ML18087A864

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Forwards Response to NRC 10CFR50.54(f) Ltr & Response to Addl NRC Concern Relayed During 830421 Site Visit.Failed Undervoltage Trip Attachment from Unit 1 Reactor Trip Breaker a Given to Westinghouse on 830302
ML18087A864
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 04/22/1983
From: Uderitz R
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Eisenhut D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8304260396
Download: ML18087A864 (72)


Text

'*

Richard A. Uderitz Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609 935-6010 Vice President -

Nuclear April 22, 1983 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Attention:

Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Gentlemen:

RESPONSE TO 10 CFR 50.54(f) LETTER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNITS NO. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 PSE&G hereby transmits, in Enclosure I to this letter, its response to your 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter, dated April 20, 1983, and, in Enclosure II, its response to an additional Commission concern relayed by Mr. Denton during his site visit on April 21, 1983.

Should you have any questions, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely, Enclosures CC:

Mr. Richard w. Starostecki, Director Division of Project and Resident Programs Region I Mr. Leif Norrholm NRC Senior Resident Inspector

,,--* a3o426o396 *0ao422 PDR ADOCK 05000272 I

s PDR l

STATE OF NEW JERSEY SS.

COUNTY OF SALEM COUNTY OF SALEM RICHARD A. UDERITZ, being duly sworn according to law deposes and says:

I am a Vice President of Public Service Electric and Gas Company, and as such, I find the matters set forth in our response dated April 22, 1983, to the NRC's 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24rH day of RUDOLPH L. von FISCHEfl JR.

Notary Public of New Jersey My Commission expires on 11i!y Commission Expires Sept. 10, 1986

ENCLOSURE 1 TO R. A. UDERITZ LETTER TO D. G. EISENHUT DATED APRIL 22, 1983

.~.

Item 1 RESPONSE TO 10 CFR 50.54(f) LETTER SALEM GENERATING STATION -

UNITS NO. 1 AND 2 The failed undervoltage trip attachment from No. 1 Unit Reactor Trip Breaker B was given to Westinghouse intact on February 28, 1983 and was in their possession on April 13, 1983.

The failed undervoltage trip attachment from No. 1 Unit Reactor Trip Breaker A was given to Westinghouse disassembled on March 2, 1983.

Item 2 I.

The undervoltage trip attachment (UTA) from No. 1 Unit Reactor Trip Breaker B that had failed to operate on 2/22/83 and 2/25/83 was sent to the Franklin Research Center on 4/15/83 by Westinghouse.

It was installed on the breaker on 8/8/72 along with the other UTAs for Nos. 1 and 2 Units as modified in accordance with NCD-ELEC-18.

To the best of our knowledge, it was installed in the No.

1 Unit B Bypass position until 2/22/83 when it was transferred to the No. 1 B trip breaker position before the event of 2/22/83.

The following activities were performed on this UTA:

A.

No. 1 B Reactor Bypass Breaker was maintained by station personnel between 1/13/83 and 1/18/83 which included:

1.

The UTA mechanism was sprayed with Calfonex 78A.

The movable core assembly cover was removed and

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the movable core assembly was cleaned and sprayed with Calfonex 78A.

To the best of our present knowledge, Calfonex 78A was used in the servicing of No. 1 Unit Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers.

The Westinghouse serviceman's report dated January 18, 1983 (Attachment A) and received by PSE&G in mid-March 1983, identifies the material used as Calfonex 78A.

The Westinghouse serviceman had inquired during his visit if the Maintenance Department at Salem had any CRC-2-26.

They did not and the Westinghouse serviceman produced a can of cleaner/solvent/

lubricant for use on the breakers.

During initial recollections of the events, PSE&G Maintenance personnel therefore referred to CRC-2-26.

2.

Mechanically tested by holding reset arm, closing breaker and releasing arm to manually trip the breaker with the UTA.

B.

After the UTA failure on 2/25/83, the UTA was removed from the breaker in the lB main trip breaker position and lubricated with Molykote "G", the lubricant referenced in Westinghouse Bulletin 74-1 which was

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provided by the Westinghouse site representative.

The lubricant was not removed.

This was done to assess the effect of the lubricant on the operation of the UTA; there was no intention to use this UTA again.

c. On 2/27/83, this UTA was used to demonstrate the failure mode to Westinghouse engineers.

It was mounted on a breaker in the maintenance shop and manually tripped numerous times by holding the reset arm.

During this period, the internals of the UTA were examined by many individuals.

This could account for anomalies in the leaf spring as observed during later Westinghouse examination and testing at their facilities.

D. On 2/28/83, the UTA was turned over to Westinghouse in Bethesda, Maryland.

Tests were conducted and the UTA was disassembled.

Results of these tests and examination were reported by letter from Mr. E. P. Rahe, Manager -

Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Department, to Mr. H. Denton, D(rector, Off ice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, dated 3/22/83.

E. The disassembled UTA was sent to Franklin Research Center from Westinghouse on 4/15/83.

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II.

The No. 1 Unit Trip Breaker "A" UTA that had failed on 2/22/83 and 2/25/83 was installed in No. 2 Unit Trip Breaker A" position until 1/6/83 at which time it was transferred to the No. 1 Unit Trip Breaker "A" position.

The following are the activities performed on this UTA:

A.

Since the startup of Unit No. 2 in August, 1980, the breaker was tripped (via the UTA) every 60 days from the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) during surveillance testing in the applicable modes.

The UTA, in conjunction with the shunt coil, was tested via the control room manual reactor trip switch prior to each unit startup in accordance with Technical Specifications.

B.

During breaker maintenance conducted 1/13/83 thru 1/18/83, a Westinghouse Service Representative provided technical assistance to station personnel who maintained the breaker in the same manner as described in Item I.A.I.

c.

After the failure on 2/25/83 this device was disassembled by station personnel to inspect for cause of failure.

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D.

The UTA was shipped to Westinghouse on 3/2/83 disassembled.

Westinghouse states that nothing was done with this disassembled device.

E.

The UTA was sent to Franklin Research Center from Westinghouse on 4/15/83.

III.

The third UTA sent to Franklin Research Center from Westinghouse was originally sent intact to Westinghouse on 3/1/83.

The breaker position for this device cannot be determined.

This device had been lubricated with Molykote "G" subsequent to the February 25 event per Bulletin 74-1.

This Bulletin was supplied to the station by the Westinghouse Site Representative.

The Molykote G" was removed using mineral spirits after maintenance personnel were informed of the existence of Data Letter 74-2.

Item 3 Westinghouse's letter, PSE 83-571, dated April 12, 1983, (Attachment B) provides their position that the installed breakers are satisfactory for plant operation, and states their general concurrence with Salem Maintenance Procedure M3Q-2 which has been implemented to provide assurance of continued operational reliability.

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Item 4 The Nuclear Review Board (NRB) has reviewed the events of February 22 and 25, 1983 and the Company's short term corrective actions.

Based on its review, the NRB concluded that the units could be safely returned to service.

(Attachment C)

The Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) review of the short term aspects of the reactor trip breaker failures was completed on April 22, 1983.

The SORC concluded that the units could be safely returned to power. (Attachment D)

Item 5 Dust and dirt would not be expected or acceptable in a circuit breaker that had been recently maintained.

The four (4) circuit breakers that were in place in Unit No. 1 during the February 22 and February 25 events had been cleaned and maintained in January, 1983.

The NRC Fact Finding Task Force found that, "On March 3, 1983, inside surfaces of the switchgear appeared dust free.

The room also appeared to be very clean from a housekeeping point of view." (NUREG 0977, Section 5.3.1, Environmental Conditions)

Item 6 As part of its Corrective Action Program submitted by letter dated April 8, 1983, (Item 2.c) PSE&G committed to a test

7 -

program to verify the adequacy of the new surveillance and maintenance program for the reactor trip breakers and to establish a basis for replacement of the undervoltage trip attachments (UTA's).

PSE&G has engaged a consultant to assist in the development of the program including sample selection.

As noted in our April 8, 1983 letter (Item A.2.c), the program description and schedule will be submitted to the NRC Staff in May 1983.

PSE&G is confident that the new undervoltage attachments which have been installed on both the reactor trip and bypass breakers will perform their safety function reliably when required.

This is based upon the following actions which are discussed in detail in our April 8, 1983 letter:

(1)

The new undervoltage attachments have been tested in accordance with n~w specifications which require manufacturer testing of 25 cycles without failure.

Following installation, each device has been tested a minimum of 10 cycles without failure.

(2)

All four Unit 1 breakers have been serviced in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations and technical assistance.

This service included measurement of the

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required forces to trip each breaker's trip bar and the output force of each UTA.

The ratio of these forces in each case provides a margin of more than two to one.

(3)

PSE&G has established a preventative maintenance and surveillance program specifically for these breakerso Every six months each breaker will be removed from the switchgear, inspected, maintained as necessary, and tested in accordance with specific procedures to establish the operability of both the UTA and the shunt coil.

Measurements will be taken of the trip forces as well as the drop out voltage and the time for comparison to the baseline data now established.

We believe this program will provide sufficient information to identify significant degradation in performance of the UTAs which could lead to failure.

(4)

The surveillance program has been modified to eliminate the shunt trip test which had been performed weekly.

This test was not a required test and has been eliminated to reduce the total number of breaker operations.

The new surveillance program includes a monthly functional test of each main trip breaker through an SSPS signal with recording of the breaker opening time on the event recorder.

Also each main trip breaker will be shunt trip

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tested through the manual pushbutton on the control room console.

(5)

The main trip breakers will be functionally tested to separately verify operability of the breaker via the UTA and the shunt coil prior to a re-start of the plant unless operability has been demonstrated within the prior 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.

In summary, PSE&G has committed to establish a replacement criterion for the UTAs based upon a test program which will be submitted to the NRC Staff for review in May 1983.

Westinghouse has committed to an evaluation and test program for the DB-50 breakers which includes an appraisal of the cycle life effects on the UTA.

This program is expected to be completed in June 1983.

Based on all the above, we are confident that the new UTA's installed will perform reliably for several years under the new preventative maintenance and surveillance programs.

Until the replacement criteria for the UTA's is established, PSE&G will institute an interim criterion calling for removal, inspection and replacement of these UTA's at the next refueling outage.

This interim criterion may be revised when the above test program is complete and final criteria for replacement are established.

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Item 7 PSE&G's written corporate policy states that safety is the primary concern of management.

To ensure that all levels of management are cognizant of the importance of their active participation in maintaining safe plant operation, the Company has developed and implemented an action plan as described in our April 8, 1983 letter.

The actions taken include procedural changes, strengthened membership of the Nuclear Review Board and Station Operations Review Committee, establishment of a Nuclear Assurance and Regulation Department, development of training programs for all levels of management personnel, and a commitment to establish a Nuclear Oversight Committee.

These and other actions in our April 8, 1983 letter, strengthen our assurance that our management personnel are aggressively dedicated to the safe operation of our nuclear facilities.

Item 8 The reactor trip data for each Salem Unit since January 1, 1979, including all reactor trips, the initiation signal, and pre-trip 'power level is provided in Attachment E.

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Item 9 The Master Equipment List (MEL) was reviewed, updated and reissued on March 24, 1983 for the following systems:

ECCS (including Actuation Systems), Reactor Protection System, Auxiliary Feedwater System and Containment Isolation System.

The MEL issue of March 24, 1983 fulfilled the short-term commitment required by the NRC in the Salem Restart Report.

As stated in our April 8, 1983 letter to the Director -

Division of Licensing, the remaining Q-List systems will be incorporated into the MEL by May, 1983.

Item 10 The first out annunciator and the status panel are not designated safety related; however, the source of information is from the Solid State Protection System which, of course, is safety related and utilizes safety related instrumentation inputs.

As stated in our letter dated April 8, 1983, the power supply for the status panel is taken from a vital (safety related) source and has been designed with the same separation criteria as in safety related systems.

The power supply for the first-out annunciator is also taken from a vital (safety related) AC power source.

These systems and their power sources are very reliable and do not degrade safe operation of the plant.

12 -

Item 11 We have reviewed the 35 erroneously classified Work Orders.

The bases for our determination that there was no adverse impact on safety are documented in Attachment F.

Item 12 Based on a review of the Transcript of the Regulatory Staff's briefing of the Commissioners on April 14, 1983, the Staff's Draft SER, and Proposed Order, we have the following comments:

A.

Commission Briefing on April 14, 1983 Comments on Transcript

1.

Pages 23, 28, 31, 43 and 44 - Periodic Replacement of UV Attachments PSE&G has committed to a program that establishes a criterion for replacement of the undervoltage trip attachments (UTAs).

Refer to the response to Item 6.

2.

Page 59 -

60 Training Response There are several errors or misconceptions evident in the proceedings of the commission briefing on April

14.

On page 59 of the transcript, Commissioner Ahearne stated that of the five test results reviewed by the auditors four individuals had failed the question requiring the trainee to list the ATWS steps correctly, and that no remedial action was being considered.

This test item was only one item on a

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comprehensive examination.

The criteria for passing was 80% as is required on NRC examinations.

No criteria require 100% performance on examinations.

In actuality, there were several examinations given.

The shift personnel in training were tested prior to expansion of the training scope.

An upgrade examination was later administered to this shift.

The shift personnel in the plant were given a different examination.

An additional examination was developed to use for makeup and remedial applications.

Of the five individuals audited, two were given single examinations (i.e., they were trained in the station) and received grades of 89 and 88 respectively; three were given the original examination (prior to scope expansion) and an upgrade examination and received grades of 80/80, 93/73, and 98/65.5.

Those receiving less than 80% were given remedial training and obtained greater than 80% on the makeup examination.

On the test item in question, however, two individuals received full credit, one individual left out one word, one lost 5 of a possible 35 points for omitting one step and missing a word.

This is quite different from "four of five failing".

On page 60 of the transcript, it was implied by Commissioner Ahearne that the Commission had told us

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what to do and we had not done it.

In actuality, the training was developed and completed prior to any contact between the Nuclear Training Center and the Commission.

The first audit of training on March 17 and 18 resulted in a recommendation for additional training but did not state that what we had done was incorrect.

On page 60 it was also stated that there were several versions of the exam and that they did not cover the same material.

It is common practice when exams are to be given several times to vary the format and content to avoid compromise.

All students, however, were tested on the key issues of ATWS steps, interpretations of the sequence of events, and the difference between demand and confirmations.

As an overall comment on the tone of the discussions, review of NUREG 0977 confirms that training was not an issue in the event and that operator response and knowledge at the time of the event were sufficient and adequate.

Moreover, training initiatives have been undertaken by PSE&G of its own volition to insure that changes to procedures and methods as a result of the event were under$tood by all operators.

Attachment G is a chronology of training activities.

1.

15 -

3.

Pages 65 and 68 -

Control Room Design Review (CRDR) Recommendations Implementation Schedule The CRDR effort is in progress and is approximately 85% completeo We are evaluating the preliminary findings of the CRDR, and anticipate that the CRDR summary report will be submitted to the NRC Staff by December, 1983.

The summary report will include an evaluation of the design and operation of the annunciator alarm systems (e.g., number of auditory codes used, color coding of annunciator tiles, use of single action switches to perform both the silence and acknowledge functions and the use of knee switches in the control room).

The report will also address the design of the first-out panel system for potential improvements in reliablility of information presented to the operators.

Several of the human engineering deficiencies have already been addressed and the changes implemented.

We expect most items, except the SPDS, to be completed during 1984.

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B.

Comments on Draft Staff SER Page 3, Paragraph 2 "Their evaluation consisted of the inspection of a failed UV trip attachment.** "

This was not a "failed" UV trip attachment but one of the original devices installed.

Page 3, Paragraph 3 "Shortly after the event, all available failed devices were believed to be lubricated.*. "

Following the event only one failed device was lubricated:

No. 1 ~Reactor Trip Breaker.

As noted in Item 2.B on Page 3, it was not intended to use this device again.

No. 1 A Reactor Trip Breaker undervoltage trip attachment was disassembled for inspection.

Page 5, Section 3 all Unit 1 reactor trip circuit breakers were cleaned, lubricated and readjusted under supervision of a Westinghouse representative."

The lA and lB Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers and Nos. 11 and 12 Rod Drive Motor Generator circuit breakers were cleaned, lubricated and readjusted

17 -

under the technical direction of a Westinghouse technical representative.

The lA and lB reactor trip bypass circuit breakers were maintained using the same methods demon-strated by the Westinghouse representative.

Page lOA -

Table 1 Under 6-mos.

Surveillance/Maintenance

1.

Response time testing

2.

Trip bar lift force measurement

3.

UV output force measurement

4.

Drop out voltage check

5.

Servicing/lubrication/adjustments

6.

Repeat testing, steps 1~4 Table should read as follows:

1.

Servicing/lubrication/adjustments

2.

Response time testing

3.

Trip bar lift force measurement

4.

UV output force measurement

5.

Drop out voltage check Pages 16-17, Section 2a, b & c See Item 12.A.2 on Page 11 for the discussion of these items.

c.

Comments on Proposed Order The title of the responsible Company Officer to which the Nuclear Oversight Committee's reports are to be submitted is the Senior Vice President -

Energy Supply and Engineering rather than the Executive Vice President.

Where the term "breaker" is used in Item 26, we believe the intended term is "undervoltage trip attachment".

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Item 13 Breaker positions can not be traced historically by serial number.

Based on information available, Attachment H has been developed to indicate breaker position history.

This information is based on breaker movement between switchgear positions.

ATTACHMENT A

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ATTACHMENT C

ATTACHMENT C

  • Page 1 of 1 Our Reference No. NRB B 3-12 DAT~:

April 20, 1983

~~S?ONSE DtJE:

  • rn:

R. A. Uderitz Vice President -

Nuclear

.!:>. :"\\ *. Krishna Chairman -

Nucl@ar Rt!view Board 51J~,l 8CT:

S/lo.Lgz.t -

l / Rfo:ACTOR TRii;) RREAK ER IHCIDEliTS ON l?EaRUAR'! 22 ANO 25,. l1j83 Raterence is.made to }'Our letter ot Apr1l-1~, 1~~3 ':!ihich requests. a written communication from ~Ra rcgardin~ its revi~w of the corrective* act ion taken oy PSt-:ItG with !"eg.ard t\\? the above i.ncidents.

The Ni"U~ reviewed the* above subject at two meetin<JS held on March 14* and April lJ,. 1983.

At the ~arch 14.th ~'eeting, the iiR~ revie\\iied tha analysis of the events associated with the t<eactor* Tr*ip Br'9ake~ failure and. the proposed c:orrectiv~

act.ion ;>rogram.

our1n,J. the ~pril 13th meeting, the soard revie.,,ed the Company' a submittal co NRC dated ~pr-.il 8, 1983

.,.,nich descri.Oea: the corrective, action proqram including shnrt. term items that have* been accomplished and the propose-a lon;,J term actions.

The l'H~8 also had the benefit of a presentation on the subject. by the C";eneral Manager -

~-!uclear support..

The ?.oard *.-aa adv.ised that the short t~r~

3Ctions taken on Unit l..,i.11. also he imt-ile!lMlnte..:l on Unit 2

~rior to its startup after r~fueli ng.

fsased on* its review, the. NP..B -concluded that the uni ts cl'tn be sa~ely returned to service.

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ATTACHMENT D

0PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station April 22, 1983 To the Vice President -

Nuclear STATION OPERATING REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING ON SALEM RESTART The Station Operating Review Committee has reviewed the short term corrective actions regarding the February 22 and 25, 1983 incidents on No. 1 Unit, as proposed in the April 8, 1983 submittal to the NRC.

Recognizing that the short term actions taken on No. 1 Unit will also be implemented on No. 2 Unit prior to its startup after refueling and SORC's overall review of the incidents, SORC concludes that both units can be safely returned to service.

~b.cb~/f irman -

tion Operating Review Committee JMZ: am Thd Energy People 95-2189 (20M) 11-81

ATTACHMENT E

J..

Page 1 of 5 ATTACHMENT E SALEM UNITS 1 AND 2 REACTOR TRIPS AND INITIATING SIGNALS JANUARY 1, 1979 -

FEBRUARY 28, 1983 STEAM GENERATOR LOW LEVEL UNIT DATE

% POWER STEAM GENERATOR LOW LEVEL 1

2/23/79 100 With Steam/Feed Flow Mismatch 1

12/29/79 5

With Steam/Feed Flow Mismatch l'

1/15/80.

7 Lo Lo 1

1/15/80 7

Lo Lo l

I/23/80 96 Lo Lo l

1/24/80 5

Lo Lo 1

1/24/80 5

Lo Lo 1

2/14/80 49 Lo Lo

1.

6/13/80 68 With Steam/Feed Flow Mismatch 1

6/14/80 17 Lo Lo 1

9/10/80 64 With Steam/Feed Flow Mismatch 1

. 12/26/80 25 Lo Lo l

12/26/80 3

Lo Lo l

12/26/80 5*

Lo Lo 1

1/19/81 100 Lo Lo 1

1/31/81 8

Lo Lo l

2/1/81 50 With Steam/Feed Flow Mismatch l

2/6/81 93 Lo Lo*

1 2/11/8:.1 95 Lo Lo.

l 3/1/81.

100 Lo Lo 1

4/27/81 0

Lo Lo 1

4/29/81 27 Lo Lo 2

6/4/81 4

Lo Lo 2

6/9/81 8

Lo Lo 2

6/24/81 7

Lo Lo 2

6/24/81 5

. With Low Feed Flow 2

6/26/81 0

Lo Lo 2

6/27 /81 30 Lo Lo 2

6/29/81 30 Lo Lo

- -... ***-~*- -*- --.

e ATTACHMENT E Page 2 of 5 t.~tT DATE

% POWER STE GENERATOR LOW LEVEL 2

07/07/81 40 Lo Lo 1

08/10/81 96 Lo Lo 2

08/22/81 100 Lo Lo l

10/17/81 97 Lo Lo 2

10/18/81 100 Lo Lo 2

10/22/81" 100 Lo Lo l

11/05/81 65 Lo Lo l

11/06/81 4

Lo Lo 2

ll/~6/81 100 Lo Lo 2

11/24/81 100 Lo Lo

2.

12/15/81*

95 Lo Lo 2

12/15/81 13 Lo Lo

2.

12/17/81 100 Lo Lo 2

12/18/81 31 Lo Lo

. 2 02/19/8~

100 Lo Lo 2

04/17/82 100 Lo Lo 2

04/21/82 100 Lo Lo 1

06/21/82 100 Lo Lo 2

, 07/06/82 0

Lo Lo 2

07/06/82 2

Lo Lo 2

07/09/82 100 W_i th Steam/Feed Flow Mismatch

  • 1 09/08/82 100 Lo Lo 2

09/09/82 4

Lo Lo

1.

09/08/82 5

Lo Lo 1

09/08/82 48 Lo Lo 2

09/17/8*2.

53 With Steam/Feed Flow Mismatch 2

09/18/82 5

Lo Lo 2

11/19/82 59 With Steam/Feed Flow Mismatch 2

-01/06/83 46 Lo Lo 1

0_2/20/83 l

Lo Lo l

02/22/83 10 Lo.Lo l

02/22/83 20 Lo Lo

ATTACHMENT E Page 3 of 5 e

4KV BUSSES UNDERVOLTAGE/UNDERFREQUENCY UNIT DATE

% POWER 4KV BUS UNDERVOLTAGE/UNDERFREQUENCY l

03/24/79 100 Undervoltage 2

10/11/82 82 Underfrequency MANUAL TRIPS UNIT DATE

% POWER MANUAL TRIP I

12/29/79 8

Turbine/Reactor 1

01/30/81 48 Reactor l

05/20/81 66 Turbine/Reactor l

08/09/82 100 Turbine/Reac;tor 1

02/22/83 20 Reactor 1

02/25/83 12

-Reactor STEAM GENERAT.OR HIGH LEVEL UNIT DA'l'E-,.-.-

%POWER l

12/31/79 45

~-.-!:.,.

2 06/02/81 5

,/

2 06/05/81 15 2

06/04/81 15 2

06/25/81 3-0 2

06/26/81 14 2

07/15/81 40 2

08/31/81 85 2

11/19/81 20 2

09/08/82 82 2

09/19/82 19 2

01/05/83 17 2

0.1/05/83 10 2

01/21/83 11 1

02/20/83 4

UNIT*

DATE 2

06/02/81 2

06/02/81 1

08/27/82 UNIT DATE 2

07 /29/81 1

10/29/81 2

08/16/82 UNIT' DATE -

l 06/23/81

l.

07/11/81 2

09/02/81 l

04/22/82 UNIT DATE*

2 01/04/83 2

01/05/83 1

O} /28/82 1

12/22/80 e

ATTACHMENT E

.tJage -4 o:r.

PRESSURIZER LEVEL

% POWER 0

10-8 Amps 100 LOW REACTOR COOLANT FLOW

% POWER 65 99 82 TURBINE TRIP

% POWER 11 90 100 10 MISCELLANEOUS CAUSES

% POWER MISCELLANEOUS 62 Control Oil Pressure Lost on Turbine Control System-Turbine Reactor Trip.

56 Spurious Trip While Performing Reactor Trip Breaker Surveillance 100 Technician Accidentally Pulled the 48V Power Supply to the Reactor Trip Breaker.

SOURCE Source Range High Flux Level RANGE not blocked

ATTACHMENT E

.riage !::>

o:c:

HIGH FLUX RATE c:~ IT DATE

% POWER 1

01/14/80 95 l

01/26/81 100 2

06/02/81 8

GENERATOR PROTECTION UNIT DATE

% POWER l

02/26/80 100 STEAM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE LOW -

P3 UNIT DATE

% POWER 1

06/0~/80 100 OVERTEMPERATURE DELTA T" UNIT DATE

% POWER 1

06/12/80 80

  • 9 ATTACHMENT F

ATTACHMENT F SALEM UNIT 1 WORKORDER REVIEW ERRONEOUSLY CLASSIFIED WORK ORDERS DR/I MD83-1515 WOii 92577 4

_e Page 1 of 18 Workorder written to disassemble, inspect and clean reactor trip breakers and bypass breakers, motor generator set breakers.

Safety related components affected:

Reactor trip breakers and bypass breakers on Unit t Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Reactor trip breakers and bypass breakers were disassembled and overhaulede Undervoltage trip attachments were replaced and the entire breaker was tested in acc.ordance with Maintenance* Procedure M3Q-2*.

DR# MD83-1521 WO/i 928884 The workorder was written to investigat* and repair a leak in the Auxiliary Feed *Pump Room cooler.

Safety related components affected:

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Air Cooler Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

An inspection was performed, on 3/24/83 to determine if repair was completed.

No leaks were evident on the cooler.

Page -

ATTACHMENT F Page 2 of 18 DR# MD83-1741 940893 A workorder was written to perform Inspection Order 200779 which was to draw a sample of the hydraulic fluid in the steam generator and main steam isolation valve snubbers and deliver the samples to the Chemistry Department.

Safety* related components affected~

Steam generator and main steam isolation valve snubbers Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Determination was made that the samples were collected and that the PSE&G research laboratory tested them in accordance with approved ASTM procedures.

DR/I CS83-005 WO#. RC-1079 Replace sample valves on Unit t with valves from Unit 2.

Safety related components affected~

Chemistry Sampling Syatem.

Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Valves were verified to be welded in place in accordance with approved.

procedures.

Page -

ATTACHMENT F Page 3 of 18 DR/I CS83~016 Workorder was written for support of an I&C safety related task on Valves 1SW379 and 1SW383 Safety related com~onents affected:

Valves 1SW379 a.nd 1SW383 Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Work* was verified as being properly performed according. to proper procedures.

(Valves have since been replaced during performance of Design Change Request 1EC0723)

DR/I CS83-031 WO# CS-984435

. The workorder was written in support of a safety related DCR on the

  1. 12 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger.

Safety related components affected:

/112 Component Cooling Water Heat Ex.changer Impact on operability:

None Method of resolut.ion of Deficiency Report:

Work was verified to have been performed in accordance with proper procedures.

j I

Page -

  • e ATTACHMENT F e*

Page 4 *of 18 DR/I IC83-1 823 WOii 991101 The workorder was written to support the Maintenance Department in work on Valves 11GB4 and 12GB4 (Install a hand sender and remove the position limit switches on the valves)

Safety related components affected; Valves 11GB4 and 12GB4 Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Repor~:

Valve seat leakage was verified ~nd stroke time tests were performed.

D~ll IC83-1813 WO# 909394 The workorder was. written to suppo*rt the Maintenance Department in work on Valve 11GB4 (Install a hand sender and remove the position limit switches on the valve)

Safety related components affected:

Valve 11 GB4 Impact on operability:

None Me_j;lfod of resolution _of Deficiency* Report:

Seat leakage and time response* test. were* verified to have been performed.

Page -

ATTACHMENT F Page 5 of 18 DR/I IC83-1815 WO# 90 9777 The workorder was written to support tbe Maintenance Department in work on valve 12GB4 (Install a hand sender and remove the position limit switches on the valve)

Safety related components affected:

Valve* 12GB4 Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution o*f Deficiency Report:

Seat leakage and time response test were verified to have been performed.

DRtl IC83-1814 WO# 909358 The workorder was written to support the Maintenance Department in work on Valves 1TGB4 and 12GB4 (Install a hand sender and remove the position limit switches on the. valve)

Safety related components affected:

Valves 11GB4 and l2GB4 Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Seat leakage and time* response test wer*e verified to have been* performed.

Page

[

ATTACHMENT F Page 6 of 18 DR// IC83-1819 WO// 985800 Workorder was written to restroke and set limit switches on Valve 14GB4.

Safety related components affected:

Valve 14GB4 Impact on operability:

None.

Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Seat l~akage and time response teat were verified to have been performed.

  • DR// IC83-1818 WO# 985792 Workorder was written to restroke and set lim~t switches on Valve 11 SS94 Safety related components affected:

Valve 11SS94 Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Verified that the results of functional testing were satis.factory.

Page

ATTACHMENT F Page 7 of 18

.DR/I-IC83-1 817 WOii 91699.7 Workorder was written to repair a noisy valve.

Solenoid parts were cleaned and lubricated.

Safety related. components affected:-

Valve 1SW213 Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Verified that the valve was cleaned and lubricated a.nd passed all required testing.

DR/I IC83-1820 WO/I 985846 Workorder was written to support NCS in restroking and re~setting limit switch for Valve 12GB4.

Safety related components ~ffected:

Valve 12GB4 Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Verified that seat leakage and time response te$t had been perfor~ed.

Page -

ATTACHMENT F Page* 8 of 18 DR/I IC83-l 821 WOii 917942 Workorder was written to investigate limit switch inoperability on Valve 11 GB4.

Safety related components affected:

Valve 11 GB'+

Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Wrote Workorder 929613 to retest seat leakage.

Workorder was cancelled by Safety Evaluation s~C-G216-191 which recommended that no test was required as the original work was determined to be in accordance with the manufacturers recommendations and was within the allowable leakage limits.

DR/I IC83-1822 WO# 991090 Workorder was written to check stroke of Valves 13GB4 and 14GB4 after

.they had failed leak rate testing.

Safety related components affected:

Valves 13GBJ+ and 14GB4 Impact on ope-ra.bili ty:

None Method or* resoluti.on of Deficiency Report:*

Time response and seat leakage test were verif:led to have been performed.

Page -

"J ATTACHMENT F Page 9

  • of 18 DR//* IC83-1 920 WO# 941693 Workorder was,written to investigate. flow oscillation of Valve 11SW122 on the 11 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger.

Adjusted proportional band on process control to eliminate oscillations.

Safety related co~ponents affected:

Valve 11SW122 Impact on operability:

None Meth.ad of resolution or* Deficiency Report:

Verified proportional band setting was correct.

DR// IC83-1824 won 991105 Workorder was written to check stroke of Valves 1WL99 and 1WL108 after they had failed leak rate testing~

Safety related components atr*cted:

Valves 1WL99 and 1WL108 Impact on operability:

None M*thod or resolution of Defici~ncy Report:

Time response and seat leakage* tests were verified to have been performed.

Page*-

I

ATTACHMENT F Page 10 of 18 DRil IC83-1 825 WOii 991129 Workorder was written to check stroke of Valve 1WL96 after it had failed leak rate testing.

Safety related components affected:

Valves 1WL96

  • Impact on operability:

None Method. of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Time response a.nd*seat leakage tests were* verified to have been performedo DR/I IC83-1832 WOii 905236 Workorder was written to change setpoints on the Air Particulate Detector 1R11A for a gaseous release through the plant vent as required by station procedures.

Safety related components affected:

1RttA Air Particulate Detector Impact on operability:

None Method of res~lution of Defiaiency Rep~rt:

/'

Setpoints were determined to have been c.hanged per established procedures.

Page

ATTACHMENT.F

  • Page 11 of 18 DR/I IC83-1844 WO# 937289 Workorder was written to *check proper operation and opening of the Exhaust Damper 1ABV28.

Safety related components affected:

Exhaust Damper 1ABV28.

Impact on operability:

None Method of resoluti-0n of Deficiency Report:

Installation of the correct solenoid valves on Design Change Request 1EC-1051 was verified and Surveillance Test ~.05-V was performed~

DR/I IC83-1852 won 989122 Workorder was written to repair Valve 1WL108 for an inoperable open limit indication.

Safety related components affected:

Valve 1WL108 Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Verified installati-0n and performance of Surveillance Test 4.05-V.

Page -

ATTACHMENT F

  • Page 12 of 18 DR/I IC83-1853 WOii 991540 Workorde~ was written to investigate and repair loss of indication on Valve 1CC215 Safety related components affected:

Valve 1CC21"5 Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Correct installation and performance of Surveillance Test 4.05~V was verified.

DR/I IC83-1862.

WOii 992836 Workorder was written to investigate loss of indication on Valve 1SS49.

Safety related components affected:

Valve 1 SS49 Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Verified successful completion of Surveillance Test 4.05-V.

Page -

1

ATTACHMENT F

  • Page 13 of 18 DR// IC83-1864 WO// 947042 Workorder was written to wire Damper 1ABV27 closed in support of the Maintenance Department work on the system.

Safety r~lated components arf*cted:

Damper 1 ABV27 Impact on operability:

Non.e Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Verified that the damper linkage was conriected in the correct position for existing mode of operation.

DR// IC83-1871 WO# 943242 Workorder was written to investigate inoperability of warning alarm on RMS Channel 1R17A in the Component Cooling System *

. Safety related components affected:

RMS Channel 1R17A Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Verifted that all work had been performed and the.alarm board had been replaced.

Verified that Channel Calibration Procedure 1PD 4.1.026 had been performed.

Page

ATTACHMENT F

  • Page 14 of 18 DR/I IC83-1872 WOii 940064 Workorder was written to reconnect Dampers 1ABV27 and 1ABV28 to their normal position.

Safety related components affected:

Dampers lABV27 and 1ABV28 Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Verified that the damper linkages were connected and in the proper position for the current mode of operation.

DR/I IC83-1878 WO# 940075 Workorder was written to support Maintenance Department in the repair of Valve 1MS132o Safety related components affected:

Valve 1MS132 Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Verified that Surveillance Procedure 4.0~-V had been performed and installatior was per correc~ design criteria.

Page - J

ATTACHMENT F

Safety related components affected:

Valve 1SW205 Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:.

Solenoid valve had been replaced by Design Change Request 1EC-1051.

DR// IC83-1. 880 WO// 994863 Workorder was written to repair an instrument cap on Instrument Line

  • 1 DA43B.

(Ac.tu al work was to replace broken 1/4" pipe nipple)

Safety related components affected:

Pressure Switch PD7228

~mpact on operability:

None Method: of resolution of. Deficiency Report:

Verified that installation was per design criteria and that diesel generator normal surve1i1ance had been performed.

Page -

ATTACHMENT F

  • Page 16 of 18 DR/I IC83-1882 WOii 984950 Workorder was written to investigate hot running APD pump.

Safety related components affected:

Air Particulate Detector 1R11A Impact on opera~ility:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency* Report:

Pump was determined to have been replaced with th~ correct part and sample flows had been verified.

DR/I IC83-1904 WOii 928518 Workorder was written to provide support to air regulators for Valves 13SW92

.and 13 SW93.

Safety related components affected:.

Valves. 13SW92 and 13SW.93 Impact on operability:

Non.e Method of resolution of Defic:iency Report:

Workorder 929616 was written and performed to secure the regulators to the trays as per original. design criteria.

Page -

1

ATTACHMENT F

  • Page 17 of 18 DR/I IC83-1 906 W0/1923188 Workorder was written to investigate loss of indication in Control Room for #11 Emergency Supply Fan.

(Damper 1CAA15 bracket broken off)

Safety related components affected:

  1. 11 Emergency Supply Fan Impact on operability:

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Report:

Operations Department cycled the damper to verify proper operation.

DR/I IC83-1910 WO# 927512

_Workorder was written to perform Procedure 1PD 4.1.001 for RMS Channel 1R1A due to previous use of test equipment which was out of calibration.

Safety related*components affected:

RMS Channel 1R1A Impact on operability:

None Method of reso..lution of Deficiency Report:

Verified that Procedure 1PD4.t.OOt had been performed.

Page -

ATTACHMENT F Page 18 of 18 DR/I IC83-1915 WO// 930328 Workorder was written to investigate incorrect reading of flow meter for containment spray additive tank.

Safety related components affected:

Flow Transmitter lFT930 Impact on operabi1ity~

None Method of resolution of Deficiency Repott:

Recalibrated as per Workorder 929623.

Performed Procedure 1PD 2.9.180.

All as-found data was within the required specifications.

Page -

1

ATTACHMENT G

\\)

ATTACHMENT G Page 1 of 2 Nuclear Training Center Chronology of Events Related to ATWS February 25 March 1 -

March 2 -

February 28,-

March 1/2/3 March 4/5/6 -

(Friday) ATWS Event (Tuesday) Analysis of event performed and lessons.developed (Wednesday) Presented training on ATWS event to shift in training ATWS event reviewed with shifts at plant by Operations staff.

(Friday/Saturday/Sunday) Discussions with

  • plant management concerning ATWS training_ in plant.

Identified additional training needs.


March 7/8 -

(Monday/Tuesday) Developed material and lesson plans to support additional training requirements identified by plant.

March 9 -

March 10 -

March 10/ll --

(Wednesday) Practiced/videotaped presentation.

Taught first shift in plant.

(Thursday) Taught additional subjects identified at meetings with plant to shift in training.

(Thursday/Friday) Taught remaining shifts at plant.

March 14/15/16 -

(Monday/Tuesday/Wednesday) Did makeup training for persons unavailable when shift t~aining was performed.

March 15 -

March 17/18 -

March 31 -

April 4 -

(Wednesday) PM - Contacted by J. Buzy -

2 NRC Auditors to visit to audit training.*

(Thursday/Friday) NRC visit by Joe Buzy and Lou Bender.

(Thursday) Detailed requirements for practical exercise for equipment operators (EO's) on manual ATWS steps and started preparation.

(Monday) Finalized plans for EO training.

April 5/6/7 -

April 6 -

April 6/7/8 -

April 9 -

April 11 -

April 19/20 -

ATTACHMENT G Page 2 of 2 (Tuesday/Wednesday/Thursday) Conducted practical exercise with EO's.

(Wednesday) Rev. 10 of Reactor Trip procedure and Rev. 6. *of Safety Injection procedures approved.

  • (Wednesday/Thursday/Friday) Development of practical exercise on procedures and indicators and alarms.

(Saturday) Two shifts trained with practical exercise checklist.

(Monday) Other two shifts at plant plus shift in training trained.

(Tuesday/Wednesday) NRC visit by Joe Buzy and Lou Bender.

ATTACHMENT H

ATTACHMENT H Page *1 of 1 Unit 1 Unit 2 RTB A BYA RTB B BYB RTB A BYA RTB B BYB

1) 1979 original lTA lYA lTB lYB 2TA 2YA 2TB 2YB locations
2) 2/6/79 Unit 2 lTA lYA lTB lYB 2TA 2YA 2TB 2YB 2TB + 2YB failures
3) 8/21/80 Unit 1 lTA lYA lTB lY:B 2TA 2YA 2TB 2YB TOR on lYA
4) 5/8/81 Unit 2 lTA lYA lTB lYB 2TA 2YA 2TB 2YB 2YA dropped
  • 5) 8/20/82 Unit 2 lTA lYA lTB lYB 2TA
  • 2TB
  • 2YA 2YB 2TB failed --

swapped with 2YA

6) 1/6/83 Unit 2
  • 2TA lYA lTB lYB
  • lTA 2TB 2YA 2YB 2TA failed --

swapped with lTA 7*) 2/22/83 Unit 1 2TA lYA

  • lYB
  • lTB lTA 2TB 2YA 2YB lTB short --

swapped with lYB

8) 2/22/83 ATWS 2TA lYA lYB lTB lTA 2TB 2YA 2YB
9) 2/25/83 ATWS 2TA lYA lYB lTB lTA 2TB 2YA 2YB
  • Indicates breaker location change.

ENCLOSURE II This enclosure is ~n response to the ques-tion relayed by Mr. H. Denton from the Commiss.ion on April 21, 1983.

ENCLOSURE II Page 1 of 12 SALEM UNIT 1 WORKORDER REVIEW WORKORDERS PROPERLY CLASSIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVIOUS PRACTICES These 522 workorders were classified non-safety related in accordance with previous practice.* Several Deficienc~ Reports were later found to be duplicates.

Some workorders from the Maintenance: Department* were* _n*ot yet completed at the time of the review.* Resolution of these items included perf~rmance of the work required~

DR# CH83-001 WO#:

The above work orders were ~ritte~ to the Chemistry Department to take samples of fuel oil.

The practice followed in sampling fuel oil through analysis work by Energy Laboratories was reviewed and determined to be satisf~ctory.

Parameters identified by Reg Guide 1.137, Fuel Oil Systems for Diesel Cenerators, were evaluated in accordance with applicable ASTK standards; The s~mpling is done within Reg Guide specified time limits.

Quarterly samples in a6cordance with th* Unit Technical Specif~cati-0n 4.8.t.1.3 have demonstrated diesel operability and provide additional coverage.

Page -

1

ENCLOSURE II tt Page 2* of 12 DR fl CH83-002 WOii 90 0624 DR/I CH83-003 WOii 901022 DR fl CH83-004 WOii 90107 8 DR/I CH83-005 WOii 902944 DR fl CH83-006 WOii 902945 DR/I CH83-007 WOii 902946 DR/F CH83-008 WOii 90.4007 DR/I CH83-009 WOii 904008 DR/I CH83-010 WOii 904099.

DR fl CH83-011 WO/F 907280 DR# CH83-013 WO ff 916*820 DR ff CH83-014 WOii. 9*17340...

DR.fl CH83-015.*

WO#. 917420 DR/I CH83-0l9.

WO# 94151'2 DR# CH83:-020 WOii 941515 DR# CH83-021 WOii 94l5'16.

DR/I CH83-022

.WO# 941674 D'Rll CH83-023

DR-fl CH83-025 WO# 98.8321 DR11** CH83-026 W04f 992014 DR/I CH83-027 WO# 989432 DR# CH83-028 WOii 994665.

DR/I CH83-029 WOii

  • 994666 DR/I CH83-030 WOii. 994667 DR fl CH83-040 WOii 985284

. DRfl CH83..:.050 WOii 916822 DR/I CH83-051 WO#, 916 850 DR# CH83.;.052 *

  • WO ff 91686'5 DR/I CH83-053 WOii 916866 DRff CH83-054 *

.. WO# 916867 DR/I CH83-055 WOii 916868 DR# CH83-056 WOii 916 869 DR/I CH83-057 WOii 917 951 DR# CH83.-060 WO ff 930456 DR# CH83-061 WO# 930457 DR# CH83-062 WOii 930458 DR/I.CH83-063 WOii 930462 DR/I CH83-064 WOii 93046.8 DR fl CH83-067 WOii 985086 DR/I CH83~068 WOii 985088 DR/I CH83-069 won 985089 DR/I CH83-071 WO# 991631 DR/I CH83-072 WOii 991987 DR/I CH83-074 WO# 99251'2 DR/I CH83-075 WO# 993956 DR# CH83-076 WO# 985090 DR/f CH83-077 won 940601 DR# CH83-078 WO# 989415 The above workorders were written to sample various. lubricating oils systems in the plant.

Determination was made that the samples were processed in accordance with approved DR/I CH83-012 DR ff CH83;..Q 16.

DRff CH83-017 DR/I CH83-018 DR/I. CH83-037*

WOii. 90958:3.

  • wotr
  • 927047
  • W0#.927141.
  • WO# 941l98 *

. WO# 902007 ASTM procedures.

from.*

These workorders were* written to calibrate the. hydrogen analyzers and _their.

associated recorders and sensors.

Determinati.on was mad:e that. the analyzers*

  • were calibrated.. in accordance with approved procedures.

DR/I. CH83-024 WOii. 988055 Written to perform analysis on hydraulic fluid from main steam isol~tion valve* snubbers.

  • Sample was determined to have been processed by the PSE&G research laboratory-in accordance with approved ASTM procedures.

Page 2

ENCLOSURE II tt Page 3 of 12 J

DRll CH83-032 WOii 908755 Written to dechromate Component Cooling Water System prior to outage.

Work was performed in accordance with approved procedure.CH-3.2.005 *

. WO//. 90875.7

. '~'

\\

~...

Written to clean steam generator tube sheet.

Work was determined to have been perf*ormed in accordance with approved procedures.

DRf/. CH83-041 WOii 908754 Wri'tten. to. dechlorinate* c*omponent Cooling:. w--ate;r. Sy:stem prior to dechromating...

  • Work was performed in acc6rdance with approved procedures.

DR/f CH83-058 wo11*925732 Written* to perform chloride swipes on Valve 1:SJ4.

Determination was made that the work was performed in accordance with approved procedures.

DR/I CH8:3-070

  • WOii 988419 w.rttten. to c*lean the pipes and take chloride swipes of the /J:t1 Residual.

Heat Removal Pump Room~

A workord*er ( 909658.) was.* written. to re.-swip*e. the

  • room.

Results were reviewed and determined to be accepta.ble.

DR/f CH83~073 WOii 992205.

w*rttten t:o: *perform analysis o*f chloride* swipes on Post"'.LOCA sample lines outside** c.ontainmen.t~

  • Determination was made that. the work was performed

. in accor_dance with approved procedures.*.

DR/I IC83-1892

  • Workorder writ.ten* to tighten loose connection on Hot Shutdown panel Steam G*enerator Level indicator.

Hot Shutdown panel was considered as non-safety ~elated per priar practices.

Work was performed in accor~anpe with approved procedures.

DR// IC83-1891 WOii 985432 Written to repair leak on 14BF40 Valye control air supply.

Contrril air was considered to be *non-safety related per prior pr-ocedures, however the work was performed in accordance with approved procedures.

Page -

3

'.I ENCLOSURE II Page 4 of i2*

DR/I IC83-1860 WOii 991735 Written to repair Component Cooling Wat~r Heat Exchanger service water flow indicator in Auxiliary Building.

No repairs made other than adjusting posi.tioner' cam in accordance with approved procedur~s.

DR# IC83--1812 DR# IC83-1827 DR/I IC83-1 840 DR# IC83-1849 DR/I IC83-1 859 WOii 909298 WOii'. 9 84807 won 926*520 WOii 985421 won 988077 f

  • These workorders were* written to support work. acttvi-ties of* oth*er *.

departments.

2 for iristalla*ti'on of a hand s*ender on valve* for* repacking, 1 for removal of pressure gauges.. and limit switches. from valves, 1 fo.r -

stroking and adjustment of a val:ve, and 1 for" ca!ib.ratfon under superv*ision.

of Westinghouse engineers..

DR# IC83-1826 DR II-IC83 ;..1. 82 9:

DR/I IC83-1841 DR/I IC8'3-1848 DR/I IC83-1 858 DR/I IC83-1865 DR'fl IC83--l868.

DR# IC.83.-1874 DR/I rc*a3-~1 877.

won 991313 WOii 988581 WO# 926676 won 985410 won 900116 won 947036 won 946394 won 926 56 2.

WOii 926680 These were-wr'i tte*n on the Fire. Protection and* Secur-1 ty. Systems.which \\

were* considered to be non safety r*elated/'no: QA* requ'ired*.*

Th*e wo.r.k.--

  • orde*rs *-were,.c*onsidered *to be. Quality Required'* and as, suc*h:- they we-re:;.
  • verified. to have been performed co_rrectly.

DR/I -IC83~l9l6

'WOii 928782 Writte.n for repair or* a.gauge on* the.. air *regulator*. for *a diese*l air* start system.

Regulator was replaced as per design specified in: DCR 12C~0574~

DR/I IC83-1828 DR/I IC83-l851**

DR/I IC83-1900 DR/I IC~3-l905 WOii 902983 WOii *9891 l8 WOii 994725 WOii 919985 Radiation monitors are now classified ~s ~afety related.

All work performed above was in accordance with SORC approved safety related pro<?edures.

Page -

4

v ENCLOSURE I I e Page 5 of 12 DRIJ IC83-1830 WOIJ 905036 DRIJ IC83-1831 WOIJ 902801 DRIJ IC83-1835 WOIJ 909101 DRIJ IC83-1837 WOIJ 928662 DRIJ IC83-1881 WOii 984939 DR# re 83.-191 9.

. WO# 928978 No work activities were performed on thes~ workorders.

DRll IC83-1833 WOii 907170 DRll IC83-1836 WOii 901113 DRIJ IC83-1842 WOii 931948 DR/A IC83-t86.7.

WO# 946703 DRll IC83-l909*

WOIJ 925062 DR# IC83-19l3 WO# 930305 The~& workQ~ders were for work on Control Room indicators located on the operator's console.

2 were for non-safety related indicator, 1 was for adj~stment of delta I target band per procedures, 1 for a* plastic chip preventi.ng insertion of an indicator,. 1 for a shutdown rod position indicator~

and 1 for replacement of a. circuit card on ft4 RCP Seal Water Delta P indicator.

DR/I. IC83-1 834

'DR# IC83-1839 DRIJ IC83-1 850 DR/# IC:83-1863 DR# IC8J--186 9*

DR/I I"CBl-1875 **

  • DRll rC83.~l883 DRtf rca3...;1aas -*

DR# IC83.;..1887 DR/I IC'83-l889*

DR/I IC83-l895 DRfJ IC83-1897..

DR/f IC83--1899

  • DRll IC83~l 903.

WO#. 907463 WO# 987722 WO# 988316 WO# 900515

-WO# 9463a7 WOii 909876

  • . WOii. *9.85l81-
    • wo*#. 98Sl83.

WO# 985185,

WO.II 9 851 87 WOii*. 99316 4.

WOii 993167 won 994670 WO# 923074 DRll IC83-183 8 DR# IC83~1846 DR# IC83-:'l854.

DR# IC83=1866 DRll IC83-1870 DR# IC83.,;, 1876

.. DR/I IC83-1884 DRff IC83'~1886,

- DR.fl IC.83-1888 DR# IC83-1894 DR# -IC83-1 896 DRfl IC83-1898' DR# IC83-1902.

DR# rc83.;.1857 WO# 901051 WOii 93 8035 WOii 900512 WO# 946973 WOii 946388 WO# 926567 WOif 985182 WOii 985184 WOii 9851 86 WOii 993159* *

. WOii' 99316 5 W0/1 '993.836

  • WO# 9067 48 WOii 905.160 These workorders were for recorders in the Control Room and included pen trace problems, printing problems or chart drive *problems.

I Page -

51 I

ENCLOSURE II' e Page 6 *.* of 12 DRll IC83-1843 DR/I IC83-1845 DRll IC83-1890 DR# IC83-1912 WOii 9377 43 WOii 9377 46 WOii 9 85197 WOii 928989 3.workorders for adjustment of limit switches on a switchgear room exhaust fan damper for. proper start-stop indicat1on*,

  • 1 for adjustment o*f a. limit switch_on Valve l3GB4..

DRfl IC83-1856 D'Rfl IC83-1861 DRfl IC83=1893 DR4f* I.C83'._.l907 DRff I:C83~19l4* *..

DR# IC83~ 1816 WOii 903185 won 991758 WOii* 989869.

. WOO~* 9288'39 WOii 984480*

  • WOii 90.946 8
  • These workorders we're written for calibration of instrumentation.

All instruments were calibrated using approved procedures.

DR II MD 8 3 -17 1 8 DR/I MD83-1 895 DR// MD83-1898 DR/I MD83-1759 DR#*MD83-1643

.DR// MD83-*17 56 DR# MD83-1541

  • .DR/I MDBJ-1715 DR// MD83-l534 DR/I MD83-153'6 DR# MD83-l500 DR# MD83-l965 DR II MD 8 3 ~ l 816 DR II MD 8 3 - 1 5 5 2 DRll MD83-1537 DR// MD81-17 92' DR// MDSJ-1755 DR/I MD83-1789 WOii,~94771 WO# ~47789 WO# 988954 WOii 920331 WO# 921339

. WOii 917286 WOii 917287 WOii 989168 won 901809.

  • WOii 90*2661 WO'/f 900440.

won 903169 WOii 905676 WOii 906 937 WOii 941144 WOif 9*4*148.1 WO// 917287 WOii 937750 DR// MD83-1847 DR# MD83-17 46 DRU MD83-1610 DR# MD83-1763*

DR# MD83-1539 DR# MD83-1893 DR// MD83-1754 DR# MD83-1533 DR# MD83-*1501

  • DRfl MD83.:., l869.

. * *. DR//*.. MD8J;..1891>

DR# MD83-17 51.

DRff MD83-1656 DR#: MD83-1750 D.Rff MD83..:.1 997.

DR# MD83~ 15 40 DRff* MD83-l542 WOii 901075 WOii 940791 WOii 900400

WOif 917354 WOii 901774 W0#.900489

  • won* 900448

. WO#. 9.94546*

WOii 921286 wo*n 937750 WOii 921486 W.Ofl

  • 992491 WOii 917286 WO// 917354 The above work orders were written for various work on ventilation systems which 1

were previously considered as non-safety related under PD-7.

Of th& work done, 2 were for breaker problems on.ventilation* *fans;.2 were for ductwork and air seals, 17 ~era to replace fan drive belts, 9 were to replace filters, 1 to replace a duct expansion.joint~ and 4 were duplicate DRs.

Page - 6

ENCLOSURE II Page 7 of 12 DR// MD83-1594 WO// 988980 DR fl MD83-1595 WO fl 988982 DR fl MD83-1596 WO fl 988988 DR fl MD83-1866 WO fl 904299 DR fl MD83-1633 WO fl 908507 DR fl MD83-1980 WO fl 919333 DR fl MD83-1597 WO fl 989004 DR#- MD83-1777 WO fl 985450 DR fl MD83-1776 WO// 9.42253 DR fl MD83-1786 WO// 936991 DR fl MD83;..1805*

WO fl 908507 The above work orders were written to repack valves which were previously

_considered as non-safety related..

These valves were on portions* of safety relat*ed systems which were formerly considered non-safet.y related.

DRfl MD83-l969 DR/I. MD8'3-17 47 WO# 920925

_ WO# 9409l0 These were ~ritten for support of handling of new fuel and were performed in accordance with Westinghouse procedures.

Such support activities were not considered as being safety related.

DR# MD83-1819 DRfl MD83-19l5 DR fl MD83-1801 WO# 913867 WO fl 90 5.716 WO# 988102 These* were written in support of DCRs and were performed in accordance with the requirements of the respective DCR packages.

Such support activities were not formerly cla~~ified as safety related *

. DRfl MD:83-1890 DRfl MD83-1571 DRfl MD?3'~1860 WO# _947 94-9:

WO# 947343 WOfl 941606

'These workorders -were wr.i tten on the Waste. Gas Syste'm which 'was. previously consi.d.ered: non-s*.afe-ty *related per* PD-To Work -was verified to have been performed c-0rrectly *.

DRf/- MD'83-1994 DRil MD83-l930 DRfl MD83-1985 DRfl MD83-1984 WO# 90-4318 WOfl 91 8l45. -

WOfl 942046 WOfl 942045 These workorders were written on the Spent Fuel Pit System and vere considered to be _non-safety-rela-ted.-

3 were for leaks in valves and tanks, and 1 was fdr ~eplacement of a bearing in the Spent Fuel Pit Pump.

Page - 7

  • 1 DR// MD83-1527 DR fl MD 8 3 - 1 6 7 4 DR// MD83-1865 DRfl MD83-1946 DR// MD83-1828 WO// 992912 WOfl 985872 WOii 985872 WO// 908828 WO// 900972 ENCLOSURE II ~

Page 8. of 12.

These. workorders were.written for* work to be performed by other departments and organizations and consisted_ of 1 workorder for welding on Valves 11 and 13MS46,-2* for performance of leak rate testing by MIET, 1 for cleaning the main flange bolts on RC.Ps, and 1' for eddy current. testing on f/11 & 12 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers.

DR/I MD83;.,1998 DR// MD83-l887 DR/I MD83~18 8'3 DRfl MD83-1882 DR/I MD83-1880 DR/I MD83-1876 DR/I MD83-1881 DR/I MD83-187 8.

DRfl MD83-1879 DRfl MD83-1873 WOii 901996

-WO# 908739 won 940894 WO# 947987 WOii 944113 WOfJ 99226'5 won 944111 WOfJ 940152 WOfJ 940799 won 993104 These were written on cranes-in the Containment and Fuel Handling Areas for lubrication services (1 for repair of a frayed cable on the manipulator crane).

All lubrication services were perf6rmed in accordance with approved procedures..

Page -

8:

I~----- --- ------

~

ENCLOSURE II

  • Page 9 of 12 DRll MD83-1773 WOii 987654 DRll MD83-1897 WOii 988563 DRll MD83-1856 WOii 923059 DRll MD83-1850 WOii 930949 DRll MD83-1705 WOii 930949 DRll MD83-1 823 WOii 918423 DRll MD83-1858 WOii_ 9353 90 DRll MD83-1779 WOii 989920 DRll MD83-1849 WOii 922104 DR fl MD83-1833 WOii 907880 DR/A MD83-l837 WOii 907 231 DRfl MD83-l 857.

WOii 928764 DRU MD83-1839 WO# 90*2894

- DRD MD83-1862 WO# 940'694

  • DR/I MD83-l863 WOii 937581 DR#
  • MD8 3*;...1 845.
  • WOii 900360 DR# MD83-l847 WOii 900362 DR# MD83-l844

- WO# 900426.

DR# MD83-1843 WO#* 900461.

DR# MD83-1848*

WOii 921413 DR fl MD83-1855 WOii 9336 93 DR# MD83-2608

.WOii 927584 DR# MD83-1854 WOii 930443 DR/I MD83-1840 WOii 901949 DR fl MD83-1842 WOii 901032 DRfJ

  • MD83'~1838
  • WOii 9047 36 DR fl MD83-l841 WO# 900465 DR# MD83:-1999 WOii 919076.

DR fl MD83-1707 WO# 937581 I These workorders were ~ritten to t~oubleshoot and repai~.annunc*iators

or indication on safety related systems.

Al though in.accordance w.ith

'past practice the systems were considered to be safety.related, these

  • components were not directly involved with the saf~ty function and henc~ work on them was *considered as non-safety related.

The items included 15 jobs *on various Control Room overhead annunciators, none of which were first out annunciators- (one was for a spare* first out window} 12 items were for Control Room bezel alarms, auxiliary alarm points or other miscellaneous alarms/indications.

Seyeral alarms on local control/indication panels were also involved.

3 of the ~ork orders required investigation and repairi the remaining items required.-

only verification of component operability.

DRU MD83*1859 DR/I MD83-1704.*

DR/I MD8.3-1'988

  • DRff MD83-1768 DRfl MD83~183-4 DRfl MD83:- 177 8 WOii 9.417 88 WO iJ 9 2:8 8 1 3-

.* WO.IF: 9151 82 WO# 9907'49 WOif 91661 l.

. WOii 909606 DR/I MD83*..:.*17 40 DR/I. MD83-l 852'

    • 0Rfl.***MD8'3..:.1*864 DR/I MD83-: i768.

DRfl MD8°3-1870

-DR# MD83:-1948 WOif 940015 WO# 9288*13:

WOif 9410*94:

W0#990749 WOif 904335~

.. WOif 914913.**

These workorders were written on mihor jo6s invol~in~ ~af~ty related.

systems but* affecting.only portions. which are non~s-afety. related.in nature.

Examples included calibration of the C~ntrol Room thermostat, placing a *temporary heater in the AFST local control panel during shutdown operation, removing a small amount of boric acid system insulation to allow gauge replacement, installation of a. knob-on a boric acd.d heat tracing controller,. several items involving temporary*

equipment in areas* adjacent to. safety related equipment, etc.

Page_- 9

    • ..l II ENCLOSURE II **

Page 10 of 12 DR It MD83-1512 WO# 909136 DR/t MD83-1511 WO It 90 9135 DR# MD83-1804 WO It 9016 80 These items involved maintenance on temporary sump pumps* in the RHR and Service Water Sumps.

The temporary pumps were installed due to unavailability of replacement parts and implementation of a DCR

.r*es.pe.cti.vely:, *.. The Servi.Ce Water Sump Pump has* since., been reinstalled.

The tempo~ary RHR sump pumps *were verified; to. be operable.

  • DR# MD83-1977 WOii 932647 This workorder was for insulating the boric ac*id transfer pumps.

Aithough. the system flowpath and vital heat tracing* are* sa*fe*ty

  • fe*lated; ** the work was external to the system* boundary* an*d only impro.v;ed overall heat tracing performance.

Operability of the vital heat ~racing. was verified to be satisfactory.

DRll MD83-l807 DR/I MD83"" 1"80 8 DR/I MD83-1743 DR/I MD83-1748 DR/I MD83-l 803 WO#.901630 WO# 909878 WO# 944109 WOii 939910 WOii 984720 DR II MD 8 3 -1 81 0 DR# MD83-1745*

DR/I MD83-17 42 DRif MD83-1744

  • D~il MD83-1809 WO# 9:10147 WOii 940100 WOii 943654 WOii 940885 WOii 90 93 91
These wo~kor~ers were for the periodi~ inspection-~nd cleaning of service water system intake strainers.

The strainers are frequently.

cleaned. t.o eliminate. problems with plugging of strainers by grassy.

  • debris -and silt from the Delaware River.

Only one strainer at a time was taken out or service~ and work was performed in a routine manner with: no-repl.a*c:ement of parts;, special tools or materials involved~

DRll MD83-l765-DR/I MD83-26.14 WO# 929464:

WOii 925040 These workorders were issued to replace the cloth* ro11

  • filter.s. on the*

Control Room ventilation supply fans.

While the fans were cons*idered *-

to be saf~ty related, the routine replacement of the filters was not.

Satisfactory operation of the fans and* filters was verified~

Page -

10

\\-.'

ENCLOSURE II

  • Page 11 of 12 DR/I MD83-1903 WOii 913738 DR# MD83-1654 WOii 937513 DR/I MD83-17 97 WOii 937513 DR/I MD83-1522 WOii 929892 DR/I MD83-1829 WOii 900700 DR# MD83-1981 WOii TM0702 DR# MD83-1971 WOii TM0702 DR/I MD83-1504 WOii 945944 DR# MD83-17 95 WOii 939650 These warkorders were written on diesel generator auxiliary systems which were* not considered as safety_ related. under.former *prac.ti.ce.

Examples include repair of a fuel. oil* trans;fer p.ump, leaky.start.ing.

air tank v:alv*es, cleaning the air regulator strainers, stuck D/G area ventila:tion** inle.t louvers, *etc.

Equipment was~ re*paired as necess*ar.y and:.operab:l.:lity of *all sy'stems: v*erified..

DR/I CS.83-00 8 DR/I CS83-0:10 DR/I. CS8'3-025' WOii 908824 WO# 909603

. WOii 9270-93 The.se* workorders were for the replacement of CFCU and Auxiliary Buil.ding Ven,tilation System roughing fil terso*

Al though the components involved were considered safety related, the routina replacement*of the* filtera was not considered to be in this classification.

No special tools or materials were used~ and the work wa~ performed in a

.routine fashion.

Acceptable installation of the filters and proper filter.DIP was verified.

DR/I CS83-036

.DR:/; CS83-045

. DR/I CS83-015 WO# 986019-WOll 991147' WO# 912113

  • These jobs involved minor cleaning and painting of* surfaces on safety related
  • components ( SG. snubber paddle ends., CCHX changeout su.pports, ductwork in SW intake structure).

Such acti vi ties.. would not* be, class-ified.safety related due*

to -the ri.ini ted pqtenti.al.. for... impact~; om th.e s.y.s.tem func*tion. -. Proper-completion and* us'e. *or* proper materials- *was. :*ierified. * *

  • DR/I CS83-01 T.

-.DR/I CS83-014>>

  • DRll csa3.,;;02a.

WOii 9:14a44*..

WOii 909829 WOif *938.812>.

These work.orders were* for minor construction* or* repair or* safe:ty rel"ated sys.terns which had no potential for adverse effects on the systems function.

The items include repair of a hanger for a SIG snubber fill system line, capping the line downstream of Valve 1CV240 to prevent discharge from the line due to accidental opening of the valve, an~ installation of railing and cases over the bridges on the-- SIG -foundations.

Use of correct materials and proper completion of the jobs were v*erified.

Page -

11

ENCLOSURE II

was verified to be operable.

DR/I CS83-018 WOii 914857 DR.fl-CS83-032 WO.#.; 9846.93, Page 12 of 12 The pump

'DR/I CS8J-035 WO#* 986012 DR/I CS83-038 WOii* 987039 DR/I-csa3.;.047 WO# 992912 DR# CS83-034 WO# 985994 DR/I CS83-004 WOii 0482E DR/I CS83-033 WOii 985959 These workorders; were wr.i tten in.support. of other dep~rtments and cons.isted of* t.ests* of :wei'.ds: performed. under Design Change Requests, ins.talla.tion of :a fl:ow meter, draining 1112 Nuclear Header, and disconnecting drain piping.

DRU HP83-001 WOii 932887 This work*-0rder was written to vacuum the Rx Vessel lower core support-plate with underwater filtration equipment.

This type of activity was formerly considered non-~afety related. *The work was performed in accordance with approved procedure

  • J * *
i.

Page -

12