ML19155A093
| ML19155A093 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/2019 |
| From: | Duke Energy Progress |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19155A082 | List:
|
| References | |
| RA-19-0131 | |
| Download: ML19155A093 (53) | |
Text
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR CHAPTER 8 ELECTRIC POWER
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8-i Amendment 11 CHAPTER 8 ELECTRIC POWER TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 8.0 ELECTRIC POWER 8.1.1-1
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8.1.1-1 8.1.1 NETWORK INTERCONNECTIONS 8.1.1-1 8.1.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 8.1.2-1 8.1.2.1 ONE-LINE DIAGRAMS 8.1.2-1 8.1.2.2 UNIT AUXILIARY AND STATION AUXILIARY TRANSFORMERS 8.1.2-1 8.1.2.3 4160 VOLT SYSTEM 8.1.2-1 8.1.2.4 480 VOLT SYSTEM 8.1.2-1 8.1.2.5 125 VOLT DC SYSTEM 8.1.2-1 8.1.2.6 120 VOLT AC SYSTEM 8.1.2-2 8.1.3 SAFETY LOADS 8.1.3-1 8.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM 8.2.1-1 8.
2.1 DESCRIPTION
8.2.1-1 8.2.2 ANALYSIS 8.2.2-1 8.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS 8.3.1-1 8.3.1 AC POWER SYSTEMS 8.3.1-1 8.3.
1.1 DESCRIPTION
8.3.1-1 8.3.1.1.1 4160 VOLT SYSTEM 8.3.1-1 8.3.1.1.2 480 VOLT SYSTEM 8.3.1-1 8.3.1.1.3 120 VOLT AC SYSTEM 8.3.1-2a 8.3.1.1.4 EVALUATION OF LAYOUT AND LOAD DISTRIBUTION 8.3.1-2a 8.3.1.1.5 EMERGENCY POWER SOURCES 8.3.1-3
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8-ii Amendment 10 CHAPTER 8 ELECTRIC POWER TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
SECTION TITLE PAGE 8.3.1.1.5.1 Description of Sources 8.3.1-3 8.3.1.1.5.2 Diesel Generator Separation 8.3.1-6 8.3.1.1.5.3 Loading Description 8.3.1-6 8.3.1.1.5.4 Test and Inspection Capabilities 8.3.1-7 8.3.1.2 Analysis 8.3.1-7 8.3.1.2.1 Studies 8.3.1-7 8.3.1.2.2 Reliability Assurance 8.3.1-8 8.3.1.3 Independence of Redundant Systems 8.3.1-10 8.3.2 DC POWER SYSTEM (125 VOLT) 8.3.2-1 8.3.3 FIRE PROTECTION FOR CABLE SYSTEMS 8.3.3-1
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8-iii Revision No.20 CHAPTER 8 ELECTRIC POWER LIST OF TABLES TABLE TITLE PAGE 8.3.1-1 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING 8.3.1-11 8.3.1-2 INSTRUMENT CHANNELS POWER SOURCES 8.3.1-14 8.3.1-3 EMERGENCY GENERATOR DESIGN DATA 8.3.1-15 8.3.1-4 DIESEL GENERATOR TRIPS AND ALARMS 8.3.1-16 8.3.1-5 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SEQUENCE 8.3.1-18 8.3.2-1 MAJOR BATTERY LOADS AND APPROXIMATE OPERATING TIMES 8.3.2-2
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8-iv Revision No. 28 CHAPTER 8 ELECTRIC POWER LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE TITLE 8.1.2-1 230 AND 115 KV SWITCHYARD DEVELOPMENT DIAGRAM 8.1.2-1a ONE LINE DIAGRAM UNIT 2 AUXILIARY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 8.2.1-1 HYDROGEN INNER-COOLED TURBINE GENERATOR 896,900 KVA -
0.925 PF -.58 SCR - 75 PSIG H2 CALCULATED CAPABILITY CURVES 8.2.1-2 DELETED BY REVISION NO. 15 8.2.2-1 LTC OPERATING BANDS 8.3.1-1 MAIN & 4160 V ONE LINE DIAGRAM 8.3.1-2 4160 V ONE LINE DIAGRAM 8.3.1-3 480 V ONE LINE DIAGRAM 8.3.1-4 DEDICATED SHUTDOWN BUS 8.3.1-5 ONE LINE DIAGRAM 125V DC & 120V VITAL AC
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.1.1-1 Amendment No 10 8.0 ELECTRIC POWER
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The H. B. Robinson (HBR 2) electrical power system consists of the switchyard, breakers, generators, various transformers, buses, and other equipment needed to produce and provide power for off-site supply and on-site needs.
8.1.1 NETWORK INTERCONNECTIONS Electrical energy generated at 22 kV by the Robinson Unit 2 is raised to 230 kV by three single phase main transformers and delivered to a 230 kV switchyard. This 230 kV switchyard is connected to outgoing 230 kV transmission lines and the adjacent 115 kV switchyard (east and west buses) through auto-transformers. The 115 kV switchyard is a split bus design incorporating two bus sectionalizing breakers. The 115 kV switchyard is connected to various points on the transmission system with 115 kV lines.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.1.2-1 Revision No. 28 8.1.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM The Auxiliary Electrical System is designed to provide a simple arrangement of buses requiring the minimum of switching to restore power to a bus in the event that the normal supply to that bus is lost.
8.1.2.1 One-Line Diagrams A one-line diagram illustrating switchyard and plant buses for the off-site and on-site sources of power is shown in Figures 8.1.2-1, 8.1.2-1a, and 8.3.1-1.
The basic components of the Station Electrical System are shown on the Main Electrical One Line Diagrams (Figures 8.3.1-2 through 8.3.1-5) which include the 4160 volt, the 480 volt, and the 125 volt DC system.
8.1.2.2 Unit Auxiliary and Station Auxiliary Transformers The plant's generator serves as the main source of auxiliary electrical power during "on-the-line" operation of the plant. Power to the Auxiliary Electrical System is supplied via an auxiliary transformer that is connected to the main leads from the generator. Power to the 480 volt buses is supplied by 4160 to 480 volt station service transformers.
Auxiliary power required during plant startup, shutdown, and after reactor trip is supplied from the 115 kV and/or 230 kV sides of the switchyard. The 115 kV side of the switchyard is served by the 115 kV system lines and two ties to the 230 kV switchyard, the 230 kV side of the switchyard is served by the 230 kV system lines and two ties to the 115 kV switchyard.
8.1.2.3 4160 Volt System The 4160 volt system supplies power via ten buses to plant loads as shown in Figure 8.3.1-2.
These buses can be connected in several different ways to provide power to loads from off-site sources.
8.1.2.4 480 Volt System The 480 volt system is divided into 9 power center buses as shown in Figures 8.3.1-3 and 8.3.1-4. This system also includes several 480V nonsafety motor control centers (MCC) and one nonsafety 208V MCC, 4 - 480V safety-related MCC, 2 - 208V safety-related MCC, and one dedicated shutdown bus. These buses may be connected to various sources depending on power supplies available. The emergency buses are also supplied by the emergency diesel generators. The generators start automatically on a loss of power to the emergency bus. The Dedicated Shutdown System bus is fed by either off-site power, the main generator, or the dedicated shutdown diesel generator.
8.1.2.5 125 Volt DC System As shown in Figure 8.3.1-5, the DC power system consists of seven 125 V station batteries, each with its' own battery charger(s) and DC buses. Two of the batteries are safety-related.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.1.2-2 Revision No. 15 8.1.2.6 120 Volt AC System The 120 volt vital AC instrument supply is split into 10 safety-related buses. Instrument buses 2 and 3 are fed from the "A" battery distribution system and "B" battery distribution system, via inverters "A" and "B" respectively. Instrument buses 1 and 4 are normally fed from 480 volt MCC-5 and MCC-6 respectively via their constant voltage transformers. The alternate power supply for instrument buses 1, 2, 3, and 4 is 208/120 volt MCC-8. Instrument buses 6, 7 (panels 7A and 7B), 8, and 9 (panels 9A and 9B) are powered from instrument buses 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively, via breakers.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.1.3-1 Revision No 20 8.1.3 SAFETY LOADS Safety loads are supplied by the diesel generators and associated buses. The safety loads that are sequenced on the diesel generator per the engineered safety features actuation sequence are noted in Table 8.3.1-5. Diesel generator loading is listed in Table 8.3.1-1.
FIGURE 8.1.2-1 DUKE ENERGY (SOUTH)
(NORTH)
REVISION 28 4.16 KV BUSES TO UNIT NO. 2 UNIT NO. 2 TRANS.
START-UP 230 KV
WEST 115kV -----.---
EAST 115kV NORTH 230kV-----.---
DARLINGTON COUNTY NORTH LINE 230kV 115kV STARTUP TRANSFORMER 230kV STARTUP TRANSFORMER
~ 1 HV-27/36/45/50.4 MVA
~
~ HV-27/36/45/50.4 MVA Y-SUT-115 NORTH 230kV -------1.----
MAIN GEN. 2 22kV, 854 MVA DARLINGTON SCPSA LINE 230kV MAIN TRANSFORMER BANK 3-330 MVA 1PH, 60HZ
,S~OCSHW+50~1'>--r < -'~1'Sj1'/m;,sl2,--M-V_A_(_EA_C_H_)--------
o--J xh ry, LV-13.5/18/22.5/25.2 MVA (EACH)
- L)~k~
29-DISC-SW-X-SUT-230
)
5 2
2 9-DISC)-s 5
w 2
-Y-SU)T 5
2 230 29-~
l
) 52
) 52
) 52
) 52
) 5422 UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER #2 I
35 36 37 41 46 47 48 T ~ HV44/49.2 MVA 4_.1.6_kv_s_u..
s_7 ____._
4_.1_6k_v_s_us_8 _____ -=----+---,-------------------~
LV-22/24.6 MVA (EACH) 4.16kV BUS 9 DISCO~~rJL o) zJ
) ~2 L ~
<?_)_z1 _________ _
4.16kV BUS 2 4.16kV BUS 3 4.16kV BUS 4 I)~~
4.16kV BUS 5
- 6) 52
- 6) 52
) 542
- 6) 52 l
- 6) 52
- 6) 52
- 6) 52
~ 13 10 DIS~~SN~ECT~------~
15
~----~9 19 28 9 24 DISC~~NIC?
DISC~8N1CT DISCONNECT
~------~lNECT
~~
(Y'(n ~f SST T
2C u..lu ~6T 6,)5'2
~
)zls STATION SERVICE SST 9 1B
~~1TI~FNORsJ::1~]
TRANSFORMER 2H 2F
- 6) 52 52 52
""" 0 '"
<MY l ii l ':,,,,
7l t BUS 1
- BUS 2A BUS 2B 3
~~ r) N.O.
Tis ) N.O.
480V DEDICATED SHUTDOWN BUS
) 52
?/ 32B
) 52 32A ~-----~
u..Lu DEDICATED SHUTDOWN SST T
2D
) 52 480V BUS 4 I 308
) 52 1
18B 480V EMERGENCY BUS E1 52 6) 22B N.O.
G TRANSFORMER 5
480V EMERGENCY BUS E2 DIESEL 298
) N.O.
~) ~~B EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A 3125 KVA, 3ft_, 60HZ GENERATOR 3250 KVA, 4160V, 3ft_, 60Hl MAINTENANCE SAFETY INJECTION PUMP B EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B 3125 KVA, 3ft_, 60HZ I
480V
- 6) 52 32 SST T2E
) 52 I 37B BUS 5 H.B. ROBINSON UNIT 2 DUKE ENERGY UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT ONE LINE DIAGRAM UNIT 2 AUXILIARY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FIGURE 8.1.2-1A REVISION NO. 28
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.2.1-1 Revision No. 27 8.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM The HBR offsite power system consists of those facilities necessary to interconnect the HBR 2 generating unit with the remainder of the DEP system. It provides capability for delivering power from HBR 2 when the unit is generating power, and also provides capability for delivering power to the unit when it is not. It includes the HBR 2 generator, the main power transformers, the 230 kV and 115 kV switchyards, the unit auxiliary and startup transformers, and the transmission lines from the site.
8.
2.1 DESCRIPTION
Figure 8.1.2-1 is a one-line diagram of the offsite power system. The generator is rated at 896.9 MVA at a power factor of 0.925. Its calculated capability curves are shown in Figure 8.2.1-1. It feeds electric power at approximately 22 kV through an isolated phase bus to the main transformers. The bulk of the power required for station auxiliaries during normal function is supplied by the unit auxiliary transformer which is also connected to the isolated phase bus.
The main transformer bank, which steps up the voltage from 22 kV to 230 kV, consists of three single phase transformers. From the main transformers, the power is delivered through the 230 kV switchyard. The 230 kV switchyard is of the "breaker-and-a-half" design with six outgoing 230 kV transmission lines and two connections to the adjacent 115 kV switchyard through 300 MVA auto-transformers. The 115 kV switchyard is a split bus design incorporating two bus sectionalizing breakers. The 115 kV switchyard is connected to various points on the transmission system with three 115 kV lines and to the 230 kV switchyard with the two auto transformers mentioned above.
The six 230 kV lines extending from the 230 kV switchyard connect to intrasystem tie points at the following locations:
a)
Darlington, S. C., an interconnection tie point with South Carolina Public Service Authority b)
Rockingham, N. C., which is also an interconnection tie point with the Duke Power Company over a double circuit 230 kV line c)
Sumter, S. C., which is also an interconnection tie point with South Carolina Electric &
Gas Company over two 230 kV lines, d)
Florence, S. C., which is also an interconnection tie point with South Carolina Public Service Authority, and e)
Two lines to the Darlington County Electric Plant which is also an interconnection tie point with South Carolina Public Service Authority.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.2.1-2 Revision No. 28 Three 115 kV lines emanate from the Robinson switchyard and tie into the transmission system at the following locations:
- 1.
Florence, S. C.
- 2.
Rockingham, N.C., which is connected to the Blewett and Tillery Hydroelectric Generating Plants of the DEP system, and
- 3.
Camden S.C. which is connected to Duke Power Company at the Wateree Hydroelectric Generating Plant near Lugoff, S.C.
The arrangement provides for continuity of external power to Unit 2 through the following independent sources:
- 1.
Hydroelectric generating plants on the DEP system (Blewett and Tillery)
- 2.
A hydroelectric generating plant on the Duke Power System (Wateree)
- 3.
System connections with the South Carolina Electric and Gas System (Sumter)
- 4.
System connections with Duke Power System (Rockingham)
- 5.
System connections with the South Carolina Public Service Authority (Darlington, Darlington County Electric Plant, and Florence), and
- 6.
Intra-system connections with the DEP system.
Protective features inherent within the arrangement of 230 kV "breaker-and-a-half" switchyard design coupled with switchyard bus and auto-transformer differential relaying provide reliable protection for isolation of faults to facilitate continuity of power supply from alternate sources.
Further protection associated with each transmission line includes high speed distance relaying, breaker failure relaying, carrier relaying, ground overcurrent relaying, and selective-automatic reclosing of lines to facilitate isolation of a sustained fault and continuity through reclosing in the event of transient faults. Synchronizing facilities, control, indication, annunciation, and metering associated with the lines and transmission equipment in the switchyard are located in a 230 kV switchyard building. Synchronizing facilities, control, indication, annunciation, and metering associated with the breakers for HBR Unit #2 are located in the HBR2 control room and Building 469.
Supervisory equipment at the Robinson 115/230 kV Switchyard provides the DEP Skaale Energy Control Center (ECC) in Raleigh, NC with parallel control, indication, annunciation and metering of the 115/230 kV transmission lines and switchyard.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.2.1-3 Revision No. 28 Under normal operating conditions the ECC will have control of the 230 kV breakers except for the Unit #2 North Bus 230 kV circuit breaker (52/9), the Unit #2 - Darlington (SCPSA) Tie 230 kV circuit breaker (52/8), the #2 230kV SUT-North Bus 230kV circuit breaker (52/15-230),
and the #2 230kV SUT-DCEP North Tie 230kV circuit breaker (52/14-230) (See Figure 8.1.2-1 for identification of supervisory equipment).
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.2.2-1 Revision No. 28 8.2.2 Analysis The nominal switchyard voltages for the Robinson Plant are 115 kV and 230 kV. System Operations provides Robinson Plant with a voltage schedule which calls for the Robinson units, when operating, to maintain these voltages within acceptable limits, as determined by both transmission system and plant auxiliary electrical system requirements.
The system dispatcher closely monitors the plant 115 kV switchyard bus voltage and will be alerted to voltages outside acceptable limits (which are fixed through setpoint adjustments at the Energy Control Center) as determined by plant operating requirements.
A minimum required switchyard voltage profile for the HBRSEP 115kV and 230kV switchyards was developed for the design of the startup transformers. The profile assumed an initial minimum scheduled switchyard voltage. The profile dropped to a minimum switchyard voltage of 0.9305 per unit (based on the nominal voltage of 115 or 230kV) for the first second following an HBRSEP Unit trip, then ramped linearly to 0.96 per unit voltage over the next 6.5 seconds, reaching a steady state value of 0.96 per unit. Simulations were performed to validate the ability of the transmission system to maintain this voltage profile under a variety of credible contingencies. The 115kV and 230kV switchyard voltage response simulations confirm that the minimum required switchyard voltage profile can be expected to conservatively represent anticipated transmission system performance.
The HBR 2 operators also monitor the voltage on the 115 kV and 230 kV switchyard bus by means of a digital voltmeter located in the HBR-2 Control Room. Control Room alarms (which are fixed through setpoint adjustments on the meter) are set to go off should the voltage fall below 100 percent or rise above 103.5 percent. In addition, loss of power to the monitor circuit will also set off the alarm in the Control Room.
The Startup Transformers are equipped with Load Tap Changers (LTC) with automatic/manual control capabilities. The LTCs can automatically maintain the 4.16kV bus voltages at the required voltage regardless of variations in switchyard voltage. This minimizes the occurrence and effect of any overvoltage or degraded grid voltage on the plant electrical equipment and the safety related buses E1 and E2 for anticipated variations in switchyard voltage during both normal and emergency operations.
The Primary LTC controller sends signals to the associated LTC to control voltage within the desired control band. The control band was established to allow for proper operation of the LTC controller while operating within the upper and lower system voltage limits. It has the ability to be configured to operate in both steady state voltage control definite time delay and fast voltage recovery mode. The steady state definite time delay prevents unnecessary LTC operations with slow voltage excursions of small magnitude. The fast voltage recovery mode provides for rapid LTC response to large grid transients. The fast voltage recovery mode (sensing time of 0.5 seconds and operation time of 2 seconds) provides acceptable voltage response for the worst case grid transients and plant trips.
The backup controller senses voltage at the same bus level as the primary controller with a separate potential transformer. This allows for proper isolation between the two controllers. The backup controller is wired in series with the primary controller LTC raise and lower commands.
The backup controller functions to provide an inhibit band which is a separate control band set just outside the normal control band. Should the sensed voltage vary outside this band, the backup controller prevents the primary controller from issuing a raise or lower command. In
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.2.2-2 Revision No. 28 addition, there is an adjustable deadband that should voltage continue to rise, the backup controller is configured with the ability to issue a lower command to the LTC to bring the voltage back into normal operating range.
HBR 2 was constructed prior to the issuance of General Design Criteria 17. HBR 2 is equipped with two (2) startup transformers (one (1) 115 kV startup and one (1) 230 kV startup) which connect the multiple sources of offsite power to the onsite electric distribution system. Both the 115 kV startup and the 230 kV startup are capable of energizing Emergency Buses E1 and E2 independently. Should a failure of either startup transformer occur, the other startup would be capable of supplying power to the onsite distribution system. Should HBR 2 experience a failure of both startups, the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) could supply power to the onsite distribution system by back-feeding the main transformer from the 230 kV switchyard. Prior to back-feeding the main transformer from the 230 kV switchyard, the generator must be disconnected from the main transformer by removing the connecting straps. The main transformer backfeeding will only be done during cold shutdown unless nuclear safety consideration require it to be done during hot shutdown when no other power sources are available.
Approximately four hours is estimated to accomplish backfeeding the plant busses through the unit auxiliary transformer.
H. B. Robinson Unit 2 Duke Energy UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT HYDROGEN INNER-COOLED TURBINE GENERATOR CALCULATED CAPABILITY CURVES 896.9 MVA, 0.925 PF, 0.57 SCR, 75 PSIG H2 FIGURE 8.2.1-1 Revision No. 27
H. B. Robinson Unit 2 Duke Energy UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT LTC OPERATING BANDS FIGURE 8.2.2-1 Revision No. 28
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-1 Revision No. 28 8.3 Onsite Power Systems 8.3.1 AC Power Systems The AC power system uses the unit's main generator, offsite supplies, onsite diesel generator, and battery powered inverters to supply various site loads. The bus system and interconnections have been sized to meet expected plant normal and abnormal operating conditions.
The unit turbine generator is equipped with an alarm set at 59.8 Hz to warn the operator of an impending reactor coolant pump (RCP) trip situation. The unit has protection from connection to the line while stopped or on turning gear.
8.3.1.1 Description As described in Section 8.1, the plant power requirements are supplied from the unit auxiliary transformer, fed from the unit generator; and two (2) unit startup transformers. The unit auxiliary and startup transformers feed various 4.16 kV buses in the station. Power requirements at lower voltages are supplied from the 4.16 kV buses through stepdown transformers. This arrangement is shown in Figure 8.3.1-1.
8.3.1.1.1 4160 volt system As shown by Figures 8.3.1-2 and 8.1.2-1a, the 4160 volt system is divided into ten buses.
During normal operation, buses 1, 2, 4, and 5 are normally connected to the generator leads via bus main breakers and unit auxiliary transformer number 2. Bus number 3 is normally connected to the 115 kV startup transformers via the bus main breaker and Bus 8. Bus 8 is connected to the Y-windings of the 115kV startup and 230kV startup. Similarly, Bus 7 is connected to the X-windings of the 115kV startup and the 230kV startup. Bus 6 is connected to the X-winding of the 115kV startup, while Bus 9 is connected to the Y-winding of the 230kV startup. Bus 10 is powered from off-site distribution and is located in the old Unit #1 area.
Buses 1 and 2 or buses 3 and 4 can be tied together via bus tie breakers. A generator lockout causes buses 1 and 2 to be automatically transferred to Bus 7. Similarly, a generator lockout also causes bus 4 to be automatically transferred to Bus 8 via Bus 3. Bus supply and bus tie circuit breakers are equipped with stored energy closing mechanisms to provide fast dead bus transfers. All 4160 volt auxiliaries are split between buses 1, 2, 4 and 5. In addition, 4.16 kV Buses 1 through 10 each serve one 4160 to 480 volt station service transformer. The plant also has a 4160 volt diesel generator and associated equipment to supply the 480 volt dedicated shutdown system.
8.3.1.1.2 480 volt system The 480 volt system is divided into nine buses. These include six nonsafety buses, two emergency buses, and one dedicated shutdown bus. The 480 volt buses are supplied from the 4160 volt buses as follows:
- 1.
1 from 4.16 kV bus 2 through station service transformer 2A
- 2.
2A and 2B from 4.16 kV bus 1 through station service transformer 2B
- 3.
3 and DS from 4.16 kV bus 3 through station service transformer 2C,
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-2 Revision No. 28
- 4.
4 from 4.16 kV bus 4 through station service transformer 2D,
- 5.
5 from 4.16 kV bus 5 via station service transformer 2E,
- 6.
E1 from 4.16 kV bus 6 through station service transformer 2F, and
- 7.
E2 from 4.16 kV bus 9 through station service transformer 2G.
Tie breakers are provided between 480 volt buses 1 and 2A, buses 3 and 2B, and buses E1 and E2.
Engineered safety features (ESF) equipment circuits are connected to 480 volt buses E1 and E2. The normal source of power for bus E1 is the 115kV startup transformer through station service transformer 2F. The normal source of power for bus E2 is the 230kV startup transformer through station service transformer 2G.
One emergency diesel generator set is connected to bus E1 and the other to bus E2. A diesel will be automatically started and connected to its bus if voltage on its associated bus is lost.
The 480 volt bus arrangement is shown in Figure 8.3.1-3.
The plant has a 480 V AC dedicated shutdown bus as part of the dedicated shutdown system.
This non-safety related bus supplies power as shown in Figure 8.3.1-4. The dedicated shutdown diesel generator also serves as the Alternate Alternating Current (AAC) supply, in accordance with 10CFR50.63, for the Station Blackout event.
The power for engineered safety systems is supplied from Motor Control Centers 5, 6, 9, 10, 16, and 18.
MCCs 5 and 16 are 480 VAC MCCs and are supplied by 480 VAC Bus E1. MCC 10 is supplied from MCC 5 through a 45 KVA, 480-120/208 VAC, 3 Phase, 60 Hz step-down transformer.
MCC 6 and 18 are 480 VAC MCCs which are supplied by 480 VAC Bus E2.
MCC 9 is supplied from MCC 6 through a 30 KVA, 480-120/208 VAC, 3 Phase, 60 Hz step-down transformer.
Motor Control Center 5 has an alternate feed from the dedicated shutdown bus. The dedicated shutdown bus does not supply MCC 16 as it is isolated from MCC 5 when MCC 5 is supplied from the dedicated shutdown bus. No branch circuit loads supplied by MCC 16 are required to be supplied from the dedication shutdown bus.
Emergency Diesel Generator loading is listed in Table 8.3.1-1.
The 480 V AC system has two levels of protection for undervoltage conditions. Either of these conditions will trip the 480 V bus E1 and E2 normal incoming breaker (off-site system) and initiate the start and operation of the diesel generators as described in Section 8.3.1.1.5. The first level (loss of voltage) occurs at 328 volts, +/- 10% with a time delay of 1.0 seconds (at zero voltage). The second level (degraded voltage) occurs at 430 V +/- 4 V with a time delay of 10.0 seconds +/- 0.5 seconds. The relays (except voltage sensing relays) and associated circuitry are designed to be testable. The 480V AC system also has protection for unbalanced voltage/open phase condition. Unbalanced voltage relays are configured similar to the degraded voltage protection. All equipment will be capable of producing a control room alarm, but with the trip
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-2a Revision No. 28 circuit disabled while in monitoring mode. The relays are set to operate at 2% voltage unbalance with a time delay of 4.53 +/- 0.47 seconds.
8.3.1.1.3 120 Volt AC System The safety-related 120 volt instrument system configuration is shown in Figure 8.3.1-5.
Instrument buses 1, 2, 3 and 4 each have a normal and an alternate power supply controlled by a break-before-make transfer switch. Instrument bus 2 is fed from inverter "A" and instrument bus 3 is fed from inverter "B". Instrument buses 1 and 4 are normally fed from 480 volt MCC-5 and MCC-6 respectively, via their constant voltage transformers. The alternate power supply for instrument buses 1, 2, 3, and 4 is 208/120 volt MCC-8. Instrument buses 6, 7, (panels 7A and 7B), 8, and 9 (panels 9A and 9B) are fed from instrument buses 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively, via breakers. Instrument Channel 1 is fed from instrument buses 1 and 6, Channel 2 from instrument buses 2 and 7, Channel 3 from instrument buses 3 and 8, and Channel 4 from instrument buses 4 and 9. This arrangement is shown in Table 8.3.1-2.
8.3.1.1.4 Evaluation of Layout and Load Distribution The physical location of electrical distribution system equipment is such as to minimize vulnerability of vital circuits to physical damage.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-3 Revision No. 28 The startup transformers, the unit auxiliary transformer, and the main transformers are located outdoors and are physically separated from each other. Lightning arresters are used where applicable for lightning protection.
The 4160 volt switchgear and 480 volt load centers are located in areas which minimize their exposure to mechanical, fire, and water damage. The 480 volt switchgear and motor control centers serving ESF circuits are located in Class I structures. Safety-related 480 V switchgear and 480 V motor control centers are coordinated electrically to minimize the impact on the electrical distribution system and its loads due to faults.
The 480 volt motor control centers are located in the areas of electrical load concentration.
Those associated with the Turbine Generator Auxiliary System in general are located below the turbine generator operating floor level. Those associated with the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) are located in the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB).
Nonsegregated, metal enclosed 4160 volt bus and cable bus are used for all major bus runs requiring high current. The routing of these buses are such as to minimize their exposure to mechanical, fire and water damage.
The dedicated shutdown system has a separate 480 V AC bus located in the 4.16 kV nonsafety related switchgear area. This system is segregated from all other electrical systems by physical barriers, including separate conduit for DC supply.
The application of routing of control, instrumentation and power cables are such as to minimize their vulnerability to damage from any source. Cables are designed using conservative margins with respect to their current carrying capacities, insulation properties, and mechanical construction. Insulation and jacket materials selected shall be suitable for maximum conductor temperature, the service conditions of the intended installation (i.e. wet and dry locations), and the voltage class of the cabling. Cables are selected for maximum resistance to radiation, heat, humidity, and fire propagation. Appropriate instrumentation cables are shielded to minimize induced voltage and magnetic interference. Wire and cables related to ESF and Reactor Protection Systems (RPS) are routed and installed to maintain the integrity of their respective redundant channels and protect them from physical damage. Separate cable trays are installed for each redundant circuit group. Cables of redundant circuits are routed through separate containment electrical penetration assemblies. Separation criteria is discussed further in Sections 7.2, 7.3, and 8.3.1.3.
8.3.1.1.5 Emergency Power Sources 8.3.1.1.5.1 Description of Sources The first sources of offsite emergency power are the 115kV and 230kV startup transformers.
As described above, these transformers have multiple sources of supply from the lines connecting to the 115 kV grid and two ties to the 230 kV grid as shown in Figure 8.1.2-1. Either transformer is fully capable of supporting all required emergency power loads.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-4 Revision No. 28 The second method to obtain off-site power is by backfeeding the safety-related busses through the main and unit auxiliary transformer. This will only be done during cold shutdown unless nuclear safety considerations require it to be done during hot shutdown when no other power sources are available.
Onsite emergency power is available from two emergency diesel generator sets. Each diesel generator set consists of a Fairbanks-Morse Model 38TD8-1/8 engine coupled to a Fairbanks-Morse generator. Diesel generator design data are shown in Table 8.3.1-3.
As a backup to the normal standby AC power supply, each diesel generator is capable of sequentially starting and supplying power to its' respective safety feature equipment as required for accident mitigation. A third source of power is the 2450 kW dedicated shutdown system diesel. Due to a bus limitation of 3000 amps between the stepdown transformer and the 480 VAC DS bus, only 2000 kW can be supplied by this system. It has controls and instrumentation similar to the emergency diesels.
The dedicated shutdown system diesel generator serves as the AC power source for plant shutdown loads under both the post-fire (10CFR50.48(c), NFPA 805) and Station Blackout (10CFR50.63) scenarios.
The emergency diesels are automatically started by injecting compressed air into the cylinders.
Each engine has compressed air storage sufficient for 8 cold diesel engine starts. However, the diesel engine will only consume enough air for one of these eight cold starts upon receiving an automatic start signal. These cold diesel engine starts are composed of one 10 second overcrank "fail to start" followed by 7 successful starts. This is due to the engine control system which is designed to stop cranking within 10 sec. Failure of the engine to start within the timing period of the overcrank time (10 sec) indicates a malfunction. Shutdown conserves the starting air supply so that the engine can be subsequently started after the malfunction is corrected.
Further cranking must be initiated manually.
To some extent, the starting air subsystems and applicable portions of the service water and fuel oil systems are arranged so that manual transfer between the units is possible. The emergency units are capable of being started and reaching rated speed and voltage within 10 sec. The EDGs have a specified capability to start 900 HP of motor load within a single load block. The EDGs also have a specified capability to pick up full rated load within 45 seconds after receiving a start signal. To ensure rapid start, each unit is equipped with heaters and pumps for circulation of lube oil and jacket water when the unit is not running. The units are located in heated rooms.
EC 59037 installed the D Deepwell pump to provide an alternate source of cooling water to the Service Water System. Piping from this pump is connected to heat exchangers of the A and B EDGs and can supply cooling water on a loss of the Service Water System. Power to this pump is supplied from MCC-16, MCC-18, or MCC-11 via manual transfer switches. Switching is arranged so that either EDG can power this pump and such that electrical separation is maintained.
The diesel generators have trip defeat circuitry in place which prevents any signals but those listed below from shutting down the diesels. This circuit is keyswitch operated and is alarmed in the Control Room when the switch is in the "Trips In Service" position. The "Trips In Service" position allows testing the diesels without endangering them if a valid trip signal is received.
When the Trips Defeat Switch is in the "Trips In Service" position, the following will shutdown a running diesel engine:
- 1.
High Crankcase Pressure
- 2.
High Jacket Water Temperature
- 3.
Low Jacket Water Pressure
- 4.
Low Lube Oil Pressure
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-5 Revision No. 24 The conditions which can shut down a running diesel generator are:
- 1.
Remote start/stop switch on the Generator Control Panel,
- 2.
Remote start/stop switch on the RTGB,
- 3.
Local stop push button on the Engine Control Panel,
- 4.
Local manual trip push button for the engine fuel rack,
- 5.
Mechanical overspeed, which trips the engine fuel rack, and
- 6.
Initiation of CO2 fire suppression system in the specific diesel generator room stops the appropriate fuel oil pump supplying the diesel fuel day tank. Eventually, if condition is not corrected, the EDG will trip due to a lack of fuel oil.
The conditions which can prevent the diesel generator from starting on a valid automatic start signal are:
- 1.
Overcranking (applicable when Local/Remote Switch is in the "Remote" position),
- 2.
Engine fuel rack tripped, and
- 3.
Local/Remote Switch in Local position.
These conditions are alarmed in the Control Room on an annunciator panel.
If the EDG is running and carrying the load, loss of 125 VDC control power to the field flash circuit will cause a loss of generator output voltage and the EDG output circuit breaker will trip.
The loss of EDG field flash power will be alarmed in the control room and locally.
An audible and visual alarm system is located in the Control Room and will alarm abnormal conditions of the EDG and its support systems. Trips, alarms and setpoints for the diesel generators are shown in Table 8.3.1-4. A shutdown of the diesel generator is indicated in the Control Room by an audible and visual alarm on the control board.
Low lube oil pressure, when the Trips Defeat Switch is in the "Trips In Service" position, will shut down the diesel generator since the engine will sustain damage without proper lubrication.
Shutdown permits corrective action to be taken before the engine is damaged, and the diesel generator can then be returned to normal operation. The diesel generator can be started without service water flow and run until the service water pumps are started.
The emergency diesel units use No. 2 fuel oil as specified by the diesel manufacturer. A 275 gallon day tank is located at each of the units. The level in the day tanks is maintained by two electric motor driven transfer pumps taking suction on the 25,000 gallon storage tank. A minimum of 34,000 gallons of fuel oil is maintained on site. This is sufficient to operate one diesel at full load for seven days.
EDG lube oil crankcase capacity is 250 gallons by design. Per the OEM, estimated engine lube oil consumption rate is 1.0 gallon per hour operating at full load. One EDG will consume approximately 168 gallons of lube oil over a 7 day operating period. A minimum of 168 gallons of diesel lube oil will be maintained on site. This is sufficient to operate one diesel at full load for seven days.
Additional supplies of diesel oil are available in the Hartsville area and from port terminals at Charleston, S.C. and Wilmington, N.C., and from inland terminals at Columbia, S.C, Charlotte, N.C., Greensboro, N.C., Fayetteville, NC and Raleigh, N.C. Ample trucking facilities exist to assure
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-6 Revision No. 20 deliveries to the site within eight hours. Diesel fuel is also available from Alternate Fuel Oil Storage Tanks (approximately 4490 gallons total capacity) and from the internal combustion turbine diesel fuel oil storage tanks (approximately 95,000 gallon total capacity) located at the site.
Connections are provided for fuel oil transfer to the Unit 2 diesel fuel oil storage tank and EDG day tanks.
8.3.1.1.5.2 Diesel generator separation The Fairbanks-Morse diesel generator units are each housed in separate rooms in the Reactor Auxiliary Building.
A control panel is located in each diesel generator room which contains relays and metering equipment for its respective diesel generator.
Fire protection for the safety-related diesel generator rooms consists of an automatic CO2 system with separate detectors in each diesel room so that the room containing a fire will be the only one blanketed. Hose stations are available adjacent to the diesel generator rooms.
Portable fire extinguishers are located in each room and in the hallway adjacent to the rooms.
The room ventilation system is interlocked so that ventilation supply and exhaust fans will be de-energized in the affected room on a CO2 system actuation. Also, the diesel room dampers are closed on a fire detector initiation. Initiation of the CO2 system also shuts down the fuel supply system to the affected diesel day tank without affecting the other diesel. Indication of system actuation is available in the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) at fire detection actuation panels A1 and B1 and in the Control Room at the fire alarm console.
The diesel generators have separate fuel supply lines, one for each diesel. These lines do not pass through the opposite diesel generator room.
The diesel generator room floor drains are isolated from each other.
The dedicated shutdown diesel generator is housed in an outdoor weatherproof skid mounted enclosure. The dedicated shutdown diesel generator is located next to the HBR 2 Turbine Building as shown in Figure 1.2.2-1.
The enclosure meets the Station Blackout (10CFR50.63) environmental requirements for severe weather conditions.
8.3.1.1.5.3 Loading description Each of the emergency diesel generator units is started by any of the following events:
- 1.
Initiation of safety injection (SI)
- 2.
Undervoltage on its 480 volt bus, and
- 3.
Manual start.
For example, upon undervoltage on 480 volt emergency bus E1, diesel generator A is started.
The automatic sequence upon undervoltage (without a concurrent SI) on an emergency bus is as follows:
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-6a Revision No. 16
- 1.
All motor feeder breakers, the main supply and the tie breakers which are on the affected bus are tripped, except MCC-5 and 16
- 2.
The diesel generator is started
- 3.
After the unit comes up to voltage, the emergency generator breaker is automatically closed and the electrically driven auxiliary feedwater, service water, and component cooling pumps connected to that bus automatically start
- 4.
Other auxiliaries are manually started as required for safe plant operation.
The maximum magnitude of loads for the diesel generators is given in Table 8.3.1-1.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-7 Revision No. 18 If there is a requirement for ESF operation coincident with undervoltage on the 480 volt bus, the ESF equipment is sequentially started as shown in Table 8.3.1-5.
Motor control centers are energized upon closing of the generator breaker and injection valves are opened.
Should any of the feeder breakers associated with the safety features components or the 480 volt bus tie breaker trip due to overload, the trip is indicated in the Control Room. The breakers can be manually reclosed from the Control Room. Overload trip elements on the reversing starters associated with the various motor-operated valves can be reset at the motor control centers.
8.3.1.1.5.4 Test and Inspection Capabilities The diesel generators are tested to assure that they will provide power for operation of equipment. These tests also assure that the emergency system controls and the control systems for safety features equipment will function automatically in the event of a loss of all normal 480 V AC station service power. The starting of the diesel generator sets can be tested from their respective rooms.
The testing frequency is often enough to identify and correct any mechanical or electrical deficiency before it can result in a system failure. The fuel supply and starting circuits and controls are continuously monitored and faults are alarm indicated. An abnormal condition in these systems would be signaled without having to place the diesel generators themselves on test.
To verify that the emergency power system will respond properly within the required time limit, surveillance testing is conducted as required by the Technical Specifications. In addition, each diesel generator shall be inspected at least once every 24 months.
8.3.1.2 Analysis The plant was built before the inception of the various Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) standards, Regulatory Guides, and other criteria now in place. The system was however compared to General Design Criteria 2 and 39, as discussed in Section 3.1.
8.3.1.2.1 Studies Several studies of plant electrical system adequacy have been done.
A study of degraded grid voltage effects on the plant is given in Reference 8.3.1-1 and 8.3.1-2.
The degraded grid voltage studies demonstrated that expected plant grid voltages were acceptable for expected running safety loads to operate within voltage tolerances. Additionally, the degraded grid voltage requirements required the installation of a second level of voltage protection for undervoltage. This protection was installed on the 480 V AC E1
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-8 Revision No. 28 and E2 emergency buses. This protection occurs when voltage decreases to 89.6 percent of 480 V AC for greater than or equal to 10 seconds. Activation of this protection results in the affected emergency bus being separated from its off-site supply and loaded onto its emergency diesel generator. The protection circuitry also prevents load shedding when the emergency bus is already being supplied by its emergency diesel generator. The design bases for this added undervoltage protection is provided in Reference 8.3.1-3 and Reference 8.3.1-9.
Additional studies are conducted as plant and/or grid conditions change to ensure that grid voltages remain acceptable for expected running safety loads to operate within voltage tolerances.
A study of equipment needed to safely shut down the plant in the event of a fire (10CFR50.48(c), NFPA 805) in any area was a part of the safe shutdown component/cable separation analysis (Reference 8.3.1-4). A description of this analysis is provided in the NSCA.
The dedicated shutdown diesel generator (and associated 480v DS switchgear, bus duct, transformer, and appurtenances) also supports all AC loads that are required to operate during the Station Blackout (10CFR50.63) event.
8.3.1.2.2 Reliability assurance The electrical system equipment is arranged so that no single active failure can inactivate enough safety features equipment to jeopardize the plant safety. The 480 volt equipment is arranged on 9 buses. The 4160 volt equipment is supplied from 10 buses.
Multiple outside sources of power are available to the plant. Normal operations utilize both outside and unit-generated power. Separation of these sources is maintained to 4160 volt systems. See Figure 8.1.2-1.
The plant auxiliary equipment is arranged electrically so that redundant items receive their power from the two different sources. An alternate feed to service water pump D and MCC 5, and a primary feed to component cooling pump A and charging pump A are all supplied from the 480 volt dedicated shutdown bus. Redundant valves are supplied from motor control centers connected to buses E1 and E2.
Refer to Table 8.3.1-5 for the engineered safety features automatic actuation sequence and times after the initiation signal for the cases when the normal power source is available and when only the diesel power source is available.
The components of the sequencing circuits are control relays, digital timers, and interposing relays. These relays are standard devices universally
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-9 Revision No. 20 used in control circuits. One control relay or open timing relay is used to close each circuit breaker feeding 480 volt, 3 phase power to the safety features components. The control power for the digital timers is supplied from the station batteries. Battery A supplies the sequencing circuit for safety features actuation train A; battery B for train B. The control power for the interposing relays is supplied from station battery backed instrument busses. Instrument Bus 7A supplies sequencing circuits for train A, Instrument Bus 3 supplies the sequencing circuits for train B. The sequencing circuits for the two safety features actuation trains are located in separate safety features actuation relay racks in the relay room.
When there is voltage on the associated 480 volt emergency buses (see Figure 8.3.1-3) operation of the master SI relay initiates the safety features sequencing circuit by energizing auxiliary control and timing relays. These timing relays actuate the starting sequence as shown in Table 8.3.1-5.
The sequencing relays all begin timing upon operation of the master SI relay. Each relay times out independently. Therefore if a timing relay fails to operate, the circuit breaker operated by that relay will not close and the associated component does not start. However, the sequence is not interrupted and the remaining components will be started.
If the sequence has started and 480 volt power on the emergency buses is interrupted, the circuit breakers will be tripped and the sequencing relays will be de-energized by contacts of the 480 volt bus undervoltage relays. The timing relays reset instantaneously. When 480 volt power is restored, the 480 volt bus undervoltage relays energize the sequencing circuit and the sequence is repeated from the beginning. The 480 volt undervoltage trip is bypassed when the emergency diesel generator output breaker is closed to prevent an undervoltage trip due to diesel voltage sags.
The "B" SI pump will be aligned to start on one of the emergency buses only to replace the "A" or "C" SI pump when they are out of service. Alignment to the E1 or E2 bus will be accomplished by racking out one SI pump breaker and racking in the appropriate E1-E2 bus tie breaker. Under normal conditions, both tie breakers will be racked out and the "B" SI pump will stand by as a maintenance pump only.
Each diesel generator has the capacity to start and supply power to its' respective safety feature equipment as required for accident mitigation.
A third diesel generator for loads required for safe shutdown is installed in a separate outdoor enclosure. This unit supplies redundant power to the dedicated shutdown system loads (Figure 8.3.1-4) and ensures that the plant may be brought to safe and stable hot shutdown conditions, and ultimately, to cold shutdown conditions, in the event of a catastrophic fire (Reference 8.3.1-4).
In addition, the unit also supplies power for seven hours to the dedicated shutdown loads required for coping during the eight-hour Station Blackout (10 CFR 50.63) event. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.155, the alternate AC power source is to be started and connected to its bus within one hour following a loss of all AC power.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-10 Amendment No. 10 8.3.1.3 Independence of Redundant Systems Control cables are separated into two basic channels as required for redundant circuits. These groups of cables are set up for systems of above 65 volts and less than 600 volts and include multiconductor control cable or other cable as required. Cables assigned to these two channels for separation will be in their respective channels, and so designated from the beginning of the cable to the final termination. These cables include the following:
a)
Motor Operated Valves - Two channels for the redundant valves b)
Solenoid Valves - Two channels where required for redundant valves and safety features. Otherwise not separated c)
Detector Drives are run in any channel as convenient d)
Motor Controls except for safety features are run in any channel as convenient e)
Small power cables are run in any channel as convenient f)
Safety Features Control cables are run in two channels as required, and g)
Safety Features Power Cables are separated into sufficient channels to provide for minimum functions. For example, three channels are provided for SI pumps.
The physical channeling is accomplished by either separate trays or trays with metal barriers and in some cases by separate conduit. In general, redundant circuits are separated horizontally rather than vertically. Where physical conditions prevented this, horizontal barriers separate power trays from instrument trays.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-11 Revision No. 25 Table 8.3.1-1 Emergency Diesel Generator Loading
- a. LOCA with E-bus Undervoltage for Diesel Generator A (Note 3)
Load Description kW Loading for Each Load Block (Note 2, 4, 5)
Load Block 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Time 0
5 15 20 25 30 35 39.5 Seconds 1
3 31 61 91 100 102 107 121 131 133 134 151 181 211 241 271 301 331 Minutes 6
Hours 480V Bus E1 115 420 571 907 1139 1338 1536 1817 2246 2499 2406 2499 2406 2406 2143 2131 2224 1739 1891 2322 2229 2322 2229 2322 2229 2322 2229 2229 480V MCC-5 94 94 94 94 94 93 93 93 93 201 201 201 201 201 202 189 189 189 189 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 480V MCC-16 21 21 21 125 125 125 125 125 125 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 208V MCC-10 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 EDG-A Loading kW 115 420 571 907 1139 1338 1536 1817 2246 2499 2406 2499 2406 2406 2143 2131 2224 1739 1891 2322 2229 2322 2229 2322 2229 2322 2229 2229 EDG Rating (Note 1) 2750 kW (2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> rating) 2500 kW Continuous
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-12 Revision No. 25 Table 8.3.1-1 (continued)
Emergency Diesel Generator Loading
- b. LOCA with E-bus Undervoltage for Diesel Generator B (Note 3)
Load Description kW Loading for Each Load Block (Note 2, 4, 5)
Load Block 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Time 0
5 15 20 25 30 35 39.5 Seconds 1
3 31 61 91 100 102 107 121 131 133 134 151 181 211 241 271 301 331 Minutes 6
Hours 480V Bus E2 134 439 590 928 1162 1361 1561 1843 2273 2539 2445 2539 2445 2445 2180 2167 2261 1772 1925 2360 2266 2360 2266 2360 2266 2360 2266 2266 480V MCC-6 114 114 114 114 114 113 113 113 113 230 230 230 230 230 231 218 218 219 219 230 231 230 231 230 231 230 231 231 480V MCC-18 19 19 19 123 123 123 123 123 123 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 208V MCC-9 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 EDG-B Loading kW 134 439 590 928 1162 1361 1561 1843 2273 2539 2445 2539 2445 2445 2180 2167 2261 1772 1925 2360 2266 2360 2266 2360 2266 2360 2266 2266 EDG Rating (Note 1) 2750 kW (2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> rating) 2500 kW Continuous
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-13 Revision No. 28 Table 8.3.1-1 (continued)
Emergency Diesel Generator Loading Notes to Table 8.3.1-1 Abbreviations:
kW kilowatts hr hours min minutes sec seconds
- 1. The EDG ratings are per Table 8.3.1-3.
- 2. Emergency Diesel Generator A and B loading in kW (kilowatts) is shown in Table 8.3.1-1, Sections a) and b), respectively. The basis for the loading data presented in this table is Calculation RNP-E-8.016. The loading shown includes system losses due to cables, transformers, etc. which are accounted for automatically by the software computer code.
- 3. Per RNP-E-8.016, Small Break LOCA loading envelops Large Break LOCA considerations. Therefore, Small Break LOCA loading is shown in Table 8.3.1-1, Sections a) and b). LOCA with E-Bus undervoltage assumes that a Safety Injection (SI) signal is received coincident with the Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP) and the failure of the opposite train EDG. Times shown are after closure of the EDG breaker (assumes 10 seconds from SI signal until closure of the EDG breaker - refer to Table 8.3.1-5).
- 4. A listing of larger sequenced on loads is shown in Table 8.3.1-5. Also see Note 5 below. The total loading shown in Table 8.3.1-1, Sections a) and b), for each individual load block is the summation of continuous load for running motors and static loads and assumes all motors have completed acceleration (i.e., the kW shown would be the final steady-state kW if the sequencer stopped at the end of the load block).
- 5. It is recognized that there may be outstanding change documents posted in the Controlled Document Management System against RNP-E-8.016. Some of the loading changes reflected in these documents (ECs, etc.) may actually be installed in the plant while others are pending. See calculation RNP-E-8.016 and associated computer runs for more detail.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-14 Revision No. 20 UPDATED FSAR TABLE 8.3.1-2 INSTRUMENT CHANNELS POWER SOURCES INSTRUMENT CHANNELS 1
2 3
4 SUPPLIED BY INSTRUMENT BUSES 1 and 61 2 and 71 3 and 81 4 and 91 Normal Feeder Source MCC-52,3 A Battery B Battery MCC-63 Normal Feeder Voltage 480V AC 125V DC 125V DC 480V AC Transforming Device Transformer A Inverter B Inverter Transformer Output Voltage 120V AC 120V AC 120V AC 120V AC Back-up Feeder Source MCC-8 MCC-8 MCC-8 MCC-8 Back-up Feeder Voltage 120V AC 120V AC 120V AC 120V AC Method of Swap-over Manually Manually Manually Manually Interlocked Interlocked Interlocked Interlocked at the at the at the at the Transfer Transfer Transfer Transfer Switch Switch Switch Switch 1 Instrument Buses 6,7A and 7B,8, and 9A and 9B are fed from Instrument Buses 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
2 MCC-5 has an alternate feed from the Dedicated Shutdown Bus.
3 Reference UFSAR Figure 8.3.1-5.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-15 Revision No. 20 TABLE 8.3.1-3 EMERGENCY GENERATOR DESIGN DATA Rated Load Capacity, Continuous 2500 kW Rated Overload Capacity, 2 hr in any 24 hr period 2750 kW Generator Rated Output 3125 KVA at 0.8 PF Rated Speed 900 rpm Frequency 60 Hz 3 phase Voltage 480 volts
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-16 Revision No. 22 TABLE 8.3.1-4 DIESEL GENERATOR TRIPS AND ALARMS TRIP FUNCTION SETPOINT High Jacket Water Temperature, ºF 205 (increasing)
Low Lube Oil Pressure, psig 18 (decreasing)
Generator Control Panel Trip Manual Starting Failure, sec 10 High Crankcase Pressure, in. H2O
+0.5 (increasing)
Low Jacket Water Pressure, psig 9 (decreasing)
Generator Overcurrent, amp (Breaker only)
Variable Mechanical Overspeed, rpm 1,053 Max.
RTGB Trip Manual 125 VDC Field Flash Power Lost (Breaker only)
N/A ALARM FUNCTION*
SETPOINT
- 1. Diesel Trouble Start Failure 10 sec Crankcase Pressure High 0.5 in. H2O (increasing)
Lube Oil Pressure Low 18 psig (decreasing)
Day Tank Level High 3 in. from top (increasing)
Service Water Pressure Low 8 psig (decreasing)
Jacket Water Pressure Low 9 psig (decreasing)
Expansion Tank Low Level 4 in. from bottom (decreasing)
Trips Defeat Switch in "Trips In Service" (N/A)
Position
Lube Oil Temperature Low 130ºF (decreasing)
- 3. Diesel Coolant Temperature Coolant Temperature Low 105ºF (decreasing)
Coolant Temperature High 195ºF (increasing)
- 4. Diesel Start Air Pressure Low 216 psig (decreasing)
- 5. Diesel Control Power Lost/Diesel Disabled 125 VDC Control Power Lost to Engine NA Fuel Rack Manually Tripped or by Overspeed NA Local/Remote Switch in Local Manual
- Alarm at local panel and RTGB except as noted. Each diesel has the set of alarms.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-17 Revision No. 20 TABLE 8.3.1-4 (Continued)
ALARM FUNCTION SETPOINT
- 6. Diesel Day Tank Level Day Tank Level Low 12 in. from bottom (decreasing)
- 7. Emergency Generator Ground (RTGB only)
NA
NA
NA 10.Diesel Oil Storage Tank Level Lo (RTGB only) 85% of 25,000 gal 11.Diesel Room Cooling Fan OL/Temp. Hi (RTGB only) 110ºF
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-18 Revision No. 20 TABLE 8.3.1-5 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SEQUENCE ACTION TRAIN A (TRAIN B)
TIME IN SECONDS With offsite power:
0 Starting signal will be given to Emergency Diesel Generator A (B) 0 Reactor trip and feedwater isolation will occur 0
Safeguard sequence will be actuated (see note)
Note:
With offsite power available the sequence will follow that given in the Diesel Generator Loading tabulation shown below. In this case 10 seconds should be subtracted from the times given in the tabulation starting with "Safeguards Buses Energized."
Without offsite power the automatic sequence will proceed as follows:
0 All loads will be tripped off bus E1 (E2) with the exception of Motor Control Center No. 5 (6) and 16 (18).
10 Emergency Diesel Generator A (B) will have started and reached no load speed and voltage at which time the breaker connecting it to bus E1 (E2) will close.
10-49.5 The sequence will follow that given in the Diesel Generator Loading Tabulation.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.1-19 Revision No. 20 TABLE 8.3.1-5 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SEQUENCE DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING BUS E1 - TRAIN A BUS E2 - TRAIN B TIME IN SEC (EDG A)
TIME IN SEC (EDG B) 0 Safety Injection Signal 0
Safety Injection Signal 10 Safeguards Bus E1 Energized 10 Safeguards Bus E2 Energized 15 Safety Injection Pump A Running 15 Safety Injection Pump C Running 15 Safety Injection Pump B Running 15 (When Safety Injection Pump C is out (When Safety Injection Pump A is of service, Safety Injection Pump B out of service, Safety Injection is aligned to run with Train B.)
Pump B is aligned to run with Train A.)
25 Residual Heat Pump A Running 25 Residual Heat Pump B Running 30 Service Water Pump A Running 30 Service Water Pump C Running 30 Service Water Booster Pump A Running 30 Service Water Booster Pump B Running 35 Service Water Pump B Running 35 Service Water Pump D Running 40 Containment Fan HVH-1 Running*
40 Containment Fan HVH-3 Running*
45 Containment Fan HVH-2 Running*
45 Containment Fan HVH-4 Running*
49.5 Aux. Feedwater Pump A Running 49.5 Aux. Feedwater Pump B Running Containment Spray Pump A Running Containment Spray Pump B Running
- The inlet louvers are actuated to the safeguards position by the safety injection sequence signal.
- Start immediately upon receipt of an SI signal and a high containment pressure, if the respective emergency bus is energized.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.2-1 Revision No. 28 8.3.2 DC Power System (125 Volt)
As shown in Figure 8.3.1-5, the DC power system consists of seven 125 V batteries, each with its' own battery charger(s) and DC buses. Two of the batteries are safety-related. The battery chargers supply the normal DC loads as well as maintaining proper charges on the batteries.
Each charger has the capacity to supply all normal DC loads and maintain the battery fully charged. For each safety-related station battery, there are two safety-related battery chargers.
One battery charger supplies the normal DC loads while the other is providing 100% back-up capability. Battery chargers may be temporarily operated in parallel on the DC power system during the period of time necessary to swap the in-service charger. The DC power system is shown in Figure 8.3.1-5.
Each of the two safety-related station batteries is sized to carry its expected shutdown loads following a plant trip and a loss of all AC power for a period of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> without battery terminal voltage falling below minimum allowable voltage. Shutdown loads with their approximate operating times on each safety-related battery are listed in Table 8.3.2-1.
Each of the four safety-related battery chargers have been sized to charge it's partially discharged battery within 24 hr while carrying its normal load.
Cells in the "A" battery are type NCN-15 with a capacity of 1070 ampere hours (based on an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> discharge to 1.75 volts/cell). The "A" bank is composed of 60 cells of the lead calcium type. Cells in the "B" battery are type KCR-11 with a capacity of 410 ampere hours (based on an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> discharge to 1.75 volts/cell). It is composed of 60 cells of the lead calcium type. The battery capacities are 525 A-Hr and 204 A-Hr for the NCN-15 and KCR-11 batteries respectively for a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> discharge to 1.75 volts/cell. The actual designed final discharge voltage following an emergency discharge will be based on required equipment voltages.
The safety-related batteries and equipment are separated physically in the plant. The existing configuration provides adequate separation with equipment for one division on the north side of the battery room and the other division on the south side. The fire hazards analysis for the battery room is contained in the Fire Safety Analysis (FSA) calculation.
The "C" battery (non-safety related) is located on the auxiliary building roof above the battery room. Cells in the "C" battery are rated at 1800 ampere hours minimum (based on an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> discharge to 1.75 volts/cell). The "C" bank is composed of 60 cells of the lead calcium type.
The following non-safety related loads are supplied by the "C" battery:
- 1.
Turbine emergency bearing oil pump (50 HP)
- 2.
Air side seal oil backup pump (10 HP)
- 3.
Main Transformer Alarm and Monitoring Circuits
- 4.
Auxiliary Transformer Alarm and Monitoring Circuits The Dedicated Shutdown (DS) Battery (Augmented Q) is located in the 4kV Switchgear Room.
The DS Battery consists of 97 nickel cadmium type cells with a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> duty cycle. The DS Battery has a minimum discharge voltage rating of 105 Volts DC.
The Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator (DSDG) Battery (Augmented Q) is located in an enclosed panel next to the DSDG Building. The DSDG Battery consists of 92 nickel cadmium type cells with a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> duty cycle. The DS Battery has a minimum discharge voltage rating of 105 Volts DC (based on 1.14 volts/cell as final voltage).
The STATION-D and STATION-E batteries are located in Building 469 on the first floor. Cells in these batteries are rated at 1600 ampere hours (based on an 8-hour discharge to 1.83 volts/cell. Each bank is composed of 60 cells. These batteries have a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> duty cycle and a minimum discharge voltage of 110V. STATION-D and STATION-E provide power to the UPS powered AC loads of PP-92 and PP-93 and DC loads of DP-D and DP-E.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.2-2 Revision No. 26 TABLE 8.3.2-1 MAJOR BATTERY LOADS AND APPROXIMATE OPERATING TIMES BATTERY A MAJOR LOAD OPERATING TIME (hr)
Inverter A 1
Control and Indication 1
Reactor Protection Relay Logic 1
Engineered Safeguards Relay Logic 1
Diesel Generator "A" Control 1
4160/480 Volt Switchgear Breaker Control Less than 1 minute Diesel Generator A Control and Field Flashing Less than 1 minute BATTERY B Inverter B 1
Control and Indication 1
Reactor Protection Relay Logic 1
Engineered Safeguards Relay Logic 1
Diesel Generator "B" Control 1
4160/480 Volt Switchgear Breaker Control Less than 1 minute Diesel Generator B Control and Field Flashing Less than 1 minute
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.3-1 Revision No. 28 8.3.3 FIRE PROTECTION FOR CABLE SYSTEMS Cable loading of trays and, consequently, heat dissipation of cable throughout the plant have been carefully studied and controlled to ensure no overloading. The criteria for electrical loading were developed using Insulated Power Cable Engineers Association (IPCEA) Standard P 426, Manufacturer Recommendations and Good Engineering Practice. Subsequent to RNP construction, criteria for electrical loading were also developed using IPCEA P-54-440, Ampacities for Cables in Open-Top Cable Trays, for future cable trays and all cable trays in which all cables were sized in accordance to RNP-E-5.001 (Reference 8.3.3-8 and 8.3.3-9).
Derating factors for cables in trays without maintained spacing were taken from Table VIII of the IPCEA P-46-426 publication. Derating factors for the maximum ambient temperature existing in any area of the plant were also taken from the applicable IPCEA publication. These factors were applied against ampacities selected from appropriate tables in other portions of the applicable standard.
For physical loading of trays, the following criteria were followed: 4 kV power, one horizontal row of cables was allowed in a tray; 480 volt power, 30 percent of the usable cross-sectional area of tray is filled; control and instrumentation, 70 percent of the usable cross-sectional area of the tray is filled. This was exceeded in 6 cases which have been analyzed and found to be satisfactory (Reference 8.3.3-1).
In general, for instrumentation cables, four basic channels are routed through the plant. These channels include cables for systems 65 volts and less. Cables assigned to these four channels will remain in their respective channels throughout the run.
Certain other cables are run in with the four instrument channels; such as, thermocouple cable, public address system cabling and instrument power supplies.
To assure that only fire retardant cables are used throughout the plant, a careful study of cable insulation systems was previously undertaken.
Insulation systems that appeared to have superior flame retardant capability were selected.
Prior to the selection of original cabling to be used in the plant, an extensive flame testing program took place which included ASTM vertical flame testing and bonfire tests. Cables were specified on the basis of results from these tests.
IEEE-383 testing was not applicable at the time of these tests. Engineered safeguards cable-trays containing cable with PVC jackets which do not meet the IEEE-383 flame test requirements are covered with a flame retardant coating.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.3-2 Revision No. 28 In areas where missile protection could not be provided, such as near the reactor coolant system (RCS), redundant instrument impulse lines and cables were run by separate routes.
These lines were kept as far apart as physically possible, or were protected by heavy (1/4 in.)
metal plates interposed where inherent missile protection could not be provided by spacing.
Cable trays are entirely of metal construction and present no combustible hazard. Safety-related cable trays outside the cable spread room have been evaluated for fire protection provisions.
Since safety-related cable runs in the Auxiliary Building do not satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75 and consist primarily of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) jacketed cables, consistent with the requirements of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A, Section D.3, a flame-retardant coating was applied to cables in trays containing engineered safeguards cable. In addition, automatic water sprinklers were installed to protect safety-related cables in the hallway of the Auxiliary Building ground floor near the station air compressors. Critical equipment potentially subject to water damage from sprinkler system discharge has been identified, the effects of sprinkler discharge have been assessed, and water spray protection measures have been implemented where appropriate. This area and other areas have manual hose stations and portable fire extinguishers available for additional protection.
The cabling inside containment installed during original plant construction has silicone rubber jacket material, which has fire-resistant properties which are superior to those of the PVC cable.
A cable tray fire would be a rather slowly propagating fire (1-2 in./min) even without flame retardant coating, so use of a coating and automatic detection would provide adequate protection unless there is a significant exposure fire hazard.
Cable and cable tray penetration of fire barriers have been sealed to provide a fire-rated seal commensurate with the required rating of the affected fire barriers. The penetration seal designs have been qualified for the required fire ratings in accordance with the provisions of ASTM E-119.
The need for derating of cable as a result of the application of the flame retardant coating has been investigated and is not necessary due to inherent ampacity safety margins.
The necessity of fire breaks in cable runs has been considered throughout the plant.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3.3-3 Amendment No. 10 The necessity of fire breaks in cable runs has been considered throughout the plant. Cable trays for electrical distribution have fire barriers of glass wool packed around the trays on approximately 10 ft. spacing in vertical runs.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3R-1 Revision No. 28
REFERENCES:
SECTION 8.3 8.3.1-1 Calculation RNP-E-8.002, "AC Auxiliary Electrical Distribution System Voltage/Load Flow/Fault Current Study".
8.3.1-2 Calculation RNP-E-8.016, "Emergency Diesel Generator Static and Dynamic Analysis".
8.3.1-3 "System Design Basis for Degraded Grid Voltage and Emergency Power System Modification," (taken from Letter, GD-79-222, dated January 24, 1979, to NRC from CP&L).
8.3.1-4 NFPA 805, 2001 Ed., Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants.
8.3.1-5 10CFR50.63, Loss of All Alternating Current Power; June 21, 1988.
8.3.1-6 Regulatory Guide 1.155, Station Blackout; August 1988.
8.3.1-7 Engineering Evaluation EE107-CS-39 (Rev. 1) for Emergency Diesel Generator Static and Dynamic Analysis Calculation RNP-E-8.016, Rev. 4 Comment Resolution.
8.3.1-8 RNP-I/INST-1010, "Emergency Bus-Degraded Grid Voltage Relay".
8.3.1-9 Modification 1065, Degraded Grid Voltage Relay Setpoint Change.
8.3.1-10 Calculation RNP-E-2.009, "Overcurrent Protection Emergency Bus E1 and E2 -
Emergency Supply".
8.3.1-11 Calculation RNP-E-4.003, "Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage Controlled Overcurrent Relay".
8.3.1-12 Calculation 82226/03-M-04-F, "Unit 1 Fuel Oil Storage Capacity Available to DFOST for Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Consumption Calculation - HBR Unit 2".
8.3.1-13 Calculation 87-17, "DG Air Start System".
8.3.2-1 Response to NRC Inspection Report No. 50-261/87-06, dated July 10, 1987, Serial No. NLS-87-145 to NRC from CP&L.
8.3.2-2 Request for License Amendment - Battery Service Test, dated September 19, 1990, Serial No. NLS-90-110 to NRC from CP&L.
8.3.3-1 "Report on Cable Tray Volumetric Overloading," CP&L HBR Unit 2, dated August, 1981, and Letter, CWC-1093, dated July 29, 1970, from Westinghouse Electric Corporation Power Systems to CP&L.
8.3.3-2 Request for Additional Information - Adequacy of Electrical Distribution System, dated March 9, 1984, CP&L to NRC, Serial NLU-84-098.
HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 8.3R-2 Revision No. 28 8.3.3-3 Supplement to Request for Additional Information - Adequacy of Electrical Distribution Voltage System, dated April 30, 1984, CP&L to NRC, Serial NLS 163.
8.3.3-4 Adequacy of Station Electrical Distribution System Voltages, dated July 2, 1991, CP&L to NRC, Serial NLS-91-164.
8.3.3-5 Response to Request for Additional Information - Station Batteries, dated January 28, 1988, CP&L to NRC, Serial NLS-88-009.
8.3.3-6 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Summary Information, dated May 7, 1991, CP&L to NRC, Serial NLS 120.
8.3.3-7 Calculation RNP-E-5.001, Ampacity of 600 Volt Cable Tray.
8.3.3-8 Cable Ampacity Study, dated March 17, 1993, CP&L to NRC, Serial NLS-93-081.
8.3.3-9 Review of the Results of the Cable Ampacity Study from H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, dated August 17, 1993, CP&L to NRC, Serial NRC 0510.
8.3.3-10 Calculation RNP-I-INST-1094, Voltage AOP Setpoint Parameters.
3 3
87 UT 3
2000/5MR 1200/5 TAP 2000/5MR 1200/5 TAP 30000/5 87 GT 52 12 3
4000/5 52 17 3
4000/5 52 7
51 87 UT 3
4000/5 4000/5 3
A 52 20 51 87 UT 4000/5 4000/5 3
A TO 230KV SWITCHYARD 3-LA 192KV 230KV RELAY SYSTEM 1200/5 22KV/
120V 22KV/
87 G
ROTATING RECTIFIER BRUSHLESS EXICITER SEE NOTE 1 87 GT 30000/5 30000/5 59 N
3 30000/5 30000/5 3
87 G
LA CAP
.13 MFD 2
4800/
120V 52 10 4800/
120V 2
52 4
51 A
4000/5 3
4800/
120V 2
4800/
120V 2
52 19 51 A
3 4800/
120V 1
4000/5 59N 1UT NEUTRAL TRANS.
10 KVA 2400-240V-1Ø 59N 2UT NEUTRAL TRANS.
10 KVA 2400-240V-1Ø W
TR A
TR A
90 VAR W
51 3
A 4160-480V STA. SERVICE TRANSF. 2B A
4160-480V STA. SERVICE TRANSF. 2A 52 13 50 51 3
A 52 15 51 3
A 4160-480V STA. SERVICE TRANSF. 2D 52 28 51 3
52 24 A
4160-480V STA. SERVICE TRANSF. 2E 52 32 50 51 3
600/5 400/5 4160V BUS NO.1 4000A (WESTINGHOUSE) 4160V BUS NO.2 4000A(WESTINGHOUSE) 51A 4160V BUS NO.3 4000A (WESTINGHOUSE) 4160-480V STA. SERVICE TRANSF. 2C 4160V BUS NO.4 4000A (WESTINGHOUSE) 4160V BUS NO.5 2000A (WESTINGHOUSE)
A 3
300/5 1000/5 A
3 2000/5 3
51A 600/5 1
3 3
51A 51A DISC. SW.
2C DISC LINK V
TR F
WH 46 40 0.48 100KW 63 63 UT WH 25 300/5 V
4200/
120V 2
27 81 V
TR V
25 RTGB 27 81 V
TR V
25 RTGB 27 V
TR V
25 RTGB 27 81 V
TR V
25 RTGB 3
3 1
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 2
3 3
3 400A FU 2
400A FU 3
2 3
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
100KVA 13.8KV/
240V VARH ERFIS SUPV ERFIS ERFIS W/VAR TR W
TR VAR TR GOV LFC PHASE SHIFT 3
3 VAR TR W
TR A
FU FU FU FU FU FU FU FU FU FU FU FU FU FU FU FU FU BUS DUCT 4000A CONTINUOUS (WESTINGHOUSE)
A ERFIS UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER H=44MVA,3 Ø,60HZ,FOA,55 $C RISE 49.28MVA,FOA,65 $C RISE, 21.95/21.42/20.90/20.38/19.85KV SET ON 20.38KV X,Y= 22MVA FOA, 55 $C RISE, 24.64MVA FOA, 65 $C RISE 4.16KV BUS DUCT 4000A CONTINUOUS (WESTINGHOUSE) 60 1
V F
TR 1
3 1
A A
SHUNT 500A 100MV GENERATOR NEUTRAL TRANSFORMER 50 51 MOTOR SEE NOTE 2
(
)
MOTOR FEEDER (TYP.)
MOTOR SEE NOTE 2
(
)
MOTOR FEEDER (TYP.)
MOTOR SEE NOTE 2
(
)
MOTOR FEEDER (TYP.)
51 3
50 A
3 MOTOR SEE NOTE 2
(
)
MOTOR FEEDER (TYP.)
HXØ HYØ XYØ 52 52 52 52 FU FU T.P.
T.P.
(SEE NOTE 7)
(SEE NOTE 7)
FU T.P.
(SEE NOTE 7)
FU T.P.
(SEE NOTE 7)
SER NO. TO TP-841Z =11.26%,Z =11.26%,
Z =22.0% @22.0MVA BASE.
(SIEMENS) 3 NOTE 8 6
NOTE 8 XPS 18KV 2GUS BKR FIELD-GEN-DISC. SW.
2A 2
X2=0.2874, X0=0.1909 (SIEMENS)
XD=1.6896, X'D=0.4431, X"D=0.2896 22KV, 60HZ, 0.57SCR, 1800RPM 896.9MVA, 0.925PF, 75PSIGH MAIN GENERATOR S.O. MK13100 4200/
120V FU 400/5 4000/5 4000/5 37 52 52 36 52 400/5 35 120V FU 52 38 52 39 41 52 C400 4000/5 C400 4000/5 4160V BUS NO. 7 51 50 51 50 FU 25 87B7 4000/5 4000/5 87B7 C400 4000/5 4160V BUS NO. 6 51 50 400/5 150/5 51 50 87B7 400/5 150/5 51 50 87B7 400/5 150/5 51 50 87B7 400/5 150/5 51 50 87B7 (SPARE) 4200/
120V FU 400/5 4000/5 4000/5 46 52 52 47 52 400/5 48 120V FU 52 45 52 44 42 52 C400 4000/5 C400 4000/5 4160V BUS NO. 8 51 50 51 50 FU 87B8 4000/5 87B8 C400 4000/5 4160V BUS NO. 9 51 50 FU 25 400/5 150/5 51 50 87B8 150/5 51 50 400/5 150/5 51 50 87B8 150/5 51 50 (SPARE) 3 1
3 1
3 3
3 3
3 1
3 3
1 3
3 1
3 3
1 3
3 3
1 3
3 3
3 1
3 3
1 1
3 3
1 3
3 1
3 3
3 1
3 25 3
3 V
230 87T 230 87T V
B 230 87T V
B ERFIS FU 25 230 87T V
A ERFIS 51 51 51 51 4000/5 FU FU 4800/
120V 2
230 LTC 4200/
FU FU 120V 2
4200/
FU FU 120V 2
4200/
FU FU 120V 3
25 2400/240V 20KVA TRANSF (X-WDG)
NEUTRAL GRD.
230Y 59N 230X 59N H2 H1 H2 H1 X3 X2 X1 X1 X2 X3 2400/240V 20KVA TRANSF (Y-WDG)
NEUTRAL GRD.
WT-X (HOT SPOT)
WT-Y (HOT SPOT) 4000/5 SR 4000/5 SR X
Y 400/5 MR 400/5 TAP 400/5 TAP WT-H (HOT SPOT) 200/5 SR SPARE T2 SBP 600/5 MR T2 SBB 230kV START-UP TRANSFORMER H= 27/36/45 MVA, 3Ø, 60HZ, ONAN/ONAF1/ONAF2, 55° C RISE 50.4 MVA ONAF2 65°C RISE 250.70/247.25/243.80/240.35/236.90/233.45/230000/226.55/
223.10/219.65/216.20/212.75/209.30/205.85/202.40/198.95/195.50 AUTOMATIC LOAD TAP CHANGER X,Y= 13.5/18/22.5 MVA ONAN/ONAF1/ONAF2, 55°C RISE 25.2 MVA ONAF2 65°C RISE 4.160KV SER. NO. TP80436501 INSTALLED Z =12.35%, Z =12.34%,
Z =23.58% @25.2 MVA BASE (HICO)
XYØ HXØ HYØ 17.15KW 3.5O 17.15KW 3.5O RELAY BU SPAN DIFF RELAY PRIMARY SPAN DIFF 230 87T RELAY PANEL SUT PRIMARY BANK UNIT NO.2 230KV DISC-SW/230-8&9 DISC-SW/230-7 FUTURE 230 87T 4KV BUS 2 TRANSF. 2H STA. SERVICE 4160-480V TRANSF. 2F STA. SERVICE 4160-480V TO DISCONN.
BUS 6 ABBREVIATIONS:
GOV - GOVERNOR CONTROL CABINET LFC - LOAD FREQUENCY CONTROL PNL LA - LIGHTNING ARRESTOR ERFIS - EMERG. RESPONSE FACILITIES INFO SYSTEM MR - MULTI-RATIO RTGB - REACTOR TURBINE GENERATOR BOARD SUPV - SUPERVISORY INTERFACE CABINET RELAY AND METER LOCATIONS 4KV SWITCHGEAR RTGB AUX PNL LB EXCITATION SWITCHGEAR TRANSFORMER CONTROL PANEL
- 7. OUTPUT VOLTAGE TEST POINT CONNECTOR
- 8. CURRENT TRANSFORMER ON MAIN TRANSFORMERS WHICH ARE SHOWN WITHOUT RATIOS ARE SHORTED.
NOTES:
- 1. CONTINUATION OF DIFFERENTIAL RELAY ZONE IN 230KV SWITCHYARD.
- 3. KEY =
CONNECTIONS NO CONNECTION POLARITY MARKING
- 5. BASIS FOR AS-BUILT CONFIGURATION IS FILED UNDER 90-167-00-DR-A543.
- 6. ALL ITEMS ON THIS PAGE ARE NON-CLASS IE.
- 2. SEE B-190628 SERIES FOR CONFIGURATION DETAILS.
4.
REFERENCE DRAWINGS
- 1. AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM LOAD LIST AND FRONT VIEWS B-190627.
- 2. CONTROL WIRING DIAGRAMS B-190628.
- 3. LOW VOLTAGE RELAY SETTINGS DRAWING HBR2-10384.
DIAGRAM" CONTROLLED BY TRANSMISSION DEPT.
- 4. RD-23700 SH. 2 "230KV" RELAY FUNCTION
- 5. G-158255 UNIT #1 ONE LINE.
- 9. - BUS DUCT 4000A CONNECTIONS PROTECTIVE RELAY PANEL 11 PROTECTIVE RELAY PANEL 2 A
B 4KV CONTROL PANEL A 4KV CONTROL PANEL B
- 10. - CABLE BUS PROTECTIVE RELAY PANEL 1 DISC-SW/BUS 6 DISC-SW/BUS 9 4200/
4200/
V A
A 2
W/VAR TR 25 4800/
120V 2
10/5 W
TR A
3 A
51A 51 4000/5 1
3 4000/5 51 51A A
1 THIS CABLE HAS BEEN DE-TERMINATED ON BOTH ENDS AND LEFT IN PLACE DS POWER SUPPLY "B" TO (CWD-900B)
FUSED DISC. SW "B" BUS DUCT 4000A CONTINUOUS (WESTINGHOUSE)
BUS DUCT 4000A CONTINUOUS (WESTINGHOUSE) 87B7 TAP i>>¿5.
i>>¿6 10KW TAP i>>¿5.
i>>¿6 10KW (SIEMENS)
Z(SPARE)= 14.5% @330MVA BASE ZA0= 14.5%, XB0= 14.5%, ZC0= 14.5%
21.5KV L=
2448.0/242.0/236.0/230.0/224.0KV SET ON 230.0KV 330MVA, ODAF, 65* C RISE H=
3,10,60HZ TRANSFORMERS MAIN TRANSFORMERS AND SPARE BUS 9 TO DISCONN.
87B8 TRANSF. 2J STA. SERVICE 4160-480V TRANSF. 2G STA. SERVICE 4160-480V 4KV BUS 3 115Y 59N 2400/240V 20KVA TRANSF (Y-WDG)
NEUTRAL GRD.
T1 SBP 2400/240V 20KVA TRANSF (X-WDG)
NEUTRAL GRD.
SPARE SPARE 400/5 MR 400/5 TAP 400/5 MR NIS/5 TAP 1200/5 TAP 1200/5 MR WT-H (HOT SPOT) 600/5 SR WT-X (HOT SPOT)
WT-Y (HOT SPOT) 4000/5 SR 4000/5 SR H1 H2 H1 H2 X1 X3 X2 X1 X3 X2 X
Y 115X 59N 115KV START-UP TRANSFORMER H= 27/36/45 MVA, 3Ø, 60HZ, ONAN/ONAF1/ONAF2, 55° C RISE AUTOMATIC LOAD TAP CHANGER X,Y= 13.5/18/22.5 MVA ONAN/ONAF1/ONAF2, 55°C RISE 25.2 MVA ONAF2 65°C RISE 4.160KV Z
50.4 MVA ONAF2 65°C RISE 125.35/123.625/121.90/120.175/118.45/116.725/115000/113.275/
111.55/109.825/108.10/106.375/104.65/102.925/101.20/99.475/97.75 SER. NO. TP80436401 INSTALLED Z =12.34%, Z =12.26%,
=24.64% @25.2 MVA BASE (HICO)
XYØ HXØ HYØ 115 87T RELAY PANEL SUT PRIMARY BANK UNIT NO.2 115KV BU SPAN DIFF RELAYS RELAY THEN TO PRIMARY SPAN DIFF 17.15KW 3.5O 17.15KW 3.5O DISC-SW/115-6&7 DISC-SW/115-8 FU FU 3
25 V
B 4200/
120V 115 87T 115 LTC 115 87T 115 87T 25 400/5 MR 00/5 TAP 4 115 87T A
50 51 1
A 50 51 1
1 1
A 50 51 1
1 1
1 REVISION 28 UNIT 2 UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 8.3.1-1 REF. DWG. G-190626 SH.1 MAIN & 4160V ONELINE DIAGRAM H. B. ROBINSON DUKE ENERGY
41/,,0V-~4)-~-*
4000 A BU'> MO, I 411',0~- ~4>-=~
15 REl'(TCJR. COOi.ANT PUMP NO, A.
2 I h
ll'50 C.l~CUlATINf, WA'TER PUMP A.
17
~TEAM t,EN,
FEEDWATeR PIMPNO,A 16 4-I h
T
"'>TA,.,,e:ev.
1'RAN".>" NO. 2 e, l>;oO/to,:;t0K.VA
..,<jl l>A/FA
~A 61J<; MO.~ -,r----------, ----~--C-T-,-r--------,~-1-------r-4KV BUS 9 DISCONN. SWITCH +/-
I
!,CONW,
- w. ic.
T STA, SERV.
TRANS. 2C 2000/2666 KVA 30 M/FA 0 m
~
0 1c z
0 "w ow
>-Ul 4000-5
~
FUSED DISC.
SW "B" TO DEV. 87B8 SEE FIGURE 8.3.1-1 TO OS PWR SUPPLY "El
,_u,,,rii,e~l\\z.
~tit,~T cv:;,...11.NN GWI IOA g
C"2 2.40 V NEUT n'ANSI, g z
0 4KV BUS 8 U w ow
>-Ul s
700 1-\\EAT DeA\\N F'\\JHPA 19 I
9
~-c.r..
'4000**
CONDEN~ATE PoMP NO, A 2.0 4000*":>
o,
- 02.
7 lNC. Ltt,JE Fi<'Ol'1 UNIT A.UX TRA.NSF. NO. '2 21
,c~r; 0:0
- i TO DEV. STUT SEE FIGURE 8.3.1-1 240V NEUT.
TRANSF.
l>l(;. LIN!a~
UNIT AUX.
"TRAN~.N0, 2 0 m TRANSF 22 I 8
9 0 m
~
0 1c z
0 "w ow
>-Ul 0 m
\\0
,,_,er:.
40Qo-o; '+----
c.-y-1 I
~I Z.4:A 08A 1
""'4v TB I
M£t*"1 T.P.
I I
'---~
~
1 AQA'!>TAT 1'14*"
1'14*"'
2~
24 2':>
To CO"lTI/OI.. aD SEE FIGURE 8.3.1-1 2'-
12 240V NEUT.
TRANSF.
4KV BUS 7 21 I'!>
14 41C..O ll*">tl>* '-0~
400o A P.>U-. No.2
~ -
ALARM I
STA. SEJc:v.
Re.Ac.TOI: COOlANT TRAN':>F',N0-2A.
PUMP NO,C 2000/2...,fMc KVA
~I/> AA/FA 2.8 4KV BUS 6 DISCONN. SWITCH 41<.,0V-"!.4'*'-0~
4000 A
~U~ N0.4 I I I I I I
@1 h
-1
-1
~ t, h 2
~
?,-CT\\
~-GT',
1000*5
,-,0.5 I
T.P.
Al.
0*\\0DOIII
?,000 CONOEN~i"E PUMP NO. e, (SEE CIRC.UL"-'Tlt*U, WAi"E.R PUMP NO,f, 41"0V !>US a, FIGURE 8.3.1-2 SH.2) 1 "l11
~T'"- '5="*
n.,.l,.)S. '2E.
ISOO/ '2.00o t<VI>,.
"lore.: 52 -
5DHU-350 A.B.C. 1200A SOLENOID 100
- "XX'O/,'SOOA. f'AIJ *COOUaO ~roREi;> t.N~l:.(W
'?
- ourq01,-i4 1'ERMI N<>l.~ TO t1E'TE.&i!l>I~ ~ R!'.lA'(l"-14 ~HOT~ f!WM ~l,J "'"R.
5DHU-350 VACUUM CIRCUIT BREAKERS WITH STORED ENERGY MECHANISM INSTALLED PER EC 91093 CHILD EC'S 5, 6, 7, AND 8 FOR UNITS 15, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, AND 28, RESPECTIVELY.
~':f'~
1?.,00,"
':>nA.M C,~M-FE£PWATElit PUMP >JO,e, REF. DWG. 5379-05373 SH.1 "c.<<
i r.oo-15
~ -
ALARM I
li:'EAc.'fOR GOOLANf PUMP NO. e T
STA. SERV.
TRANSF. NO. 2D 1500/2000KVA 30 M/FA H. B. ROBINSON UNIT 2 DUKE ENERGY UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT 4160V ONE LINE DIAGRAM (SHEET 1)
FIGURE 8.3.1-2 REVISION 28
4lbOV BUS4 SKVA, IB 4160 120/24OV CONTROL POWER TRANSFORMER
)A o-5KV SWITCH6ERR
- HEATER, Ll6HT RECEPT 1 AC CONTROL CIRCUITS 0-JOOA 416OV BU5 NQ5 33 ZOOoA BUS 34 I
I REF. DWG. 5379-05373 SH.2 0
1150 SP4RC HI?
CIRCl,l.ATING WATER PUMP C-STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER ZE-l500/?000 IVA 0
A O-IZOOA 0
V O-6OOV 5YMBOL5 c LEGEND S(1UIRREL CAGE MOTOR I 400 DENOTES HORSE POWER TRANSFORMER FUSE AND POTENTIAL TRANSFORMER1 2 INDICATES NUMBER DF TRANSFORMER5 CURRENT TRANSFCRMER (3 INDICATES NO OF TRANSFORMERS RATIO 300/
5 URCUIT BREAKER 4160 VOLT/Z4 DENOTE5 CUBICLE NUMKR
- AMMETER, 0- I200 A INDICATES SCALE VOLTMETERsO-6OOV INDICATES SCALE AMMETER SWITCH VOLT METER SW lTCH ANNUNCIATOR TIME OVERCURRENT PHASE RELAY WITH INSTANTEOUS TRIP 3 INDlCAlES NUMBCR OF RELAYS UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY AUXLLIARY UNOERVOLTAQE RfLAY NEUTRAL RESISTOR OVERVOLTAGE RELAY AL ARM RELAY H. B. ROBINSON UNIT 2
Carolina Power
& Light Company UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT 4160V ONE LINE DIAGRAM (SHEET
- 2)
FIGURE 8.3.1-2 REVISION 15 E2
4160V-30-60~
4000A BUS NO. 7 41 I-------
!Jifcrv"l" INC. LINE FROM 230KV START UP TRANSF.
X WINDING 4160V-30-60~
4000A BUS NO. 8 42 3-CT'S 6~gg15
- ~
~
DISCONNECT ---:
M :
SWITCH INC. LINE FROM 11 5KV START UP TRANSF.
Y WINDING 40 4800/ 12 120V m SEE NOTE 5
- t
- 25 SEE NOTE 9 43 NOTE 1 3-PT'S ~
4200/ lJJ 120V T NOTE 2 3-PT'S 1 4200/
120V T SEE NOTE 3 39 STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER 2H 500KVA -
30 44
~
Li-J 3-CT'S 150/5 3-CT'S 400/5 STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER 2J 750KVA -
30 38 (SPARE) 45 5
3-CT'S 150/5 3-CT'S 400/5 (SPARE) 38 37
- rs;-i
~
3-CT'S 4000/5 DISCONNECT---:
M :
SWITCH 4KV BUS 2 52-12 45 INC. LINE FROM 11 SKV START UP TRANSF.
X WINDING 46 io8J7s C400 3-CT'S 4000/5 io8J7s OISC-SW/230~
-8&9 M
4kV BUS 3 52-17 INC. LINE FROM 230KV START UP TRANSF.
Y WINDING 1
4200/
2 120V T
SEE NOTE 4 SEE NOTE 5 1
4200/
2 120V T
SEE NOTE 6 36
~
~
3-CT'S 400/5 i2JJ7 120V T SEE NOTE 7 47 lo8JJs C400 3-CT'S 400/5 1
3-PT'S 4200/
120V T NOTE 7 35
~
~
3-CT'S 400/5 DISC-SW/BUS6 4KV BUS 2 48 SEE NOTE 5 8
3-CT'S 400/5 0ISC-SW/BUS9 4kV BUS 3 SST 2F SST 2C 4160V-30-60~
1 200A BUS NO. 6 4160V-30-60~
1200A BUS NO. 9 REF. DWG. 5379-05373 SH.3 1,
BUS CONNECTIONS BETWEEN COMPARTMENTS 39 AND 40 ARE NON SEG BUS.
- 2.
BUS CONNECTIONS BETWEEN COMPARTMENTS 43 AND 44 ARE NON SEG BUS.
- 3.
LOCATED ON PANEL 11 IN ELECTRONICS ROOM A.
- 4.
- 5.
LOCATED ON PANEL 2 IN ELECTRONICS ROOM B.
- 6.
LOCATED AT RELAY PANEL 2
- 7.
LOCATED AT 4KV CONTROL PANEL A
- 8.
LOCATED AT 4KV CONTROL PANEL B
- 9.
LOCATE A 1 MCR RTG B LEGEND:
4000A FAN COOLED BREAKER.
ALL OTHER BREAKERS ARE 1200A.
?
OUTGOING TERMINALS TO METERING & RELAYING REMOTE FROM SWITCHGEAR.
H. B. ROBINSON UNIT 2 DUKE ENERGY UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT 4160V ONE LINE DIAGRAM (SHEET 3)
FIGURE 8.3.1-2 REVISION 28
VS V
6A H. B. ROBINSON UNIT 2 UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Carolina Power & Light Company SPARE BUILDING CONSTRUCTION COOL PUMP B SPENT FUEL PIT CRANE TURBINE BLDG.
AUX. BLDG.
MCC-2 REACTOR 2A 271 CV-7 2A 271X1 2A 271X2 2A 271X3 MG-6 MG-6 MG-6 24V (REACTOR BUILDING)
MCC-11 RADWASTE 27 V
30B 52 30C 52 31A 52 31B 52 31C 52 31D 52 30B 30C 31A 31B 31C 31D (4160V ROOM)
MCC-12 PLANT SECURITY MEZZANINE MCC-14 TURBINE BLDG.
POLISHING BLDG.
MCC-13 CONDENSATE 480V-3Ú-60~ BUS NO. 4 4160V-480V-3Ú- 60~
1500/2000 KVA STA SERV. TRANS. 2D UNIT - 2 36A 52 36B 52 36C 52 36D 52 37B 52 37C 52 ANN.
TO 4160V-480V-3Ú- 60~
1500/2000 KVA STA SERV. TRANS. 2E UNIT - 2 N
59 (4160V SWGR ROOM)
MCC-17 PRE-HT RADWASTE BLDG.
2-HA-HVS-50 PP-74 SPARE (RADWASTE BLDG.)
MCC-15 37B 36A 36B 36C 36D 37C 480V-3Ú-60~ BUS NO. 5 VS V
6A E2 271X5 E2 271 E2 272 MG-6 24V MG-6 MG-6 MG-6 MG-6 E2 272X1 E2 272X2 E2 272X3 E2 272X4 E2 272X5 MG-6 24V MG-6 MG-6 MG-6 MG-6 CV-7 CV-7 E2 271X1 E2 271X2 E2 271X3 E2 271X4 PUMP 'C' COMPONENT COOLING REMOVAL PUMP 'B' RESIDUAL HEAT MCC-18 PUMP 'B' CONTAINMENT SPRAY HVH-4 COOLING UNIT RECIRULATION HVH-3 COOLING UNIT RECIRULATION PUMP 'B' AUX. FEEDWATER PUMP 'D' SERVICE WATER PUMP 'C' SERVICE WATER AUX. BLDG.
MCC-6 REACTOR PUMP 'C' SAFETY INJECTION CHARGING PUMP 'C' COOLING PUMP 'B' COMPONNENT REMOVAL PUMP 'A' RESIDUAL HEAT PUMP 'A' SAFETY INJECTION CHARGING PUMP 'B' MCC-16 PUMP 'B' SERVICE WATER PUMP 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 'A' FEEDWATER AUXILIARY HVH-2 COOLING UNIT RECIRCULATION NOTES RELAY REMOTE FROM SWITCHGEAR.
OUTGOING TERMINALS TO METERING &
3 - 1200A CURRENT LIMITERS 3 - 2000A CURRENT LIMITERS 3 - 4000A CURRENT LIMITERS HVH-1 COOLING UNIT RECIRCULATION PUMP 'A' CONTAINMET SPRAY
'A' CONTROL PANEL TO DIESEL GENERATOR EMERGENCY DIESEL GEN. 'A' E1 271 E1 271X1 E1 271X2 E1 271X3 E1 271X4 E1 271X5 E1 272X5 E1 272X4 E1 272X3 E1 272X2 E1 272X1 E1 272 MG-6 24V MG-6 MG-6 MG-6 MG-6 MG-6 MG-6 MG-6 MG-6 MG-6 24V CONTROL GROUP-400KW PRESSURIZER HEATER GENERATOR AREA MCC-3 TURBINE COMPRESSOR STATION AIR SPARE FEEDER MGSET ROD DRIVE 'A' GENERATOR AREA MCC-4 TURBINE COOLING PUMP 'A' SPENT FUEL PIT MGSET ROD DRIVE 'B' SPARE FEEDER FIRE PUMP MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP 'B' CONDENSOR VACUUM BUS NO. 3 MAIN BREAKER (FIG.8.2.1-4)
TO DEDICATED SHUTDOWN BUS 480V ONE LINE DIAGRAM FIGURE 8.3.1-3 ANN.
TO N
59 1
271X1 1
271X2 1
271X3 59N 1
1 TAP 39 1380W 554 ANN.
REACTOR AUX. BLDG.
MCC-1 480V PP-63 INTAKE STRUCTURE MCC-7 2B 271 2B 271X1 2B 271X2 2B 271X3 CV-7 MG-6 24V MG-6 MG-6 2
59N CV-8 TO ANN.
2B 52 11C MCC-20 3
271 3
271X1 3
271X2 3
271X3 MG-6 24V MG-6 MG-6 3
59N CV-8 TO ANN.
CV-7 29B 52 3000A 120V 480 1PT 200 1200 350 1200 350 1200 350 1200 300 1200 300 1200 2000 150 1200 350 1200 300 1200 350 1200 150 1200 350 1200 2000 300 1200 300 1200 350 1200 350 1200 350 1200 200 1200 2000 300 1200 350 1200
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
19A 52 19B 52 20C 52 20A 52 20B 52 19C 52 21A 52 21B 52 21C 52 22A 52 22C 52 23A 52 23B 52 23C 52 24A 52 24B 52 24C 52 25A 52 24B 52 25C 52 26A 52 26B 52 26C 52
+
+
+
4000 22B 52 350 E1-E2 29C 52 19C 20C MCC-5 REACTOR AUX. BLDG.
6A 6A 24V MG-6 MG-6 MG-6 1
271 CV-7 SST 2F 150*C 3375/4499KVA 80*C 2500KVA 4160/480V,3Ú,60~
L C
TO SI PUMP 'B' 480V BUS E1 SUPPLY TO SI PUMP 'B' 480V BUS E2 SUPPLY PUMP 'B' SAFETY INJECTION 120 480/
2PT 4160/480V, 3Ú 60~
150*C 3375/4499 KVA 80*C 2500 KVA SST 2G VACUUM PUMP "A" MOTOR SPENT FUEL PIT "B" TOTAL RUN TIME METERS VACUUM PUMP 'B' RUN TIME METERS STATION AIR COMPRESSOR 17B 52 4000A 18B 52 4000A INCOMING LINE BREAKER TO BUS E1 27B 52 4000A 28B 52 4000A BUS E2 INCOMING LINE BREAKER TO REF. DWGS. 5379-05374/G-190626 SH.2 27 V
37A PWR CONTROL REVISION 25 SUPPLY SECURITY POWER FILTRATION SKID KAYDON LO
4.16 KV BUS 3
)
15 l STATION SERVICE TRANS. 2C 2000/2666 KVA TO 86
~
~-~ l NGR 1/2
~:;0/240/120 10 KVA GEN.
~
FROM 2450 KW TO 86 I
4160-480V 30 60HZ 51V 7 4 160V 30 160HZ 480V BUS NO. 3 LEGEND L
LOCAL TO DIESEL UV UNDER VOLTAGE TRIP HO MANUALLY OPERATED EO ELECTRIC OPERATED AC-C -
AC CLOSE AC-T -
AC TRIP DC-C -
DC CLOSE DC-T -
DC TRIP SYNC. -
SYNCRONIZING CONNECTION T
TRANSDUCER CONTROL ROOM D
DIESEL GENERATOR CONTROL PANEL D
2PTS L
~
F D
87 -- - YL D
I FROM __ J 59G
>---1----.... BKR 52/32A UV AC-T 480/
120 D
.__ __ SYNC.
125V 1
L D
TRIP 32B 1 BATTERY,:-
) Dc-T
- -----------x AC-C 480/120 D
480 BUS DS
~ E0 AC-C T EO AC-C EO AC-C 1' 6)UV AC-T 6 ) UV AC-T
) UV AC-T b) f 33C 33B +/-
34B f 3H'c; CPR PANEL CPR PANEL CPR PANEL 33A GROUND DET.
CPT 480/
5KVA T 120V 2 PT
~
SYNC.
3 PTS 480/120 D
59 34A FU 2 PTS 480/120 ALARM*
D-G UNDER VOLTAGE RELAY D
D RHR PUMP COMP.
SERVICE CHGING MCC5 CONTROL POWER FOR TO DG D
OVERVOLTAGE SYNC.
"A" & "B" COOLING WATER PUMP "A" ALT.
ALT. POWER PUMP "A" PUMP "D" FEED (ALT.)
PROTECTION BREAKERS RELAY 52/33B,52/33C, 52/33D AND 52/34B 3D l) 34D HO 480V f POWER PANEL 51 r - - - -._- - - - - - - - - - -,
t) t) r) x) r) I) 1 f
FUEL BREATH-125VDC I TRANS.
ING AIR RECTIFIER PUMP COMP.
"A' AND I MCC-24 SPARE UPS I
SPARE
____________..J H. B. ROBINSON UNIT 2 DUKE ENERGY UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT DEDICATED SHUTDOWN BUS REF. DWG. HBR2-07706 FIGURE 8.3.1-4 REVISION NO. 28
EMER. MCC 5 480V 3Ú "A"
CHARGER BATTERY 125V DC MCC "A" EMER. MCC 5 480V 3Ú (1 HR RATE TO 1.75 V.P.C.)
60 CELLS 525 A-HR MFR. GOULD MODEL NO. NCX1050 125V STATION BATTERY A AUX. PNL. "DC" PP "A-1" 7.5 KVA "A"
INVERTER LP-33 LP-29 208 2Ú 3W LP-26 NO NC NC NC NO PP-26 43 INST/2 MANUAL TRANSFER SWITCH 120V INSTRUMENT BUS #2 EMER. MCC 6 480V 3Ú 125V DC MCC "B" EMER. MCC 6 480V 3Ú "B"
CHARGER BATTERY 7.5 KVA "B"
INVERTER NO NC NC 43 INST/3 MANUAL TRANSFER SWITCH PP "25" (SWYD)
NO NC NC 43 INST/1 MANUAL TRANSFER SWITCH 120V INSTRUMENT BUS #6 120V INSTRUMENT BUS #1 120V INSTRUMENT BUS #7A 120V INSTRUMENT BUS #7B EMER. MCC #5 480V 1Ú TRANSF. NO. 1 CONSTANT VOLTAGE MCC #8 120V 1Ú 120V INSTRUMENT BUS #9A 120V INSTRUMENT BUS #9B 120V INSTRUMENT BUS #8 AUX. PNL. "GC" MCC "B-A" NO NC NC 43 INST/4 MANUAL TRANSFER SWITCH EMER. MCC #6 480V 1Ú MCC #8 120V 1Ú "B-1" CHARGER BATTERY DP "B" TRANSF. NO. 2 CONSTANT VOLTAGE 120V INSTRUMENT BUS #3 120V INSTRUMENT BUS #4 DP "A" "A-1" CHARGER BATTERY MCC #8 120V 1Ú MCC #8 120V 1Ú DP "B-1" PP-51 480V 3Ú "A"(DS)
SUPPLY PWR (1 HR RATE TO 1.75 V.P.C.)
60 CELLS 204 A-HR MFR. C&D TECHNOLOGIES MODEL NO. KCR-11 125V STATION BATTERY B 97 CELLS NICKEL CADIUM 125V DC BATTERY (DS) 5.0 KVA DS INVERTER DISTRIBUTION PNL. "A" (DS)
PP-50 "C"
CHARGER BATTERY MCC 12 480V 3Ú 125V DC MCC "C" PP "C" (8 HR RATE TO 1.75 V.P.C.)
1800 A-HR MINIMUM 60 CELLS RATED AT 125V STATION BATTERY C (1 HOUR RATE TO 1.14 V.P.C.)
92 CELLS 133A-HR 125V DSDG BATTERY CHARGER BATTERY DSDG 125VDC CONNECTION BOX MCC 24 480V 1Ú DS/DP-A-16 4-1/C #4/0 FEEDER TYPICAL FEEDER TYPICAL INVERTER CHARGER SWITCH STATIC SWITCH MANUAL 175 600A TM FEEDER TYPICAL 1600 A-HR 60 CELLS BATTERY STATION-D 125VDC 6-1/C 500MCM LP-53 POWER PANEL 208/120 VAC 4-1/C 500MCM PP-90 PANEL POWER 480VAC 3-1/C #1/0 TM 4-1/C #4/0 FEEDER TYPICAL INVERTER CHARGER SWITCH STATIC 175 TM 600A TM FEEDER TYPICAL FEEDER TYPICAL PP-91 PANEL POWER 480VAC LP-52 POWER PANEL 208/120 VAC 3-1/C #1/0 4-1/C 500MCM 4-1/C #4/0 4-1/C #4/0 1600 A-HR 60 CELLS BATTERY STATION-E 125VDC 6-1/C 500MCM (MLO)
MAIN LUG ONLY (MLO)
MAIN LUG ONLY (CS/SW1-UPS-E)
CS/SW1-UPS-D SWITCH MANUAL (CS/SW1-UPS-E)
CS/SW1-UPS-D H. B. ROBINSON UNIT 2 UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT DUKE ENERGY FIGURE 8.3.1-5 REVISION 28 REF DWG. G-190626 SH. 3 125V DC & 120 VITAL AC ONE LINE DIAGRAM 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL DP-D UPS-D 208/120 VAC PANEL PP-92 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL DP-E UPS-E 208/120 VAC PANEL PP-93 DS/DP-B-16