ML18033A311

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Proposed Tech Specs Re Operability of ATWS & Recirculation Pump Trip Sys
ML18033A311
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 08/04/1988
From:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML18033A310 List:
References
TAC-R00436, TAC-R00437, TAC-R00438, TAC-R436, TAC-R437, TAC-R438, NUDOCS 8808120267
Download: ML18033A311 (49)


Text

ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS BROGANS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, .2, AND 3 (TVA BFN TS 252) 8808120267 880804 PDR ADOCK 05000259

'P

r TABLE OF CONTENTS

~Seotfo ~Pe e No 1.0 Definitions. 1.0-1 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SA TY SYSTEM

~SETT NGS 1.1/2.1 Fuel Cladding Integrity. 1.1/2.1-1 1.2/2.2 Reactor Coolant System Integrity . 1.2/2.2-1 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 3.1/4.1 Reactor Protection System . 3.1/4.1-1 3.2/4.2 Protective Instrumentatiori. 3.2/4.2-1 A. Primary Containment and. Reactor Building Isolation Functions. 3.2/4.2-1

'. Core and Containment Cooling Systems Initiation and Control 3.2/4.2-2.

C. Control Rod Block Actuation. 3.2/4.2-2 D. Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentatxon. 3.2/4.2-3 E. Drywell Leak Detection . 3.2/4.2-4 F. Surveillance Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-4 G. Control Room Isolation . 3.2/4.2-4 H. Flood Protection . 3.2/4.2-4 I. Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-4 J. Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-5 K. Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentatxon 3.2/4.2-6 L. ATMS-Recirculation Pump Trip 3.2/4.2-6a 3.3/4.3 Reactivity Control ~ ~ ~ ~ 3.3/4.3-1 A. Reactivity Limitations 3.3/4.3-1 B. Control Rods 3'.3/4.3-5 C. Scram Insertion Times. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3.3/4.3-10 BFH Unit 1

LIST OF TABLES 0

Table Title ~Pa e Ne Surveillance Frequency Notation . 1.0-12 r

3.1.A Reactor Protection System (SCRAM)

Instrumentation Requirements. 3.1/4.1-3 4.1.A Reactor Protection System (SCRAM) Instrumentation Functional Tests Minimum Functional Test Frequencies for Safety Instr. and Control Circuitse ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 e ~ 3.1/4.1-8 4.1.B Reactor Protection System (SCRAM) Instrumentation Calibration Minimum Calibration Frequencies for Reactor Protection Instrument Channels. 3.1/4.1-11 3.2.A Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-7 3.2.B Instrumentation that Initiates or Controls the Core and Containment Cooling Systems. 3.2/4.2-14 3.2.C Instrumentation'that Initiates Rod Blocks *. . . . . 3.2/4.2-25 3.2.D Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring, Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-28 3.2.E Instrumentation that Monitors Leakage Into Drywell. 3.2/4.2-30 3.2.F Surveillance Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-31 3.2.G Control Room Isolation Instrumentation. . . . . . . 3.2/4.2-34 3.2eH Flood Protection Instrumentation. . . . . . . . . .- 3.2/4.2-35 3.2.I Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation . . . . . 3.2/4.2-36 3.2eJ Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation. . . . . . . . . 3.2/4.2-37 3.2.K. Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-38 3.2.L ASS Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation . .. 3.2/4.2-39a 4.2.A Surveillance Requirements for Primary Containment and Reactor Bui.lding Isolation Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-40 4.2.B Surveillance Requirements for Instrumentation that Initiate or Control the CSCS. 3.2/4.2-44 4.2.C Surveillance Requirements for Instrumentation that Initiate Rod Blocks . . . . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3.2/4.2-5O 4.2.D Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirement~ 3.2/4.2-51 BFN vi Unit 1

IST OF TABLES (Cont'd)

Table Title ~Pa e Ne.

4.2.E Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Drywell Leak Detection Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-53 4.2.F Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Surveillance Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-54 4.2.G Surveillance Requirements for Control Room Isolation Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-56 4.2.H Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for

.Flood Protection Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-57 4.2e J Seismic Monitoring Instrument Surveillance Requirements 3.2/4.2-58 4.2aK Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Instrumentation Surveillance 3.2/4.2-62 4.2.L ATMS-Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation Surveillance 3.2/4.2-63a 3.5-1 Minimum RHRSW and EECM Pump Assignment 3.5/4.5-11 3.5.I MAPLHGR Versus Average Planar Exposure 3.5/4.5-21 3.7.A Primary Containment Isolation Valves 3.7/4.7-25 3.7.B Testable Penetrations vith Double 0-Ring Seals 3.7/4.7-32 3.7.C Testable Penetrations vith Testable Bellows. 3.7/4.7-33 3.7.D Air Tested Isolation Valves. 3.7/4.7-34 3.7.E Primary Containment Isolation Valves vhich Terminate belov the Suppression Pool Mater Level. 3.7/4.7-37 3.7.F Primary Containment Isolation Valves Located in Mater Sealed Seismic Class 1 Lines 3.7/4.7-38 3.7.H Testable Electrical Penetrations . 3.7/4.7-39 4.9.A.4.C Voltage Relay Setpoints/Diesel Generator Start . 3.9/4.9-16 3.11.A Fire Protection System Hydraulic Requirements. 3.11/4.11-10 6.2.A Minimum Shift Crev Requirements. 6.0-3 vii BFN Unit 1

2 4 2 Protective Instrumentation LIMI ING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE E UIRENENTS 3.2.L ~TWS RPT

1. The ATWS/RPT System Instrumentation l. Each of the ATWS/RPT shall be OPERABLE during REACTOR System Instrumentation POMER OPERATION in accordance with shall be OPERABLE BY Table 3.2.L. performance of tests in Table 4.2.L.
2. The ATMS/RPT System Trip setpoints will be set in accordance with Table 3.2.L.
3. The actions required when the number of operable channels is less than the minimum operable channels per trip system is specified in Table 3.2.L.

3.2/4.2-6a BFN Unit 1'

TABLE 3.2.8 (Continued)

Hinimum Ho.

Operable Per T~ri S~sLIL Function Trr I.evel Settrn Action Jhsiurks lnslrumcnt Channel- 1< p<2.5 psig l. Below trip settirIg prevents Orywcll Illgh Pressure inadvertent operation oF (VS-64-50 E-II) contalwrcnt spray during accident condrtinns ~

Instrumcnl Channcl- < 2.5 psig l. Above trip settirig in con-Drywc I 1 lligh I'r'cssurc juncllon with lurI r eactur (I'5-64-50 A-U, SII N2) pressure inl liatus CSS IIIrlti[>lierrelays init)ate .

IIPC I

2. Hul tipilcr relay from CSS ilrltihtes accidcllt signal. (15)

Below

~~nb-6hanne4-4rra etor-Ili 0tr-Pre ccuio.

, C, 01.

lnslrumcnt Channel- < 2.5 psig A 1 I. Above trip set ling in Orywell Iligh Prcssure conjunction wilh low (I'5-64-50A-U, N Irl) re~ctor pressure nitiales tpci.

2(16) Instrument Channel- < 2.5 psig l. Above trip setting, ln Orywcll Iligh Pressure conjuncllon with low reactor (PS-64-5 IA-0) water level, drywcll lrlgiI Fessure, 120 sec. delay Filmcr and CSS or RIIR pgy running, initiate~ APS, OUL.Unit 1

Table 3.2.L Hinimum No.

Channels operable per Trip A'llowable T~ri S s ~1 Function Settin Value Action Remarks ASS/RPT Logic (2) Two out of two of Reactor Dome 1118 psig 1146.5 psig the high reactor Pressure lligh dome pressure channels or the Reactor .Vessel 483" above 471.52" above low reactor vessel Level Low vessel zero vessel zero level channels in either trip system trips both reactor recirculation pumps'1)

One channel in only one trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

)

for required surveillance provided the other channels in that trip system are operable.

(2) Two trip systems exist, either of which will trip both recirculation pumps. Perform Surveillance/maintenance/calibration on one channel in only one trip system at a time.

If a channel is found to be inoperable or if the surveillance/maintenance/calibration period for one channel exceeds 6 consecutive hours, the trip system will be declared

. inoperable or the channel will be placed in a tripped condition. If in RUN mode and one trip system is inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or both trip systems are inoperable, the reactor shall be in at least hot standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

BFN-Unit 1

TABLE 4.2.8 SuAvEltlAHCE ArqrITAEIIEHTS FOA IHSTRUHEHTA110H lllA1 IHITIAIE OA COHTROL TIIE C5C5 I'unction Functional'est Calibration Instrument Check Instnme I, Channel -. once/3 aenlhs once/day Ileyctor m Water Level (LIS -0)

InStrunept Channel once/3 months once/day Reactor I.m Water Level (LIS-3-I04 6 105) fnstrufnent Channel- once/3 months once/day Aeaclor (.m Waler level (LITS-3-52 6 62)

~.

instr erent-64anneT--

-ReeetoM~\er-'+eve I

- =56-)-

~tree.n~nneT--

RehetoW6gh-Presetre Instrvnrnt Channel- once/3 nanths none Orwe I I Iligh Pressure (Pj-64-50E-10 I

Instr vncnl Channel- once/3 months none Oryvel I lligh Pressure (P5-64-50A.O)

Ingtrinznt Channel- once/3 months none Ormell lligh P) essure (P)-64-5)A-0)

In tronr.nt Channel- once/3 tenths none Ae clor loM Pressure (I'3.-14A 6 0)

P 95)

P 96)

Br H.unit I

'NOTES FOR ABLES 4 2 A UGH 4 2 L exce t 4 2.D

l. Functional tests shall be performed once per month.
2. Functional tests shall be performed before each startup with a required frequency not to exceed once per week.
3. This instrumentation is excepted from the functional test definition. The functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the measurement channel.
4. Tested during logic system functional tests.
5. Refer to Table 4.1.B.
6. The logic system functional tests shall include a calibration once per operating, cycle of time delay relays and timers necessary for proper functioning of the trip systems.
7. The functional test will consist of verifying continuity across the inhibit with a volt-ohmmeter.
8. Instrument checks shall be performed in accordance with the definition of instrument check (see Section 1.0, Definitions). An instrument check is not applicable to a particular setpoint, such as Upscale, but is a qualitative check that the instrument is behaving and/or indicating in an acceptable manner for the particular plant condition. Instrument check is included in this table for convenience and to indicate that an instrument check will be performed on the instrument. Instrument checks are not required when these instruments are not required to be operable or are tripped.
9. Calibration frequency shall be once/year.
10. Deleted ll. Portion of the logic is functionally tested during outage only.
12. The detector will be inserted during each operating cycle and the proper amount of travel into the core verified.
13. Functional test will consist of applying simulated inputs (see note 3). Local alarm lights representing upscale and downscale trips will be verified, but no rod block will be produced at this time. The inoperative trip will be initiated to produce a rod block (SRM and IRM inoperative also bypassed with the mode switch in RUN). The functions that cannot be verified to produce a rod block directly will be verified during the operating cycle.

3.2/4.2-59 BFN Unit 1

BOOTES FOR TABLES 4 2 A T UGH 4 2 L exc t 4.2.D (Conti )

14. (Deleted)
15. The flow bias comparator will be tested by putting one flow unit in "Test" (producing 1/2 scram) and adjusting the test input to obtain comparator rod block. The flow bias upscale will be verified by observing a local upscale trip light during operation and verified that it will produce a rod block during the operating cycle.
16. Performed during operating cycle. Portions of the logic is checked more frequently during functional tests of the functions that produce a rod block.
17. This calibration consists of removing the function from service and performing an electronic calibration of the channel.
18. Functional test is limited to the condition where secondary containment integrity is not required as specified in Sections 3.7.C.2 and 3.7.C.3.
19. Functional test is limited to the .time where the SGTS is required to meet the requirements of Section 4.7.C.l.a.
20. Calibration of the comparator requires the inputs from both recirculation loops to be interrupted, thereby removing the flow bias signal to the APRM and RBM and scramming the reactor. This calibration can only be performed during an outage.
21. Logic test is limited to the time where actual operation of the equipment is permissible.
22. One channel of either the reactor zone or refueling zone Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitoring System may be administratively bypassed for a period not to exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for functional testing and calibration.
23. (Deleted)
24. This instrument check consists of comparing the thermocouple readings for all valves for consistence and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).

25.. During each refueling outage, all acoustic monitoring channels shall be calibrated. This calibration includes verification of accelerometer response due to mechanical excitation in the vicinity of the sensor.

3.2/4.2-60 BFN Unit 1

NOTES FOR TABLES 4 2 A 'GH '

4 2 L exce t 4 2 D (Conti . d)

26. This instrument check consists of comparing the background signal levels for all valves for consistency and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).
27. Functional test consists of the injection of a simulated signal into the electronic trip circuitry in place of the sensor signal to verify operability of the trip and alarm functions.
28. Calibration consists of the adjustment of the primary sensor and associated'omponents so"that they correspond within acceptable range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel .monitors, including adjustment of the electronic trip circuitry, so that its output relay changes state at or more conservatively than the analog equivalent of the trip level setting.
29. The functional test frequency decreased to once/3 months to reduce challenges to relief valves per NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.16.

3.2/4.2-61 BZS Unit 1

Table 4.2.L Functional Channel Instrument Functio Test Calibration Check Reactor Vessel Water H(27) R(28) N/A Level Low LS-3-58A-D Reactor Vessel Dome M(27) R(2S) N/A Pressure lligh PS-3-204-D BFN-Unit 1

3.2 BASES (Cont'd)

The operability of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation dose to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public.

The operability of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety.

This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. The instrumentation provided is consistent with specific portions of the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12 "Instrumentation for Earthquakes."

The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to momtor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during actual or potential releases of gaseous effluents. The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments will be calculated in accordance with guidance provided in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. This instrumentation also includes provisions for monitoring the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the offgas.

holdup system. The operability and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

The radioactive liquid effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents during actual or potential releases of liquid effluents. The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated in accordance with guidance provided in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 Appendix B, Table II, Column 2. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

ATWS/RPT, Anticipated Transients without Scram/Recirculation Pump Trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during, an ATWS event. The response of the plant to this postulated event (ATWS/RPT) follows the BWR Owners Group Report by General Electric NEDE-31096-P-A and the accompanying NRC Staff Safety Evaluation Report.

ATWS/RPT utilizes the engineered safety feature (ESF) master/slave analog trip units (ATU) which"consists of four level and four pressure channels total. The initiating logic consists of two independent trip systems each consisting of two reactor dome high pressure channels and two reactor vessel low level channels. A coincident trip of either two low levels or two high pressures in the same trip system causes initiation of ATWS/RPT. This signal from either trip system opens one of two EOC 3.2/4.2-70 BFN Unit 1

I 3.2 BASES (Cont'd)

(end-of-cycle) breakers in series (the other system opens the other breaker) between the pump motor and the Motor Generator set driving each recirculation pump. Both systems are completely redundant such that only one trip system is necessary to perform the ATMS/RPT function. Power comes from the 250 VDC shutdown boards.

Setpoints for reactor dome high pressure and reactor vessel low level are such that a normal Reactor Protection System scram and accompanying recirculation pump trip would occur before or coincident with the trip by ATWS/RPT.

4.2 USES The instrumentation listed in Tables 4.2.A through 4.2.F will be functionally tested and calibrated at regularly scheduled intervals: . The same design reliability goal as 'the Reactor Protection System of 0.99999 generally applies for all applications of (l-out-of-2) X (2) logic.

Therefore, on-off sensors are tested once/3 months, and bistable trips associated with analog sensors and amplifiers are tested once/week.

3.2/4.2-708 BFN Unit 1"

TABLE OF CONTENTS Section P~ae Ne 1.0 Definitions. 1.0-1 SAFETY LIM TS AND L MITING SAFETY SYSTEM

~SE TTNGS 1.1/2.1, Fuel Cladding Integrity. ., 1.1/2.1-1 1.2/2.2 Reactor Coolant System Integrity . 1.2/2.2-1 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 3.1/4.1 Reactor Protection System . 3.1/4.1-1 3.2/4.2 Protective Instrumentation. '.. 3.2/4.2-1 A. Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Functions. 3.2/4.2-1 B. ...Core and Containment Cooling Systems Initiation and Control 3.2/4.2-1 C. Control Rod Block Actuation. 3.2/4.2-2 D. Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-3 E. Drywell Leak Detection . 3.2/4.2-4 F. Surveillance Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-4 G. Control Room Isolation . 3.2/4.2-4 H. Flood Protection . 3.2/4.2-4 Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-4 Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-5 K. Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation ~ e ~ 3.2/4.2-6 L. ATHS-Recirculation Pump Trip . ~ ~ ~ 3.2/4.2-6a 3.3/4.3 Reactivity Control . 3.3/4.3-1 A. Reactivity Limitations . 3.3/4.3-1 B. Control Rods . 3.3/4.3-5 C. Scram Insertion Times. 3.3/4.3-10 BFN Unit 2

IST OF TABLES Table T tie ~Pa e Ne Surveillance Frequency Notation . 1.0-11 3.1.A Reactor Protection System (SCRAM)

Instrumentation Requirements. 3.1/4.1-3 4.1.A Reactor Protection System (SCRAM) Instrumentation Functional Tests Minimum Functional Test Frequencies for Safety Instr. and Control Circuits. 3.1/4.1-8 4.1.B Reactor Protection System (SCRAM) Instrumentation

.Calibration Minimum Calibration Frequencies for Reactor Protection Instrument Channels. 3el/4.i-11 3.2.A Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-7 3.2.B Instrumentation that Initiates or Controls the Core and Containment Cooling Systems. 3.2/4.2-14 3.2.C Instrumentation that Initiates Rod Blocks 3.2/4.2-25 3.2.D 'Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring. . . . . . . 3.2/4.2-28 3.2.E Instrumentation that Monitors Leakage Into Drywell. 3.2/4.2-30 3.2.F Surveillance Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-31 3.2.G ~

Control Room Isolation Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-34 3.2eH Flood Protection Instrumentation. . . . . . . . . .- 3.2/4.2-35 3.2.I Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-36 3.2.J- Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-37 3.2eK Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-38 3.2.L ASS-Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation. . . . 3.2/4.2-39a 4.2.A Surveillance Requirements for Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-40 4.2.B Surveillance Requirements for Instrumentation that Initiate or Control the CSCS. 3.2/4.2-44 4.2.C Surveillance Requirements for Instrumentation that Initiate Rod Blocks . . . ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ 3.2/4.2-50 4.2.D Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements 3.2/4.2-51 BFN vi Unit 2

Table 7~it e ~Pa e Ne 4.2.E Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Drywell Leak Detection Instrumentation. . . . . . . . . . 3.2/4.2-53 4.2.F Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Surveillance Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-54 4.2.G Surveillance Requirements for Control Room Isolation Instrumentation. . 3.2/4.2-56 4.2.H Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Flood Protection Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-57 4.2eJ Seismic Monitoring Instrument Surveillance Requirements . 3.2/4.2<<58 4.2eK Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Instrumentation Surveillance 3.2/4.2-62 4.2.L ATWS-Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation Surveillance . 3.2/4.2-63a 3.5-1 Minimum RHRSW and EECW Pump Assignment 3.5/4.5-11 3.5.I MAPLHGR Versus Average Planar Exposure 3.5/4.5-21 3.7.A Primary Containment Isolation Valves . 3.7/4.7-25 3.7.B Testable Penetrations with Double 0-Ring Seals 3.7/4.7-32 3.7.C Testable Penetrations with Testable Bellows. 3.7/4.7-33 3.7.D Air Tested Isolation Valves. 3.7/4.7-34 3.7.E Primary Containment Isolation Valves which Terminate below the Suppression Pool Water Level. 3.7/4.7-37 3.7.F Primary Containment Isolation Valves Located in.,

Water Sealed Seismic Class 1 Lines 3.7/4.7-38 3.7.H Testable Electrical Penetrations . 3.7/4.7-39 4.9.A.4.C Voltage Relay Setpoints/Diesel Generator Start . 3.9/4.9-16 3.11.A Fire Protection System Hydraulic Requirements. .3.11/4.11-10 6.2.A Minimum Shift Crew Requirements. 6.0-3 vii BFN Unit 2

2 4 2 Protective Instrumentation LIMITINj"CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 3.2.L A~TWS RPT

1. The ATWS/RPT System Instrumentation 1. Each of the ATWS/RPT shall be OPERABLE during REACTOR System Instrumentation POMER OPERATION in accordance with shall be OPERABLE BY Table 3.2.L. performance of tests in Table 4.2.L.
2. The ASS/RPT System Trip setpoints vill be set in accordance with Table 3.2.L.
3. The actions required when the number of operable channels is less than the minimum operable channels per trip system is specified in Table 3.2.L.

3.2/4.2-6a BFN Unit 2

lAIILE 3.2.8 (Continued)

Hininwm Ho.

Operable Pcr Tri~level Session Aclion IIenarks

~Tr i S~slL Function lnstriuncnt Channel- 1< p<2.5 psig l. Oclou trip sel,ling operation of prevents'nadvertent

~

Oryucl I IIigh Prcssure cunta lltncnt s))ray during (P IS-64-58 L'-II) accidcnL conditions.

I lnstrunicnl Channcl- < 2.5 psig l. Above trip sett)ng in con-

]unction Mith low rcacl,or Oryucll Iligh Prcssure rcssurc iniLiales CSS.

(ITS-64-58 A-0) ulliplicr relays initiate III'C l.

2. fIultIplier relay froin CSS.

iniliales accident signal. (15)

NREM) bntrtinv.nt-Clia nne4- IIc1 ox-trip-set+in~+

~e ter-I ~Ala ten-Level- re. 'ecmulatb)n-p QH~H6~) 'i 4&54pwHn &aha Rea&oWligh-Pivssurc peulat4o~ Hp5; i i

~5-3-204A Instrument Channcl- < 2.5 psig l. Above trip setting ih Orywcll ll>gh Prcssure conjunction uilh (I )S.64-5OA u) prcssure inl}late'f, lou'eaclor l PC l. I 2( 16) lnstrwent Cliannel- < 2.5 psig i. Annve irTTT selsintS, In)

Oryucl) Iligh Pressure conJunction with lou.reactor (I'IS-64 -5)A-U) water level, drywnll high:

pressure, 120 sec. dqlay ;

tinier and CSS or RIIR'pyy running, initiates AOS. l ~

I i

BIH.Unit 2 enenne,

~

Table 3.2.L Minimum No.

Channels operable per Trip Allowable Function Settin Value Action Remarks ATWS/RPT Logic (2) Two out of two of Reactor Dome 1118 psig 1146.5 psig the high reactor Pressure High dome pressure channels or the Reactor Vessel 483" above 471.52" above low reactor vessel Level Low vessel zero vessel zero level channels in either trip system trips both reactor recirculation pumps'1)

One channel in only one trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 1>ours for required surveillance provided the other channels in that trip system are operable.

(2) Two trip systems exist, either of which will trip both recirculation pumps. Perform Surveillance/maintenance/calibration on one channel in only one trip system at a time.

If a channel is found to be inoperable or if the surveillance/maintenance/calibration period for one channel exceeds 6 consecutive hours, the trip system will be declared

inoperable or the channel will be placed in a tripped condition. If in RUN mode and one trip system is inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or both trip systems are inoperable, the reactor shall be in at least hot standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

l3FN-Unit 2

t ~

I TABLE 4.2.8 StNVEILLAHCE REQUIREMEHTS FOR IHSTRUMENTATIOH Tl AT IHITIATE OR COHTROL TllE CSCS Function Ca 1 ibrat i on Instrunent Check Instrunent Channel (1) (2I) Once/) 8 Months (28) Once/day eactor Lm Mater t.evel L I 5-3-58A-O)

I Instrunent Channel (1) (2)) Once/)8 Months (20) Once/day eactor Lm Mater Level LIS-3-104 6 105) nstrteent Channel (I) (21) Once/18 Months (20) Once/day eactar Lac Mater l.evel LIS-3-52 6 62) 4ss4p~t-Glenml

. 4edctof~totlklate~vel

~

~5-~6A=BJ

'=

Rnstr Nnent-phdnnef 1

~otor-111 gh&~~

i ff <<g 3 284~)-

j Instr nt Channel (1) (21) Once/18 Months (20) none

Or~I lligh Pressure (P IS-6 -50E-II)

! Instr nt Channel (1) (21) Once/)8 Months (28) none

Orgy.l lligh Pressure (PIS-6 -50A-0)

Instr nt Channel (1) (2I) Once/18 Months (28) none Oriel lligh Pressure (PIS-6 -5>A-0)

Instrument Channel (1) (21) Once/18 Months (28) none Reactor Lou Pressure (PIS-3-14 CB, PS-3-1480)

~

PIS-60-95, PS-60-95)

~

P IS-60-96, PS-60-96)

BIH-Unit 2

NOTES FOR TAB ES 4.2 A THROUGH 4 2.L exce t 4.2. D Functional tests shall be performed once per month.

2. Functional tests shall be performed before each startup with a required frequency not to exceed once per week.
3. This instrumentation is excepted from the functional test definition. The functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the measurement channel.

Tested during logic system functional tests.

Refer to Table 4.1.B.

6. The logic system functional tests shall include a calibration once per operating cycle of time delay relays and timers necessary for proper functioning of the trip systems.
7. The functional 'test will consist of verifying continuity across the inhibit with a volt-ohmmeter.
8. Instrument checks shall be performed in accordance with the definition of instrument check (see Section 1.0, Definitions). An instrument check is not applicable to a particular setpoint, such as Upscale, but is a qualitative check that the instrument is-behaving and/or indicating in an acceptable manner for the particular plant condition. Instrument check is included in this table for convenience and to indicate that an instrument check will be performed on the instrument. Instrument checks are not required when these instruments are not required to be OPERABLE or are tripped.
9. Calibration frequency shall be once/year.
10. Deleted Portion of the logic is functionally'ested during outage only.
12. The detector will be inserted during each operating cycle and the proper amount of travel into the core verified.
13. Functional test will consist of applying simulated inputs (see note 3). Local alarm lights representing upscale and downscale trips will be verified, but no rod block will be produced at this time. The inoperative trip vill be initiated to produce a rod block {SRN and IRM inoperative also bypassed with the mode switch in RUN). The functions that cannot be verified to produce a rod block directly will be verified during the operating cycle.

3.2/4.2-59 BFN Unit 2

OTES FOR TABLES 4 2 A THROUGH 4 2 L exce t 4.2 D (Cont'd)

14. (Deleted)
15. The flow bias comparator will be tested by putting one flow unit in "Test" (producing 1/2 scram) and adjusting the test input to obtain comparator rod block. The flow bias upscale will be verified by observing a local upscale trip light during operation and verified that it will produce a rod block during the operating cycle.
16. Performed during operating cycle. Portions of the logic is checked more frequently during functional tests of the functions that produce a rod block.
17. This calibration consists of removing, the function from service and performing an electronic calibration of the channel.
18. Functional test is limited to the condition where secondary containment integrity is not required as specified in Sections 3.7.C.2 and 3.7.C.3.
19. Functional test is limited to the time where the SGTS is required to meet the requirements of Section 4.7.C.l.a.
20. Calibration of the comparator requires the inputs from both recirculation loops to be interrupted, thereby removing the flow bias signal to the APRM and RBM and scramming the reactor. This calibration can only be performed during an outage.
21. Logic test is limited to the time where actual operation of the equipment is permissible.
22. One channel of either the reactor zone or refueling zone Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitoring System may be administratively bypassed 'for a period not to exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for functional testing, and calibration.
23. (Deleted)

'I

24. This instrument check consists of comparing the thermocouple readings for all valves for consistence and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).
25. - During each refueling outage, all acoustic monitoring channels shall be calibrated. This calibration includes verification of accelerometer response due to mechanical excitation in the vicinity of the sensor.

3.2/4.2-60

NOTES FOR TABLES 4.2 A THROUGH 4.2 L exce t 4 2 D (Cont'd)

26. This instrument check consists of comparing the background signal levels for all valves for consistency and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).

27, Functional test consists of the injection of a simulated signal into the electronic. trip circuitry in place of the sensor signal to verify operability of the trip and alarm functions.

28. Calibration consists of the adjustment of the primary sensor and associated components so that they correspond within acceptable range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors, including adjustment of the electronic trip circuitry, so that its output relay changes state at or more conservatively than the analog equivalent of the trip level setting.
29. The functional'test frequency decreased to once/3 months to reduce challenges to relief valves per NUREG-0737, item'I.K.3.16.
30. Calibration shall consist of an electronic calibration of the channel, not including the detector, for range decades above 10 R/hr and a one-point: source check of the detector below 10 R/hr with an installed or portable gamma source.

3.2/4.2-61

Table 4.2.L Functional Channel Instrument Function" Test Calibration Check Reactor Vessel Mater M(27) R(28)

Level Low LS-3-58A-D Reactor Vessel Dome M(27) R(28) N/A Pressure High PS-3-204-D BFN-Unit 2

3.2 BASES (Cont'd)

The operability of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation dose to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public.

The operability of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety.

This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. The instrumentation provided is consistent with specific portions of the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12 "Instrumentation for Earthquakes."

The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the 'releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during actual or potential releases of gaseous effluents. The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments will be calculated in accordance with guidance provided in the ODCM to ensur'e that the alarm/trip will occur prior'o exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. This instrumentation also includes provisi'ons for monitoring the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the offgas..

holdup system. The operability and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of'Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

The radioactive liquid effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents during actual or potential releases of liquid ~

effluents. The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated in accordance with guidance provided in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 Appendix B, Table II, Column 2. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

ATWS/RPT, Anticipated Transients without Scram/Recirculation Pump Trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an ATWS event.. The response of the plant to this postulated event (ATWS/RPT) follows the BWR Owners

- Group Report by General Electric NEDE-31096-P-A and the accompanying NRC Staff Safety Evaluation Report.

ATWS/RPT utilizes the engineered safety feature (ESF) master/slave analog trip units (ATU) which consists of four level and four pressure channels total. The initiating logic consists of two independent trip systems each consisting of two reactor dome high pressure channels and two reactor vessel low level channels. A coincident trip of either two low levels or two high pressures in the same trip system causes initiation of ATWS/RPT. This signal from either trip system opens one of two EOC 3.2/4.2-70 BFH Unit 2

S.S BASES (Cont'd)

(end-of-cycle) breakers in series (the other system opens the other breaker) between the pump motor and the Motor Generator set driving each recirculation pump. Both systems are completely redundant such that only one trip system is necessary to perform the ASS/RPT funct'ion. Power comes from the '250 VDC shutdown boards.

Setpoints for reactor dome high pressure and reactor vessel low level are such that a normal Reactor Protection System scram and accompanying recirculation pump trip would occur before or coincident with the trip by ATMS/RPT.

4.2 BASES The instrumentation listed in Tables 4.2.A through 4.2.F will be functionally tested and calibrated at regularly scheduled intervals; The same design reliability goal as the Reactor Protection System of 0.99999 generally. applies for all applications of (l-out-of-2) X (2) logic.

Therefore, on-off sensors are tested once/3 months, and bistable trips associated with analog sensors and amplifiers are tested once/week.

3.2/4.2-70a BFN Unit 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS Section ~Pa e No.

1.0 Definitions. 1.0-1 S FETY LIM TS AND LI I ING S FETY SYSTEM

~SETT NGS Fuel Cladding Integrity. 1.1/2.1-1 1.2/2.2 Reactor Coolant System Integrity 1.2/2.2-1 IMITING CONDI IONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE RE UI E NTS 3.1/4.1 'eactor Protection System . 3el/4.1~1 3.2/4.2 Protective Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-1 A. Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Functions. 3.2/4.2-1 B. Core and Containment Cooling Systems Initiation and Control 3.2/4.2-1 C. Control Rod Block Actuation. 3.2/4.2-2 D. Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-3 E. Dryvell Leak Detection . 3.2/4.2-4 F... Surveillance Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-4 G. Control Room Isolation . 3.2/4.2-4 H. Flood Protection . 3.2/4.2-4 I. Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-4 J. Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation ~ ~ 3.2/4.2-5 K. Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 3. 2/4. 2-6 L. ATWS-Recirculation Pump Trip 3.2/4.2-6a 3.3/4.3 Reactivity Control . 3.3/4.3-1 A. Reactivity Limitations 3.3/4.3-1 I

B. Control Rods . ~ ~ ~ ' 3.3/4.3-5 C. Scram Insertion Times. ~ ~ ~ ~ 3.3/4.3-10 BFiN Unit 3

LIST OF TABLES Table ~Tit e ~Pa e Ne Surveillance Frequency Notation . 1.0-12 3.1.A Reactor'rotection System (SCRAM)

Instrumentation Requirements. 3.1/4.1-2 4.1.A Reactor Protection System (SCRAM) Instrumentation Functional Tests Minimum Functional Test Frequencies for Safety Instr. and Control Circuits. 3.1/4.1-7 4.1.B Reactor Protection System (SCRAM) Instrumentation Calibration Minimum Calibration Frequencies for Reactor Protection Instrument Channels. 3.1/4.1=10 3.2.A Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-7 3.2.B Instrumentation that Initiates or Controls the Core and Containment Cooling Systems. 3.2/4.2-14 3.2.C Instrumentation that Initiates Rod Blocks . . . . . 3.2/4.2-24 3.2.D Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-27 3.2.E Instrumentation that Monitors Leakage Into Drywell. 3.2/4.2-29 3.2.F Surveillance Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-30 3.2.G Control Room Isolation Instrumentation. . . . . . . 3.2/4.2-33 3.2eH Flood Protection Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-34 3.2.I Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-35 3.2eJ Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-36 3.2eK Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-37 ATHS-Recirculation Trip Instrumentation

'.2.L Pump . 3.2/4.2-38a 4.2.A Surveillance Requirements for Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Instrumentation. .3.2/4.2-39 4.2.B Surveillance Requirements for Instrumentation that Initiate or Control the CSCS. . . . '. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3.2/4.2-43 4.2.C Surveillance Requirements for Instrumentation that Initiate Rod Blocks 3.2/4.2-49 4.2.D Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements 3.2/4.2-50 BFN vi

.Unit 3

LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd)

Table Title ~Pa e Ne 4.2.E Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Drywell Leak Detection Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-52 4.2.F Minimum"Test and Calibration Frequency for Surveillance Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-53 4.2.G Surveillance Requirements for Control Room Isolation Instrumentation. ,3.2/4.2-55 4.2.H . Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for

.. Flood Protection Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-56 4.2eJ Seismic Monitoring Instrument Surveillance Requirements . 3.2/4.2-57 4.2PK Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Instrumentation Surveillance 3.2/4.2-61 4.2.L ATWS-Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation Surveillance . 3.2/4.2-62a

3. 5-1 Minimum RHRSW and EECW Pump Assignment 3.5/4.5-11 3.5.I MAPLHGR Versus Average Planar Exposure 3.5/4.5-21 3.7.A Primary Containment Isolation Valves 3.7/4.7-25 3.7.B Testable Penetrations with Double 0-Ring Seals 3.7/4.7-31 3.7.6 Testable Penetrations with Testable Bellows. 3.7/4.7-32 3.7.D Air Tested Isolation Valves. 3.7/4.7-33 3.7.E Primary Containment Isolation Valves which Terminate below the Suppression Pool Water Level. 3-7/4.7-36 3.7.F Primary Containment Isolation Valves Located in Water Sealed Seismic Class 1 Lines 3.7/4.7-37 3.7.H Testable Electrical Penetrations 3.7/4.7-38 4.9.A.4.C Voltage Relay Setpoints/Diesel Generator Start 3.9/4.9-15 3.11.A Fire Protection System Hydraulic Requirements. 3.11/4.11-10 6.2.A Minimum Shift Crew Requirements. 6.0-3 BFN Unit 3 vii

3.2 4 2 Protective Instrumentation LIMIT NG CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIRENENTS 3.2.L ~ATWS RPT

1. The ATMS/RPT System Instrumentation l. Each of the ATWS/RPT shall be OPERABLE during REACTOR System Instrumentation POMER OPERATION in accordance vith shall be OPERABLE BY Table 3.2.L. performance of tests in Table 4.2.L.
2. The ATWS/RPT System Trip setpoints vill be set in accordance with

'able 3.2.L.

3. The actions required when the number of operable channels is less than the minimum operable channels per trip system is specified in Table 3.2.L.

3.2/4.2-6a BEN Unit 3

TABLE 3.2.8 (Continued)

N'Inln'Hei No Operable Per Iri(L.SxS(]) ~rillJ.eyeL5eLLim ~Mon HcaiaE).

2 Instrument Channcl -- Ig p52.5 psig I. Below trip setting prevents Orywcll Illgh Pressure inadvertent operation oF (PS-64-58 E-II) contaI<wlcn< spray during accident. condi ti ons.

Instrivncnt Channel- 5 2.5 psig I. Above trip setting in eon- '

Orywell Iligh PreSSure junct Ion with low reactor (PS-64 58 A-O. SM a2) pressure 1niLial.cs CSS.

Hultiplier relays inil.iate I.

IIPCI .

2. Hul t i plier relay Fron. ".~5 initiates pccidcnt signal. (I'i) brt~~nen~ennel- ~eel o be~alo~~ reelveulot4on-I~pe ..

56~ o I

4ne~snen t-Ehannel-r~f hbe v~~LLlug~~,

u+~~UNpo Aoac4o~tlgh-gr.occuco Instnment Channel g 2.5 psig l. Above trip setting in Orywell Iligh Pressure conjunction with low . I (ps-64-58A-0, sw <<I) reaclor pressure in)tiates j LPCI,

~

h 2(16) I nS I nmnent Channel- 5 2.5 pslg l. Above trip setting, in Orywcll Illgh Pressure conjunction with low reactoi (PS-64 '7A-D) water level, drywel) high pressure, 120 scc. (Ielay . i timer and C55 or RHR running, Inlt)ates AOS.

p~

BFH Unit 3 '1

~

I s ~

~

i rf s ~

1 I

Table 3.2.L Minimum No.

Channels operable per Trip Allowable Function Settin Value Action Remarks ATWS/RPT Logic (2) Two out of two of Reactor Dome 1118 psig 1146.5 psig the high reactor Pressure Iligh dome pressure channels or the Reactor Vessel 483" above g 471.52" above low reactor vessel

'Level Low vessel zero vessel zero level, channels in either trip system trips both reactor recirculation pumps'1)

One channel in only one trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for required surveillance provided the other channels in that trip system are operable.

(2) Two trip systems exist, either of which will trip both recirculation pumps. Perform Surveillance/maintenance/calibration on one channel in only one trip system at a time.

if If a channel is found to be inoperable or the surveillance/maintenance/calibration period for one channel exceeds 6 consecutive hours, the trip system will be'declared inoperable or the channel will be placed in a tripped condition. If in RUN mode and one trip system is inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or both trip systems are inoperable, the reactor shall be in at least hot standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

BFN-Unit 3

~

1 ~

R FuncLlon

".Ihstru11ent Channel-

.Rt actor Low Mater l.eve IS-3-58A-0)

L'*"""

(0

"'al TABLE 4.2.0 SNVEILLAHCE REqUIREHEHTS FOR IHSTRLSEHTATIOH TfNT IHITIATE OR COHTROL TIIE CSCS ibrat1 on once/3 rranths Instrurent once/day Cheek strunent Channel- once/3 nanths once/day actor hw Mater Level IS-3-)04 6 105) strunent (>anne) once/3 nanths once/day actor Lm Mater Level (jITS-3-52 6 62)

4ssbuqent -Channel-s factor-l~-Mater keveb

-P-3-66A-9)-

-, 'Ibstrrrtknt~annel-

. ]Reaetov&19h-PFesQJFo

,'PS-S-204A-0)-

I

'! Instrunent Channel- once/3 rranths Drprell lligh Pressure

.l (r SW4-50E-lf) nstrunent Channel once/3 nanths pell lligh Pressure ps-64-58n-0) i 1 nstrunent Channel- once/3 rran th>>

rvtrel 1 High Pressure 8~4-5TA-0) nstrunent C4nnel- once/3 rranths eactor Lrw Pressure PS'-3-74A 6 0)

PS-60-95)

PS-60-96)

, BFH-Un lt3 R

)

1

NOTES FOR TABLES 4 2 A THROUGH 4 2.L exce t 4 2 D Functional tests shall be performed once per month.

2. Functional tests shall be performed before each startup with a required frequency not to exceed once per week.
3. This instrumentation is excepted from the functional test definition. The functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the measurement channel.

4~ Tested during logic system functional tests.

5. Refer to Table 4.1.B.
6. The logic system functional tests shall include a calibration once per operating cycle of time delay relays and timers necessary for proper functioning of the trip systems.
7. The functional test will consist of verifying continuity across the inhibit with a volt-ohmmeter.
8. Instrument checks shall be performed in accordance with the definition of instrument check (see Section 1.0, Definitions). An instrument check is not applicable to a particular setpoint, such as Upscale, but is a qualitative check that the instrument is-behaving and/or indicating in an acceptable manner for the particular plant condition. Instrument check is included in this table for convenience and to indicate that an instrument check will be performed on the instrument. Instrument checks are not required when these instruments are not required to be operable or are tripped.
9. Calibration frequency shall be once/year.
10. (DELETED) =

Portion of the logic is functionally tested during outage only.

12. The detector will be inserted during each operating cycle and the proper amount of travel 'into the core verified.

Functional test will consist of applying simulated inputs (see note 3). Local alarm lights representing upscale and downscale trips will be verified, but no rod block will be produced at this time. The inoperative trip will be initiated to produce a rod block (SRM and IRK inoperative also bypassed with the mode switch in RUN). The functions that cannot be verified to produce a rod block directly will be verified during the operating cycle.

BFN Unit 3 3.2/4.2-58

NOTES FOR TABLES 4 2.A THROUGH 4 2 L exce t 4 2 D (Continued)

14. (Deleted)
15. The flow bias comparator will be tested by putting one flow unit in "Test" (producing 1/2 scram) and adjusting the test input to obtain comparator rod block. The flow bias upscale will be verified by observing a local upscale trip light during operation and verified that it will produce a rod block during the operating cycle.
16. Performed during operating cycle. Portions of the logic is checked more frequently during functional tests of the functions that produce a rod block.
17. This calibration consists of removing the function from service and performing an electronic calibration of the channel.
18. Functional test is limited to the condition where secondary containment integrity is not re'quired as specified in Sections 3.7.C.2 and 3.7.C.3.
19. Functional test is limited to the time where the SGTS is required to meet the requirements of Section 4.7.C.l.a.
20. Calibration of the comparator requires the inputs from both recirculation loops to be interrupted, thereby removing the flow bias signal to the APRM and RBM and scramming the reactor. This calibration can only be performed during an outage.
21. Logic test is limited to the time where actual operation of the equipment is- permissible.
22. One channel of either the reactor zone or refueling zone Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitoring System may be administratively bypassed for a period not to exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for functional testing and calibration.
23. (DELETED)
24. This instrument check consists of comparing the thermocouple readings for all valves for consistence and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).

25: During each refueling outage, all acoustic monitoring channels shall be calibrated. This calibration includes verification of accelerometer response due to mechanical excitation in the vicinity of the sensor.

BFN Unit 3 3.2/4.2-59

t

~

NOTES FOR TABLES 4.2 A THROUGH 4 2 L exce 4 2 D (Continued)

26. This instrument check consists of comparing the background signal levels for all valves for consistency and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages).

'I

27. Functional test frequency decreased to once/3 months to reduce the challenges to'elief valves per NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.16.
28. Functional test consists of the injection. of a simulated signal into the electronic trip circuitry in place of the sensor signal to verify operability of the trip and alarm functions.
29. Calibration consists of the adjustment of the primary sensor and associated components so that they correspond within acceptable range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors, including adjustment of the electronic trip circuitry, so its output relay changes state at or more conservatively than the analog equivalent of the trip level settings.

3.2/4.2-60 BFN Unit 3

, Table 4.2.L Functional Channel Instrument Function Test Calibration Check Reactor Vessel Mater M(28) R(29) N/A Level Low LS-3-58A-D Reactor Vessel Dome M(28) R(29) N/A Pressure High PS-3-204-D BFN-Unit 3

3.2 BASES (Cont'd)

The operability of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation dose to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public.

The operability of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety.

This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. The instrumentation provided is consistent with specific portions of the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12 "Instrumentation for Earthquakes."

The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during actual or potential releases of gaseous effluents. The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments will be calculated in accordance with guidance provided in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. This instrumentation also includes provisions for monitoring the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the offgas.

holdup system. The operability and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

The radioactive liquid effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents during actual or potential releases of liquid effluents. The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments shall be

.calculated in accordance with guidance provided in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 Appendix B, Table II, Column 2. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

ATWS/RPT, Anticipated Transients without Scram/Recirculation Pump Trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an ATWS event. The response of the plant to this postulated event (ATWS/RPT) follows the BWR Owners Group Report by General Electric NEDE-31096-P-A and the accompanying NRC Staff Safety Evaluation Report.

ATWS/RPT utilizes the engineered safety feature (ESF) master/slave analog trip units (ATU) which consists of four level and four pressuresystems channels total. The initiating logic consists of two independent trip each consisting of two reactor dome high pressure channels and two reactor vessel low level channels. A coincident trip of either two low levels or two high pressures in the same trip system causes initiation of ATWS/RPT. This signal from either trip system opens one of two EOC 3.2/4.2-69 BFN Unit 3

3.2 BASES (Cont'd)

(end-of-cycle) breakers in series (the other system opens the other breaker) between the pump motor and the Motor Generator set driving each recirculation pump. Both systems are completely redundant such that only one trip system is necessary to perform the ATWS/RPT function. Power comes from the '250 VDC shutdown boards.

Setpoints for reactor dome high pressure and reactor vessel low level are such that a normal Reactor Protection System scram and accompanying recirculation pump trip would occur before or coincident with the trip by ATMS/RPT.

4.2 BASES The instrumentation listed in Tables 4.2.A through 4.2.F will be functionally tested and calibrated at regularly scheduled intervals. The same design reliability goal as the Reactor Protection System of 0.99999 generally applies for all applications of (1-out-of-2) X (2) logic.

Therefore, on-off sensors are tested once/3 months, and bistable trips associated with analog sensors and amplifiers are tested once/week.

3.2/4.2-69a BFN Unit 3

N L

li ENCLOSURE 2 DESCRIPTIOH AHD JUSTIFICATION BROWHS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2, AHD 3 Descri tion of Chan e The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3 Technical Specifications are being revised to incorporate requirements for the Anticipated Transients Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) System.

The limiting conditions for operation, section 3.2.L and table 3.2.L, are being added to provide operability requirements for the ATWS-RPT System.

Surveillance Requirements, (section 4.2.L) are also being added to periodically verify system operability. The bases section 3.2/4.2 and the index are also being revised to reflect this change.

In addition, the instrument channels for the reactor low water level (LS-3-56A-D) and reactor high pressure (PS-3-204A-D) are being deleted in existing tables 3.2.B and 4.2.B. These- instruments will be tested in accordance with new tables 3.2.L and 4.2.L.

Footnotes 28 and 29 are being added to unit 3 "Notes for Table 4.2.A through 4.2.L except 4.2.D" (page 3.2/4.2-60). These footnotes are currently in unit 1 and 2 and need. to be added for consistency.

Reason for Chan e Paragraph (c)(5) of 10 CFR 50.62 states in part, "Each boiling water reactor must have equipment to trip the reactor recirculation pumps automatically under conditions. indicative of an ATWS. This equipment must be designed to perform its function in a reliable manner." BFN is installing an ATWS-RPT System to comply with the regulations. The installation of this system for unit 2 is scheduled to be completed before unit 2 fuel load from the current outage. Units 1 and 3 ATWS-RPT modifications are scheduled to be completed before their fuel load from the current outage.

Justification for Chan e 10 CFR 50.62 requires all boiling water reactors to make modifications to mitigate the consequences of a failure to scram the reactor during an anticipated operational transient. The basis for these modifications are described in NEDE-31096-P-A, "Anticipated Transients without Scram: Response to NRC ATWS Rule, 10 CFR 50.62," December, 1985.

The ATWS-RPT System will replace the existing RPT-MG logic. The existing RPT-MG trip coils are located before the motor generator (MG) sets (figure 1). When a trip signal is received, the RPT-MG breaker is tripped.

The MQ set will supply power to the recirculation pump motor until the MQ set inertia is spent.

Justification for Chan e (Cont'd)

The ATWS-RPT System will provide for a faster stopping of recirculation flow by eliminating any MG set inertia effects on the ATWS-RPT. The ATWS-RPT modification employs the "Monticello" design using the two end-of-cycle (EOC) trip breakers. These breakers are located between the MG output and the recirculation pump motor (figure 2). When a trip signal is received, the EOC breakers are tripped and the recirculation pumps coast down. Core power is reduced by flow coast down and by the subsequent voiding of the reactor core.

The ATWS-RPT allows for quicker power reduction as it eliminates the MG set inertia.

The trip logic consists of a two-out-of-two low reactor water level signal or a two-out-of-two high reactor dome pressure signal. A coincident trip of either two low-level signals or two high-pressure signals in the, same trip channel initiates an ATWS-RPT trip.

lhe ATRS-RPT System is required to be operable during Reactor ~ower

~O aration. Reactor Power Operation is defined in the BFH.Technical Specifications as operation with the mode switch in startup or run with the reactor critical and above one percent'power. This is more conservative than the op'erability requirements of the General Electric Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG 0123) which'require operability whenever the mode switch is in run (4-5 percent). This operability requirement will ensure the instrumentation is operable under conditions indicative of an ATWS event.

The ATWS-RPT trip setpoints and allowable values for the low reactor water level are 483 and 471.5 inches above vessel zero respectfully. The trip setpoints for high reactor pressure are 1118 and 1146.5 psig. The existing Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip setpoints are 538 inches above vessel zero for low reactor water level and 1055 psig for reactor dome pressure. The ATWS RPT setpoints were chosen such that a RPS would occur before the ATWS-RPT trip.

ENCLOSURE 3 DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 Descri tion of Pro osed Technical S ecificatio Amendment The proposed technical specifications would be added to the BFN Technical Specifications for Units 1, 2, and 3 to incorporate the necessary limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for the Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) System.

Basis for Pro osed No S nificant Hazards Consideration Det rmi ation NRC has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences. of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously ev'aluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

1. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated. The proposed technical specification change adds operability and surveillance requirements for the ATWS-RPT modifications as required by 10 CFR 50.62(c)(5). The addition of this system does not adversely alter the function or method of operation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) under which BFN was license. The installation of the ATWS-RPT System results in a faster recirculation pump coast down which decreases core power at a faster rate then the existing RPT-MG trip system. As required by the ATWS rule, the ATWS-RPT logic is independent of the RPS. The ATWS-RPT logic modification enhances the existing reactor protection features.

The ATWS-RPT logic modification replaces the existing RPT-motor generator (MG) one-out-of-two trip logic with a two-out-of-two ATWS-RPT trip logic to avoid spurious trips. The limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements have been added to ensure system operability.

The consequences of an accident are not increased because each ATWS-RPT channel will trip both recirculation pumps by means of the end-of-cycle (EOC) breakers which will provide a more rapid core flow reduction and subsequent. insertion of negative reactivity due"to increased voiding of the reactor core than is provided by the existing RPT-MG trip.'he new action statements or surveillance requirements will not affect the consequences of any accident previously analyzed in the BFN Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) since the ATWS-RpT System is not used to mitigate the consequences of any accident previously analyzed

Basis for Pro osed No Si n ficant Hazards Consideration Determination (Cont'd)

The ATWS-RPT System modification does not affect the precursors for any accident analysis in the BFN FSAR. In addition, the proposed technical specification change will support the present FSAR assumptions and limitations will be maintained.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated. These changes do not alter the function or method of operation of any safe shutdown systems. The ATWS-RPT two-out-of-two logic modification reduces the potential for spurious trips from the existing RPT-MG trip which is a one-out-of-two logic. In the event the ATWS-RPT logic would trip, the resulting transient would be similar to and bounded by those previously evaluated, (i.e., dual recirculation pump trip at power). If the ATWS-RPT logic fails to actuate when required, the consequences are no greater than before this design change is installed.
3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The ATWS-RPT logic modification will enhance the existing reactor protection features and therefore increases the margin of safety.

Each ATWS-RPT channel will trip bo'th recirculation pumps by means of the EOC breakers, which will provide a more rapid core flow reduction and subsequent insertion of negative reactivity due to increased voiding of the core.

The proposed ATWS-RPT allowable and trip setpoints for the reactor dome pressure and low reactor water level are enveloped by the current safety limits. The addition of these technical specifications will ensure that the ATWS-RPT System will perform in a reliable manner, or that the necessary compensating action requirements will be taken such that the margin of safety will be maintained.

Determination of Basis for Pro osed No Si nificant Hazards Since the application for amendment involves a proposed change that is encompassed by the criteria for which no significant hazards consideration TVA has made a proposed determination that the application involves no 'xists, significant hazards consideration.

Figure 1 Generator RPT Motor Generator RPT Motor Breaker Breaker Motor Generator Set Motor Generator Set Recirulation Recirulation Pump A Pump 13

f".igure 2 RFT Hotor Generator Rf'T Hotor Generator Breaker Bi.eaker ASS-RPT Trip f.ogic Hotor Generator Hotor Generator Set 250 VfIC Set La I

Pb Lb ATWS -RPT-EOC-Breaker h'I'Wfi -RPT-EOC Breaker ASS -RPT ATWS -RPT-EOC-Breaker Trip f.ogic A'I'WS-RPT-EOC Breaker P Lc c

I I Pd Ld Recirulation Reclrulation 25OVDC Pump A I'IuIiP f3

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