ML19239A359
| ML19239A359 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 08/23/2019 |
| From: | Joseph Demarshall Operations Branch III |
| To: | FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| demarshall j | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17215A920 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML19239A359 (67) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NUREG 1021, Rev. 11 Page 1 of 1 FENOC Facsimile Facility: Perry Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Op-Test No.: 2019-1 Examiners:
Operators:
(SRO)
(ATC)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: Plant is at 100% power. Stator Water Pump B Pump is tagged out due to oil leak.
ESW A & ECC A are running. I&C tech is performing SVI-D23-T1213, Suppression Pool Average Temperature. eSOMS Narrative Log is down. PRA Risk is Green and the Grid Risk is Normal Planned Activities: Start RCIC in CST to CST Mode for vibration testing. Page Jeff Reeves when RCIC is running. NLO has been briefed and is on station to support pump start. When contacted by SCC, lower power to 93% per the Reactivity Plan and IOI-3 Power Maneuvering, for upcoming surveillances. Make any Narrative Log entries on your note pads.
Critical Tasks: 1) Insert control rods.
- 3) Close MSIVs before exceeding 100 °F/Hr. Cooldown rate Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N(BOP)
N(SRO)
Start RCIC in CST to CST Mode 2
R(ATC )
R(SRO)
Lower Power with Rx Recirc flow to 93%
3 C(ATC)
C(SRO)
Hotwell Pump A Headloss - Shift Hotwell pumps 4
C(BOP)
C(SRO)
TS(SRO)
RCIC CST Level instrument fails low - RCIC fails to complete shift to SP from CST.
T.S. 3.3.5.2 & T.S. 3.5.3 & 3.3.6.1 5
C(BOP)
C(SRO)
TS(SRO)
Inadvertent HPCS initiation due to failed RPV level transmitters.
T.S. 3.5.1 & T.S. 3.3.5.1 6
M(ALL)
Loss of Feedwater 7
CT-1 C(ATC)
RPS fails in AUTO and MANUAL - ARI fails in AUTO - ARI works in Manual 8
CT-2 C(BOP)
HPCS fails to auto start @ L2 - Start HPCS manually.
9 CT-3 C(ATC)
Bypass valve #1 fails open - Close MSIV before 500 psig (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Narrative Summary - Scenario #1 - 100% Rx Power Event 1.
The BOP starts RCIC in CST to CST mode.
2.
The ATC lowers Rx. Power with Rx. Recirc flow to 93%
3.
Hotwell pump A experiences a head-loss issue requiring ATC to determine necessity to shift Hotwell pumps per SOI-N21.
4.
RCIC Suppression Pool Level instrument fails high. BOP determines that the auto-swap of the water supply to the RCIC pump to the Suppression Pool from the CST failed to occur.
BOP takes action to close 1E51-F010 and verifies subsequent actions based on failure of F010 closure to occur. BOP shuts down RCIC as directed. SRO evaluates T.S. 3.3.5.2 & T.S.
3.5.3 & 3.3.6.1.
5.
Failed RPV Level Instruments results in a HPCS inadvertent initiation. The SRO enters ONI-E12-1 and ONI-C51. After SRO concurrence the BOP will override the HPCS pump to stop.
SRO evaluates TS 3.3.5.1 and TS 3.5.1 6.
Low Hot Surge Tank level causes RFBPs to trip resulting in a loss of all Rx Feedwater pumps. This causes a low Reactor Water level scram signal.
7.
ATC determines Level 3 scram did not work. ATC determines Manual Scram did not function. Also, if RPV level lowers to L2, automatic ARI will not insert rods. A manual ARI initiation will cause control rods to insert.
8.
BOP determines that HPCS failed to Auto start on L2 and must manually initiate HPCS to recover RPV level.
9.
ATC determines that #1 Turbine Bypass valve is partially open and that reactor pressure is lowering and cooldown rate could exceed 100 degrees per hour. ATC takes action to close MSIVs to stop excessive cooldown rate and switches pressure control to the SRVs.
EOPs:
EOP-1 ABNORMALs:
ONI-E12-1 ONI-C51 Critical Tasks:
- 1. Insert control rods.
- 3. With reactor pressure lowering due to open Bypass Valve, close MSIVs to prevent a RPV cooldown rate in excess of 100 degrees per hour.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
N/A - Driver Instructions Cue:
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Simulator Setup:
Reset Simulator to IC 58 Load Schedule File: NRC-2019.Scen-1.sch Verify Schedule File: NRCinfotags19.sch loads Verify Event File NRC-2019 Scen-1.evt loads Obtain pictures of E51-N635A and B21-N673C & G Trip Units.
Remove Requal IOI-3 and Rod Book from horseshoe.
Markup Crew Sheet to show who is supporting RCIC run.
Add SYM STATUS placard with 1N62-F601 100% open Remove Info Tags from P870-05B & P680-09C Driver Driver Verify Initial Conditions:
Reactor Power 100%. BOL Pull Sheets, Rods @ Step 81.
IOI-3 Section 4.6 is complete.
Place yellow switch cap on Stator Water Cooling B pump.
Verify APRM gains are adjusted.
Green Risk.
Driver Driver Initial Conditions:
Plant is at 100% power. Stator Water Pump B Pump is tagged out due to oil leak.
ESW A & ECC A are running. I&C tech is performing SVI-D23-T1213, Suppression Pool Average Temperature. eSOMS Narrative Log is down. PRA Risk is Green and the Grid Risk is Normal Planned activities:
Start RCIC in CST to CST Mode for vibration testing. Page Jeff Reeves when RCIC is running. NLO has been briefed and is on station to support pump start. When contacted by SCC lower power to 93% per the Reactivity Plan and IOI-3 Power Maneuvering, for upcoming surveillances. Make any Narrative Log entries on your note pads.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 2 of 20 Event
Description:
1 - Start RCIC in CST to CST Mode Cue: Turnover - planned activity Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver
- 1. Role play as an NLO and Jeff Reeves as directed.
- 2. For SOI-E51 step 4.5.6 opening 1E51-F022 for 2 seconds will be 10%. Use InSight point RCVP1E51F0022 to determine valve position.
- 3. If asked to open E51-F022 locally, inform operator that we usually open from Control Room and NLO gives mark at 10% open.
Evaluator Should discuss expected alarm for RCIC Pump start.
00:00 SRO Direct BOP to perform a RCIC Manual Startup from Standby Readiness (CST to CST) IAW SOI-E51.
BOP Perform SOI-E51 Section 4.5 to start RCIC in CST to CST Mode 4.5.1 Initiate an evacuation from the following:
- Reactor Building Annulus
- Containment.
4.5.2 Refer to SVI-D23-T1213, Suppression Pool Average Temperature, and commence monitoring suppression pool temperature.
4.5.4 Confirm RCIC suction on the CST.
4.5.6 Throttle RCIC First Test Valve to CST 10% open as follows:
4.5.6.a Determine full closed position indication from the local indicator.
4.5.6.b Throttle RCIC First Test Valve to CST open until local indicator reads 10%
higher than initial value. 1E51-F022 4.5.7 Take the RCIC Turbine Gland Seal Comp to start. 1E51-C004 4.5.8 Take the RCIC Second Test Valve to CST to open to provide a discharge path to the CST. 1E51-F059 4.5.9 Simultaneously perform the following:
- Hold the RCIC First Test Valve to CST control switch in open until the valve is open. 1E51-F022 4.5.10 When RCIC flow is < 120 gpm and RCIC Pump discharge pressure is > 125 psig, then verify the RCIC Pump Min Flow Valve opens. 1E51-F019
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 3 of 20 Event
Description:
1 - Start RCIC in CST to CST Mode Cue: Turnover - planned activity Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 4.5.11 When the RCIC Steam Shutoff is open, verify the following valves automatically close:
1E51F045
- RCIC Turb Cnds to CRW First Shutoff 1E51F004
- RCIC Turb Cnds to CRW Second Shutoff 1E51F005
- RCIC ST Supp Second Drn Shutoff 1E51F026 Driver If NLO is directed to operate 1E51-F534 to clear Drain Pot Hi Level alarm, wait until alarm P601-21-D3 resets then report as completed.
BOP 4.5.12 Adjust RCIC flow until the desired flow is reached with the RCIC Pump Flow Control. 1E51-R600 4.5.13 Prior to lowering RCIC flow to < 350 gpm, place the RCIC Pump Flow Control in manual. 1E51-R600 4.5.14 Throttle RCIC First Test Valve to CST to achieve a RCIC Pump discharge pressure approximately 100 psig above reactor pressure. 1E51-F022 BOP Report to SRO that pump start is complete and contact Jeff Reeves.
Evaluator Crew may set a Suppression Pool temperature limit to start RHR A in Suppression Pool cooling.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 4 of 20 Event
Description:
2 - Lower Power with Rx Recirc flow to 93%
Cue: Turnover - SCC request Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Role-play as SCC and contact Control Room SRO to request lowering power to 93%.
Shift Manager may need to intervene if crew is hesitant to perform power maneuver with RCIC running.
SRO Direct ATC to lower power to 93% per the Reactivity Plan and IOI-3 Power Maneuvering.
Evaluator It is expected that the ATC will use Recirculation flow to lower power.
ATC should maintain flow mismatch < 5%.
Target Rx power is 3495 MWT (~1236 MWE).
ATC Notify RP and Chemistry of the intended power change.
ATC Perform SOI-B33, Reactor Recirculation System Section 7.7, Rcirc Flow Control in Loop Manual 7.7.1 Confirm RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL is in MAN.
1B33K603A 7.7.2 Confirm RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL is in MAN.
1B33K603B 7.7.3 Adjust the following as required for the desired Recirc Flow while maintaining recirculation loop flow mismatch within limits:
RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL 1B33K603A RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL 1B33K603B 7.7.4 When Rcirc Flow Control valves are full open, 1B33K603A/ 1B33K603B then verify that the RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL is not in saturation (approximately 0%/SEC) by monitoring the ICS point RECIRC FCV VEL CONT OUTPUT. B33 EA015/ B33 EA016 ATC Report to SRO that Reactor power has been lowered to 93% power by lowering Rx Recirc flow.
SRO Report to SCC that power is at 93%
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 5 of 20 Event
Description:
3 - Hotwell Pump A Headloss - Shift Hotwell pumps Cue: ARI-H13-P680-0002-D5 and D6 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver When directed initiate Event 3. Role play as needed.
If directed to investigate Condensate Filter trouble alarm (ARI-H13-P680-07-D12) report that there was a momentary Hi-Hi Filter Differential Pressure. Use Xtreme view to acknowledge (multiple alarms)
ATC Announce unexpected alarms and give stability report.
ATC Announce CBP DISCH HDR PRESS LO and HOTWELL PUMP DISCH PRESS LO alarms. Walkdown H13-P680 and determine that Hotwell discharge header pressure is <136 psig and HW Pump A amps are lower than other running Hotwell pump.
Determines that there are no Automatic or Immediate Actions for either annunciator.
ATC Perform subsequent actions for ARIs:
ARI-H13-P680-0002-D5/ ARI-H13-P680-0002-D6:
4.1 Monitor Hot Surge Tank Level & Cnds To Htr 4 Flow.
ATC Direct NLO to walkdown Hotwell pumps to look for problems with HW Pump A.
Make determination based on indications that Hotwell pump A is not working properly and that Hotwell pumps should be shifted.
Driver If asked to walkdown HW Pumps, wait 10 minutes after initiation of Event 3 to report HW pump A is making abnormal noise.
SRO Direct ATC to shift Hotwell pumps from A and B running to B and C running.
ATC Direct NLO to standby for shifting Hotwell pumps. Make plant announcement.
ATC Perform SOI-N21, Condensate System, Section 7.2 Shifting Hotwell Pumps:
7.2.1 If condensate filtration is in service, then refer to SOI-N23 and verify at least one Condensate Filter in Manual.
7.2.2 If two Hotwell Pumps are in operation, then perform the following:
7.2.2.a Take the oncoming Hotwell Pump control switch to start on 1H13-P680.
1N21C001C 7.2.2.b Take the offgoing Hotwell Pump control switch to stop.
1N21C001A 7.2.4 When Condensate flows have stabilized, then verify only one RFP Seal Injection Pump is running on P870.
ATC Determine alarms have reset and Hotwell pump C parameters are normal.
Report to SRO that pump shift is complete.
SRO Notify Workweek Manager of problem with Hotwell Pump A.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 6 of 20 Event
Description:
4 - RCIC CST level instrument fails low - RCIC fails to complete shift to SP from CST. TS 3.3.5.2 Cue: ARI-H13-P601-0021-F3 and H5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Prior to initiating Event 4, place picture of E51-N635A picture on P629.
Driver When directed initiate Event 4. Role play as needed.
ATC Announce unexpected alarms and give stability report.
BOP Announce RCIC SUPR POOL SUCT VLV OPEN CST LVL LOW alarm.
Walkdown H13-P601 and determine that RCIC PUMP SUPR PL SUCT ISOL, 1E51-F031, is opening but RCIC PUMP CST SUCTION VALVE, 1E51-F010, did not close.
Announces that Immediate Actions did not occur and closes 1E51-F010.
Verifies that 1E51-F010 closes.
Verifies that 1E51-F022 and 1E51-F059 are closed and 1E51-F019 opens.
Evaluator 1E51-F010 gets a close signal from the open limit switch of the 1E51-F031 valve.
BOP Observes CST level indications and reports that levels are within normal band.
SRO Directs BOP to either trip or shutdown RCIC.
BOP Trips or Shutdowns RCIC Evaluator Tripping RCIC would be the preferred method.
Evaluator SRO may direct BOP to restore RCIC to standby. If so, 1E51-F510 will lose power when its control switch is taken to OPEN.
Driver If asked to investigate loss of power to E51-F510, report both mainline fuses are blown.
SRO Directs BOP to investigate back panels for indication of CST level indication problem.
Driver If requested report as I&C Tech that I&C will begin preparing a work package to investigate.
BOP Investigates back panels and informs SRO that 1E51-N635A is pegged low, tripped and has a gross fail light illuminated on panel P629.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 7 of 20 Event
Description:
4 - RCIC CST level instrument fails low - RCIC fails to complete shift to SP from CST. TS 3.3.5.2 Cue: ARI-H13-P601-0021-F3 and H5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Evaluate Technical Specifications TS 3.3.5.2 Action A.1 - Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.2 Immediately TS 3.5.3 Action A.1 Verify by administrative means that HPCS is operable - 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> And A.2 Restore RCIC System to operable status - 14 days Evaluator TS 3.3.5.2 Action D requirements are already met since RCIC pump is now aligned to Suppression Pool. RCIC is inoperable after crew trips system.
RCIC 3.5.3 entered if RCIC is tripped or when 1E51-F510 blows fuses.
Driver After this event is complete, remove the pictures from P629.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 8 of 20 Event
Description:
5 - Inadvertent HPCS initiation due to failed RPV level transmitters.
Cue: ARI-H13-P601-0016 -A1, A5, and C5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Prior to initiating Event 5, place pictures of B21-N673 C & G on P625 Driver When directed initiate Event 5. Role play as needed Evaluator Instruments 1B21-N673C and G trip. C will fail low and G will give spurious trip.
When operator does backpanel review will find C failed low and G instrument providing unstable readings.
ATC Announce unexpected alarms and give stability report.
BOP Make announcement that HPCS has started and is injecting. Looks at 2 independent sources of Reactor Water level and Drywell pressure to verify HPCS initiation was inadvertent.
Informs SRO of entry conditions for ONI-C51 and ONI-E12-2 BOP ONI-E12-1 Immediate Actions Unit Supervisor concurrence is required to override safety system.
An ECCS system shall not be manually overridden unless one of the following is confirmed
- Initiation is proven incorrect (beyond a reasonable doubt by two independent indications
- Continued operation is no longer necessary
- Misoperation in automatic is confirmed.
SRO Announce and enter ONI-C51 and ONI-E12-1 SRO Concur with the override of the HPCS pump to stop.
Evaluator The BOP operator must receive concurrence from the SRO prior to stopping the HPCS pump. ONI Immediate Actions are from memory.
BOP ONI-E12-1 Immediate Actions 3.1 IF HPCS Initiation is incorrect or misoperation in automatic is confirmed, then take the HPCS pump to stop.
ATC Monitors Rx power, pressure and level BOP Walkdown P601 and observe and report that the D/G has started and HPCS ESW has started.
Makes plant announcement concerning HPCS and Division 3 D/G start.
SRO Contact I&C to investigate cause of low RPV Level 2 signal to HPCS.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 9 of 20 Event
Description:
5 - Inadvertent HPCS initiation due to failed RPV level transmitters.
Cue: ARI-H13-P601-0016 -A1, A5, and C5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver If requested report as I&C Tech that I&C will begin preparing a work package to investigate.
SRO Direct Supplemental Actions for ONI-E12-1 4.2 If HPCS Initiation is incorrect or misoperation in automatic is confirmed, then verify closed HPCS injection valve BOP When directed, Close the HPCS injection valve 1E22-F004 SRO Direct ONI-C51 Actions:
ATC: Monitor Nuclear instruments for oscillations Confirm Jet Pump operation within established limits BOP:
Perform ONI-SPI-G-4 Power verification ATC When directed Monitor Nuclear instruments for oscillations Confirm Jet Pump operation within established limits BOP When directed Perform ONI-SPI-G-4 Power verification SRO Evaluate Technical Specifications T.S. 3.3.6.1 Actions A.1 - Place channel in trip - 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> T.S. 3.5.1 Actions B.1 - Evaluate by administrative means RCIC System is operable when RCIC is required to be operable - 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> And B.2 - Restore HPCS System to operable status - 14 days T.S. 3.3.5.1 Actions A.1 - Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.1 Immediately And B.2 - Declare HPCS inoperable - 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from discovery of loss of HPCS initiation capability B.3 - Place channel in trip - 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Driver After this event is complete, remove the pictures from P625.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 10 of 20 Event
Description:
6 - Loss of Feedwater Cue: ARI-H13-P680-0002-E3, ARI-H13-P680-003-D1 through D4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver When directed initiate Event 6. Role play as needed Evaluator Initiating event is a low Hot Surge Tank level which will trip all RFBPs.
If all RFBPs tripped due to low Hot Surge Tank level, then RFP A, RFP B and the MFP will trip.
ATC Announce unexpected alarms and give stability report.
ATC Announces Low Hot Surge Tank Level followed by loss of all RFBPs Determines that Reactor Water Level is below Level 3 and that Scram did not occur BOP Make Plant announcement for the Scram and evacuate containment ATC Locks the Mode Switch in Shutdown Determines that scram did not occur.
Evaluator Actions continue in subsequent sequences.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 11 of 20 Event
Description:
7 - RPS fails in AUTO and MANUAL - ARI fails in AUTO - ARI works in Manual Cue: Reactor Scram Hardcard Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Role play as needed.
Evaluator Automatic and manual scram actions will not work. Also, if RPV level lowers to L2, automatic ARI will not insert rods. A manual ARI initiation will cause control rods to insert.
ATC Recognizes failure of Mode Switch and RPS pushbuttons and initiates ARI.
(Critical Task 1)
Recognizes manual ARI inserts all control rods.
ATC Performs Scram Hard Card Actions:
- 1. VERIFY the following actions completed:
- Mode Switch Locked in Shutdown.
- RPS Initiated, if all control rods are not fully inserted.
- 2. IF Reactor Recirc Pumps are running in fast speed: THEN Simultaneously Take RCIRC PUMP A BRKR 5A AND RCIRC PUMP B BRKR 5B to XFER.
- 3. IF Reactor power is above 4%, THEN PERFORM the following:
- INHIBIT ADS with US Concurrence
- 5. STABILIZE Reactor pressure using Turbine / Turbine Bypass valves / SRVs
- 6. PERFORM crew update with the following information:
- The Mode Switch is locked in shutdown and failed
- All Control Rods (are/are not) inserted
- Reactor Power is ________________%
- Reactor Pressure is _______________psig
- Reactor Level is __________________inches
- Reactor Recirc Pumps (Running in Slow Speed / Tripped)
EOP-01 Entry (only if condition met): PWR >4% or Unknown SRO Enters EOP-1, RPV Control
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 12 of 20 Event
Description:
7 - RPS fails in AUTO and MANUAL - ARI fails in AUTO - ARI works in Manual Cue: Reactor Scram Hardcard Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs ATC/BOP to:
Monitor and Control Rx Power Stabilize Reactor Water Level Stabilize Reactor Pressure Evaluator SRO may direct an expanded level band since level control will be on HPCS.
SRO Directs RPV Level Band (normally >178 to <219)
ATC Maintains RPV level in directed band ATC Perform Feedwater hard card (OAI-1703 Att. 11) (FW Hardcard will not be useful)
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 13 of 20 Event
Description:
8 - HPCS fails to auto start @ L2 - Start HPCS manually.
Cue: Isolations and Actuations Hard Cards Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Role play as needed.
Verify Isolations And Actuations BOP Verifies Isolations and Actuations BOP Announces that HPCS failed to Auto start at L2, and manually initiates HPCS.
(Critical Task 2)
Evaluator HPCS was overridden in event 5. If crew restored HPCS a fault is introduced to prevent HPCS from auto-initiating on Level 2.
ATC may start or direct BOP to start HPCS from Scram Actions.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 14 of 20 Event
Description:
9 - Bypass valve #1 fails open - Close MSIV before 500 psig.
Cue: Pressure Control Hardcard Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs RPV Pressure band (normally 800 to 1000 psig)
Evaluator SRO may direct an expanded pressure band since pressure will be lowering.
ATC Announces that Pressure is lowering and cannot be maintained in given pressure band.
Determines that #1 Bypass valve is partially open.
ATC/BOP Reactor Scram Hardcard (continued)
- 12.
STABLIZE reactor pressure using one or more of the following:
a) Turbine / Turbine Bypass valves:
- Refer to the Pressure Control Hardcard b) SRVs:
- Evacuate Containment
- Refer to the Pressure Control Hardcard
ATC Inform SRO of inability to stop RPV pressure decrease without closing MSIVs.
SRO Direct ATC to close MSIV prior to RPV pressure lowering to <500 psig.
(Critical Task 3)
ATC Prior to exceeding a cooldown rate of 100ºF/hr, then perform the following:
(1) NOTIFY the Unit Supervisor that the MSIVs are being closed.
(2) VERIFY the following control switches in CLOSE:
INBD MSIV, 1B21-F022B INBD MSIV, 1B21-F022D INBD MSIV, 1B21-F022A INBD MSIV, 1B21-F022C OTBD MSIV, 1B21-F028B OTBD MSIV, 1B21-F028D OTBD MSIV, 1B21-F028A OTBD MSIV, 1B21-F028C (Critical Task 3)
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 15 of 20 Event
Description:
9 - Bypass valve #1 fails open - Close MSIV before 500 psig.
Cue: Pressure Control Hardcard Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator When MSIVs are closed pressure control may need to be transferred to SRVs. If pressure control is transferred to SRVs, the SRO should direct an expanded level band of 150 to 219 inches. And, the SRO should adjust the pressure band between 500 and 1000 psig.
SRO Direct ATC/BOP to maintain pressure band using the SRVs /MSIV drains and to maintain reactor level from 150 inches to 219 inches per EOP-1 ATC/BOP Maintain directed level and pressure bands.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 16 of 20 Event
Description:
Scenario Termination Criteria Cue:
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- 1.
All control rods inserted to position 00.
- 2.
RPV pressure maintained between 400* to 1000 psig.
- 3.
RPV level maintained between 150 to 219 inches
- Lower pressure of 100 °F per hour cooldown rate
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 17 of 20 Event
Description:
Critical Task #1 Cue:
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, take action to reduce power by initiating ARI to cause control rod insertion.
- 1. Safety Significance:
Shutting down reactor can preclude failure of containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant.
Correct reactivity control.
- 2. Cues:
Reactor power indication.
Procedural compliance.
- 3. Measured by:
Observation - ARI pushbuttons armed and depressed to cause control rod insertion.
- 4. Feedback:
Reactor power trend.
Rod status indication
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 18 of 20 Event
Description:
Critical Task #2 Cue:
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Prior to Reactor Level lowering to ADS automatic initiation setpoint (RPV Level 1),
crew restores HPCS to control Reactor Level.
- 1. Safety Significance:
With the Main Condenser is available as a heat sink for depressurization of the Reactor, initiation of ADS will unnecessarily increase the energy released to the primary containment.
- 2. Cues:
Procedural compliance.
Reactor Level trend.
- 3. Measured by:
Observation - Reactor Level maintained greater than 16.5".
Observation - ADS valves do not open on low reactor level.
- 4. Feedback:
Reactor level trend HPCS pump status HPCS Injection Valve position indication
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 19 of 20 Event
Description:
Critical Task #3 Cue:
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With reactor pressure lowering due to open Bypass Valve, initiate action to prevent a RPV cooldown rate in excess of 100 degrees per hour.
- 1. Safety Significance:
Preclude exceeding Tech. Spec RPV cool down rate limit.
- 2. Cues:
Procedural compliance.
RPV pressure trending down.
- 3. Measured by:
Observation - RPV cooldown rate does not exceed 100 degrees/hour, by crew performance of Pressure Control Hardcard actions and / or manual closure of the MSIVs.
- 4. Feedback:
RPV pressure / temperature trend.
MSIV status indication
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%
Page 20 of 20 Event
Description:
Procedures to verify clean Procedure Number Check IV Procedure Number Check IV ARI-H13-P601-0016-A1 SOI-B33 P&Ls and Sect 7.7 ARI-H13-P601-0016-A5 SOI-E51 P&Ls and Sects 4.5 & 6.2 ARI-H13-P601-0016-C5 SOI-N21 P&Ls and Sects 4.3, 6.3 & 7.2 ARI-H13-P601-0016-D1 TS 3.3.5.1 & Bases ARI-H13-P601-0021-D3 TS 3.3.5.2 & Bases ARI-H13-P601-0021-F3 TS 3.5.1 & Bases ARI-H13-P601-0021-H5 TS 3.5.3 & Bases ARI-H13-P680-0002-D5 ARI-H13-P680-0002-D3 ARI-H13-P680-0002-D6 ARI-H13-P680-0003-A9 ARI-H13-P680-0003-B7 ARI-H13-P680-0003-D1 ARI-H13-P680-0002-E3 ARI-H13-P680-0003-D2 ARI-H13-P680-0003-D3 ARI-H13-P680-0003-D4 ARI-H13-P680-0007-D12 EOP CHARTS Flip-chart hardcards Hardcards (horseshoe & back-panel)
IOI-18 ONI-C51 Chart ONI-E12-1 ONI-SPI-G-4
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NUREG 1021, Rev. 11 Page 1 of 1 FENOC Facsimile Facility: Perry Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Op-Test No.: 2019-1 Examiners:
Operators:
(SRO)
(ATC)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: Plant is at 85% power. Containment pressure transmitter 1E12-N062D, CONTAINMENT PRESSURE - HIGH failed its Surveillance as it could not be adjusted within the allowable value yesterday. PLCO (P19-E12-010) has been generated. eSOMS Narrative Log is down.
PRA Risk is Green and the Grid Risk is Normal.
Planned Activities: Shift Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Fans A/C to B/C for planned work. When contacted by SCC raise power to 93% per the Reactivity Plan and IOI-3 Power Maneuvering and hold there for upcoming surveillances. Make any Narrative Log entries on your note pads.
Critical Tasks: 1) Isolate leak into Sec. Containment.
- 4) Inhibit ADS (Potential)
- 2) Isolate Main Steam to SJAE.
- 3) Insert Control Rods Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N(BOP)
N(SRO)
Shift Fuel Handling Building Exhaust fans 2
TS(SRO)
CONTAINMENT PRESSURE - HIGH transmitter (E12-N662B) failure.
T.S. 3.3.6.2 3
C(BOP)
C(SRO)
TS(SRO)
AEGT A Controller failure T.S. 3.6.4.1 and 3.6.4.3 4
C(ATC)
C(SRO)
APRM D fails downscale 5
CT-1 C(ATC)
C(BOP)
C(SRO)
RWCU leak into A Pump room - Enter EOP-3 6
CT-2 M(All)
Earthquake < OBE causes failure of SJAE. Enter ONI-D51, ONI-D17, ONI-N11, ONI-C51 7
R(ATC )
R(SRO)
On failure of SJAE, lower power with flow and insert Manual Rx Scram.
8 CT-3, CT-4 M(ALL)
ATWS (<4%) Enter EOP-1 & EOP-1A - Manually insert rods.
9 C(ATC)
C(SRO)
CRD pump trips. Restart CRD pump to insert rods.
10 C(ATC)
C(SRO)
Generator field breaker fails to automatically trip on generator trip.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Narrative Summary - Scenario #2 - 85% Rx Power Event 1.
The BOP shifts the Fuel Handling Building Exhaust fans.
2.
Containment Spray pressure (Containment Pressure transmitter) fails high. BOP reports pressure instrument has failed and that there may be T.S. implications. SRO evaluates T.S.
3.3.6.2.
3.
AEGT system controller fails. BOP determines that Annulus p has degraded and places AEGT A controller in Manual to control p. SRO evaluates T.S. 3.6.4.1 and T.S. 3.6.4.3.
4.
Receives an APRM Downscale Rod Block for APRM D. SRO directs ATC to bypass APRM D. SRO evaluates T.S. 3.3.1.1-1 Item 2. (No active LCOs applicable) 5.
A leak starts in RWCU pump A room. SRO enters EOP-03 Secondary Containment Control. Crew determines that RWCU pump A failed to automatically isolate. ATC trips RWCU pumps and BOP isolates RWCU containment isolation valves.
6.
An earthquake (< OBE) causes multiple indications of entry conditions for ONI-D17 and ONI-N11 due to damage in Offgas system. SRO directs BOP/ATC to isolate SJAE within 15 minutes of Offgas failure. May also enter ONI-D51 and ONI-C51.
7.
ATC lowers recirc flow to 58 Mlbm/hr and scrams the reactor as directed. Mode Switch and RPS & ARI pushbuttons fail to insert all control rods.
8.
SRO enters EOP-01 and then transitions into EOP-01A. SRO directs ATC to insert control rods per EOP-SPI-1.1 through 1.7. ATC/BOP performs EOP-SPI 1.3 to insert control rods.
When all control rods inserted SRO transitions back to EOP-01.
9.
ATC determines that CRD pump has tripped. SRO directs CRD Pump Trip Recovery IAW SOI-C11(CRDH). ATC performs CRD Pump Trip Recovery.
10.
While performing Scram Hard Card actions ATC determines that Generator Field Breaker failed to trip open following generator trip. ATC manually trips open the Generator Field Breaker.
EOPs:
EOP-01 EOP-01A EOP-03 ABNORMALs:
ONI-D51 ONI-C51 ONI-D17 ONI-N11 Critical Tasks:
- 1. Isolation leak (RWCU) into Secondary Containment.
- 2. Isolation of Main Steam to SJAE within 15 minutes of Offgas failure.
- 3. Inserts control rods.
- 4. Inhibit ADS (Potential)
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 1 of 21 Event
Description:
N/A - Driver Instructions Cue:
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Simulator Setup:
Reset Simulator to IC 59 Load Schedule File: NRC-2019 Scen-2.sch Verify Schedule Files: NRCinfotags19.sch, NRC-2019-S2-Seismic LT-OBE.sch, NRC-2019-S2 SJAE-Failure.sch, and NRC-2019-S2 SJAE-Fix.sch load.
Verify Event File: NRC-2019 Scen-2.evt loads Load the ATWS rod position patch file RaysLoATWS.dat from PSIMA computer in the computer room as follows:
Login using RYAN - password = ryan_2008 On the executive window:
- 1. Place simulator in FREEZE
- 2. Click on the Run Patch (pumpkin) icon
- 3. Double click on the RaysLoATWS.dat file
- 4. Click on the Messages icon - check for error messages in the popup window
- 5. Close the Messages popup window if no error messages
- 6. Place the simulator in RUN Remove Requal IOI-3 and Rod Book from horseshoe.
Obtain pictures of back panel Trip Units.
Remove yellow switch cap from FHB B heater switch.
Remove yellow switch cap from G33-F042 valve switch.
Markup Crew Sheet to show who is supporting FHB fan shift run.
Add SYM STATUS placard with 1N62-F601 100% open Remove Info Tags from P870-05B & P680-09C Driver Driver Verify Initial Conditions:
Reactor Power 85%. BOL Pull Sheets, Rods @ Step 81.
IOI-3 Step 4.6 is complete.
Green Risk.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 2 of 21 Event
Description:
N/A - Driver Instructions Cue:
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Initial Conditions:
Plant is at 85% power. Containment Pressure transmitter 1E12-N062D failed its Surveillance as it could not be adjusted within the allowable value yesterday. PLCO (P19-E12-010) has been generated. eSOMS Narrative Log is down. PRA Risk is Green and the Grid Risk is Normal Planned activities:
Shift Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Fans A/C to B/C for planned work. When contacted by SCC raise, power to 93% per the Reactivity Plan and IOI-3 Power Maneuvering, and hold there for upcoming surveillances. Make any Narrative Log entries on your note pads.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 3 of 21 Event
Description:
1 - Shift Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Fans (AB)
Cue: Direction from Turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Role play as an NLO/Rad Protection as directed including post start report.
SRO Direct BOP to shift Fuel Handling Building Exhaust fans from A/C to B/C IAW SOI-M40 BOP Perform SOI-M40 Section 7.1 to shift FHB Exhaust fans A to B running.
7.1.1 Notify Radiation Protection to monitor the area prior to shifting fans.
7.1.2 If an electric heater is in service, then place the offgoing FHB HVAC EXH ELEC HTR in OFF.
M40-D001A 7.1.3 Allow the offgoing heaters to cooldown for 5 minutes.
7.1.4 Place the oncoming FHB HVAC EXH FAN in ON M40-C002B 7.1.5 Place the oncoming FHB HVAC EXH ELEC HTR in ON.
M40-D001B 7.1.6 Take the offgoing FHB HVAC EXH FAN to STOP M40-C002A 7.1.7 Perform Independent Verification of required components.
BOP Report to SRO that FHB fan shift is complete.
NOTE Stopping one exhaust fan prior to starting the standby exhaust fan will trip the supply fan.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 4 of 21 Event
Description:
2 - CONTAINMENT PRESSURE - HIGH trip unit (E12-N662B) failure.
Cue: ARI-H13-P601-17-B3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Prior to initiating Event 2, place picture of E12-N662B on P618.
Driver When directed initiate Event 2. Role play as needed ATC Announce unexpected alarms and give stability report.
BOP Announce CNTMT SPRAY B CNTMT PRESSURE HIGH alarm. Walkdown H13-P601 and determine containment pressure is normal.
BOP Walkdown back-panels and determine and announce that 1E12-N662B is indicating upscale and has TRIP and GROSS FAIL LEDs on with all other Containment Pressure trip units reading normally.
Driver If requested report as I&C Tech that I&C will begin preparing a work package to investigate.
BOP Review ARI-H13-P601-17-B2. Inform SRO of Tech Spec references.
SRO Evaluate Tech Specs T.S. 3.3.6.2 Action A.1 - Enter the Conditions referenced in Table 3.3.6.2 Immediately And C.2 - Restore channel to OPERABLE status - 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Driver When Event 2 is completed, remove picture of E12-N662B from P618
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 5 of 21 Event
Description:
3 - AEGT A Controller Failure Cue: Alarm H13-P800-01-A2 & D2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver When directed initiate Event 3. Role play as needed Evaluator Alarm comes in about one minute after initiating event.
ATC Announce unexpected alarms and give stability report.
BOP Walkdown H13-P800 and announce ANNULUS DIFF PRESS LOW alarm.
Determine and announce Annulus P has degraded.
Evaluator From NOP-OP-1002, Conduct of Operations:
4.10.3 Automatic System Response Versus Manual Actions
- 2. The need and intent to place a controller into manual operation shall be communicated to the Command SRO prior to taking this action.
- When operating systems in manual control, a clear owner is assigned.
Control operating bands and rates to create and maintain sufficient operating margins. (OF - Conservatism)
- Whenever a controller associated with a Technical Specification system or support system which is required to be in auto to satisfy the Technical Specification is taken to manual the system or support system will be declared inoperable, unless evaluation has shown that continued operability is supported.
BOP Inform SRO of need to place AEGT A controller in MANUAL.
SRO Direct BOP to take manual control of annulus P and assign band. Direct increased monitoring or assign monitoring frequency of Annulus P.
BOP Place AEGT A controller in MANUAL and control annulus P within assigned band.
BOP Review ARI-H13-P800-01-A2 / D2. Confirm proper SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTION and inform SRO of Tech Spec references.
Evaluator SRO may direct shifting AEGT trains. If so BOP will use SOI-M15 Section 7.1 and has no effect on remainder of scenario.
If shift is completed, will need to adjust M15A controller to allow M15B to control P
Evaluator Annunciator alarms @ -0.69 H2O. If operator does not restore annulus P and it reaches -0.66 H2O, T.S. 3.6.4.1 RA is entered.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 6 of 21 Event
Description:
3 - AEGT A Controller Failure Cue: Alarm H13-P800-01-A2 & D2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Evaluate Tech Specs T.S. 3.6.4.1 Action A.1 - Restore secondary containment to OPERABLE status. - 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> T.S. 3.6.4.3 Action A.1 - Restore AEGT subsystem to OPERABLE status. - 7 days
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 7 of 21 Event
Description:
4 - APRM D fails downscale Cue: Alarm H13-P680-06-D4 (ROD BLOCK APRM DOWNSCALE)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver When directed initiate Event 4. Role play as needed including jumper installation.
ATC Announce unexpected ROD BLOCK APRM DOWNSCALE alarm and give stability report.
ATC Determine APRM D has failed downscale and inform crew.
BOP Walks down back panel H13-P672 and informs crew that APRM D DOWNSCALE light is on.
ATC Review ARI-H13-P680-06-D4 and inform SRO that APRM D should be bypassed.
SRO Direct ATC to bypass APRM D.
ATC Perform SOI-C51(APRM) Section 7.4 to Bypass APRM D 7.4.1 REFER TO Technical Specification Table 3.3.1.1-1 Item 2 for applicability.
7.4.3 PLACE the NEUTRON MONITOR BYPASS, APRM joystick on 1H13-P680, in the BYPASS position for the APRM Channel being bypassed.
BOP 7.4.4 CONFIRM that the APRM Bypass status light comes on at the selected APRMs Power Range Neutron Mon Panel.
ATC Directs I&C to connect jumper for APRM D per Step 7.4.7.
Driver As I&C, inform operator that jumper is installed and verified.
SRO Evaluate Tech Specs No Active LCOs applicable.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 8 of 21 Event
Description:
5 - RWCU leak into A Pump room - Enter EOP-3 Cue: Alarm H13-P680-01-C5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver When directed initiate Event 5. Role play as needed Evaluator It takes approximately 4 minutes for first alarm to come in after event is initiated.
ATC Announce unexpected RWCU AREAS LD TEMP P632 alarm and give stability report.
BOP Walkdown back panel H13-P632 / P642 and informs crew that RWCU Pump A Room temperature is rising. Monitors area temperatures using EOP-03 Condition Monitoring Hardcard ATC Announce unexpected RWCU ISOL PUMP A/B RM TEMP HI alarm and give stability report. Inform crew that this is a potential EOP-03 entry condition.
Driver If asked to investigate RWCU rooms for leakage:
Before isolation - Report steam coming from RWCU rooms and cant get closer for a better look.
After isolation - Report steam visible in RWCU rooms but diminishing and dont feel safe to get closer for a better look.
If asked to investigate RCIC room, report no visible leakage.
RWCU Announce entry into EOP-03, Secondary Containment Control.
Directs BOP to Monitor and Control SC area Temperatures and Water Levels.
Directs BOP to isolate all systems discharging into the affected area. (Critical Task 1)
Evaluator Crew may trip RWCU pumps and isolate RWCU prior to reaching isolation setpoint.
Crew Identifies that RWCU failed to automatically isolate.
Evaluator RWCU valves F001, F004, F039, F040, F053, & F054 fail to isolate.
ATC Trips RWCU pumps as directed.
BOP Isolates RWCU as directed. (Critical Task 1)
BOP Continues to monitor area temperatures using EOP-03 Condition Monitoring Hardcard to determine if isolation actions were effective.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 9 of 21 Event
Description:
6 - Earthquake < OBE causes failure of SJAE. Enter ONI-D51, ONI-D17, & ONI-N11 Cue: Alarm H13-P680-08-C3 and sound and SEISMIC ALARM light P969 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver When directed initiate Event 6. Role play as needed Driver Immediately after initiating Event 6, call the Control Room as the Security Shift Supervisor and report multiple Security Officers reported feeling an earthquake.
Driver If directed to report indications from local panel H51-P021, Seismic Monitoring Control Center within the first 5 minutes, report that the amber TRIGGER light is on.
If asked to report indication after 5 minutes report that the amber TRIGGER light is on.
Evaluator Mark time of initiation of Event 6 ________ and mark time of closure of N62-F020A ________ for evaluation of Critical Task.
Time should not exceed 15 minutes.
Evaluator Shortly after the earthquake the Control Room will receive multiple indications (Offgas alarms, radiation levels rising and area temperatures rising) of damage to the Offgas system.
ATC Announce multiple unexpected alarms including SEISMIC ALARM P969 and give stability report.
BOP Walks down back panel H13-P969 and informs crew that TRIGGER (amber) alarm light is on and possible entry into ONI-D51 SRO Announce entry into ONI-D51, Earthquake.
Directs BOP to perform ONI-D51 SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS.
BOP Performs ONI-D51 SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS including assigning Attachments 1, 2, & 3 Evaluator NOTE: Actions to isolate SJAEs are specific in ONI-D17 and ONI-D51 rather then general in ONI-N11. Therefore, the SRO may not enter ONI-N11.
Crew Identifies multiple indications of entry conditions for ONI-D17, High Radiation Levels Within Plant and ONI-N11, Pipe Break Outside Containment
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 10 of 21 Event
Description:
6 - Earthquake < OBE causes failure of SJAE. Enter ONI-D51, ONI-D17, & ONI-N11 Cue: Alarm H13-P680-08-C3 and sound and SEISMIC ALARM light P969 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Enters ONI-D17 and ONI-N11 and directs BOP to perform SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS.
BOP Performs IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of ONI-D17 and ONI-N11 (announce evacuate the area)
BOP Performs SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS of ONI-D17 and ONI-N11 SRO Directs RO to isolate steam to SJAE IAW ONI-D17 or ONI-D51. (Critical Task 2)
ATC/BOP Isolates steam to the SJAE by closing 1N62-F020A. (Critical Task 2)
Driver Verify Event 18 activates when 1N62-F020A is taken to CLOSE
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 11 of 21 Event
Description:
7 - On failure of SJAE, lower power with flow and insert Manual Rx Scram Cue: ONI-D17 Supplemental Actions Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO IAW ONI-D17 or ONI-D51:
Directs ATC to CLOSE both RCIRC Loop Flow Control Valves simultaneously UNTIL total core flow is approximately 58 Mlbm/hour.
SCRAM the reactor.
ATC Lowers Recirc flow to ~58 Mlbm/hr and scrams the reactor as directed.
ATC Recognizes failure of Mode Switch to insert any rods.
Arms and depresses RPS pushbuttons and ARI pushbuttons to insert all control rods.
Recognizes failure of RPS and ARI to insert all control rods.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 12 of 21 Event
Description:
8 - ATWS (<4%) Enter EOP-1 & EOP-1A - Manually insert rods.
Cue: EOP-1A direction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Rx power will be <4% following scram and ARI. Step 3 (below) will not be necessary.
ATC Performs Scram Hard Card Actions:
- 1. VERIFY the following actions completed:
- Mode Switch Locked in Shutdown.
- RPS Initiated, if all control rods are not fully inserted.
- 2. IF Reactor Recirc Pumps are running in fast speed: THEN Simultaneously Take RCIRC PUMP A BRKR 5A AND RCIRC PUMP B BRKR 5B to XFER.
- 3. IF Reactor power is above 4%, THEN PERFORM the following:
- INHIBIT ADS with US Concurrence
- 5. STABILIZE Reactor pressure using Turbine / Turbine Bypass valves / SRVs
- 6. PERFORM crew update with the following information:
- The Mode Switch is locked in shutdown and failed
- All Control Rods (/are not) inserted
- Reactor Power is _______<4%______%
- Reactor Pressure is _______________psig
- Reactor Level is __________________inches
- Reactor Recirc Pumps (Running in Slow Speed / Tripped)
Marks EOP-1 chart to Step RC-2 and identifies transition to EOP-1A, Level/Power Control
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 13 of 21 Event
Description:
8 - ATWS (<4%) Enter EOP-1 & EOP-1A - Manually insert rods.
Cue: EOP-1A direction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Enters EOP-1A, Level/Power Control.
Directs ATC/BOP to:
- Monitor and Control Rx Power
- Stabilize Reactor Water Level
- Stabilize Reactor Pressure SRO Directs ATC to insert control rods per EOP-SPI 1.11.7 (Critical Task 3)
ATC Coordinates with BOP to insert control rods IAW EOP-SPI 1.3. (Critical Task 3)
- Verify Isolations And Actuations
- Inhibit ADS
- Verifies Isolations And Actuations
- Inhibits ADS (Critical Task 4 (Potential))
ATC Maintains RPV level in directed band.
SRO Directs RPV Pressure band (normally 800 to 1000 psig)
ATC Maintains RPV pressure in directed band.
SRO Wait in HOLD boxes until all control rods are inserted.
ATC Report when all control rods are inserted.
SRO When all control are inserted, transition to EOP-1, RPV Control
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 14 of 21 Event
Description:
9 - CRD pump trips. Restart CRD pump to insert rods Cue: Alarm H13-P601-22-D2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Recognize and announce CRD pump trip.
Evaluator Crew may use either EOP-SPI 1.3 or SOI-C11to restart CRD pump.
SRO Direct CRD Pump Recovery ATC Perform CRD Pump start IAW EOP-SPI 1.3 7.5 No CRD pump is running CRD Pump A is available Then at H13-P601, perform the following:
7.5.1 Start CRD Aux Oil Pump A 7.5.2 Verify blue Perm light is energized.
7.5.3 Start CRD PUMP A ATC Perform CRD Pump Trip Recovery IAW SOI-C11(CRDH) Section 7.6 7.6.3 TAKE the tripped CRD PUMP to STOP. 1C11-C001A 7.6.4 TAKE the oncoming CRD AUX OIL PUMP to START. 1C11-C002A 7.6.5 CONFIRM the CRD PUMP TRIP OIL PRESS LOW alarm clears.
7.6.6 PLACE the CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL in Manual.
7.6.7 LOWER the CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL output to 0%.
7.6.8 CONFIRM CRD FLOW CONTROL VALVE indicates closed.
7.6.9 TAKE the oncoming CRD PUMP to START. 1C11-C001A 7.6.10 WHEN CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL indicates less than tapeset, THEN PROCEED.
7.6.11 SLOWLY THROTTLE the in-service CRD FLOW CONTROL VALVE UNTIL flow is restored on the CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL.
7.6.12 PLACE the CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL in AUTO.
ATC Directs NLO to perform Steps 7.6.157.6.18
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 15 of 21 Event
Description:
10 - Generator field breaker fails to automatically trip on generator trip Cue: Rx Scram Hardcard direction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Continues Scram Hard Card Actions:
- 7. WHEN generator load is reduced to less than 90 MWe, THEN PERFORM the following:
a) TRIP the main turbine by depressing the TURBINE TRIP push-button.
b) VERIFY the following have occurred:
- MAIN STOP VALVEs, CONTROL VALVEs and COMBINED INTERMEDIATE VALVEs are closed.
- GEN BRKRs S-610-PY-TIE and S-611-PY-TIE is open.
- GEN FIELD BREAKER is open.
- EXCITER FIELD BREAKER is open.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 16 of 21 Event
Description:
Scenario Termination Criteria Cue:
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- 1. All control rods inserted to position 00.
- 2. N62-F020A or MSIVs are shut.
- 3. RPV level maintained between 150 and 219.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 17 of 21 Event
Description:
Critical Task #1 Cue:
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With a primary system discharging into the secondary containment, take action to manually isolate the break.
- 1. Safety Significance:
Isolating high energy sources can preclude failure of secondary containment and subsequent radiation release to the public.
- 2. Cues:
Procedural compliance.
Area temperature indication.
- 3. Measured by:
With the reactor at pressure and a primary system discharging into the secondary containment, operator takes action to manually isolate the break.
- 4. Feedback:
Valve position indication.
In field reports.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 18 of 21 Event
Description:
Critical Task #2 Cue:
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Within 15 minutes following a loss of flow in Offgas due to a SJAE discharge line failure, isolate Main Steam to the SJAEs.
- 1. Safety Significance:
Isolating high energy sources can preclude failure of secondary equipment, injury to plant personnel, and subsequent radiation release to the public.
- 2. Cues:
Procedural compliance.
Area temperature indication.
Area radiation levels
- 3. Measured by:
The RO places MN STEAM TO SJAE SUPPLY valve, 1N62-F020A (B)
Control Switch in CLOSE.
- 4. Feedback:
Area temperature trend.
Area radiation level trend.
Valve position indications
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 85%
Page 19 of 21 Event
Description:
Critical Task #3 Cue:
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, initiate action to reduce power by inserting control rods.
- 1. Safety Significance:
Shutting down reactor can preclude failure of containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant.
- 2. Cues:
Procedural compliance.
Control Pod Position Indication.
- 3. Measured by:
Observation - If operating per EOP-01A Reactor Power Control, US determines that Control Rod insertion is required (indicated by verbal direction or EOP place-keeping action) prior to depressurizing RPV.
AND Control Rod insertion commenced in accordance with Section 1.0 of EOP-SPIs.
- 4. Feedback:
Reactor Power trend.
Control Rod indications.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 20 of 21 Event
Description:
Critical Task #4 (Potential)
Cue:
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization and subsequent power excursion, inhibit ADS.
- 1. Safety Significance:
Precludes core damage due to an uncontrolled reactivity addition.
- 2. Cues:
Procedural compliance.
- 3. Measured by:
ADS logic inhibited prior to an automatic initiation unless all required injection systems are Terminated and Prevented.
- 4. Feedback:
RPV pressure trend.
RPV level trend.
ADS "ADS OUT OF SERVICE" annunciator status.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 21 of 21 Event
Description:
Procedures to verify clean Procedure Number Check IV Procedure Number Check IV ARI-H13-P601-17-B3 ARI-H13-P680-01-C5 ARI-H13-P680-01-D1 ARI-H13-P680-01-D4 ARI-H13-P680-03-C6 & C7 ARI-H13-P680-04-E2 & E11 ARI-H13-P680-07-A9, A10, & A11 ARI-H13-P800-01 A2 & D2 ARI-H13-P845-01-B4 & E5 EOP-SPI 1.2 EOP-SPI 1.3 EOP-SPI 2.3 ONI-D17 ONI-D51 ONI-N11 SOI-C11(CRDH) Sect 7.6 SOI-C51(APRM) Sect 7.4 SOI-M15 Sect 7.1 SOI-M40 Sect 7.2 EOP Flow Charts Hardcards Flip-charts TS 3.6.4.1 TS 3.6.4.3 TS 3.3.6.2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NUREG 1021, Rev. 11 Page 1 of 1 FENOC Facsimile Facility: Perry Scenario No.: 4 - 11%
Op-Test No.: 2019-1 Examiners:
Operators:
(SRO)
(ATC)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: Plant S/U in progress; Main turbine @ 1800 rpm. Ready for Main Generator synch per IOI-3, Step 4.3.35. RFPT A is out of service; installing insulation. TBCC Pump C is out of service for bearing replacement. eSOMS Narrative Log is down. PRA Risk is Green and the Grid Risk is Normal.
Turnover: Planned activities; raise reactor power per IOI-3. Reactor Engineering concurs with gang rod withdrawal where not prohibited. Then synchronize to the grid and continue power ascension.
Make any Narrative Log entries on your note pads.
Critical Tasks: 1) Initiate Suppression Pool leak isolation,
- 2) Insert control rods,
- 3) Manually isolate the Main Steam Lines,
- 4) Initiate Emergency Depressurization (Potential)
Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
R-(ATC)
R-(SRO)
Raise Reactor power to establish approximately 2 1/2 Bypass Valves open.
2 N-(BOP)
N-(BOP)
Synchronize the Main Generator to the grid 3
I-(SRO)
Control Room Ventilation Rad Monitor sample pump fails; TS 3.3.7.1 4
C-(ATC)
C-(SRO)
High vibration main turbine bearing manually trip turbine.
5 C-(ATC)
C-(SRO)
ONI-N32 - Main Turbine Trip, generator output breaker S610 fails to trip.
6 C-(SRO)
Both Upper Containment airlock doors open at same time TS 3.6.1.2 7
CT-1, CT-4 C-(BOP)
C-(SRO)
LPCS Room sump alarm, enter EOP-3 ; SP Level <17.8 feet, enter EOP-2; Closes LPCS Suction Valve prior to SP lowering < 14.25 feet 8
CT-2, CT-3 M-(Crew)
TB/HB Vent Hi Rad, Turbine Area Temperature High, MSIVs fail to close 9
CT-3 C-(BOP)
MSIVs on C MSL fail to close - isolate the main steam line (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Narrative Summary - Initial Scenario 4 - 11%
Event 1.
The ATC increases Rx power by control rod withdrawal to obtain 2 and 1/2 bypass valves open. The SRO provides reactivity oversight.
2.
The BOP will synchronize the main generator to the grid.
3.
The Control Room radiation monitor sample pump fails. The SRO evaluates Tech Specs - 3.3.7.1.
4.
Vibration develops on main turbine bearing #5. The auto trip of the main turbine fails requiring the ATC to manually trip the main turbine.
5.
The crew enters ONI-N32 for trip of the main turbine. One of the generator output breakers fail to open requiring the ATC to manually open the generator output breaker.
6.
Both upper Containment airlock doors are opened simultaneously indicating a failure of the airlock interlock mechanism. The SRO evaluates Tech Specs - 3.6.1.2 7.
A Suppression Pool leak in the LPCS pump room requires entry into EOP-3. As suppression pool level lowers, EOP-02 is entered. The leak is stopped by shutting the LPCS suction valve. If Suppression Pool level lowers to 14.25 feet, Emergency Depressurization must be performed.
8.
A steam leak in the Turbine Building at the Bypass Valve manifold results in turbine building high temperature and high radiation level. ONI-N11 is entered. The MSIVs receive an isolation signal, but only one Main Steam line isolates. This requires the crew to scram the Rx and manually isolate all main steam lines to stop the radiation release.
9.
MSIVs on C line fail to isolate. This requires the BOP to the C Main Steam Stop valve.
EOPs:
ARI for Main Turbine vibration ONI-N32 ONI-N11 ONI-D17 ONI-C71-1 Critical tasks:
- 1. Isolate Suppression Pool Leak.
- 2. Insert Control Rods
- 3. Isolate main steam lines
- 4. Emergency Depressurize (Potential)
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 4 - 11%
Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
N/A - Driver Instructions Cue:
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Simulator Setup:
Reset Simulator to IC-69 Load Schedule File: NRC-2019-Scen-4 Verify Schedule File NRC-2019-Scen-4-1 loads Verify Event File NRC-2019-Scen-4 loads Adjust white o-rings.
Remove Info Tags from P870-05 Remove INFO tag from P680-15 for Eastlake power light.
Provide Switching Order Reset NUMACS and acknowledge alarms on Yokagawas (P632/P642 & P614)
Remove Requal IOI-3 and Rod Book from horseshoe.
Set out SOI-N64 Sect 4.3.22 (Step 22 is circled) for SJAE vacuum and place Sys Stat marker on P870 maintain 3-4 HgA Driver Driver Verify Initial Conditions:
Reactor Power ~11%. Rods @ Step 35. (Pull Sheets, Book A2Training.SEQ)
IOI-3 Step 4.3.34 is complete. RFPTA is out of service while installing insulation.
TBCC C is out of service for bearing replacement Place yellow switch cap on TBCC C pump.
Traffic light - Green Risk.
Driver Driver Initial Conditions: Plant S/U in progress; Main turbine @ 1800 rpm. Ready for Main Generator synch per IOI-3, Step 4.3.35. RFPT A is out of service; installing insulation. TBCC Pump C is out of service for bearing replacement. eSOMS Narrative Log is down. PRA Risk is Green and the Grid Risk is Normal.
Planned Activities: Planned activities; raise reactor power per IOI-3. Reactor Engineering concurs with gang rod withdrawal where not prohibited. Then synchronize to the grid and continue power ascension. Make any Narrative Log entries on your note pads.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 2 of 20 Event
Description:
1 - Raise Reactor power to establish approximately 2 1/2 Bypass Valves open.
Cue: from Turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Role play as RP, Chemistry, and Unit Dispatch / ACC for the power change SRO Direct ATC to raise Reactor Power in accordance with the Reactivity Plan with Control Rods. Provide Oversight.
ATC Raise Rx power to establish ~ 2.5 Bypass Valves open in accordance with the Reactivity Plan with Control Rods.
ATC Monitor Main turbine bypass valve positions for proper response to the power change ATC Monitor Average Power Range Monitors for proper response to the power change Evaluator It will require ~6 gangs to get 2.5 BPVs open.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 3 of 20 Event
Description:
2 - Synchronize the Main Generator to the grid Cue: From Turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Role play as necessary SRO Direct BOP to synchronize the Main Generator with the Grid per IOI-3 Synchronize the Main Generator with the Grid per IOI-3 Section 4.3 4.3.38 CLOSE the GEN FIELD BREAKER.
4.3.39 CLOSE the EXCITER FIELD BREAKER.
4.3.40 OBSERVE indication of voltage on GEN. FIELD VOLTS.
1N51 R011 4.3.41 OBSERVE indication of voltage on all three phases of GEN VOLTS.
1N41 R013, R014, R015 4.3.42 ADJUST the MAN. VOLT. ADJUST to increase generator terminal voltage to approximately 22 kV and a Main Transformer output voltage of 345 kV.
Evaluator It takes about a minute before the Auto voltage regulator shows a response.
If Candidate is too aggressive on increasing LOAD SELECTOR (Step 4.3.39), the Bypass valves may momentarily close then reopen BOP 4.3.43.a ADJUST the AUTO. VOLT. ADJUST to Zero the REG TRANSFER DIFF VOLTS.
4.3.43.b TRANSFER the VOLTAGE REGULATOR to the AUTO position.
4.3.44 Make a PA announcement.
4.3.45 TURN the SYNC. SELECT. SWITCH to the position of the first GEN BRKR to be closed as directed by the switching order.
S-611-PY-TIE 4.3.46 MATCH the incoming voltage with running voltage using the AUTO.
VOLT. ADJUST. or the MAN. VOLT. ADJUST.
4.3.47 ADJUST the turbine load selector UNTIL the synchroscope pointer is rotating slowly clockwise.
4.3.48 WHEN the synchroscope pointer is rotating clockwise AND is approximately the width of the pointer before the 12 oclock position, THEN CLOSE GEN BRKR.
S-611-PY-TIE 4.3.49 INCREASE the turbine LOAD SELECTOR UNTIL Bypass Valve 1 is fully closed.
4.3.50 SELECT OFF on the SYNC SELECT SWITCH.
4.3.51 ADJUST Main Generator voltage to bring generator megavars to zero.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 4 of 20 Event
Description:
2 - Synchronize the Main Generator to the grid Cue: From Turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 4.3.52 WHILE increasing load, ADJUST the turbine LOAD SELECTOR to maintain the turbine LOAD SET approximately 120 MWe above generator output.
4.3.53 TURN the SYNC SELECT SWITCH to the position for the second GEN BRKR to be closed as directed by the switching order.
S-610-PY-TIE 4.3.54 VERIFY synchronization.
4.3.55 CLOSE the second GEN BRKR.
S-610-PY-TIE 4.3.56 PLACE the SYNC SELECT SWITCH in OFF.
4.3.57 NOTIFY the dispatcher that the generator is synchronized to the grid.
4.3.58 SELECT turbine STARTING RATE-SLOW.
4.3.59 NOTIFY Chemistry that reactor power is greater than 10% rated and to sample for Fuel Warranty limits.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 5 of 20 Event
Description:
3 - Control Room Ventilation Rad Monitor sample pump fails; TS 3.3.7.1 Cue: Alarm H13-P902-01-C2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver When directed initiate Event 3. Role play as needed ATC Announce unexpected P902 alarm and give stability report.
BOP Investigate H13-P902 and report CONTROL ROOM AIR RAD MON FLOW LOW alarm and review ARI.
BOP Notifies RP of Control Room Vent. Rad Monitor low flow alarm and requests RP to investigate.
Driver As RP, after 3 minutes, inform control room that the sample pump has failed and cannot be restarted.
SRO Evaluate T.S. 3.3.7.1 Action and its Bases A.1 - Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.7.1-1 for the channel -
Immediately C.1 - Provide alternate method of control room radiation monitoring - 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and C.2 - Restore the inoperable monitor to an Operable status - 7 days Tech Spec Bases Alternate monitoring means will be either a portable continuous noble gas monitor or the control room area radiation monitor.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 6 of 20 Event
Description:
4 - High vibration main turbine bearing, manually trip main turbine Cue: Alarm H13-P680-07-B13 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver When directed initiate Event 4. Role play as needed Driver If directed to investigate turbine prior to trip, inform him that bearing 5 is making abnormal noise.
If directed to investigate turbine after the trip, inform him that there is no abnormal noise.
ATC Announce unexpected TURB/GEN/EXCTR VIB P823 alarm and give stability report and review the ARI.
1.0 CAUSE OF ALARM 1.1 Main Turbine, Generator or Exciter bearing vibration >12 mils as sensed by 1N31-N001 through 1N31-N012.
2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTION The trip is enabled 3 seconds have elapsed since the alarm The Main Turbine Generator trips.
ATC Evaluate Turbine bearing vibration levels and report that vibration is indicating >12 mils on bearing #5 for >3 seconds.
ATC Announce manually tripping the Main Turbine and trip the Main Turbine.
Evaluator NOP-OP-1002 4.10.3 step 5 states If automatic actions fail to occur when required, it is the responsibility of the operator to take manual actions to perform the system or component function. Pump or component auto start failures are examples where operators are expected to take manual action.
SRO Announce entry into ONI-N32, Main Turbine Trip.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 7 of 20 Event
Description:
5 - ONI-N32, Main Turbine Trip; generator output breaker S610 fails to trip.
Cue: Turbine Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Enter ONI-N32, Main Turbine Trip.
Evaluator ONI-C51 may be entered if a reactor power change is detected. However, no significant actions will be performed for ONI-C51 ATC Perform Immediate Actions of ONI-N32 Automatic Actions 2.5 GEN BRKR trips. S-610-PY-TIE trips Immediate Actions 3.2 DEPRESS the TURBINE TRIP pushbutton to trip the main turbine.
3.3 VERIFY the following:
- MAIN STOP VALVEs close.
- CONTROL VALVEs close.
- COMBINED INTERMEDIATE VALVEs close.
- GEN BRKR trips. S-610-PY-TIE
- GEN BRKR trips. S-611-PY-TIE
- GEN FIELD BREAKER trips.
ATC Identify GEN BRKR, S-610-PY-TIE did NOT trip; Manually trips breaker S610.
ATC Announce that the Main Turbine is tripped and S610 was manually opened.
ATC Give stability report Evaluator Following turbine trip, vibration levels on bearing #5 lower during coast down.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 8 of 20 Event
Description:
6 - Both Upper Containment Airlock doors open.
Cue: Alarm H13-P680-07-C5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver When directed initiate Event 6. Role play as an NLO when directed ATC Announce unexpected PERS AL DOORS BOTH OPEN alarm and give stability report.
ATC or BOP Observe the matrix lights on H13-P601 to determine which airlock has both doors open ATC Review ARI-H13-P680-07-C5. Inform SRO of Tech Spec references.
SRO Direct subsequent operator actions of ARI-H13-P680-07-C5 4.1.1 Immediately Investigate 4.1.2 If necessary then direct maintenance to repair Driver After both doors are closed call the control room, as an NLO, and notify them:
Contractors moving scaffold into containment opened both doors. They are now closed with the seals inflated. The Contractors have been coached and their supervisor will report to the control room.
Driver If asked about the doors, respond that the doors are closed and the seals are fully inflated.
If asked if the interlock mechanism is defeated or broken, respond that it is not intact, but it can be restored.
Evaluator T.S. 3.6.1.2 Condition B is for the Airlock Interlock mechanism.
May discuss entering T.S. 3.6.1.1 Condition A while both airlock doors are open.
SRO Evaluate Tech Specs T.S. 3.6.1.2 Action B.1 - Verify operable door closed - W/I 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> B.2 - Lock operable door closed - W/I 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> B.3 - Verify operable door locked closed - Once per 31 days
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 4 - 11%
Page 9 of 20 Event
Description:
7 - LPCS Room sump alarm, enter EOP-3 ; SP Level <17.8 feet, enter EOP-2 Cue: Alarm H13-P601-18-E2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver When directed initiate Event 7. Role play as needed ATC Announce unexpected P601 alarm and give stability report.
BOP Report LPCS PUMP ROOM SUMP LEVEL HIGH alarm and EOP-3 entry condition.
SRO Enter EOP-3, Secondary Containment Control and direct BOP to perform EOP-3 actions.
- Monitor area water levels
- Restore and maintain area water levels below entry conditions o Operate all available sump pumps for the Aux Building o Operate cubicle sump drain valves as required BOP Direct NLO to investigate cause of the alarm in the LPCS Pump Room.
Driver When SP Water Level is 17.85 feet (using ICS SP Temperature Validation Screen),
report to the CR that water is entering the LPCS Room from the piping between the suppression pool Suction Valve and the LPCS pump.
If asked, water level is below grating.
BOP Direct Radwaste Operator to operate all available Aux Building sump pumps.
BOP Direct NLO to operate LPCS Pump Room cubicle sump drain valve as required.
Crew Monitor Suppression Pool Level for EOP-2 entry, < 17.8 feet Evaluator If crew isolates leak quickly, entry into EOP-2 may not be required.
SRO When Suppression pool level lowers to <17.8 feet, enter EOP-02, Primary Containment Control and direct BOP to perform EOP-2 actions.
- Isolate all systems discharging into the affected area
- Monitor and control SP Level
- Maintain SP level between 17.8 ft. and 18.5 ft.
Evaluator The SRO has several system options for restoring/maintaining suppression pool level, such as, Condensate transfer, HPCS, and SPMU.
When suppression pool level cannot be maintained above 17.8 ft. then proceed
- Maintain suppression pool level above 14.25 ft.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2019-01 Scenario No.: 4 - 11%
Page 10 of 20 Event
Description:
7 - LPCS Room sump alarm, enter EOP-3 ; SP Level <17.8 feet, enter EOP-2 Cue: Alarm H13-P601-18-E2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO
- When SP level cannot be maintained above 14.25 ft. Emergency Depressurization is required. (Critical Task 4 (Potential))
Evaluator It is not anticipated that crew will allow the suppression pool level to lower to the Emergency Depressurization setpoint. However, if suppression pool level is allowed to approach 14.25 feet, ED prior to lowering below 14.25 would become a Critical Task. With break in LPCS Room, SP Level will lower, if not stopped, to 13.47 feet.
BOP Inform SRO that leak in LPCS room is on the suppression pool suction line downstream of the LPCS suction valve.
Closing 1E21-F001, LPCS SUPR POOL SUCTION VALVE will stop the lowering trend of Suppression Pool level.
SRO Direct BOP to close 1E21-F001, LPCS Supr Pool Suction Valve, (Critical Task 1) place LPCS in Secured Status, and place RHR A on Alternate Keepfill.
Evaluator SRO should direct BOP to shutdown LPCS to Secured Status either before or directly after shutting the suppression pool suction valve. He should also direct 1)
Starting RHR A, 2) placing RHR A on Alternate Keepfill or 3) shutting down RHR A to secured status as the water leg pump will eventually lose suction when the LPCS suppression pool valve is closed BOP Close LPCS suppression pool suction valve as directed. (Critical Task 1) Monitor suppression pool level trend. Direct NLO to monitor the leak. Report when leak is stopped.
Driver If directed to monitor leakage, report leak has stopped once the E21-F001 valve is fully closed.
If asked about LPCS room water tight door, it is closed.
Driver When 1E21-F001 is fully closed, Event 25 will automatically initiate to modify PC04 to 0%.
BOP Directs NLO to perform field actions to place LPCS in Secured Status and RHR A on Alternate Keepfill.
Driver If directed to pull control power fuses or rack out EH1111, wait appropriate time and initiate Event 15.
Driver If directed to open EF1A07-R for E21F005, wait appropriate time and initiate Event 16.
Driver If directed to place RHR A on Alternate Keepfill, initiate Event 17 SRO May direct BOP to take actions to recover Suppression Pool level using systems identified in EOP-2.
BOP Perform actions to recover Suppression Pool level as directed.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 11 of 20 Event
Description:
8 - TB/HB Vent Hi Rad, Turbine Area Temperature High, MSIVs fail to close Cue: Alarms H13-P680-07-A10, H13-P601-0019-A1, H13-P601-0019-B3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Place pictures of E31-N0361A, D, B, & C on Back Panels H13-P869 and H13-P868 prior to initiation of Event 8.
Driver When directed initiate Event 8. Role play as needed ATC Announce unexpected AIRBORNE RAD P804 alarm and give stability report.
Report ONI-D17 entry condition.
BOP Investigate P804 rad alarm and report TB/HB Gas has an ALERT alarm in with rad levels increasing.
SRO Announce entry into ONI-D17, High Radiation Levels Within The Plant ATC/BOP Perform ONI-D17 Immediate Actions - Announce Turbine Building evacuation.
Evaluator Crew may enter ONI-N11, Pipe Break Outside Containment from ONI-D17 Supplemental Actions.
ATC Review ARI-H13-P680-07-A10 and commence performing actions.
1.0 CAUSE OF ALARM 1.1 Any of the following:
Receipt of an alert, high or fail for any of the following PLANT RAD MONITORs on Airborne Radiation Monitoring Panel 1H13-P804:
- TB/HB VENT GAS 1D17-K856 D17EA036 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTION 4.2 IF any of the below monitors have a valid Hi Alarm,
- Unit 1 PLANT VENT GAS
- Unit 2 PLANT VENT GAS
- TB/HB VENT GAS
- OG VENT PIPE GAS THEN VERIFY with Chemistry that a MIDAS run is performed within 15 minutes per EPI-A1, HA-1.
4.3 DIRECT as appropriate, Chemistry or Radiation Protection to initiate actions in accordance with RPI-0506, Radiation Protection Section Response to Radiation Monitor Alarms.
Evaluator About one minute after the rad alarm is received, the TB high temp alarms will be received and the TB/HB rad monitor will reach the HIGH alarm setpoint.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 12 of 20 Event
Description:
8 - TB/HB Vent Hi Rad, Turbine Area Temperature High, MSIVs fail to close Cue: Alarms H13-P680-07-A10, H13-P601-0019-A1, H13-P601-0019-B3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Announce multiple unexpected alarms and give stability report. Announces Half Scram and MSIV Closure alarms received.
BOP Announce MSL ISOL TURBINE AREA TEMPERATURE HIGH and MSIV CLOSED SIGNAL RECEIVED alarms. Evaluates and report MSIV isolation status and review ARIs.
4.3 Refer to ONI-N11, Pipe Break Outside Containment as required.
4.4 MONITOR the following temperatures ANALOG LOOP DIVISION 1 PANEL, 1H13-P869 Recorder 1E31-N361A, Ch. 1 - MSIV Isol.
1E31-N360A Recorder 1E31-N361D Ch. 1 - MSIV Isol.
1E31-N360D ANALOG LOOP DIVISION 2 PANEL, 1H13-P868 Recorder 1E31-N361B, Ch. 1 - MSIV Isol.
1E31-N360B Recorder 1E31-N361C, Ch. 1 - MSIV Isol.
1E31-N360C BOP Inform SRO of ONI-N11 entry condition SRO Announce ONI-N11, Pipe Break Outside Containment entry, evaluates potential source of temperature increase in Turbine Building.
Evaluator MSL Drain Valves and MSL B isolates, inboard and outboard.
MSLs A & D do not isolate.
MSL C does not isolate - attains only partial outboard valve closure.
ATC/BOP Announce evacuation of turbine building over PA per ONI-N11 Immediate Action.
BOP Investigate E31-N360 A,B,C,D on back panels; report all four temperature recorders indicate high temperatures and tripped status.
Evaluator Scram Actions may have been completed in Event 7 if EOP-1 was entered.
SRO Direct ATC to insert a Reactor SCRAM and announce entry into ONI-C71.
(Critical Task 2)
SRO Direct BOP to isolate the MSIVs. (Critical Task 3)
ATC Perform Scram Hardcard actions (OAI-1703 att. 10)
- 1.
VERIFY the following actions completed:
- Mode Switch Locked in Shutdown (Critical Task 2)
- RPS Initiated (if all control rods are not fully inserted)
- 4.
STABILIZE Reactor level using Feedwater / RCIC / HPCS
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 13 of 20 Event
Description:
8 - TB/HB Vent Hi Rad, Turbine Area Temperature High, MSIVs fail to close Cue: Alarms H13-P680-07-A10, H13-P601-0019-A1, H13-P601-0019-B3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- 5.
STABILIZE Reactor pressure using Turbine / Turbine Bypass valves /
- 6.
PERFORM crew update.
- 7.
RECORD the TIME: _____________
- 8.
STABLIZE reactor water level:
a) Feedwater REFER TO the FEEDWATER HARDCARD b) RCIC c) HPCS
- 9.
STABLIZE reactor pressure:
a) Turbine / Turbine Bypass valves:
- REFER TO the PRESSURE CONTROL HARDCARD b) SRVs:
- EVACUATE Containment
- REFER TO the PRESSURE CONTROL HARDCARD
- EVALUATE placing RCIC in pressure CONTROL MODE
- 10.
INSERT Nuclear Instruments:
BOP Isolate Main Steam Lines by closing MSIVs. (Critical Task 3)
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 14 of 20 Event
Description:
9 - MSIVs on C MSL fail to close - isolate the main steam line Cue: Alarms H13-P680-07-A10, H13-P601-0019-A1, H13-P601-0019-B3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Identify MSL C MSIVs did not isolate and informs SRO of need to close 1N11-F020C to isolate.
SRO Direct BOP to isolate MSL C by closing MSL C Shutoff Valve, 1N11-F020C.
(Critical Task 3)
BOP Close 1N11-F020C, MSL C Shutoff Valve as directed and report closure to SRO.
(Critical Task 3)
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 15 of 20 Event
Description:
Scenario Termination Criteria Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- 1.
Suppression Pool leak is stopped.
- 2.
Main Turbine is tripped.
- 3.
Reactor is shutdown
- 4.
All Main Steam Lines are isolated
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 16 of 20 Event
Description:
Critical Task #1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With Suppression Pool level lowering due to a leak, the US determines that Suppression Pool leak isolation is required; RO initiates Suppression Pool leak isolation as directed by the US.
- 1.
Safety Significance:
Precludes failure of Containment.
- 2.
Cues:
Procedural compliance.
Suppression Pool level trend.
- 3.
Measured by:
Observation - US determines (indicated by announcement) that Suppression Pool leak isolation is required before Suppression Pool level drops below 14.25 feet.
AND Observation - RO Isolates the LPCS Suppression Pool Suction valve.
- 4.
Feedback:
Suppression Pool level trend.
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Page 17 of 20 Event
Description:
Critical Task #2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, initiate action to reduce power by inserting control rods.
- 1.
Safety Significance:
Places the reactor in the lowest possible energy state and reduces driving head and flow of main steam discharging outside the primary and secondary containment.
- 2.
Cues:
Procedural compliance.
- 3.
Measured by:
Observation - Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN or RPS pushbuttons armed and depressed to cause control rod insertion.
- 4.
Feedback:
Reactor Power trend.
Control Rod indication.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 18 of 20 Event
Description:
Critical Task #3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With the failure of a MSIV automatic isolation, take action to manually isolate the Main Steam Lines.
- 1.
Safety Significance:
Take action to prevent degradation of a barrier to fission product release.
- 2.
Cues:
Procedural compliance.
MSL MSIV position indication shows valves OPEN.
- 3.
Measured by:
The RO places B21-F022A (C, D) Control Switch in CLOSE.
The RO places B21-F028A (C, D) Control Switch in CLOSE The RO places N11-F020C Control Switch in CLOSE
- 4.
Feedback:
Main Steam Line Tunnel temperature trend MSIV valve position indications.
MSL Shutoff valve position indication.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 19 of 20 Event
Description:
Critical Task #4 (Potential)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When Suppression Pool level cannot be maintained above 14.25 feet the US determines that Emergency Depressurization is required, RO initiates Emergency Depressurization as directed by US.
- 1. Safety Significance:
Precludes failure of Containment.
- 2. Cues:
Procedural compliance.
Suppression Pool level trend.
- 3. Measured by:
Observation - US determines (indicated by announcement or observable transition to EOP-04-2) that Emergency Depressurization is required before Suppression Pool level drops below 14.25 feet.
AND Observation - RO opens at least 6 SRV's during performance of Emergency Depressurization actions.
- 4. Feedback:
RPV pressure trend.
Suppression Pool temperature trend.
SRV status indication.
Appendix D, Rev. 11 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
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Page 20 of 20 Procedures to verify clean Procedure Number Check IV Procedure Number Check IV ARI-H13-P601-17-E1 ECCS T & P Hardcard ARI-H13-P601-18-E2 Feedwater Hardcard ARI-H13-P601-19-A1 Feedwater T & P Hardcard ARI-H13-P601-19-B3 Hydrogen Analyzer Startup Hardcard ARI-H13-P601-20-E2 Hydrogen Igniter Startup Hardcard ARI-H13-P680-07-A10 Isolation & Actuations Hardcards ARI-H13-P680-07-B13 Margins and Limits Hardcard ARI-H13-P902-01-C2 Pressure Control Hardcard EOP-01 Chart Scram Hardcard EOP-02 Chart SRO oversight flip packs EOP-3 Chart EOP-4-2 Chart ONI-C71-1 ONI-D17 ONI-N11 ONI-N32 SOI-C11(CRDH)
SOI-C11(RC&IS)
SOI-E12 Sections 4.4 & 6.4 SOI-E21 Section 6.2 TS 3.3.7.1