L-17-351, Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Information and Status

Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Information and Status

ML17348A838
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	12/14/2017
From:	Bologna R FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-17-351
Download: ML17348A838 (3)

Text

Beaver Valley Power Station FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company P.O. Box4 Shippingport, PA 15077 Richard D. Bologna 724-682-5234 Site Vice President Fax: 724-643-8069 December 14, 2017 L-17-351 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-001

SUBJECT:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Information and Status In Reference 1, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) provided the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) a resolution plan for the U.S. Nuclear Industry to address the known Anchor Darling Double Disk Gate Valve (ADDDGV) issues. Reference 2 indicated each utility will provide a listing of their ADDDGV population with active safety functions along with relevant valve information, including the results of susceptibility evaluations, repair status, and a repair schedule for each susceptible valve not yet repaired. This letter serves to provide this information for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1. Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2, has no ADDDGVs.

The Attachment to this letter contains the following information for each ADDDGV.

• Plant Name, Unit, and Valve ID

• System

• Valve Functional Description

• Valve Size

• Active Safety Function (open, close, both)

• Are multiple design basis post-accident strokes required? (yes/no)

• Expert Panel Risk Ranking (high, medium, low)

• Result of susceptibility evaluation (susceptible or not susceptible)

• Is the susceptibility evaluation in general conformance with TP16-1-112, Revision 4? (Reference 3)

• Does the susceptibility evaluation rely on thread friction? If yes, was the coefficient of friction (COF) greater than 0.1 0? For cases where thread-friction was relied upon, information is provided whether the COF was above or below 0.1.

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 L-17-351 Page 2

• Was an initial stem-rotation check performed? If yes, include rotation criteria (i.e., less than or equal to 1O degrees or less than or equal to 5 degrees).

• Was the diagnostic test data reviewed for failure precursors described in TP16-1-112, Revision 4? (Reference 3)

• The valve's repair status (i.e., repaired or not repaired)

• A repair schedule for each susceptible valve By letter dated August 29, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17243A134), FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company identified "High Significance" motor-operated valves (MOVs) and provided commitments related to the repair schedule for those MOVs.

Further analysis of the identified MOVs was performed in accordance with the guidance provided in Reference 3. Based on the analysis results, the MOVs are now classified as not susceptible, and the Attachment to this letter reflects this change. Because no repair schedule is necessary, the commitments identified in the August 29, 2017 letter are hereby rescinded.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal. If there are any questions or if additional information is required, please contact Mr. Thomas A. Lentz, Manager - Fleet Licensing, at 330-315-6810.

Respectfully,

,\ () j/j(l l L v_v-_ ---

Richard D. Bologna

Attachment:

Beaver Valley Power Station ADDDGV Listing

References:

1. Letter from Greg Krueger (NEI) to John Lubinski (NRC), Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Industry Resolution Plan Update (Project 689), dated August 4, 2017.

2. Letter from Joseph Pollock (NEI) to Brian Holian (NRC), NSIAC Concurrence on Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Industry Response Actions (Project 689),

dated October 26, 2017.

3. BWROG Topical Report TP16-1-i 12, Revision 4, Recommendations to Resolve Flowserve 10CFR Part 21 Notification Affecting Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Wedge Pin Failures, dated August 2017.

cc: NRC Region I Administrator NRC Resident Inspector NRR Project Manager Director BRP/DEP Site BRP/DEP Representative

Attachment L-17-351 Beaver Valley Power Station ADDDGV Listing Is the Does the susceptibility Was an initial stem-susceptibility Valve Active Are multiple design Expert Result of evaluation rely on thread rotation check Was the diagnostic test data Plant Valve Size evaluation in Valve repair Unit Valve ID System Functional Safety basis post-accident Panel Risk susceptibility friction? performed? reviewed for failure precursors Name (inches) general status (7)

Description Function strokes required? Ranking evaluation If yes, was the COF greater If yes, include rotation described in TP16-1-112R4?

conformance with than 0.10? criteria TP16-1-112R4? (A)

(Open, (High, (No), (No),

(susceptible or (repaired or Close, Medium, (Yes/No) (Yes, >0.10), (Yes, 10 deg.), (Yes/ No)

(Yes/No) not susceptible) not repaired)

Both) Low) (Yes, 0.10) (Yes, 5 deg.)

Diesel Generator (DG)

Heat Exchanger Inlet River Beaver River Water (RW)

Valley 1 MOV-1RW-113A Water Supply Header 4 Open No (4) Medium Not Susceptible (1) Yes No Yes, 10 deg. Yes Not repaired DG Heat Exchanger Inlet Beaver River RW Supply Valley 1 MOV-1RW-113B Water Header 4 Open No (4) Medium Not Susceptible (1) Yes No Yes, 10 deg. Yes Not repaired DG Heat Exchanger Inlet Beaver River RW Supply Valley 1 MOV-1RW-113C Water Header 4 Open No (4) Medium Not Susceptible (1) Yes No Yes, 10 deg. Yes Not repaired DG Heat Exchanger Inlet Beaver River RW Supply Valley 1 MOV-1RW-113D1 Water Header 4 Open No (4) Medium Not Susceptible (1) Yes No Yes, 10 deg. Yes Not repaired Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) to Beaver Safety Charging Pumps Valley 1 MOV-1SI-863A Injection Supply Valve 6 Open No (5) Medium Not Susceptible (2) Yes No Yes, 10 deg. Yes Not repaired LHSI to Beaver Safety Charging Pumps Valley 1 MOV-1SI-863B Injection Supply Valve 6 Open No (5) Medium Not Susceptible (2) Yes No Yes, 10 deg. Yes Not repaired LHSI to Reactor Beaver Safety Coolant System Valley 1 MOV-1SI-890A Injection (RCS) Hot Legs 10 x 8 x 10 Open No (6) Low Not Susceptible (3) Yes Yes, > 0.10 Yes, 5 deg. Yes Not repaired Beaver Safety LHSI to RCS Valley 1 MOV-1SI-890B Injection Hot Legs 10 x 8 x 10 Open No (6) Low Not Susceptible (3) Yes Yes, > 0.10 Yes, 5 deg. Yes Not repaired Beaver Safety LHSI to RCS Valley 1 MOV-1SI-890C Injection Cold Legs 10 x 8 x 10 Close No (6) High Not Susceptible (3) Yes Yes, > 0.10 Yes, 10 deg. Yes Not repaired (A)

Applied Wedge Pin Torque must bound anticipated design basis operating torque requirements and current maximum total torque.

(1) MOV-1RW-113A, 113B, 113C, and 113D1: wedge pin shear capability exceeds the design basis operating torque requirements and current maximum total torque.

(2) MOV-1SI-863A and 863B: wedge pin shear capability exceeds the design basis operating torque requirements and current maximum total torque.

(3) MOV-1SI-890A, 890B, and 890C: wedge pin shear capability including thread friction exceeds the design basis operating torque requirements and current maximum total torque.

(4) MOV-1RW-113A, 113B, 113C, and 113D1: multiple design basis post-accident strokes are not required; however, as a contingency the valves could be stroked to secure the associated diesel generator which has auto-started from a safety injection signal and is running unloaded.

(5) MOV-1SI-863A and 863B: multiple design basis post-accident strokes are not required; however, as a contingency the valves could be stroked to prevent damage to high head safety injection (HHSI) charging pumps if a loss of offsite power occurs with the plant in SI recirculation alignment.

(6) MOV-1SI-890A, 890B, and 890C: multiple design basis post-accident strokes are not required; however, as a contingency the valves could be stroked to isolate a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) outside containment.

(7) There are no susceptible valves; therefore, a repair schedule is not necessary.