ML18087A833

Petition for Order to Show Cause Why Util Should Not Be Restrained from Restarting Facility Until Qualifications for Operation Demonstrated at Public Hearing

ML18087A833
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	04/12/1983
From:	Potter R NEW JERSEY, STATE OF
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML18087A832	List: ML18087A831 ML18087A833 ML18087A834
References
NUDOCS 8304140085
Download: ML18087A833 (10)

Text

• I JOSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ PUBLIC ADVOCATE BY: R. WILLIAM POTTER ASSISTJl..NT COMMISSIONER DEPARTMENT OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE CN 850 JUSTICE COMPLEX TRENTON, NEW JERSEY 08625 (609) 984-4015 Petition to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the United States Nuclear BEFORE THE Regulatory Commission, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR requesting an Order to Show Cause REGULATORY COIV1MISSION to the Public Service Electric

& Gas Co. why it should not be restrained from restarting the Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 and 2 until certain safety demonstrations are met, and after public hearing

1. The Public Advocate of the State of New Jersey hereby petitions the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ("NRR") of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC" or "Corrunission")

to order the Public Service Electric & Gas Co. ( "PSE&G" or "Public Service") to show cause why it should not be restrained from re-starting the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, ("Salem'~ Uni ts 1 and 2, located in Lower Alloways Creek, New Jersey, until, after notice and public hearing before a duly appointed Atomic Safety and

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Licensing Board, PSE&G has demonstrated:

(1) that it has adequately analyzed the causes of the reactor circuit-trip breaker failures of February 22 and 25, 1983, which required that Unit 1 be manually shut down; (2) that it has proposed and established systems sufficient to prevent the recurrence of the trip breaker failures or similar failures of other safety-related devices and systems; and (3) that its overall program of quality assurance, maintenance, and management are adequate for it to continue to operate Salem consistent with its operating license, and the protection of public health, safety and welfare of the residents of the State of New Jersey.

2. The Public Advocate is the Corrnnissioner of a cabinet-level department of the State of New Jersey, within the executive branch of State government. The Department of the Public Advocate has jurisdiction to represent the public interest of the citizens of the State of New Jersey in such administrative 1 legislative 1 and judicial proceedings as the Public Advocate determines in his sole discretion are necessary to protect New Jersey citizens and resi-dents. See 1 e.g., N.J.S.A. 52:27E-l, et seq.; N.J.A.C. 14A:l-l.l, et~

3. PSE&G is an investor-owned public utility company with its headquarters in Newark, New Jersey; it is franchised to generate, transmit and sell electricity to customers within the State of New Jersey by the Board of Public Utilities.

See N.J.S.A. 48:2-1, et~ PSE&G has been licensed by the*NRC toOperate Salem. The company owns 42.6% of both

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units; the other co-owners are Philadelphia Electric Co., Delmarva Power Co., and Atlantic City Electric Co. In its capacity as an owner-operator, PSE&G has the nondelegatable responsibility to' operate Salem in strict accordance with all applicabile safety, health and environmental standards, regulation and orders. 42 U.S.C.A. 2236*

4. The Director of NRR has jurisdiction to issue the order to show cause as requested in paragraph ~ and to grant such other relief, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Energy Re-organization Act of 1974, and the regulations of the NRC promulgated thereunder. See 42 U.S.C.A.§2011, et seq.; especially 42 U.S.C.A. § 5843 (establishes the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation), 42 U.S.C.A. ~2236 (provides for revocation of licenses for any "material false statement . . or because of [unsafe] conditions revealed" subsequent to the issuance of a license), and 42 U.S.C.A.§2239 (provides for public hearings in proceedings such as this) .

5. The "Rules of Practice" of the NRC provide for the sub-mission and review of a petition such as this, together with a description of the procedure for its grant or denial. For example, 10 C.F.R. §2.206, subpart (a) ("requests .for action. .") states that

"[a]ny person may file a request for the Director of [NRR] to institute a proceeding pursuant to Sec. 2.202 to modify, suspend or revoke a license, or for such other action as may be proper

. The request shall specify the action requested and set forth the facts that constitute the basis for the request." At subpart (b)

• See also 42 U.S.C.A. 2131, 2133, 2137, 2233 and 2234.

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the Director is instructed to respond to the petition for action

"[w] ithin a reasonable time . [H] e shall either institute the requested proceeding . . or shall advise the person who made the request in writing that no proceeding will be instituted . and the reasons therefor." In addition, 10 C.F.R. 2.202(a) permits the Director to institute the order to show cause proceeding, requested by the Public Advocate to determine whether to revoke a license or for such other [enforcement] action as may be proper."

6. The facts relied upon by the Public Advocate in this petition are set forth in detail in the accompanying affidavit of Dale G. Bridenbaugh. Mr. Bridenbaugh is a licensed nuclear engineer who has testified as an expert witness in numerous NRC and state regu-1atory proceedings regarding matters of nuclear reactor operations, safety and cost. (See Attachment A). The relevant facts and in-ferences, are sum.~arized as follows:

(a) On February 22, 1983 and again on February 25, 1983, the circuit ("trip") breakers in the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, failed to open after receipt of "valid signals" that the attempted restart of the reactor should be aborted. (The reactor had been "down" - out of operation since October, 1983 - and PSE&G was attempting to return it to service.) As a result of this failure, the automatic system for the safe shutdown of the reactor was dis-connected, leaving only the manual controls. On both occasions, PSE&G operators successfully used these manual controls to shut the reactor down.

. I (b) The February 22nd incident is most significant for the failure of PSE&G officials to recognize that, in fact, the trip breakers were inoperative and the reactor had been manually "scranuned" (i.e., shutdown). PSE&G apparently did not understand what had happened until after the system failed again on February 25, and an intensive NRC scrutiny had begun. Apparently, PSE&G officials either failed to review computer printouts (which documented the failure) or reviewed them so carelessly and superficially that they did not acknowledge what had happened. These multiple failures suggest that the management of PSE&G employed an inadequate process for post-trip review, and consequently failed to inform the NRC of the incident as required b~ NRC regulations.

(c) The February 25 incident exceeded the Yebruary 22 incident both in duration and intensity. It began with a series of "degrading events (e.g., loss of feedwater) which informed the operators that the reactor should be shut down immediately and the restart efforts aborted again. When the reactor failed again to automatically shut itself down, the operator attempted to use manual controls to insert the control rods and thereby turn it off. The operator's first attempt failed when the control handle came off in his hand. A second attempt was successful when, about 20 seconds later a supervisor re-attached the handle and shut the reactor down.

(d) As a result of these "transients" (i.e., an unexpected failure to shut down) "the water level . . dropped to a level equivalent to approximately 20% of the [fuel] bundle [being] ex-posed . II Thus, for brief periods on February 22 and again on February 25 the nuclear fuel rods were not fully immersed in cooling water as required at all times by NRC regulations for the safe operation and shutdown of nuclear reactors. (See letter of Richard Uderitz, PSE&G Vice President-Nuclear to Darrel G. Eisenhut, NRC Director of Licensing, dated March 1, 1983.)

(e) PSE&G's failure to employ even minimally acceptable procedures for the care and maintenance of the breaker devices caused the trip breaker system to be inoperative. For example, PSE&G failed to properly clasify the devices and systems in question as "safety related" or "important to safety". This failure could indicate that there are other, systemic inadequacies in PSE&G's quality control and quality assurance programs which may affect other, critical devices and systems that are important to the safe operation of Salem.

(f) As further evidence of its poor management practices, PSE&G failed for nearly 9 years to lubricate the trip breaker systems which failed to perate as intended on February 22 and 25. Yet PSE&G was clearly aware or should have been aware that the sytems were in questionable condition: they had failed to oi;erate properly twice before during "surveillance tests" in August, 1982 and again in January, 1983. (PSE&G cannot claim that it is absolved of responsi-bility because it may not have received a "maintenance bulletin" from Westinghouse, which apparently set forth a schedule for lubri-cating and maintaining the breakers. As PSE&G officials must know, they bear a nondelegatable responsibility to properly classify, maintain and operate all safety grade devices and systems employed at Salem.)

(g) Even though the earlier test failures afforded PSE&G more than six (6) months actual notice of problems in the breaker system, PSE&G did not replace the faulty systems with new, safety-grade equipment. Instead, PSE&G employed the questionable practice of "swapping" i.e., exchanging -- inoperable breakers in one Salem reactor for breakers in the other. This practice created an obvious potential for a breakdown in reporting and quality controls which may have contributed substantially to the February failures.

Moreover, this practice of "swapping" suggests a careless and cavalier attitude on the part of PSE&G officials to quality assurance at the two Salem reactors.

(h) Since the February incidents the officials at PSE&G have expressed a public commitment to retaining an "outside con-sultant organization" to review the company's quality assurance program, organizational structure, staffing and the implementation of those programs and procedures. A public commitment to hiring a consultant, however, is no substitute for a thorough, public inquiry into prior PSE&G deficiencies, followed by an NRC deter-rnination that those deficiencies have been corrected and will not reappear. Thus, the final consultants report should be a part of the order to show cause hearing, which the Public Advocate believes the Director should initiate by granting this petition.

(i) The above summary of deficiencies, failures and history of flawed operation of the Salem Unit 1 reactor may apply as well

. I to Salem Unit 2. At least there is no reason a priori to believe that PSE&G management of one unit has been more diligent than, or superior, to its management of the other. Accordingly, neither Salem unit should be permitted to restart until after the officials of PSE&G have adequately demonstrated their present ability and commitment to operate the two nuclear reactors in a safe and proper manner.

(j) This demonstration can only be made in the public forum provided by the rules of the NRC, and initiated by granting this petition. This is the public hearing on an order to show cause before a duly constituted Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. 10 C.F.R. 1.11

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11 These three member boards . conduct such hearings as the Commission may authorize or direct . [e.g.] in proceedings to grant, suspend, revoke or amend licenses and authorizations . . ")

(k) The alternative of simply reviewing the staff presentations in public or private meetings and through other informal mechanisms (e.g., letters) is inadequate to restore confidence in PSE&G 1 s ability and commitment to operate the Salem units safely. In this case the staff of the NRC in Region 1, which has primary regulatory responsibility for the operating reactors in its area, must answer serious questions as well. (The opportunity for public review of staff performance will be lost if this petition is denied.) For example, the staff apparently failed to discover that PSE&G lacked an adequate system for qualifying equipment as safety-grade or safety-related, and for maintaining those critical systems in a

, I proper manner -- in spite of the surveillance test failures in February. Thus, granting this petition and ordering a public hearing will serve to illuminate not only the deficiencies in PSE&G's performance and the adequacy of planned remedial measures, but the need for improved regulatory oversight by the regtonal NRC staff, as well.

7. Upon the granting of the Public Advocate's petition or other action by the Commission that will lead to a full public hearing, the Advocate intends to participate fully in those proceedings, subject at all times to the Commission's rules of practice. (See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. §2. 714 which govems petitions to intervene.) For example, the Advocate would be likely to file formal contentions similar to the summary described in paragraph 6, subparts (a) to (i)

• together with the testimony of expert witnesses. (The Public Advocate has previously participated in formal NRC licensing pro-ceedings, including PSE&G's construction permit application for two floating nuclear plants, Atlantic Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Offshore Power Systems application for a manufacturing license, OPS 1-8, and PSE&G's application to amend its operating license at these same Salem units.)

• Subparagraphs (j) and (k) may not be appropriate as factual contentions in an ASLB hearing, although they may raise other, distinct factual issues appropriate for contentions.

' I CONCLUSION

8. For thereasons stated above, the Public Advocate requests s

that the Director issue an order under 10 C.F.R. s2.206 and 2.202 to PSE&G to show cause why it should not be restrained from re-starting or attempting to restart Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, until PSE&G has adequately demonstrated in a public hearing that it is qualified to operate the units, and for such other relief as the Director may order.

Respectfully submitted, JOSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ PUBLIC ADVOCATE Dated: April 12, 1983

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