ML17320A549

Draft Control of Heavy Loads (C-10),Donald C Cook Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 & 2, Technical Evaluation Rept

ML17320A549
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	02/24/1983
From:	Vosbury F FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
To:	Clemenson F NRC
Shared Package
ML17320A548	List: ML17320A549
References
CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-07980, TAC-07981, TAC-7980, TAC-7981, TER-C5506-344-3, TER-C5506-344-345-DR, NUDOCS 8306030299
Download: ML17320A549 (36)

Text

(DRAFT) ENCLOSURE 2 TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL 0F H"-AVY LOADS (c-j.oi INDIANA AND NI CHI GAN ELECTRI C CONI ANY DONALD C COOK NUClEAR PLAINT UNITS I AND 2 NRC DOCKET NO. 50-315) 50-316 FRC PROJECT C5506 NRC TAC NO. 07980, 07 981 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC<3-81-130 FRC TASKS 344, 345 Prepared by Franklin Research Center Author: F. V. Vosbury 20th and Race Streets Philadelphia, PA 1S103 FRCGroupLeader: X. H. Sargent Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washing. on, D.C. 20558 Lead NRC Engineer: P. C'enson February 24, 1983 This repoc was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty. expressed or implied. or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, appa-ratus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not Infringe privately owned rights.

a Franklin Research Center A Division of The Franklin Institute The aen)anan Frankfin Parkway. Phila.. Pa. I91 03 (215) 448 l 000 BSoaoaoa99 8SOSX6 PDR,ADOCK OS000315 P.~~.'>> -

PDR.

'1 t~ w l ,())' 'l. 3 q

TERW550 6-344/345 CONTENTS Sect'on Title Pacae 1 INTRODUCTIONe ~ ~ e ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 1.1 Purpose of Review 1 1.2 Gene ic Background 1

l. 3 ?lant-Snecific Background ~ 2

- QLUATION ~

~ ~ 4 2.1 General Guidelines 4 2.2 Interim Protec"ion Measures. 22 3 CON LUSION ~ 25 3.1 Genera'rovisions for Load Handling 25 3.2 Interin Protection Measures. 26 R=- ER- t'C- S 28

..'renidin Researc:h Center vaon>>r Th>> Ft>>ntten Ins>>a'

0 T~RM5506-344/345 PORE> JORD This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) foe technical assistance in support of NRC operating reactor licensing actions. The techn'cal evaluation was conducted in accorcance with crite ia established. by the NRC.

Mr. F. W. Vosbury and Mr. X. H. Sargen" contributed to the technical prepa."ation of th:s report through a subcontract with WESTEC Services, Inc.

v

.~'."3 Franklin Research Center h ~~zen cl The Frcnshn insane

0 l

TERM5506-344/345 l~ INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE OF RVXcM This technical evaluation report documents an independent review of general load handling policy and procedures at the Indiana and Michigan Electric Company's (IMEC) Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. This evaluation was performed with the following objectives:

o to assess conformance to the aeneral load handling guidelines of NUEKG- 0612, "Control o" Heaw Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1],

Section 5.1.1 o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of NUREG-06'2, Section 5.3.

1.2 GENIC aACZGROUND Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S. Nuclear R gulatory Commiss'on (NRC) staff to systemat'cally exam'ne staf licensing

. criteria and De adeauacy of measures in effec" at operat'ng nuclear power plants to ensure the sa e handling of heavy loads anc to recommend necessary changes in these measures. Th's activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC. staf on May 17, 1978 [2] to all power reactor licensees, requesting in or...ation conce ning 'te control of heavy 'oads nea'= spent fuel.

he results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, "Cont ol of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protect:ion from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load handling accidents and should be upgraded.

In order to upgrade measures provided to control heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part objective using an accepted approach or protect'on philosophy. The first portion of the objective, achieved through a set of geneial guidelines identified in NUBEG-0612, Section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling svstems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated such that their probability of

.".'."J Franklin Research Center A Dinscn ot >he Fran&n tnsotute

TER-C550 6-344/34 5 failure is uniformly small and apiropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second portion of the sta f's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.2. through 5.1.5g is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small.

Acceptability of accident consecuences is quant'fiec in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation crit:eria.

C A defense-in-depth approach was used to develop the staff guidelines so as to ensure that al'oad handling systems are designed and opera ed so that their probability of failure is appropriately small. The intent of the guidelines is to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power plants per orm the following:

o define sa e load travel paths through procedures anc operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carr'ed over o near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment o provide sufficient ope ator training> handling system des'gn, load handling inst"uctions, and ecuipment inspect'cn to ensure reliable ope ation of the handling systera.

Staf guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a program be initiated to ensure that these guidelines are impleraented at operating plants.

1.3 PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter (3] to IMEC, the Licensee for'. C. Cook Units 1 and 2, requesting that the Licensee review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines. IMEC responded on July 31, 1981 [4]. In iJL(ti FranMin Research Center A o~sion or The fruu4n lnsct4tc

TZRM5506-344/345 l7 response to a December ~ 1981 conference call wi& the NRC and PRC, the Licensee superseded Reference 4 with subr ittals on June 18, 1982 [5] and September 29, 1982 [6], wnich have been incorporated into this technical evalua tion.

.'". FranMin Research Center n Cncscon cd The Fcennsn cnsecccce

TERM5506-344/345

2. EVALUATZQN This section. presents a point-by-point evaluation of load handling provisions at D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 with. respect to NRC staff guidelines provided in NUREG-0612. Separate subsections are provided for both the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 and the interim measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3. Zn each case, the guideline or interim measure is presented, Licensee-provided information is summarized and evaluated, and a conclusion as to the extent of compliance, includ'ng recommended additional ection whe e appropriate, is presented. These conc'usions are summarized in Table 2.1.

2 1 GEN~L GUZDELZ¹S The NK has established seven general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-inMepth approach for the handling of heavy loads. These guidelines consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 o f NUREG-0 612:

o Guideline 1 - Safe Load Paths o Guide'ine 2 - Load Handling Procedures o Guide'ne 3 Crane Operator Training o Guideline 4 - Special Lifting Devices o Guideline 5 Lifting Devices (not specially designed) o Guideline 6 - Cranes (Znspection, Testing, and Maintenance) o Guideline 7 - Crane Design.

These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhead handling systems and programs in order to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. The Licensee's verifica-tion of the extent to which these guidelines have been satisfied and the evaluation of this verification are contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

w4 l'."L~.~FranMin Research Center A ~son cl The FtankJin ireasst

table 2.1. I>. C.'onk I/nits I and 2/>tttAtlt-0612 Cospllanco Hvtr lx

'Hol<tht Inter ln tnt er In or ldel inc I Clu I<tel lno 2 lno I Gut<tel lno 5 rtuldellno I

('ll ra< Ca< I<tel inn 3 Ca<I<tel 6 Noasure I<ensure 6

~l< Capacity

~tons Stfe Ix<ad I'aths Proceduren Crane r<pcrator tralnlng Opec!el De<<lees I.lftlnq Olin<In Crane

~1 test I ~<

technical I<< l<

Special Att< nt.lnn

1. Polar Crane 250/35 C Reactor Vessel II8.5 ttc p ttead-ttpper Internals 58 R lo<<cr Internals 80 150/2'a Nl asl le Oh!aids 39/07 HC p Cavity Dulkhcad 28/30 Sections Itleccl Iancoun Plant IItulpscnt C 2 ~ Aux Ill Cry Du I 14 I n<3 Crane fipcnt Fuel Sh lppin<3 Cask 110 Rad I at Ion 55 ttc Protection A< I e I<ta Ir radiate I 2 8 pre lan

!Inlpplng cask

'IG Hl eccl lancous 6 C Plant Ittulpscnt A

Vl Vt C ~ Licensee act lon cospl les <<lth ttt<RflG-0612 ouldotlno. C)

Ch tx'. ~ Llconnee action does not cosply ulth ttttlWi 0612 rt<<I<to linc. I p I.Iceoxee action partially cnsplles ulth ttuABG-0612 cul<tellno. W

~ t)>t applicable.

~<

R ~ Licensee has proposed rovlnlons or tao llfIcatlonn <<Dirt<> <<hen lnplenontcd, <<lll be In cnapl lance ulth ttttt<Frt-06I2 <a<I<tel lno.

~ ~ Auxlllary tx<lldlnO crane capacity I!nit.ed to 75 tons pending resolution of ~ <utstandln<3 Itess. t<t VI

'rable 2.) ICont.)

lnt er lm lnl er Im HelSht I'u idol Inc or Capacity Du Idol Inc Safe lnarl Paths Prncedures 2 Duldellne 3 Crane Operator vrslnlnJI 6 I 'SII rnildel Inc 4 Spcalal l.lfting Culdellne 5 Arldellne Crane

\

I

- mrt

~tl 6

Crane ~Deal n Heasure I Technics I

~Smclf lcatlnn Hr.sauce 6 Slav:la I Attention ISa ILlste Dnxes 2 Haste Container 2 C Hetsl Din Reactnr Stul 4-5 Rack Superstructure 25 8 C lire anl Spent tuel irene 8 Iulpment Hatch 45 Reactor Conlsnt 28 C Pump RotstlnJI Xssemhly Reactnr Coolant 38 Pump Hntor Glycol Tank 5

3. CH Pump and 30 8 Screen House Bridge Crane CH Pump llotor I5.5 8 C CH Pump It>tnr 8 C Suppnr t CH Pump 23 Essential 4.5 HC Service Hater Ul Pump ~ tA C)

Fw sent I el 2.5 I serv Inc Hater IJJ pump ra>tnf W

4 lil

( ~ ~

TZB.-C5506-344/345 2.'.1 NUiKG-0612, Heavy Load Overhead Handl'nc S stems

a. Summar of Licenseee S ta tements and Conclusions The Licensee's review of overhead handling systems at D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 has identified the following cranes to be subject to the general guidelines of NUREG-0612:

o polar cranes (250/35 tons) '

aux'liary building crane (150/20 tons) o 30-ton circulating water (CN) pump and screen house bricge crane.

In addition, the following load handling systems have been excluded for the following reasons:

Ph sical senaration from safet -related ecuiament. Zt was determined by inspection that a load drop could not damage any system or component required or plant shutdown or decay heat removal for the following load handling systems:

o turbine building main overhead crane o two tu bine building auxiliary cranes

2. Single purpose system. Each of the following load handling systems is used for maintenance of a single piece of safety>>related equipment; consequently, these systems will carry heavy loads over safety-related equipment only when plant conditions have been established to allow such ecuipment to be removed from serv'ce:

o diesel generator crane o reciprocating charging pump monorail o centrifugal charging pump monorail .

o safety injection pump monorail o containment spray pump monorail o residual heat removal pump monorail o main steam valve monorail o recirculation valve monorail o auxiliary feedwater pump hoist

3. Wei ht carried b the handlina system. The devices do not carry loads that satis y the weight requirements for a heavy load:

lJ JtIL'ranklin Research Center A Cieson of abc Ftonkhn lnsamte

TERMSS06-344/345 o containmenr building manipulator crane o auxiliary building nev and spent: fuel handling cranes.

b. Evaluation and Conclusion The Licensee's conclusions concerning the load handling systems at the D. C. Cook plant that are subject to the general guidelines are consistent with NUREG-0612.

2.1.2 Safe Load Pa hs Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(l)]

"Safe loaa oaths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy Xoads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if, the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly markea on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.

Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has proviaed drawings which identify the location of safe shutdown equipment and load handling areas. Safe load paths are being aeveloped or the individual heavy loads and vill be incorporated into the appropriate procedures as soon as possible. These component-specific safe load paths remain within the indicated load handling areas and are based on the general concept of handling heavy loads as close to the operating floor as

. is feasible in order to minimize the potential load drop impact energy, and with the maximum possible horizontal separation from spent fuel. In cases where loads must pass over the reactor vessel, the safe load path is establishea by considering the minimum time spent over the reactor vessel, the minimum height reauired for obstacle clearance, and the minimum number of

, crane operations which require load direction changes.

This approach of. using component-specific safe load paths contained =-

within the handling or maintenance procedure for each individual component was

,ltlll

'.~'.0 Franklin Research Center h Cushion ot The Frauen 4uomte

T" R-C550 6-344/34 5 developed in lieu o providing f'xed load paths on facility structures such as markings on loors, walls, and c ane rails or supoorts. The maintenance supervisor or 'eadman directs the crane operator and is responsible for ensuring that heavy load handling remains within the established safe load pa ths.

The circulating water pump and screen house crane has within its operating area only one set of safety-related equipment, the essential service water pumps. Bach of these oumps is individually locatea inside its ovn enchased room. The crane's sa e load oath covers the entire area except that portion over the essential service water pumps room. With the exception of a lift pertaining to the essential service water pumps or for storage on the essential service water pumps roam roof, there is no need or reason for a lif&

to pass over the essential service water oumps room. This room was designed to withstand the impact of the crane falling on it while carrying a 30-ton load. Therefore, the essential service water pumps are protected from all credible load drops.

Po circumstances requiring deviations from established sa e load handling paths, an alte nate safe load path vill be formulated and temporarily incorporated into the handling procedure as provided in the plant: manager' ns true tion PMI-2010.

Miscellaneous loads w'thin the reactor containment building will normally be handled only when the missile shields are in place over the reactor vessel and will follow the general safe load path guidelines previously stated.

In the auxiliary building, miscellaneous loads will be handled as prese ibed in procedure 12MHP 5021.001.036, "Control of Heavy Loads in the Auxiliary Building."

b. Evalua tion Development and use of component-specific load paths far individual heavy

'loads is consistent with the intent'. of this guideline: to develop individual load paths for heavy loads based upon review by engineering staff familiar with plant layout and system functions. In addition, the use of load handling vugg J Franklin Resenrch Center A Clv!SIOh Ol Thc FtI hk5h IASCAI<C

TER-C5 50 6-344/34 5 areas which encompass these 3oad paths and 3ift-neight restrictions provides an a"c't'onal zactor of safety wher; handling these loacs. Although no mention is mace of load path czawings, it is assumed that drawings or equivalent measures aze used, based upon the Licensee's statement that the component-specific load paths wre contained within procedures for individual heavy loacs. Regarding deviations from these load paths, the Licensee states that, if reduiredl PMX 2010 provides guidance to formulate an alte nate path and direc"s temporary incorporation into the handling procedure; verification shou'c be made that a formal review of this temporary deviat'on is conducted ov "ae "'ant safety zeview committee or, if so delegated, the plant manager and quaried al"ernates.

Xn acdition, the use of the maintenance supervisor/leadman to direct load r:ovemen".s is an acceptable alternative to load oath ma king. However, the Licensee shou3.d ensure that the duties and responsibilit'es of the maintenance supezvsor relative to load hand3.ing aze speci ically del'neated in appropriate procecuzes to ensure that load movement is contro'led within the established safe -oad paths.

he establ'shment o an exclusion area over the essential sezvice water pum" room in lieu of safe 3oad paths for the loads handled by the circulating water pump and sczeenhouse crane is acceptable because the excluded area is sma ansi we3.'e 'nec. However, taking credit for the desicn impact, loading

(

of Ne essent'al service water pump room does not meet the intent of Phase 1 of X~.==-Q-06&~, which limits the movement of heavy loads over safe shutdown ecu'p;ent. Therefore, the Licensee should implement formal acministrative controls to prevent movement of heavy loads over this exclusion area. Such controls should direct movement of essential service water pumps so as not to impac" any other. service water pump as well as to prohibit storage of heavy loa"s on the roof of any enclosure containing an essential service water pump which 's in service.

c. Conclusion and Recommendations Cook Units 1 and 2 partially comply with Guide'ine 1'f NUREG-0612. Xn orce to ccmply fully, the Licensee should perform the fol'owing:

.""renidin Research Center E "~s.an d .he Ftsncn Insamie ~

TERM5506-344/345 veri y tha" devia-'ons from safe 'oad paths reauire formal review and approval by the plant safety review committee.

2. vexifv "Hat supe visor/leadman responsibilities are clearly defined in load handling procedures.

3. implement formal administrative procedures that prevent movement of heavy loads over the essential service water pump rooms and that prohibit storage of any heavy loads on the roof over any such pump which is in service.

2.1.3 Load Handlina Procecures Guidel'ne 2, NURZG-0612, Section 5.1.1(2)

"P ocedures should be ceve'oped to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures should cove handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.

hese procedures should include: identification of required equipment; spections and acceptance criteria recuired before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed 'n handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."

a. Surcttarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions A detailec list of heavy loads and procedures governir.g the handling of each 'oad has been supplied by the Licensee, who has stated hat these procecures partially comply with the recommendations of NUREG-0612. As the safe 'oad paths are incorporated into procedures, additional updating will be performed to incluce equipment identification, inspection and acceptance cr'=eria, step-by-step load handling sequences, and special precautions.

Also, spent fuel cask handling procedures will be developed when required and will conform to the requirements of NUREG-0612.

In addition, the Licensee stated [5l:

"Each Essential Service Water Pump .is accessed through the roof via its own hatchway. Since the exposed pump is already out for maintenance Were wou'd be no chance in system status if it was damaged. Therefore,

~ =-there is no need for special procedures with respect to the Circulating Water Pump and Screen Fouse Crane."

."'L'ranklin Research Center A Qcnaon el Thc Fran~ Inc".ate

TZRM5506-344/345

b. Evaluat'on Load handling procedures for the auxiliary bui "ing crane and the polar crane at the D. C; Cook plant are consistent with t"e gu'dance in Section 5.1.1(2) of NUREG-0612 based on the Licensee's commitmen- to revise the listed procedures to include the following:

1. safe load paths

2. equipment identification

3. inspection and acceptance criteria

4. step-by-step load handl'ng sequences

5. special precautions.

J+

As stated in Section g.1.2 of this report, approcriate adm'nistrative procedures should be implemented to control movemen: of heavy loacs near the essential service water pumps.

c. Conclusion and Recommendations D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 comply with Guideline 2 Of NURE~0612 in the auxiliarv and reactor buildings on the basis of the . 'nsee's cozaitment to revise load hand'ing procedures as indicated. However, -Ne Licensee should implement appropriate administrative controls for handl'ng heavy 'oads in the vic'nity of the essent'al service water pumps.

2.1.4 Crane Ooerator Traininc Guideline 3 NUREG-".61~, Sect'on 5.1.1(3 "Crane operators should be trained, qualified anc conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976, 'Overhead and Gantry Cranes'7].

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions A Licensee review of crane operator skill training lessons, cuality control inspection procedures, and the safety manua'sec at the D. C. Cook plant for operator training, qualifications, and con"uct was performed in compar'son to the provisions of Chapter 2-3 of ANSI 330.2-&76. In some instances, ANSI standard items are not specifically acdressed, but no stated

".J'.L Franklin Research Center A chosen or The Franc Insc<u<e

TERM550 6-344/345 exceptions are- taken. A Maintenance Head Instruction (MHZ) will be prepared to add"ess ANSI B30.2-1976 on operator training.

b. Evaluation Crane operator training at the D. C. Cook plant is consistent with Section 5.1.1(3) of NUREG-0612 based on the point-by-point review of ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-3. Further, the Licensee has committed to prepare an MHZ ro fully address ANSi B30.2-1976 regarding operator training.

c. Conclus ion D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 will comply with Guideline 3 when the MHZ has been prepared and implemented.

P 2.1.5 Special Liftinc Devices (Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 4) ]

"Spec'al 'if" ing devices should satisfy the guiaelines of ANSI N14.6-1978/

'Standard fo" Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing .

10,000 pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials'8). This standard should apply to a'1 special lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as de ined above. For operat'ng plants certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the

.standard. Zn addi.tion, the stress design factor stated 'in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads "Hat could be imparted on the handling dev'ice based on characteris-tics of the crane which will be used. This is in 'ieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design actor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the interven'ng components of the special handling device."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has stated that arrangements are in progress to provide verification from Westinghouse Electric Corporation of compliance of the rea'ctor vessel head and the upper internals lifting rig with ANSI N14.6-1978 radiation protection shield lifting device and missile shield lifting 'he device were evaluated to determine compliance with ANSI N14.6-1978. The Licensee determined that both devices meet the intent of ANSI N14.6-1978 with the following exceptions:

t'I i J<]u P.

ranklin Research Center A bnrrran at The Frerurtn In3" err e

TERM550 6-344/34 5 Safety factor (AISC):

o radiation protection sh'e3.ds - 1.5 o missile shields>> 2.0 o initial proof test of 110% of maximum 3oad o continuing acceptance test - 110% of maximum load.

b. Evaluation Insufficient information has been provided to allow a determination of complianc with respect to Guiaeline 4 for the reactor vessel head and inter-nals lifting ig. The Licensee has indicated Bat De radiation protection shield (RPS) and missile shield (NS) lifting devices were built to AISC guide-lines, Qsing factors of safety of 1.5 and'.0, respectively, for yield stress.

These safety margins are significantly less than those values specified in ANSI N14.6>>1978 and, when, combined with a substantially lower load test (110%

versus 150%), do not provide the degree of conservatism in design and proof of workmanship necessary for consistency with this guiaeline. Any of the fo13.owing options may enable the Licensee to demonstrate that aesign and continued use of these 1'fting devices are consis ent with the intent of ANSI N14 . 6-1978:

'l. Reevaluation of the design criteria of the HS and MS lifting cevices to identify those components which should be modified or replaced in order to establish design margins consistent with the ANSI N14 6-1978 ~

values of 3 or minimum vield strength and 5 or ultimate strength.

2. Use a load sensing device in the load train (such as a load cell or similar device) set at a maximum of 110% of the rated load, which wou3.d prevent exceeding the maximum safe working load (static and impact) of these lifting devices.

3. Use of ~ present lifting devices may be acceptable demonstrated that (a) a comprehensive test and inspection program is if it can be implemented which requires an annual (or prior to use) load test of 110% combined with inspections specified in ANSI N14.6-1978, Section 5.3.1(2); (b) adminis""ative procedures which provide sufficient details, figures, and precautions to minimize the potential for unexpected loading (load hangup of impact loadings) .

For the remaining special lifting devices currently being evaluated, the intent of this guideline, in addition to determining that design and fabrication provide high reliability, is also to make certain that appropriate r,0r-JL'IJ~ Franklin Research Center h Otnson d The Ftankfin Insonicc

TZRM550 6-344/34 5 seeps are taken to ensure that these devices are 'nspected, tested, and maintained so as to ensure continued reliability. Guidance for a program to support the goal is contained in Section 5 of ANS3: N14.6. IMEC has provided no information addressing these issues for the reactor vessel head and internals lift rig.

c. Conclusion and Recommendations Special lifting devices at D. C..Cook Units 1 and 2 do not comply w'th Guiceline 4. To demonst"ate compliance, the Licensye should perform the ollowing:

o iver the reactor vessel head and internals lift rig, complete the overall assessment which should include verification of design adequacy of the devices as we3.1 as the implementation of" a program continuing compliance in accordance with ANSI'14.6-1978r to'nsure Section 5.

o For the BPS and MS lifting devices, implement one of the above listed opr,ions or propose a suitable alternative.

2,1.6 Liftina Dev'ces (Not Sneciallv Designed [Guideline 5, NURs'G-0612,

.Section 5.1.1(531 "Lifting dev'ces that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accorcance with the guidelines of ANSI'30.9-1971, 'Slings'9J.

However, in se'ecting the prope sl'na, the load usec shou'd be the sum of the static ana maximum cynamic load. The rating, identified on the s'ing should be in terms of the 'static load'hich produces the maximum static and cynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."

a. Surfraarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Routine lifting devices (slings, ropes, chains, etc.) follow the guide-lines set forth in Hancbook for Riggers by W. G, iVewberry, revised edition, 1977. This handbook meets the intent of ANSI S30.9-1971.

At present, slings at the Cook plant are selected after the rigger has estimated the 3.oad weight to be lifted and the rigging arrangement that ia to be used.

-15 JL'(lJ FranMin Research Center A Onnsscn of The Franasn insaa re

TZRM550 6-344/34 5 Lifting capacity of the wire rope slings is identified by the diameter of rope and lifting arrangement charts provided at each crib. The Tuflex slings are color-coded according to capacity, and the nylon straps are rated by width for their lifting capacities. Ropes and slings throughout the plant are generally used for one particular job (i.e., turbine work, vertical walls, missile blocks, etc.) and are stored in the general area close to the equipment that is lifted.

Marking of slings would recuire a great deal of time and effort and would noc completely eliminate the possibility of selecting an incorzect sling.

Further, markings on nylon slings would become obscured as they accumulate grease.

Zt is the Licensee's opinion that "any further marking of the slings will not provide further assurance of the proper sling being chosen for a par t icular task. "

En addition, the Licensee does not believe that it is practical or necessary to account for a dynamic. load factor'. Presumab1y, if such a factor were a real safety concern, the universally accepted ANSI standards would require it. This belief is based on the following factors: first, the hoisting speeds at the Cook plant are relatively slow and any contribution from a dynamic e ect would not be significant; second, critical lifts (e.g.,

reactor vessel heai or missile shield) are always cone at very slow speeds.

b. Evaluation The D. C. Cook plant substantially satisfies the requirements of this guideline on the basis that slings are selected and used in accordance with ANSI B30.9-1971. A review of available information indicates that the maximum hoist speeds for the cranes subject to NUREG-0612 are relatively slow:

o Polar crane main hoist - 4.75 fpm auxiliary hoist - 31 fpm A Oivraron ol The Franrrrrn InaaoNe

TERM550 6-344/34 5 o Auxiliarv building crane main hoist - 4.5 fpm auxiliary hoist - 35 fpm o Circulating water pump and screen house crane 18.75 fpm.

Therefore, dynamic loads imposed on these slings are reasonably small and may be disregarded when determining the static load to be used when selecting and using slings.

Use of wire rope diameter or nylon sling width is an acceptable means of determining sling capacitv; however, the Licensee should ensure Rat this\

cetermination is based upon the tables contained in ANSI B30.9-1971.

c. Conclusion The D. C. Cook plant complies with Guideline 5 of NUREG-0612.

2.1.7 Cranes Znsoection, Testin , and Maintenance [Guideline 6, NUREG-0612 Sec" ion 5.1.3. (6 "The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, 'Overhead and Gantry Cranes, exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use

'ith the where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the speci ied inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a 'PNR conta'nment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be'peration.

performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use) ."

a. Summar of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has stated that crane inspection, testing, and ma'ntenance at the D. C. Cook plant 's primarily controlled by MHZ 5030, the AEP safety manual, maintenance procedures, pre-operational test procedures, quality control inspection procedures, and the crane manufacturer's parts list and operat:ion and maintenance instructions. These documents were reviewed ag5inst the criteria set forth in Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976. As a result of this A 0~

il".lI Franklin Research Center ot The Ftandn insmue

TERM550 6-344/34 5 evalua"'on, he Licensee considers c"ane inspection, testing, and maintenance o oe 'n c'ose agreement wi"4 ANSI B30.2 wi6 few exceptions.

b. Evaluation Crane inspection, testing, and maintenance at D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 is cons'stent with Guideline 6 in that the Licensee employs a program in close agreement with ANSI B30.2. However, those differences identified between the D. C. Cook program and the ANSI standard should be addressed by the Licensee and incorporated 'nto the inspection program at the D. C. Cook plant.

C=ane maintenance procedures should be upgraded to incorporate requirements similar to those contained in ANSI B30.2-1976 for component repai" and replacement (Articles 2-2.3.3.C, 2-2.3.1, 2-2.3.2) and wire rope maintenance (Articles 2-2.4.2 and 2-2.4.3).

c. Conclusion and Recommencations D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 partially comply with Guideline 6 of NUREG-0612.

In or" er to comply fully, the crane maintenance program and procedures 'should be.rev'sed to include criteria of ANSI B30.2-1976 related to component repai" and replacement and wire rope maintenance.

2.'.6 Crane Desicn [Guide'ne 7; NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(7) )

"Ne crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidel'nes of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, 'Overhead and Gantry Cranes, 'nd of ~A-70, 'Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling C=anes'10]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CKA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the speci fication is sa tisfied. "

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has stated that the auxiliary building crane, the two polar cranes, and the circulating water pump and screen house crane were designed and manufactured in 1969-1970 by the Whiting Corporation according to the guidelines of EOCZ Specification 61 and ANSI B30.2-1967. Zn order to determine compliance, the specifications under which the cranes were designed

"'ranMin Research Center A Chv San cl The Fand n Insane

~

~

TMM550 6-344/34 5 we e compared item-by-item against the most recent versions of the present specifications.

The study addressing the ANSI Standard and the resulting analysis of the cranes in the areas of discrepancy indicated that the cranes were in compliance. The study comparing CMAA-70 and KOCH-61 was performed by Whiting Corporation and indicated twelve areas in which the cranes did not meet M&A-70 (1975) design standards:

150/20 Ton Auxi'arv Buildinc Crane

1. "The drum pin'on strength of the main hoist extra reduction gearing

's exceeded by 8% and the gear durability is exceeded by 458."

Disposition Load lifting will be limited to 75 tons maximum until this item is resolved.

2. The main block bronze sheave bushing is overstressed by 28%."

Disposition - Whiting states that the 1,000 psi working pressure stated in CP2A Rev. 75, is not related to any specific type o bea 'g material supplied. The existing bushings in the block sheaves are 79 bronzoid, wnich has an ultimate compressive stress

=at'ng of 10,000 psi, and Nhiting futher states, at a safety factor of 5 as specified bv CK,A-70, the bushing should be adequate or working loads up to compressive stresses of 2,000 psi. Thereforeg the bushing is satisfactory.

3. " ae auxiary hoist sheave material is Class 35 cast iron with an

' imate "ens'le strength of 35,000 psi, instead of the Class 40 czs"

'"on with an ultimate tensile strength oR'40>000 psi a's specified in C~-70."

Disposition - Whiting states that sheaves are generally stressed 'n compression between their rope contact area and hub. Tensile st esses are usually of minor consequence at bearing hubs and at rope entry points in their flanges. We concur that the sheave material is satisfactory.

4. The horsepower and torque rating of the auxiliary hoist motor is exceeded by 1.5% when handling a rated load of 20 tons."

Disposition - The horsepower and torque rating of the auxiliary hoist motor is exceeded because the weight of the load block was added to the 20-ton capacity of the hoist. The gears, bearings, and brake are all adequate for the additional load. Therefore, no modification is necessary since at worst the motor would stall when attempting to

'if" a full-capacity load.

i"'L".'.enMin Reseerc',h Center A 0~A d The Ftanen Insane;te

T~RM550 6-344/34 5

5. "The longitudinal stif eners are not located properly and do not meet moment of inertia requirements." I Disposition - A design change will be initiated to add longitudinal stiffeners to the outside face of each main girder web plate.

6. . "In the event of an axle failure, the bridge end truck may drop 1-7/8 inch, instead of the allowed 1 inch."

Disposition - A design change will be initiated to weld bars to the end truck plates across the runway rail head near each bridge wheel.

250 35 Ton Containment polar Cranes 7 ~ "The auxiliary hoist sheave material is Class 35 cast iron with an ultimate tensile strength of 35,000 psi, instead of the Class 40 cast iron with an ultimate tensile strength of 40,000 psi as speci ied in C%A-70."

Disposition - Same as Item 3 above; no modification is necessary;

8. "The girder longitudinal stiffener is not 'ocated properly."

Disposition - According to the evaluation by Whiting, the locat'on of the long'tucinal stif eners was determined by the weld length required to t'ransfer bridge rail loadings through the intermediate shor" depth stiffeners to both webs of each girder, as well as the overall depth required in these short depth stiffeners to transfer the raiL load moment across the span between girder webs. Whiting believes Sat the longitudinal stiffener location specified in C~-70 has been established based on the extreme case where only full depth 'nternal stiffeners may be used and that it neglects the reduction in effective unsupported web panel lengths provided by the short depth internal stiffeners. The Licensee concurs with b>iting's conclusion that the probability of web buckling in this critical web compression area is reduced to an extent equal to or exceeding the reinforcement required by the present specification. Therefore, girder stiffener modification is not needed.

30-Ton Circulatin Water Pumns and Screen House Crane 9 ~ "The hoist sheave materials is AS% A48 Class 35 cast iron instead of steel or ASTM A48-64 o" later Class 40 iron, as specified in CMAA-70."

Disposition - A design change will be initiated to install new sheaves. Please note that the reason why the sheaves are being replaced on this crane but not on the containment polar cranes crr on the auxi'iary building crane is that the sheaves on the circulating III( Franklin Research Center h i&sion d Thc Franwn!nscm<e

T~M5506-344/345 wate pump and screen house. crane are smaller and thus the compression st"ess is larger.

10. "The horsepower and torcue rating of the hoist motor is exceeded by 4.758 when handling a ated load of 30 tons."

Disposition - The motor has a 70 C at 60 minutes temperature rise rating at the rated 40 hp. At the required 41.9 hp, the motor has a 77 C temperature rise at 60 minutes. The CMA standards for Class P

~

insulation allow a 105'C temperature rise. Therefore, the motor will meet the temperature rise limitations and is adequate.

1 L~ "The recuired hoist brake torque exceeds the rated torcue by 2%."

D'sposit.'on A design change will be init'ated to modify the existing brake so that it will meet the required torque rating.

12. "The Xongitudinal st'ffeners do not meet the moment of inert'a requirements."

Disposition - A design change wi' be initiated. to add longitudinal stiffeners to meet the moment of inertia requirements.

The above review indicates that the containment polar cranes are entirely adecua"e. Two modi ications will be 'made for the auxi'iary building crane:

insza lation of acditional longitudinaL stiffene" s and installation of bars to reduce end-truck drop.

he following modifications will be made to the c'rculating water pump anc sere . house crane: (1) replacement of the hoist Sheaves, (2) modification oi rhe hoist brake, and (3) installa"ion of additional longitudinal stifzeners.

b. "-valua ion t The polar cranes at D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 are consist:ent with Guideline 7 of NUREG-0612 since deviations from CMA-70 identified in the detailed analysis. performed by the Licensee and by Whiting Corporation are not expected to result in crane reliability significantly less than that provided by fu'1 compliance with CMA-70. The auxiliary building crane is not in verbatim compliance with the crane design criteria of C~-70; however, the Licensee has demonst ated the adequacy of the present design and has committed to make modifications to the longitudinal stiffeners and to install bars to reduce bridge end truck azop. The Licensee's intent to limit the auxiliary

"..';."renklin Reseerch Center E Civoen d The franc'n lascar(c

T~M550 6-344/34 5 building crane to a 75-ton maximum lift (normally 150 tons maximum) until the drum pinion strength and gear durability questions are resolved is also consistent with Guiceline 7.

Similarly, the circulating water pump and screen house crane is not in verbatim compliance with the crane design criteria of CMAA-70; again, however, the Licensee has demonstrated the adequacy of the current design and committed to the following modifications: (1) the hoist sheaves will be replaced with stronge material, (2) the hoist brake design will be modified to improve braking orcue, and (3) longitudinal stiffeners will be added to meet moment of inertia reauirements.

c. Conclusion and Recommendations The polar cranes at D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 comply with Guideline 7 of NU~-0612. Contingent upon completion of modifications proposed for both the auxil'ary building crane and the CW pump and screen house crane, these cranes will comply with this guideline. Howeve , the auxiliarv building crane should be restricted to a capac'y of 75 tons until resolution of the drum pinion streng"4 and gear durabity questions and subsequent review by the NRC.

2. 2 1NTERZM PROZKCTION iMASURHS The NR: has established six interim protection measures to be implemented at operating nuclear power plants to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy loads will be handled over the spent fuel pool and that measures exist to reduce the potential for accidental load drops to impact on fuel in the core or spent fuel pool. Pour of the six interim measures of the report consist of general Guideline 1, Safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Load Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Enspection, Testing, and Maintenance) . The two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria:

1. Heavy load technical specifications

2. Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.

22>>

(,'.'Ld Frankiin Research Center A Oieaon ol The Fi<<uVw instable

TERM550 6-344/345 Licensee implementation and evaluat'on of these interim protection measures are contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.

2.2.1 Technical Snecifications [Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612 Section 5.3 1))

"Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,

'Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building, Temnical Specification 3.9.6.2< 'Crane Travel,

'orBNR's,

'or PWR's and Standard to orohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implemen-tation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.3.."

a. Evaluation The Technical Spec'fications for D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 include a requirement in paragraph 3.9.7 which prohibits the movement of loads in excess of 2500 lb over spent fuel in the storage pool. Since the intent of this inter'm action is to limit the unnecessary movement of heavy loads over spent fuel in the storage pool, D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 sa is y this recui ement.

b. Conclus ion D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 comply with Znterim Protection Measure 1.

2.2.2 Administrative Contiols [Xnterim Protection Measures 2, 3 4, and 5, NUREG-0612, Sections 5.3 2)-5.3 5 )

"Procedural or administrative measures [including safe load paths, load handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection)...

can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for..

completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 of [NUREG-0612)."

a. Summar of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Sumnaries of Licensee statements and conclusions are contained in

~ discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.2< 2.1.3i 2.1.4, and 2.1.7.

~ A2 3 l'il'1 JJu u Franklin Research Center A Oivnian of The Frani4n Irusaac

TZRM550 6-344/34 5

b. Evaluations, Conclusions, and Recommendations

"-valuations, conclusions, and recommencations are contained in discussions of "he respective. general guidelines in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7.

2.2.3 Sbecial Reviews for Heavy Loads Over the Core [Interim Protection Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 6) ]

"Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. Th's special review should include the follow'ng or these loads: (1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifti.ng dev'ces and movement of the load to assu e that sufficient detail

's prov'ed and that instructions are clear and conc'se; (2) visual inspections o load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lift'ng devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane ooerators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduc of operations, and content of procedures."

a. =~aluaticn though no in ormation has been provided by the Licensee, it is apparent from ae responses to Guidelines 2 and 3 that procedures for handling loads ove De core and operator training have been reviewed and upgraded as PeLQ g apprc-r'ate. :n accit'or., "ae design of c"anea at te D. C. Cook plan- has been eviewed anc found to comply with NUREG-0612 ~ Therefore, o satis y the ~

requi ements of this interim measure, the Licensee should perform the recuested special review of all special lifting devices used over the core since a design review has not been completed by the vendor,

b. Conclusion and Recommendation The D. C. Cook p'ant substantially complies with Interim Protection Measure 6. In order to fully comply, the Licensee should perform a visual

'nspection of load bearing components of special lift'ng devices used to handle heavy loads over the core, pending completion of the full design and continuing compliance review being performed in accordance with Guideline 4.

.;".L'mnkiin Research Center h M~ or The FranAn Inseam

TZRM550 6-344/345

3. CONCLUSZON Th's summarv is provided to consolidate the results of the evaluation contained in Section 2 concerning individual NRC staff guidelines into an overall evaluation of heavy load handling at D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2.

Overall conclusions and recommended Licensee act'ons, where appropriate, are provided with respect to both general provisions for load handling (NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1) and completion of the staf f recommenaations for interim protec" ion (NUM>G-0612, Section 5.3) .

3.1 GO=PAL PROVZSZONS FOR LOAD HANDLZNG The HK staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for handling heavy loa'ds in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent fuel, or 'n other areas where an accidental load d"op could damage equipment.

requ'red for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The intent of these guidelines is twofold. A plant conforming to these guidelines will have developed and implemented, through procedures and operator training, safe load trave'aths such that, to the max'mum extent practical, heavy loacs are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or sa e shutdown ecuipment. A plant conforming to these guidelines will also have provided sufficient operator

""aining, handling system design, load handling 'nst="ctions, and equipment inspec ion to ensure reliable ope ation of the handling system. As. detailed in Section 2, it has been found that. load handling operations at D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 can be expected to be conducted in a highly reliable manner consisten" with the staff 's objectives as expressed in these guidelines.

need for further Licensee action, however, was identified in the following areas:

-: o TJKC should verify that implementation of safe load paths incorporates the following additional issues: (1) verify that deviations from established load paths reauire formal review and approval by the plant safety review committee or its equivalent; (2) verify that duties of the supervisor/leadman are clearly defined in procedures; and (3) implement formal administrative procedures that prevent movement of heavy loads over the essential service water pump rooms and prohibit storage of any heavy loads on the roof over any such pump which is in service.

t'~LIJ Frenldin Reseerch Center A Dreaan ot The Ftani4n Insanrtc

TERW550 6-344/345 o IMEC should complete the assessment of the reactor vessel head and internals

~'ae lift rig. Such an assessment should include verification of adequacy of design of the devices as well as the implementation of programs to ensure continuing compliance in accordance with Section 5 of ANSI N14.6-1978.

o IMEC should implement one of the following options for the radiation protection shield and missile shield lifting devices: (a) reevaluate the design margins of load-bearing components and replace or modify the necessary components to establish design margins consistent with ANSI N14.6-1978; (b) install a load-sensing device in the load train which would prevent the operator from exceeding the maximum safe working load o these devices; or (c) implement a comprehensive test and inspection program wnich requires an annual load test of 110%

combined with the comprehensive inspections of ANSI N14.6-1978, Section 5.3.1(2), as well as improved administ"ative procedures which recuce the potential for unexpected impact loading and effects of a possible load dzop.

o IMEC should upgrade the crane maintenance and inspection program to incorporate ANSI B30.2-1976 requirements for component repair and replacement and wire rope maintenance.

3.2 'NTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES In NUBEG-0612, Section 5.3, the NFd staff has established certain measures that should be in'tiated to prov'de reasonable assurance "oat handling of heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until f'nal implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 is complete. Specified measures inc'uce: the implementation of a techn'ca'pecification to proh'bit the handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool; compliance with Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load handling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure. The evaluation of information provided by the Licensee indicates that additional action is required in seve al areas to satisfy compliance with the Interim Protection Measures. Licensee action for slings has been addressed in Section 3.1 or this evaluation. Further Licensee action necessary for compliance includes the following item:

rr~q tJLtJ Franklin Research Center A ~on ol The Fram4n Insole

TZRW550 6-344/345 o EMC should perform a visual inspection of all load bearing'components of special lifting devices used to handle heavy loads over the core.

27>>

~JM Frarikiin Research Center A &veen el The Fsewcsn Insecwe

TERM550 6-344/34 5 4 ~ ~~ ERENCES NRC "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" July 1980 NURE~ 612 20 V. Stello, Jr. (NRC)

Letter to all Licensees

Subject:

Reauest for Additional Informat'on Near Spent uel on Cont o'f Heavy Loads 17 May 1978 3 ~ D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)

Letter to All Operating Reactors

Subject:

Control of Heavy Toads 22 December 1980

4. R. S. Hunter (IMi:C)

Letter to H. R. Denton (NRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads 31 July 1981 5 ~ R. S. Hunter (IMEC)

Lette" to H. R. Denton (NRC)

Subject:

Cont:ol oz Heavy Loads 18 June 1982

6. R. S. Hunter (IMEC)

Letter to H. R. Oenton (NRC)

Sub~cot: C~n""ol o= Heavv leads 29 September 1982 7~ American National Standards Institute "Overhead and Gantry Cranes" New York: 1976 ANSI B30.2-1976

8. American National Standards Institute "Standard for Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" ANSI N14.6-1978 9 ~ American National Standards Institute "Slings" ANSI B3 0. 9-19 71 I I'J/I: F'ranklin Research Center A Croon d %bc Franklin Instate

TZRM550 6-344/34 5 l0. C ane Fanufacturers Association of America, Znc.

"Specifications for Electric Cverhead Travelina Cranes" Pittsburch, PA CMA-7 0 J/ll!J Franklin Research Center A ~eon of The Fran&n Insomte

C F

r, 5"

W

'1