ML18082A501

Reply in Opposition to Licensee Response to ASLB 800222 Memorandum & Order,Question 5,re Spent Fuel Pool Gross Loss of Water.Urges to Strike Testimony W/Appropriate Sanctions

ML18082A501
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	04/18/1980
From:	Valore C LOWER ALLOWAYS CREEK, NJ, VALORE, C.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML18082A500	List: ML18082A499 ML18082A501 ML18082A502
References
NUDOCS 8005300506
Download: ML18082A501 (5)

Text

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... UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUC~EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of Docket No. 50-272 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND Proposed Issuance of Amendment GAS COMPANY, et al. to Facility Operating License

) No. DPR-70 (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit #1) l INTERVENOR TOWNSHIP OF LOWER ALLOWAYS CREEK'S OBJECTIONS TO LICENSEE '*S RESPONSE. TO LICENSING BOARD QUESTION 5 REGARDING A "GROSS LOSS OF WATER" FROM THE SALEM SPENT FUEL POOL Analysis of Li.censee' s Response

1.

• The* response details the design of the fuel handling building and the spent fuel building along with the alarm detection systems and make-up water sources. (Pages 1 through 4}~

• 2. The response postulates that even if there were a complete failure of all fuel liner welds that make-up water sources would prevent a gross loss of water accident resulting in any consequences. (Pages 4 *through S).*

3. The response indicates installation of* increased capacity racks would not effect the consequences of the type of "gross loss of water accident" as postulated in the response. Therefore, there would be no adverse consequences to the public's health and safety. (p~ge 5) .

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4. The response distinquishes the proposed floating nuclear power plant in the Offshore Power Systems case from a land based plant.(Pages 6 through 7)

Discussion of Response

1. .Licensee's response simply details the plant design specifically in reference to the fuel handling building and the spent fuel pool.

2. The response postulates a single scenario involving gross loss of water from the storage pool. The postulation is structured so as to self-fulfill the conclusion of no adverse consequences to the public's health and safety. An accident is postulated where the loss of water will not exceed ~he influx of make-up water.

3. Since the response postulates that the make-up source "would be sufficient to keep the spent fuel covered and cool at all times" (page 4) it is cqncluded that the installation of increased capacity racks would have no effect on the consequences. In effect the response concludes there can be no gross loss of water accident.

4. The response is not relevant to the Board's question.

Page 2

Objections to Licensee's Response It is time for some plain talk. The response of the Licensee is a flagrant non-answer.

A Board Order dated February 22, 1980 directed the parties to answer the following question:

"In the event of a gross loss of water from the storage pool, what would be the differences in consequences between those occasioned by the pool.with expanded storage and those occasioned by the present pool?" (emphasis supplied)

The Licensee has refused to address itself in the response to the event postulated by the Board. In its response the Licensee has told the Board the event of a gross loss of water accident cannot happen.

The presumptuous conduct of the Licensee in filing* this response quickens anger. .Espeoially when the Intervenor, Township of Lower Alloways Creek (TOLAC) has spent substantial sums of money and substantial man hours in preparing responsive testimony to the Board's 5th question.

The proceeding before the Atomic Safety & Licensing Board is a significant matter involving the public's. health and safety. Prior to the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident it was nuclear law dogma that certain events were incredible and need not be evaluated in the context of the public's health and safety. Certainly, of all the lessons learned from TMI, we should have learned that obvious and legitimate questions of safety and impacts on the public should not be closeted behind the door of incredible events. Who is to say what is incredible? The Licensee or the ~tomic Safety & Licensing Board!

Page 3

If the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board permits the Licensee's response to its 5th question without requiring a pro~er response then we are ha~ing a mockery of those proceedings. The response of the Licensee is not a conservative polemic adversial position. It is a transparent, cute and obvious failure to respond to the Board's 5th question.

The Licensee seems to arrogate to itself the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's functions. As brought out in ALAB-588 - April 1, 1980:

"The Board's reformulated question, as we construe it, poses neither serious nor irre-parable consequences for the licensee. The basic structure of the proceeding is not affected by the change; rather, the new question simply appears to reflect the Licensing Board's effort to carry out its fundamental responsibility; namely, to satisfy itself whether the proposed license amendment would unreasonably affect the public health and safety. In ,our judgment, the Board below.has marked a path of inquiry that stops short of considering a Class 9 accident. The Licensee's motion for directed certification is therefore premature."

If the Licens~e gives a proper answer to the Board's 5th question, the Board will possibily have before it honest scientific disagreement as to the consequences of a gross loss of water accident in a spent fuel pool with expanded storage ~ersus limited storage.

Perhaps, there is no disagreement with Intervenor TOLAC's testimony as to the dire consequences and this is why the Licensee has delibe~ately evaded answering the Board's 5th question.

Page 4

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I If the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board is satisfied the~e can be ad~erse consequences to the safety and health of the publi~

as a result of a gross loss of water accident in spent fuel pools, then the Board can certify to the Commission as to whether Cla.ss 9

. accidents should be considered as part of the process of allowing enlargement qf spent fuel pools at reactor sites - 10 CF'R 2.716(1).

It is not for the* Licensee to decide what action the Board should take, The Intervenor, TOLAC, objects to the Licensee's testimony in toto and moves to strike the same with sanctions which may be deemed appropriate by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.

Respectfully-Submitted, ..

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• CARL ~VALORE, SpecialN"uclear Counsel for the Township of Lower Alloways Creek April 18, 1980