ML19256A477

Withdraws Request for Surveillance of 8 Test Fuel Elements, & Insists That Utility Perform Detailed Surveillance on Reference Fuel,Defined by NRC as a first-core Loading.In Future,All Mods Should Be Submitted to NRC for Review

ML19256A477
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	01/03/1979
From:	Speis T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Justin Fuller PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO
References
TAC-57625, NUDOCS 7901080268
Download: ML19256A477 (4)

Text

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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O 9, ol WASmNG TON. D. C. 20555

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JAN 3 1979 s

Mr. J. K. Fuller, Vice President Public Service Company of Colorado P. O. Box 840 Denver, Colorado 80201

SUBJECT:

FUEL SURVEILLANCE Your letter of January 3,1978 (p-78004) submitted a Safety Analysis Report for FSV Reload 1 Test Elements FTE-1 through FTE-8 to facilitate installation of eight test fuel elements into the reactor core at the first refueling.

We indicated that the safety analysis was acceptable although a commitment to perform and report the results of a PIE on the test elernents was needed.

In subsequent correspondences references were made to planned PIE to be performed under DOE funding; however, there was no commitment to perform PIE in the event that DOE funding were reduced or withdrawn.

As indicated in Rev.1 of the Standard Review Plan, Section 4.2 Fuel System Design, a post-irradiation examination fuel surveillance program is expected for each plant to detect anomalies or confirm expected fuel performance.

While the plan is primarily for LWR type plants, we believe that this action is applicable to FSV.

Because FSV is a first-of-a-kind reactor, with a fuel system unlike that of any other, its first core, standard fuel design should be subjected to a comprehensive surveillance program including significant PIE.

The extent of an acceptable program will depend on the history of the fuel design, that is, on whether the proposed fuel design is the same as current operating fuel or incorporates new design features.

We have investigated past NRC practices and needs for fuel surveillance and discussed the matter in depth with the Division of Operating Reactors, who have handled a number of test assemblies in LWRs during the last four years.

No clear surveillance policy existed, but a consistent pattern does exist.

We found for test assemblies, that extensive PIE is always performed (that is the purpose of the test fuel), and that the results are usuallf reported to NRC, but that requirements for this have not been made for LWRs. This is contrary to the direction we were taking with FSV.

With D0R's assistance, we have arrived at a recommended plan for fuel surveillance in commercial power pl ants. This is described in Enclosure A and is applicable to FSV.

In light of this new recommended plan, which is consistent with past practice with LWRs, we withdraw our request for required surveillance on the 8 test elements proposed for FSV. At the same time we must insist that a finn comitment be secured from PSCo to perform detailed surveillance on their 3.z V7

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Mr. J. K. Fuller jag 3 7979 reference fuel, which is a first-core loading by our definition. Until such time as a finn commitmentAis established for an approved first-core surveillance program, we will not fonvard any approvals for test element irradiation or other fuel-related requests from PSco. As we have previously noted, the proposed FSV fuel PIE programs currently planned under DOE funding are acceptable. All we really require at this time, therefore, is a statement from PSCo that, should future funding changes require modifications to the.

current PIE program for standard fuel, the modifications would be submitted for NRC review and approvil.

PSCo should also realize that, for future reloads of fuel of new designs (some components of which may be included in the eight test elements), safety analyses supported by results from post-irradiation surveillance will be required.

Should you have any questions or comments, please call me or George Vsuzmycz, the project manager.

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$1, hemis P. Speis, Chief Advanced Reactors Branch Division of Project Management cc: Bryant O'Donnell, Esquire Kelly, Stansfield & 0'Donnell 990 Public Service Company Building Denver, Colorado 80201 James B. Graham Manager, Licensing and Regulation East Coast Office General Atomic Company 2021 K Street, N.W.

Suite 709 Washington, D. C.

20006

Enclosure A Recommended Plan for Fuel Surveillance in Commercial Power Plants 4

Experimental Test Assemblies--The irradiation of experimental test assemblies is encouraged.

Since these assemblies will be limited to a small core fraction and since a safety analysis will have been performed, no extensive PIE is (generally) needed to assure safe operation of the plant containing the test assemblies.

Lead Prototype Assemblies--Lead prototype assemblies differ from experimental test assemblies inasmuch as a follo' wing core reload is scheduled.

Surveillance of the lead prototype assemblies wculd thus be required in support of the following core reload but not (generally) to assure safety of the cycle containing the lead pro-totype assemblies. An instructive example is the requirement for Surry to perform surveillance on 17x17 lead prototype assemblies in support of a first core 17x17 fuel in Trojan.

The surveillance requirement exists because of the timing of the Trojan core loading; if timely results from Surry were not obtained, the assurance of i

safe operation of Trojan would be compromised. Westinghouse acted,

as a broker in that case and got Surry to make commitments to NRC in behalf of the Trojan submittal.

First Core Loading--Detailed surveillance, including interim exam-inations, is required to confirm the safety analysis of a new fuel design. This detai,'ed surveillance has been required on the first two plants to use the design in order to sample a statistically large number of assemblies and also to sample effects of different manufacturing and operating histories.

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liature Core Loadings--Simplified surveillance is now required on a routine basis for mature fu'el designs.

This. requirement is a result of activities on Regulatory Guide 1.119 (withdrawn in favor of SRP revisions) and appears in SRP-4.2, Rev. 1.

The requirement is an attempt to catch anomalies that result from insidious changes in plant operation or fabrication histories.

Recent problems with poison rod failures and guide tube wear support the need for such wide-scale surveillance.

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