ML18310A313

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Part 02 - Final Safety Analysis Report (Rev. 2) - Part 02 - Tier 01 - Certified Design Descriptions and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria - Chapters 01 - 05
ML18310A313
Person / Time
Site: NuScale
Issue date: 10/30/2018
From: Bergman T
NuScale
To:
Office of New Reactors
Cranston G
References
NUSCALESMRDC, NUSCALESMRDC.SUBMISSION.6, NUSCALEPART02.NP, NUSCALEPART02.NP.2
Download: ML18310A313 (154)
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Text

NuScale Standard Plant Design Certification Application Certified Design Descriptions and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, & Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC)

PART 2 - TIER 1 Revision 2 October 2018

©2018, NuScale Power LLC. All Rights Reserved

COPYRIGHT NOTICE This document bears a NuScale Power, LLC, copyright notice. No right to disclose, use, or copy any of the information in this document, other than by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), is authorized without the express, written permission of NuScale Power, LLC.

The NRC is permitted to make the number of copies of the information contained in these reports needed for its internal use in connection with generic and plant-specific reviews and approvals, as well as the issuance, denial, amendment, transfer, renewal, modification, suspension, revocation, or violation of a license, permit, order, or regulation subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 2.390 regarding restrictions on public disclosure to the extent such information has been identified as proprietary by NuScale Power, LLC, copyright protection notwithstanding. Regarding nonproprietary versions of these reports, the NRC is permitted to make the number of additional copies necessary to provide copies for public viewing in appropriate docket files in public document rooms in Washington, DC, and elsewhere as may be required by NRC regulations. Copies made by the NRC must include this copyright notice in all instances and the proprietary notice if the original was identified as proprietary.

NuScale Tier 1 Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.0-1 1.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0-1 1.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1-1 1.2 General Provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2-1 1.2.1 Design Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2-1 1.2.2 Interpretation of System Description Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2-1 1.2.3 Interpretation of System Description Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2-1 1.2.4 Implementation of Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . 1.2-2 1.2.5 Acronyms and Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2-3 CHAPTER 2 UNIT SPECIFIC STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS DESIGN DESCRIPTIONS AND INSPECTIONS, TESTS, ANALYSES, AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.0-1 2.0 Unit Specific Systems, Structures, and Components Design Descriptions and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0-1 2.1 NuScale Power Module. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1-1 2.1.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1-1 2.1.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1-4 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2-1 2.2.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2-1 2.2.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2-1 2.3 Containment Evacuation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3-1 2.3.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3-1 2.3.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3-1 2.4 Not Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4-1 2.5 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System . . . . . . . . . . 2.5-1 2.5.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5-1 2.5.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5-5 2.6 Neutron Monitoring System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6-1 2.6.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6-1 2.6.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6-1 2.7 Radiation Monitoring Module Specific. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7-1 2.7.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7-1 Tier 1 i Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS 2.7.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7-1 2.8 Equipment Qualification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8-1 2.8.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8-1 2.8.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8-2 2.9 Fuel Assembly Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9-1 2.9.1 Fuel Assembly Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9-1 2.9.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9-1 CHAPTER 3 SHARED STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS AND NON-STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS DESIGN DESCRIPTIONS AND INSPECTIONS, TESTS, ANALYSES, AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.0-1 3.0 Shared Structures, Systems, and Components and Non-Structures, Systems, and Components Design Descriptions and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0-1 3.1 Control Room Habitability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1-1 3.1.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1-1 3.1.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1-1 3.2 Normal Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System . . . . . . . 3.2-1 3.2.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2-1 3.2.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2-1 3.3 Reactor Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3-1 3.3.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3-1 3.3.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3-1 3.4 Fuel Handling Equipment System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4-1 3.4.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4-1 3.4.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4-1 3.5 Fuel Storage System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5-1 3.5.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5-1 3.5.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5-1 3.6 Ultimate Heat Sink. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6-1 3.6.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6-1 3.6.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6-2 3.7 Fire Protection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-1 3.7.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-1 Tier 1 ii Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.7.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-2 3.8 Plant Lighting System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8-1 3.8.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8-1 3.8.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8-1 3.9 Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1 - 12. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9-1 3.9.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9-1 3.9.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9-1 3.10 Reactor Building Crane. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10-1 3.10.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10-1 3.10.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10-1 3.11 Reactor Building. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11-1 3.11.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11-1 3.11.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11-2 3.12 Radioactive Waste Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12-1 3.12.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12-1 3.12.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12-1 3.13 Control Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13-1 3.13.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13-1 3.13.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13-2 3.14 Equipment Qualification - Shared Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.14-1 3.14.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.14-1 3.14.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.14-1 3.15 Human Factors Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.15-1 3.15.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.15-1 3.15.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.15-1 3.16 Physical Security System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16-1 3.16.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16-1 3.16.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16-2 3.17 Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1 - 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.17-1 3.17.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.17-1 3.17.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.17-1 3.18 Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 7 - 12. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18-1 Tier 1 iii Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.18.1 Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18-1 3.18.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18-1 CHAPTER 4 INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.0-1 4.0 Interface Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0-1 4.1 Site-Specific Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0-1 CHAPTER 5 SITE PARAMETERS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5.0-1 5.0 Site Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0-1 Tier 1 iv Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 List of Tables LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1-1: NuScale Power Module Piping Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1-5 Table 2.1-2: NuScale Power Module Mechanical Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1-7 Table 2.1-3: NuScale Power Module Electrical Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1-10 Table 2.1-4: NuScale Power Module Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1-12 Table 2.2-1: Chemical and Volume Control System Piping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2-2 Table 2.2-2: Chemical and Volume Control System Mechanical Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2-3 Table 2.2-3: Chemical and Volume Control System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2-4 Table 2.3-1: Containment Evacuation System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3-2 Table 2.4-1: Not Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4-2 Table 2.5-1: Module Protection System Automatic Reactor Trip Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5-6 Table 2.5-2: Module Protection System Automatic Engineered Safety Feature Functions . . . . 2.5-7 Table 2.5-3: Module Protection System Manual Switches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5-9 Table 2.5-4: Module Protection System Interlocks/Permissives/Overrides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5-10 Table 2.5-5: Safety Display and Indication System Accident Monitoring Variables. . . . . . . . . . . 2.5-11 Table 2.5-6: Important Human Actions Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5-12 Table 2.5-7: Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5-14 Table 2.6-1: Neutron Monitoring Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . 2.6-2 Table 2.7-1: Radiation Monitoring - Module-Specific Automatic Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7-2 Table 2.7-2: Radiation Monitoring - Module-Specific Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7-3 Table 2.8-1: Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8-3 Table 2.8-2: Equipment Qualification Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8-17 Table 3.0-1: Shared Systems Subject to Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0-2 Table 3.1-1: Control Room Habitability System Mechanical Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1-2 Table 3.1-2: Control Room Habitability System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1-3 Table 3.2-1: Normal Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System Mechanical Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2-2 Tier 1 v Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 List of Tables LIST OF TABLES Table 3.2-2: Normal Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2-3 Table 3.3-1: Reactor Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3-2 Table 3.4-1: Fuel Handling Equipment System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4-2 Table 3.5-1: Fuel Storage System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . 3.5-2 Table 3.6-1: Ultimate Heat Sink Piping System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6-3 Table 3.6-2: Ultimate Heat Sink Piping System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6-4 Table 3.7-1: Fire Protection System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . 3.7-3 Table 3.8-1: Plant Lighting System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria. . . . . 3.8-2 Table 3.9-1: Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1-12 Automatic Actions . . . . . . . . 3.9-2 Table 3.9-2: Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1-12 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9-4 Table 3.10-1: Reactor Building Crane Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria. . . 3.10-2 Table 3.11-1: Reactor Building Shield Wall Geometry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11-3 Table 3.11-2: Reactor Building Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . 3.11-7 Table 3.12-1: Radioactive Waste Building Shield Wall Geometry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12-2 Table 3.12-2: Radioactive Waste Building ITAAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12-3 Table 3.13-1: Control Building Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . 3.13-3 Table 3.14-1: Mechanical and Electrical/Instrumentation and Controls Shared Equipment . . . 3.14-2 Table 3.14-2: Equipment Qualification - Shared Equipment ITAAC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.14-3 Table 3.15-1: Human Factors Engineering Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.15-2 Table 3.16-1: Physical Security System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16-3 Table 3.17-1: Radiation Monitoring - Automatic Actions for NuScale Power Modules 1 - 6 . . . . 3.17-2 Table 3.17-2: Radiation Monitoring - Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria for NuScale Power Modules 1-6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.17-3 Table 3.18-1: Radiation Monitoring - Automatic Actions For NuScale Power Modules 7 - 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18-2 Table 3.18-2: Radiation Monitoring Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria For NuScale Power Modules 7 - 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18-3 Table 5.0-1: Site Design Parameters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0-2 Tier 1 vi Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 List of Figures LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1-1: Containment System (Isolation Valves). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1-16 Figure 2.5-1: Module Protection System Safety Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5-19 Figure 2.5-2: Reactor Trip Breaker Arrangement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5-20 Figure 5.0-1: NuScale Horizontal Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra 5% Damping . . . . 5.0-4 Figure 5.0-2: NuScale Vertical Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra 5% Damping. . . . . . . 5.0-5 Figure 5.0-3: NuScale Horizontal Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra - High Frequency 5% Damping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0-6 Figure 5.0-4: NuScale Vertical Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra - High Frequency 5% Damping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0-7 Tier 1 vii Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Introduction CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.0 Introduction This document presents the Tier 1 information developed for the NuScale, LLC Power Plant.

The Tier 1 information is the information that is to be certified through rulemaking and includes the Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria required by 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1).

Tier 1 includes the following information:

  • definitions
  • general provisions
  • design descriptions
  • Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
  • site parameters
  • interface requirements The information presented in Tier 1 is consistent with the information presented in Tier 2.

A graded approach is employed relative to the level of design information presented in Tier 1, i.e., the amount of design information presented is proportional to the safety significance of the structures, systems, and components being addressed.

Tier 1 1.0-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Definitions 1.1 Definitions The definitions below apply to terms that may be used in the design descriptions and associated Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC).

Acceptance Criteria refers to the performance, physical condition, or analysis result for structures, systems, and components (SSC), or program that demonstrates that the design commitment is met.

Analysis means a calculation, mathematical computation, or engineering or technical evaluation. Engineering or technical evaluations could include, but are not limited to, comparisons with operating experience or design of similar SSC.

As-built means the physical properties of an SSC following the completion of its installation or construction activities at its final location at the plant site. In cases where it is technically justifiable, determination of physical properties of the as-built SSC may be based on measurements, inspections, or tests that occur prior to installation, provided that subsequent fabrication, handling, installation, and testing do not alter the properties.

ASME Code meansSection III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, as endorsed in 10 CFR 50.55a, unless a different section of the ASME Code is specifically referenced.

ASME Code Data Report means a document that certifies that a component or system is constructed in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code. This data is recorded on a form approved by the ASME.

Component, as used for reference to ASME Code components, means a vessel, concrete containment, pump, pressure relief valve, line valve, storage tank, piping system, or core support structure that is designed, constructed, and stamped in accordance with the rules of the ASME Code. ASME Code Section III classifies a metal containment as a vessel.

Design Commitment means that portion of the design description that is verified by ITAAC.

Design Description means that portion of the design that is certified. Design descriptions consist of a system description, system description tables, system description figures, and design commitments. System description tables and system description figures are only used when appropriate. The system description is not verified by ITAAC; only the design commitments are verified by ITAAC. System description tables and system description figures are only verified by ITAAC if they are referenced in the ITAAC table.

Inspect or Inspection means visual observations, physical examinations, or reviews of records based on visual observation or physical examination that compare (a) the SSC condition to one or more design commitments or (b) the program implementation elements to one or more program commitments, as applicable. Examples include walkdowns, configuration checks, measurements of dimensions, or nondestructive examinations. The terms, inspect and inspection, also apply to the review of Emergency Planning ITAAC requirements to determine whether ITAAC are met.

Tier 1 1.1-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Definitions ITAAC are those Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria identified in the combined license that if met by the licensee are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the facility has been constructed and will be operated in conformity with the license, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and the Commission's rules and regulations.

NuScale Power Module (NPM) is a collection of systems, sub-systems, and components that together constitute a modularized, movable, nuclear steam supply system. The NPM is composed of a reactor core, a pressurizer, and two steam generators integrated within a reactor pressure vessel and housed in a compact steel containment vessel.

Reconciliation or Reconciled means the identification, assessment, and disposition of differences between an approved design feature and an as-built plant design feature. For ASME Code piping systems, it is the reconciliation of differences between the approved design and the as-built piping system. For structural features, it is the reconciliation of differences between the approved design and the as-built structural feature.

Report, as used in the ITAAC table Acceptance Criteria column, means a document that verifies that the acceptance criteria of the subject ITAAC have been met and references the supporting documentation. The report may be a simple form that consolidates all of the necessary information related to the closure package for supporting successful completion of the ITAAC.

Common or Shared ITAAC means ITAAC that are associated with common or shared SSC and activities that support multiple NPMs. This includes (1) SSC that are common or shared by multiple NPMs, and for which the interface and functional performance requirements between the common or shared SSC and each NPM are identical, or (2) analyses or other generic design and qualification activities that are identical for each NPM (e.g., environmental qualification of equipment). For a multi-module plant, satisfactory completion of a common or shared ITAAC for the lead NPM shall constitute satisfactory completion of the common or shared ITAAC for associated NPMs.

Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) Ground Motion is the site-specific vibratory ground motion for which safety-related SSC are designed to remain functional. The SSE for a site is a smoothed spectra developed to envelop the ground motion response spectra. The SSE is characterized at the free ground surface. A combined license (COL) applicant may use the SSE for design of site-specific SSC.

System Description (Tier 1) includes

  • a concise description of the system's or structure's safety-related functions, nonsafety-related functions that support safety-related functions, and certain nonsafety risk-significant functions.
  • a listing of components required to perform those functions.
  • identification of the system safety classification.
  • the system components general locations.

The system description may include system description tables and figures.

Tier 1 1.1-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Definitions Test means actuation or operation, or establishment of specified conditions, to evaluate the performance or integrity of as-built SSC, unless explicitly stated otherwise, to determine whether ITAAC are met.

Tier 1 means the portion of the design-related information contained in the generic Design Control Document that is approved and certified by the design certification rule (Tier 1). The design descriptions, interface requirements, and site parameters are derived from Tier 2 information. Tier 1 includes:

  • definitions and general provisions
  • design descriptions
  • significant site parameters
  • significant interface requirements Type Test means a test on one or more sample components of the same type and manufacturer to qualify other components of the same type and manufacturer. A type test is not necessarily a test of an as-built SSC.

Top-Level Design Features means the principal performance characteristics and physical attributes that are important to performing the safety-related and certain nonsafety-related functions of the plant.

Module-Specific ITAAC means ITAAC that are associated with SSC that are specific to and support operation of a single, individual NuScale Power Module. Module-specific ITAAC shall be satisfactorily completed for each NuScale Power Module.

Tier 1 1.1-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 General Provisions 1.2 General Provisions 1.2.1 Design Descriptions Design descriptions pertain only to the structures, systems, and components (SSC) of the standard design and not to their operation and maintenance after fuel load. In the event of an inconsistency between the design descriptions and the Tier 2 information, the design descriptions in Tier 1 shall govern.

Design descriptions consist of system descriptions, system description tables, system description figures, and design commitments. System description tables and system description figures are only used when appropriate. The system description provides a concise description of the top-level design features and performance characteristics of the SSC system functions, safety classification, and general location. The system description only describes those portions of the system or structure that are important to the top-level design features and performance characteristics of the system or structure. Design commitments are provided in numbered paragraphs that are used to develop the Design Commitment column in the Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) table. These commitments address top-level design features and performance characteristics such as:

  • seismic classification
  • American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code classification
  • equipment to be qualified for harsh environments
  • instrumentation and controls equipment to be qualified for other than harsh environments The absence of discussion or depiction of SSC in the design description shall not be construed as prohibiting a licensee from using such SSC, unless it would prevent SSC from performing a top-level design feature or performance characteristic, or impairing the performance of those functions, as discussed or depicted in the design description.

When the term operate, operates, or operation is used with respect to equipment discussed in the acceptance criteria, it refers to the actuation or control of the equipment.

1.2.2 Interpretation of System Description Tables Cells with no values in system description tables contain an N/A to denote that the cell is not applicable.

1.2.3 Interpretation of System Description Figures Figures are provided for some systems or structures with the amount of information depicted based on their safety significance. These figures may represent a functional diagram, general structural representation, or other general illustration. Unless specified, these figures are not indicative of the scale, location, dimensions, shape, or spatial relationships of as-built SSC. In particular, the as-built attributes of SSC may vary from the Tier 1 1.2-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 General Provisions attributes depicted on these figures, provided that the top-level design features discussed in the design description pertaining to the figure are not adversely affected. Valve position indications shown on system description figures do not represent a specific operational state.

The figure legends in Tier 2 Section 1.7 are used to interpret Tier 1 system description figures.

1.2.4 Implementation of Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design commitments, inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria are provided in ITAAC tables with the following format:

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria Each commitment in the Design Commitment column of the ITAAC tables has one or more associated requirements for inspections, tests or analyses specified in the Inspections, Tests, Analyses column.

Inspections, tests, or analyses may be performed by the licensee or by its authorized vendors, contractors, or consultants.

Inspections, tests, or analyses may be

  • performed by more than a single individual or group.
  • implemented through discrete activities separated by time.
  • performed at any time prior to fuel load, including before issuance of the combined license for those ITAAC that do not require as-built equipment.
  • performed at a location other than the construction site.

Additionally, inspections, tests, or analyses may be performed as part of other activities such as construction inspections and preoperational testing. Therefore, inspections, tests, or analyses need not be performed as a separate or discrete activity.

If an acceptance criteria does not specify the temperature, pressure, or other conditions under which an inspection or test must be performed, then the inspection or test conditions are not constrained.

For the acceptance criteria, appropriate documentation may be a single document or a collection of documents that show that the stated acceptance criteria are met. Examples of appropriate documentation include:

  • design reports
  • test reports
  • inspection reports
  • analysis reports
  • evaluation reports Tier 1 1.2-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 General Provisions

  • design and manufacturing procedures
  • certified data sheets
  • quality assurance records
  • calculation notes
  • equipment qualification data packages Conversion or extrapolation of test results from the test conditions to the design conditions may be necessary to satisfy an ITAAC. Suitable justification should be provided for, and applicability of, any necessary conversions or extrapolations of test results necessary to satisfy an ITAAC.

1.2.5 Acronyms and Abbreviations The acronyms and abbreviations contained in Tier 2 Table 1.1-1 are applicable to Tier 1.

Tier 1 1.2-3 Revision 2

Unit Specific Systems, Structures, and Components Design Descriptions NuScale Tier 1 and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria CHAPTER 2 UNIT SPECIFIC STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS DESIGN DESCRIPTIONS AND INSPECTIONS, TESTS, ANALYSES, AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 2.0 Unit Specific Systems, Structures, and Components Design Descriptions and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria This chapter of Tier 1 provides the structures, systems, and components Design Descriptions and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria for those structures, systems, and components that are specific to and support operation of a single NuScale Power Module.

Unit-specific Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria shall be satisfactorily completed for each NuScale Power Module in a multi-unit plant.

Tier 1 2.0-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module 2.1 NuScale Power Module 2.1.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is the NuScale Power Module (NPM) and its associated systems.

The NPM is installed in the reactor pool in the Reactor Building (RXB). Up to 12 NPMs may be installed in the Reactor Building. Figure 2.1-1 identifies the mechanical system boundaries for the mechanical systems within the NPM. A description of NPM piping systems is found in Table 2.1-1. The systems contained within the boundary of the NPM are the

All RCS piping is located inside the containment vessel (CNV) and connects to containment piping located outside the CNV via CNV nozzles.

  • control rod drive system (CRDS), including the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDM) with embedded cooling water tubes, cables, and associated cooling water piping. All CRDS piping is located inside the CNV and connects to containment piping located outside the CNV via CNV nozzles. The CRDS also includes instrumentation to provide control rod position indication information.
  • containment system (CNTS), including the containment vessel (CNV) and containment isolation valves (CIVs) and associated piping. All containment piping is located outside the CNV with the exception of CNTS piping used for containment flooding and drain.
  • decay heat removal system (DHRS), including associated piping and valves. DHRS steam piping is located outside the CNV and connects to containment piping outside the CNV. The DHRS condensate lines connect the DHR condensers to the steam generator system (SGS) feedwater piping inside the CNV.
  • All SGS piping is located inside the CNV. The SGS steam piping connects to CNTS steam piping located outside the CNV via CNV nozzles. The SGS feedwater piping connects to the DHRS condenser condensate line inside the CNV.

The NPM includes the pressure retaining structures of these systems because they are part of either the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) or the CNV pressure boundary.

Therefore, the mechanical design and arrangement of the piping, CRDS, and NPM valves (emergency core cooling, reactor safety, and containment isolation) are included in this section.

The CRDM pressure housings form the pressure boundary between the environments inside the RPV and the CNV. The CRDM pressure housings consist of the latch housing, rod travel housing, and rod travel housing plug.

The NPM performs the following safety-related functions that are verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

Tier 1 2.1-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module

  • The RCS supports the CNTS by supplying the RCPB and a fission product boundary via the RPV and other appurtenances.
  • The CRDS supports the RCS by maintaining the pressure boundary of the RPV.
  • The SGS supports the RCS by supplying part of the RCPB.
  • The ECCS supports the RCS by providing a portion of the RCPB for maintaining the RCPB integrity.
  • The CNTS supports the RXB by providing a barrier to contain mass, energy, and fission product release from a degradation of the RCPB.
  • The ECCS supports the CNTS by providing a portion of the containment boundary for maintaining containment integrity.
  • The CNTS supports the DHRS by providing the required pressure boundary for DHR operation.
  • The RCS supports the SGS by providing physical support for the SG tube supports and for the integral steam and feed plenums.
  • The RCS supports the reactor core by the RVI providing mechanical support to orient, position, and seat the fuel assemblies.
  • The RCS supports the CRDS by the RPV and the RVI supporting and aligning the control rods.
  • The CNTS supports the DHRS by providing structural support for the DHRS piping.
  • The CNTS supports the neutron monitoring system by providing structural support for the ex-core detectors.
  • The RCS supports the ECCS by providing mechanical support for the ECCS valves.
  • The RCS supports the in-core instrumentation system by providing structural support of the in-core instrumentation guide tubes.
  • The CNTS supports the CRDS by providing structural support for the CRDMs.
  • The CNTS supports the RCS by providing structural support for the RPV.
  • The CNTS supports the ECCS by providing structural support of the trip and reset valves for the ECCS reactor vent valves (RVVs) and reactor recirculation valves (RRVs).
  • The CNTS supports the RCS by closing the CIVs for pressurizer spray, chemical and volume control system (CVCS) makeup, CVCS letdown, and RPV high point degasification when actuated by module protection system (MPS) for RCS Isolation.
  • The CNTS supports the RXB by providing a barrier to contain mass, energy, and fission product release by closure of the CIVs upon containment isolation signal.
  • The CNTS supports the DHRS by closing CIVs for main steam and feedwater and opening DHRS actuation valves when actuated by MPS for DHRS operation.
  • The ECCS supports the RCS by opening the ECCS reactor vent valves and RRVs when their respective trip valve is actuated by MPS.
  • The DHRS supports the RCS by opening the DHRS actuation valves on a DHRS actuation signal.

Tier 1 2.1-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module

  • The CNTS supports the MPS by providing MPS actuation instrument information signals through the CNV.

The NPM performs the following nonsafety-related, risk-significant function that is verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

  • The CNTS supports the Reactor Building crane (RBC) by providing lifting attachment points that the RBC can connect to so that the NPM can be lifted.

The NPM performs the following nonsafety-related functions that are verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

  • The CNTS supports the SGS by providing structural support for the SGS piping.
  • The CNTS supports the CRDS by providing structural support for the CRDS piping.
  • The CNTS supports the RCS by providing structural support for the RCS piping.
  • The CNTS supports the feedwater system (FWS) by providing structural support for the FWS piping.

Design Commitments

  • The NPM American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping systems listed in Table 2.1-1 comply with ASME Code Section III requirements.
  • The Nuscale Power Module ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components conform to the rules of construction of ASME Code Section III.
  • The Nuscale Power Module ASME Code Class CS components conform to the rules of construction of ASME Code Section III.
  • Safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSC) are protected against the dynamic and environmental effects associated with postulated failures in high- and moderate-energy piping systems.
  • The Nuscale Power Module ASME Code Class 2 piping systems and interconnected equipment nozzles are evaluated for leak-before-break (LBB).
  • The RPV beltline material has a Charpy upper-shelf energy of 75 ft-lb minimum.
  • The CNV serves as an essentially leak-tight barrier against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment.
  • The CIV closure times limit potential releases of radioactivity.
  • The length of piping shall be minimized between the containment penetration and the associated outboard CIVs.
  • The CNTS containment electrical penetration assemblies are sized to power their design loads.
  • Physical separation exists between the redundant divisions of the MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits, and between Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits and non-Class 1E instrumentation and current-carrying circuits. The scope of this commitment includes the cables from the NPM disconnect box to the instrument.

Tier 1 2.1-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module

  • The RPV is provided with surveillance capsule holders to hold a capsule containing RPV material surveillance specimens.
  • The CNTS safety-related valves change position under design differential pressure.
  • The ECCS safety-related valves change position under design differential pressure.
  • The DHRS safety-related valves change position under design differential pressure.
  • The CNTS safety-related hydraulic-operated valves fail to their safety-related position on loss of electrical power under design differential pressure.
  • The ECCS safety-related RRVs and RVVs fail to their safety-related position on loss of electrical power to their corresponding trip valves under design differential pressure.
  • The DHRS safety-related hydraulic-operated valves fail to their safety-related position on loss of electrical power under design differential pressure.
  • The CNTS safety-related check valves change position under design differential pressure and flow.
  • A CNTS containment electrical penetration assembly is rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source, or a CNTS containment electrical penetration assembly is rated to withstand the maximum fault current for its circuits without a circuit interrupting device.

2.1.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1-4 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the NPM.

Tier 1 2.1-4 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Table 2.1-1: NuScale Power Module Piping Systems Piping System Description ASME Code High/ Evaluated for Length of Section III Moderate LBB Containment Class Energy Piping (ft)

Outside CNV CNTS reactor coolant system injection line from valves 3 High No 0 CVC-HOV-0331 & CVC-HOV-0330 at CNV nozzle CNV6 up to (see Note 1) and including CVC-CKV-0329 CNTS reactor coolant system pressurizer spray line from valves 3 High No 0 CVC-HOV-0325 & CVC-HOV-0324 at CNV nozzle CNV7 up to (see Note 1) and including CVC-CKV-0323 CNTS reactor coolant system discharge line from valves 3 High No 0 CVC-HOV-0334 & CVC-HOV-0335 at CNV nozzle CNV13 to NPM (see Note 1) disconnect flange CNTS reactor coolant system RPV high point degasification line 3 High No 0 from valves CVC-HOV-0401 & CVC-HOV-0402 at CNV nozzle (see Note 1)

CNV14 to NPM disconnect flange CNTS containment evacuation line from valves CE-HOV-0001 & N/A No No 0 CE-HOV-0002 at CNV nozzle CNV10 to NPM disconnect flange (see Note 1)

CNTS flood and drain line from valves CFD-HOV-0022 & N/A No No 0 CFD-HOV-0021 at CNV nozzle CNV11 to NPM disconnect flange (see Note 1)

CNTS control rod drive mechanism cooling water supply line N/A No No 0 from valves RCCW-HOV-0185 & RCCW-HOV-0184 at CNV nozzle (see Note 1)

CNV12 to NPM disconnect flange CNTS control rod drive mechanism cooling water return line N/A No No 0 from valves RCCW-HOV-0190 & RCCW-HOV-0191 at CNV nozzle (see Note 1)

CNV05 to NPM disconnect flange CNTS steam generator #1 feedwater line from valves N/A High No 0 FW-HOV-0137 & FW-CKV-0136 at CNV nozzle CNV1 to NPM (see Note 1) disconnect flange CNTS steam generator #2 feedwater line from valves N/A High No 0 FW-HOV-0237 & FW-CKV-0236 at CNV nozzle CNV2 to NPM (see Note 1) disconnect flange CNTS steam generator #1 steam line from CNV nozzle CNV3 to 2 High No 4 and including valves MS-HOV-0101 & MS-HOV-0103 CNTS steam generator #2 steam line from CNV nozzle CNV4 to 2 High No 4 and including valves MS-HOV-0201 & MS-HOV-0203 DHRS #1 lines from steam generator #1 steam line to DHRS 2 High No N/A Passive Condenser A including valves DHR-HOV-0101A and DHR-HOV-0101B DHRS #1 condensate line from DHRS Passive Condenser Train 1 2 High No N/A to CNV nozzle CNV22 DHRS #2 lines from steam generator #2 steam line to DHRS 2 High No N/A Passive Condenser B including valves DHR-HOV-0201A and DHR-HOV-0201B DHRS #2 condensate line from DHRS Passive Condenser Train 2 2 High No N/A to CNV nozzle CNV23 Tier 1 2.1-5 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Table 2.1-1: NuScale Power Module Piping Systems (Continued)

Piping System Description ASME Code High/ Evaluated for Length of Section III Moderate LBB Containment Class Energy Piping (ft)

Inside CNV RCS injection line from RPV nozzle RPV11 to CNV nozzle CNV6 1 High No N/A RCS pressurizer spray line from RPV nozzles RPV14 and RPV15 1 High No N/A to CNV nozzle CNV7 RCS discharge line from RPV nozzle RPV12 to CNV nozzle 1 High No N/A CNV13 RCS RPV high point degasification line from RPV nozzle RPV20 1 High No N/A to CNV nozzle CNV14 CNTS flood and drain line from CNV nozzle CNV11 to open pipe 2 No No N/A end at bottom of CNV CRDS control rod drive mechanism cooling water supply line 2 No No N/A from CNV nozzle CNV12 to CRDM heat exchangers CRDS control rod drive mechanism cooling water return line 2 No No N/A from CRDM heat exchangers to CNV nozzle CNV5 SGS steam generator #1 feedwater line from RPV nozzles RPV3 2 High Yes N/A and RPV5 to CNV nozzle CNV1 SGS steam generator #2 feedwater line from RPV nozzles RPV4 2 High Yes N/A and RPV6 to CNV nozzle CNV2 SGS steam generator #1 steam line from RPV nozzles RPV8 and 2 High Yes N/A RPV10 to CNV nozzle CNV3 SGS steam generator #2 steam line from RPV nozzles RPV7 and 2 High Yes N/A RPV9 to CNV nozzle CNV4 DHRS #1 condensate line from CNV nozzle CNV22 to SG #1 2 High No N/A feedwater line DHRS #2 condensate line from CNV nozzle CNV23 to SG #2 2 High No N/A feedwater line Note:

1) The listed component is welded directly to the safe end which is part of the containment vessel.

Tier 1 2.1-6 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Table 2.1-2: NuScale Power Module Mechanical Equipment Equipment Name Equipment Identifier ASME Code Valve Containment Section III Actuator Isolation Class Type Valve RCS integral RPV/SG/Pressurizer RPV-VSL-0001 1 N/A N/A RVI upper core plate N/A CS N/A N/A RVI core barrel N/A CS N/A N/A RVI reflector blocks N/A CS N/A N/A RVI lower core plate N/A CS N/A N/A RVI core support blocks N/A CS N/A N/A CNTS containment vessel CNT-VSL-0001 1 N/A N/A RCS reactor safety valve RCS-PSV-0003A 1 N/A No RCS reactor safety valve RCS-PSV-0003B 1 N/A No CNTS pressurizer spray check valve CVC-CKV-0323 3 N/A No CNTS injection check valve CVC-CKV-0329 3 N/A No CNTS discharge excess flow check valve CVC-CKV-0336 3 N/A No ECCS reactor vent valve ECC-HOV-0001A 1 Hydraulic No ECCS reactor vent valve trip valve ECC-SV-0101A 1 Solenoid No ECCS reactor vent valve reset valve ECC-SV-0103A 1 Solenoid No ECCS reactor vent valve ECC-HOV-0001B 1 Hydraulic No ECCS reactor vent valve trip valve ECC-SV-0101B 1 Solenoid No ECCS reactor vent valve reset valve ECC-SV-0103B 1 Solenoid No ECCS reactor vent valve ECC-HOV-0001C 1 Hydraulic No ECCS reactor vent valve trip valve Div 1 ECC-SV-0101C-1 1 Solenoid No ECCS reactor vent valve reset valve ECC-SV-0103C 1 Solenoid No ECCS reactor recirculation valve ECC-HOV-0002A 1 Hydraulic No ECCS reactor recirculation valve trip valve ECC-SV-0102A 1 Solenoid No ECCS reactor recirculation valve reset valve ECC-SV-0104A 1 Solenoid No ECCS reactor recirculation valve ECC-HOV-0002B 1 Hydraulic No ECCS reactor recirculation valve trip valve ECC-SV-0102B 1 Solenoid No ECCS reactor recirculation valve reset valve ECC-SV-0104B 1 Solenoid No ECCS reactor vent valve trip valve Div 2 ECC-SV-0101C-2 1 Solenoid No CNTS solenoid valves None 1 Solenoid No CNTS reactor coolant system injection inboard CIV CVC-HOV-0331 1 Electro- Yes hydraulic CNTS reactor coolant system injection outboard CIV CVC-HOV-0330 1 Electro- Yes hydraulic CNTS pressurizer spray inboard CIV CVC-HOV-0325 1 Electro- Yes hydraulic CNTS pressurizer spray outboard CIV CVC-HOV-0324 1 Electro- Yes hydraulic CNTS reactor coolant system discharge inboard CIV CVC-HOV-0334 1 Electro- Yes hydraulic CNTS reactor coolant system discharge outboard CIV CVC-HOV-0335 1 Electro- Yes hydraulic CNTS reactor pressure vessel high point CVC-HOV-0401 1 Electro- Yes degasification inboard CIV hydraulic CNTS reactor pressure vessel high point CVC-HOV-0402 1 Electro- Yes degasification outboard CIV hydraulic Tier 1 2.1-7 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Table 2.1-2: NuScale Power Module Mechanical Equipment (Continued)

Equipment Name Equipment Identifier ASME Code Valve Containment Section III Actuator Isolation Class Type Valve CNTS containment evacuation inboard CIV CE-HOV-0001 1 Electro- Yes hydraulic CNTS containment evacuation outboard CIV CE-HOV-0002 1 Electro- Yes hydraulic CNTS flood and drain inboard CIV CFD-HOV-0022 1 Electro- Yes hydraulic CNTS flood and drain outboard CIV CFD-HOV-0021 1 Electro- Yes hydraulic CNTS reactor component cooling water system RCCW-HOV-0185 1 Electro- Yes supply inboard CIV hydraulic CNTS reactor component cooling water system RCCW-HOV-0184 1 Electro- Yes supply outboard CIV hydraulic CNTS reactor component cooling water system RCCW-HOV-0190 1 Electro- Yes return inboard CIV hydraulic CNTS reactor component cooling water system RCCW-HOV-0191 1 Electro- Yes return outboard CIV hydraulic CNTS control rod drive system pressure relief valve CRD-RCCW-PSV-0221 2 N/A No CNTS feedwater #1 CIV FW-HOV-0137 2 Electro- Yes hydraulic CNTS feedwater line #1 check valve FW-CKV-0136 2 N/A No CNTS steam generator #1 relief valve SG-PSV-1002 2 N/A Yes CNTS feedwater #2 CIV FW-HOV-0237 2 Electro- Yes hydraulic CNTS feedwater line #2 check valve FW-CKV-0236 2 N/A No CNTS steam generator #2 relief valve SG-PSV-2002 2 N/A Yes CNTS main steam #1 CIV MS-HOV-0101 2 Electro- Yes hydraulic CNTS main steam line #1 bypass valve CIV MS-HOV-0103 2 Electro- Yes hydraulic CNTS main steam #2 CIV MS-HOV-0201 2 Electro- Yes hydraulic CNTS main steam line #2 bypass valve CIV MS-HOV-0203 2 Electro- Yes hydraulic DHRS actuation valve DHR-HOV-0101A 2 Electro- No hydraulic DHRS actuation valve DHR-HOV-0101B 2 Electro- No hydraulic DHRS actuation valve DHR-HOV-0201A 2 Electro- No hydraulic DHRS actuation valve DHR-HOV-0201B 2 Electro- No hydraulic DHRS passive condenser DHR-CND-0103 2 N/A N/A DHRS passive condenser DHR-CND-0203 2 N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-0001 2 N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-0002 2 N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-0003 2 N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-0004 2 N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-0005 2 N/A N/A Tier 1 2.1-8 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Table 2.1-2: NuScale Power Module Mechanical Equipment (Continued)

Equipment Name Equipment Identifier ASME Code Valve Containment Section III Actuator Isolation Class Type Valve CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-0006 2 N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-0007 2 N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-0008 2 N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-0009 2 N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-0010 2 N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-0011 2 N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-0012 2 N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-0013 2 N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-0014 2 N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-0015 2 N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-0016 2 N/A N/A CRDM cooling water supply flex hose CRDS-FHS-0101 thru 2 N/A N/A CRDS-FHS-0116 CRDM cooling water return flex hose CRDS-FHS-0201 thru 2 N/A N/A CRDS-FHS-0216 CRDM latch housing N/A 1 N/A N/A CRDM rod travel housing N/A 1 N/A N/A CRDM rod travel housing plug N/A 1 N/A N/A CNTS I&C Division I Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV8 1 N/A N/A (EPA)

CNTS I&C Division II Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV9 1 N/A N/A (EPA)

CNTS PZR Heater Power #1 Electrical Penetration CNV15 1 N/A N/A Assembly (EPA)

CNTS PZR Heater Power #2 Electrical Penetration CNV16 1 N/A N/A Assembly (EPA)

CNTS I&C Channel A Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV17 1 N/A N/A (EPA)

CNTS I&C Channel B Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV18 1 N/A N/A (EPA)

CNTS I&C Channel C Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV19 1 N/A N/A (EPA)

CNTS I&C Channel D Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV20 1 N/A N/A (EPA)

CNTS CRD Power Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV37 1 N/A N/A (EPA)

CNTS RPI Group #1 Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV38 1 N/A N/A (EPA)

CNTS RPI Group #2 Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV39 1 N/A N/A (EPA)

RPV Instrument Seal Assembly RPV39 1 N/A N/A RPV Instrument Seal Assembly RPV40 1 N/A N/A RPV Instrument Seal Assembly RPV41 1 N/A N/A RPV Instrument Seal Assembly RPV42 1 N/A N/A Tier 1 2.1-9 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Table 2.1-3: NuScale Power Module Electrical Equipment Equipment Name Equipment Identifier Remotely Loss of CIV Closure Operated Motive Time (sec)1 Power Position ECCS reactor vent valve trip valve ECC-SV-0101A Yes Open N/A ECCS reactor vent valve reset valve ECC-SV-0103A Yes Close N/A ECCS reactor vent valve trip valve ECC-SV-0101B Yes Open N/A ECCS reactor vent valve reset valve ECC-SV-0103B Yes Close N/A ECCS reactor vent valve trip valve Div 1 ECC-SV-0101C-1 Yes Open N/A ECCS reactor vent valve reset valve ECC-SV-0103C Yes Close N/A ECCS reactor recirculation valve trip valve ECC-SV-0102A Yes Open N/A ECCSreactor recirculation valve reset valve ECC-SV-0104A Yes Close N/A ECCS reactor recirculation valve trip valve ECC-SV-0102B Yes Open N/A ECCS reactor recirculation valve reset valve ECC-SV-0104B Yes Close N/A ECCS reactor vent valve trip valve Div 2 ECC-SV-0101C-2 Yes Open N/A CNTS reactor coolant system injection inboard CIV CVC-HOV-0331 Yes Closed 7 CNTS reactor coolant system injection outboard CIV CVC-HOV-0330 Yes Closed 7 CNTS pressurizer spray inboard CIV CVC-HOV-0325 Yes Closed 7 CNTS pressurizer spray outboard CIV CVC-HOV-0324 Yes Closed 7 CNTS reactor coolant system discharge inboard CIV CVC-HOV-0334 Yes Closed 7 CNTS reactor coolant system discharge outboard CIV CVC-HOV-0335 Yes Closed 7 CNTS reactor pressure vessel high point degasification CVC-HOV-0401 Yes Closed 7 inboard CIV CNTS reactor pressure vessel high point degasification CVC-HOV-0402 Yes Closed 7 outboard CIV CNTS containment evacuation inboard CIV CE-HOV-0001 Yes Closed 7 CNTS containment evacuation outboard CIV CE-HOV-0002 Yes Closed 7 CNTS flood and drain inboard CIV CFD-HOV-0022 Yes Closed 7 CNTS flood and drain outboard CIV CFD-HOV-0021 Yes Closed 7 CNTS reactor component cooling water system supply RCCW-HOV-0185 Yes Closed 7 inboard CIV CNTS reactor component cooling water system supply RCCW-HOV-0184 Yes Closed 7 outboard CIV CNTS reactor component cooling water system return RCCW-HOV-0190 Yes Closed 7 inboard CIV CNTS reactor component cooling water system return RCCW-HOV-0191 Yes Closed 7 outboard CIV CNTS feedwater #1 CIV FW-HOV-0137 Yes Closed 7 CNTS feedwater #2 CIV FW-HOV-0237 Yes Closed 7 CNTS main steam #1 CIV MS-HOV-0101 Yes Closed 7 CNTS main steam line #1 bypass valve CIV MS-HOV-0103 Yes Closed 7 CNTS main steam #2 CIV MS-HOV-0201 Yes Closed 7 CNTS main steam line #2 bypass valve CIV MS-HOV-0203 Yes Closed 7 DHRS actuation valve DHR-HOV-0101A Yes Open N/A DHRS actuation valve DHR-HOV-0101B Yes Open N/A DHRS actuation valve DHR-HOV-0201A Yes Open N/A DHRS actuation valve DHR-HOV-0201B Yes Open N/A CNTS I&C Division I Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV8 N/A N/A N/A (EPA)

Tier 1 2.1-10 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Table 2.1-3: NuScale Power Module Electrical Equipment (Continued)

Equipment Name Equipment Identifier Remotely Loss of CIV Closure Operated Motive Time (sec)1 Power Position CNTS I&C Division II Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV9 N/A N/A N/A (EPA)

CNTS PZR Heater Power #1 Electrical Penetration CNV15 N/A N/A N/A Assembly (EPA)

CNTS PZR Heater Power #2 Electrical Penetration CNV16 N/A N/A N/A Assembly (EPA)

CNTS I&C Channel A Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV17 N/A N/A N/A (EPA)

CNTS I&C Channel B Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV18 N/A N/A N/A (EPA)

CNTS I&C Channel C Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV19 N/A N/A N/A (EPA)

CNTS I&C Channel D Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV20 N/A N/A N/A (EPA)

CNTS CRD Power Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA) CNV37 N/A N/A N/A CNTS RPI Group #1 Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV38 N/A N/A N/A (EPA)

CNTS RPI Group #2 Electrical Penetration Assembly CNV39 N/A N/A N/A (EPA)

Tier 1 2.1-11 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Table 2.1-4: NuScale Power Module Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The NuScale Power Module ASME An inspection will be performed of the The ASME Code Section III Design Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping systems NuScale Power Module ASME Code Reports (NCA-3550) exist and listed in Table 2.1-1 comply with ASME Class 1, 2 and 3 as-built piping system conclude that the NuScale Power Code Section III requirements. Design Reports required by ASME Module ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 as-Code Section III. built piping systems listed in Table 2.1-1 meet the requirements of ASME Code Section III.
2. The NuScale Power Module ASME An inspection will be performed of the ASME Code Section III Data Reports for Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components NuScale Power Module ASME Code the NuScale Power Module ASME conform to the rules of construction of Class 1, 2, and 3 as-built component Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components ASME Code Section III. Data Reports required by ASME Code listed in Table 2.1-2 and Section III. interconnecting piping exist and conclude that the requirements of ASME Code Section III are met.
3. The NuScale Power Module ASME An inspection will be performed of the ASME Code Section III Data Reports for Code Class CS components conform to NuScale Power Module ASME Code the NuScale Power Module ASME the rules of construction of ASME Class CS as-built component Data Code Class CS components listed in Code Section III. Reports required by ASME Code Table 2.1-2 exist and conclude that the Section III. requirements of ASME Code Section III are met.
4. Safety-related SSC are protected An inspection and analysis will be Protective features are installed in against the dynamic and performed of the as-built high- and accordance with the as-built Pipe environmental effects associated with moderate-energy piping systems and Break Hazard Analysis Report and postulated failures in high- and protective features for the safety-related SSC are protected moderate-energy piping systems. safety-related SSC. against or qualified to withstand the dynamic and environmental effects associated with postulated failures in high- and moderate-energy piping systems.
5. The NuScale Power Module ASME An analysis will be performed of the The as-built LBB analysis for the ASME Code Class 2 piping systems and ASME Code Class 2 as-built piping Code Class 2 piping systems listed in interconnected equipment nozzles are systems and interconnected Table 2.1-1 and interconnected evaluated for LBB. equipment nozzles. equipment nozzles is bounded by the as-designed LBB analysis.
6. The RPV beltline material has a Charpy A vendor test will be performed of the An ASME Code Certified Material Test upper-shelf energy of 75 ft-lb Charpy V-Notch specimen of the RPV Report exists and concludes that the minimum. beltline material. initial RPV beltline material Charpy upper-shelf energy is 75 ft-lb minimum.
7. The CNV serves as an essentially leak- A leakage test will be performed of the The leakage rate for local leak rate tight barrier against the uncontrolled pressure containing or leakage- tests (Type B and Type C) for pressure release of radioactivity to the limiting boundaries, and CIVs. containing or leakage-limiting environment. boundaries and CIVs meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J.
8. Containment isolation valve closure A test will be performed of the Each CIV listed in Table 2.1-3 travels times limit potential releases of automatic CIVs. from the full open to full closed radioactivity. position in less than or equal to the time listed in Table 2.1-3 after receipt of a containment isolation signal.

Tier 1 2.1-12 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Table 2.1-4: NuScale Power Module Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

9. The length of piping shall be An inspection will be performed of the The length of piping between each minimized between the containment as-built piping between containment containment penetration and its penetration and the associated penetrations and associated outboard associated outboard CIV is less than or outboard CIVs. CIVs. equal to the length identified in Table 2.1-1.
10. The CNTS containment electrical i. An analysis will be performed of i. An electrical rating report exists penetration assemblies are sized to the CNTS as-designed that defines and identifies the power their design loads. containment electrical penetration required design electrical rating to assemblies. power the design loads of each CNTS containment electrical penetration assembly listed in Table 2.1-3.

ii. An inspection will be performed of ii. The electrical rating of each CNTS CNTS as-built containment containment electrical penetration electrical penetration assembly. assembly listed in Table 2.1-3 is greater than or equal to the required design electrical rating as specified in the electrical rating report.

11. Physical separation exists between the An inspection will be performed of the i. Physical separation between redundant divisions of the MPS Class MPS Class 1E as-built instrumentation redundant divisions of MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control and control current-carrying circuits. 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits, and between current-carrying circuits is Class 1E instrumentation and control provided by a minimum current-carrying circuits and non-Class separation distance, or by barriers 1E instrumentation and current- (where the minimum separation carrying circuits. The scope of this distances cannot be maintained),

commitment includes the cables from or by a combination of separation the NPM disconnect box to the distance and barriers.

instrument. ii. Physical separation between MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits and non-Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits is provided by a minimum separation distance, or by barriers (where the minimum separation distances cannot be maintained),

or by a combination of separation distance and barriers.

12. The RPV is provided with surveillance An inspection will be performed of the Four surveillance capsule holders are capsule holders to hold a capsule as-built RPV surveillance capsule installed in the RPV beltline region at containing RPV material surveillance holders. approximately 90 degree intervals.

specimens.

13. The remotely-operated CNTS A test will be performed of the CNTS Each remotely-operated CNTS containment isolation valves change safety-related valves under containment isolation valve listed in position under design-basis preoperational temperature, Table 2.1-2 strokes fully open and fully temperature, differential pressure, and differential pressure, and flow closed by remote operation under flow conditions. conditions. preoperational temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions.

Tier 1 2.1-13 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Table 2.1-4: NuScale Power Module Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

14. The ECCS safety-related valves change A test will be performed of the ECCS Each ECCS safety-related valve listed in position under design-basis safety-related valves under Table 2.1-2 strokes fully open and fully temperature, differential pressure, and preoperational temperature, closed by remote operation under flow conditions. differential pressure, and flow preoperational temperature, conditions. differential pressure, and flow conditions.
15. The DHRS safety-related valves change A test will be performed of the DHRS Each DHRS safety-related valve listed position under design-basis safety-related valves under in Table 2.1-2 strokes fully open and temperature, differential pressure, and preoperational temperature, fully closed by remote operation flow conditions. differential pressure, and flow under preoperational temperature, conditions. differential pressure, and flow conditions.
16. Not used. Not used. Not used.
17. Not used. Not used. Not used.
18. The CNTS safety-related A test will be performed of the CNTS Each CNTS safety-related hydraulic-operated valves fail to their safety-related hydraulic-operated hydraulic-operated valve listed in safety-related position on loss of valves under preoperational Table 2.1-2 fails to its safety-related electrical power under design-basis temperature, differential pressure, and position on loss of motive power temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions. under preoperational temperature, flow conditions. differential pressure, and flow conditions.
19. The ECCS safety-related RRVs and RVVs A test will be performed of the ECCS Each ECCS safety-related RRV and RVV fail to their safety-related position on safety-related RRVs and RVVs under listed in Table 2.1-2 fails open on loss loss of electrical power to their preoperational temperature, of electrical power to its corresponding trip valves under differential pressure, and flow corresponding trip valve under design-basis temperature, differential conditions. preoperational temperature, pressure, and flow conditions. differential pressure, and flow conditions.
20. The DHRS safety-related hydraulic- A test will be performed of the DHRS Each DHRS safety-related hydraulic-operated valves fail to their safety- safety-related hydraulic-operated operated valve listed in Table 2.1-2 related position on loss of electrical valves under preoperational fails open on loss of motive power power under design-basis temperature, differential pressure, and under preoperational temperature, temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions. differential pressure, and flow flow conditions. conditions.
21. The CNTS safety-related check valves A test will be performed of the CNTS Each CNTS safety-related check valve change position under design-basis safety-related check valves under listed in Table 2.1-2 strokes fully open temperature, differential pressure, and preoperational temperature, and closed (under forward and reverse flow conditions. differential pressure, and flow flow conditions, respectively) under conditions. preoperational temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions.

Tier 1 2.1-14 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Table 2.1-4: NuScale Power Module Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

22. i. A CNTS containment electrical i. An analysis will be performed of the i. A circuit interrupting device penetration assembly is rated to CNTS as-built containment electrical coordination analysis exists and withstand fault currents for the time penetration assembly. concludes that the current carrying required to clear the fault from its capability for each CNTS containment power source. electrical penetration assembly listed OR in Table 2.1-3 is greater than the analyzed fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

OR ii. A CNTS containment electrical ii. An analysis of the CNTS containment penetration assembly is rated to penetration maximum fault current withstand the maximum fault current exists and concludes the fault current for its circuits without a circuit is less than the current carrying interrupting device. capability of the CNTS containment electrical penetration

23. The CNV serves as an essentially A preservice design pressure leakage No water leakage is observed at CNV leaktight barrier against the test of the CNV will be performed. bolted flange connections.

uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment.

Tier 1 2.1-15 Revision 2

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Figure 2.1-1: Containment System (Isolation Valves)

NOTE:

ALL COMPONENTS NOT WITHIN A DASHED BOX ARE PART OF THE CNTS.

MS CES CFDS CVCS RCCW FW MS TO MS TO/FROM CFD FROM CVC FROM CVC FROM RCCW FROM FW FROM FW CNT MS-HOV-0101 E MS-HOV-0103 E H H DHRS TO CE TO CVC TO CVC TO RCCW TO DHRS CE CFD CVC CVC CVC CVC RCCW RCCW FW FW TO DHRS CNT DHRS MS CNT CNT CNT CNT CNT CNT CNT CNT CNT CNT MS TO MS CVC-CKV-0336 CVC-CKV-0329 CVC-CKV-0323 CNT MS-HOV-0201 E MS-HOV-0203 E H H CE-HOV-0002 E CFD-HOV-0021 E CVC-HOV-0335 E CVC-HOV-0330 E CVC-HOV-0324 E CVC-HOV-0402 E RCCW-HOV-0184 E RCCW-HOV-0191 E H H H H H H H H DHRS TO DHRS TO DHRS CNT DHRS FW-CKV-0136 FW-CKV-0236 CE-HOV-0001 E CFD-HOV-0022 E CVC-HOV-0334 E CVC-HOV-0331 E CVC-HOV-0325 E CVC-HOV-0401 E RCCW-HOV-0185 E RCCW-HOV-0190 E FW-HOV-0137 E FW-HOV-0237 E H H H H H H H H H H CNV4 CNV10 CNV11 CNV13 CNV6 CNV7 CNV14 CNV12 CNV5 CNV1 CNV2 CNV3 2.1-16 CNT CNT CNT CNT CNT CNT CNT CNT CNT CNT NOTE:

TO RCS TO RCS TO CRDS ALL COMPONENTS NOT WITHIN A CRDS CRDS DASHED BOX ARE PART OF THE CNTS RCS RCS RCS RCS SG SG SG SG FROM RCS FROM RCS FROM CRDS FROM SG 1 FROM SG 2 SGS-PSV-1002 SGS-PSV-2002 DHRS COUPLER RCS CRDS CNV22 TO SG TO SG FROM TO SG DHRS CNV23 FROM TO SG DHRS SGS NuScale Power Module Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Chemical and Volume Control System 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System 2.2.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is the chemical and volume control system (CVCS). The system purifies reactor coolant, manages reactor coolant chemistry, provides reactor coolant inventory injection and discharge, and supplies spray flow to the pressurizer to reduce the reactor coolant system pressure. The CVCS is nonsafety-related. Each NuScale Power Module (NPM) has its own module-specific CVCS. The Reactor Building houses all CVCS equipment.

The CVCS performs the following safety-related system functions that are verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

  • The CVCS supports the RCS by isolating dilution sources.

Design Commitments

  • The chemical and volume control system American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 3 piping complies with the ASME Code Section III.
  • The chemical and volume control system ASME Code Class 3 components conform to the rules of construction of ASME Code Section III.
  • The chemical and volume control system ASME Code Class 3 air-operated demineralized water system supply isolation valves change position under design differential pressure.
  • The chemical and volume control system ASME Code Class 3 air-operated demineralized water system supply isolation valves fail to or maintain their safety-related position on loss of motive power under design differential pressure.

2.2.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.2-3 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the CVCS.

Tier 1 2.2-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Chemical and Volume Control System Table 2.2-1: Chemical and Volume Control System Piping Piping System Description ASME Code Section III Class Demineralized water supply line between valves CVC-AOV-0089 and CVC-AOV-0090 3 Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) discharge line from the NPM disconnect flange downstream of 3 containment isolation valve CVC-HOV-0335 up to and including isolation valve CVC-AOV-0001 and including NPM removable spool piece RPV high point degasification line from the NPM disconnect flange downstream of 3 containment isolation valve CVC-HOV-0402 up to and including isolation valve CVC-SV-0079 and NPM removable spool piece Tier 1 2.2-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Chemical and Volume Control System Table 2.2-2: Chemical and Volume Control System Mechanical Equipment Equipment Name Equipment Identifier ASME Code Loss of Motive Section III Class Power Position Demineralized water system supply isolation valve CVC-AOV-0089 3 Closed Demineralized water system supply isolation valve CVC-AOV-0090 3 Closed RPV discharge isolation valve CVC-AOV-0001 3 N/A RPV high point degasification isolation valve CVC-SV-0079 3 N/A Tier 1 2.2-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Chemical and Volume Control System Table 2.2-3: Chemical and Volume Control System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 The chemical and volume control An inspection will be performed of The ASME Code Section III Design Report system ASME Code Class 3 piping the chemical and volume control (NCA-3550) exists and concludes that system complies with the ASME Code system ASME Code Class 3 as-built the chemical and volume control system Section III. piping system Design Report ASME Code Class 3 as-built piping required by ASME Code Section III. system meets the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

2 The chemical and volume control An inspection will be performed of ASME Code Section III Data Reports for system ASME Code Class 3 the chemical and volume control the chemical and volume control system components conform to the rules of system ASME Code Class 3 as-built ASME Code Class 3 components listed in construction of ASME Code Section III component Data Reports required by Table 2.2-2 and interconnecting piping ASME Code Section III. exist and conclude that the requirements of ASME Code Section III are met.

3 The chemical and volume control A test will be performed of the Each chemical and volume control system ASME Code Class 3 chemical and volume control system system ASME Code Class 3 air-operated air-operated demineralized water ASME Code Class 3 air-operated demineralized water system supply system supply isolation valves demineralized water system supply isolation valve listed in Table 2.2-2 change position under design-basis isolation valves under preoperational strokes fully open and fully closed by temperature, differential pressure, temperature, differential pressure, remote operation under preoperational and flow conditions. and flow conditions. temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions.

4 Not used. Not used. Not used.

5 The chemical and volume control A test will be performed of the Each chemical and volume control system ASME Code Class 3 chemical and volume control system system ASME Code Class 3 air-operated air-operated demineralized water ASME Code Class 3 air-operated demineralized water system supply system supply isolation valves demineralized water system supply isolation valve listed in Table 2.2-2 perform their function to fail (or isolation valves under preoperational performs fails closed on loss of motive maintain) their position on loss of temperature, differential pressure power under preoperational motive power under design-basis and flow conditions. temperature, differential pressure, and temperature, differential pressure, flow conditions.

and flow conditions.

Tier 1 2.2-4 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Containment Evacuation System 2.3 Containment Evacuation System 2.3.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is the containment evacuation system (CES). Water vapor and non-condensable gases are removed from the containment vessel by the CES. The water vapor is collected and condensed into the CES sample vessel where it is monitored using level and temperature instrumentation. The CES pressure instrumentation and sample vessel level instrumentation is used to quantify and trend leak rates in the containment.

The CES is a non-safety related system. Each NuScale Power Module (NPM) has its own module-specific CES. The Reactor Building houses all CES equipment.

The CES performs the following non-safety related system functions that are verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

Design Commitments

  • The CES level instrumentation supports RCS leakage detection.
  • The CES pressure instrumentation supports RCS leakage detection.

2.3.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.3-1 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the CES.

Tier 1 2.3-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Containment Evacuation System Table 2.3-1: Containment Evacuation System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The CES level instrumentation A test will be performed of the CES. The CES detects a level increase in the supports RCS leakage detection. CES sample tank, which correlates to a detection of an unidentified RCS leakage rate of one gpm within one hour.
2. The CES pressure instrumentation A test will be performed of the CES. The CES detects a pressure increase in supports RCS leakage detection. the CES inlet pressure instrumentation (PIT-1001/PIT1019), which correlates to a detection of an unidentified RCS leakage rate of one gpm within one hour.

Tier 1 2.3-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Not Used 2.4 Not Used Tier 1 2.4-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Not Used Table 2.4-1: Not Used Tier 1 2.4-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System 2.5 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System 2.5.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is the module protection system (MPS) and its associated components in the safety display and indication system (SDIS). The primary purpose of the MPS is to monitor process variables and provide automatic initiating signals in response to out-of-normal conditions to provide protection against unsafe reactor operation during steady state and transient power operation. The MPS is a safety-related system. Each NuScale Power Module has its own independent MPS and SDIS. The Reactor Building and the Control Building house all MPS and SDIS equipment.

The MPS is comprised of the reactor trip system (RTS) and the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS). The RTS is responsible for monitoring key variables and shutting down the reactor when specified limits are reached. The ESFAS is responsible for monitoring key variables and actuating the engineered safety features (ESF) such as the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and the decay heat removal system (DHRS) when specified limits are reached.

The MPS performs the following safety-related system functions that are verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

  • The MPS supports the containment system (CNTS) by removing electrical power to the trip solenoids of the following containment isolation valves (CIVs) on a containment system isolation actuation signal:

reactor coolant system (RCS) injection CIVs RCS discharge CIVs pressurizer spray CIVs reactor pressure vessel (RPV) high point degasification containment isolation valves feedwater CIVs main steam CIVs main steam bypass valves containment evacuation (CE) system CIVs reactor component cooling water CIVs containment flooding and drain system (CFDS) containment isolation valves

  • The MPS supports the CNTS by removing electrical power to the trip solenoids of the following valves on a DHRS actuation signal:

DHRS actuation valves main steam CIVs main steam bypass valves Tier 1 2.5-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System feedwater CIVs

  • The MPS supports the ECCS by removing electrical power to the trip solenoids of the following valves on an ECCS actuation signal:

reactor vent valves reactor recirculation valves

  • The MPS supports the CNTS by removing electrical power to the trip solenoids of the following CIVs on a chemical and volume control isolation actuation signal:

RCS injection CIVs RCS discharge CIVs Pressurizer spray CIVs RPV high point degasification CIVs

  • The MPS supports the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) by removing electrical power to the trip solenoids of the demineralized water system supply isolation valves on a demineralized water system isolation actuation signal.
  • The MPS supports the ECCS by removing electrical power to the trip solenoids of the reactor vent valves on a low temperature overpressure protection actuation signal.
  • The MPS supports the low voltage AC electrical distribution system (ELVS) by removing electrical power to the pressurizer heaters on a pressurizer heater trip actuation signal.
  • The MPS supports the following systems by providing power to sensors for reactor trip and ESFAS actuation:

CNTS RCS DHRS (main steam system pressure sensors)

The MPS performs the following nonsafety-related system function that is verified by ITAAC.

  • The MPS supports the following systems by providing power to sensors for post-accident monitoring (PAM) Type B and Type C variables:

CNTS RCS The primary purpose of the SDIS is to provide accurate, complete and timely information pertinent to MPS status and information displays. The SDIS provides display panels of MPS post-accident monitoring variables to support manually controlled protective actions if required.

Tier 1 2.5-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System The SDIS performs the following nonsafety-related system function that is verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

  • The SDIS supports the main control room (MCR) by providing displays of PAM Type B and Type C variables.

Design Commitments

  • The MPS design and software are implemented using a quality process composed of the following software lifecycle phases, with each phase having outputs that satisfy the requirements of that phase:

system functional specification phase system design phase system prototype development phase equipment requirements specification phase hardware planning phase hardware requirements phase hardware design phase.

software planning phase software requirements phase software design phase software implementation phase software configuration phase system testing phase system installation phase

  • Protective measures are provided to restrict modifications to the MPS tunable parameters.
  • Physical separation exists between the redundant separation groups and divisions of the MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits, and between Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits and non-Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits.
  • Electrical isolation exists between the redundant separation groups and divisions of the MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control circuits, and between Class 1E instrumentation and control circuits and non-Class 1E instrumentation and control circuits to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.
  • Electrical isolation exists between the highly reliable DC power system-module-specific (EDSS-MS) subsystem non-Class 1E circuits and connected MPS 1E circuits to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.
  • Communications independence exists between redundant separation groups and divisions of the Class 1E MPS.

Tier 1 2.5-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System

  • Communications independence exists between the Class 1E MPS and non-Class 1E digital systems.
  • The MPS automatically initiates an ESF actuation signal.
  • The MPS automatically actuates the ESF equipment.
  • The MPS manually actuates the ESF equipment.
  • The reactor trip logic fails to a safe state such that loss of electrical power to an MPS separation group or division results in a trip state for that separation group or division.
  • The ESFs logic fails to a safe state such that loss of electrical power to an MPS separation group or division results in a predefined safe state for that separation group or division.
  • An MPS signal, once initiated automatically or manually, results in an intended sequence of protective actions that continue until completion, and requires deliberate operator action in order to return the safety systems to normal.
  • The MPS response times from sensor output through equipment actuation for the reactor trip functions and engineered safety feature functions are less than or equal to the value required to satisfy the design basis safety analysis response time assumptions.
  • The MPS interlocks function as required when associated conditions are met.
  • The MPS permissives function as required when associated conditions are met.
  • The MPS overrides function as required when associated conditions are met.
  • The MPS is capable of performing its safety-related functions when one of its separation channels is placed in maintenance bypass.
  • The MPS operational bypasses are indicated in the MCR.
  • The MPS maintenance bypasses are indicated in the MCR.
  • The MPS self-test features detect faults in the system and provide an alarm in the MCR.
  • The PAM Type B and Type C displays are indicated on the SDIS displays in the MCR.
  • The controls located on the operator workstations in the MCR operate to perform important human actions (IHAs).
  • The reactor trip breakers (RTBs) are installed and arranged in order to successfully accomplish the reactor trip function under design conditions.
  • Two of the four separation groups and one of the two divisions of RTS and ESFAS will utilize a different programmable technology.
  • The MCR isolation switches that isolate the manual MCR switches from MPS in case of a fire in the MCR are located in the remote shutdown station (RSS).

Tier 1 2.5-4 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System 2.5.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.5-7 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the MPS and SDIS.

Tier 1 2.5-5 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-1: Module Protection System Automatic Reactor Trip Functions Parameter Input Variable Interlock/Permissive High source range count rate Source range count rate N-1 High source range log power rate Source range log power N-1 High intermediate range log power rate Intermediate range log power N-2L High-1 power range linear power Power range linear power N-2L High-2 power range linear power Power range linear power None High power range positive rate Power range rate (calculated from power N-2H range power)

High power range negative rate Power range rate (calculated from power N-2H range power)

High narrow range containment pressure Narrow range containment pressure None High narrow range RCS hot temperature Narrow range RCS hot temperature (NR RCS L-1 Thot)

High pressurizer level Pressurizer level None High pressurizer pressure Pressurizer pressure None High main steam pressure Steam Generator Main steam pressure (DHRS inlet pressure) None (SG) 1 High main steam pressure SG 2 Main steam pressure (DHRS inlet pressure) None High steam superheat SG 1 Main steam pressure (DHRS inlet pressure) None Main steam temperature (DHRS inlet temperature)

High steam superheat SG 2 Main steam pressure (DHRS inlet pressure) None Main steam temperature (DHRS inlet temperature)

Low AC Voltage to battery chargers ELVS voltage None Low low RCS flow RCS flow None Low pressurizer level Pressurizer level None Low pressurizer pressure Pressurizer pressure T-4 Low low pressurizer pressure Pressurizer pressure None Low main steam pressure SG 1 Main steam pressure (DHRS inlet pressure) N-2H Low main steam pressure SG 2 Main steam pressure (DHRS inlet pressure) N-2H Low low main steam pressure SG 1 Main steam pressure (DHRS inlet pressure) None Low low main steam pressure SG 2 Main steam pressure (DHRS inlet pressure) None Low steam superheat SG 1 Main steam pressure (DHRS inlet pressure) None Main steam temperature (DHRS inlet temperature)

Low steam superheat SG 2 Main steam pressure (DHRS inlet pressure) None Main steam temperature (DHRS inlet temperature)

High under-the-bioshield temperature Under-the-bioshield temperature None Tier 1 2.5-6 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-2: Module Protection System Automatic Engineered Safety Feature Functions Engineered Safety Feature Protective Input Variable Interlock/Permissive Function ESFAS - ECCS actuation High containment water level Containment water level T-3 Low RPV riser level RPV riser level None Low ELVS voltage 24-hour ELVS voltage None timer ESFAS - DHRS actuation High narrow range Narrow range containment T-3 containment pressure pressure L-1 High narrow range RCS hot Narrow range RCS hot L-1 temperature temperature (NR RCS Thot)

High pressurizer pressure Pressurizer pressure L-1 High main steam pressure SG Main steam pressure (DHRS L-1 1 inlet pressure)

High main steam pressure SG Main steam pressure (DHRS L-1 2 inlet pressure)

High steam superheat SG 1 Main steam pressure (DHRS L-1 inlet pressure)

Main steam temperature (DHRS inlet temperature)

High steam superheat SG 2 Main steam pressure (DHRS L-1 inlet pressure)

Main steam temperature (DHRS inlet temperature)

Low AC Voltage to battery ELVS voltage None chargers Low low pressurizer level Pressurizer level T-2 L-1 Low pressurizer pressure Pressurizer pressure T-4 L-1 Low low pressurizer pressure Pressurizer pressure T-3 L-1 Low main steam pressure SG Main steam pressure (DHRS N-2H 1 inlet pressure)

Low main steam pressure SG Main steam pressure (DHRS N-2H 2 inlet pressure)

Low low main steam pressure Main steam pressure (DHRS L-1 SG 1 inlet pressure)

Low low main steam pressure Main steam pressure (DHRS L-1 SG 2 inlet pressure)

Low steam superheat SG 1 Main steam pressure (DHRS L-1 inlet pressure)

Main steam temperature (DHRS inlet temperature)

Low steam superheat SG 2 Main steam pressure (DHRS L-1 inlet pressure)

Main steam temperature (DHRS inlet temperature)

High under-the-bioshield Under-the-bioshield None temperature temperature Tier 1 2.5-7 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-2: Module Protection System Automatic Engineered Safety Feature Functions (Continued)

Engineered Safety Feature Protective Input Variable Interlock/Permissive Function ESFAS - containment system High narrow range Narrow range containment T-3 isolation containment pressure pressure Low ELVS 480VAC to EDSS ELVS bus voltage None battery chargers Low low pressurizer level Pressurizer level T-2 High under-the-bioshield Under-the-bioshield None temperature temperature ESFAS - demineralized water High subcritical Source range count rate N-1 system isolation multiplication Low RCS flow RCS flow None Automatic reactor trip N/A N/A Manual reactor trip N/A N/A ESFAS - chemical and volume High narrow range Narrow range containment T-3 control system isolation containment pressure pressure High pressurizer level Pressurizer level None Low low pressurizer level Pressurizer level T-2 Low pressurizer pressure Pressurizer pressure T-4 Low low pressurizer pressure Pressurizer pressure T-3 Low low RCS flow RCS flow F-1 ESFAS - pressurizer heater trip Low pressurizer level Pressurizer level None Automatic DHRS actuation N/A N/A Manual DHRS actuation N/A N/A Automatic containment N/A N/A isolation Manual containment isolation N/A N/A Low temperature overpressure Low temperature interlock Wide range RCS cold T-1 protection actuation with high pressure temperature (WR RCS Tcold)

Wide range RCS pressure Tier 1 2.5-8 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-3: Module Protection System Manual Switches Reactor trip Neutron flux trip bypass ECCS actuation Containment isolation actuation DHRS actuation CVCS isolation actuation Demineralized water system isolation actuation Pressurizer heater trip Low temperature overpressure protection actuation ESFAS actuation isolation CNTS isolation override Tier 1 2.5-9 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-4: Module Protection System Interlocks/Permissives/Overrides Interlock/Permissive/Override F-1 RCS flow interlock L-1 Containment water level interlock N-1 Intermediate range log power interlock/permissive N-2H Power range linear power interlock N-2L Power range linear power interlock/permissive O-1 CNTS isolation override RT-1 Reactor tripped interlock T-1 Wide range RCS cold temperature interlock T-2 Wide range RCS hot temperature interlock T-3 Wide range RCS hot temperature interlock T-4 Narrow range RCS hot temperature interlock Tier 1 2.5-10 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-5: Safety Display and Indication System Accident Monitoring Variables Variable Type B Type C Source range count rate X Intermediate range log power X Power range linear power X Neutron monitoring system-flood X Core exit temperature X X Core inlet temperature X Wide range RCS pressure X X Degrees of subcooling (calculated from WR RCS Thot and WR RCS pressure) X Wide range RCS hot temperature X RPV riser level X X Wide range containment pressure X X Containment water level X X CIV positions X X Inside bioshield area radiation monitor X X Narrow range containment pressure X Tier 1 2.5-11 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-6: Important Human Actions Controls Tag No. Component Description Operation CFDS Emergency Flooding MPS-HS-1S-0001 Division I enable nonsafety control switch Enable MPS-HS-2S-0001 Division II enable nonsafety control switch Enable MPS-HS-1S-0004 Division I override switch Override MPS-HS-2S-0004 Division II override switch Override CFD-AOV-0108 Containment drain inlet valve Close CFD-AOV-0109 Containment drain discharge valve Close CFD-AOV-0112 Containment drain separator gas discharge valve Close CFD-AOV-0128 Module flood isolation valve Open/Close CFD-AOV-0125 Module flood isolation valve Open/Close CFD-AOV-0122 Module flood isolation valve Open/Close CFD-AOV-0119 Module flood isolation valve Open/Close CFD-AOV-0116 Module flood isolation valve Open/Close CFD-AOV-0113 Module flood isolation valve Open/Close CFD-AOV-0102 Pool suction isolation valve Open CFD-AOV-0107 CFDS flood/drain selector valve Open CFD-FCV-0106 CFDS pump discharge flow control valve Open CFD-HV-0132 System priming valve Open/Close CFD-HV-0139A CFDS pump A case vent valve Open/Close CFD-HV-0139B CFDS pump B case vent valve Open/Close CNT-CFD-ISV-0129 Module flood outboard CIV Open/Close CNT-CFD-ISV-0130 Module flood inboard CIV Open/Close CFD-P-0001A CFDS pump A Start/Stop CFD-P-0001B CFDS pump B Start/Stop CVCS Injection Following Containment Isolation MPS-HS-1S-0001 Division I enable nonsafety control switch Enable MPS-HS-2S-0001 Division II enable nonsafety control switch Enable MPS-HS-1S-0004 Division I override switch Override MPS-HS-2S-0004 Division II override switch Override BAS-P-0007A Boric acid supply pump A Start/Stop BAS-P-0007B Boric acid supply pump B Start/Stop BAS-AOV-0130 CVCS makeup aligning valve Open CVC-AOV-0110 Boric acid supply to CVCS makeup pumps Open CVC-AOV-0113 CVCS three-way valve Open CVC-AOV-0124 CVCS isolation valve Open CVC-AOV-0311 CVCS isolation valve Open CVC-AOV-0312 CVCS to module heatup system isolation valve Open CVC-AOV-0313 CVCS from module heatup system isolation valve Open CVC-MOV-0318 CVCS isolation valve Open CVC-FCV-0356 CVCS isolation valve Open CVC-MOV-0319 CVCS isolation valve Open CNT-CVC-ISV-0329 RCS injection CIV Open/Close CNT-CVC-ISV-0331 RCS injection CIV Open/Close CNT-CVC-ISV-0323 Pressurizer spray CIV Open/Close CNT-CVC-ISV-0325 Pressurizer spray CIV Open/Close Tier 1 2.5-12 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-6: Important Human Actions Controls (Continued)

Tag No. Component Description Operation CVC-P-0002A CVCS makeup pump A Start/Stop CVC-P-0002B CVCS makeup pump B Start/Stop Tier 1 2.5-13 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-7: Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The MPS design and software are i. An analysis will be performed of i. The output documentation of the implemented using a quality the output documentation of the MPS Functional Specification Phase process composed of the following System Functional Specification satisfies the requirements of the system design lifecycle phases, with Phase. System Functional Specification each phase having outputs which Phase.

satisfy the requirements of that ii. An analysis will be performed of ii. The output documentation of the phase. the output documentation of the MPS Design Phase satisfies the

  • System Functional Specification System Design Phase. requirements of the System Design Phase Phase.
  • System Design Phase iii. An analysis will be performed of iii. The output documentation of the
  • System Prototype Development the output documentation of the MPS Prototype Development Phase Phase System Prototype Development satisfies the requirements of the
  • Equipment Requirements Phase. System Prototype Development Specification Phase Phase.
  • Hardware Planning Phase iv. An analysis will be performed of iv. The output documentation of the
  • Hardware Requirements Phase the output documentation of the MPS Equipment Requirements
  • Hardware Design Phase Equipment Requirements Specification Phase satisfies the
  • Software Planning Phase Specification Phase. requirements of the Equipment
  • Software Requirements Phase Requirements Specification Phase.
  • Software Design Phase
  • Software Implementation Phase v. An analysis will be performed of v. The output documentation of the
  • Software Configuration Phase the output documentation of the MPS Hardware Planning Phase
  • System Testing Phase Hardware Planning Phase. satisfies the requirements of the
  • System Installation Phase Hardware Planning Phase.

vi. An analysis will be performed of vi. The output documentation of the the output documentation of the MPS Hardware Requirements Phase Hardware Requirements Phase. satisfies the requirements of the Hardware Requirements Phase.

vii. An analysis will be performed of vii. The output documentation of the the output documentation of the MPS Hardware Design Phase satisfies Hardware Design Phase. the requirements of the Hardware Design Phase.

viii. An analysis will be performed of viii. The output documentation of the the output documentation of the MPS Software Planning Phase Software Planning Phase. satisfies the requirements of the Software Planning Phase.

ix. An analysis will be performed of ix. The output documentation of the the output documentation of the MPS Software Requirements Phase Software Requirements Phase. satisfies the requirements of the Software Requirements Phase.

x. An analysis will be performed of x. The output documentation of the the output documentation of the MPS Software Design Phase satisfies Software Design Phase. the requirements of the Software Design Phase.

xi. An analysis will be performed of xi. The output documentation of the the output documentation of the MPS Software Implementation Phase Software Implementation Phase. satisfies the requirements of the Software Implementation Phase.

xii. An analysis will be performed of xii. The output documentation of the the output documentation of the MPS Software Configuration Phase Software Configuration Phase. satisfies the requirements of the Software Configuration Phase.

Tier 1 2.5-14 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-7: Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria xiii. An analysis will be performed of xiii. The output documentation of the the output documentation of the MPS Testing Phase satisfies the System Testing Phase. requirements of the System Testing Phase.

xiv. An analysis will be performed of xiv. The output documentation of the the output documentation of the MPS Installation Phase satisfies the System Installation Phase. requirements of the System Installation Phase.

2. Protective measures are provided to A test will be performed on the access Protective measures restrict modification restrict modifications to the MPS control features associated with MPS to the MPS tunable parameters without tunable parameters. tunable parameters. proper configuration and authorization.
3. Physical separation exists between An inspection will be performed of i. Physical separation between the redundant separation groups the MPS Class 1E as-built redundant separation groups and and divisions of the MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control current- divisions of MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control carrying circuits. instrumentation and control current-current-carrying circuits, and carrying circuits is provided by a between Class 1E instrumentation minimum separation distance, or by and control current-carrying circuits barriers (where the minimum and non-Class 1E instrumentation separation distances cannot be and control current-carrying circuits. maintained), or by a combination of separation distance and barriers.

ii. Physical separation between MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits and non-Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits is provided by a minimum separation distance, or by barriers (where the minimum separation distances cannot be maintained), or by a combination of separation distance and barriers.

4. Electrical isolation exists between An inspection will be performed of i. Class 1E electrical isolation devices the redundant separation groups the MPS Class 1E as-built are installed between redundant and divisions of the MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control circuits. separation groups and divisions of instrumentation and control circuits, MPS Class 1E instrumentation and and between Class 1E control circuits.

instrumentation and control circuits ii. Class 1E electrical isolation devices and non-Class 1E instrumentation are installed between MPS Class 1E and control circuits to prevent the instrumentation and control circuits propagation of credible electrical and non-Class 1E instrumentation faults. and control circuits.

5. Electrical isolation exists between i. A type test, analysis, or a i. The Class 1E circuit does not degrade the EDSS-MS subsystem non-Class combination of type test and below defined acceptable operating 1E circuits and connected MPS Class analysis will be performed of the levels when the non-Class 1E side of 1E circuits to prevent the Class 1E isolation devices. the isolation device is subjected to propagation of credible electrical the maximum credible voltage, faults. current transients, shorts, grounds, or open circuits.

ii. An inspection will be performed ii. Class 1E electrical isolation devices of the MPS Class 1E as-built are installed between the EDSS-MS circuits. Subsystem non-Class 1E circuits and connected MPS Class 1E circuits.

Tier 1 2.5-15 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-7: Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

6. Communications independence A test will be performed of the Class Communications independence between exists between redundant 1E MPS. redundant separation groups and separation groups and divisions of divisions of the Class 1E MPS is provided.

the Class 1E MPS.

7. Communications independence A test will be performed of the Class Communications independence between exists between the Class 1E MPS and 1E MPS. the Class 1E MPS and non-Class 1E digital non-Class 1E digital systems. systems is provided.
8. The MPS automatically initiates a A test will be performed of the MPS. A reactor trip signal is automatically reactor trip signal. initiated for each reactor trip function listed in Table 2.5-1.
9. The MPS automatically initiates an A test will be performed of the MPS. An ESF actuation signal is automatically ESF actuation signal. initiated for each ESF function listed in Table 2.5-2.
10. The MPS automatically actuates a A test will be performed of the MPS. The RTBs open upon an injection of a reactor trip. single simulated MPS reactor trip signal.
11. The MPS automatically actuates the A test will be performed of the MPS. The ESF equipment automatically engineered safety feature actuates to perform its safety-related equipment. function listed in Table 2.5-2 upon an injection of a single simulated MPS signal.
12. The MPS manually actuates a A test will be performed of the MPS. The RTBs open when a reactor trip is reactor trip. manually initiated from the main control room.
13. The MPS manually actuates the ESF A test will be performed of the MPS. The MPS actuates the ESF equipment to equipment. perform its safety-related function listed in Table 2.5-3 when manually initiated.
14. The reactor trip logic fails to a safe A test will be performed of the MPS. Loss of electrical power in a separation state such that loss of electrical group results in a trip state for that power to a MPS separation group separation group.

results in a trip state for that separation group.

15. The ESFs logic fails to a safe state A test will be performed of the MPS. Loss of electrical power in a separation such that loss of electrical power to group results in an actuation state for a MPS separation group results in a that separation group.

predefined safe state for that separation group.

16. An MPS signal once initiated A test will be performed of the MPS i. Upon initiation of a real or simulated (automatically or manually), results reactor trip and engineered safety MPS reactor trip signal listed in in an intended sequence of features signals. Table 2.5-1, the RTBs open, and the protective actions that continue RTBs do not automatically close when until completion, and requires the MPS reactor trip signal clears.

deliberate operator action in order ii. Upon initiation of a real or simulated to return the safety systems to MPS engineered safety feature normal. actuation signal listed in Table 2.5-2, the ESF equipment actuates to perform its safety-related function and continues to maintain its safety-related position and perform its safety-related function when the MPS engineered safety feature actuation signal clears.

Tier 1 2.5-16 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-7: Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

17. The MPS response times from A test will be performed of the MPS. The MPS reactor trip functions listed in sensor output through equipment Table 2.5-1 and ESFs functions listed in actuation for the reactor trip Table 2.5-2 have response times that are functions and ESF functions are less less than or equal to the design basis than or equal to the value required safety analysis response time to satisfy the design basis safety assumptions.

analysis response time assumptions.

18. The MPS interlocks function as A test will be performed of the MPS. The MPS interlocks listed in Table 2.5-4 required when associated automatically establish an operating conditions are met. bypass for the specified reactor trip of ESF actuations when the interlock condition is met. The operating bypass is automatically removed when the interlock condition is no longer satisfied.
19. The MPS permissives function as A test will be performed of the MPS. The MPS permissives listed in Table 2.5-4 required when associated allows the manual bypass of the specified conditions are met. reactor trip or ESF actuations when the permissive condition is met. The operating bypass is automatically removed when the permissive condition is no longer satisfied.
20. The MPS overrides function as A test will be performed of the MPS. The MPS overrides listed in Table 2.5-4 required when associated are established when the manual conditions are met. override switch is active and RT-1 interlock is established. The Override switch must be manually taken out of Override when the Override, O-1, is no longer needed.
21. The MPS is capable of performing its A test will be performed of the MPS. With a safety function module out of safety-related functions when one service switch activated, the safety of its protection channels is placed function is placed in trip or bypass based in maintenance bypass. on the position of the safety function module trip/bypass switch.
22. MPS operational bypasses are A test will be performed of the MPS. Each operational MPS manual or indicated in the MCR. automatic bypass is indicated in the MCR.
23. MPS maintenance bypasses are A test will be performed of the MPS. Each maintenance bypass is indicated in indicated in the MCR. the MCR.
24. The MPS self-test features detect A test will be performed of the MPS. A report exists and concludes that:

faults in the system and provide an

  • Self-testing features verify that faults alarm in the main control room. requiring detection are detected.
  • Self-testing features verify that upon detection, the system responds according to the type of fault.
  • Self-testing features verify that faults are detected and responded within a sufficient timeframe to ensure safety function is not lost.
  • The presence and type of fault is indicated by the MPS alarms and displays.

Tier 1 2.5-17 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-7: Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

25. The PAM Type B and Type C displays An inspection will be performed for The PAM Type B and Type C displays are indicated on the SDIS displays in the ability to retrieve the as-built PAM listed in Table 2.5-5 are retrieved and the MCR. Type B and Type C displays on the displayed on the SDIS displays in the SDIS displays in the MCR. MCR.
26. The controls located on the A test will be performed of the The IHAs controls provided on the operator workstations in the MCR controls on the operator workstations operator workstations in the MCR operate to perform IHAs. in the MCR. perform the functions listed in Table 2.5-6.
27. The RTBs are installed and arranged An inspection will be performed of The RTBs have the proper connections for in order to successfully accomplish the as-built RTBs, including the the shunt and undervoltage trip the reactor trip function under connections for the shunt and mechanisms and auxiliary contacts, and design conditions. undervoltage trip mechanism and are arranged as shown in Figure 2.5-2 to auxiliary contacts. successfully accomplish the reactor trip function.
28. Two of the four separation groups An inspection will be performed of Separation groups A & C and Division I of and one of the two divisions of RTS the as-built MPS. RTS and ESFAS utilize a different and ESFAS will utilize a different programmable technology from programmable technology. separation groups B & D and Division II of RTS and ESFAS.
29. The MCR isolation switches that An inspection will be performed of The MCR isolation switches are located in isolate the manual MCR switches the location of the as-built MCR the remote shutdown station.

from MPS in case of a fire in the MCR isolation switches.

are located in the remote shutdown station.

Tier 1 2.5-18 Revision 2

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Figure 2.5-1: Module Protection System Safety Architecture Overview P T L N F P T L N F P T L N F P T L N F Signal Conditioning Signal Conditioning Signal Conditioning Signal Conditioning A B C D Monitoring Monitoring Trip Determination Trip Determination Trip Determination Trip Determination and and A B C D Indication Indication Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System 2.5-19 Monitoring Monitoring ESFAS Voting and RTS Voting RTS Voting and ESFAS Voting I Indication I II Indication II Priority Logic I Manual Priority Logic I Priority Logic II Manual Priority Logic II Actuation Actuation ESFAS Equipment ESFAS Equipment Reactor Trip Breakers LEGEND RTS Reactor Trip System ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Hard-wired Signal One-way Serial Connection Triple Modular Redundant One-Way Serial Data Connection Revision 2

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Figure 2.5-2: Reactor Trip Breaker Arrangement RTS Voting RTS Voting I II Manual Manual Priority Logic I Priority Logic II Trip Trip Control Rod From EDNS Drive System Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System 2.5-20 Reactor Trip Breakers Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Neutron Monitoring System 2.6 Neutron Monitoring System 2.6.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is the neutron monitoring system (NMS). The NMS is a safety-related system. Each NuScale Power Module has its own module-specific NMS. The Reactor Building houses all NMS equipment.

The NMS monitors the neutron flux level of the reactor core by detecting neutron leakage from the core. The NMS measures neutron flux as an indication of core power and provides safety-related inputs to the module protection system.

The NMS performs the following safety-related system function that is verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

  • The NMS supports the module protection system by providing neutron flux data for various reactor trips.

Design Commitments

  • Electrical isolation exists between the NMS Class 1E circuits and connected non-Class 1E circuits to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.
  • Physical separation exists between the redundant divisions of the NMS Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits, and between Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits and non-Class 1E instrumentation and current-carrying circuits.
  • Electrical isolation exists between the redundant divisions of the NMS Class 1E instrumentation and control circuits as well as between Class 1E instrumentation and control circuits and non-Class 1E instrumentation and control circuits to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

2.6.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.6-1 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the NMS.

Tier 1 2.6-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Neutron Monitoring System Table 2.6-1: Neutron Monitoring Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Electrical isolation exists between the i. A type test, analysis, or a i. The Class 1E circuit does not NMS Class 1E circuits and connected combination of type test and degrade below defined acceptable non-Class 1E circuits to prevent the analysis will be performed of the operating levels when the non-propagation of credible electrical Class 1E isolation devices. Class 1E side of the isolation device faults. ii. An inspection will be performed of is subjected to the maximum the NMS Class 1E as-built circuits. credible voltage, current transients, shorts, grounds, or open circuits.

ii. Class 1E electrical isolation devices are installed between NMS Class 1E circuits and connected non-Class 1E circuits.

2. Physical separation exists between the An inspection will be performed of the i. Physical separation between redundant divisions of the NMS Class NMS Class 1E as-built instrumentation redundant divisions of NMS Class 1E instrumentation and control and control current-carrying circuits. 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits, and between current-carrying circuits is Class 1E instrumentation and control provided by a minimum current-carrying circuits and non-Class separation distance, or by barriers 1E instrumentation and control (where the minimum separation current-carrying circuits. distances cannot be maintained),

or by a combination of separation distance and barriers.

ii. Physical separation between NMS Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits and non-Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits is provided by a minimum separation distance, or by barriers (where the minimum separation distances cannot be maintained),

or by a combination of separation distance and barriers.

3. Electrical isolation exists between the An inspection will be performed of the i. Class 1E electrical isolation devices redundant divisions of the NMS Class NMS Class 1E as-built instrumentation are installed between redundant 1E instrumentation and control and control circuits. divisions of NMS Class 1E circuits, and between Class 1E instrumentation and control instrumentation and control circuits circuits.

and non-Class 1E instrumentation and ii. Class 1E electrical isolation devices control circuits to prevent the are installed between NMS Class propagation of credible electrical 1E instrumentation and control faults. circuits and non-Class 1E instrumentation and control circuits.

Tier 1 2.6-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Radiation Monitoring Module Specific 2.7 Radiation Monitoring Module Specific 2.7.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is automatic actions of various systems based on radiation monitoring. Automatic actions of systems based on radiation monitoring are nonsafety-related functions. The components actuated by these automatic radiation monitoring functions are contained in module-specific systems.

Design Commitments

  • The containment evacuation system (CES) automatically responds to a high radiation signal from CES-RT-1011 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The chemical and volume control system (CVCS) automatically responds to a high radiation signal from CVC-RT-3016 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The CVCS automatically responds to a high radiation signal from 6A-AB-RT-0142 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The CVCS automatically responds to a high radiation signal from 6B-AB-RT-0141 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.

2.7.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7-2 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the radiation monitoring - module-specific automatic actions.

Tier 1 2.7-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Radiation Monitoring Module Specific Table 2.7-1: Radiation Monitoring - Module-Specific Automatic Actions Radiation Variable Actuated Component(s) Component ID(s) Component Monitor ID(s) Monitored Action(s)

CES-RT-1011 CES vacuum 1. CES effluent to Reactor Building 1. CES-A0V-0128 1. Close pump discharge heating ventilation and air conditioning system isolation valve

2. CES effluent to gaseous waste 2. CES-A0V-0130 2. Open management system isolation valve
3. CES effluent to process sample panel 3. CES-A0V-0117 3. Close isolation valve
4. CES purge air solenoid valve to CES 4. CES-SV-0123A 4. Close vacuum pump A
5. CES purge air solenoid valve to CES 5. CES-SV-0124A 5. Close vacuum pump A
6. CES purge air solenoid valve to CES 6. CES-SV-0125A 6. Close vacuum pump A
7. CES purge air solenoid valve to CES 7. CES-SV-0123B 7. Close vacuum pump B
8. CES purge air solenoid valve to CES 8. CES-SV-0124B 8. Close vacuum pump B
9. CES purge air solenoid valve to CES 9. CES-SV-0125B 9. Close vacuum pump B CVC-RT-3016 Reactor coolant 1. Reactor coolant system discharge to 1. CVC-AOV-0342 1. Close system discharge process sampling system isolation to regenerative valve heat exchanger 6A-AB-RT-0142 AB system steam 1. CVCS module heatup system 6A & 6B 1. CVC-AOV-0354 1. Close flow to 6A module heat exchanger isolation valve heatup system 2. CVCS module heatup system 6A & 6B 2. CVC-AOV-0355 2. Close heat exchanger heat exchanger isolation valve 6B-AB-RT-0141 Auxiliary boiler 1. CVCS module heatup system 6A & 6B 1. CVC-AOV-0354 1. Close system steam flow heat exchanger isolation valve to 6B module 2. CVCS module heatup system 6A & 6B 2. CVC-AOV-0355 2. Close heatup system heat exchanger isolation valve heat exchanger Tier 1 2.7-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Radiation Monitoring Module Specific Table 2.7-2: Radiation Monitoring - Module-Specific Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The CES automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the CES Upon initiation of a real or simulated high radiation signal from CES-RT- high radiation signal. CES high radiation signal listed in 1011 to mitigate a release of Table 2.7-1, the CES automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions identified in the table.
2. The CVCS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the CVCS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high radiation signal from CVC-RT- high radiation signal. CVCS high radiation signal listed in 3016 to mitigate a release of Table 2.7-1, the CVCS automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified component to the position identified in the table.
3. The CVCS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the CVCS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high radiation signal from 6A-AB-RT- high radiation signal. CVCS high radiation signal listed in 0142 to mitigate a release of Table 2.7-1, the CVCS automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified component to the position identified in the table.
4. The CVCS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the CVCS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high radiation signal from 6B-AB-RT- high radiation signal. CVCS high radiation signal listed in 0141 to mitigate a release of Table 2.7-1, the CVCS automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified component to the position identified in the table.

Tier 1 2.7-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Qualification 2.8 Equipment Qualification 2.8.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is equipment qualification (EQ) of equipment specific to each NuScale Power Module. Equipment qualification applies to safety-related electrical and mechanical equipment and safety-related digital instrumentation and controls equipment.

Additionally, this section applies to a limited population of module-specific, nonsafety-related equipment that has augmented Seismic Category I or environmental qualification requirements. The nonsafety-related equipment in this section has one of the following design features:

  • Nonsafety-related mechanical and electrical equipment located within the boundaries of the NuScale Power Module that has an augmented Seismic Category I or environmental qualification design requirement.
  • Nonsafety-related mechanical and electrical equipment that performs a credited function in Chapter 15 analyses (secondary main steam isolation valves (MSIV),

feedwater regulating valves (FWRV) and secondary feedwater check valves).

Design Commitments

  • The module-specific Seismic Category I equipment, including its associated supports and anchorages, withstands design basis seismic loads without loss of its function(s) during and after a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The scope of equipment for this design commitment is module-specific, safety-related equipment, and module-specific, nonsafety-related equipment that has one of the following design features:

Nonsafety-related mechanical and electrical equipment located within the boundaries of the NuScale Power Module that has an augmented Seismic Category I design requirement.

Nonsafety-related mechanical and electrical equipment that performs a credited function in Chapter 15 analyses (secondary main steam isolation valves (MSIV),

feedwater regulating valves (FWRV) and secondary feedwater check valves).

  • The module-specific electrical equipment located in a harsh environment, including associated connection assemblies, withstand the design basis harsh environmental conditions experienced during normal operations, anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs), design basis accidents (DBAs), and post-accident conditions, and performs its function for the period of time required to complete the function. The scope of equipment for this design commitment is module-specific, Class 1E equipment located within a harsh environment, and module-specific, nonsafety-related equipment with an augmented equipment qualification design requirement located within the boundaries of the NuScale Power Module.
  • The non-metallic parts, materials, and lubricants used in module-specific mechanical equipment perform their function up to the end of their qualified life in the design basis harsh environmental conditions (both internal service conditions and external Tier 1 2.8-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Qualification environmental conditions) experienced during normal operations, AOOs, DBAs, and post-accident conditions. The scope of equipment for this design commitment is module-specific, safety-related mechanical equipment, and module-specific, nonsafety-related mechanical equipment that performs a credited function in Chapter 15 analyses (secondary main steam isolation valves (MSIV), feedwater regulating valves (FWRV) and secondary feedwater check valves.)

  • The Class 1E computer-based instrumentation and control systems located in a mild environment withstand design basis mild environmental conditions without loss of safety-related functions.
  • The Class 1E digital equipment performs its safety-related function when subjected to the design basis electromagnetic interference, radio frequency interference, and electrical surges that would exist before, during, and following a DBA.
  • The safety-related valves are functionally designed and qualified to perform their safety-related function under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including DBA conditions.
  • The safety-related relief valves provide overpressure protection.
  • The safety-related decay heat removal system (DHRS) passive condensers have the capacity to transfer their design heat load.
  • The CNTS containment electrical penetration assemblies located in a harsh environment, including associated connection assemblies, withstand the design basis harsh environmental conditions experienced during normal operations, anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs), design basis accidents (DBAs), and post-accident conditions, and performs its function for the period of time required to complete the function.

2.8.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.8-2 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for equipment qualification-module-specific equipment.

Tier 1 2.8-2 Revision 2

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Table 2.8-1: Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment Equipment Description Location EQ Qualification Seismic Class 1E EQ Identifier Environment Program Category I Category(1)

Containment System CNV-8 CNTS I&C Division I Electrical Penetration RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Assembly (EPA) RXB - Inside Containment Mechanical CNV-9 CNTS I&C Division II Electrical Penetration RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Assembly (EPA) RXB - Inside Containment Mechanical CNV-15 CNTS PZR Heater Power #1 Electrical RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Penetration Assembly (EPA) RXB - Inside Containment Mechanical CNV-16 CNTS PZR Heater Power #2 Electrical RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Penetration Assembly (EPA) RXB - Inside Containment Mechanical CNV-17 CNTS I&C Channel A Electrical Penetration RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A Assembly (EPA) RXB - Inside Containment Mechanical CNV-18 CNTS I&C Channel B Electrical Penetration RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A Assembly (EPA) RXB - Inside Containment Mechanical CNV-19 CNTS I&C Channel C Electrical Penetration RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A 2.8-3 Assembly (EPA) RXB - Inside Containment Mechanical CNV-20 CNTS I&C Channel D Electrical Penetration RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A Assembly (EPA) RXB - Inside Containment Mechanical CNV-37 CNTS CRD Power Electrical Penetration RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Assembly (EPA) RXB - Inside Containment Mechanical CNV-38 CNTS RPI Group #1 Electrical Penetration RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Assembly (EPA) RXB - Inside Containment Mechanical CNV-39 CNTS RPI Group #2 Electrical Penetration RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Assembly (EPA) RXB - Inside Containment Mechanical MS-HOV-0101 MS #1 CIV (MSIV #1) RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB Mechanical MS-HOV-0201 MS #2 CIV (MSIV #2) RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB Mechanical Equipment Qualification MS-HOV-0103 MS line #1 Bypass Valve (MSIV Bypass #1) RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB Mechanical MS-HOV-0203 MS line #2 Bypass Valve (MSIV Bypass #2) RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB Mechanical Revision 2 FW-HOV-0137 FW #1 CIV (FWIV #1) RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB Mechanical

Table 2.8-1: Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Description Location EQ Qualification Seismic Class 1E EQ Identifier Environment Program Category I Category(1)

FW-HOV-0237 FW #2 CIV (FWIV #2) RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB Mechanical FW-HOV-0136 FW line #1 Check Valve RXB - Top of Module Harsh Mechanical Yes N/A AB FW-HOV-0236 FW line #2 Check Valve RXB - Top of Module Harsh Mechanical Yes N/A AB CVC-HOV-0334 CVC Discharge CIV RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB CVC-HOV-0335 Mechanical CVC-HOV-0330 CVC Injection CIV RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB CVC-HOV-0331 Mechanical CVC-HOV-0324 CVC PZR Spray CIV RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB CVC-HOV-0325 Mechanical CVC-HOV-0401 RPV High Point Degas CIV RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB CVC-HOV-0402 Mechanical RCCW-HOV-0184 RCCW Supply CIV RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB RCCW-HOV-0185 Mechanical 2.8-4 RCCW-HOV-0190 RCCW Return CIV RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB RCCW-HOV-0191 Mechanical CE-HOV-0001 CE CIV RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB CE-HOV-0002 Mechanical CFD-HOV-0021 CFDS CIV RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB CFD-HOV-0022 Mechanical CVC-CKV-0323 CNTS Check Valves and Excess Flow Check RXB - Top of Module Harsh Mechanical Yes N/A AB CVC-CKV-0329 Valve CVC-CKV-0336 CNT-SKD-501 Hydraulic Skid RXB - 100 Harsh Electrical Yes No A CNT-SKD-502 RXB - 120' Mechanical Equipment Qualification CNT-PE-1001A Containment Pressure Transducer (Narrow RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A CNT-PE-1001B Range)

CNT-PE-1001C CNT-PE-1001D Revision 2 CNT-PE-1002A Containment Pressure Transducer (Wide RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Yes No A CNT-PE-1002B Range)

Table 2.8-1: Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Description Location EQ Qualification Seismic Class 1E EQ Identifier Environment Program Category I Category(1)

CNT-LE-1003A Containment Water Level Sensors (Radar RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A CNT-LE-1003B Transceiver) RXB - Inside Containment CNT-LE-1003C CNT-LE-1003D MS-TE-1001A SG #1 Steam Temperature Sensors (RTD) RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A MS-TE-1001B MS-TE-1001C MS-TE-1001D MS-TE-2004A SG #2 Steam Temperature Sensor (RTD) RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A MS-TE-2004B MS-TE-2004C MS-TE-2004D CE-ZSC-0001 CE Inboard CIV Close Position Sensor RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A 2.8-5 CE-ZSO-0001 CE Inboard CIV Open Position Sensor RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A CE-ZSC-0002 CE Outboard CIV Close Position Sensor RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A CE-ZSO-0002 CE Outboard CIV Open Position Sensor RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A CFD-ZSC-0022 CFD Inboard CIV Close Position Sensor RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A CFD-ZSO-0022 CFD Inboard CIV Open Position Sensor RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A CFD-ZSC-0021 CFD Outboard CIV Close Position Sensor RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A CFD-ZSO-0021 CFD Outboard CIV Open Position Sensor RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A CVC-ZSC-0334 CVCS Inboard RCS Discharge CIV Close RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Position Sensor CVC-ZSO-0334 CVCS Inboard RCS Discharge CIV Open RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Position Sensor CVC-ZSC-0335 CVCS Outboard CIV RCS Discharge Close RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Position Sensor Equipment Qualification CVC-ZSO-0335 CVCS Outboard CIV RCS Discharge Open RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Position Sensor CVC-ZSC-0330 CVCS Inboard RCS Injection CIV Close RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Position Sensor Revision 2 CVC-ZSO-0330 CVCS Inboard RCS Injection CIV Open RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Position Sensor

Table 2.8-1: Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Description Location EQ Qualification Seismic Class 1E EQ Identifier Environment Program Category I Category(1)

CVC-ZSC-0329 CVCS Outboard RCS Injection CIV Close RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Position Sensor CVC-ZSO-0329 CVCS Outboard RCS Injection CIV Open RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Position Sensor CVC-ZSC-0325 CVCS Inboard PZR Spray Line CIV Close RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Position Sensor CVC-ZSO-0325 CVCS Inboard PZR Spray Line CIV Open RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Position Sensor CVC-ZSC-0324 CVCS Outboard PZR Spray Line CIV Close RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Position Sensor CVC-ZSO-0324 CVCS Outboard PZR Spray Line CIV Open RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Position Sensor CVC-ZSC-0401 CVCS Inboard RPV High- Point RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Degasification CIV Close Position Sensor CVC-ZSO-0401 CVCS Inboard RPV High- Point RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A 2.8-6 Degasification CIV Open Position Sensor CVC-ZSC-0402 CVCS Outboard RPV High-Point RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Degasification CIV Close Position Sensor CVC-ZSO-0402 CVCS Outboard RPV High-Point RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Degasification CIV Open Position Sensor RCCW-ZSC-0185 RCCW Supply Inboard CIV Close Position RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Sensor RCCW-ZSO-0185 RCCW Supply Inboard CIV Open Position RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Sensor RCCW-ZSC-0184 RCCW Supply Outboard CIV Close Position RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Sensor RCCW-ZSO-0184 RCCW Supply Outboard CIV Open Position RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Sensor Equipment Qualification RCCW-ZSC-0190 RCCW Return Inboard CIV Close Position RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Sensor RCCW-ZSO-0190 RCCW Return Inboard CIV Open Position RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Sensor Revision 2 RCCW-ZSC-0191 RCCW Return Outboard CIV Close Position RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Sensor

Table 2.8-1: Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Description Location EQ Qualification Seismic Class 1E EQ Identifier Environment Program Category I Category(1)

RCCW-ZSO-0191 RCCW Return Outboard CIV Open Position RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Sensor FW-ZSO-0137A FW Supply to SG1 and DHR HX1 CIV/FWIV RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Open Position Sensor FW-ZSC-0137A FW Supply to SG1 and DHR HX1 CIV/FWIV RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Close Position Sensor FW-ZSO-0137B FW Supply to SG1 and DHR HX1 CIV/FWIV RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Open Position Sensor FW-ZSC-0137B FW Supply to SG1 and DHR HX1 CIV/FWIV RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Close Position Sensor FW-ZSC-0237A FW Supply to SG2 and DHR HX2 CIV/FWIV RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Close Position Sensor FW-ZSO-0237A FW Supply to SG2 and DHR HX2 CIV/FWIV RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Open Position Sensor FW-ZSC-0237B FW Supply to SG2 and DHR HX2 CIV/FWIV RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A 2.8-7 Close Position Sensor FW-ZSO-0237B FW Supply to SG2 and DHR HX2 CIV/FWIV RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Open Position Sensor MS-ZSC-0101A SG1 Steam Supply CIV/ MSIV Close Position RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Sensor MS-ZSO-0101A SG1 Steam Supply CIV/ MSIV Open Position RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Sensor MS-ZSC-0101B SG1 Steam Supply CIV/ MSIV Close Position RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Sensor MS-ZSO-0101B SG1 Steam Supply CIV/ MSIV Open Position RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Sensor MS-ZCS-0103A SG1 Steam Supply CIV/ MS Bypass Isolation RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Valve Close Position Sensor Equipment Qualification MS-ZSO-0103A SG1 Steam Supply CIV/ MS Bypass Isolation RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Valve Open Position Sensor MS-ZSC-0103B SG1 Steam Supply CIV/ MS Bypass Isolation RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Valve Close Position Sensor Revision 2 MS-ZSO-0103B SG1 Steam Supply CIV/ MS Bypass Isolation RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Valve Open Position Sensor

Table 2.8-1: Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Description Location EQ Qualification Seismic Class 1E EQ Identifier Environment Program Category I Category(1)

MS-ZSC-0201A SG2 Steam Supply CIV/ MSIV Close Position RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Sensor MS-ZSO-0201A SG2 Steam Supply CIV/ MSIV Open Position RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Sensor MS-ZSC-0201B SG2 Steam Supply CIV/ MSIV Close Position RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Sensor MS-ZSO-0201B SG2 Steam Supply CIV/ MSIV Open Position RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Sensor MS-ZSC-0203A SG2 Steam Supply CIV/ MS Bypass Isolation RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Valve Close Position Sensor MS-ZSO-0203A SG2 Steam Supply CIV/ MS Bypass Isolation RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Valve Open Position Sensor MS-ZSC-0203B SG2 Steam Supply CIV/ MS Bypass Isolation RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A Valve Close Position Sensor MS-ZSO-0203B SG2 Steam Supply CIV/ MS Bypass Isolation RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A 2.8-8 Valve Open Position Sensor Steam Generator System None SG Tubes and Tube Supports RXB - Inside Containment N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A None Steam Plenums RXB - Inside Containment N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A RPV43 Feedwater Plenums RXB - Inside Containment N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A RPV44 RPV45 RPV46 None Flow Restrictors RXB - Inside Containment N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A SG-PSV-1002 Thermal Relief Valves RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Mechanical Yes N/A B SG-PSV-2002 Control Rod Drive System Equipment Qualification CRDS-ZS- Rod Position Indication (RPI) Coils RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Yes No B 0001A to 0016A CRDS-ZS-Revision 2 0001B to 0016B None Control Rod Drive Shafts RXB - Inside Containment N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A None Control Rod Drive Latch Mechanism RXB - Inside Containment N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A

Table 2.8-1: Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Description Location EQ Qualification Seismic Class 1E EQ Identifier Environment Program Category I Category(1)

None CRDM Pressure Boundary (Latch Housing, RXB - Inside Containment N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A Rod Travel Housing, Rod Travel Housing Plug)

Control Rod Assembly None All components RXB - Inside Containment N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A Neutron Source Assembly None Primary and secondary neutron source RXB - Inside Containment N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A rodlets None Spider body, hub or coupling housing RXB - Inside Containment N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A Reactor Coolant System None Reactor Vessel Internals RXB - Inside Containment N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A None Reactor Safety Valve Position Indicator RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Yes No B RCS-PSV-0003A Reactor Safety Valves RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Yes N/A A RCS-PSV-0003B Mechanical RCS-PE-1013A Narrow Range Pressurizer Pressure RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A 2.8-9 RCS-PE-1013B Elements RCS-PE-1013C RCS-PE-1013D RCS-PE-1014A Wide Range RCS Pressure Elements RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A RCS-PE-1014B RCS-PE-1014C RCS-PE-1014D RCS-LE-1015A PZR/RPV Level Elements RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A RCS-LE-1015B RXB - Inside Containment RCS-LE-1015C Equipment Qualification RCS-LE-1015D Revision 2

Table 2.8-1: Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Description Location EQ Qualification Seismic Class 1E EQ Identifier Environment Program Category I Category(1)

RCS-TE-1005A Narrow Range RCS Hot Leg Temperature RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A RCS-TE-1005B Elements RCS-TE-1005C RCS-TE-1005D RCS-TE-1006A RCS-TE-1006B RCS-TE-1006C RCS-TE-1006D RCS-TE-1007A RCS-TE-1007B RCS-TE-1007C RCS-TE-1007D RCS-TE-1008A Wide Range RCS Hot Leg Temperature RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A RCS-TE-1008B Elements 2.8-10 RCS-TE-1008C RCS-TE-1008D RCS-TE-1011A Wide Range RCS Cold Leg Temperature RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Yes Yes B RCS-TE-1011B Elements RCS-TE-1011C RCS-TE-1011D RCS-FE-1012A RCS Flow Transmitter RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A RCS-FE-1012B RCS-FE-1012C RCS-FE-1012D RCS-HT-0002A PZR Heaters RXB - Inside Containment N/A N/A Yes No N/A Equipment Qualification RCS-HT-0002B Chemical and Volume Control System CVC-AOV-0089 DWS Supply Isolation Valve RXB - 50 Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB Mechanical Revision 2 CVC-AOV-0090 DWS Supply Isolation Valve RXB - 50 Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB Mechanical

Table 2.8-1: Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Description Location EQ Qualification Seismic Class 1E EQ Identifier Environment Program Category I Category(1)

Emergency Core Cooling System ECC-HOV-0001A Reactor Vent Valve RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Mechanical Yes No A ECC-HOV-0001B ECC-HOV-0001C ECC-ZSC-0001A RVV Position Indication RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Yes No A ECC-ZSO-0001A ECC-ZSC-0001B ECC-ZSO-0001B ECC-ZSC-0001C-1 ECC-ZSO-0001C-1 ECC-ZSC-0001C-2 ECC-ZSO-0001C-2 ECC-HOV-0002A Reactor Recirculation Valve RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Mechanical Yes No A 2.8-11 ECC-HOV-0002B ECC-ZSC-0002A RRV Position Indication RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Yes No A ECC-ZSO-0002A ECC-ZSC-0002B ECC-ZSO-0002B ECC-SV-0101A RVV Trip Valve RXB - Pool Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB ECC-SV-0101B Mechanical ECC-SV-0101C-1 ECC-SV-0101C-2 ECC-SV-0102A RRV Trip Valve RXB - Pool Harsh Electrical Yes Yes AB ECC-SV-0102B Mechanical Equipment Qualification Revision 2

Table 2.8-1: Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Description Location EQ Qualification Seismic Class 1E EQ Identifier Environment Program Category I Category(1)

ECC-ZSC-0101A RVV Trip Valve Position Indication RXB - Pool Harsh Electrical Yes No A ECC-ZSO-0101A ECC-ZSC-0101B ECC-ZSO-0101B ECC-ZSC-0101C-1 ECC-ZSO-0101C-1 ECC-ZSC-0101C-2 ECC-ZSO-0101C-2 ECC-ZSC-0102A RRV Trip Valve Position Indication RXB - Pool Harsh Electrical Yes No A ECC-ZSO-0102A ECC-ZSC-0102B ECC-ZSO-0102B ECC-SV-0103A RVV Reset Valve RXB - Pool Harsh Electrical Yes No A 2.8-12 ECC-SV-0103B Mechanical ECC-SV-0103C ECC-SV-0104A RRV Reset Valve RXB - Pool Harsh Electrical Yes No A ECC-SV-0104B Mechanical Decay Heat Removal System DHR-HOV-0101A DHRS Actuation Valve (2 per side) RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A DHR-HOV-0101B Mechanical DHR-HOV-0201A DHR-HOV-0201B DHR-TT-1003A DHRS Condenser Outlet Temperature RXB - Pool Harsh Electrical Yes No A DHR-TT-1003B Transmitters (2 per side)

Equipment Qualification DHR-TT-2003A DHR-TT-2003B Revision 2

Table 2.8-1: Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Description Location EQ Qualification Seismic Class 1E EQ Identifier Environment Program Category I Category(1)

DHR-PT-1004A DHRS Condenser Outlet Pressure RXB - Pool Harsh Electrical Yes No A DHR-PT-1004B Transmitters (3 per side)

DHR-PT-1004C DHR-PT-2004A DHR-PT-2004B DHR-PT-2004C DHR-ZSO-0101A DHRS Valve Position Indicator (2 for open, 2 RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes No A DHR-ZSC-0101A for close per side)

DHR-ZSO-0101B DHR-ZSC-0101B DHR-ZSO-0201A DHR-ZSC-0201A DHR-ZSO-0201B 2.8-13 DHR-ZSC-0201B DHR-CND-0103 Condenser RXB - Side of Module N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A DHR-CND-0203 DHR-PT-1001A SG Steam Pressure Transmitters (4 per side) RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A DHR-PT-1001B DHR-PT-1001C DHR-PT-1001D DHR-PT-2001A DHR-PT-2001B DHR-PT-2001C DHR-PT-2001D Equipment Qualification Main Steam System MS-AOV-0003A Secondary Main Steam Isolation Valves RXB - 100' Harsh Electrical Yes No AB MS-AOV-0003B Mechanical MS-AOV-0004A Secondary Main Steam Isolation Bypass RXB - 100' Harsh Electrical Yes No AB Revision 2 MS-AOV-0004B Valves Mechanical

Table 2.8-1: Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Description Location EQ Qualification Seismic Class 1E EQ Identifier Environment Program Category I Category(1)

Condensate and Feedwater System FW-FCV-0034 Feedwater Regulating Valve A/B RXB - 100 Harsh Electrical Yes No A FW-FCV-0234 Mechanical FW-CKV-0035 Feedwater Supply Check Valve RXB - 100 Harsh Mechanical Yes N/A A FW-CKV-0235 Module Protection System None Safety-Related MPS Modules RXB - 75' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E Safety Function Modules RXB - 86' Hard-wired Modules Scheduling and Bypass Modules Equipment Interface Modules Scheduling and Voting Modules None Power Isolation, Conversion and RXB - 75' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E Monitoring Devices RXB - 86' 2.8-14 None ELVS Voltage Sensors RXB - 75' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E RXB - 86' None Under-the-Bioshield Temperature Sensors RXB - Top of the Module Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A MPS-BKR-1S-0002A PZR Heater Trip Breakers RXB - 75' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E MPS-BKR-1S-0002B RXB - 86' MPS-BKR-2S-0002A MPS-BKR-2S-0002B MPS-BKR-1S-0001A Reactor Trip Breakers RXB - 75' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E MPS-BKR-1S-0001B RXB - 86' MPS-BKR-2S-0001A MPS-BKR-2S-0001B Equipment Qualification Revision 2

Table 2.8-1: Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Description Location EQ Qualification Seismic Class 1E EQ Identifier Environment Program Category I Category(1)

MPS-HS-AS-TB01 Safety Function Module Trip/Bypass RXB - 75' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E through TB15 Switches RXB - 86' MPS-HS-BS-TB01 through TB15 MPS-HS-CS-TB01 through TB15 MPS-HS-DS-TB01 through TB15 MPS-HS-1S-0001 Enable Nonsafety Control Switches CRB - 76.5' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E MPS-HS-2S-0001 MPS-HS-1S-0002 MCR Isolation Switches RXB - 75' Harsh Electrical Yes Yes B MPS-HS-2S-0002 MPS-HS-1S-MA08 Manual PZR Heater Breaker Trip Switches CRB - 76.5' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E MPS-HS-2S-MA08 2.8-15 MPS-HS-1S-MA07 Manual LTOP Actuation Switches CRB - 76.5' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E MPS-HS-2S-MA07 MPS-HS-1S-MA06 Manual ECCS Actuation Switches CRB - 76.5' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E MPS-HS-2S-MA06 MPS-HS-1S-MA05 Manual DWSI Actuation Switches CRB - 76.5' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E MPS-HS-2S-MA05 MPS-HS-1S-MA04 Manual DHRS Actuation Switches CRB - 76.5' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E MPS-HS-2S-MA04 MPS-HS-1S-MA03 Manual CVCSI Actuation Switches CRB - 76.5' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E MPS-HS-2S-MA03 MPS-HS-1S-MA02 Manual CSI Actuation Switches CRB - 76.5' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E Equipment Qualification MPS-HS-2S-MA02 MPS-HS-1S-MA01 Manual Reactor Trip Switches CRB - 76.5' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E MPS-HS-2S-MA01 MPS-HS-1S-0004 Override Switches CRB - 76.5' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E Revision 2 MPS-HS-2S-0004 MPS-HS-1S-0003 Operating Bypass Switches CRB - 76.5' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E MPS-HS-2S-0003

Table 2.8-1: Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Description Location EQ Qualification Seismic Class 1E EQ Identifier Environment Program Category I Category(1)

Neutron Monitoring System None Excore Neutron Detectors RXB - Pool Harsh Electrical Yes Yes A None Excore Signal Conditioning and Processing RXB - 75' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E Equipment RXB - 86' None Excore Power Isolation, Conversion and RXB - 75' Mild Electrical Yes Yes E Monitoring Devices RXB - 86' In-Core Instrumentation System None In-core instrument string / temperature and RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Yes No A flux sensors None In-core instrument string sheath RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Mechanical Yes N/A B Notes:

1. EQ Categories:
  • A Equipment that will experience the environmental conditions of design basis accidents for which it must function to mitigate said accidents, and that will be qualified to demonstrate operability in the accident environment for the time required for accident mitigation with safety margin to failure.

2.8-16

  • B Equipment that will experience the environmental conditions of design basis accidents through which it need not function for mitigation of said accidents, but through which it must not fail in a manner detrimental to plant safety or accident mitigation, and that will be qualified to demonstrate the capability to withstand the accident environment for the time during which it must not fail with safety margin to failure.
  • E Equipment that will not experience environmental conditions of design basis accidents and that will be qualified to demonstrate operability under the expected extremes of its nonaccident service environment.

Equipment Qualification Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Qualification Table 2.8-2: Equipment Qualification Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The module-specific Seismic Category i. A type test, analysis, or a i. A seismic qualification record form I equipment, including its associated combination of type test and exists and concludes that the supports and anchorages, withstands analysis will be performed of the module-specific Seismic Category I design basis seismic loads without loss module-specific Seismic Category I equipment listed in Table 2.8-1, of its function(s) during and after an equipment, including its including its associated supports SSE. The scope of equipment for this associated supports and and anchorages, will withstand the design commitment is module- anchorages. design basis seismic loads and specific, safety-related equipment, and ii. An inspection will be performed of perform its function during and module-specific, nonsafety-related the module-specific Seismic after an SSE.

equipment that has one of the Category I as-built equipment, ii. The module-specific Seismic following design features: including its associated supports Category I equipment listed in

  • Nonsafety-related mechanical and and anchorages. Table 2.8-1, including its electrical equipment located within associated supports and the boundaries of the NuScale anchorages, is installed in its Power Module that has an design location in a Seismic augmented Seismic Category I Category I structure in a design requirement. configuration bounded by the
  • Nonsafety-related mechanical and equipments seismic qualification electrical equipment that performs a record form.

credited function in Chapter 15 analyses (secondary main steam isolation valves (MSIV), feedwater regulating valves (FWRV) and secondary feedwater check valves.)

2. The module-specific electrical i. A type test or a combination of i. An EQ record form exists and equipment located in a harsh type test and analysis will be concludes that the module-environment, including associated performed of the module-specific specific electrical equipment listed connection assemblies, withstand the electrical equipment, including in Table 2.8-1, including associated design basis harsh environmental associated connection assemblies. connection assemblies, perform conditions experienced during normal ii. An inspection will be performed of their function under the operations, AOOs, DBAs, and post- the module-specific as-built environmental conditions accident conditions and performs its electrical equipment, including specified in the EQ record form for function for the period of time associated connection assemblies. the period of time required to required to complete the function. The complete the function.

scope of equipment for this design ii. The module-specific electrical commitment is module-specific, Class equipment listed in Table 2.8-1, 1E equipment located within a harsh including associated connection environment, and module-specific, assemblies, are installed in their nonsafety-related equipment with an design location in a configuration augmented equipment qualification bounded by the EQ record form.

design requirement located within the boundaries of the NuScale Power Module.

Tier 1 2.8-17 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Qualification Table 2.8-2: Equipment Qualification Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

3. The non-metallic parts, materials, and A type test or a combination of type A qualification record form exists and lubricants used in module-specific test and analysis will be performed of concludes that the non-metallic parts, mechanical equipment perform their the non-metallic parts, materials, and materials, and lubricants used in function up to the end of their lubricants used in module-specific module-specific mechanical qualified life in the design basis harsh mechanical equipment. equipment listed in Table 2.8-1 environmental conditions (both perform their function up to the end of internal service conditions and their qualified life under the design external environmental conditions) basis harsh environmental conditions experienced during normal (both internal service conditions and operations, AOOs, DBAs, and post- external environmental conditions) accident conditions. The scope of specified in the qualification record equipment for this design form.

commitment is module-specific, safety-related mechanical equipment, and module-specific, nonsafety-related mechanical equipment that performs a credited function in Chapter 15 analyses (secondary main steam isolation valves (MSIV),

feedwater regulating valves (FWRV) and secondary feedwater check valves.)

4. The Class 1E computer-based i. A type test or a combination of i. An EQ record form exists and instrumentation and control systems type test and analysis will be concludes that the Class 1E located in a mild environment performed of the Class 1E computer-based instrumentation withstand design basis mild computer-based instrumentation and control systems listed in environmental conditions without loss and control systems located in a Table 2.8-1 perform their function of safety-related functions. mild environment. under the environmental ii. An inspection will be performed of conditions specified in the EQ the Class 1E as-built computer- record form.

based instrumentation and control ii. The Class 1E computer-based systems located in a mild instrumentation and control environment. systems listed in Table 2.8-1 are installed in their design location in a configuration bounded by the EQ record form.

5. The Class 1E digital equipment A type test, analysis, or a combination An EQ record form exists and performs its safety-related function of type test and analysis will be concludes that the Class 1E digital when subjected to the design basis performed of the Class 1E digital equipment listed in Table 2.8-1 electromagnetic interference, radio equipment. withstands the design basis frequency interference, and electrical electromagnetic interference, radio surges that would exist before, during, frequency interference, and electrical and following a DBA. surges that would exist before, during, and following a DBA without loss of safety-related function.
6. The safety-related valves are A type test or a combination of type A Qualification Report exists and functionally designed and qualified to test and analysis will be performed of concludes that the safety-related perform their safety-related function the safety-related valves. valves listed in Table 2.8-1 are capable under the full range of fluid flow, of performing their safety-related differential pressure, electrical function under the full range of fluid conditions, temperature conditions, flow, differential pressure, electrical and fluid conditions up to and conditions, temperature conditions, including DBA conditions. and fluid conditions up to and including DBA conditions.

Tier 1 2.8-18 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Qualification Table 2.8-2: Equipment Qualification Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

7. The safety-related relief valves provide i. A vendor test will be performed of i. An American Society of overpressure protection. each safety-related relief valves. Mechanical Engineers Code ii. An inspection will be performed of Section III Data Report exists and each safety-related as-built relief concludes that the relief valves valves. listed in Table 2.8-1 meet the valves required set pressure, capacity, and overpressure design requirements.

ii. Each relief valve listed in Table 2.8-1 is provided with an American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code Certification Mark that identifies the set pressure, capacity, and overpressure.

8. The safety-related DHRS passive A type test or a combination of type A report exists and concludes that the condensers have the capacity to test and analysis will be performed of safety-related DHRS passive transfer their design heat load. the safety-related DHRS passive condensers listed in Table 2.8-1 have a condensers. heat removal capacity sufficient to transfer their design heat load.
9. The CNTS containment electrical i. A type test or a combination of i. An EQ record form exists and penetration assemblies located in a type test and analysis will be concludes that the CNTS electrical harsh environment, including performed of the CNTS penetration assemblies listed in associated connection assemblies, containment electrical penetration Table 2.8-1, including associated withstand the design basis harsh assemblies equipment including connection assemblies, performs environmental conditions associated connection assemblies. their function under the experienced during normal ii. An inspection will be performed of environmental conditions operations, AOOs, DBAs, and the containment CNTS electrical specified in the EQ record form for postaccident conditions and performs penetration assembles, including the period of time required to its function for the period of time associated connection assemblies. complete the function.

required to complete the function. ii. The CNTS electrical penetration assemblies listed in Table 2.8-1, including associated connection assemblies, are installed in their design location in a configuration bounded by the EQ record form.

Tier 1 2.8-19 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Fuel Assembly Design 2.9 Fuel Assembly Design 2.9.1 Fuel Assembly Design

System Description

The fuel assembly is designed to ensure that possible fuel damage will not result in the release of radioactive materials during normal operations, anticipated operational occurrences, and postulated accidents, in excess of prescribed limits. The fuel assembly is comprised of fuel rods, spacer grids, guide tubes, top and bottom nozzles, and plenum springs. The fuel assembly design is approved by the NRC for the NuScale reactor design.

2.9.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria None Tier 1 2.9-1 Revision 2

Shared Structures, Systems, and Components and Non-Structures, Systems, and NuScale Tier 1 Components Design Descriptions and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria CHAPTER 3 SHARED STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS AND NON-STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS DESIGN DESCRIPTIONS AND INSPECTIONS, TESTS, ANALYSES, AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 3.0 Shared Structures, Systems, and Components and Non-Structures, Systems, and Components Design Descriptions and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria This chapter of Tier 1 provides the structures, systems, and components (SSC) Design Descriptions and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) for those SSC that are common or shared by multiple NuScale Power Modules (NPMs). Shared systems in this chapter of Tier 1 are either shared by 1-12 NPMs or by 1- 6 NPMs as shown in Table 3.0-1. This chapter also includes non-SSC based Design Descriptions and ITAAC that are common or shared by multiple NPMs. For a multi-module plant, satisfactory completion of a shared ITAAC for the lead module shall constitute satisfactory completion of the shared ITAAC for associated modules. The ITAAC in Sections 3.1 through 3.17 shall only be completed once in conjunction with the ITAAC in Chapter 2 for the first NPM. The ITAAC in Section 3.18 shall only be completed once in conjunction with the ITAAC in Chapter 2 for NPM 7 or NPM 12, whichever is completed first.

Tier 1 3.0-1 Revision 2

Shared Structures, Systems, and Components and Non-Structures, Systems, and NuScale Tier 1 Components Design Descriptions and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.0-1: Shared Systems Subject to Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Shared System NPMs Supported Balance-of-plant drain system 1 system per 6 modules Containment flooding and drain system 1 system per 6 modules Normal control room heating ventilation and air conditioning system 1 system per 12 modules Control room habitability system 1 system per 12 modules Reactor Building heating ventilation and air conditioning system 1 system per 12 modules Fuel handling equipment system 1 system per 12 modules Fuel storage system 1 system per 12 modules Ultimate heat sink 1 system per 12 modules Fire protection system 1 system per 12 modules Plant lighting system 1 system per 12 modules Gaseous radioactive waste system 1 system per 12 modules Liquid radioactive waste system 1 system per 12 modules Auxiliary boiler system 1 system per 12 modules Pool surge control system 1 system per 12 modules Reactor Building crane system 1 system per 12 modules Reactor Building and Reactor Building components 1 system per 12 modules Radioactive Waste Building 1 system per 12 modules Control Building 1 system per 12 modules Physical security system 1 system per 12 modules Tier 1 3.0-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Control Room Habitability 3.1 Control Room Habitability 3.1.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is the control room habitability system (CRHS). The CRHS provides clean breathing air to the control room envelope and maintains a positive control room pressure during high radiation or loss of offsite power conditions for habitability and control of radioactivity. The CRHS is a nonsafety-related system which supports up to 12 NuScale Power Modules (NPMs). The Control Building houses all CRHS equipment.

The CRHS performs the following nonsafety-related system function that is verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

  • The CRHS supports the Control Building by providing clean breathing air to the main control room (MCR) and maintains a positive control room pressure during high radiation or loss of normal AC power conditions.

Design Commitments

  • The air exfiltration out of the control room envelope (CRE) does not exceed the assumptions used to size the CRHS inventory and the supply flow rate.
  • The CRHS valves change position under design basis temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions.
  • The CRHS solenoid-operated valves perform their function to fail open on loss of motive power under design basis temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions.
  • The CRE heat sink passively maintains the temperature of the CRE within an acceptable range for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a design basis accident (DBA).
  • The CRHS maintains a positive pressure in the MCR relative to the adjacent areas.

3.1.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.1-2 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the CRHS.

Tier 1 3.1-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Control Room Habitability Table 3.1-1: Control Room Habitability System Mechanical Equipment Equipment Name Equipment Identifier Failure Position Air supply isolation solenoid valve 00-CRH-SV-0001A Open Air supply isolation solenoid valve 00-CRH-SV-0001B Open CRE pressure relief isolation valve 00-CRH-SV-0002A Open CRE pressure relief isolation valve 00-CRH-SV-0002B Open Tier 1 3.1-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Control Room Habitability Table 3.1-2: Control Room Habitability System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 The air exfiltration out of the CRE A test will be performed of the CRE. The air exfiltration measured by tracer meets the assumptions used to size gas testing is less than the CRE air the CRHS inventory and the supply infiltration rate assumed in the dose flow rate. analysis.

2 The CRHS valves change position A test will be performed of the CRHS Each CRHS valve listed in Table 3.1-1 under design basis temperature, valves under preoperational strokes fully open and fully closed by differential pressure, and flow temperature, differential pressure, and remote operation under conditions. flow conditions. preoperational temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions.

3 The CRHS solenoid-operated valves A test will be performed of the CRHS Each CRHS solenoid-operated valve perform their function to fail open on solenoid-operated valves under listed in Table 3.1-1 performs its loss of motive power under design preoperational temperature, function to fail open on loss of motive basis temperature, differential differential pressure and flow power under preoperational pressure, and flow conditions. conditions. temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions.

4 The CRE heat sink passively maintains An analysis will be performed of the A report exists and concludes that the the temperature of the CRE within an as-built CRE heat sinks. CRE heat sink passively maintains the acceptable range for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> temperature of the CRE within an following a DBA. acceptable range for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a DBA.

5 The CRHS maintains a positive A test will be performed of the CRHS. The CRHS maintains a positive pressure in the MCR relative to pressure of greater than or equal to adjacent areas. 1/8 inches water gauge in the CRE relative to adjacent areas, while operating in DBA alignment.

Tier 1 3.1-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Normal Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System 3.2 Normal Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System 3.2.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is the normal control room HVAC system (CRVS). The CRVS serves the entire Control Building (CRB) and the access tunnel between the CRB and the Reactor Building (RXB). The CRVS is a nonsafety-related system. The CRVS supports up to 12 NuScale Power Modules. The CRB houses all CRVS equipment.

The CRVS performs the following nonsafety-related system functions that are verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

  • The CRVS supports the CRB by maintaining the CRB at a positive pressure relative to the RXB and the outside atmosphere to control the ingress of potentially airborne radioactivity from the RXB or the outside atmosphere to the CRB.
  • The CRVS supports the highly reliable DC power system by providing ventilation to maintain airborne hydrogen concentrations below the allowable limits.
  • The CRVS supports the normal DC power system by providing ventilation to maintain airborne hydrogen concentrations below allowable limits.

Design Commitments

  • The CRVS air-operated CRE isolation dampers perform their function to fail to the closed position on loss of motive power under design basis temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions.
  • The CRVS maintains a positive pressure in the CRB relative to the outside environment.
  • The CRVS maintains the hydrogen concentration levels in the CRB battery rooms containing batteries below one percent by volume.

3.2.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.2-2 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the CRVS.

Tier 1 3.2-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Normal Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System Table 3.2-1: Normal Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System Mechanical Equipment Equipment Name Equipment Identifier Actuator Type CRE isolation damper None Pneumatic CRE isolation damper None Pneumatic CRE isolation damper None Pneumatic CRE isolation damper None Pneumatic CRE isolation damper None Pneumatic CRE isolation damper None Pneumatic CRE isolation damper None Pneumatic CRE isolation damper None Pneumatic Tier 1 3.2-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Normal Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System Table 3.2-2: Normal Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 The CRVS air-operated CRE isolation A test will be performed of the air- Each CRVS air-operated CRE isolation dampers perform their function to fail operated CRE isolation dampers under damper listed in Table 3.2-1 performs to the closed position on loss of preoperational temperature, its function to fail to the closed motive power under design basis differential pressure and flow position on loss of motive power temperature, differential pressure, and conditions. under preoperational temperature, flow conditions. differential pressure, and flow conditions.

2 The CRVS maintains a positive A test will be performed of the CRVS The CRVS maintains a positive pressure in the CRB relative to the while operating in the normal pressure of greater than or equal to outside environment. operating alignment. 1/8 inches water gauge in the CRB relative to the outside environment, while operating in the normal operating alignment.

3 The CRVS maintains the hydrogen A test will be performed of the CRVS The airflow capability of the CRVS concentration levels in the CRB battery while operating in the normal maintains the hydrogen concentration rooms containing batteries below one operating alignment. levels in the CRB battery rooms percent by volume. containing batteries below one percent by volume.

Tier 1 3.2-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Reactor Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System 3.3 Reactor Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System 3.3.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is the Reactor Building HVAC system (RBVS). The RBVS is designed to remove radioactive contaminants from the exhaust streams of the Reactor Building (RXB) general area, the Radioactive Waste Building (RWB) general area, and the Annex Building. The RBVS is a nonsafety-related system. The RBVS supports up to 12 NuScale Power Modules. The RXB and the RWB house the RBVS equipment.

The RBVS performs the following nonsafety-related system functions that are verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

  • The RBVS supports the RXB by maintaining the RXB at a negative pressure relative to the outside atmosphere to control the movement of potentially airborne radioactivity from the RXB to the environment.
  • The RBVS supports the RWB by maintaining the RWB at a negative ambient pressure relative to the outside atmosphere to control the movement of potentially airborne radioactivity from the RWB to the environment.
  • The RBVS supports the highly reliable DC power system by providing ventilation to maintain airborne hydrogen concentrations below allowable limits.
  • The RBVS supports the normal DC power system by providing ventilation to maintain airborne hydrogen concentrations below allowable limits.

Design Commitments

  • The RBVS maintains a negative pressure in the RXB relative to the outside environment.
  • The RBVS maintains a negative pressure in the RWB relative to the outside environment.
  • The RBVS maintains the hydrogen concentration levels in the RXB battery rooms below one percent by volume.

3.3.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.3-1 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the RBVS.

Tier 1 3.3-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Reactor Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System Table 3.3-1: Reactor Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 The RBVS maintains a negative A test will be performed of the RBVS The RBVS maintains a negative pressure in the RXB relative to the while operating in the normal pressure in the RXB relative to the outside environment. operating alignment. outside environment, while operating in the normal operating alignment.

2 The RBVS maintains a negative A test will be performed of the RBVS The RBVS maintains a negative pressure in the RWB relative to the while operating in the normal pressure in the RWB relative to the outside environment. operating alignment. outside environment, while operating in the normal operating alignment.

3. The RBVS maintains the hydrogen A test will be performed of the RBVS The airflow capability of the RBVS concentration levels in the RXB battery while operating in the normal maintains the hydrogen concentration rooms containing batteries below one operating alignment. levels in the RXB battery rooms percent by volume. containing batteries below one percent by volume.

Tier 1 3.3-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Fuel Handling Equipment System 3.4 Fuel Handling Equipment System 3.4.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is the fuel handling equipment (FHE) system. The FHE system is designed to support the periodic refueling of the reactor as well as movement of control rods and other radioactive components within the reactor core, refueling pool, and spent fuel pool. The FHE system is a nonsafety-related system. The FHE system supports up to 12 NuScale Power Modules (NPMs). The Reactor Building houses all FHE system equipment.

The FHE system performs the following nonsafety-related system function that is verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

  • The FHE system supports the reactor fuel assembly by providing structural support during handling of fuel.

Design Commitments

  • The single-failure-proof fuel handling machine (FHM) main and auxiliary hoists are constructed to provide assurance that a failure of a single hoist mechanism component does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.
  • The FHM main hoist is capable of lifting and supporting its rated load, holding the rated load, and transporting the rated load.
  • The FHM auxiliary hoist is capable of lifting and supporting its rated load, holding the rated load, and transporting the rated load.
  • Single-failure-proof FHM welds are inspected.
  • The FHM travel is limited to maintain a water inventory for personnel shielding with the pool level at the lower limit of the normal operating low water level.
  • The new fuel jib crane hook movement is limited to prevent carrying a fuel assembly over the fuel storage racks in the spent fuel pool.

3.4.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.4-1 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the FHE system.

Tier 1 3.4-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Fuel Handling Equipment System Table 3.4-1: Fuel Handling Equipment System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The single-failure-proof FHM main and An inspection will be performed of the The FHM main and auxiliary hoists are auxiliary hoists are constructed to as-built FHM main and auxiliary hoists. single-failure-proof.

provide assurance that a failure of a single hoist mechanism component does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.

2. The FHM main hoist is capable of A rated load test will be performed of The FHM main hoist lifts, supports, lifting and supporting its rated load, the FHM main hoist. holds with the brakes, and transports a holding the rated load, and load of 125 percent of the transporting the rated load. manufacturers rated capacity.
3. The FHM auxiliary hoist is capable of A rated load test will be performed of The FHM auxiliary hoist lifts, supports, lifting and supporting its rated load, the FHM auxiliary hoist. holds with the brakes, and transports a holding the rated load, and load of 125 percent of the transporting the rated load. manufacturers rated capacity.
4. Single-failure-proof FHM welds are An inspection will be performed of the The results of the non-destructive inspected. as-built FHM. examination of the FHM welds comply with American Society of Mechanical Engineers NOG-1 Code.
5. The FHM travel is limited to maintain a A test will be performed of the FHM The FHM maintains at least 10 feet of water inventory for personnel gripper mast limit switches. water above the top of the fuel shielding with the pool level at the assembly when lifted to its maximum lower limit of the normal operating height with the pool level at the lower low water level. limit of the normal operating low water level.
6. The new fuel jib crane hook A test will be performed of new fuel jib The new fuel jib crane interlocks movement is limited to prevent crane interlocks. prevent the crane from carrying a fuel carrying a fuel assembly over the fuel assembly over the spent fuel racks.

storage racks in the spent fuel pool.

Tier 1 3.4-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Fuel Storage System 3.5 Fuel Storage System 3.5.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is the fuel storage system. The fuel storage system consists of the fuel storage racks in the spent fuel pool (SFP) that can store either spent fuel assemblies or new fuel assemblies. The fuel storage system is a nonsafety-related system. The fuel storage system supports up to 12 NuScale Power Modules (NPMs). The Reactor Building houses all fuel storage system equipment.

The fuel storage system performs the following nonsafety-related system functions that are verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

  • The fuel storage system supports the reactor fuel assembly system by providing mechanical support for storage of new and spent fuel in a wet storage location.
  • The fuel storage system supports the reactor fuel assembly system by providing neutron absorption to ensure subcriticality during storage of new and spent fuel.
  • The fuel storage system supports the control rod assembly system by providing mechanical support for storage of control rods in fuel assemblies.

Design Commitments

  • The fuel storage system American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class NF components conform to the rules of construction of ASME Code Section III.
  • The fuel storage racks maintain an effective neutron multiplication factor (k-effective) within the following limits at a 95 percent probability, 95 percent confidence level when loaded with fuel of the maximum reactivity to assure subcriticality during plant life, including normal operations and postulated accident conditions:

If credit for soluble boron is taken, k-effective must not exceed 0.95 if flooded with borated water, and k-effective must not exceed 1.0 if flooded with unborated water.

3.5.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.5-1 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the fuel storage system.

Tier 1 3.5-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Fuel Storage System Table 3.5-1: Fuel Storage System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 The fuel storage system ASME Code An inspection will be performed of the ASME Code Section III Data Reports for Class NF components conform to the fuel storage system ASME Code Class the fuel storage system ASME Code rules of construction of ASME Code NF as-built component Data Reports Class NF fuel storage racks exist and Section III. required by ASME Code Section III. conclude that the requirements of ASME Code Section III are met.

2 The fuel storage racks maintain an An inspection will be performed of the The as-built fuel storage racks, effective neutron multiplication factor as-built fuel storage racks, their including any neutron absorbers, and (k-effective) within the following limits configuration in the SFP, and the their configuration within the SFP at a 95 percent probability, 95 percent associated documentation. conform to the design values for confidence level when loaded with materials and dimensions and their fuel of the maximum reactivity to tolerances, as shown to be acceptable assure subcriticality during plant life, in the approved fuel storage criticality including normal operations and analysis.

postulated accident conditions:

  • If credit for soluble boron is taken, k-effective must not exceed 0.95 if flooded with borated water, and k-effective must not exceed 1.0 if flooded with unborated water.

Tier 1 3.5-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Ultimate Heat Sink 3.6 Ultimate Heat Sink 3.6.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is the ultimate heat sink (UHS). The UHS is the system of structures and components credited for functioning as a heat sink for decay heat removal from the NuScale Power Modules during normal reactor operations or shutdown following an accident or transient, including a loss-of-coolant accident. The UHS is a safety-related system and supports up to 12 NuScale Power Modules. The Reactor Building (RXB) houses all UHS equipment.

The configuration of the UHS includes the combined volume of water in the reactor pool, refueling pool (RFP), and spent fuel pool (SFP). The pool areas are open to each other with a weir wall partially separating the SFP from the RFP. The dry dock area is not considered part of the UHS volume.

The structural components of the reactor pool, RFP, and SFP (i.e., structural walls, weir wall, and floor) and associated pool liners are a component of the RXB structure.

The UHS performs the following safety-related system functions that are verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

  • The UHS supports the containment system by providing the removal of heat via direct water contact with the containment vessel.
  • The UHS supports the spent fuel system by providing the removal of decay heat from the spent fuel via direct water contact with the spent fuel assemblies.

The UHS performs the following nonsafety-related system functions that are verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

  • The UHS supports the containment system by providing the radiation shielding for the NPMs via the water surrounding the components.
  • The UHS supports the spent fuel system by providing radiation shielding for spent fuel via the water surrounding the components.
  • The UHS supports the RXB by having an assured water make-up line that can provide emergency make-up water to the UHS during off-normal events.

Design Commitments

  • The UHS American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 3 piping system listed in Table 3.6-1 complies with ASME Code Section III requirements.
  • The spent fuel pool, refueling pool, reactor pool, and dry dock piping and connections are located to prevent the drain down of the SFP water level below the minimum safety water level.

Tier 1 3.6-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Ultimate Heat Sink 3.6.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.6-2 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the UHS.

Tier 1 3.6-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Ultimate Heat Sink Table 3.6-1: Ultimate Heat Sink Piping System Piping System Description ASME Code Section III Class Make-up line from the exterior of the RXB to the SFP. 3 Tier 1 3.6-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Ultimate Heat Sink Table 3.6-2: Ultimate Heat Sink Piping System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 The ultimate heat sink ASME Code An inspection will be performed of the The ASME Code Section III Design Class 3 piping system listed in ultimate heat sink ASME Code Class 3 Report (NCA-3550) exists and Table 3.6-1 complies with ASME Code as-built piping system Design Report concludes that the ultimate heat sink Section III requirements. required by ASME Code Section III. ASME Code Class 3 as-built piping system meets the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

2 The spent fuel pool, refueling pool, An inspection will be performed of the There are no gates, openings, drains, reactor pool, and dry dock piping and as-built SFP, RFP, reactor pool and dry or piping within the SFP, RFP, reactor connections are located to prevent the dock piping and connections. pool, and dry dock that are below 80 ft drain down of the SFP and reactor building elevation (55 ft pool level) as pool water level below the minimum measured from the bottom of the SFP safety water level. and reactor pool.

Tier 1 3.6-4 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Fire Protection System 3.7 Fire Protection System 3.7.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is the fire protection system (FPS). The FPS is comprised of the equipment and components that provide early fire detection and suppression to limit the spread of fires. The FPS is a nonsafety-related system that supports up to 12 NuScale Power Modules (NPMs). The FPS equipment is located throughout the plant site.

The FPS includes the following equipment:

  • fire water storage tanks, motor and diesel driven fire pumps, jockey pump, distribution piping, valves, and fire hydrants
  • automatic fire detection, fire alarm notification, and fire suppression systems, including fire water supply and distribution systems
  • manual firefighting capability, including portable fire extinguishers, standpipes, hydrants, hose stations, and fire department connections The FPS performs the following nonsafety-related system functions that are verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:
  • The FPS supports the Reactor Building by providing fire prevention, detection, and suppression.
  • The FPS supports the Radioactive Waste Building by providing fire prevention, detection, and suppression.
  • The FPS supports the Control Building by providing fire prevention, detection, and suppression.

Design Commitments

  • Two separate firewater storage tanks provide a dedicated volume of water for firefighting.
  • The FPS has a sufficient number of fire pumps to satisfy the flow demand for any FPS connected to the pumps.
  • Safe-shutdown can be achieved assuming that all equipment in any one fire area (except for the main control room (MCR) and under the bioshield) is rendered inoperable by fire damage and that reentry into the fire area for repairs and operator actions is not possible. An alternative shutdown capability that is physically and electrically independent of the MCR exists. Additionally, smoke, hot gases, or fire suppressant cannot migrate from the affected fire area into other fire areas to the extent that they could adversely affect safe-shutdown capabilities, including operator actions.
  • A plant fire hazards analysis (FHA) considers potential fire hazards and ensures the fire protection features in each fire area are suitable for the hazards.

Tier 1 3.7-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Fire Protection System 3.7.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.7-1 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the FPS.

Tier 1 3.7-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Fire Protection System Table 3.7-1: Fire Protection System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 Two separate firewater storage tanks An inspection will be performed of the Each firewater storage tank provides a provide a dedicated volume of water as-built firewater storage tanks. usable water volume dedicated for for firefighting. firefighting that is greater than or equal to 300,000 gallons.

2 The FPS has a sufficient number of fire i. An analysis will be performed of i. A report exists and concludes that pumps to provide the design flow the as-built fire pumps. the fire pumps can provide the requirements to satisfy the flow ii. A test will be performed of the fire flow demand for the largest demand for the largest sprinkler or pumps. sprinkler or deluge system plus an deluge system plus an additional additional 500 gpm for fire hoses 500 gpm for fire hoses assuming assuming failure of the largest fire failure of the largest fire pump or loss pump or loss of off-site power.

of off-site power. ii. Each fire pump delivers the design flow to the FPS, while operating in the fire-fighting alignment.

3 Safe-shutdown can be achieved A safe-shutdown analysis of the as- A safe-shutdown analysis report exists assuming that all equipment in any built plant will be performed, and concludes that:

one fire area (except for the MCR and including a post-fire safe-shutdown

  • Safe-shutdown can be achieved under the bioshield) is rendered circuit analysis. assuming that all equipment in any inoperable by fire damage and that one fire area (except for the MCR and reentry into the fire area for repairs under the bioshield) is rendered and operator actions is not possible. inoperable by fire and that reentry An alternative shutdown capability into the fire area for repairs and that is physically and electrically operator actions is not possible independent of the MCR exists.
  • Smoke, hot gases, or fire suppressant Additionally, smoke, hot gases, or fire cannot migrate from the affected suppressant cannot migrate from the fire area into other fire areas to the affected fire area into other fire areas extent that they could adversely to the extent that they could adversely affect safe-shutdown capabilities, affect safe-shutdown capabilities, including operator actions.

including operator actions.

  • An independent alternative shutdown capability that is physically and electrically independent of the MCR exists.

4 A plant FHA considers potential fire A FHA of the as-built plant will be A FHA report exists and concludes hazards and ensures the fire performed. that:

protection features in each fire area

  • Combustible loads and ignition are suitable for the hazards. sources are accounted for, and
  • Fire protection features are suitable for the hazards they are intended to protect against.

Tier 1 3.7-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Plant Lighting System 3.8 Plant Lighting System 3.8.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is the plant lighting system (PLS). The PLS is a nonsafety-related system and supports up to 12 NuScale Power Modules (NPMs). The PLS provides artificial illumination for the entire plant: buildings (interior and exterior), rooms, spaces, and all outdoor areas of the plant. The PLS consists of normal and emergency lighting and includes miscellaneous non-lighting loads as required.

The PLS performs the following nonsafety-related system functions that are verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

  • The PLS supports the Reactor Building (RXB) by providing normal lighting.
  • The PLS supports the Control Building by providing normal lighting.

Design Commitments

  • The PLS provides normal illumination of the operator workstations and auxiliary panels in the MCR and the operator workstations in the RSS.
  • The PLS provides emergency illumination of the operator workstations and auxiliary panels in the MCR and the operator workstations in the RSS.
  • Eight-hour battery-pack emergency lighting fixtures provide illumination for post-fire safe shutdown (FSSD) activities performed by operators outside the MCR and RSS where post-FSSD activities are performed.

3.8.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.8-1 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the PLS.

Tier 1 3.8-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Plant Lighting System Table 3.8-1: Plant Lighting System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 The PLS provides normal illumination i. A test will be performed of the i. The PLS provides at least 100 foot-of the operator workstations and MCR operator workstations and candles illumination at the MCR auxiliary panels in the MCR and auxiliary panel illumination. operator workstations and at least operator workstations in the RSS. ii. A test will be performed of the RSS 50 foot-candles at the auxiliary operator workstations panels.

illumination. ii. The PLS provides at least 100 foot-candles illumination at the RSS operator workstations.

2 The PLS provides emergency i. A test will be performed of the i. The PLS provides at least 10 foot-illumination of the operator MCR operator workstations and candles of illumination at the MCR workstations and auxiliary panels in auxiliary panel illumination. operator workstations and the MCR and operator workstations in ii. A test will be performed of the RSS auxiliary panels when it is the only the RSS. operator workstations MCR lighting system in operation.

illumination. ii. The PLS provides at least 10 foot-candles at the RSS operator workstations when it is the only RSS lighting system in operation.

3 Eight-hour battery-pack emergency A test will be performed of the eight- Eight-hour battery-pack emergency lighting fixtures provide illumination hour battery-pack emergency lighting lighting fixtures illuminate their for post-FSSD activities performed by fixtures. required target areas to provide at operators outside the MCR and RSS least one foot-candle illumination in where post-FSSD activities are the areas outside the MCR or RSS performed. where post-FSSD activities are performed.

Tier 1 3.8-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1 - 12 3.9 Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1 - 12 3.9.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is automatic actions of various systems based on radiation monitoring (RM). Automatic actions of systems based on RM are nonsafety-related functions. The systems actuated by these automatic RM functions are shared by NuScale Power Modules (NPMs) 1-12.

Design Commitments

  • The normal control room HVAC system (CRVS) automatically responds to a high-radiation signal from 00-CRV-RT-0503, 00-CRV-RT-0504, and 00-CRV-RT-0505 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The CRVS and the control room habitability system (CRHS) automatically respond to a high-radiation signal from 00-CRV-RT-0510 and 00-CRV-RT-0511 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The Reactor Building HVAC system (RBVS) automatically responds to a high-radiation signal from 00-RBV-RE-0510, 00-RBV-RE-0511, and 00-RBV-RE-0512 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The gaseous radioactive waste system (GRWS) automatically responds to a high-radiation signal from 00-GRW-RIT-0046 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The GRWS automatically responds to a high-radiation signal from 00-GRW-RIT-0060 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The GRWS automatically responds to a high-radiation signal from 00-GRW-RIT-0071 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The liquid radioactive waste system (LRWS) automatically responds to a high-radiation signal from 00-LRW-RIT-0569 and 00-LRW-RIT-0571 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The auxiliary boiler system (ABS) automatically responds to a high-radiation signal from 00-AB-RT-0153 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The ABS automatically responds to a high-radiation signal from 00-AB-RT-0166 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The pool surge control system (PSCS) automatically responds to a high-radiation signal from 00-PSC-RE-1003 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.

3.9.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.9-2 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for radiation monitoring NPMs 1-12.

Tier 1 3.9-1 Revision 2

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Table 3.9-1: Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1-12 Automatic Actions Radiation Monitor Variable Monitored Actuated Component(s) Component ID(s) Component Action(s)

ID(s) 00-CRV-RT-0503 CRVS outside air upstream of 1. CRVS filter unit bypass damper 1. None 1. Close 00-CRV-RT-0504 CRVS filter unit 2. CRVS filter unit bypass damper 2. None 2. Close 00-CRV-RT-0505 3. CRVS filter unit inlet isolation damper 3. None 3. Open

4. CRVS filter unit outlet isolation damper 4. None 4. Open
5. CRVS filter unit fan 5. None 5. Start 00-CRV-RT-0510 CRVS outside air downstream of 1. CRVS outside air intake damper 1. None 1. Close 00-CRV-RT-0511 CRVS filter unit 2. CRVS outside air intake damper 2. None 2. Close
3. CRVS filter unit fan 3. None 3. Stop
4. CRVS control room envelope supply damper 4. None 4. Close
5. CRVS control room envelope supply damper 5. None 5. Close
6. CRVS control room envelope return damper 6. None 6. Close
7. CRVS control room envelope return damper 7. None 7. Close
8. CRVS control room envelope smoke purge damper 8. None 8. Close
9. CRVS control room envelope smoke purge damper 9. None 9. Close
10. CRVS control room envelope exhaust damper 10. None 10. Close
11. CRVS control room envelope exhaust damper 11. None 11. Close 3.9-2 12. CRHS air supply isolation valve 12. 00-CRH-SV-0001A 12. Open
13. CRHS air supply isolation valve 13. 00-CRH-SV-0001B 13. Open
14. CRHS pressure relief isolation valve 14. 00-CRH-SV-0002A 14. Open
15. CRHS pressure relief isolation valve 15. 00-CRH-SV-0002B 15. Open Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1 - 12 00-RBV-RE-0510 RBVS spent fuel pool exhaust 1. RBVS Reactor Building general exhaust isolation damper 1. None 1. Close 00-RBV-RE-0511 for the spent fuel pool and dry dock area 2. None 2. Open 00-RBV-RE-0512 2. RBVS spent fuel pool filter unit A inlet isolation damper 3. None 3. Open
3. RBVS spent fuel pool filter unit A outlet isolation damper 4. None 4. Close
4. RBVS spent fuel pool filter unit A bypass isolation damper 5. None 5. Open
5. RBVS spent fuel pool filter unit B inlet isolation damper 6. None 6. Open
6. RBVS spent fuel pool filter unit B outlet isolation damper 7. None 7. Close
7. RBVS spent fuel pool filter unit B bypass isolation damper 8. 00-RBV-AHU-0001A 8. Reduce flow to maintain
8. RBVS main supply AHU fan 9. 00-RBV-AHU-0001B Reactor Building (RXB) &
9. RBVS main supply AHU fan 10. 00-RBV-AHU-0001C Radioactive Waste
10. RBVS main supply AHU fan 11. 00-RBV-AHU-0001D Building (RWB) dP
11. RBVS main supply AHU fan 9. Reduce flow to maintain RXB & RWB dP
10. Reduce flow to maintain Revision 2 RXB & RWB dP
11. Reduce flow to maintain RXB & RWB dP

Table 3.9-1: Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1-12 Automatic Actions (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Radiation Monitor Variable Monitored Actuated Component(s) Component ID(s) Component Action(s)

ID(s) 00-GRW-RIT-0046 GRWS train A charcoal decay 1. GRWS train A charcoal bed effluent isolation valve 1. 00-GRW-AOV-0047 1. Close bed discharge 00-GRW-RIT-0060 GRWS train B charcoal decay 1. GRWS train B charcoal bed effluent isolation valve 1. 00-GRW-AOV-0061 1. Close bed discharge 00-GRW-RIT-0071 GRWS effluent to RBVS 1. GRWS common charcoal bed effluent isolation valve 1. 00-GRW-AOV-0072 1. Close

2. GRWS common charcoal bed effluent isolation valve 2. 00-GRW-AOV-0117 2. Close 00-LRW-RIT-0569 LRWS discharge to utility water 1. LRWS to UWS isolation valve 1. 00-LRW-AOV-0570 1. Close 00-LRW-RIT-0571 system (UWS) 2. LRWS to UWS isolation valve 2. 00-LRW-AOV-0580 2. Close 00-AB-RT-0153 ABS flash tank vent 1. ABS flash tank vent pressure control valve 1. 00-AB-PCV-0002 1. Close
2. ABS high pressure steam supply isolation valve 2. 00-AB-AOV-0014 2. Close
3. ABS high pressure steam supply isolation valve 3. 00-AB-AOV-0160 3. Close 00-AB-RT-0166 ABS high pressure to low 1. ABS high pressure to low pressure steam supply pressure 1. 00-AB-PCV-0052 1. Close pressure steam supply control valve 00-PSC-RE-1003 PSCS tank vent 1. PSCS tank inlet isolation valve 1. 00-PSC-AOV-0006 1. Close
2. PSCS tank outlet isolation valve 2. 00-PSC-AOV-0008 2. Close 3.9-3 Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1 - 12 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1 - 12 Table 3.9-2: Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1-12 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 The CRVS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the CRVS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high-radiation signal from 00-CRV-RT- high-radiation signals. CRVS high-radiation signals listed in 0503, 00-CRV-RT-0504, and 00-CRV-RT- Table 3.9-1, the CRVS automatically 0505 to mitigate a release of aligns/actuates the identified radioactivity. components to the positions identified in the table.

2 The CRVS and the CRHS automatically A test will be performed of the CRVS Upon initiation of a real or simulated respond to a high-radiation signal high-radiation signals. CRVS high-radiation signals listed in from 00-CRV-RT-0510 and 00-CRV-RT- Table 3.9-1, the CRVS and the CRHS 0511 to mitigate a release of automatically align/actuate the radioactivity. identified components to the positions identified in the table.

3 The RBVS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the RBVS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high-radiation signal from 00-RBV-RE- high-radiation signals. RBVS high-radiation signals listed in 0510, 00-RBV-RE-0511, and 00-RBV-RE- Table 3.9-1, the RBVS automatically 0512 to mitigate a release of aligns/actuates the identified radioactivity. components to the positions identified in the table.

4 The GRWS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the GRWS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high-radiation signal from 00-GRW- high-radiation signals. GRWS high-radiation signals listed in RIT-0046 to mitigate a release of Table 3.9-1, the GRWS automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions identified in the table.

5 The GRWS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the GRWS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high-radiation signal from 00-GRW- high-radiation signals. GRWS high-radiation signals listed in RIT-0060 to mitigate a release of Table 3.9-1, the GRWS automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions identified in the table.

6 The GRWS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the GRWS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high-radiation signal from 00-GRW- high-radiation signals. GRWS high-radiation signals listed in RIT-0071 to mitigate a release of Table 3.9-1, the GRWS automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions identified in the table.

7 The LRWS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the LRWS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high-radiation signal from 00-LRW-RIT- high-radiation signals. LRWS high-radiation signals listed in 0569 and 00-LRW-RIT-0571 to mitigate Table 3.9-1, the LRWS automatically a release of radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions identified in the table.

8 The ABS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the ABS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high-radiation signal from 00-AB-RT- high-radiation signal. ABS high-radiation signal listed in 0153 to mitigate a release of Table 3.9-1, the ABS automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions identified in the table.

Tier 1 3.9-4 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1 - 12 Table 3.9-2: Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1-12 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 9 The ABS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the ABS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high-radiation signal from 00-AB-RT- high-radiation signal. ABS high-radiation signal listed in 0166 to mitigate a release of Table 3.9-1, the ABS automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions identified in the table.

10 The PSCS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the PSCS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high-radiation signal from 00-PSC-RE- high-radiation signal. PSCS high-radiation signal listed in 1003 to mitigate a release of Table 3.9-1, the PSCS automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions identified in the table.

Tier 1 3.9-5 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Reactor Building Crane 3.10 Reactor Building Crane 3.10.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is the Reactor Building crane (RBC). The RBC is a bridge crane that rides on rails anchored to the Reactor Building. The bridge crane can travel the length of the reactor pool, refueling pool, and the dry dock. The RBC is nonsafety-related and supports up to 12 NuScale Power Modules (NPMs). The Reactor Building houses all RBC equipment.

The RBC includes the following:

  • RBC with auxiliary hoist
  • below-the-hook lifting devices, including the module lifting adapter and the wet hoist The RBC performs the following risk-significant system function that is verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:
  • The RBC supports the NuScale Power Module by providing structural support and mobility while moving from refueling, inspection and operating bay.

Design Commitments

  • The single-failure-proof RBC main hoist is constructed to provide assurance that a failure of a single hoist mechanism does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.
  • The single-failure-proof RBC auxiliary hoists are constructed to provide assurance that a failure of a single hoist mechanism does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.
  • The single-failure-proof RBC wet hoist is constructed to provide assurance that a failure of a single hoist mechanism does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.
  • The RBC main hoist is capable of lifting and supporting its rated load, holding the rated load, and transporting the rated load.
  • The RBC auxiliary hoists are capable of lifting and supporting their rated load, holding the rated load, and transporting the rated load.
  • The RBC wet hoist is capable of lifting and supporting its rated load, holding the rated load, and transporting the rated load.
  • Load path RBC wet hoist welds are inspected.

3.10.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.10-1 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the RBC.

Tier 1 3.10-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Reactor Building Crane Table 3.10-1: Reactor Building Crane Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 The single-failure-proof RBC main An inspection will be performed of the The RBC main hoist is single-failure-hoist is constructed to provide as-built RBC main hoist. proof.

assurance that a failure of a single hoist mechanism does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.

2 The single-failure-proof RBC auxiliary An inspection will be performed of the The RBC auxiliary hoists are single-hoists are constructed to provide as-built RBC auxiliary hoists. failure-proof.

assurance that a failure of a single hoist mechanism does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.

3 The single-failure-proof RBC wet hoist An inspection will be performed of the The RBC wet hoist is single-failure-is constructed to provide assurance as-built RBC wet hoist. proof.

that a failure of a single hoist mechanism does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.

4 The RBC main hoist is capable of lifting A rated load test will be performed of The RBC main hoist lifts, supports, and supporting its rated load, holding the RBC main hoist. holds with the brakes, and transports a the rated load, and transporting the load of 125 to 130 percent of the rated load. manufacturers rated capacity.

5 The RBC auxiliary hoists are capable of A rated load test will be performed of The RBC auxiliary hoists lift, support, lifting and supporting their rated load, the RBC auxiliary hoists. hold with the brakes, and transport a holding the rated load, and load of 125 to 130 percent of the transporting the rated load. manufacturers rated capacity.

6 The RBC wet hoist is capable of lifting A rated load test will be performed of The RBC wet hoist lifts, supports, holds and supporting its rated load, holding the RBC wet hoist. with the brakes, and transports a load the rated load, and transporting the of 125 to 130 percent of the rated load. manufacturers rated capacity.

7 Load path RBC welds are inspected. An inspection will be performed of the The results of the non-destructive as-built RBC. examination of the RBC welds comply with American Society of Mechanical Engineers NOG-1 Code.

8 Load path RBC wet hoist welds are An inspection will be performed of the The results of the non-destructive inspected. as-built RBC wet hoist. examination of the RBC wet hoist welds comply with American Society of Mechanical Engineers NOG-1 Code.

Tier 1 3.10-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Reactor Building 3.11 Reactor Building 3.11.1 Design Description Building Description The scope of this section is the Reactor Building (RXB). The RXB is a safety-related structure.

The RXB supports up to 12 NuScale Power Modules. The RXB is a reinforced-concrete structure that is embedded in soil and supported on a basemat foundation. The RXB houses all Reactor Building components equipment.

The RXB performs the following safety-related system function that is verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC):

  • The RXB supports the following systems by housing and providing structural support:

NuScale Power Module chemical and volume control system (CVCS) ultimate heat sink module protection system nuclear monitoring system The RXB performs the following nonsafety-related, risk-significant system function that is verified by ITAAC:

  • The RXB supports the RXB crane by housing and providing structural support.

Design Commitments

  • Fire and smoke barriers provide confinement so that the impact from internal fires, smoke, hot gases, or fire suppressants is contained within the RXB fire area of origin.
  • The Seismic Category I RXB is protected against external flooding in order to prevent flooding of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSC) within the structure.
  • The RXB includes radiation shielding barriers for normal operation and post-accident radiation shielding.
  • The RXB includes radiation attenuating doors for normal operation and post-accident radiation shielding. These doors have a radiation attenuation capability that meets or exceeds that of the wall within which they are installed.
  • The RXB is Seismic Category I and maintains its structural integrity under the design basis loads.
  • Non-Seismic Category I SSC located where a potential for adverse interaction with a Seismic Category I SSC exists in the RXB will not impair the ability of Seismic Category I SSC to perform their safety functions during or following a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).

Tier 1 3.11-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Reactor Building

  • Safety-related SSC are protected against the dynamic and environmental effects associated with postulated failures in high- and moderate-energy piping systems.

3.11.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.11-2 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the RXB.

Tier 1 3.11-2 Revision 2

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Table 3.11-1: Reactor Building Shield Wall Geometry Elev. Room Name North Wall East Wall South Wall West Wall Floor Ceiling (Note 1) (Note 1) (Note 1) (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 2) 24 Module 1 CVCS ion exchanger 20 structural steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 20" concrete/steel sluice room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall floor) composite slab 24 Module 2 CVCS ion exchanger 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 20" concrete/steel sluice room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall floor) composite slab 24 Module 3 CVCS ion exchanger 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 20" concrete/steel sluice room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall floor) composite slab 24 Module 4 CVCS ion exchanger 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 20" concrete/steel sluice room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall floor) composite slab 24 Module 5 CVCS ion exchanger 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 20" concrete/steel sluice room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall floor) composite slab 24 Module 6 CVCS ion exchanger 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 20" concrete/steel sluice room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall floor) composite slab 24 Module 7 CVCS ion exchanger 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 20" concrete/steel sluice room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall floor) composite slab 3.11-3 24 Module 8 CVCS ion exchanger 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 20" concrete/steel sluice room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall floor) composite slab 24 Module 9 CVCS ion exchanger 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 20" concrete/steel sluice room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall floor) composite slab 24 Module 10 CVCS ion 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 20" concrete/steel exchanger sluice room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall floor) composite slab 24 Module 11 CVCS ion 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 20" concrete/steel exchanger sluice room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall floor) composite slab 24 Module 12 CVCS ion 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 20" concrete/steel exchanger sluice room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall floor) composite slab 24 Degasifier room A 5 concrete, RXB 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 3 concrete (floor of exterior wall partition wall partition wall partition wall floor) 50 elevation) 24 Degasifier room B 5 concrete, RXB 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 3 concrete (floor of exterior wall partition wall partition wall partition wall floor) 50 elevation) 24 Pool cleanup filter room A 5 concrete, RXB wall 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 5 concrete, RXB 10 concrete (ground 3 concrete (floor of partition wall partition wall exterior wall floor) 50 elevation)

Reactor Building 24 Pool cleanup filter room B 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 5 concrete, RXB 10 concrete (ground 3 concrete (floor of Revision 2 partition wall partition wall partition wall exterior wall floor) 50 elevation) 24 Pool cleanup system (PCUS) 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 5 concrete, RXB 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 3 concrete (floor of demin room #1 partition wall partition wall exterior wall partition wall floor) 50 elevation)

Table 3.11-1: Reactor Building Shield Wall Geometry (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Elev. Room Name North Wall East Wall South Wall West Wall Floor Ceiling (Note 1) (Note 1) (Note 1) (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 2) 24 PCUS demin room #2 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 5 concrete, RXB 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 3 concrete (floor of partition wall partition wall exterior wall partition wall floor) 50 elevation) 24 PCUS demin room #3 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 5 concrete, RXB 20 concrete/steel 10 concrete (ground 3 concrete (floor of partition wall partition wall exterior wall partition wall floor) 50 elevation) 35-8 Module 1 CVCS recirc. pump 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20" concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall composite slab 50 elevation) 35-8 Module 2 CVCS recirc. pump 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20" concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall composite slab 50 elevation) 35-8 Module 3 CVCS recirc. pump 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20" concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall composite slab 50 elevation) 35-8 Module 4 CVCS recirc. pump 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20" concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall composite slab 50 elevation) 35-8 Module 5 CVCS recirc. pump 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20" concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall composite slab 50 elevation) 35-8 Module 6 CVCS recirc. pump 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20" concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of 3.11-4 room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall composite slab 50 elevation) 35-8 Module 7 CVCS recirc. pump 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20" concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall composite slab 50 elevation) 35-8 Module 8 CVCS recirc. pump 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20" concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall composite slab 50 elevation) 35-8 Module 9 CVCS recirc. pump 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20" concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall composite slab 50 elevation) 35-8 Module 10 CVCS recirc. pump 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20" concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall composite slab 50 elevation) 35-8 Module 11 CVCS recirc. pump 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20" concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall composite slab 50 elevation) 35-8 Module 12 CVCS recirc. pump 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20" concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of room partition wall partition wall partition wall partition wall composite slab 50 elevation) 50 Module 1 CVCS heat 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 5 concrete, RXB 20 concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of 20" concrete/steel exchanger room partition wall partition wall exterior wall partition wall 50 elevation) composite slab 50 Module 2 CVCS heat 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 5 concrete, RXB 20 concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of 20" concrete/steel Reactor Building exchanger room partition wall partition wall exterior wall partition wall 50 elevation) composite slab Revision 2 50 Module 3 CVCS heat 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 5 concrete, RXB 20 concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of 20" concrete/steel exchanger room partition wall partition wall exterior wall partition wall 50 elevation) composite slab

Table 3.11-1: Reactor Building Shield Wall Geometry (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Elev. Room Name North Wall East Wall South Wall West Wall Floor Ceiling (Note 1) (Note 1) (Note 1) (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 2) 50 Module 4 CVCS heat 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 5 concrete, RXB 20 concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of 20" concrete/steel exchanger room partition wall partition wall exterior wall partition wall 50 elevation) composite slab 50 Module 5 CVCS heat 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 5 concrete, RXB 20 concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of 20" concrete/steel exchanger room partition wall partition wall exterior wall partition wall 50 elevation) composite slab 50 Module 6 CVCS heat 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 5 concrete, RXB 20 concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of 20" concrete/steel exchanger room partition wall partition wall exterior wall partition wall 50 elevation) composite slab 50 Module 7 CVCS heat 5 concrete (reactor 20 concrete/steel 20 structural steel 20 concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of 20 structural steel exchanger room pool wall) partition wall partition wall partition wall 50 elevation) partition wall 50 Module 8 CVCS heat 5 concrete (reactor 20 concrete/steel 20 structural steel 20 concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of 20" concrete/steel exchanger room pool wall) partition wall partition wall partition wall 50 elevation) composite slab 50 Module 9 CVCS heat 5 concrete (reactor 20 concrete/steel 20 structural steel 20 concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of 20" concrete/steel exchanger room pool wall) partition wall partition wall partition wall 50 elevation) composite slab 50 Module 10 CVCS heat 5 concrete (reactor 20 concrete/steel 20 structural steel 20 concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of 20" concrete/steel exchanger room pool wall) partition wall partition wall partition wall 50 elevation) composite slab 50 Module 11 CVCS heat 5 concrete (reactor 20 concrete/steel 20 structural steel 20 concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of 20" concrete/steel 3.11-5 exchanger room pool wall) partition wall partition wall partition wall 50 elevation) composite slab 50 Module 12 CVCS heat 5 concrete (reactor 20 concrete/steel 20 structural steel 20 concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of 20" concrete/steel exchanger room pool wall) partition wall partition wall partition wall 50 elevation) composite slab 50 Vertical pipe chase 20 concrete 20 concrete 20 concrete 5 concrete (RXB N/A N/A exterior) 62 Modules 1-6 heatup heat 5 concrete (reactor 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20" concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of exchangers pool wall) partition wall partition wall partition wall composite slab 75 elevation) 62 Modules 7-12 heatup heat 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 5 concrete, RXB 20 concrete/steel 20" concrete/steel 3 concrete (floor of exchangers partition wall partition wall exterior wall partition wall composite slab 75 elevation) 75 Modules 1-6 CVCS vertical pipe 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 5 concrete (reactor 20 concrete/steel N/A N/A chases partition wall partition wall pool wall) partition wall 75 Modules 7-12 CVCS vertical 5 concrete (reactor 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel N/A N/A pipe chases pool wall) partition wall partition wall partition wall 86 Modules 1-6 CVCS vertical pipe 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 5 concrete (reactor 20 concrete/steel N/A N/A chases partition wall partition wall pool wall) partition wall 86 Modules 7-12 CVCS vertical 5 concrete (reactor 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel N/A N/A Reactor Building pipe chases pool wall) partition wall partition wall partition wall Revision 2 100 Modules 1-6 CVCS vertical pipe 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 5 concrete (reactor 20 concrete/steel N/A N/A chases partition wall partition wall pool wall) partition wall

Table 3.11-1: Reactor Building Shield Wall Geometry (Continued)

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Elev. Room Name North Wall East Wall South Wall West Wall Floor Ceiling (Note 1) (Note 1) (Note 1) (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 2) 100 Modules 7-12 CVCS vertical 5 concrete (reactor 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel 20 concrete/steel N/A N/A pipe chases pool wall) partition wall partition wall partition wall 126 Reactor pool area 5 concrete wall 5 concrete wall 5 concrete wall 5 concrete wall 21.5 concrete, 2 4 concrete roof high-density polyethylene, 0.25 steel (Bioshield)

Note 1: A 20 concrete/steel partition wall consists of two one-half inch steel plates with 19 of concrete in between.

Note 2: A 20 concrete/steel composite slab consists of two one-half inch steel plates with 19 of concrete in between.

3.11-6 Revision 2 Reactor Building

NuScale Tier 1 Reactor Building Table 3.11-2: Reactor Building Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 Fire and smoke barriers provide An inspection will be performed of the The following RXB fire and smoke confinement so that the impact from RXB as-built fire and smoke barriers. barriers exist in accordance with the internal fires, smoke, hot gases,or fire fire hazards analysis, and have been suppressants is contained within the qualified for the fire rating specified in RXB fire area of origin. the fire hazards analysis:

  • fire-rated doors
  • fire-rated walls, floors, and ceilings
  • flood resistant doors
  • curbs and sills
  • walls
  • National Electrical Manufacturer's Association enclosures 3 The Seismic Category I RXB is An inspection will be performed of the The RXB floor elevation at ground protected against external flooding in RXB as-built floor elevation at ground entrances is higher than the maximum order to prevent flooding of safety- entrances. external flood elevation.

related SSC within the structure.

4 The RXB includes radiation shielding An inspection will be performed of the The thickness of RXB radiation barriers for normal operation and as-built RXB radiation shielding shielding barriers is greater than or post-accident radiation shielding. barriers. equal to the required thickness specified in Table 3.11-1.

5 The RXB includes radiation An inspection will be performed of the The RXB radiation attenuating doors attenuating doors for normal as-built RXB radiation attenuating are installed in their design location operation and for post-accident doors. and have a radiation attenuation radiation shielding. These doors have a capability that meets or exceeds that radiation attenuation capability that of the wall within which they are meets or exceeds that of the wall installed in accordance with the within which they are installed. approved door schedule design.

6 The RXB is Seismic Category I and i. An inspection and analysis will be i. A design report exists and maintains its structural integrity under performed of the as-built RXB. concludes that the deviations the design basis loads. ii. An inspection will be performed of between the drawings used for the as- built RXB. construction and the as-built RXB have been reconciled, and the RXB maintains its structural integrity under the design basis loads.

ii. The dimensions of the RXB critical sections conform to the approved design.

Tier 1 3.11-7 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Reactor Building Table 3.11-2: Reactor Building Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 7 Non-Seismic Category I SSC located An inspection and analysis will be A report exists and concludes that the where a potential for adverse performed of the as-built non-Seismic Non-Seismic Category I SSC located interaction with a Seismic Category I Category I SSC in the RXB. where a potential for adverse SSC exists in the RXB will not impair interaction with a Seismic Category I the ability of Seismic Category I SSC to SSC exists in the RXB will not impair perform their safety functions during the ability of Seismic Category I SSC to or following a SSE. perform their safety functions during or following an SSE as demonstrated by one or more of the following criteria:

  • Seismic Category I SSC are isolated from non-Seismic Category I SSC, so that interaction does not occur.
  • Seismic Category I SSC are analyzed to confirm that the ability to perform their safety functions is not impaired as a result of impact from non-Seismic Category I SSC.
  • A non-Seismic Category I restraint system designed to Seismic Category I requirements is used to assure that no interaction occurs between Seismic Category I SSC and non-Seismic Category I SSC.

8 Safety-related SSC are protected An inspection and analysis will be Protective features are installed in against the dynamic and performed of the as-built high- and accordance with the as-built Pipe environmental effects associated with moderate-energy piping systems and Break Hazard Analysis Report and postulated failures in high- and protective features for the safety- safety-related SSC are protected moderate-energy piping systems. related SSC located in the RXB outside against or qualified to withstand the the Reactor Pool Bay. dynamic and environmental effects associated with postulated failures in high- and moderate-energy piping systems.

Tier 1 3.11-8 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Radioactive Waste Building 3.12 Radioactive Waste Building 3.12.1 Design Description Building Description The scope of this section is the Radioactive Waste Building (RWB). The RWB is a nonsafety-related building which supports up to 12 NuScale Power Modules (NPMs). The RWB is located west of the Reactor Building (RXB) and serves as the primary radioactive waste facility to collect waste from the RXB and the Annex Building.

The RWB is a reinforced-concrete structure with a concrete roof supported on a steel frame.

It is embedded in soil and is supported on a foundation basemat. There are penetrations in the east wall and in the west wall through which the NuScale Power Module is transported into the RXB using a module import trolley.

Design Commitments

  • The RWB includes radiation shielding barriers for normal operation and post-accident radiation shielding.
  • The RWB includes radiation attenuating doors for normal operation and for post-accident radiation shielding. These doors have a radiation attenuation capability that meets or exceeds that of the wall within which they are installed.
  • The RWB is an RW-IIa structure and maintains its structural integrity under the design basis loads.

3.12.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.12-2 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the RWB.

Tier 1 3.12-1 Revision 2

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Table 3.12-1: Radioactive Waste Building Shield Wall Geometry Elev. Room Name North wall East wall South wall West wall Floor Ceiling 71 Tank room 20 concrete 20 concrete 20 concrete 48 concrete wall 60 concrete (Facility basemat) 24 concrete (Facility external wall) 71 Tank room 20 concrete 20 concrete 20 concrete 48 concrete wall 60 concrete (Facility basemat) 24 concrete (Facility external wall) 71 Tank room 36 concrete 48 concrete wall 15 concrete 15 concrete 60 concrete (Facility basemat) 24 concrete (Facility external wall) 71 Tank room 36 concrete 15 concrete 15 concrete 24 concrete 60 concrete (facility basemat) 24 concrete 71 Tank room 36 concrete 24 concrete 24 concrete 24 concrete 60 concrete (facility basemat) 24 concrete 71 Tank room 36 concrete 24 concrete 24 concrete 24 concrete 60 concrete (facility basemat) 24 concrete 71 Tank room 24 concrete 24 concrete 36 concrete 24 concrete 60 concrete (facility basemat) 24 concrete 71 Tank room 24 concrete 24 concrete 36 concrete 24 concrete 60 concrete (facility basemat) 24 concrete 71 Tank room 24 concrete 24 concrete 36 concrete 24 concrete 60 concrete (facility basemat) 24 concrete 71 Tank room 24 concrete 24 concrete 24 concrete 24 concrete 60 concrete (facility basemat) 24 concrete 71 Tank room 24 concrete 24 concrete 24 concrete 24 concrete 60 concrete (facility basemat) 24 concrete 71 Tank room 24 concrete 34 concrete 24 concrete 24 concrete 60 concrete (facility basemat) 24 concrete 3.12-2 71 Tank room 36 concrete 34 concrete 36 concrete 34 concrete 60 concrete (facility basemat) 24 concrete 71 Tank room 36 concrete 48 concrete wall 36 concrete 34 concrete 60 concrete (facility basemat) 24 concrete (Facility external wall) 71 High integrity container 36 concrete 36 concrete 36 concrete 36 concrete 60 concrete (facility basemat) 24 concrete filling room (Note 1) (Note 1) (Note 1) (Note 1) 71 Class A/B/C high integrity 36 concrete 36 concrete 36 concrete 48 concrete wall 60 concrete (facility basemat) 24 concrete container room (Facility external wall) 82 Pipe chase 24 concrete 24 concrete 24 concrete 24 concrete 20 concrete 24 concrete 100 Liquid radioactive waste 24 concrete 36 concrete 24 concrete 36 concrete 24 concrete 12 concrete -

mobile processing area Facility ceiling (Note 2)

Radioactive Waste Building 100 Drum dryer room A 24 concrete 36 concrete 24 concrete 12 concrete 24 concrete 12 concrete -

Facility ceiling (Note 3)

Note 1: The equivalent attenuation to an additional 4.5 of lead is provided for a high integrity container process shield.

Note 2: The equivalent attenuation to an additional one inch of steel on top of the low-conductivity waste demineralizers and granulated activated charcoal processing skid inside the liquid radioactive waste mobile processing area is provided.

Revision 2 Note 3: The equivalent attenuation to an additional two inches of steel on top of the drum dryer is provided.

NuScale Tier 1 Radioactive Waste Building Table 3.12-2: Radioactive Waste Building ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 The RWB includes radiation shielding An inspection will be performed of the The thickness of RWB radiation barriers for normal operation and as-built RWB radiation shielding shielding barriers is greater than or post-accident radiation shielding. barriers. equal to the required thickness specified in Table 3.12-1.

2 The RWB includes radiation An inspection will be performed of the The RWB radiation attenuating doors attenuating doors for normal as-built RWB radiation attenuating are installed in their design location operation and for post-accident doors. and have a radiation attenuation radiation shielding. These doors have a capability that meets or exceeds that radiation attenuation capability that of the wall within which they are meets or exceeds that of the wall installed in accordance with the within which they are installed. approved door schedule design.

3 The RWB is an RW-IIa structure and An inspection and analysis will be A design report exists and concludes maintains its structural integrity under performed of the as-built RW-IIa RWB. that the deviations between the the design basis loads. drawings used for construction and the as-built RW-IIa RWB have been reconciled and that the as-built RW-IIa RWB maintains its structural integrity under the design basis loads.

Tier 1 3.12-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Control Building 3.13 Control Building 3.13.1 Design Description Building Description The scope of this section is the Control Building (CRB). The CRB is a safety-related building that supports up to 12 NuScale Power Modules (NPMs). The CRB houses the main control room, the technical support center, the control room habitability system, the normal control room HVAC system, and safety and non-safety control and instrumentation systems.

The CRB is designated as Seismic Category I except for the following areas which are designated Seismic Category II:

  • above the 120'-0" elevation
  • inside the elevator shaft (full building height)
  • inside the two stairwells (full building height)
  • the fire protection vestibule located on the East side of the CRB The CRB is a reinforced-concrete building with an upper steel structure supporting the roof and has an underground equipment tunnel that connects to the Reactor Building. The tunnel is comprised of two levels-- an upper tunnel for personnel access to the Reactor Building and a lower tunnel that is a utilities tunnel between the CRB and for the Reactor Building. Above Elevation 120'-0", the CRB is a steel structure supporting a steel roof.

The CRB performs the following safety-related system function that is verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

  • The CRB supports the module protection system by housing and providing structural support.

The CRB performs the following nonsafety-related system function that is verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

Design Commitments

  • Fire and smoke barriers provide confinement so that the impact from internal fires, smoke, hot gases, or fire suppressants is contained within the CRB fire area of origin.
  • The Seismic Category I CRB is protected against external flooding in order to prevent flooding of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSC) within the structure.

Tier 1 3.13-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Control Building

  • The CRB at Elevation 120'-0" and below (except for the elevator shaft, the stairwells and the fire protection vestibule which are Seismic Category II) is Seismic Category I and maintains its structural integrity under the design basis loads.
  • Non-Seismic Category I SSC located where a potential for adverse interaction with a Seismic Category I SSC exists in the CRB will not impair the ability of Seismic Category I SSC to perform their safety functions during or following a safe shutdown earthquake.

3.13.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.13-1 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the CRB.

Tier 1 3.13-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Control Building Table 3.13-1: Control Building Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 Fire and smoke barriers provide An inspection will be performed of the The following CRB fire and smoke confinement so that the impact from CRB as-built fire and smoke barriers. barriers exist in accordance with the internal fires, smoke, hot gases, or fire fire hazards analysis, and have been suppressants is contained within the qualified for the fire rating specified in CRB fire area of origin. the fire hazards analysis:

  • fire-rated doors
  • fire-rated walls, floors, and ceilings
  • flood resistant doors
  • walls
  • National Electrical Manufacturer's Association (NEMA) enclosures 3 The Seismic Category I CRB is An inspection will be performed of the The CRB floor elevation at ground protected against external flooding in CRB as-built floor elevation at ground entrances is higher than the maximum order to prevent flooding of safety- entrances. external flood elevation.

related SSC within the structure.

Tier 1 3.13-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Control Building Table 3.13-1: Control Building Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 4 The CRB at Elevation 120-0(except for i. An inspection and analysis will be i. A design report exists and the elevator shaft, the stairwells, and performed of the as-built CRB. concludes that the deviations the fire protection vestibule which are ii. An inspection will be performed of between the drawings used for Seismic Category II) and below is the as-built CRB at Elevation 120- construction and the as-built CRB Seismic Category I and maintains its 0 and below. have been reconciled, and the CRB structural integrity under the design at Elevation 120-0 and below basis loads. (except for the elevator shaft, the stairwells, and the fire protection vestibule) maintains its structural integrity under the design basis loads.

ii. The dimensions of the CRB critical sections conform to the approved design.

5 Non-Seismic Category I SSC located An inspection and analysis will be A report exists and concludes that the where a potential for adverse performed of the as-built non-Seismic Non-Seismic Category I SSC located interaction with a Seismic Category I Category I SSC in the CRB. where a potential for adverse SSC exists in the CRB will not impair interaction with a Seismic Category I the ability of Seismic Category I SSC to SSC exists in the CRB will not impair perform their safety functions during the ability of Seismic Category I SSC to or following a safe shutdown perform their safety functions during earthquake. or following a safe-shutdown earthquake as demonstrated by one or more of the following criteria:

  • The collapse of the non-seismic Category I structure to strike a seismic Category I SSC.
  • The collapse of the non-Category I structure will not impair the integrity of Seismic Category I SSCs, nor result in incapacitating injury to control room occupants,
  • The non-Category I structure will be analyzed and designed to prevent its failure under SSE conditions.

Tier 1 3.13-4 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Qualification - Shared Equipment 3.14 Equipment Qualification - Shared Equipment 3.14.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is equipment qualification (EQ) of equipment shared by NuScale Power Modules 1 through 12.

This section applies to the RPV support stand (the only common, safety-related equipment) and a limited population of common, nonsafety-related equipment that has augmented Seismic Category I or environmental qualification requirements. The nonsafety-related equipment in this section provides one of the following nonsafety-related functions:

  • Provides physical support of irradiated fuel (fuel handling machine, spent fuel storage racks, reactor building crane, and module lifting adapter).
  • Provides a path for makeup water to the UHS.
  • Provides containment of the UHS water.
  • Monitors UHS water level.

Design Commitments

  • The common, Seismic Category I equipment, including its associated supports and anchorages, withstands design basis seismic loads without loss of its function(s) during and after a safe shutdown earthquake. The scope of equipment for this design commitment is the common, safety-related equipment, and the common, nonsafety-related equipment that provides one of the following nonsafety-related functions:

Provides physical support of irradiated fuel (fuel handling machine, spent fuel storage racks, reactor building crane, and module lifting adapter)

Provides a path for makeup water to the UHS Provides containment of UHS water Monitors UHS water level

  • The common electrical equipment located in a harsh environment, including its connection assemblies, withstands the design basis harsh environmental conditions experienced during normal operations, anticipated operational occurrences, design basis accidents, and post-accident conditions, and performs its function for the period of time required to complete the function. The scope of equipment for this design commitment is the nonsafety-related equipment that provides monitoring of the UHS water level and the non-safety related electrical equipment on the fuel handling machine and reactor building crane used to physically support irradiated fuel.

3.14.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.14-2 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for EQ -- shared equipment.

Tier 1 3.14-1 Revision 2

Tier 1 NuScale Tier 1 Table 3.14-1: Mechanical and Electrical/Instrumentation and Controls Shared Equipment Equipment Identifier Description Location EQ EQ Program Seismic Class 1E EQ Environment Category Category(1)

Module Assembly Equipment - Bolting None RPV Support Stand RXB - UHS N/A N/A I N/A N/A Fuel Handling Equipment B140-CRN-001 Fuel handling machine (FHM) RXB 100'-0" Elevation Harsh Electrical I No B Mechanical Spent Fuel Storage System 00-SFS-SRK-0001 Fuel Storage Racks RXB - Spent Fuel Pool N/A N/A I N/A N/A Ultimate Heat Sink LI/LIT-101A Pool level instruments RXB 24-0 Elevation Harsh Electrical I No A LI/LIT-101B LI/LIT-102A LI/LIT-102B None Water Makeup Line RXB - UHS N/A N/A I N/A N/A 3.14-2 Reactor Building Cranes 00-RBC-CRN-001 Reactor Building crane RXB 100-0 thru 145-6 Harsh Electrical I No B Elevation Mechanical 00-RBC-MHE-0001 Module Lifting Adapter RXB - Various N/A N/A I N/A N/A Reactor Building Components None UHS Pool Liner and Dry Dock RXB - UHS N/A N/A I N/A N/A Equipment Qualification - Shared Equipment Liner Notes:

1. EQ Categories:
  • A - Equipment that will experience the environmental conditions of design basis accidents for which it must function to mitigate said accidents, and that will be qualified to demonstrate operability in the accident environment for the time required for accident mitigation with safety margin to failure.
  • B - Equipment that will experience the environmental conditions of design basis accidents through which it need not function for mitigation of said accidents, but through which it must not fail in a manner detrimental to plant safety or accident mitigation, and that will be qualified to demonstrate the capability to withstand the accident environment for the time during which it must not fail with safety margin to failure.

Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Qualification - Shared Equipment Table 3.14-2: Equipment Qualification - Shared Equipment ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The common Seismic Category I i. A type test, analysis, or a i. A seismic qualification record form equipment, including its associated combination of type test and exists and concludes that the supports and anchorages, withstands analysis will be performed of the common Seismic Category I design basis seismic loads without loss common Seismic Category I equipment listed in Table 3.14-1, of its function(s) during and after a equipment, including its including its associated supports safe shutdown earthquake. The scope associated supports and and anchorages, will withstand the of equipment for this design anchorages. design basis seismic loads and commitment is common, safety- perform its function during and related equipment, and common, after a safe shutdown earthquake.

nonsafety-related equipment that ii. An inspection will be performed of ii. The common Seismic Category I provides one of the following the common Seismic Category I as- equipment listed in Table 3.14-1, nonsafety-related functions: built equipment, including its including its associated supports

  • Provides physical support of associated supports and and anchorages, is installed in its irradiated fuel (fuel handling anchorages. design location in a Seismic machine, spent fuel storage racks, Category I structure in a reactor building crane, and module configuration bounded by the lifting adaptor) equipments seismic qualification
  • Provides a path for makeup water to record form.

the UHS

  • Provides containment of UHS water
  • Monitors UHS water level
2. The common electrical equipment i. A type test or a combination of i. An equipment qualification record located in a harsh environment, type test and analysis will be form exists and concludes that the including its connection assemblies, performed of the common common electrical equipment withstands the design basis harsh electrical equipment, including its listed in Table 3.14-1, including its environmental conditions connection assemblies. connection assemblies, performs experienced during normal its function under the operations, anticipated operational environmental conditions occurrences, DBA, and post-accident specified in the equipment conditions and performs its function qualification record form for the for the period of time required to period of time required to complete the function. complete the function.

The scope of equipment for this ii. An inspection will be performed of ii. The common electrical equipment design commitment is the common as-built electrical listed in Table 3.14-1, including its nonsafety-related equipment that equipment, including its connection assemblies, is installed provides monitoring of the UHS water connection assemblies. in its design location in a level and the non-safety related configuration bounded by the EQ electrical equipment on the fuel record form.

handling machine and reactor building crane used to physically support irradiated fuel.

Tier 1 3.14-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Human Factors Engineering 3.15 Human Factors Engineering 3.15.1 Design Description

System Description

The human factors engineering (HFE) program design process is employed to design the control rooms and the human-system interfaces (HSIs) and associated equipment while relating the high-level goal of plant safety into individual, discrete focus areas for the design.

The HFE and control room design team establish design guidelines, define program-specific design processes, and verify that the guidelines and processes are followed. The scope of the HFE program includes the following:

  • location and accessibility requirements for the control rooms and other control stations
  • layout requirements of the control rooms, including requirements regarding the locations and design of individual displays and panels
  • basic concepts and detailed design requirements for the information displays, controls, and alarms for HSI control stations
  • coding and labeling conventions for control room components and plant displays
  • HFE design requirements and guidelines for the screen-based HSI, including the actual screen layout and the standard dialogues for accessing information and controls
  • requirements for the physical environment of the control rooms (e.g., lighting, acoustics, heating, ventilation, and air conditioning)
  • HFE requirements and guidelines regarding the layout of operator workstations and work spaces
  • corporate policies and procedures regarding the verification and validation of the design of HSI The HFE program applies to the design of the main control room (MCR) and the remote shutdown station. The HSI of the technical support center, the emergency operations facility, and local control stations (LCS) are derivatives of the main control room (MCR) HSI.

The design of local control station is accomplished concurrently with the applicable system design and follows guidelines established by the HFE and control room design team.

Design Commitments

  • The MCR design incorporates HFE principles that reduce the potential for operator error.
  • The as-built MCR HSI is consistent with the final design specifications validated by the integrated system validation test.

3.15.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.15-1 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the HFE.

Tier 1 3.15-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Human Factors Engineering Table 3.15-1: Human Factors Engineering Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The as-built main control room HSI is An inspection will be performed of the The as-built configuration of main consistent with the final design as-built configuration of MCR HSI. control room HSI is consistent with the specifications validated by the as-designed configuration of main integrated system validation test. control room HSI as modified by the Integrated System Validation Report.

Tier 1 3.15-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Physical Security System 3.16 Physical Security System 3.16.1 Design Description

System Description

The NuScale Power Plant physical security system design provides the capabilities to detect, assess, impede and delay threats up to and including the design basis threat, and to provide for defense-in-depth through the integration of systems, technologies, and equipment.

Design Commitments

  • Vital equipment within the Reactor Building (RXB) and Control Building (CRB) will be located in a vital area.
  • Access to vital equipment within the RXB and CRB will require passage through at least two physical barriers.
  • The external walls, doors, ceiling, and floors in the main control room (MCR), central alarm station (CAS), and the last access control function for access to the protected area will be bullet-resistant.
  • An access control system will be installed and designed for use by individuals who are authorized access to vital areas within the RXB and CRB without escort.
  • Unoccupied vital areas within the RXB and CRB will be designed with locking devices and intrusion-detection devices that annunciate in the CAS.
  • The CAS will be located inside the protected area and will be designed so that the interiors is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area.
  • Security alarm devices, including transmission lines to annunciators, will be tamper-indicating and self-checking, and alarm annunciation indicates the type of alarm and its location.
  • Intrusion-detection and assessment systems for the RXB and CRB will be designed to provide visual display and audible annunciation of alarms in the CAS.
  • Intrusion detection systems' recording equipment will record onsite security alarm annunciations, including each alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication and the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time.
  • Emergency exits in the vital area boundaries within the RXB and CRB will be alarmed with intrusion-detection devices and secured by locking devices that allow prompt egress during an emergency.
  • The CAS will have landline telephone service with the control room and local law enforcement authorities.
  • The CAS will be capable of continuous communication with on-duty security force personnel.
  • Non-portable communications equipment in the CAS will remain operable from an independent power source in the event of the loss of normal power.

Tier 1 3.16-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Physical Security System 3.16.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.16-1 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for physical security system.

Tier 1 3.16-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Physical Security System Table 3.16-1: Physical Security System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Vital equipment will be located only All vital equipment locations will be Vital equipment is located only within within a vital area. inspected. a vital area.
2. Access to vital equipment requires All vital equipment physical barriers Vital equipment is located within a passage through at least two physical will be inspected. protected area such that access to the barriers. vital equipment requires passage through at least two physical barriers.
3. The external walls, doors, ceiling, and Type test, analysis, or a combination of A report exists and concludes that the floors in the MCR and CAS will be type test and analysis of the external walls, doors, ceilings, and floors in the bullet-resistant. walls, doors, ceiling, and floors in the MCR and CAS are bullet-resistant.

MCR and CAS, will be performed.

4. An access control system will be The access control system will be The access control system is installed installed and designed for use by tested. and provides authorized access to vital individuals who are authorized access areas within the nuclear island and to vital areas within the nuclear island structures only to those individuals and structures without escort. with authorization for unescorted access.
5. Unoccupied vital areas within the Tests, inspections, or a combination of Unoccupied vital areas within the nuclear island and structures will be tests and inspections of unoccupied nuclear island and structures are designed with locking devices and vital areas' intrusion detection locked and alarmed and intrusion is intrusion detection devices that equipment and locking devices will be detected and annunciated in the CAS.

annunciate in the CAS. performed.

6. The CAS will be located inside the The CAS will be inspected. The CAS is located inside the protected area and will be designed so protected area, and the interior of the that the interior is not visible from the alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area. perimeter of the protected area.
7. Security alarm devices, including All security alarm devices and Security alarm devices, within the transmission lines to annunciators, will transmission lines in the RXB and CRB nuclear island and structures including be tamper-indicating and self- will be tested. transmission lines to annunciators, are checking, and alarm annunciation tamper-indicating and self-checking; indicates the type of alarm and its an automatic indication is provided location. when failure of the alarm system or a component occurs or when the system is on standby power; the alarm annunciation indicates the type of alarm and location.
8. Intrusion detection and assessment Intrusion detection and assessment The intrusion detection systems, systems within the nuclear island and systems in the RXB and CRB will be within the nuclear island and structures will be designed to provide tested. structures provide a visual display and visual display and audible audible annunciation of all alarms in annunciation of alarms in the CAS. the CAS.
9. Intrusion detection systems' recording The intrusion detection systems' Intrusion detection systems' recording equipment will record security alarm recording equipment in the RXB and equipment is capable of recording annunciations within the nuclear CRB will be tested. each security alarm annunciation island and structures including each within the nuclear island and alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and structures, including each alarm, false tamper indication, and the type of alarm, alarm check, and tamper alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and indication and the type of alarm, time. location, alarm circuit, date, and time.

Tier 1 3.16-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Physical Security System Table 3.16-1: Physical Security System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

10. Emergency exits through the vital area Tests, inspections, or a combination of Emergency exits through the vital area boundaries will be alarmed with tests and inspections of emergency boundaries within the nuclear island intrusion detection devices and within exits through vital area boundaries and structures are alarmed with the nuclear island and structures are within the nuclear island and intrusion detection devices and secured by locking devices that allow structures will be performed. secured by locking devices that allow prompt egress during an emergency. egress during an emergency.
11. The CAS will have a landline telephone Tests, inspections, or a combination of The CAS is equipped with landline service with the control room and local tests and inspections of the CAS's telephone service with the control law enforcement authorities. landline telephone service will be room and local law enforcement performed. authorities.
12. The CAS will be capable of continuous Tests, inspections, or a combination of The CAS is capable of continuous communication with on-duty security tests and inspections of the CAS's communication with on-duty force personnel. continuous communication watchmen, armed security officers, capabilities will be performed. armed responders, or other security personnel who have responsibilities within the physical protection program and during contingency response events.
13. Nonportable communications Tests, inspections, or a combination of All nonportable communication equipment in the CAS will remain tests and inspections of the devices in the CAS remain operable operable from an independent power nonportable communications from an independent power source in source in the event of the loss of equipment will be performed. the event of the loss of normal power.

normal power.

Tier 1 3.16-4 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1 - 6 3.17 Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1 - 6 3.17.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is automatic actions of various systems based on radiation monitoring. Automatic actions of systems based on radiation monitoring are nonsafety-related functions. The systems actuated by these automatic radiation monitoring functions are shared by NuScale Power Modules (NPMs) 1 through 6.

Design Commitments

  • The containment flooding and drain system (CFDS) automatically responds to a high-radiation signal from 6A-CFD-RT-1007 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The balance-of-plant drain system (BPDS) automatically responds to a high-radiation signal from 6A-BPD-RIT-0552 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The BPDS automatically responds to a high-radiation signal from 6A-BPD-RIT-0529 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The BPDS automatically responds to a high-radiation signal from 6A-BPD-RIT-0705 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.

3.17.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.17-2 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for radiation monitoring --

NuScale Power Modules 1 - 6.

Tier 1 3.17-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1 - 6 Table 3.17-1: Radiation Monitoring - Automatic Actions for NuScale Power Modules 1 - 6 Radiation Monitor Variable Monitored Actuated Component(s) Component ID(s) Component ID(s) Action(s) 6A-CFD-RT-1007 CFDS containment 1. CFDS containment drain separator 1. 6A-CFD-AOV-0112 1. Close drain separator gaseous discharge isolation valve gaseous discharge to Reactor Building heating ventilation and air conditioning system 6A-BPD-RIT-0552 6A condensate 1. North chemical waste water sump 1. 6A-BPD-P-0012A 1. Stop polishing system pump A regeneration skid 2. North chemical waste water sump 2. 6A-BPD-P-0012B 2. Stop waste effluent pump B

3. North chemical water sump to BPDS 3. 6A-BPD-FCV-0162 3. Close collection tank
4. North chemical water sump to 4. 6A-BPD-FCV-0163 4. Close liquid radioactive waste system (LRWS) isolation valve 6A-BPD-RIT-0529 BPDS north turbine 1. North waste water sump pump 1. 6A-BPD-P-0002A 1. Stop building floor drains 2. North waste water sump pump 2. 6A-BPD-P-0002B 2. Stop
3. North waste water sump to BPDS 3. 6A-BPD-FCV-0531 3. Close collection tank
4. North waste water sump to LRWS 4. 6A-BPD-FCV-0532 4. Close isolation valve 6A-BPD-RIT-0705 BPDS auxiliary 1. North waste water sump pump 1. 6A-BPD-P-0002A 1. Stop blowdown cooler 2. North waste water sump pump 2. 6A-BPD-P-0002B 2. Stop condensate 3. North waste water sump to BPDS 3. 6A-BPD-FCV-0531 3. Close collection tank
4. North waste water sump to LRWS 4. 6A-BPD-FCV-0532 4. Close isolation valve Tier 1 3.17-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 1 - 6 Table 3.17-2: Radiation Monitoring - Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria for NuScale Power Modules 1-6 No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The CFDS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the CFDS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high-radiation signal from 6A-CFD-RT- high-radiation signal. CFDS high-radiation signal listed in 1007 to mitigate a release of Table 3.17-1, the CFDS automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions identified in the table.
2. The BPDS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the BPDS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high-radiation signal from 6A-BPD-RIT- high-radiation signal. BPDS high-radiation signal listed in 0552 to mitigate a release of Table 3.17-1 the BPDS automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions identified in the table.
3. The BPDS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the BPDS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high-radiation signal from 6A-BPD-RIT- high-radiation signal. BPDS high-radiation signal listed in 0529 to mitigate a release of Table 3.17-1, the BPDS automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions identified in the table.
4. The BPDS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the BPDS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high-radiation signal from 6A-BPD-RIT- high-radiation signal. BPDS high-radiation signal listed in 0705 to mitigate a release of Table 3.17-1, the BPDS automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions identified in the table.

Tier 1 3.17-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 7 - 12 3.18 Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 7 - 12 3.18.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is automatic actions of various systems based on radiation monitoring. Automatic actions of systems based on radiation monitoring are nonsafety-related functions. The systems actuated by these automatic radiation monitoring functions are shared by NuScale Power Modules (NPMs) 7 through 12.

Design Commitments

  • The containment flooding and drain system (CFDS) automatically responds to a high-radiation signal from 6B-CFD-RT-1007 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The balance-of-plant drain system (BPDS) automatically responds to a high-radiation signal from 6B-BPD-RIT-0551 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.
  • The BPDS automatically responds to a high-radiation signal from 6B-BPD-RIT-0530 to mitigate a release of radioactivity.

3.18.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.18-2 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for radiation monitoring of NuScale Power Modules 7 - 12.

Tier 1 3.18-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 7 - 12 Table 3.18-1: Radiation Monitoring - Automatic Actions For NuScale Power Modules 7 - 12 Radiation Monitor Variable Monitored Actuated Component(s) Component ID(s) Component ID(s) Action(s) 6B-CFD-RT-1007 CFDS containment 1. CFDS containment drain separator 1. 6B-CFD-AOV-0112 1. Close drain separator gaseous discharge isolation valve gaseous discharge to Reactor Building heating ventilation and air conditioning system 6B-BPD-RIT-0551 6B condensate 1. South chemical waste water sump 1. 6B-BPD-P-0014A 1. Stop polishing system pump A regeneration skid 2. South chemical waste water sump 2. 6B-BPD-P-0014B 2. Stop waste effluent pump B

3. South chemical water sump to BPDS 3. 6B-BPD-FCV-0171 3. Close collection tank
4. South chemical water sump to 4. 6B-BPD-FCV-0172 4. Close liquid radioactive waste system (LWRS) isolation valve 6B-BPD-RIT-0530 BPDS south turbine 1. South waste water sump pump 1. 6B-BPD-P-0005A 1. Stop building floor drains 2. South waste water sump pump 2. 6B-BPD-P-0005B 2. Stop
3. South waste water sump to BPDS 3. 6B-BPD-FCV-0533 3. Close collection tank
4. South waste water sump to liquid 4. 6B-BPD-FCV-0534 4. Close radioactive waste system isolation valve Tier 1 3.18-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Radiation Monitoring - NuScale Power Modules 7 - 12 Table 3.18-2: Radiation Monitoring Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria For NuScale Power Modules 7 - 12 No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The CFDS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the CFDS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high-radiation signal from 6B-CFD-RT- high-radiation signal. CFDS high-radiation signal listed in 1007 to mitigate a release of Table 3.18-1, the CFDS automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions identified in the table.
2. The BPDS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the BPDS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high-radiation signal from 6B-BPD-RIT- high-radiation signal. BPDS high-radiation signal listed in 0551 to mitigate a release of Table 3.18-1, the BPDS automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions identified in the table.
3. The BPDS automatically responds to a A test will be performed of the BPDS Upon initiation of a real or simulated high-radiation signal from 6B-BPD-RIT- high-radiation signal. BPDS high-radiation signal listed in 0530 to mitigate a release of Table 3.18-1, the BPDS automatically radioactivity. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions identified in the table.

Tier 1 3.18-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Interface Requirements CHAPTER 4 INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS 4.0 Interface Requirements As noted in10 CFR 52.47(a)(25), identification of the interface requirements is to be met by those portions of the plant for which the application does not seek certification. Also, 10 CFR 52.47(a)(26) requires justification that compliance with the interface requirements be verifiable through inspection, testing (either in the plant or elsewhere), or analysis. The method to be used for verification of interface requirements must be included as part of the proposed Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria required by 10 CFR 52.47 (b)(1).

In additiion, 10 CFR 52.79(d)(2) requires that if the combined license application references a standard design certification, then the Final Safety Analysis Report must demonstrate that the interface requirements established for the design under § 52.47 have been met.

This section provides the Tier 1 material for interface items. No Tier 1 information is provided for the conceptual design portions that are combined license applicant scope.

4.1 Site-Specific Structures Failure of any of the site-specific structures not within the scope of the NuScale Power Plant certified design will not cause any of the Seismic Category I structures within the scope of the NuScale Power Plant-certified design to fail.

Tier 1 4.0-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Site Parameters CHAPTER 5 SITE PARAMETERS 5.0 Site Parameters The NuScale Power Plant design certification may be deployed over a wide variety of sites; therefore, it is necessary to specify a set of design parameters that bound the site conditions that are suitable for NuScale Power Plant operation. A site for construction of a NuScale Power Plant is acceptable if the site-specific characteristics fall within the design parameter values specified in Table 5.0-1 and Figure 5.0-1 through Figure 5.0-4. In case of deviation from these parameters, justification may be provided that the proposed facility is acceptable at the proposed site.

Tier 1 5.0-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Site Parameters Table 5.0-1: Site Design Parameters Site Characteristic/Parameter NuScale Design Parameter Nearby Industrial, Transportation, and Military Facilities External hazards on plant structures, systems, and components (SSC) (e.g., explosions, fires, release of toxic chemicals and flammable clouds, pressure effects) on plant SSC No external hazards Aircraft hazards on plant SSC No design basis aircraft hazards Meteorology Maximum precipitation rate 19.4 inches per hour 6.3 inches for a 5 minute period Normal roof snow load 50 psf Extreme roof snow load 75 psf 100-year return period 3-second wind gust speed 145 mph (Exposure Category C) with an importance factor of 1.15 for Reactor Building, Control Building, and Radioactive Waste Building Design Basis Tornado maximum wind speed 230 mph translational speed 46 mph maximum rotational speed 184 mph radius of maximum rotational speed 150 ft pressure drop 1.2 psi rate of pressure drop 0.5 psi/sec Tornado missile spectra Table 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.76, Revision 1, Region 1.

Maximum wind speed design basis hurricane 290 mph Hurricane missile spectra Tables 1 and 2 of Regulatory Guide1.221, Revision 0.

Zero percent exceedance value (historical limit excluding peaks <2 hours)

Maximum outdoor design dry bulb temperature 115°F Minimum outdoor design dry bulb temperature -40°F Accident release /Q values at exclusion area boundary and outer boundary of low population zone 0-2 hr 6.22E-04 s/m3 2-8 hr 5.27E-04 s/m3 8-24 hr 2.41E-04 s/m3 24-96 hr 2.51E-04 s/m3 96-720 hr 2.46E-04 s/m3 Accident release /Q values at main control room/

technical support center door and heating ventilation and air Door Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning conditioning intake Intake 0-2 hr 6.50E-03 s/m3 6.50E-03 s/m3 2-8 hr 5.34E-03 s/m3 5.34E-03 s/m3 8-24 hr 2.32E-03 s/m3 2.32E-03 s/m3 1-4 day 2.37E-03 s/m3 2.37E-03 s/m3 4-30 day 2.14E-03 s/m3 2.14E-03 s/m3 Hydrologic Engineering Maximum flood elevation Probable maximum flood and coincident wind wave and other effects on maximum flood level 1 foot below the baseline plant elevation Maximum elevation of groundwater 2 feet below the baseline plant elevation Tier 1 5.0-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Site Parameters Table 5.0-1: Site Design Parameters (Continued)

Site Characteristic/Parameter NuScale Design Parameter Geology, Seismology, and Geotechnical Engineering Ground motion response spectra/safe shutdown earthquake See Figure 5.0-1 and Figure 5.0-2 for horizontal and vertical certified seismic design response spectra (CSDRS) for all Seismic Category I SSC.

See Figure 5.0-3 and Figure 5.0-4 for horizontal and vertical high frequency certified seismic design response spectra (CSDRS-HF) for Reactor Building and Control Building.

Fault displacement potential No fault displacement potential Minimum soil bearing capacity (Qult) beneath safety-related structures 75 ksf Lateral soil variability Uniform site (< 20 degree dip)

Minimum soil angle of internal friction 30 degrees Minimum shear wave velocity 1000 fps at bottom of foundation Maximum settlement for the Reactor Building, Control Building, and Radioactive Waste Building:

  • total settlement 4 inches
  • tilt settlement Maximum of 0.5 inch per 50 feet of building length or 1 inch total in any direction at any point in these structures
  • differential settlement (between Reactor Building and 0.5 inch Control Building, and Reactor Building and Radioactive Waste Building)

Slope failure potential No slope failure potential Tier 1 5.0-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Site Parameters Figure 5.0-1: NuScale Horizontal Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra 5% Damping 10.00 CSDRS RG 1.60 @ 0.3g RG 1.60 @ 0.1g 1.00 Acceleration (g) 0.10 0.01 0.1 1.0 10.0 100.0 Frequency (Hz)

Tier 1 5.0-4 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Site Parameters Figure 5.0-2: NuScale Vertical Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra 5% Damping 10.000 CSDRS RG 1.60 @ 0.3g RG 1.60 @ 0.1g 1.000 Acceleration (g) 0.100 0.010 0.1 1.0 10.0 100.0 Frequency (Hz)

Tier 1 5.0-5 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Site Parameters Figure 5.0-3: NuScale Horizontal Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra - High Frequency 5% Damping 10.00 CSDRS CSDRS-HF 1.00 Acceleration (g) 0.10 0.01 0.1 1.0 10.0 100.0 Frequency (Hz)

Note: CSDRS-HF is evaluated for the RXB and CRB only Tier 1 5.0-6 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Site Parameters Figure 5.0-4: NuScale Vertical Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra - High Frequency 5% Damping 10.000 CSDRS CSDRS-HF 1.000 Acceleration (g) 0.100 0.010 0.1 1.0 10.0 100.0 Frequency (Hz)

Note: CSDRS-HF is evaluated for the RXB and CRB only Tier 1 5.0-7 Revision 2

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