ML18092A344

Nuclear Oversight Committee Fourth Quarterly Rept.

ML18092A344
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	10/22/1984
From:	Public Service Enterprise Group
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ML18092A343	List: ML18092A342 ML18092A344
References
NUDOCS 8410310395
Download: ML18092A344 (6)

Text

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NUCLEAR OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE FOURTH QUARTERLY REPORT OCTOBER 22, 1984 Membership:

Dr. M. B. Gottlieb, Chairman Dr. s. Levy Dr. K *. c. Rogers Admiral E. P. Wilkinson Dr. W. F. Witzig

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PAGE 1 NUCLEAR OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE FOURTH QUARTERLY REPORT The fourth meeting of the Nuclear Oversight Committee (NOC) of Public Service Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G) was held during the evening of September 5, 1984 and on September 6 and 7, 1984.

Vice Presid-ent Nuclear Response to the NOC's Third Quarterly

• ~eport.

The Not is 'appreciative of management's response to the NOC's Third Quarterly Report and in giving the needed attention to personnel staffing ~nd the management of the safety review

- process.

Relative to the safety review process, the NOC believes that the revised Nuclear Department Organization should enhance safety through clearer communication channels and a better definition of responsibility and accountability.* Regarding the new Nublear Safety Advisory Board structure, the NOC ackn6wledge~ that the Vice President ~ Nuclear feels the need of a ~afefy review group reporting ~irectly to his off ice to provide assurance of Nuclear Department safety performance.

• However, the NOC continues to believe th~t the primar~ need is for a safety review group reporting at a higher level and consisting mainly of outside members. The rationale for this belief is that PSE&G sho~ld have an independent body which reviews. the Vice President - Nu~lear act~vities and reports to higher levels. However, a satisfactory alternative is to . :"

implement the proposed arrangement:

• Nuclea~ Safety Advisory Board re~orting to-the Vice President - Nuclear, Nuclear Safety Assurance* group reporting to the Senior Vice President, and .the NOC composed of outside members reporting to senior management and/or the PSE&G Board of Directors.

The NOC does not feel it was effective in communicating,. in its last quarterly report~ two of its concerns to management in the areas of nuclear operations support and nuclear engineering. Specifically, these two conc~rns are:

1. The backlog of design change requests (DCR)1 and,

2. The addressing of longer term, generic problems with an emphasis on root.cause determination and long term remedies.

PAGE 2 Both of these areas are addressed again. in t_his report.

During this quarter, the NOC reviewed Nuclear Operations

. Support and Nuclear Engineering: *Personnel Reen.ii ting and Assimilation: "Zero Defects": Upper.Management Involvement: and lastly, Action Plans-NRC Milestones and Follow Up. This review was discussed with Messrs. Eckert and Uderitz on September 7, 1984.

Nuclear Operations Support and Nuclear Engineering

.The NOC continues to be concerned about the Engineering support of Station operations, the DCR/DCP backlog and the identificati6n of generic or fundamental aspects of plant trips. These primary areas. are developed in the* following:

1. Engineering support for operations has improved over the past year, but further improvement shOuld be attained. The NOC perceives a lack of problem recognition which.inhibits the development of methods to address the problem. With resources monopolized by high priority items and exacerbated by outages, long term plant reliability-improvements fall further behind.

• 2._ The NOC believes that the backlog of DCR's and DCP's is excessive. It appears .that high priority jobs are being done, but the continued sequence of unplanned outages places a drain bn engineering resources that has resuited in an increased backlog* of lower priority DCR's. The NOC believes that these lower priority tasks should be studied to identify those that could be safely eliminated thus making resources. available for the higher priority tasks. Tnis elimination review should be carried out by the about-to-be-created, Change Control Board.

There are a number of tasks which have been subject to very long delays. This backlog problem was recognized by MAC_in its report and the NOC believes that a plan should be implemented by preparing a schedule to add~e~s the close-out of DCR's and iricorporation of Design Change Packages (DCP). The NOC suggests that the. process used by the Salem Maintenance Department to -

reduce its backlog of work orders be considered by Nuclear Engineering to address its DCR/DCP backlog.

The NOC urges that a plan and schedule, complete with milestones, be prepared to reduce the backlog.

Additional internal or contract personnel may be required.

PAGE 3

3. The NOC continues to emphasize to management the need to aggressively pursue root causes, generic or fundamental aspects of plant trips and unplanned outages. It is recognized that high priority items may conflict with root cause efforts. In the long term it is essential that the reasons for the succession of failures be identified in order to break out of the "bad luck" pattern. The NOC recommends that a small experienced group, perha~s in Licensin~ and Reliability, be assigned this responsibility. This group could address questions such as: Is there some pattern that can be discerned in this broader perspective? Are there changes to equipment (i.e., the removal of unused test gear) or_changes in supervision, operational procedures, methods, or training which would change this pattern of performance?

Consideration of assigning an engineering "mother" to each system is also suggested.

Personnel Recruiting and Assimilation The NOC recognizes the size of the effort required to bring

_aboard the large number of qualified personnel as stated in the

• staffing plan, 1,760 by the end of 1984. Good progress is being made in this area. For example, the priority positions ~s identified in Action Plan 2.4.5 are mostly filled (18 out of 19) and the remaining one is expected to be filled in early October, 1984. Th~ key training positions identified in Action Plan 2.7.4 are 85% filled (29 out of 34), somewhat behind the schedule date of April, 1984. Ih the area of exempt recruiting, the year to date results are 153 acceptances with another 140 exempt personnel to be hired by year end.* In addition, approximately 100 non exempt personnel are to be recruited by year end. These tasks are formidable.

At the projected rate of hiring to year end, it will be-difficult to achieve th~se objectives. Since quality personnel' are essential to safe operations, special management attention

• will be required to achieve the recruiting objectives. The NOC also notes that as~imilation of this large riumber of new personnel is a requirement just as important and time consuming.

"Zero Defects" For the lack of a better title, the NOC has borrowed from

• NASA the term "Zero Defects" to describe a limited term, intensive effort for improved plant reliability, availability

PAGE 4 and safe operations. We know that the on-line availability of the Salem units is below management's expectation and below iridustry average performance. While a significant part of this unavailability is due to unusual equipment failures (e.g.,

turbine generators), personnel errors, .component deficiencies, component wearout, and plant trips have also contributed to the situation. The NOC recommends that a special, temporary program be implemented to strive for Zero Defects to keep the Salem plants safely on-line. The progr~m could incl~de such actions as:

o Using th~ most-experienced pe~sbnnel and/or extra personnel to carry out tests on partly disabled critical systems such as vital power busses7 o requiring apprentice personnel to demonstrate their procedures and planned actions prior to performing actions; o implementing plant-tours to identify deficiencies such as vibrations in the piping or air ingestion at pumps, and to take appropriate action before a plant shutdown might result; o .. eliminating superfluous equipment whicih could lead to plant trips (e.g., 2PR47);

• o coordinating engineering or QA participation in valve line-ups to assure correctness (this should also be implemented on balance of plant systems);

o implementing multi~discipline task force and management participation to resdlve post trip reviews; o and takirig other specific actioris PSE&G management feels would be effective in such a "Zero Defect" effort.

Upper Management Involvement in Post Plant Trip Review~

The NOC comment in this area is not a criticism of the dedication nor the amount of on-site presence of the Vice President - Nuclear, which is extensive. Rather, the comment is intended to deal with actions that senior management can take to improve the morale and spirit of the nuclear operation, particularly in post-trip reviews. With respect to post-trip reviews, it is suggested that upper management involvement and drive be more visible in encouraging the identification of root causes and the implementation of corrective action without,

• however, interfering with th~ r~sponsibility and authority of the Vice President - Nuclear. Plant trips frequently have

PAGE 5 safety implications. The primary objective should be to ensure, in a time urgent manner, the thorough investigation and implementation of corrective action a~ dictated by safety.

Upper level mariagement involvement on-site should facilitate decision making, encourage professional rigor and assure ear1ier availability 6f resources.

This management presence and ,involvement would se.nd a clear signal to assist in achieving an attitude of excellence in plant operations and engineerin~ ~ersonnel; one of pride in a safe, competent operation on the part, not only of management and engineering personnel, but even more importantly, of the non-exempt level employees.

Action Plan -*NRC Milestones and Follow Up

. An impressive number of manhours has been expended with good results on the Action Plans. Most of the milestones are being accomplished on schedule. An administrative* review of.

each Actio.n Plan is required to assure that the NRC commitment is met. Some of these commitments are required in the very near future in Action Plans 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.1, 2.3.1, and 2.4.5. The administration of the plan should assure itself ~hat there are no misunderstandings with the NRC concerning wh~t constitutes Action Plan close out and NRC notification of same.

PSE&G has expended (and continues to expend) major resources to carry out the numerous Action Plans. Completion of the Actio~ Plans will_be followed by an implementation phase and then a phase of evaluating implementation effectiveness. The NOC will watch with gre~t inte~est these processe~. It is recommended that the follow up program be designed to provide feedback to make any changes necessary to the plan s6 it

• accomplishes its purpose.