches, set at 145 F, are closed.
The major components of the RHR, RCIC and llPCI Rooms Ventilation system required for safe shutdown are as follows:
Unit No. I 1)
Fan 1 A-FCU-RB 2)
Fan 1A Discharge Damper IJ-TPD-RB
- 3) Discharge Damper Solenoid Valve IVA-SV-936A 4)
Fan IB-FCU-RB 5)
Fan IB Discharge Damper IK-TPD-RB
- 6) Discharge Damper Solenoid Valve IVA-SV-936B 7)
Temperature Switch ;1-VA-TS-936A r
- 8) Tempe rature Switch 1-VA-TS-936B g
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- 9) Temperature Switih'l-VA-TS-936C s
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- 10) Temperature switch 1-VA-TS-93.6D
- 11) Temperature Switch 1-VA-TS-936E R y M,",)
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- 12) Temperattue Switch 1-VA-TS-936F
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Ve n t i l a t'i on Systems (VA)
(Cont'd)
Unit No. 2
- 1) Fan 2A-FCU-kB
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Fan 2A Discharge Damper 2J-TPD-P3
- 3) Discharge Damper Solenoid Valve 2VA-SV-936A 4)
Fan 2B-FCU-RB 5)
Fan 2B Discharge Damper 2K-TPD-RB
- 6) Discharge Damper Solenoid Valve 2VA-SV-936B
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- 7) Temperature Switch 2-VA-TS-936A
- 8) Temperature Switch 2-VA-TS-936B S) Tempe rature Swi tch 2-VA-TS-936C
- 10) Temperature Switch 2-VA-TS-936D
- 11) Temperature Switch 2-VA-TS-936E
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- 12) Temperature Swtich 2-VA-TS-936F em
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Diesel Generator Ventilation The ventilation system in the Dies.cl Generator Building is l
necessary to maintain diesel generators at a suitable ambient environment.
The diesel generator cells receiv'e supply air from the
. building's common supply air plenum which is normally pressurized by one or more supply air fans.
While four g
supply air fans are provided, only three are required to provide maximum ventilation during the most severe design conditions.
The four diesel gene rator units are independently ventilated by its temperature control system which positions two supply air, one recirculation air and one exhaust air dar.per.
When 1
the temperature in the unit exceeds a given set point, the control system repositions the recirculation and exhaust air dampers.
The major components of the Diesel Generator Ventilation system required for safe shutdown are as follows:
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1)
Supply Air Fan A-SF-DC 2)
Supply Air Fan B-SF-DG
- 3) Supply Air Fan C-SF-DG
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Supply Air Fan D-SF-DG U
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- 5) Exhaust Fan E-EF-DC-l
- 6) Exhaust Fan F-EF-DG
- 7) Exhaust Fan G-EF-DC
- 8) Exhaust Fan H-EF-DG l
9)' Damper Solenoid Valve SV-1606A
.I 10)
Damper Solenoid Valve SV-1607A
- 11) Temperatute,6sitch TS-1642
- 12) Temperature Switc!j TS-164 3
- 13) Temperature Switch TS-1644
- 14) Temperature Switch TS-1645 f
I.D.11 u
4.
Service Water System (SW)
The nuclear service. water pumps supply cooling water to the RHR heat exchangers for decay heat load removal.
The RiiR service water hooster pumps are used in conjunction with the nuclear service water pumps to obtain the necessary system pressure.
The major components of the Service Water system required for safe shutdeun are as follows:
Unit No. I a.
Nuclear Service Water Pump 1A or 1B b.
N'ucicar Service Water Pump 2A Discharge MO Valve 1-SW-V19 c'
Nuc1 car Service Wate r Pump 2B Discharge Mr *,*21vc 1-SW-V20 d.
Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water IIcat Exchanger Primary Isolation valve 1-SW-V106 e.
RHR Heat Exchanger Discharge MO Valves 1-E11-F002A or 1-E11-F0023 f.
RHR Boos te r Pumps '1 A 6 1C or 1B 6 1D g.
RilR Heat Exchanger Discharge MO Valves 1-E11-F06SA or 1-E11-F06SB h.
RilR Booste r Pump Suc tion MO Valve 1-SW-V105 1.
RilR Booster Pump Crossove r MO Valve 1-SW-V102 r,
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IUIR. Boos ter Pump Suc tion MO valve 1-SW-V101
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Unit No. 2
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Nucicar Service Water Pump 2A or 2B b.
Nuclear Service Water Pump 2A Discharge MO Valve 2-SW-vi9 Nuc1 car Service Water Pump 2B ' Discharge M0 Valve 2-SW-V20 c.
d.
Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Primary Isolation Valve 2-SW-VLO6.
',s e.
PHR Heat Exchanger Discharge M0 Valves 2-E11-F002A or 2-E11-F0023
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RHR Booster Pumps 2A
'2C or 2B 6 2D g.
RHR Heat Exchanger Discharge M0 Valves 2-E11-F068A or 2-E11-F066B h.
RHR Booster Pump Suction MO valve 2-SW-V105 i.
RHR Boos ter Pump Crossove r MO Valve 2-SW-V102 J.
RllR Booster Pump Suction MO Valve 2-SW-V101
!. D.12
5.
Reactor Core Isolation Coolini. Svs. tem (E51) 9 During sa fe shutdown, steam generation continues due to decay heat.
The steam flow can be bled to the suppression pool via the automatic depressurization system (ADS) valves or by the reactor vessel safety relief valves. The water inve tory los t as ste n. is replaced by the RCIC system.
Either the suppression pool or the conden ate storage tank can be used as a source of makeup water.
Decay steam may also be condensed in the residual heat removal (RllR) system heat exchangers.
The condensate from the heat exchangers is returned to the reactor by the RCIC pump.
The RCIC system is comprised of a steam turbine driven pump and associated piping and instrumentation.
Steam is supplied to the turbine from the main steam header at a point upstream of the containment iso 1'ation valves.
The exhaus t discharges to the suppression pool.
The major components of the RCIC system required for safe shutdown are as follows:
a.
RCIC Turbine b.
Steam to Turbine MO valve E51-F045 c.
Turbine Trip Throttle MO Valve E51-V8 d.
Turbine Control llydraulic Operated Valve E51-V9 c.
Lube Oil Cooling Water MO Valve E51-F046 f.
Steam Line Isolation MD Valve E51-F007
'b g.
Steam Line Isolation M0 Valve E51-F008
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RCIC Pump C001
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Pump Suction from Condensate Storage MO Valve E51-F010 j.
Pump Suction from Supp.ression Pool MO valve E51-F029 k.
Pump Suction from Suppression Pool MO Valve E51-F031 1.
Pump Discharge,gopReactor Mo Valve E51-F012 s
PumpDischarg4ff'ReactorMOValveE51-F013 m.
t Minimum Flow to Suppression Pool MO Valve E51-F019 n.
o.
RCIC Baroietric Condenser p.
RCIC Condensate Pump q.
MCIC Vacuum Pump 1
I.D.13
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- 6.
- Residual Pcat Rcmoval System (Ell)
During safe shutdown the Ri!R system heat exchangers are used to transfer the decay heat' load to the service water sys tem.
The heat exchangers can remove core heat in three ways:
1.
,Directly from the primary coolant via a connection to one of the recirculation system lines, 2.
By condensing decay steam via a connection to the steam supply of the high pressure coolant injection system, 3.
By cooling suppression pool water which has been heated by steam blowdown f rom either the automatic depressurization system or the reactor vessel safety relie f valves.
The RHR pumps can also be used to inject makeup water f rom the suppression pool to the reactor vessel.
The major components of the RHR ' system required for safe sht tdova are as follows:
a.
RHR Pumps A, B, C, D b.
Pump Suction f rem Suppression Pool M0 Valves E11-F004A, B, C, D Suppression Pool Isolation M0 Valves E11-F020A, B c.
d.
Pump Suction from Recirculation System MO Valves E11-7006A, B,C,D Inboard Isolation f rom Recirculation Sys ter,':0 Valse E11-F009 e.
f.
. Outboard Isolation from Recirculation System MO Valve E11-F00S g.
Pump Discharge to Recirculation System MO Valves E11-F017A, B h.
Pump Discharge to Recirculation System MO Valves Ell-F015A, B i.
Reactor Head Spray MO Valve Ell-F023 j.
Reactor Head Spcay MO Valve E11-F022 k.
Heat Exchanger B001A, 3,,
t Exc hanger Inlet M[0 Valves E11-F0/ 7A, B
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Heat Exchanger Bypass 1M'O Valves E11-F048A, B\\f)', s h
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Heat Exchanger Outlet MO Valves E11-F003A. B o.
Condensate Discharge to Suppression Pool MG Valves E11-F028A, B p.
Containment S> ray MO valves L11-F024A, B i
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1.D.14' 4
- r 6.
Residual fleat Removal Sv. stem (I. l l )
(Cont'd)
In addition, the recirculation pump suction valves (B32-F023A and B) must be isolated to prevent backflos through the recirculation pump.
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7.
Automa tic Depressurization Svstem (B21)
During shutdown the ADS system is used to manually reduce reactor vessel pre ssure at a controlled rate by blowiag down to the suppression pool.
The ADS system is comprised of the reactor pressure vessel safety relief valves and their remote manual controls.
The major components of the ADS system required for safe shutdown are as follows:
a.
ADS Valve B21-F013A b.
ADS Vals B21-F013B c.
ADS Valve B21-F013C d.
ADS Valve B21-F013D e.
ADS Valve B21-F013E
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ADS Valve B21-F013F 4
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ADS Valve B21-F013G
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ADS Valve B21-F013H -
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ADS Valve B21-F013J J.
ADS Valve B21-F013K k.
ADS' Valve B21-F013L
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O e G I.D.16
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SECT 1CN V.
LOSS OF 'NO DIESEL CENERATORS
~
A.
Criteria Safe shutdown shall be achievable. utilizing only the two diesel generators assigned to the same division. The postulated cause of this failure is a fire in the diesel generator building basement which af fects cables from both emergency power supplies in one division, and therefore renders one entire division of emergency power unusabic for both units.
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B.
Equipment Required But Not Availabic 1.
Loss of Division T Electrical System a..
Fed From Switchgear El If the Division I electrical system is lost, the following loads vill be lost in addition to the strictly Division I loads.
These loads are fed from the Division I power source, and are located such that they can prevent operation of systems which are predominately fed from the Division II power source.
The
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following loads are fed from Emergency Switchgear E1:
- 1) Motor Operated Valve 1-E11-F022 (Vessel Head Spray)
=
- 3) MOV 1-SW-V106 (Service Water Supply to Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Heat Exchangers) 4
- 4) Mov 1-SW-V255 (Service Water Supply to Diesel Generators 1, 2, 3 and 4)
Foi discussion of the effects of these failures see paragraph C.I.a.
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Fed From Switchgear E3 o
Loss of the power supply to and from Emergency Switchgear E3 would result in failure of the following equipment:
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- 1) Motor operated valve 2-E11-F022 (Vessel Head Spray Valve)
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Valve)
- 3) MOV 2-SW-V106 (Service Water Supply to Reactor Building
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Closed Cooling Water Heat Exchangers)
- 4) MOV 2-SW-V255 (Service Water Supply to Diesel Generators 1, 2, 3 and 4)
- 5) MOV 2-E51-F007 (RCIC Steam Line inboard Isolation Valve) e For details on the ef fect of these failures see paragraph C.1.b.
2.
Loss of Division II Electrical System a.
Fed From Switchgear E2 Loss of' power to and from Emergency Switchgear E2 would cause loss of the function of the following equipment :
e
- 1) Motor operated valve 1-E41-F002 (HPCI, Steam Supply Inboard Isolation Valve)
- 2) Motor driven fire pump alternate feeder
- 3) MOV's 1-SW-V105,1-SW-V102 and 1-SW-v11 (RHR Service Water System Valves)
For detailed analysis of the results of these failures see paragraph C.2.b.
i b.
Fed From Switchgear E4 27 Loss of the power stfpply to and from Emergency Switchgear E4
[
would cause the following equipment to. fail:
I a
,s
- 1) Motoroperatedvalve2-E41-F002(HPCISteamSupplyknboard l
Isolation Valve
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- 2) Motor driven hire. pump normal feeder l
- 3) Motor operated valves 2-SW-V105, 2-SW-V102 and 2-SW-V117 5
(RHR Ser4 ice Water System Valves).
V. lf. 2 t
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Recommendations for Modifications 1.
Loss of Division I Systems
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Fed From Switchgear El c'd b3 d
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1)
Failure of motor operated valve 1-E11-F022 (Vessel Ifead Spray Valve) would result only in a slower cooldown and possibly in the necessity to depressurize the reactor using ADS, and would not make it impossible to cool the reactor and safely achieve a cold shutdown condition.
There fore, no modification is required even though this valve would incapacitate a Division II system (Div. II RHR loops in Vessel Head Spray configuration).
- 2) Failure of MOV 1-E11-F009 to open would result in the~
inability of the Division II RHR pumps to take suction from the reactor vessel. An alternative source of water for the RHR system is the suppression pool, but it is considered extremely undesirabic to use this water for the reactor unless no alternative is availabic.
Because there are no rigorous time constraints on operation of the RHR system in a safe shutdown configuration, a manual transfer l
switch to a Division II power supply will oc provided for valve Ell-F009, which can be manually transferred if necessary.
- 3) MOV 1-SW-V106 is required to close because, under a shutdown condition with only two diesel generators availabic, only one nucicar service water pump will be availabic. Therefore, the service water system flow
~
capacity will not be sufficient to provide service water to the Reactor Building closed cooling water heat exchangers as well as systems required for safe shutdown.
1-SW-V106 must close to ensure an adequate supply of water to the RHR heat exchangers. Again, there is ample time to close this valve by hand, and because it is located in the Reactor Building it would be accessibic, so no modification is proposed.
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I V.C.1
- 4) Both 2-SW-V255 and 1-SW-v255 are currently feed from Division I power supplies. One.of the two valves will be supplied from a Division II power source rather than the present Division I source. This modification will ensure that at least one of these valves will always be abic to open cicctrically (as required because of the speed of response needed ircm the diesel generators).
- 5) MOV 1-E51-F007 is the RCIC Steam Line Inboard Isolation Valve, and is normally open. Failure of the Division I power supply would result in this valve remaining open, which is a safe condition and permits the use of RCIC to inject water into the reactor vessel. No modification is required. The only consideration is that administrative procedures should emphasize that this valve must be open at all times when the plant is in operation.
b.
Fed From Switchgear E3
- 1) Failure of motor operated valve 2-E11-F022 (Vessel Head Spray Valve) would result only in a slower cooldown and possibly in the necessity to depressurize the reactor using ADS, and would not make it impossible to cool the reactor and safely achieve a cold shutdown condition.
Therefore, no modification is required even though this valve would incapacitate a Division 11 system (Division II Fum loops in vessel head spray configuration).
- 2) Failure of MOV 2-Ell-F009 to open would result in the inability of the Division II RHR pumps to take suction from the reactor vessel. An alternative source of water for the RRR system is the suppression pool, but it is considered extremely undesirable to use this water for the reactor unless no alternative is available. Because there are no rigorous time constraints on operation of the RHR system in a safe shutdown configuration, a manual transfer switch to a Division II power supply will be provided for valve E11-F009, which can be manually transferred if necessary.
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- 3) MOV 2-SW-v106 is required to close because, under a shutdown condition with only two diesel generators availabic, only one nucicar service water pump will "l
be availabic. The re fore, the service water system flow J
capacity will not be sufficient to provide service water to the Reactor Building closed cooling water heat cxchangers as well as the systems required for safe shutdown. 2-SW-V106 must close to ensure an adequate supply of water to the RHR heat exchangers. Again, there is ample time to close this valve by hand, and because it is located in the reactor building it would be accessibic, so no modification is proposed.
- 4) For MOV 2-SW-V255, (see paragraph V.C.1.a.4).
Valve and is normally open.
Failure of the Division I power supply would result in this valve remaining open, which is a safe condition and permits the use of RCIC to inject water into the reactor vessel. No modification is requir6d. The only consideration is that administrative procedures should emphasize that this valve must be open at all times when the plant is in operation.
2.
Loss of Division II Electrical Systen a
a.
Fed From Switchgcar E2
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- 1) MOV 1-E41-F002 (HPCI Steam Line Inboard Isolation Valve) is a normally open valve which would remain open on failure of the Division II electrical power supply.
No modification is required.
The only consideration is that the valve must remain open during plant operation.
This should be an administrative function.
- 2) The fire pump normal feed is required for operation of
=
the motor driven fire pump.
Division II cicctrical power supply failure results in loss of all cicetrical power supplies for the motor driven fire pump, but no modification is required because the diesel engine fire pump is availabic.
- 3) MOV's 1-SW-ViO5,1-SW-V102,.and 1-SW-v117, i.e they fail to open, will'idlate the RHR service water system from the nuclear seprike water header, These valves must open in ord'er for thd' plant to go into shutdown cooling mode, but the time requirements are such that these valves can be operated by hand if a fire renders them inoperabic by cicctrical means. No mo'dification is required.
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Fed From Switchgear E4
- 1) MOV 2-E41-F002 (11PCI Steam Line Inboard Isolation Valve) is a normally open valve which would remain open on failure of the Division Il electrical power supply.
No modification is required. The only consideration is that the valve must remain open during plant operation.
This should be an administrative function.
- 2) The fire pump normal feed is required for operation of the motor driven fire pump. Division II cicetrical power supply failure results in loss of all electrical power supplies for the motor driven fire pump, but no modification is required because the diesel engine fire pump is available.
- 3) MOV's 2-SW-V105, 2-SW-V102, and 2-SW-V117, if they fail t'o open, will isolate the RHR service water system from the nuclear service water header.
These valves must open in order for the plant to go into shutdown cooling mode, but the time requirements are such that these valves can be operated by hand if a fire renders them inoperabic by electrical means.
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D.
Diesel Cencrator Canacities 1.
Calculation sheets (Pages V.D.2 and V.D.3) indicate the minimum
.i.
major equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant on loss of one division (2 diesel generators) power supplies for both units.
As can be seen on the calculation sheets, the diesel generator capacities are completly adequate to safely shut down the plant on loss of both diesel generators in one division.
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P R E LIM.
FINAL Naut or COMPANY CP&L BRUNSWICK UNIT /S - 1 & 2_
voro DIESEL CENERATOR LOADING SHEET 1 OF 2 sve;cci J. O.
9527-030 FOR EACH UNIT, THE FOLLOWING 4000-VOLT-MOTOR-DRIVEN
.c comp BY CHK'O BY v
EQUIPMENT IS REQUIRED TO PERFORM A JHW CDG SAFE SHUTDCWN, ASSUMING FAILURE OF 0
oart oiTo TWO DIESEL GENERATORS IN ONE DIVISION.
6/1/77 6/14/77 JHW CDG RHR PUMPS oATc CAft 1
6/15/77 6/15/77 RHR SERVICE WATER PUMPS 1
NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER " UMPS 1
JHW CDC 10/18/7.7 10/16/77 TYPICAL BUS LOADINGS WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:
CASE 1:
DIVISION I DIESELS AVAILABLE LOAD HP MW MVAR BUS El (DIESEL CENERATOR NO. 1)
.798
.387 RHR SERVICE WATER PUMP IC 800
.633
.141 NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER PUMP 1A 300
.223
.138 UNIT SUBSTATION ES (1728 KVA) 1.469
.910 TOTAL 3.123 1.576 TOTAL MVA 3.498 BUS E3 (DIESEL CENERATOR NO. 3)
RHR PUMP 2A 1000
.798
.387 RHR SERVICE WATER PUMP2A
[
800
.633
.141 NUCLEAR SERVICE WATEWPIOT 2A 300
.223
.138 UNIT SUBSTATION E7 (1571 KuA) 1.336
.828
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TOTAL 2.990 1.494 TOTAL MVA 3.342 V.p.2 i )}. '
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J PRELIM.
FINAL
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Naut or courany C.P&L. BRUNSWI.QK 1&2 VOID
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U NIT /S suanci-DIESEL CENERATOR LOADING SHEET 2
OF 2 J. O.
9527-030 CASE 2:
DIVISION II DIESET.S AVAILABLE
v C O M P. S Y CM'D B y l JHW C30 0
oarc o,n 6/1/77 6/;' /77 JHN C:G 1
cart carc 6/15/77 6/15/77
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2 10/18/77 10/1E/77i L-1 LOAD 9
HP MW MVAR BUS E2 (DIESEL CENERATOR NO. 2) w RHR PUMP ID 1000
.798
.387 RHR SERVICE WATER PUXP ID 800
.633
.141
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NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER PUMP IB 300
.223
.13S FIRE PUMP 250
.154
.079 UNIT SUBSTATION E6 (1756 KVA) 1.493
.925 TOTAL 3.301 1.670
'IDTAL MVA 3.700 BUS E4 (DIE,S,EL CNERATOR NO. ' 4)
J RHR PUMP 2B 7
1000
.798
.3S7 RHR SERVICE WATER PUMP. 2B 800
.633
.141 j
NUCLEAR SERVICE WAT):{4'irMP 2n 300
.223
.138 UNIT SUBSTATION E8,(1620 KVA)
_1.373
.854
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TOTAL 3.027 1.520 7
TOTAL MVA 3.387 DIESEL CENERATOR RATINGS:
3.85 MW @
.8 P.F.
OR 4.813 MVA TilEREIVRE DIESEL CENERATOR cal'ACITY IS ADEQUATE TO SilU BOTd REACTORS WITil ONLY ONE DIVISION AVAILABLE.
V.D.3