ML18141A854

PV-2018-04 Draft Outlines

ML18141A854
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	04/20/2018
From:	Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV
To:	Arizona Public Service Co
References
Download: ML18141A854 (59)

Text

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline (RO)

Form ES-401-2 2018 PVNGS NRC Initial Written Exam Outline Rev 2 Facility: Palo Verde Date of Exam: April 2018 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K

1 K

2 K

3 K

4 K

5 K

6 A

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G*

Total A2 G*

Total

1.

Emergency &

Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1

2 2

4 N/A 3

4 N/A 3

18 6

2 2

2 1

1 1

2 9

4 Tier Totals 4

4 5

4 5

5 27 10

2.

Plant Systems 1

3 3

3 2

1 2

2 3

3 3

3 28 5

2 1

1 0

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

10 3

Tier Totals 4

4 3

3 2

3 3

4 4

4 4

38 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1

3 2

3 3

2 4

2 10 1

2 3

4 7

Note:

1.

Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 Radiation Control K/A is allowed if the K/A is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 Category).

2.

The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3.

Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4.

Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5.

Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6.

Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.

The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8.

On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9.

For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G*

Generic K/As

ES-401 2

Form ES-401-2 2018 PVNGS NRC Initial Written Exam Outline Rev 2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K

1 K

2 K

3 A

1 A

2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000007 Reactor Trip / 1 X

Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a reactor trip: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA2.03 Reactor trip breaker position 4.2 1

CE/E02 Reactor Trip Recovery / 1 X

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Reactor Trip Recovery) (CFR:

41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

3.3 2

000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 X

2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment. (CFR: 41.7

/ 43.5 / 45.12) 3.6 3

000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the small break LOCA:

(CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

EK3.07 Increasing indication on CCWS process monitor: indicates in-leakage of radioactive liquids 3.3 4

000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 X

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Large Break LOCA : (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.01 Natural circulation and cooling, including reflux boiling.

4.1 5

000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 /

45.3)

AK1.01 Consequences of thermal shock to RCP seals 2.8 6

000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X

2.4.31 Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures. (CFR: 41.10 /

45.3) 4.2 7

000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 X

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.01 PZR heaters, sprays, and PORVs 4.0 8

000029 ATWS / 1 X

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the ATWS: (CFR 41.5 /

41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

EK3.12 Actions contained in EOP for ATWS 4.4 9

000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 000040 Steam Line Rupture / 4

ES-401 3

Form ES-401-2 2018 PVNGS NRC Initial Written Exam Outline Rev 2 CE/E05 Excess Steam Demand / 4 X

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Excess Steam Demand) (CFR:

43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility*s license and amendments.

3.4 10 000054 Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 X

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW):

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.03 AFW auxiliaries, including oil cooling water supply 3.5 11 CE/E06 Loss of Feedwater / 4 X

Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Feedwater) and the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.2 Facilitys heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

3.5 12 000055 Station Blackout / 6 X

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the Station Blackout:

(CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

EK3.02 Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite power 4.3 13 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 X

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: (CFR: 43.5

/ 45.13)

AA2.68 CVCS letdown flow 2.7 14 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.16 Normal and abnormal PZR level for various modes of plant operation 3.0 15 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 X

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: (CFR 41.4, 41.8 / 45.7 )

AK3.01 The conditions that will initiate the automatic opening and closing of the SWS isolation valves to the nuclear service water coolers 3.2*

16 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X

2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment (CFR: 41.7

/ 43.5 / 45.12) 3.6 17 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 X

Knowledge of the interrelations between Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances and the following: (CFR: 41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10 / 45.8)

AK2.06 Reactor power 3.9 18 K/A Category Totals:

2 2

4 3

4 3

Group Point Total:

18/6

ES-401 4

Form ES-401-2 2018 PVNGS NRC Initial Written Exam Outline Rev 2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K

1 K

2 K

3 A

1 A

2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 X

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 /

45.13)

AK3.02 Tech-Spec limits on rod operability 3.2 19 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 X

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.05 Reactor power - turbine power 4.1 20 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 X

Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

AK2.03 Controllers and positioners 2.6 21 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 Fuel Handling Accident / 8 X

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Fuel Handling Incidents: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 /

45.3)

AK1.01 Radiation exposure hazards 3.5 22 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 X

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Generator Tube Leak: (CFR 41.8 /

41.10 / 45.3)

AK1.02 Leak rate vs. pressure drop 3.5 23 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 X

2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 /

45.12) 4.2 24 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 Control Room Evac. / 8 X

Knowledge of the interrelations between the Control Room Evacuation and the following (CFR 41.7 / 45.7):

AK2.01 Auxiliary shutdown panel layout 3.9 26 000069 Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 X

2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. (CFR: 41.7) 4.1 25 000074 Inad. Core Cooling / 4 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 CE/A13 Natural Circulation Operations / 4

ES-401 5

Form ES-401-2 2018 PVNGS NRC Initial Written Exam Outline Rev 2 CE/A11 RCS Overcooling / 4 X

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (RCS Overcooling) (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility*s license and amendments.

3.0 27 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals:

2 2

1 1

1 2

Group Point Total:

9/4

ES-401 6

Form ES-401-2 2018 PVNGS NRC Initial Written Exam Outline Rev 2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K

1 K

2 K

3 K

4 K

5 K

6 A

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RCPS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45/5)

K6.04 Containment isolation valves affecting RCP operation 2.8 28 004 Chemical and Volume Control X

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41/7

/ 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.14 Ion exchangers and demineralizers 2.8 29 004 Chemical and Volume Control X

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following CVCS components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

K6.17 Flow paths for emergency boration 4.4 30 005 Residual Heat Removal X

2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license. (CFR:

41.7 / 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13) 3.6 31 006 Emergency Core Cooling X

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ECCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

A1.17 ECCS flow rate 4.2 32 006 Emergency Core Cooling X

2.4.20 Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 3.8 33 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PRTS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.03 RCS 3.0 34 008 Component Cooling Water X

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7

/ 45.5)

A4.01 CCW indications and controls 3.3 35 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PZR PCS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 /

45.7 to 45.8)

K1.06 CVCS 2.9 36 012 Reactor Protection X

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RPS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.01 CRDS 3.9 37

ES-401 7

Form ES-401-2 2018 PVNGS NRC Initial Written Exam Outline Rev 2 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation X

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ESFAS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.02 RCS 4.3 38 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation X

Knowledge of ESFAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

K4.13 MFW isolation/reset 3.7 39 022 Containment Cooling X

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CCS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A3.01 Initiation of safeguards mode of operation 4.1 40 026 Containment Spray X

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.03 Failure of ESF 4.1 41 039 Main and Reheat Steam X

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MRSS: (CFR: 41.5 /

45.7)

K5.08 Effect of steam removal on reactivity 3.6 42 059 Main Feedwater X

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MFW will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.02 AFW system 3.6 43 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

K2.01 AFW system MOVs 3.2*

44 062 AC Electrical Distribution X

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

K2.01 Major system loads 3.3 45 063 DC Electrical Distribution X

2.4.6 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 4.0 46 063 DC Electrical Distribution X

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the DC electrical system, including:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A3.01 Meters, annunciators, dials, recorders, and indicating lights 2.7 47 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

K2.02 Fuel oil pumps 2.8*

48

ES-401 8

Form ES-401-2 2018 PVNGS NRC Initial Written Exam Outline Rev 2 073 Process Radiation Monitoring X

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRM system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

A1.01 Radiation levels 3.2 49 073 Process Radiation Monitoring X

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 /

45.13)

A2.01 Erratic or failed power supply 2.5 50 076 Service Water X

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SWS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A3.02 Emergency heat loads 3.7 51 076 Service Water X

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45/3 / 45/13)

A2.01 Loss of SWS 3.5*

52 078 Instrument Air X

Knowledge of IAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

K4.03 Securing of SAS upon loss of cooling water 3.1*

53 078 Instrument Air X

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7

/ 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.01 Pressure gauges 3.1 54 103 Containment X

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the containment system and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.08 SIS, including action of safety injection reset 3.6 55 K/A Category Point Totals:

3 3

3 2

1 2

2 3

3 3

3 Group Point Total:

28/5

ES-401 9

Form ES-401-2 2018 PVNGS NRC Initial Written Exam Outline Rev 2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K

1 K

2 K

3 K

4 K

5 K

6 A

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 001 Control Rod Drive X

2.4.50 Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. (CFR: 41.10 /

43.5 / 45.3) 4.2 56 002 Reactor Coolant X

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RCS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A3.03 Pressure, temperatures, and flows 4.4 57 011 Pressurizer Level Control X

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

K2.02 PZR heaters 3.1 58 014 Rod Position Indication X

Knowledge of RPIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

K4.03 Rod bottom lights 3.2 59 015 Nuclear Instrumentation X

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the NIS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

K5.05 Criticality and its indications 4.1 60 016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-Core Temperature Monitor 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control X

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the HRPS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

K6.01 Hydrogen recombiners 2.6 61 029 Containment Purge 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 Fuel Handling Equipment 035 Steam Generator X

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the S/GS and the following systems: (CFR:

41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.14 ESF 3.9 63 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control X

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.08 Steam dump valves 3.0 64 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal

ES-401 10 Form ES-401-2 2018 PVNGS NRC Initial Written Exam Outline Rev 2 056 Condensate X

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Condensate System ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 /

45.13)

A2.04 Loss of Condensate Pumps 2.6 62 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal 072 Area Radiation Monitoring X

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ARM system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 /

45.5)

A1.01 Radiation levels 3.4 65 075 Circulating Water 079 Station Air 086 Fire Protection K/A Category Point Totals:

1 1

0 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 Group Point Total:

10/3

ES-401 RO Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

Form ES-401-3 2018 PVNGS NRC Initial Written Exam Outline Rev 2 Facility: Palo Verde Date of Exam: April 2018 Category K/A #

Topic RO SRO-Only IR IR

1.

Conduct of Operations 2.1.21 Ability to verify the controlled procedure copy. (CFR:

41.10 / 45.10 / 45.13) 3.5*

66 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation. (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6) 4.3 67 2.1.34 Knowledge of primary and secondary plant chemistry limits. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 2.7 68 Subtotal

2.

Equipment Control 2.2.6 Knowledge of the process for making changes to procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13) 3.0 69 2.2.40 Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 43.5 / 45.3) 3.4 70 2.2.43 Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 3.0 71 Subtotal

3.

Radiation Control 2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities. (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10) 3.4 72 2.3.15 Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc. (CFR:

41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9) 2.9 73 Subtotal

4.

Emergency Procedures /

Plan 2.4.1 Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 4.6 74 2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.0 75 Subtotal Tier 3 Point Total 10 7

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 2018 PVNGS NRC Initial Written Exam Outline Rev 2 Q #

Tier/Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection 7

1 / 1 025 2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications is SRO level knowledge. Reselected 025 2.4.31.

8 1 / 1 027 AA1.05 PVNGS does not have backup power supplies for pressurizer heaters. Reselected 027 AA1.01.

17 1 / 1 065 2.2.3 There are no design, procedural, or operational differences between the units for the Instrument Air system. Reselected 065 2.2.37.

20 1 / 2 005 AA1.04 No specific direction exists for adjusting reactor and/or turbine power for a stuck CEA, with the exception of MODE 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. This evolution would be conducted at the discretion of the CRS so conclusively saying one answer is right and the other answers would be wrong is not really possible. Since the original KA was more appropriate for a dropped CEA (which would also meet the original KA since a dropped CEA is inoperable),

reselected 003 AA1.04. Only difference in KAs is dropped CEA vs. inoperable/stuck CEA.

22 1 / 2 036 AK1.03 After several attempts to write a question about indications of approaching criticality following a fuel handling incident, we determined that we (1) dont have procedural guidance for approaching criticality following a fuel handling incident, and (2) were unable to create plausible distractors for this concept. Reselected 036 AK1.01.

26 1 / 2 076 AK2.01 KA overlaps with question 85. All other AK2 items for 076, High Reactor Coolant Activity, are < 2.5.

Reselected 068 (Control Room Evacuation), AK2.01.

33 2 / 1 007 2.4.34 There are no specific RO actions taken outside of the control room during an emergency related to the Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank. Due to having a question about a lifted PZR relief and an additional 007 question, replaced KA with 006 (ECCS) G 2.4.20.

35 2 / 1 008 A4.02 There are no operations or monitoring points in the control room related to the filling and/or venting of the CCW system. Replaced with 008 A4.01.

41 2 / 1 026 A2.08 The KAs for questions 40 and 41 both required containment pressures having to do with either a CSAS actuation or securing of Containment Spray resulting in a cueing issue for one of the two questions. Replaced the KA on question 41 in order to avoid a cueing issue on either question. Reselected 026 A2.03.

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 2018 PVNGS NRC Initial Written Exam Outline Rev 2 46 2 / 1 063 2.4.11 All operations having to do with DC distribution while operating in the EOP network are directed from either the EOP or the EOP Standard Appendices. Reselected 063 G 2.4.11.

62 2 / 2 034 A2.03 Using procedures to correct, control or mitigate the misposition of a fuel element could be RO level knowledge if the KA was asking about the impact in a general sense, however the KA is asking for how to respond specifically to the impact to the Refueling Machine/Equipment which is SRO level knowledge and solely and SRO job function at PVGS. Reselected 056 A2.04 64 2 / 2 068 A4.03 PVNGS is a zero liquid release plant, therefore the KA does not apply. Reselected 041 (Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control) A4.08.

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline (SRO)

Form ES-401-2 Facility: Palo Verde Date of Exam: April 2018 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K

1 K

2 K

3 K

4 K

5 K

6 A

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G*

Total A2 G*

Total

1.

Emergency &

Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1

N/A N/A 18 3

3 6

2 9

2 2

4 Tier Totals 27 5

5 10

2.

Plant Systems 1

28 3

2 5

2 10 1

2 3

Tier Totals 38 4

4 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1

2 3

4 10 1

2 2

2 3

1 4

2 7

Note:

1.

Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 Radiation Control K/A is allowed if the K/A is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 Category).

2.

The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3.

Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4.

Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5.

Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6.

Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.

The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8.

On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9.

For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G*

Generic K/As

ES-401 2

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K

1 K

2 K

3 A

1 A

2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000007 Reactor Trip / 1 CE/E02 Reactor Trip Recovery / 1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.01 Proper amperage of running LPI/decay heat removal/RHR pump(s) 2.9 76 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 X

2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12) 4.0 77 000029 ATWS / 1 X

2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13) 4.0 78 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 000040 Steam Line Rupture / 4 X

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: (CFR: 43.5 /

45.13)

AA2.03 Difference between steam line rupture and LOCA 4.7 79 CE/E05 Excess Steam Demand / 4 000054 Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 CE/E06 Loss of Feedwater / 4 000055 Station Blackout / 6 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.18 The indicator, valve, breaker, or damper position which will occur on a loss of power 3.1 80 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 X

2.4.31. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.3) 4.1 81 K/A Category Totals:

3 3

Group Point Total:

18/6

ES-401 3

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K

1 K

2 K

3 A

1 A

2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 X

2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (CFR: 41.5 /

43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) 4.7 82 000036 Fuel Handling Accident / 8 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 X

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.02 Conditions requiring reactor and/or turbine trip 4.1 83 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 X

2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.6 84 000068 Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 Inad. Core Cooling / 4 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 X

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.01 Location or process point that is causing an alarm 3.2 85 CE/A13 Natural Circulation Operations / 4 CE/A11 RCS Overcooling / 4 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals:

2 2

Group Point Total:

9/4

ES-401 4

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K

1 K

2 K

3 K

4 K

5 K

6 A

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 003 Reactor Coolant Pump 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal 006 Emergency Core Cooling 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 008 Component Cooling Water 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control 012 Reactor Protection 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 022 Containment Cooling 026 Containment Spray 039 Main and Reheat Steam 059 Main Feedwater 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 062 AC Electrical Distribution X

2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 43.2) 4.2 86 063 DC Electrical Distribution X

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the DC electrical systems; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5

/ 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.01 Grounds 3.2*

87 064 Emergency Diesel Generator 073 Process Radiation Monitoring X

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 /

45.13)

A2.02 Detector failure 3.2 88 076 Service Water X

2.4.47 Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material. (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.2 89 078 Instrument Air

ES-401 5

Form ES-401-2 103 Containment X

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 /

45.13)

A2 03 Phase A and B isolation 3.8*

90 K/A Category Point Totals:

3 2

Group Point Total:

28/5

ES-401 6

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K

1 K

2 K

3 K

4 K

5 K

6 A

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 001 Control Rod Drive 002 Reactor Coolant 011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation X

2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13) 4.0 92 016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-Core Temperature Monitor 027 Containment Iodine Removal X

2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc. (CFR:

41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.6 91 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 Fuel Handling Equipment 035 Steam Generator 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal X

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Waste Gas Disposal System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 /

45.13)

A2.09 Stuck-open relief valve 3.5*

93 072 Area Radiation Monitoring 075 Circulating Water 079 Station Air 086 Fire Protection K/A Category Point Totals:

1 2

Group Point Total:

10/3

ES-401 SRO Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

Form ES-401-3 Facility: Palo Verde Date of Exam: April 2018 Category K/A #

Topic RO SRO-Only IR IR

1.

Conduct of Operations 2.1.13 Knowledge of facility requirements for controlling vital/controlled access. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.9 / 45.10) 3.2 94 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management.

(CFR: 41.1 /

43.6 / 45.6) 4.6 95 Subtotal

2.

Equipment Control 2.2.7 Knowledge of the process for conducting special or infrequent tests. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13) 3.6 96 2.2.39 Knowledge of less than or equal to one hour Technical Specification action statements for systems. (CFR: 41.7 /

41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) 4.5 97 Subtotal

3.

Radiation Control 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10) 3.7 98 Subtotal

4.

Emergency Procedures /

Plan 2.4.38 Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator if required. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11) 4.4 99 2.4.37 Knowledge of the lines of authority during implementation of the emergency plan. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) 4.1 100 Subtotal Tier 3 Point Total 10 7

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Q #

Tier/Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection 78 1 / 1 029 G 2.4.1 EOP entry conditions and immediate actions steps are RO knowledge. Reselected 029 G 2.4.18.

81 1 / 1 077 G 2.4.34 There are no RO tasks performed outside the control room during Generator Voltage and Grid Disturbances at PVNGS. Reselected 077 G 2.4.31.

92 2 / 2 028 G 2.4.18 Very similar KA to question 61 on the RO exam. Kept G 2.4.18 but reselected system 015, Nuclear Instrumentation.

98 3

G 2.3.5 Ability to use RM systems and personnel monitoring equipment is generic plant worker knowledge and/or RO level knowledge. Reselected G 2.3.4.

100 3

G 2.4.46 Understanding what causes alarms to come in (verify alarms are consistent with plant conditions) is RO knowledge. Reselected G 2.4.37.

Administrative Topics Outline PVNGS 2018 NRC RO Admin JPM Outline ES-301-1 Rev 0 Facility:

PVNGS Date of Examination:

4/13/18 Examination Level RO Operating Test Number:

2018 NRC Administrative Topic (see Note)

Type Code*

Describe Activity to be Performed (A1)

N, R JPM: Determine the void volume in the Train A EC System K/A: G 2.1.20 - Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

IR: 4.6 (A2)

D, R JPM: Determine the time until SDC must be in service K/A: G 2.1.25 - Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

IR: 3.9 (A3)

N, R JPM: Calculate Containment Sump in-leakage K/A: G 2.2.12 - Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

IR: 3.7 (A4)

D, R JPM: Determine correct REP and RCS entry requirements K/A: G 2.3.7 - Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions.

IR: 3.2 Emergency Plan NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (2)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (2)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) (0)

Administrative Topics Outline Task Summary PVNGS 2018 NRC RO Admin JPM Outline ES-301-1 Rev 0 A1 The applicant will determine the void volume in the Train A Essential Chiller Water System, per 40OP-9EC01, Essential Chilled Water Train A, Section 6.15, Void Checking Essential Chilled Water System Train A. This is a new JPM.

A2 The applicant will determine the time until SDC must be placed in service using post-trip parameters and Standard Appendix 4, CST Level vs Time to Shutdown Cooling. This is a bank JPM.

A3 The applicant will utilize various Containment Sump level readings to determine Containment Sump in-leakage using 40ST-9RD01, Containment Sump Hourly Check. This is a new JPM.

A4 The applicant will determine EPD dose alarm, EPD dose rate alarm, protective clothing requirements, RP coverage requirements, and briefing requirements for performance of a valve lineup in the RCA based on the provided REP and survey maps. This is a bank JPM.

Administrative Topics Outline PVNGS 2018 NRC SRO Admin JPM Outline ES-301-1 Rev 0 Facility:

PVNGS Date of Examination:

4/13/18 Examination Level SRO Operating Test Number:

2018 NRC Administrative Topic (see Note)

Type Code*

Describe Activity to be Performed (A5)

M, R JPM: Determine compliance with fatigue rules K/A: G 2.1.5 - Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew compliment, overtime limitations, etc.

IR: 3.9 (A6)

D, R JPM: Times for required actions following slipped CEA K/A: 2.1.25 - Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

IR: 4.2 (A7)

D, R JPM: MSIV operability determination K/A: G 2.2.40 - Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system.

IR: 4.7 (A8)

N, R JPM: PAR evaluation following a release related General Emergency declaration K/A: G 2.3.14 - Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.

IR: 3.8 (A9)

N, R JPM: Classify the EAL following an emergency K/A: G 2.4.29 - Knowledge of the emergency plan.

IR: 4.4

Administrative Topics Outline Task Summary PVNGS 2018 NRC SRO Admin JPM Outline ES-301-1 Rev 0 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (2)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (3)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) (0)

A5 The applicant will review the past 7 days worked for 3 ROs and determine which, if any, of them is available to work the next day by comparing their work history to Personal Fatigue Rules per 01DP-0AP17, Managing Personnel Fatigue. This is a modified bank JPM (modified from a 2015 NRC Exam SRO JPM).

A6 The applicant will determine maximum completion times for initial and subsequent power reductions and minimum required CEA withdrawal times using various graphs and tables following a slipped CEA per 40AO-9ZZ11, CEA Malfunctions. This is a bank JPM.

A7 The applicant will evaluate the operability of MSIVs based on valve actuator accumulator pressures over the course of two hours, and determine the impacted LCO conditions, using Technical Specifications. This is a bank JPM.

A8 The applicant will evaluate the status of a radiological release and meteorological conditions to make a Protective Area Recommendation per EP-0803E, PAR Flowchart. This is a new JPM.

A9 The applicant will classify an emergency event using EP-0901, Classifications, and the EAL classification charts. This is a new JPM.

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 1 of 3 PVNGS 2018 NRC RO & SRO JPM Outline ES-301-2 Rev 1 Facility:

PVNGS Date of Examination:

04/13/18 Exam Level:

RO SRO(I) SRO (U)

Operating Test No.:

2018 NRC Control Room Systems (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code*

Safety Function S1 (RO Only)

Reset CEA positions in the Plant Computer and Core Monitoring Computer per 40AO-9ZZ11 N, S 1

S2 Reset Train A and Train B AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 actuations per Standard Appendix 27 EN, L, N, S 2

S3 Take manual control of Pressurizer Spray prior to an automatic reactor trip following a controller failure per the alarm response procedure A, N, S 3

S4 Restore Seal Injection following an extended loss of letdown per 40AO-9ZZ05, Loss of Charging or Letdown A, D, S 4P S5 Vent the RCS to Containment per Standard Appendix 15, RCS Void Control A, D, L, S 5

S6 Transfer 13.8 kV Bus NAN-S02 to MAN-X02 per 40OP-9NA03, 13.8 kV Electrical System A, D, S 6

S7 Adjust Linear Power NI to correspond with calorimetric power indication per 40ST-9NI01, Adjustable Power Signal Calibrations N, S 7

S8 Cross-Tie Train A EW to NC with the A EW Pump tripping during evolution A, M, S 8

In-Plant Systems (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P1 Cross-Tie AFW to Fire Protection Water per Standard Appendix 118, Cross-Connect FP to AF E, N 4S P2 Minimize Release to Environment during a SGTR - Align Turbine Building Sumps to LRS per 40AO-9ZZ02, Excessive RCS Leakrate D, E 3

P3 Disable Aux Building Sump Pump Breakers per Standard Appendix 99, Aux Building Sump Pump Breaker List E, N, R 9

RO: Will perform all simulator and in-plant JPMs SRO(I): Will perform all simulator and in-plant JPMs with the exception of S-1 SRO(U): Will perform S-2, S-6, S-8, P-1, P-3

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 2 of 3 PVNGS 2018 NRC RO & SRO JPM Outline ES-301-2 Rev 1 All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 (5) / 4-6 (5) / 2-3 (2)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9 (5) / 8 (5) / 4 (1)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 (3) / 1 (3) / 1 (2)

(EN)gineered safety feature 1 (1) / 1 (1) / 1 (1) (control room system)

(L)ow Power / Shutdown 1 (3) / 1 (3) / 1 (1)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2 (6, 1Alt) / 2 (5, 1Alt) / 1 (4, 1Alt)

(P)revious 2 exams 3 (0) / 3 (0) / 2 (0) (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1 (1) / 1 (1) / 1 (1)

(S)imulator NRC JPM Examination Summary Description S1 The applicant will reset CEA positions in the Plant Monitoring Computer and Core Monitoring Computer following a CEA slip to 50 withdrawn per 40AO-9ZZ11, CEA Malfunctions. This is a new JPM covered by Safety Function 1.

S2 The applicant will reset Train A and Train B AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 per Standard Appendix 27-E, AFAS Reset and Restoration. This is a new JPM covered by Safety Function 2.

S3 The applicant will begin by placing the Pressurizer in Boron Equalization. The alternate path will occur one minute after placing the Pressurizer Pressure Controller in AUTO.

The controller output will fail to 100% causing both Main Spray valves to go full open.

The applicant will either take prompt and prudent action to close the spray valves or address the ARP to close the spray valves. This is a new JPM covered by Safety Function 3.

S4 The applicant will restore RCP Seal Injection following an extended loss of letdown per 40AO-9ZZ05, Loss of Charging or Letdown. The alternate path will occur when the differential pressure controller fails to 0% output when placed in auto, requiring the operator to take manual controller of differential pressure to establish 6.0 - 7.5 gpm of seal injection flow to each RCP. This is a bank JPM covered by Safety Function 4P.

S5 The applicant will attempt to vent the Reactor Vessel Head to the Reactor Drain Tank following a loss of coolant accident per Standard Appendix 15, RCS Void Control. The alternate path will occur when the vent valves to the RDT will not open and the applicant will have to open alternate valves to align the vent path to containment. This is a bank JPM covered by Safety Function 5.

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 3 of 3 PVNGS 2018 NRC RO & SRO JPM Outline ES-301-2 Rev 1 S6 The applicant will transfer 13.8 kV Bus NAN-S02 from 13.8 kV Bus NAN-S04 to Unit Aux Transformer MAN-X02 per 40OP-9NA03, 13.8 kV Electrical System. Following the parallel with the alternate source, the normal supply breaker will fail to auto trip and the applicant will address the ARP and manually open the normal supply breaker prior to an automatic Main Turbine trip due to overheating. This is a bank JPM covered by Safety Function 6.

S7 The applicant will perform a post-maintenance NI alignment for the linear power NI per 40ST-9NI01, Adjustable Power Signal Calibrations. This is a new JPM covered by Safety Function 7.

S8 The applicant will cross-tie Train A Essential Cooling Water system to supply Nuclear Cooling Water non-essential loads following a complete loss of NC per 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water. The alternate path occurs when the A EW Pump trips, rendering the cross-tie impossible and requiring a reactor trip. This is a modified bank JPM covered by Safety Function 8.

P1 The applicant will simulate field actions to align the Fire Protection system to the Auxiliary Feedwater system to supply emergency feedwater to the SGs per Standard Appendix 118, Cross-Connect FP to AF. This is a new JPM covered by Safety Function 4S.

P2 The applicant will simulate aligning Turbine Building Sumps to the Liquid Radwaste System following a SGTL per 40AO-9ZZ02, Excessive RCS Leakrate. This is a bank JPM covered by Safety Function 3.

P3 The applicant will simulate locally opening all of the breakers for Auxiliary Building Sump Pumps to minimize the potential to spread contamination following a LOCA outside of containment per Standard Appendix 99, Aux Building Sump Pump Breaker List. This is a new JPM covered by Safety Function 9.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 4/13/18 Operating Test No.: 2018 A

P P

L I

C A

N T

E V

E N

T T

Y P

E Scenarios 1

2 3

4 T

O T

A L

M I

N I

M U

M(*)

CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P R

I U

R1 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 1

I/C 2,4,7 2,4,5 6

4 MAJ 6

6,8 3

2 TS 0

0 R2 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 1

I/C 2,3,5 3,4,7 6

4 MAJ 6

6,8 3

2 TS 0

0 R3 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 1

I/C 2,4,7 2,4,5 6

4 MAJ 6

6,8 3

2 TS 0

0 R4 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 1

I/C 2,3,5 3,4,7 6

4 MAJ 6

6,8 3

2 TS 0

0 Instructions:

1.

Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4.

For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 4/13/18 Operating Test No.: 2018 A

P P

L I

C A

N T

E V

E N

T T

Y P

E Scenarios 1

2 3

4 T

O T

A L

M I

N I

M U

M(*)

CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P R

I U

R5 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 1

I/C 2,4,7 2,4,5 6

4 MAJ 6

6,8 3

2 TS 0

0 R6 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 1

I/C 2,3,5 3,4,7 6

4 MAJ 6

6,8 3

2 TS 0

0 R7 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 1

I/C 2,4,7 2,4,5 6

4 MAJ 6

6,8 3

2 TS 0

0 R8 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 1

I/C 2,3,5 3,4,7 6

4 MAJ 6

6,8 3

2 TS 0

0 Instructions:

1.

Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4.

For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 4/13/18 Operating Test No.: 2018 A

P P

L I

C A

N T

E V

E N

T T

Y P

E Scenarios 1

2 3

4 T

O T

A L

M I

N I

M U

M(*)

CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P R

I U

R9 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 1

I/C 2,3,5 3,4,7 6

4 MAJ 6

6,8 3

2 TS 0

0 I1 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 2,3,4

,5 4,5, 7

2,4,5 10 4

MAJ 6

6 6,8 4

2 TS 2,4 2

2 I2 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 2,4,7 3,5 2,3,4

,5,7 10 4

MAJ 6

6 6,8 4

2 TS 3,5 2

2 I3 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 2,3,5 3,4,5

,7 3,4,7 10 4

MAJ 6

6 6,8 4

2 TS 2,4 2

2 Instructions:

1.

Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4.

For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 4/13/18 Operating Test No.: 2018 A

P P

L I

C A

N T

E V

E N

T T

Y P

E Scenarios 1

2 3

4 T

O T

A L

M I

N I

M U

M(*)

CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P R

I U

I4 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 2,3,4

,5 4,5, 7

2,4,5 10 4

MAJ 6

6 6,8 4

2 TS 2,4 2

2 I5 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 2,4,7 3,5 2,3,4

,5,7 10 4

MAJ 6

6 6,8 4

2 TS 3,5 2

2 I6 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 2,3,5 3,4,5

,7 3,4,7 10 4

MAJ 6

6 6,8 4

2 TS 2,4 2

2 I7 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 2,3,4

,5 4,5, 7

2,4,5 10 4

MAJ 6

6 6,8 4

2 TS 2,4 2

2 Instructions:

1.

Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4.

For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 4/13/18 Operating Test No.: 2018 A

P P

L I

C A

N T

E V

E N

T T

Y P

E Scenarios 1

2 3

4 T

O T

A L

M I

N I

M U

M(*)

CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P R

I U

I8 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 2,4,7 3,5 2,3,4

,5,7 10 4

MAJ 6

6 6,8 4

2 TS 3,5 2

2 I9 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 2,3,5 3,4,5

,7 3,4,7 10 4

MAJ 6

6 6,8 4

2 TS 2,4 2

2 I10 RX 0

1 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 2,4,7 2,3,4

,5,7 8

4 MAJ 6

6,8 4

2 TS 3,5 2

2 U1 RX 0

0 NOR 1

1 1

I/C 2,3,4

,5 4

2 MAJ 6

1 1

TS 2,4 2

2 Instructions:

1.

Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4.

For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 4/13/18 Operating Test No.: 2018 A

P P

L I

C A

N T

E V

E N

T T

Y P

E Scenarios 1

2 3

4 T

O T

A L

M I

N I

M U

M(*)

CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P R

I U

U2 RX 0

0 NOR 1

1 1

I/C 2,3,4

,5,7 5

2 MAJ 6,8 2

1 TS 3,5 2

2 U3 RX 0

0 NOR 1

1 1

I/C 2,3,4

,5 4

2 MAJ 6

1 1

TS 2,4 2

2 U4 RX 0

0 NOR 1

1 1

I/C 2,3,4

,5,7 5

2 MAJ 6,8 2

1 TS 3,5 2

2 U5 RX 0

0 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 2,3,4

,5 2,3,4

,5,7 9

2 MAJ 6

6,8 3

1 TS 2,4 3,5 4

2 Instructions:

1.

Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4.

For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 4/13/18 Operating Test No.: 2018 A

P P

L I

C A

N T

E V

E N

T T

Y P

E Scenarios 1

2 3

4 T

O T

A L

M I

N I

M U

M(*)

CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P R

I U

U6 RX 0

0 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 2,3,4

,5 2,3,4

,5,7 9

2 MAJ 6

6,8 3

1 TS 2,4 3,5 4

2 U7 RX 0

0 NOR 1

1 1

I/C 2,3,4

,5 2,4,5 7

2 MAJ 6

6,8 3

1 TS 2,4 2

2 Info for all scenarios RX NOR 1

1 1

1 1

1 I/C 2,3,4

,5 2,4,7 2,3,4

,5 3,4,5

,7 4,5, 7

3,4,5 2,3,4

,6 2,3,6 1,3,4 2,3,4

,5,7, 8

2,5,7 3,5,8 MAJ 6

6 6

6 6

6 5,7 5,7 5,7 6

6 6

TS 2,4 2,4 2,4 3,4 Instructions:

1.

Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4.

For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 PVGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 1 Rev 0 Facility:

Palo Verde Scenario: 1 Test:

2018 NRC Exam Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOC, A HPSI Pump OOS Turnover: Raise SIT 1A pressure to ~ 615 psig Event Number Event Type*

Event Description 1

N (ATC)

Raise 1A SIT Pressure 2

I (ALL), TS (CRS)

Inadvertent Train A CIAS 3

I (BOP)

Turbine Load Index (TLI) Instrument #1 Fails Low 4

C (ALL), TS (CRS) 30 gpm SGTL on SG #1 5

C (BOP)

Stator Cooling Pump trips; Standby pump fails to Auto-Start 6

M (ALL)

Main Turbine Trip / Stuck Open SG Safety on SG #1 7

C (ATC)

CEA 14 Sticks out on Reactor Trip - Borate the RCS

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 7

Total malfunctions (5-8) 1 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Abnormal events (2-4) 1 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

Appendix D Scenario Event Summary Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 PVGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 1 Rev 0 2018 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 Overview Event 1 The crew will take the shift with the 1A SIT low pressure alarm in. The ATC operator will raise 1A SIT pressure to the normal band using 40OP-9SI03, Safety Injection Tank Operations, Section 6.1, Pressurizing the Safety Injection Tanks to Establish or Maintain Normal Pressure.

Event 2 After 1A SIT pressure is raised to the normal band, a Train A CIAS will occur. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Actuations, and restore normal chill water and reopen containment sump isolation valves. Letdown will isolate on the CIAS and the crew will restore letdown per 40AO-9ZZ05, Loss of Charging or Letdown.

Event 3 Turbine Load Index (TLI) Instrument #1 will fail low. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ16, RRS Malfunctions, and the crew will determine the failed instrument and select the unaffected channel.

Event 4 A 30 gpm SGTL will develop on SG #1. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ02, Excessive RCS Leakrate, and the crew will perform a leak rate calculation and take actions to minimize release to the environment.

Event 5 After the crew has taken actions to minimize contamination to the environment, the running Stator Cooling Water will trip and the standby pump will fail to auto start. The crew will start the standby pump per the ARP to restore cooling to the Main Turbine.

Event 6 Following the Stator Cooling Water Pump failure, the Main Turbine will trip. A stuck CEA will prevent a normal Reactor Power Cutback from mitigating the turbine trip and will result in an automatic Reactor trip. The turbine trip will also result in a Main Steam Safety Valve on SG #1 to fail open and remain open for the duration of the scenario.

Event 7 The stuck CEA on the Reactor trip will require the crew to emergency borate to ensure adequate shutdown margin following the trip.

Following SPTAs, the CRS will transition to the Functional Recovery and will direct feeding the faulted/ruptured SG at a rate of 1360-1600 gpm to restore SG level to 45% NR and ensure the u-tubes are covered to minimize release to the environment.

Appendix D Critical Task Summary Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 PVGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 1 Rev 0 Critical Task # 1: Commence borating to the RCS at a rate of 26 gpm within 15 minutes of the reactor trip due to less than all full-strength CEAs being fully inserted.

Safety Significance: Per the Time Critical Action Program, commence emergency boration (MODES 3 -

5) within 15 minutes due to minimum shutdown margin less than limit in COLR. With less than all full strength CEAs fully inserted, the SDM is assumed to be less than minimum required. Justification for the 15 minutes is from 40DP-9ZZ04, Time Critical Action Program. Justification for the 26 gpm limit is from Technical Specification Bases for LCO 3.1.1, SDM - Reactor Trip Breakers Open.

Cueing: The crew will have indication of the stuck CEA from the Rod Bottom Light for the CEA failing to illuminate on the trip as well as the CPDS (CEA Position Display System) indicating one CEA failed to insert on the reactor trip.

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew will align Charging Pump suction from the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) and ensure adequate Charging Pump flow of greater than or equal to 26 gpm. The crew will have to manually start a Charging Pump to achieve the minimum required boration flow of 26 gpm.

Additionally, the crew will need to start at least one Charging Pump per step 4 of SPTAs for inventory control as well as to utilize Auxiliary Spray to control RCS pressure. Adequate boration flow can also be seen using the CVCS System Diagram using an ERFDADS computer display.

Performance Feedback: The crew will have indication of boration flow by ensuring the Charging Pump suction has been aligned to the Refueling Water Tank and Charging Pump flow is 26 gpm.

Critical Task # 2: Establish a feedrate of 1360-1600 gpm to SG #1 prior to exiting HR-2, RCS and Core Heat Removal, SG with SI.

Safety Significance: An event in which a SG has a tube leak or rupture concurrently with an unisolable steam leak to atmosphere will result in a radioactive release to the atmosphere. A feedrate of 1360-1600 gpm to the affected SG is performed in order to expeditiously establish sufficient inventory in the affected SG to ensure the U-tubes are covered (~ 45% NR), thus minimizing the release to the environment.

Cueing: The crew will have indication of SG tube leakage on SG #1 prior to the reactor trip from rad monitor alarms and, if called, confirmation from chemistry. The stuck open Main Steam Safety Valve will be indicated by an alarm window on Board 6 as well as a red LED MSSV position indicating light.

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew will align 2 AFW pumps to supply feedwater to SG #1 for a total of 1360-1600 gpm, per step 15 of 40EP-9EO09, Functional Recovery, HR-2, SG with SI.

Performance Feedback: Total feed flow to the affected SG will be available using any ERFDADS computer terminal.

Appendix D Driver Set-Up Instructions Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 PVGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 1 Rev 0 Driver Setup Instructions Reset to IC-20 Run scenario file NRC Scenario # 1 Hang Yellow Caution tags on the A HPSI Pump Place Protected Equipment sign on the B HPSI Pump handswitch Lower SIT 1A pressure to ~ 609 psig (to bring in the class alarm) using mfSI03C, then delete mfSI03C.

Appendix D Scenario File Description Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 PVGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 1 Rev 0 Event Type Malf #

Description Final Initiator 1

MF mfSI03C Pressure leak on SIT 1A (initiated and deleted prior to scenario)

N/A N/A 2

MF mfRP06E1 Inadvertent Train A CIAS N/A Key 2 2

MF mfRP06E2 N/A Key 2 3

CM cmTRMS03MTNPT11A_1 TLI #1 fails low 0

Key 3 4

MF mfTH06A 30 gpm SGTL SG #1 (60 sec ramp) 2 Key 4 5

MF mfTP01B B Stator Water Cooling Pump trip (10 sec delay)

N/A Key 5 5

CM cmCPTP01CENP01A_5 A Stator Water Cooling Pump fails to auto start N/A Key 5 6

MF mfTC13 Main Turbine Trip N/A Key 6 6

CM cmRVMS01SGEPSV692_2 Stuck Open MSSV on SG

1. 1 (5 sec delay) 100 Key 6 7

MF mfRD03A CEA 14 stuck out N/A Setup OOS crB2SI01SIAP02_1 A HPSI Pump Control Power Breaker open Open Setup OOS crB2SI01SIAP02_2 A HPSI Pump Breaker Rackout Setup

Appendix D Crew Turnover Sheet Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 PVGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 1 Rev 0 Plant Conditions:

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, 250 EFPD The SIT 1A low pressure alarm came in at the end of the previous shift Equipment Out of Service:

HPSI Pump A is OOS for emergent maintenance LCO 3.5.3, ECCS - Operating, Condition B, was entered 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ago Expected return to service is 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Planned Shift Activities:

Raise SIT 1A pressure to ~ 615 psig per 40OP-9SI03, Safety Injection Tank Operations, section 6.1, Pressurizing the Safety Injection Tanks to Establish or Maintain Normal Pressure Prerequisites, Initial Conditions, and steps 6.1.3.1 through 6.1.3.3 are complete Start on step 6.1.3.4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 PVGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 2 Rev 1 Facility:

Palo Verde Scenario: 2 Test:

2018 NRC Exam Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% Power, MOC, HPSI A OOS.

Turnover: Exercise CEA 66 following ATCM card replacement Event Number Event Type*

Event Description 1

N (ATC)

Exercise CEA 66 2

TS (CRS)

RU-1 Inlet CIV HCA-UV-46 Fails Closed 3

C (BOP)

Loss of Condenser Vacuum 4

I (ATC), TS (CRS)

PZR Level Transmitter LT-110X Fails Low 5

C (ALL)

Loss of NNN-D16 6

M (ALL)

ESD Outside Containment on SG #2 7

C (ATC)

ATWS - Actions at B01 are successful at shutting down the reactor

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 6

Total malfunctions (5-8) 1 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3 Abnormal events (2-4) 1 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered requiring substantive actions (1-2) 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

Appendix D Scenario Event Summary Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 PVGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 2 Rev 1 2018 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 Overview Event 1 The crew will take the shift and the ATC will exercise CEA 66 to retest the CEA following ATCM replacement.

Event 2 After CEA 66 has been withdrawn to the fully withdrawn position, HCA-UV-46 will fail close.

This will result in a low sample flow alarm on RU-1. The CRS will address Tech Specs due to the isolation of the RM.

Event 3 After Tech Specs have been addressed, Condenser vacuum will begin to degrade. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ07, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, and direct a down power while field operators look for the cause of degraded vacuum. After power has been lowered 3-5%, an AO will report an empty loop seal and will commence filling it.

Event 4 After the loop seal has been filled, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, LT-110X will fail to 0%.

The crew will address the alarm response procedure and select the unaffected channel and the CRS will address Tech Specs due to the failed PAMI transmitter.

Event 5 After the crew has restore the pressurizer level control system to normal and the CRS has addressed Technical Specifications, Non-Class Instrument Bus NNN-D16 will fail. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ14, Loss of Non-Class Instrument Bus or Control Power. The loss of NNN-D16 will result in a loss of speed control for the B MFP. The crew will manually trip the B MFP resulting in a Reactor Power Cutback. Following the cutback, the CRS will also enter 40AO-9ZZ09, Reactor Power Cutback. The crew will stabilize the plant by placing the pressurizer in boron equalization, lowering the turbine load adjust setpoint, and placing CEDMCS in Manual Sequential.

Event 6 When the crew has taken stabilizing actions following the cutback, an unisolable ESD will occur outside containment on SG #2. The crew will attempt to manually trip the reactor.

Event 7 When the reactor fails to trip using the manual reactor trip pushbuttons, they will have to de-energize the load centers upstream of the reactor trip circuit breakers in order to insert all CEAs.

During SPTAs, the crew will monitor for dryout on the affected SG and when dryout occurs, take action to stabilize Tcold. Following SPTAs, the CRS will transition to 40EO-9EO05, ESD, and isolate the affected SG.

Appendix D Critical Task Summary Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 PVGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 2 Rev 1 Critical Task # 1: Following a failure of the Reactor to automatically and/or manually trip using the Reactor Trip Pushbuttons, trip the Reactor by de-energizing load centers L03 and L10 at Board 1 in the Control Room prior to performing step 2 of SPTAs, Vital Auxiliaries verification.

Safety Significance: Failure to ensure the reactor is tripped following an automatic reactor trip signal during an excess steam demand event, could result in exceeding power limits and fuel temperatures.

Cueing: Failure of the reactor to trip using the reactor trip pushbuttons and/or RPS reactor trip setpoints being exceeded as indicated by red RPS alarms on Board 5 in the Control Room.

Measurable Performance Indicator: Open the feeder breakers for L03 and L10 on Board 1 in the control room.

Performance Feedback: All CEAs inserted as indicated by rod bottom lights on Board 4 in the Control Room, lowering reactor power and a negative startup rate.

Critical Task # 2: Following an Excess Steam Demand event, stabilize RCS temperature and throttle SI flow as necessary to prevent lifting any Pressurizer Relief Valves.

Safety Significance: Failure to control RCS pressure below the lift setpoint of a pressurizer relief valve will result in compounding the ESD by unnecessarily creating a loss of coolant event.

Cueing: Rising pressurizer pressure and RCS temperature following termination of the ESD (dryout).

Measurable Performance Indicator: Trending of pressurizer pressure and pressurizer relief valve status to ensure the reliefs did not lift throughout the duration of the event.

Performance Feedback: Red LED pressurizer relief valve position on Board 4 and ERFDADS pressurizer pressure trends.

Appendix D Driver Set-Up Instructions Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 PVGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 2 Rev 1 Driver Setup Instructions Reset to IC-20 Run scenario file NRC Scenario # 2 Place Yellow Caution Tags on the A HPSI Pump Place Protected Equipment sign on the B HPSI Pump handswitch

Appendix D Scenario File Description Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 PVGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 2 Rev 1 Event Type Malf #

Description Final Initiator 1

None None Exercise CEA 66 N/A None 2

OR diCH_ZDHCAHS46 HCA-UV-46 fails closed Close Key 2 3

CM MC01B Degraded condenser vacuum 1.8 Key 3 4

CM TRCV19RCALT110X_1 Pressurizer Level Transmitter LT-110X fails to 65%

0 Key 4 5

MF ED13D Loss of NNN-D16 OFF Key 5 6

MF MS03D ESD on SG #2 Outside Containment (60 sec ramp) 10 Key 6 7

MF RP04A ATWS As-Is Setup 7

MF RP04C ATWS As-Is Setup 7

MF RD12A ATWS As-Is Setup OOS crB2SI01SIAP02_1 A HPSI Pump Control Power Breaker open Open Setup OOS crB2SI01SIAP02_2 A HPSI Pump Breaker Rackout Setup

Appendix D Crew Turnover Sheet Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 PVGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 2 Rev 1 Plant Conditions:

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, 250 EFPD An ATCM card was replaced during the previous shift on CEA 66 Equipment Out of Service:

HPSI Pump A is OOS for emergent maintenance.

LCO 3.5.3, ECCS - Operating, Condition B, was entered 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ago Expected return to service is 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Planned Shift Activities:

Insert CEA 66 seven steps and withdraw to the UEL position as part of a post-maintenance test following the replacement of an ATCM card per 40ST-9SF01, CEA Operability Checks, Section 6.1, Exercising CEAs at Power

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 PVNGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 3 Rev 0 Facility:

Palo Verde Scenario: 3 Test:

2018 NRC Exam Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% Power, MOC, HPSI A OOS Turnover: Maintain steady state operations Event Number Event Type*

Event Description 1

C (BOP)

TCW Pump Sheared Shaft, Standby Pump fails to Auto-Start 2

C (ATC), TS (CRS)

LOP on PBB-S04 / B EDG Breaker Fails to Auto Close 3

C (ALL)

EHC Load Control Circuit fails to 80%

4 C (BOP), TS (CRS)

UV Relay 727-4 Fails 5

M (ALL)

Loss of Offsite Power / B EDG Overspeed Trip 6

C (ATC)

PBA-S03 Normal Supply Breaker Fails to Auto Open 7

M (ALL)

SGTR on SG #1 (2 minutes post-trip)

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 7

Total malfunctions (5-8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered requiring substantive actions (1-2) 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

Appendix D Scenario Event Summary Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 PVNGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 3 Rev 0 2018 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 Overview Event 1 The running TC Pump will trip and the standby TC Pump will fail to auto start. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water, and direct starting the standby pump.

Event 2 After the standby pump has been started, Train B 4kV Bus PBB-S04 will be de-energized due to a fault of the supply transformer NBN-X04. The B EDG output breaker will fail to auto close. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ12, Degraded Electrical Power, and take action to re-energize the bus. The CRS will also address Tech Specs due to the EDG failing to load onto the bus automatically.

Event 3 After PBA-S03 has been re-energized, the EHC Load Control Circuit for the Main Generator will fail to 80% resulting in a partial load rejection. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ08, Load Rejection, and take action to stabilize the unit.

Event 4 After the unit has been stabilized, Train B 4kV bus UV relay 727-4 will fail. The crew will address the alarm response procedure and bypass the failed UV relay at the BOP-ESFAS cabinet. The CRS will address Tech Specs due to the failed LOVS relay.

Event 5 After the UV relay has been bypassed, a loss of offsite power will occur. The crew will perform Standard Post Trip Actions.

When offsite power is lost, the B EDG will trip on overspeed.

Event 6 Following the loss of offsite power, the normal feeder breaker for PBA-S03 will fail to auto open, preventing the A EDG from loading onto the bus. The crew will have to manually open the normal feeder to complete the interlock required for the A EDG to re-energize the bus, however the Train B 4kV bus will remain de-energized due to the overspeed trip of the B EDG.

Event 7 Two minutes after the reactor trip, a SGTR will develop on SG #1. Since the N-16 decays away in the first 45 seconds following a trip, there will be no associated radiation monitor alarms and the crew will have to diagnose the SGTR by evaluating steam and feed rates to each SG compared to the rate of level change in each SG.

The CRS will transition to the Functional Recovery procedure due to the loss of all HPSI flow and SGTR. The CRS will direct the crew to re-energize PBB-S04 in order to establish HPSI flow and to cooldown Th to < 540°F and isolate SG #1.

Appendix D Critical Task Summary Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 PVNGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 3 Rev 0 Critical Task # 1: Re-energize PBA-S03 within 14 minutes and 35 seconds of the loss of offsite power Safety Significance: The A EDG will be running unloaded with no cooling water until PBA-S03 is re-energized. 15 minutes is the time limit for the A EDG to run unloaded without cooling water before damage could occur. Since the A Spray Pond Pump sequences on 25 seconds after the bus is re-energized, a total of 14 minutes and 35 seconds is allowed to re-energize the bus.

Cueing: Indications on B01 of the A EDG running with the output breaker open, indication of the PBA-S03 normal feeder breaker failing to auto open on B01 (red light on, green light off), and procedural direction for this condition in SPTAs and the Supplemental SPTA Actions for an EDG running with its output breaker open.

Measurable Performance Indicator: After verifying that the A EDG is running at rated speed and voltage, the crew will manually open the PBA-S03 Normal Feeder Breaker which will satisfy the interlock for the EDG Output Breaker to auto-close and re-energize PBA-S03.

Performance Feedback: Re-energization of PBA-S03 will be verified by the EDG output breaker closing, voltage indications on PBA-S03 on B01 and ERFDADS, and additional lights re-illuminating in the control room.

Critical Task # 2: Ensure adequate Safety Injection flow to meet Safety Function requirements prior to completing Step 3 of IC-2 in the Functional Recovery procedure Safety Significance: This is based on a degraded core cooling system. Inadequate SI flow may result in loss of subcooled margin and/or core uncovery, increasing the risk of core damage.

Cueing: ERFDADS indication of insufficient SI flow, SI flow not meeting the minimum flow requirements of Standard Appendix 2, Figures.

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew will restore power to PBB-S04 by cross-tying power from the A EDG via PBA-S03 and start the B HPSI Pump to restore adequate SI flow. Adequate SI flow can be verified by comparing current RCS pressure to the SI flowrate using Standard Appendix 2, Figures (located on B02).

Performance Feedback: SI flow can be verified using SI flow transmitters on B02, or any of the ERFDADS terminals.

Appendix D Driver Set-Up Instructions Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 PVNGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 3 Rev 0 Driver Setup Instructions Reset to IC-20 Run scenario file NRC Scenario # 3 Hang Yellow Caution tags on the A HPSI Pump Place Protected Equipment sign on the B HPSI Pump handswitch

Appendix D Scenario File Description Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 PVNGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 3 Rev 0 Event Type Malf #

Description Final Initiator 1

CM cmCPTP04TCNP01A_1 A Turbine Cooling Water Pump trip (5 sec delay)

Trip Key 1 1

CM cmCPTP04TCNP01B_5 B Turbine Cooling Water Pump fails to auto start FTAS Key 1 2

mfED10B Loss of PBB-S04 supply transformer NBN-X04 Trip Key 2 2

cmBKEG03PBBS04B_2 B EDG Output Breaker fails to auto close As-Is Setup 3

mfTC11 Partial Turbine Load Rejection 80 Key 3 4

doED_ZLS047274DS_W1 UV Relay 727-4 failure Fail Key 4 4

mfAN_1C18D4 UV Relay 727-4 failure Fail Key 4 4

doRP_ZLSABC02BLOP4_W3 UV Relay 727-4 failure Fail Key 4 5

mfED02 Loss of Offsite Power Key 5 5

rfEG40 B EDG overspeed trip Rx Trip 5

mfEG05B B EDG Governor failure Rx Trip 6

cmBKED06PBAS03L_1 PBA-S03 Normal Feeder Breaker fails to auto open FTAO Setup 7

mfTH06B SGTR on SG #2 (2 min delay, 5 minute ramp 50 Rx Trip OOS crB2SI01SIAP02_1 A HPSI Pump Control Power Breaker open Open Setup OOS crB2SI01SIAP02_2 A HPSI Pump Breaker Rackout Setup

Appendix D Crew Turnover Sheet Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 PVNGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 3 Rev 0 Plant Conditions:

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, 250 EFPD Equipment Out of Service:

HPSI Pump A is OOS for emergent maintenance LCO 3.5.3, ECCS - Operating, Condition B, was entered 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ago Expected return to service is 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Planned Shift Activities:

Maintain full power operation

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 PVNGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 4 Rev 0 Facility:

Palo Verde Scenario: 4 Test:

2018 NRC Exam Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: 2%, MOC, no MFPs in service, A HPSI Pump OOS Turnover: Shift the order of Charging Pumps from 1-2-3 to 2-3-1 Event Number Event Type*

Event Description 1

N (ATC)

Change the order of Charging Pumps to from 1-2-3 to 2-3-1 2

C (ATC)

Gas Binding of the E Charging Pump 3

I (BOP), TS (CRS)

C RWT Transmitter Fails Low 4

TS (CRS)

Class Pressurizer Heater trip 5

C (ALL)

Loss of Non-Class Instrument Bus NNN-D11 6

M (ALL)

Large Break LOCA 7

C (ATC)

B HPSI Pump Fails To Auto Start on SIAS 8

C (BOP)

CSAS Fails to Auto Actuate

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 7

Total malfunctions (5-8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Abnormal events (2-4) 1 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered requiring substantive actions (1-2) 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

Appendix D Scenario Event Summary Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 4 PVNGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 4 Rev 0 2018 NRC Exam Scenario # 4 Overview Event 1 The crew will change the running order of Charging Pumps from 1-2-3 to 2-3-1 per 40OP-9CH01, CVCS Normal Operations.

Event 2 After the running order of Charging Pumps has been completed, the E Charging Pump will begin to degrade due to gas binding. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ05, Loss of Charging or Letdown and direct placing the affected Charging Pump in Pull-To-Lock and isolating the pump locally.

Event 3 After the E Charging Pump has been isolated, the C RWT Transmitter will fail low. The CRS will address Technical Specifications and direct the BOP to bypass the associated ESFAS bistable at the PPS-ESFAS cabinet.

Event 4 After the affected bistable has been bypassed, the Train A class Pressurizer heater will trip. The CRS will address TS for the loss of the class heater.

Event 5 After TS have been addressed, non-class instrument bus NNN-D11 will fault resulting in a loss of SBCS and causing pressurizer pressure to rise, RCS temperature to rise, and Reactor power to lower. The ATC operator will manually adjust the output of PIC-100 to control primary pressure and the BOP operator will have to use ADVs to control steaming rates in the secondary plant as well as Reactor power and RCS temperature.

Event 6 After secondary heat removal has been transferred to the ADVs, a large break LOCA inside Containment will occur. The crew will trip the Reactor and perform SPTAs.

Event 7 When SIAS actuates, the B HPSI Pump will fail to auto-start requiring the crew to manually start the B HPSI Pump for SI flow (A HPSI Pump is OOS).

Event 8 CSAS will fail to auto actuate when Containment pressure reaches 8.5 psig and the crew will have to recognize the failed actuation and manually actuate CSAS to satisfy the Containment Temperature and Pressure Control safety function.

Appendix D Critical Task Summary Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 4 PVNGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 4 Rev 0 Critical Task # 1: When the Safety Injection Actuation setpoint is exceeded, ensure adequate SI flow to meet the safety function prior to the completion of SPTAs.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish adequate SI flow may result in the loss of subcooling margin and could lead to core uncover, increasing the likelihood of core damage.

Cueing: Containment pressure > 3.0 psig and/or RCS pressure < 1837 psia without meeting the minimum required SI flowrates (based on RCS pressure) as indicated on Standard Appendix 2, Figures.

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew will manually start the B HPSI Pump to establish minimum required SI flowrate.

Performance Feedback: The crew will be able to observe adequate SI flow by using either SI flowrate on ERFDADS or board indications.

Critical Task # 2: When the Containment Spray Actuation setpoint is exceeded, ensure adequate CS flow prior to meet the safety function prior to the completion of SPTAs.

Safety Significance: Failure of CSAS to actuate with Containment pressure above the CSAS setpoint could lead to degradation of the Containment barrier and potential release to the environment.

Cueing: Containment pressure > than the CSAS setpoint (8.5 psig) as indicated by ERFDADS and board indications of Containment pressure.

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew will either initiate CSAS manually from B05 by taking the CSAS actuation handswitches to the actuate position or will manually start CS Pump(s) and valves to establish a minimum indicated CS flowrate of > 4350 gpm.

Performance Feedback: The crew will be able to observe CS flowrate on ERFDADS for each train of CS.

Appendix D Driver Set-Up Instructions Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 4 PVNGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 4 Rev 0 Driver Setup Instructions Reset to IC-10 Run scenario file NRC Scenario # 4 Hang Yellow Caution tags on the A HPSI Pump Place Protected Equipment sign on the B HPSI Pump handswitch

Appendix D Scenario File Description Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 4 PVNGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 4 Rev 0 Event Type Malf #

Description Final Initiator 1

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2

CM cmDPCV06CHEP01_3 Gas binding E Charging Pump Key 2 3

CM cmTRCV07CHCLT203C_1 C RWT transmitter fails low 0

Key 3 4

CM cmBKRC09RCEB01_6 A Pressurizer Heater trip Trip Key 4 5

MF mfED13A Loss of Non-Class Instrument Bus NNN-D11 Trip Key 5 6

MF mfTH01A Large Break LOCA inside Containment (5 min ramp) 25 Key 6 7

CM cmCPSI01SIBP02_5 B HPSI Pump fails to auto start on SIAS FTAS Setup 8

CM cmBSRP01BSCNTPRHHAT_1 As-Is Setup 8

CM cmBSRP01BSCNTPRHHBT_1 As-Is Setup 8

CM cmBSRP01BSCNTPRHHCT_1 As-Is Setup 8

CM cmBSRP01BSCNTPRHHDT_1 As-Is Setup OOS crB2SI01SIAP02_1 A HPSI Pump Control Power Breaker open Open Setup OOS crB2SI01SIAP02_2 A HPSI Pump Breaker Rackout Setup

Appendix D Crew Turnover Sheet Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 4 PVNGS 2018 NRC Scenario # 4 Rev 0 Plant Conditions:

Unit 1 is operating at 2% power, 250 EFPD Feedwater is being supplied by AFN-P01 Equipment Out of Service:

HPSI Pump A is OOS for emergent maintenance LCO 3.5.3, ECCS - Operating, Condition B, was entered 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ago Expected return to service is 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Planned Shift Activities:

Shift the order of running Charging Pumps from 1-2-3 to 2-3-1 per 40OP-9CH01, CVCS Normal Operations, Section 6.8, Changing the Running Order of Charging Pumps