ML18033A311

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Proposed Tech Specs Re Operability of ATWS & Recirculation Pump Trip Sys
ML18033A311
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 08/04/1988
From:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML18033A310 List:
References
TAC-R00436, TAC-R00437, TAC-R00438, TAC-R436, TAC-R437, TAC-R438, NUDOCS 8808120267
Download: ML18033A311 (49)


Text

ENCLOSURE 1

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS BROGANS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1,.2, AND 3 (TVA BFN TS 252) 8808120267 880804

. PDR ADOCK 05000259

'P

r TABLE OF CONTENTS

~Seotfo 1.0 Definitions.

~Pe e

No 1.0-1 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SA TY SYSTEM

~SETT NGS 1.1/2.1 1.2/2.2 Fuel Cladding Integrity.

Reactor Coolant System Integrity LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 1.1/2.1-1

. 1.2/2.2-1 3.1/4.1 3.2/4.2 Reactor Protection System Protective Instrumentatiori.

A.

Primary Containment and. Reactor Building Isolation Functions.

3.1/4.1-1 3.2/4.2-1 3.2/4.2-1 Core and Containment Cooling Systems Initiation and Control C.

Control Rod Block Actuation.

3.2/4.2-2.

3.2/4.2-2 D.

Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentatxon.

E.

Drywell Leak Detection F.

Surveillance Instrumentation G.

Control Room Isolation H.

Flood Protection I.

Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation.

J.

Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-3 3.2/4.2-4 3.2/4.2-4 3.2/4.2-4 3.2/4.2-4 3.2/4.2-4 3.2/4.2-5 3.3/4.3 L.

ATMS-Recirculation Pump Trip Reactivity Control

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Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentatxon 3.2/4.2-6 3.2/4.2-6a 3.3/4.3-1 A.

Reactivity Limitations B.

Control Rods C.

Scram Insertion Times.

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3.3/4.3-1 3'.3/4.3-5 3.3/4.3-10 BFH Unit 1

LIST OF TABLES 0

Table Title

~Pa e

Ne 3.1.A Surveillance Frequency Notation r

Reactor Protection System (SCRAM)

Instrumentation Requirements.

1.0-12 3.1/4.1-3 4.1.A Reactor Protection System (SCRAM) Instrumentation Functional Tests Minimum Functional Test Frequencies for Safety Instr.

and Control Circuitse

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3.1/4.1-8 4.1.B Reactor Protection System (SCRAM) Instrumentation Calibration Minimum Calibration Frequencies for Reactor Protection Instrument Channels.

3.1/4.1-11 3.2.A Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-7 3.2.B Instrumentation that Initiates or Controls the Core and Containment Cooling Systems.

3.2/4.2-14 3.2.C Instrumentation'that Initiates Rod Blocks *.

3.2/4.2-25 3.2.D 3.2.E 3.2.F Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring, Instrumentation Instrumentation that Monitors Leakage Into Drywell.

Surveillance Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-28 3.2/4.2-30 3.2/4.2-31 3.2.G 3.2eH Control Room Isolation Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-34 Flood Protection Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-35 3.2.I 3.2eJ Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-36 Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-37 3.2.K.

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-38 3.2.L 4.2.A 4.2.B Surveillance Requirements for Primary Containment and Reactor Bui.lding Isolation Instrumentation.

Surveillance Requirements for Instrumentation that Initiate or Control the CSCS.

3.2/4.2-40 3.2/4.2-44 ASS Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-39a 4.2.C Surveillance Requirements for Instrumentation that Initiate Rod Blocks

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3.2/4.2-5O 4.2.D Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirement~

3.2/4.2-51 BFN Unit 1 vi

IST OF TABLES (Cont'd)

Table 4.2.E Title

~Pa e Ne.

Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Drywell Leak Detection Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-53 4.2.F Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Surveillance Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-54 4.2.G Surveillance Requirements for Control Room Isolation Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-56 4.2.H Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for

.Flood Protection Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-57 4.2e J Seismic Monitoring Instrument Surveillance Requirements 3.2/4.2-58 4.2aK Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Instrumentation Surveillance 3.2/4.2-62 4.2.L 3.5-1 ATMS-Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation Surveillance Minimum RHRSW and EECM Pump Assignment 3.2/4.2-63a 3.5/4.5-11 3.5.I 3.7.A 3.7.B 3.7.C MAPLHGR Versus Average Planar Exposure Primary Containment Isolation Valves Testable Penetrations vith Double 0-Ring Seals Testable Penetrations vith Testable Bellows.

3.5/4.5-21 3.7/4.7-25 3.7/4.7-32 3.7/4.7-33 3.7.D 3.7.E Air Tested Isolation Valves.

Primary Containment Isolation Valves vhich Terminate belov the Suppression Pool Mater Level.

3.7/4.7-34 3.7/4.7-37 3.7.F Primary Containment Isolation Valves Located in Mater Sealed Seismic Class 1 Lines 3.7.H Testable Electrical Penetrations 3.11.A 6.2.A Fire Protection System Hydraulic Requirements.

Minimum Shift Crev Requirements.

4.9.A.4.C Voltage Relay Setpoints/Diesel Generator Start 3.7/4.7-38 3.7/4.7-39 3.9/4.9-16 3.11/4.11-10 6.0-3 vii BFN Unit 1

2 4 2 Protective Instrumentation LIMI ING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE E UIRENENTS 3.2.L

~TWS RPT 1.

The ATWS/RPT System Instrumentation shall be OPERABLE during REACTOR POMER OPERATION in accordance with Table 3.2.L.

l. Each of the ATWS/RPT System Instrumentation shall be OPERABLE BY performance of tests in Table 4.2.L.

2.

The ATMS/RPT System Trip setpoints will be set in accordance with Table 3.2.L.

3.

The actions required when the number of operable channels is less than the minimum operable channels per trip system is specified in Table 3.2.L.

3.2/4.2-6a BFN Unit 1'

Hinimum Ho.

Operable Per T~ri S~sLIL Function lnslrumcnt Channel-Orywcll Illgh Pressure (VS-64-50 E-II)

Instrumcnl Channcl-DrywcI 1 lligh I'r'cssurc (I'5-64-50 A-U, SII N2)

TABLE 3.2.8 (Continued)

Trr I.evel Settrn 1< p<2.5 psig

< 2.5 psig Action Jhsiurks l.

Below trip settirIg prevents inadvertent operation oF contalwrcnt spray during accident condrtinns

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Above trip settirig in con-juncllon with lurI r eactur pressure inlliatus CSS IIIrlti[>lierrelays init)ate IIPC I 2.

Hultipilcr relay from CSS ilrltihtes accidcllt signal.

(15)

Below 2(16)

C, lnslrumcnt Channel-Orywell Iligh Prcssure (I'5-64-50A-U, N Irl)

Instrument Channel-Orywcll Iligh Pressure (PS-64-5 IA-0)

~~nb-6hanne4-4rra etor-Ili0tr-Pre ccuio.

01.

< 2.5 psig

< 2.5 psig A

1 I.

Above trip set ling in conjunction wilh low re~ctor pressure nitiales tpci.

l.

Above trip setting, ln conjuncllon with low reactor water level, drywcll lrlgiI Fi

Fessure, 120 sec.

delay lmcr and CSS or RIIR pgy running, initiate~ APS, OUL.Unit 1

Table 3.2.L Hinimum No.

Channels operable per T~ri S s

~1 Function Trip Settin A'llowable Value Action Remarks ASS/RPT Logic Reactor Dome Pressure lligh Reactor.Vessel Level Low 1118 psig 483" above vessel zero 1146.5 psig 471.52" above vessel zero (2)

Two out of two of the high reactor dome pressure channels or the low reactor vessel level channels in either trip system trips both reactor recirculation pumps'1)

One channel in only one trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6

hours for required surveillance provided the other channels in that trip system are

)operable.

(2)

Two trip systems exist, either of which will trip both recirculation pumps.

Perform Surveillance/maintenance/calibration on one channel in only one trip system at a time.

If a channel is found to be inoperable or if the surveillance/maintenance/calibration period for one channel exceeds 6 consecutive

hours, the trip system will be declared

. inoperable or the channel will be placed in a tripped condition. If in RUN mode and one trip system is inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or both trip systems are inoperable, the reactor shall be in at least hot standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

BFN-Unit 1

I'unction TABLE 4.2.8 SuAvEltlAHCE ArqrITAEIIEHTS FOA IHSTRUHEHTA110H lllA1 IHITIAIE OA COHTROL TIIE C5C5 Functional'est Calibration Instrument Check Instnme I, Channel -.

Ileyctor m Water Level (LIS -0)

InStrunept Channel Reactor I.m Water Level (LIS-3-I04 6 105) fnstrufnent Channel-Aeaclor (.m Waler level (LITS-3-52 6 62)

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instr erent-64anneT--

-ReeetoM~\\er-'+eve I

- =56-)-

~tree.n~nneT--

RehetoW6gh-Presetre once/3 aenlhs once/3 months once/3 months once/day once/day once/day Instrvnrnt Channel-Orwe I I Iligh Pressure (Pj-64-50E-10 Instr vncnl Channel-Oryvel I lligh Pressure (P5-64-50A.O)

Ingtrinznt Channel-Ormell lligh P) essure (P)-64-5)A-0)

In tronr.nt Channel-Ae clor loM Pressure (I'3.-14A 6 0)

P 95)

P 96) once/3 nanths once/3 months once/3 months once/3 tenths none Inone none none Br H.unit I

'NOTES FOR ABLES 4 2

A UGH 4 2 L exce t 4 2.D l.

Functional tests shall be performed once per month.

2.

Functional tests shall be performed before each startup with a required frequency not to exceed once per week.

3.

This instrumentation is excepted from the functional test definition.

The functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the measurement channel.

4.

Tested during logic system functional tests.

5.

Refer to Table 4.1.B.

6.

The logic system functional tests shall include a calibration once per operating, cycle of time delay relays and timers necessary for proper functioning of the trip systems.

7.

The functional test will consist of verifying continuity across the inhibit with a volt-ohmmeter.

8.

Instrument checks shall be performed in accordance with the definition of instrument check (see Section 1.0, Definitions).

An instrument check is not applicable to a particular setpoint, such as

Upscale, but is a qualitative check that the instrument is behaving and/or indicating in an acceptable manner for the particular plant condition.

Instrument check is included in this table for convenience and to indicate that an instrument check will be performed on the instrument.

Instrument checks are not required when these instruments are not required to be operable or are tripped.

9.

Calibration frequency shall be once/year.

10.

Deleted ll. Portion of the logic is functionally tested during outage only.

12.

The detector will be inserted during each operating cycle and the proper amount of travel into the core verified.

13.

Functional test will consist of applying simulated inputs (see note 3).

Local alarm lights representing upscale and downscale trips will be verified, but no rod block will be produced at this time.

The inoperative trip will be initiated to produce a rod block (SRM and IRM inoperative also bypassed with the mode switch in RUN).

The functions that cannot be verified to produce a rod block directly will be verified during the operating cycle.

BFN Unit 1 3.2/4.2-59

BOOTES FOR TABLES 4 2

A T UGH 4 2 L exc t 4.2.D (Conti

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14.

(Deleted) 15.

The flow bias comparator will be tested by putting one flow unit in "Test" (producing 1/2 scram) and adjusting the test input to obtain comparator rod block.

The flow bias upscale will be verified by observing a local upscale trip light during operation and verified that it will produce a rod block during the operating cycle.

16.

Performed during operating cycle.

Portions of the logic is checked more frequently during functional tests of the functions that produce a rod block.

17.

This calibration consists of removing the function from service and performing an electronic calibration of the channel.

18.

Functional test is limited to the condition where secondary containment integrity is not required as specified in Sections 3.7.C.2 and 3.7.C.3.

19.

Functional test is limited to the.time where the SGTS is required to meet the requirements of Section 4.7.C.l.a.

20.

Calibration of the comparator requires the inputs from both recirculation loops to be interrupted, thereby removing the flow bias signal to the APRM and RBM and scramming the reactor.

This calibration can only be performed during an outage.

21.

Logic test is limited to the time where actual operation of the equipment is permissible.

22.

One channel of either the reactor zone or refueling zone Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitoring System may be administratively bypassed for a period not to exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for functional testing and calibration.

23.

(Deleted) 24.

This instrument check consists of comparing the thermocouple readings for all valves for consistence and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).

25.. During each refueling outage, all acoustic monitoring channels shall be calibrated.

This calibration includes verification of accelerometer response due to mechanical excitation in the vicinity of the sensor.

BFN Unit 1 3.2/4.2-60

NOTES FOR TABLES 4 2

A 'GH 4 2 L exce t 4 2

D (Conti

. d) 26.

This instrument check consists of comparing the background signal levels for all valves for consistency and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).

27.

Functional test consists of the injection of a simulated signal into the electronic trip circuitry in place of the sensor signal to verify operability of the trip and alarm functions.

28.

Calibration consists of the adjustment of the primary sensor and associated'omponents so"that they correspond within acceptable range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel.monitors, including adjustment of the electronic trip circuitry, so that its output relay changes state at or more conservatively than the analog equivalent of the trip level setting.

29.

The functional test frequency decreased to once/3 months to reduce challenges to relief valves per NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.16.

BZS Unit 1 3.2/4.2-61

Table 4.2.L Functio Functional Test Channel Calibration Instrument Check Reactor Vessel Water Level Low LS-3-58A-D H(27)

R(28)

N/A Reactor Vessel Dome Pressure lligh PS-3-204-D M(27)

R(2S)

N/A BFN-Unit 1

3.2 BASES (Cont'd)

The operability of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation dose to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere.

This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public.

The operability of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety.

This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.

The instrumentation provided is consistent with specific portions of the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12 "Instrumentation for Earthquakes."

The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to momtor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during actual or potential releases of gaseous effluents.

The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments will be calculated in accordance with guidance provided in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20.

This instrumentation also includes provisions for monitoring the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the offgas.

holdup system.

The operability and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

The radioactive liquid effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents during actual or potential releases of liquid effluents.

The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated in accordance with guidance provided in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 Appendix B, Table II, Column 2.

The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

ATWS/RPT, Anticipated Transients without Scram/Recirculation Pump Trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during, an ATWS event.

The response of the plant to this postulated event (ATWS/RPT) follows the BWR Owners Group Report by General Electric NEDE-31096-P-A and the accompanying NRC Staff Safety Evaluation Report.

ATWS/RPT utilizes the engineered safety feature (ESF) master/slave analog trip units (ATU) which"consists of four level and four pressure channels total.

The initiating logic consists of two independent trip systems each consisting of two reactor dome high pressure channels and two reactor vessel low level channels.

A coincident trip of either two low levels or two high pressures in the same trip system causes initiation of ATWS/RPT.

This signal from either trip system opens one of two EOC BFN Unit 1 3.2/4.2-70

I 3.2 BASES (Cont'd)

(end-of-cycle) breakers in series (the other system opens the other breaker) between the pump motor and the Motor Generator set driving each recirculation pump.

Both systems are completely redundant such that only one trip system is necessary to perform the ATMS/RPT function.

Power comes from the 250 VDC shutdown boards.

Setpoints for reactor dome high pressure and reactor vessel low level are such that a normal Reactor Protection System scram and accompanying recirculation pump trip would occur before or coincident with the trip by ATWS/RPT.

4.2 USES The instrumentation listed in Tables 4.2.A through 4.2.F will be functionally tested and calibrated at regularly scheduled intervals:

. The same design reliability goal as 'the Reactor Protection System of 0.99999 generally applies for all applications of (l-out-of-2) X (2) logic.

Therefore, on-off sensors are tested once/3 months, and bistable trips associated with analog sensors and amplifiers are tested once/week.

BFN Unit 1" 3.2/4.2-708

TABLE OF CONTENTS Section P~ae Ne 1.0 Definitions.

1.0-1 1.1/2.1, Fuel Cladding Integrity.

1.2/2.2 Reactor Coolant System Integrity.

SAFETY LIM TS AND L MITING SAFETY SYSTEM

~SE TTNGS

., 1.1/2.1-1 1.2/2.2-1 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 3.1/4.1 Reactor Protection System 3.2/4.2 Protective Instrumentation.

3.1/4.1-1 3.2/4.2-1 A.

Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Functions.

3.2/4.2-1 C.

Control Rod Block Actuation.

B.

...Core and Containment Cooling Systems Initiation and Control 3.2/4.2-1 3.2/4.2-2 D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation.

Drywell Leak Detection Surveillance Instrumentation Control Room Isolation Flood Protection Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation.

Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-3 3.2/4.2-4 3.2/4.2-4 3.2/4.2-4 3.2/4.2-4 3.2/4.2-4 3.2/4.2-5 K.

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Instrumentation Monitoring

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3.2/4.2-6 3.3/4.3 A.

Reactivity Limitations B.

Control Rods C.

Scram Insertion Times.

L.

ATHS-Recirculation Pump Trip.

Reactivity Control

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IST OF TABLES Table T tie

~Pa e

Ne Surveillance Frequency Notation 1.0-11 3.1.A Reactor Protection System (SCRAM)

Instrumentation Requirements.

3.1/4.1-3 4.1.A Reactor Protection System (SCRAM) Instrumentation Functional Tests Minimum Functional Test Frequencies for Safety Instr.

and Control Circuits.

3.1/4.1-8 4.1.B Reactor Protection System (SCRAM) Instrumentation

.Calibration Minimum Calibration Frequencies for Reactor Protection Instrument Channels.

3el/4.i-11 3.2.A Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-7 3.2.B 3.2.C Instrumentation that Initiates or Controls the Core and Containment Cooling Systems.

Instrumentation that Initiates Rod Blocks 3.2/4.2-14 3.2/4.2-25 3.2.D

'Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring.

3.2/4.2-28 3.2.E Instrumentation that Monitors Leakage Into Drywell.

3.2/4.2-30 3.2.F 3.2.G

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Surveillance Instrumentation.

Control Room Isolation Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-31 3.2/4.2-34 3.2eH Flood Protection Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-35 3.2.I 3.2.J-Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-36 3.2/4.2-37 3.2eK Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-38 3.2.L 4.2.A Surveillance Requirements for Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-40 ASS-Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-39a 4.2.B Surveillance Requirements for Instrumentation that Initiate or Control the CSCS.

3.2/4.2-44 4.2.C Surveillance Requirements for Instrumentation that Initiate Rod Blocks

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Table 7~it e

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Ne 4.2.E Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Drywell Leak Detection Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-53 4.2.F Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Surveillance Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-54 4.2.G Surveillance Requirements for Control Room Isolation Instrumentation.

. 3.2/4.2-56 4.2.H Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Flood Protection Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-57 4.2eJ Seismic Monitoring Instrument Surveillance Requirements 3.2/4.2<<58 4.2eK Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Instrumentation Surveillance 3.2/4.2-62 4.2.L 3.5-1 3.5.I 3.7.A 3.7.B 3.7.C 3.7.D 3.7.E ATWS-Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation Surveillance Minimum RHRSW and EECW Pump Assignment MAPLHGR Versus Average Planar Exposure Primary Containment Isolation Valves Testable Penetrations with Double 0-Ring Seals Testable Penetrations with Testable Bellows.

Air Tested Isolation Valves.

Primary Containment Isolation Valves which Terminate below the Suppression Pool Water Level.

3.2/4.2-63a 3.5/4.5-11 3.5/4.5-21 3.7/4.7-25 3.7/4.7-32 3.7/4.7-33 3.7/4.7-34 3.7/4.7-37 3.7.F 3.7.H 4.9.A.4.C 3.11.A 6.2.A Primary Containment Isolation Valves Located in.,

Water Sealed Seismic Class 1 Lines Testable Electrical Penetrations Voltage Relay Setpoints/Diesel Generator Start Fire Protection System Hydraulic Requirements.

Minimum Shift Crew Requirements.

3.7/4.7-38 3.7/4.7-39 3.9/4.9-16

.3.11/4.11-10 6.0-3 BFN Unit 2

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2 4 2 Protective Instrumentation LIMITINj"CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.2.L A~TWS RPT 1.

The ATWS/RPT System Instrumentation shall be OPERABLE during REACTOR POMER OPERATION in accordance with Table 3.2.L.

2.

The ASS/RPT System Trip setpoints vill be set in accordance with Table 3.2.L.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS

1. Each of the ATWS/RPT System Instrumentation shall be OPERABLE BY performance of tests in Table 4.2.L.

3.

The actions required when the number of operable channels is less than the minimum operable channels per trip system is specified in Table 3.2.L.

BFN Unit 2 3.2/4.2-6a

Hininwm Ho.

Operable Pcr

~Tr i S~slL 2( 16)

Function lnstriuncnt Channel-Oryucl I IIigh Prcssure (P IS-64-58 L'-II) lnstrunicnl Channcl-Oryucll Iligh Prcssure (ITS-64-58 A-0) bntrtinv.nt-Clianne4-

~e ter-I ~Alaten-Level-QH~H6~)

4&54pwHn&aha NREM)

Rea&oWligh-Pivssurc

~5-3-204A Instrument Channcl-Orywcll ll>gh Prcssure (I )S.64-5OA u) lnstrwent Cliannel-Oryucl) Iligh Pressure (I'IS-64 -5)A-U) lAIILE 3.2.8 (Continued)

Tri~level Session Aclion 1< p<2.5 psig

< 2.5 psig

< 2.5 psig

< 2.5 psig IIenarks l.

Oclou trip sel,ling prevents'nadvertent operation of

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cunta lltncnt s))ray during accidcnL conditions.

I l.

Above trip sett)ng in con-

]unction Mith low rcacl,or rcssurc iniLiales CSS.

ulliplicr relays initiate III'Cl.

2.

fIultIplier relay froin CSS.

iniliales accident signal.

(15)

IIc1ox-trip-set+in~+

'ecmulatb)n-p re.

'i peulat4o~ Hp5; i i

l.

Above trip setting ih conjunction uilh lou'eaclor prcssure inl}late'f, l PC l.

I i.

Annve irTTT selsintS, In) conJunction with lou.reactor water level, drywnll high:

pressure, 120 sec.

dqlay tinier and CSS or RIIR'pyy running, initiates AOS.

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BIH.Unit 2

~enenne,

Table 3.2.L Minimum No.

Channels operable per Function Trip Settin Allowable Value Action Remarks ATWS/RPT Logic Reactor Dome Pressure High Reactor Vessel Level Low 1118 psig 483" above vessel zero 1146.5 psig 471.52" above vessel zero (2)

Two out of two of the high reactor dome pressure channels or the low reactor vessel level channels in either trip system trips both reactor recirculation pumps'1)

One channel in only one trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6

1>ours for required surveillance provided the other channels in that trip system are operable.

(2)

Two trip systems exist, either of which will trip both recirculation pumps.

Perform Surveillance/maintenance/calibration on one channel in only one trip system at a time.

If a channel is found to be inoperable or if the surveillance/maintenance/calibration period for one channel exceeds 6 consecutive

hours, the trip system will be declared
inoperable or the channel will be placed in a tripped condition. If in RUN mode and one trip system is inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or both trip systems are inoperable, the reactor shall be in at least hot standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

l3FN-Unit 2

I t

~

Function TABLE 4.2.8 StNVEILLAHCE REQUIREMEHTS FOR IHSTRUMENTATIOH Tl AT IHITIATE OR COHTROL TllE CSCS Ca 1 ibrat ion Instrunent Check Instrunent Channel eactor Lm Mater t.evel LI5-3-58A-O)

I Instrunent Channel eactor Lm Mater Level LIS-3-104 6 105) nstrteent Channel eactar Lac Mater l.evel LIS-3-52 6 62)

(1) (2I)

(1) (2))

(I) (21)

Once/)8 Months (20)

Once/day Once/18 Months (20)

Once/day Once/) 8 Months (28)

Once/day

,'- 4ss4p~t-Glenml

. 4edctof~totlklate~vel

~ ~5-~6A=BJ

'= Rnstr Nnent-phdnnef 1 ~otor-111 gh&~~

i ff <<g 3 284~)-

j Instr nt Channel

Or~I lligh Pressure (P IS-6 -50E-II)

! Instr nt Channel

Orgy.l lligh Pressure (PIS-6 -50A-0)

Instr nt Channel

< Oriel lligh Pressure (PIS-6 -5>A-0)

Instrument Channel Reactor Lou Pressure (PIS-3-14 CB, PS-3-1480)

~

PIS-60-95, PS-60-95)

~

P IS-60-96, PS-60-96)

(1)

(21)

(1) (21)

(1) (2I)

(1)

(21)

Once/18 Months (20)

Once/)8 Months (28)

Once/18 Months (28)

Once/18 Months (28) none none none none BIH-Unit 2

NOTES FOR TAB ES 4.2 A THROUGH 4 2.L exce t 4.2.

D Functional tests shall be performed once per month.

2.

Functional tests shall be performed before each startup with a required frequency not to exceed once per week.

3.

This instrumentation is excepted from the functional test definition.

The functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the measurement channel.

Tested during logic system functional tests.

Refer to Table 4.1.B.

6.

The logic system functional tests shall include a calibration once per operating cycle of time delay relays and timers necessary for proper functioning of the trip systems.

7.

The functional 'test will consist of verifying continuity across the inhibit with a volt-ohmmeter.

8.

Instrument checks shall be performed in accordance with the definition of instrument check (see Section 1.0, Definitions).

An instrument check is not applicable to a particular setpoint, such as Upscale, but is a qualitative check that the instrument is-behaving and/or indicating in an acceptable manner for the particular plant condition.

Instrument check is included in this table for convenience and to indicate that an instrument check will be performed on the instrument.

Instrument checks are not required when these instruments are not required to be OPERABLE or are tripped.

9.

10.

Calibration frequency shall be once/year.

Deleted Portion of the logic is functionally'ested during outage only.

12.

The detector will be inserted during each operating cycle and the proper amount of travel into the core verified.

13.

Functional test will consist of applying simulated inputs (see note 3).

Local alarm lights representing upscale and downscale trips will be verified, but no rod block will be produced at this time.

The inoperative trip vill be initiated to produce a rod block {SRN and IRM inoperative also bypassed with the mode switch in RUN).

The functions that cannot be verified to produce a rod block directly will be verified during the operating cycle.

3.2/4.2-59 BFN Unit 2

OTES FOR TABLES 4 2

A THROUGH 4 2 L exce t 4.2 D (Cont'd) 14.

(Deleted) 15.

The flow bias comparator will be tested by putting one flow unit in "Test" (producing 1/2 scram) and adjusting the test input to obtain comparator rod block.

The flow bias upscale will be verified by observing a local upscale trip light during operation and verified that it will produce a rod block during the operating cycle.

16.

Performed during operating cycle.

Portions of the logic is checked more frequently during functional tests of the functions that produce a rod block.

17.

This calibration consists of removing, the function from service and performing an electronic calibration of the channel.

18.

Functional test is limited to the condition where secondary containment integrity is not required as specified in Sections 3.7.C.2 and 3.7.C.3.

19.

Functional test is limited to the time where the SGTS is required to meet the requirements of Section 4.7.C.l.a.

20.

Calibration of the comparator requires the inputs from both recirculation loops to be interrupted, thereby removing the flow bias signal to the APRM and RBM and scramming the reactor.

This calibration can only be performed during an outage.

21.

Logic test is limited to the time where actual operation of the equipment is permissible.

22.

One channel of either the reactor zone or refueling zone Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitoring System may be administratively bypassed 'for a period not to exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for functional testing, and calibration.

23.

(Deleted)

'I 24.

This instrument check consists of comparing the thermocouple readings for all valves for consistence and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).

25. - During each refueling outage, all acoustic monitoring channels shall be calibrated.

This calibration includes verification of accelerometer response due to mechanical excitation in the vicinity of the sensor.

3.2/4.2-60

NOTES FOR TABLES 4.2 A THROUGH 4.2 L exce t 4 2

D (Cont'd) 26.

This instrument check consists of comparing the background signal levels for all valves for consistency and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).

27, Functional test consists of the injection of a simulated signal into the electronic. trip circuitry in place of the sensor signal to verify operability of the trip and alarm functions.

28.

Calibration consists of the adjustment of the primary sensor and associated components so that they correspond within acceptable range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors, including adjustment of the electronic trip circuitry, so that its output relay changes state at or more conservatively than the analog equivalent of the trip level setting.

29.

The functional'test frequency decreased to once/3 months to reduce challenges to relief valves per NUREG-0737, item'I.K.3.16.

30.

Calibration shall consist of an electronic calibration of the

channel, not including the detector, for range decades above 10 R/hr and a one-point: source check of the detector below 10 R/hr with an installed or portable gamma source.

3.2/4.2-61

Table 4.2.L Function" Functional Test Channel Calibration Instrument Check Reactor Vessel Mater Level Low LS-3-58A-D M(27)

R(28)

Reactor Vessel Dome Pressure High PS-3-204-D M(27)

R(28)

N/A BFN-Unit 2

3.2 BASES (Cont'd)

The operability of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation dose to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere.

This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public.

The operability of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety.

This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.

The instrumentation provided is consistent with specific portions of the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12 "Instrumentation for Earthquakes."

The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the 'releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during actual or potential releases of gaseous effluents.

The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments will be calculated in accordance with guidance provided in the ODCM to ensur'e that the alarm/trip will occur prior'o exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20.

This instrumentation also includes provisi'ons for monitoring the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the offgas..

holdup system.

The operability and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of'Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

The radioactive liquid effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents during actual or potential releases of liquid

~

effluents.

The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated in accordance with guidance provided in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 Appendix B, Table II, Column 2.

The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

ATWS/RPT, Anticipated Transients without Scram/Recirculation Pump Trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an ATWS event..

The response of the plant to this postulated event (ATWS/RPT) follows the BWR Owners

- Group Report by General Electric NEDE-31096-P-A and the accompanying NRC Staff Safety Evaluation Report.

ATWS/RPT utilizes the engineered safety feature (ESF) master/slave analog trip units (ATU) which consists of four level and four pressure channels total.

The initiating logic consists of two independent trip systems each consisting of two reactor dome high pressure channels and two reactor vessel low level channels.

A coincident trip of either two low levels or two high pressures in the same trip system causes initiation of ATWS/RPT.

This signal from either trip system opens one of two EOC BFH Unit 2 3.2/4.2-70

S.S BASES (Cont'd)

(end-of-cycle) breakers in series (the other system opens the other breaker) between the pump motor and the Motor Generator set driving each recirculation pump.

Both systems are completely redundant such that only one trip system is necessary to perform the ASS/RPT funct'ion.

Power comes from the '250 VDC shutdown boards.

Setpoints for reactor dome high pressure and reactor vessel low level are such that a normal Reactor Protection System scram and accompanying recirculation pump trip would occur before or coincident with the trip by ATMS/RPT.

4.2 BASES The instrumentation listed in Tables 4.2.A through 4.2.F will be functionally tested and calibrated at regularly scheduled intervals; The same design reliability goal as the Reactor Protection System of 0.99999 generally. applies for all applications of (l-out-of-2) X (2) logic.

Therefore, on-off sensors are tested once/3 months, and bistable trips associated with analog sensors and amplifiers are tested once/week.

BFN Unit 2 3.2/4.2-70a

TABLE OF CONTENTS Section

~Pa e No.

1.0 Definitions.

S FETY LIM TS AND LI I ING S

FETY SYSTEM

~SETT NGS 1.0-1 Fuel Cladding Integrity.

1.2/2.2 Reactor Coolant System Integrity 1.1/2.1-1 1.2/2.2-1 IMITING CONDI IONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE RE UI E NTS 3.2/4.2 Protective Instrumentation.

3.1/4.1

'eactor Protection System 3el/4.1~1 3.2/4.2-1 A.

Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Functions.

3.2/4.2-1 B.

Core and Containment Cooling Systems Initiation and Control C.

Control Rod Block Actuation.

3.2/4.2-1 3.2/4.2-2 D.

Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-3 E.

Dryvell Leak Detection F... Surveillance Instrumentation G.

Control Room Isolation 3.2/4.2-4 3.2/4.2-4 3.2/4.2-4 H.

Flood Protection J.

Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation

~

~

I.

Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-4 3.2/4.2-4 3.2/4.2-5 3.3/4.3 K.

Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation L.

ATWS-Recirculation Pump Trip Reactivity Control

3. 2/4. 2-6 3.2/4.2-6a 3.3/4.3-1 A.

Reactivity Limitations B.

Control Rods C.

Scram Insertion Times.

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

3.3/4.3-1 I

3.3/4.3-5 3.3/4.3-10 BFiN Unit 3

LIST OF TABLES Table

~Tit e Surveillance Frequency Notation

~Pa e

Ne 1.0-12 3.1.A Reactor'rotection System (SCRAM)

Instrumentation Requirements.

3.1/4.1-2 4.1.A Reactor Protection System (SCRAM) Instrumentation Functional Tests Minimum Functional Test

- Frequencies for Safety Instr.

and Control Circuits.

3.1/4.1-7 4.1.B Reactor Protection System (SCRAM) Instrumentation Calibration Minimum Calibration Frequencies for Reactor Protection Instrument Channels.

3.1/4.1=10 3.2.A Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-7 3.2.B Instrumentation that Initiates or Controls the Core and Containment Cooling Systems.

3.2/4.2-14 3.2.C Instrumentation that Initiates Rod Blocks 3.2/4.2-24 3.2.D Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-27 3.2.E Instrumentation that Monitors Leakage Into Drywell.

3.2/4.2-29 3.2.F Surveillance Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-30 3.2.G Control Room Isolation Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-33 3.2eH 3.2.I 3.2eJ Flood Protection Instrumentation.

Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-34 3.2/4.2-35 3.2/4.2-36 3.2eK

'.2.L Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ATHS-Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-37 3.2/4.2-38a 4.2.A Surveillance Requirements for Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Instrumentation.

.3.2/4.2-39 4.2.B Surveillance Requirements for Instrumentation that Initiate or Control the CSCS.

~

~

~

~

~

3.2/4.2-43 4.2.C Surveillance Requirements for Instrumentation that Initiate Rod Blocks 3.2/4.2-49 4.2.D BFN

.Unit 3

Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements vi 3.2/4.2-50

LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd)

Table 4.2.E Title

~Pa e

Ne Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Drywell Leak Detection Instrumentation.

3.2/4.2-52 4.2.F Minimum"Test and Calibration Frequency for Surveillance Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-53 4.2.G Surveillance Requirements for Control Room Isolation Instrumentation.

,3.2/4.2-55 4.2.H Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for

.. Flood Protection Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-56 4.2eJ Seismic Monitoring Instrument Surveillance Requirements 3.2/4.2-57 4.2PK Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Instrumentation Surveillance 3.2/4.2-61 4.2.L

3. 5-1 3.5.I 3.7.A 3.7.B 3.7.6 3.7.D 3.7.E ATWS-Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation Surveillance Minimum RHRSW and EECW Pump Assignment MAPLHGR Versus Average Planar Exposure Primary Containment Isolation Valves Testable Penetrations with Double 0-Ring Seals Testable Penetrations with Testable Bellows.

Air Tested Isolation Valves.

Primary Containment Isolation Valves which Terminate below the Suppression Pool Water evel.

L 3.2/4.2-62a 3.5/4.5-11 3.5/4.5-21 3.7/4.7-25 3.7/4.7-31 3.7/4.7-32 3.7/4.7-33 3-7/4.7-36 3.7.F Primary Containment Isolation Valves Located in Water Sealed Seismic Class 1 Lines 3.7.H Testable Electrical Penetrations 3.11.A Fire Protection System Hydraulic Requirements.

4.9.A.4.C Voltage Relay Setpoints/Diesel Generator Start 3.7/4.7-37 3.7/4.7-38 3.9/4.9-15 3.11/4.11-10 6.2.A Minimum Shift Crew Requirements.

6.0-3 BFN Unit 3 vii

3.2 4

2 Protective Instrumentation LIMIT NG CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIRENENTS 3.2.L

~ATWS RPT 1.

The ATMS/RPT System Instrumentation shall be OPERABLE during REACTOR POMER OPERATION in accordance vith Table 3.2.L.

l. Each of the ATWS/RPT System Instrumentation shall be OPERABLE BY performance of tests in Table 4.2.L.

2.

The ATWS/RPT System Trip setpoints vill be set in accordance with

'able 3.2.L.

3.

The actions required when the number of operable channels is less than the minimum operable channels per trip system is specified in Table 3.2.L.

3.2/4.2-6a BEN Unit 3

TABLE 3.2.8 (Continued)

N'Inln'Hei No Operable Per Iri(L.SxS(])

2 Instrument Channcl --

Orywcll Illgh Pressure (PS-64-58 E-II)

~rillJ.eyeL5eLLim

~Mon Ig p52.5 psig HcaiaE).

I.

Below trip setting prevents inadvertent operation oF contaI<wlcn< spray during accident.

condi tions.

2(16)

BFH Unit 3

Instrivncnt Channel-Orywell Iligh PreSSure (PS-64 58 A-O.

SM a2) brt~~nen~ennel-be~alo~~

56~

4ne~snen t-Ehannel-Aoac4o~tlgh-gr.occuco Instnment Channel Orywell Iligh Pressure (ps-64-58A-0, sw <<I)

InS I nmnent Channel-Orywcll Illgh Pressure (PS-64 '7A-D) 5 2.5 psig g 2.5 psig 5 2.5 pslg I.

Above trip setting in eon- '

junct Ion with low reactor pressure 1niLial.cs CSS.

Hultiplier relays inil.iate I.

IIPCI.

2.

Hul ti plier relay Fron. ".~5 initiates pccidcnt signal. (I'i)

~eel o reelveulot4on-I~pe..

o I

hbev~~LLlug~~,

r~fu+~~UNpo l.

Above trip setting in conjunction with low I

reaclor pressure in)tiates j

LPCI,

~

h l.

Above trip setting, in conjunction with low reactoi water level, drywel) high

pressure, 120 scc.

(Ielay i

timer and C55 or RHR p~

running, Inlt)ates AOS.

'1

~ I s

~

~

i rf s

~

1 I

Table 3.2.L Minimum No.

Channels operable per Function Trip Settin Allowable Value Action Remarks ATWS/RPT Logic Reactor Dome Pressure Iligh Reactor Vessel

'Level Low 1118 psig 1146.5 psig 483" above g

471.52" above vessel zero vessel zero (2)

Two out of two of the high reactor dome pressure channels or the low reactor vessel level, channels in either trip system trips both reactor recirculation pumps'1)

One channel in only one trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6

hours for required surveillance provided the other channels in that trip system are operable.

(2)

Two trip systems exist, either of which will trip both recirculation pumps.

Perform Surveillance/maintenance/calibration on one channel in only one trip system at a time.

If a channel is found to be inoperable or if the surveillance/maintenance/calibration period for one channel exceeds 6 consecutive

hours, the trip system will be'declared inoperable or the channel will be placed in a tripped condition. If in RUN mode and one trip system is inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or both trip systems are inoperable, the reactor shall be in at least hot standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

BFN-Unit 3

FuncLlon R

1

~

~

".Ihstru11ent Channel-

.Rtactor Low Mater l.eve IS-3-58A-0)

TABLE 4.2.0 SNVEILLAHCE REqUIREHEHTS FOR IHSTRLSEHTATIOH TfNT IHITIATE OR COHTROL TIIE CSCS L'*""""'alibrat1 on Instrurent Cheek (0

once/3 rranths once/day strunent Channel-actor hw Mater Level IS-3-)04 6 105) strunent (>anne) actor Lm Mater Level ITS-3-52 6 62)

(j

-, 'Ibstrrrtknt~annel-

. ]Reaetov&19h-PFesQJFo

,'PS-S-204A-0)-

I

'! Instrunent Channel-Drprell lligh Pressure

.l (r SW4-50E-lf) nstrunent Channel pell lligh Pressure ps-64-58n-0) i 1

nstrunent Channel-rvtrel 1 High Pressure 8~4-5TA-0) nstrunent C4nnel-eactor Lrw Pressure PS'-3-74A 6 0)

PS-60-95)

PS-60-96) lt3

, BFH-Un

)

R 1

4ssbuqent -Channel-s factor-l~-Mater keveb

-P-3-66A-9)-

once/3 nanths once/3 nanths once/3 rranths once/3 nanths once/3 rran th>>

once/3 rranths once/day once/day

NOTES FOR TABLES 4 2

A THROUGH 4 2.L exce t 4 2

D Functional tests shall be performed once per month.

2.

Functional tests shall be performed before each startup with a required frequency not to exceed once per week.

3.

This instrumentation is excepted from the functional test definition.

The functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the measurement channel.

4 ~

5.

Tested during logic system functional tests.

Refer to Table 4.1.B.

6.

The logic system functional tests shall include a calibration once per operating cycle of time delay relays and timers necessary for proper functioning of the trip systems.

7.

The functional test will consist of verifying continuity across the inhibit with a volt-ohmmeter.

8.

Instrument checks shall be performed in accordance with the definition of instrument check (see Section 1.0, Definitions).

An instrument check is not applicable to a particular setpoint, such as Upscale, but is a qualitative check that the instrument is-behaving and/or indicating in an acceptable manner for the particular plant condition.

Instrument check is included in this table for convenience and to indicate that an instrument check will be performed on the instrument.

Instrument checks are not required when these instruments are not required to be operable or are tripped.

9.

10.

Calibration frequency shall be once/year.

(DELETED)

=

Portion of the logic is functionally tested during outage only.

12.

The detector will be inserted during each operating cycle and the proper amount of travel 'into the core verified.

Functional test will consist of applying simulated inputs (see note 3).

Local alarm lights representing upscale and downscale trips will be verified, but no rod block will be produced at this time.

The inoperative trip will be initiated to produce a rod block (SRM and IRK inoperative also bypassed with the mode switch in RUN).

The functions that cannot be verified to produce a rod block directly will be verified during the operating cycle.

BFN Unit 3 3.2/4.2-58

NOTES FOR TABLES 4 2.A THROUGH 4 2 L exce t 4 2

D (Continued) 14.

(Deleted) 15.

The flow bias comparator will be tested by putting one flow unit in "Test" (producing 1/2 scram) and adjusting the test input to obtain comparator rod block.

The flow bias upscale will be verified by observing a local upscale trip light during operation and verified that it will produce a rod block during the operating cycle.

16.

Performed during operating cycle.

Portions of the logic is checked more frequently during functional tests of the functions that produce a rod block.

17.

18.

This calibration consists of removing the function from service and performing an electronic calibration of the channel.

Functional test is limited to the condition where secondary containment integrity is not re'quired as specified in Sections 3.7.C.2 and 3.7.C.3.

19.

Functional test is limited to the time where the SGTS is required to meet the requirements of Section 4.7.C.l.a.

20.

Calibration of the comparator requires the inputs from both recirculation loops to be interrupted, thereby removing the flow bias signal to the APRM and RBM and scramming the reactor.

This calibration can only be performed during an outage.

21.

Logic test is limited to the time where actual operation of the equipment is-permissible.

22.

One channel of either the reactor zone or refueling zone Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitoring System may be administratively bypassed for a period not to exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for functional testing and calibration.

23.

(DELETED) 24.

This instrument check consists of comparing the thermocouple readings for all valves for consistence and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).

25:

During each refueling outage, all acoustic monitoring channels shall be calibrated.

This calibration includes verification of accelerometer response due to mechanical excitation in the vicinity of the sensor.

BFN Unit 3 3.2/4.2-59

,~

NOTES FOR TABLES 4.2 A THROUGH 4 2 L exce t 4 2

D (Continued) 26.

This instrument check consists of comparing the background signal levels for all valves for consistency and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).

'I 27.

Functional test frequency decreased to once/3 months to reduce the challenges to'elief valves per NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.16.

28.

Functional test consists of the injection. of a simulated signal into the electronic trip circuitry in place of the sensor signal to verify operability of the trip and alarm functions.

29.

Calibration consists of the adjustment of the primary sensor and associated components so that they correspond within acceptable range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors, including adjustment of the electronic trip circuitry, so its output relay changes state at or more conservatively than the analog equivalent of the trip level settings.

3.2/4.2-60 BFN Unit 3

, Table 4.2.L Function Functional Test Channel Calibration Instrument Check Reactor Vessel Mater Level Low LS-3-58A-D M(28)

R(29)

N/A Reactor Vessel Dome Pressure High PS-3-204-D M(28)

R(29)

N/A BFN-Unit 3

3.2 BASES (Cont'd)

The operability of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation dose to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere.

This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public.

The operability of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety.

This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.

The instrumentation provided is consistent with specific portions of the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12 "Instrumentation for Earthquakes."

The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during actual or potential releases of gaseous effluents.

The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments will be calculated in accordance with guidance provided in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20.

This instrumentation also includes provisions for monitoring the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the offgas.

holdup system.

The operability and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

The radioactive liquid effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents during actual or potential releases of liquid effluents.

The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments shall be

.calculated in accordance with guidance provided in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 Appendix B, Table II, Column 2.

The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

ATWS/RPT, Anticipated Transients without Scram/Recirculation Pump Trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an ATWS event.

The response of the plant to this postulated event (ATWS/RPT) follows the BWR Owners Group Report by General Electric NEDE-31096-P-A and the accompanying NRC Staff Safety Evaluation Report.

ATWS/RPT utilizes the engineered safety feature (ESF) master/slave analog trip units (ATU) which consists of four level and four pressure channels total.

The initiating logic consists of two independent trip systems each consisting of two reactor dome high pressure channels and two reactor vessel low level channels.

A coincident trip of either two low levels or two high pressures in the same trip system causes initiation of ATWS/RPT.

This signal from either trip system opens one of two EOC BFN Unit 3 3.2/4.2-69

3.2 BASES (Cont'd)

(end-of-cycle) breakers in series (the other system opens the other breaker) between the pump motor and the Motor Generator set driving each recirculation pump.

Both systems are completely redundant such that only one trip system is necessary to perform the ATWS/RPT function.

Power comes from the '250 VDC shutdown boards.

Setpoints for reactor dome high pressure and reactor vessel low level are such that a normal Reactor Protection System scram and accompanying recirculation pump trip would occur before or coincident with the trip by ATMS/RPT.

4.2 BASES The instrumentation listed in Tables 4.2.A through 4.2.F will be functionally tested and calibrated at regularly scheduled intervals.

The same design reliability goal as the Reactor Protection System of 0.99999 generally applies for all applications of (1-out-of-2) X (2) logic.

Therefore, on-off sensors are tested once/3 months, and bistable trips associated with analog sensors and amplifiers are tested once/week.

BFN Unit 3 3.2/4.2-69a

N L

li ENCLOSURE 2 DESCRIPTIOH AHD JUSTIFICATION BROWHS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2, AHD 3 Descri tion of Chan e

The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3 Technical Specifications are being revised to incorporate requirements for the Anticipated Transients Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) System.

The limiting conditions for operation, section 3.2.L and table 3.2.L, are being added to provide operability requirements for the ATWS-RPT System.

Surveillance Requirements, (section 4.2.L) are also being added to periodically verify system operability.

The bases section 3.2/4.2 and the index are also being revised to reflect this change.

In addition, the instrument channels for the reactor low water level (LS-3-56A-D) and reactor high pressure (PS-3-204A-D) are being deleted in existing tables 3.2.B and 4.2.B.

These-instruments will be tested in accordance with new tables 3.2.L and 4.2.L.

Footnotes 28 and 29 are being added to unit 3 "Notes for Table 4.2.A through 4.2.L except 4.2.D" (page 3.2/4.2-60).

These footnotes are currently in unit 1 and 2 and need. to be added for consistency.

Reason for Chan e

Paragraph (c)(5) of 10 CFR 50.62 states in part, "Each boiling water reactor must have equipment to trip the reactor recirculation pumps automatically under conditions. indicative of an ATWS.

This equipment must be designed to perform its function in a reliable manner."

BFN is installing an ATWS-RPT System to comply with the regulations.

The installation of this system for unit 2 is scheduled to be completed before unit 2 fuel load from the current outage.

Units 1 and 3 ATWS-RPT modifications are scheduled to be completed before their fuel load from the current outage.

Justification for Chan e

10 CFR 50.62 requires all boiling water reactors to make modifications to mitigate the consequences of a failure to scram the reactor during an anticipated operational transient.

The basis for these modifications are described in NEDE-31096-P-A, "Anticipated Transients without Scram:

Response

to NRC ATWS Rule, 10 CFR 50.62," December, 1985.

The ATWS-RPT System will replace the existing RPT-MG logic.

The existing RPT-MG trip coils are located before the motor generator (MG) sets (figure 1).

When a trip signal is received, the RPT-MG breaker is tripped.

The MQ set will supply power to the recirculation pump motor until the MQ set inertia is spent.

Justification for Chan e (Cont'd)

The ATWS-RPT System will provide for a faster stopping of recirculation flow by eliminating any MG set inertia effects on the ATWS-RPT.

The ATWS-RPT modification employs the "Monticello" design using the two end-of-cycle (EOC) trip breakers.

These breakers are located between the MG output and the recirculation pump motor (figure 2).

When a trip signal is received, the EOC breakers are tripped and the recirculation pumps coast down.

Core power is reduced by flow coast down and by the subsequent voiding of the reactor core.

The ATWS-RPT allows for quicker power reduction as it eliminates the MG set inertia.

The trip logic consists of a two-out-of-two low reactor water level signal or a two-out-of-two high reactor dome pressure signal.

A coincident trip of either two low-level signals or two high-pressure signals in the, same trip channel initiates an ATWS-RPT trip.

lhe ATRS-RPT System is required to be operable during Reactor

~ower

~O aration.

Reactor Power Operation is defined in the BFH.Technical Specifications as operation with the mode switch in startup or run with the reactor critical and above one percent'power.

This is more conservative than the op'erability requirements of the General Electric Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG 0123) which'require operability whenever the mode switch is in run (4-5 percent).

This operability requirement will ensure the instrumentation is operable under conditions indicative of an ATWS event.

The ATWS-RPT trip setpoints and allowable values for the low reactor water level are 483 and 471.5 inches above vessel zero respectfully.

The trip setpoints for high reactor pressure are 1118 and 1146.5 psig.

The existing Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip setpoints are 538 inches above vessel zero for low reactor water level and 1055 psig for reactor dome pressure.

The ATWS RPT setpoints were chosen such that a

RPS would occur before the ATWS-RPT trip.

ENCLOSURE 3

DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 Descri tion of Pro osed Technical S ecificatio Amendment The proposed technical specifications would be added to the BFN Technical Specifications for Units 1, 2, and 3 to incorporate the necessary limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for the Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) System.

Basis for Pro osed No S

nificant Hazards Consideration Det rmi ation NRC has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c).

A proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences.

of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously ev'aluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

1.

The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed technical specification change adds operability and surveillance requirements for the ATWS-RPT modifications as required by 10 CFR 50.62(c)(5).

The addition of this system does not adversely alter the function or method of operation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) under which BFN was license.

The installation of the ATWS-RPT System results in a faster recirculation pump coast down which decreases core power at a faster rate then the existing RPT-MG trip system.

As required by the ATWS rule, the ATWS-RPT logic is independent of the RPS.

The ATWS-RPT logic modification enhances the existing reactor protection features.

The ATWS-RPT logic modification replaces the existing RPT-motor generator (MG) one-out-of-two trip logic with a two-out-of-two ATWS-RPT trip logic to avoid spurious trips.

The limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements have been added to ensure system operability.

The consequences of an accident are not increased because each ATWS-RPT channel will trip both recirculation pumps by means of the end-of-cycle (EOC) breakers which will provide a more rapid core flow reduction and subsequent.

insertion of negative reactivity due"to increased voiding of the reactor core than is provided by the existing RPT-MG trip.'he new action statements or surveillance requirements will not affect the consequences of any accident previously analyzed in the BFN Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) since the ATWS-RpT System is not used to mitigate the consequences of any accident previously analyzed

Basis for Pro osed No Si n ficant Hazards Consideration Determination (Cont'd)

The ATWS-RPT System modification does not affect the precursors for any accident analysis in the BFN FSAR.

In addition, the proposed technical specification change will support the present FSAR assumptions and limitations will be maintained.

2.

The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated.

These changes do not alter the function or method of operation of any safe shutdown systems.

The ATWS-RPT two-out-of-two logic modification reduces the potential for spurious trips from the existing RPT-MG trip which is a one-out-of-two logic.

In the event the ATWS-RPT logic would trip, the resulting transient would be similar to and bounded by those previously evaluated, (i.e., dual recirculation pump trip at power). If the ATWS-RPT logic fails to actuate when required, the consequences are no greater than before this design change is installed.

3.

The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The ATWS-RPT logic modification will enhance the existing reactor protection features and therefore increases the margin of safety.

Each ATWS-RPT channel will trip bo'th recirculation pumps by means of the EOC breakers, which will provide a more rapid core flow reduction and subsequent insertion of negative reactivity due to increased voiding of the core.

The proposed ATWS-RPT allowable and trip setpoints for the reactor dome pressure and low reactor water level are enveloped by the current safety limits.

The addition of these technical specifications will ensure that the ATWS-RPT System will perform in a reliable manner, or that the necessary compensating action requirements will be taken such that the margin of safety will be maintained.

Determination of Basis for Pro osed No Si nificant Hazards Since the application for amendment involves a proposed change that is encompassed by the criteria for which no significant hazards consideration

'xists, TVA has made a proposed determination that the application involves no significant hazards consideration.

Figure 1

RPT Motor Generator Breaker RPT Motor Generator Breaker Motor Generator Set Motor Generator Set Recirulation Pump A

Recirulation Pump 13

f".igure 2 RFT Hotor Generator Breaker Rf'T Hotor Generator Bi.eaker Hotor Generator Set ASS-RPT Trip f.ogic 250 VfIC Hotor Generator Set ATWS -RPT-EOC-Breaker Pb La I

Lb h'I'Wfi-RPT-EOC Breaker ATWS -RPT-EOC-Breaker ASS -RPT Trip f.ogic A'I'WS-RPT-EOC Breaker Pc I

Pd Lc I

Ld Recirulation Pump A

25OVDC Reclrulation I'IuIiP f3

't