ML20077L851

Control of Heavy Loads (C-10) Indiana & Michigan Electric Co,Dc Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2, Technical Evaluation Rept

ML20077L851
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	09/01/1983
From:	Bomberger C, Vosbury F FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
To:	Singh A NRC
Shared Package
ML17320A768	List: ML20077L851
References
CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-07980, TAC-07981, TAC-7980, TAC-7981, TER-C5506-344-3, TER-C5506-344-345, NUDOCS 8309060263
Download: ML20077L851 (33)

Text

_

IC TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT p.-r CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS (C-10)

!Z INDIANA AND MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY r :4.

D. C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 L

• 7 o

NRC DOCKET NO. 50-315. 50-316 FRC PROJECT C5506 NRC TA C NC. 07980. 07981 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 19..

O NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81-130 FRC TASKS 379, 380 Pm 7:s

,$ i

- i.h

.S

., s

,[l Prepared by d[I Franklin Research Center Author:

F.

',J. Vosbury 7

20th and Race Streets C. R. Bomberger Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader:

I. H. Sargent

t Prepared for W@

Nuclear Regulatory Commission l

Washington, D.C. 2055S Lead NRC Engineer:

A. Singh September 1, 1983 This report was prepared as an account of work sponscred by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any lega! liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any info (mation, appa-i ratus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not Infringe pnvately owned rights.

XA Copy Has Been Sent 4o PDR,4 j

i j

t L.L Frank!in Research Center

$ h h ^Mh A Divisien of Th,e Franklin, inst,itute e

g n.

er _..

. ~..,imai,-s.iwo c

M TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS (C-10)

O INDIANA AND MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY D. C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NO. 50-315, 50-316 FRC PROJECT C5506 NRC TAC NO. 07980, 07981 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 1

NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81-i30 FRC TASKS 379, 380 Prepared by Franklin Research Center Author:

F. W. Vosbury 20th and Race Streete C. R. Bomberger Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader:

I. H. Sargent Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washingtcn, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer:

A. Singh 1

Sepccmber 1, 1983 l

l This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their i

employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or l

responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, acca-ratus, prMuct or process disclosed in this report, or represents t.lat its use by such third party woulo not infringe pnvately owned rights.

Prepared by:

Reviewed by:

Approved by:

$$ ^"w L4 M

Prin::1 pal Adhor

\\/

Tepa'rtment D[I ~ Y3 rectq)

Date 8/31/8 5 Cate:

b'IO Date:

1 l

Al'lu

. Franklin Research Center L

i l

A Division of The Franklin institute j

The Benamn F aruen 7er=*ey. 7%a. 7s 19103 (21S1448 4000 i

.. ~.

..c TER-C550 6-344/345 CONTENTS Section Title Page 1

INTRODUCTION.

1 1.1 Purpose of Review 1

1.2 Generic Background.

1 l.3 Plant-Specific Background 2

2 EVALUATION 4

2.1 General Guidelines.

4 2.2 Interim Protection Measures.

23 3

CONCLUSION 26 3.1 General Provisions for Load Handling 26 3.2 Interim Protection Measures.

26 4

REFERENCES 28 iii O

$U Franidin Research Center s ommen w N r--

r TER-C550 6-3 44/345 l

FOREWORD This Technical Evaluatior. Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical assistance in support of NBC operating reactor licensing actions. The technical evaluation was conducted in accordanca with criteria established by the NBC.

Mr. F. W. Vosbury, Mr. C. Bomberger, and Mr. I. H. Sargent contributed to the technical preparation of this report through a subcontract with WESTEC Services, Inc.

v O

fl Franidin Research Center t w.e w % -

e j

e TER-C550 6-344/345 1..

INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEW" This technical evaluation report documents an independent review of general load handling policy and procedures at the Indiana and Michigan Electric Company's (IMEC) Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2.

This evaluation was performed with the following objectives:

o to assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of NUhZG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" (1),

Section 5.1.1 o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3.

1.2 GENERIC BACKGROUND Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NBC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to ensure the safe handling of heavy loads and to reconaend necessary changes in these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NBC staff on May 17, 1978 (2] to all power reactor licensees, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not acequately cover the major causes of loac handling accidents and should be upgraded.

In order to upgrade measures provided to control heavy loeds, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part abjective using an accepted approads or protection philoscphy. The first portion of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling systems at

_rankhn Research Center

TER-C550 6-344/345 nuclear power plants are designec and operated such that their probability of I

failure is unifocaly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.2. through 5.1.5, is co ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small.

Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.

A defense-in-depth approach was used to develop the staff guidelines so as to ensure that all load handling systems are designed and operated so that their probability of failure is appropriately small. The intent of the guidelines is to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power plants perform the following:

define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training o

so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment o provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system.

- Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612.

Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a program be initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.

1.3 PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND On December 22, 1980, the NBC issued a letter [3] to IMEC, the Licensee 4

for D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2, requesting that the Licensee review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of b0 Franidin Research Center 4 on

.# n. n.a.mn

. _..... _ _.,.. _. _ _,.. - -,,..., -,. ~,, ~ -,. _ _,...,,,

TER-C5506-344/345 conformance to these guidelines. IMEC responded on July 31, 1981 [4].

In response to a December 17, 1981 conference call with the NPC and FFC, the Licensee superseded Reference 4 with submittals on June 18, 1982 (5],

September 29,1982 [6], July 5,1983 (7], and August 4, 1983 [8]; these submittals have been incorporated into this technical evaluation.

. D'!b Franidin Researen Center s w w w--

TER-C550 6-344/345 2.

EVALUATICN This section presents a point-by-point evaluation of load handling provisions at D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 with respect to NBC staff guidelines provided in NUREG-0612. Separate subsections are provided for both the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 and the interim measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3.

In each case, the guideline or interim measure is presented, Licensee-provided information is summarized and evaluated, and a conclusion as to the extent of compliance, including recommended additional

-action where appropriate, is presented. These conclusions are summarized in Table 2.1.

2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES The NBC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy loads. These guidelines censist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:

Guideline 1 - Safe Load Paths Guideline 2 - Load Handling Procedures Guideline 3 - Crane Operator Training Guideline 4 - Special Lifting Devices Guideline 5 - Lifting Devices (not specially designed)

Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance)

Guideline 7 - Crane Design.

These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhead handling systems and programs in order to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. The Licensee's verifica-tion of the extent to which these guidelines have been satisfied and the evaluation of this verification are contained in the succeeding paragrapns..'W Franklin Research Canter A omena er we nonen -

e,

o a...e a..

D *TI

' Pg 3

i l g Table 2.1.

D. C. CuaA Unite I asus 2/NUM.G-0612 Compliance Mats is S3

}M eg Weight inteste lateste

'E or cuideline. I Cuideline 2 Culdeline 3 Guideline 4 Culdeline S Culdeline 6 Culdeline i seeaanse !

Measure &

Capacity safe t.oad Csane Operatos special L48 ting Csane - Test Technical special 5

Egewy.4**Je St onal Isthe Ps & -l-..e Tsainin1 twe lce s Jhs aruS In6pection Crane Deelen p elfication Attention y

1. Pulas Osane 2SO/3S R

C C

s Deastus vessel led.S C

R C

C Ieead uppes Intesnale SS C

A C

~

C C

imes latesmale se C

3 C

sittelle 6htende 39/02 C

a

~

p C

Caelty sulkheed 20/30 C

R C

C Sectlone 8

in ses scellaneous I

plant Equiseent 30 C

R C

C

2. Ausillasy 858/20' R

C R*

Building Crane l

Spent Peel f

Shi ytews Cask lie C

R C

l a

hadiation SS C

3 m

tsules:llon tJ.leide lesadiated 2

C a

C Specimen bhlgt ng Cask

>3 i

tn Mimselteneous 4

C 3

C c

f riant Egulgeant

(-)

tn tn O

~...-.lsensee act ion complies ulth NuitG-06 32 Culdeline, C

1 m

--.~t 6,.i l m.i...

,i,

e 4 assnm e 9.am prog = sed sevisions us emma t ricat ions utelch, uhen implemented, util t.e in cumpliance ulth esuhtG-0612 Guideltne, y

• Aum allasy 4 utlding csane capacity limited to it tune 3 emalag resolution el out stasmilng items.

4-N ts A-4.n 1

J a

1 e.. -

4.

ELS s: -

D 71 Table 2.8 Scunt.I lE e 5' 23 Weight Interte lateste og Guideline i caldeline 2 Caldeline 2 Guideline 4 Culdeline S Guideline 6 culdeline 7 Meamuse 1 Measure 6 Capacity safe 14:a4 Crane Operatus special Lif ting Crane - Test Technical Special monsyg ItonsJ Patha Pr ocedures Tr aining peelces Slines and inasect M Csane Deelen Ssiecificat ion Attention m

0 In 1.s4 taaste Ibsses 2

C R

C 89d Weste Cuataineg 2

.c R

C

-~

1 m ten Rin Reactue stud 4-S C

R C

Rech r

i Supesettmuture 25 C

R C

C j

eeuw and Spent Fuei Cs ane 5

Equipment htch 4S C

R C

C Reactos Ctmlant 20 C

R C

I Pump Rotailng C

Assembly 1

Reactos Cnalant ja C

R C

C Pump stator Glycol Tank S

C R

C C

1. m rump and 30 R

C R

i 1

seseen muse Rsidge Csam 1

CW rump peutur IS.S C

R C

CW Pump festot 4

C R

C l

suppas t CW Pump 23 C

R C

Essential 4.S C

R C

Sesvice Wales g

Pump gyg o

Essent ial 2.5 C

B C

b Ch 1

seswice Wates Pump Mutus om d-N ta i

d-l til e

i 1

TER-C550 6-344/345 2.1.1 NUREG-0612, Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems a.

Summary of Licenseee Statements a'nd Conclusions The Licensee's review of overhead handling systems at D. C. Cook Units 1 end 2 has identified the following cranes to be subject to the general

- guidelines of NUREG-0612:

polar cranes (250/35 tons) auxiliary building crane (150/20 tons) 30-ton circulating water pump and screen house bridge crane.

In addition, the following load handling systems have been excluded for the following reascns:

1.

Physical separation from safetv-related ecuipment.

It was determined by inspection that a load drop could not damage any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal for the following load handling systems:

o turbine building main overhead crane o two turbine building auxiliary cranes 2.

Single purpose system. Each of the following load handling systems is used for maintenance of a single piece of safety-related equipment; consequently, these systems will carry heavy loads over safety-related equipment only when plant conditions have been established to allow such equipment to be removed from services o diesel generatoe crane o reciprocating charging pump monorail o centrifugal charging pump monorail o safety injection pump monorail o containment spray pump monorail o residual heat removal pump monorail o main steam valve monorail o recirculation valve monorail o auxiliary feedwater pump hoist 3.

Weight carried by the handling system. The devices do not carry loads that satisfy the weight requirements for a heavy load:

o containment building manipulator crane o

auxiliary building new and spent fuel handling cranes.

- nWh Rueamn Cenar A Duimen of The Fresuen casame l

l TER-C550 C-3 44/345

)

b.

Evaluation and Conclusion The Licensee's conclusions concerning the load handling systems at the D. C. Cook plant that are subject to the general guidelines are consistent l

with NUREG-0612.

2.1.2 Safe Load Paths (Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(1))

" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact.

These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.

Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

a.

Summary of Licensee Statements and conclusions The Licensee has provided drawings which identify the location of safe shutdown equipment and load handling areas. Safe load paths are being developed fo'r the individual heavy loads and will be incorporated into the l

appropriate procedures as soon as possible. These component-specific safe i

load paths remain within the indicated load handling areas and are based on the general concept of handling heavy loads as close to the operating floor as is feasible in order to minimize.the potential load drop impact energy, and with the maximum possible horizontal separation from spent fuel.

In cases where loads must pass over the reactor vessel, the safe load path is established by considering the minimum time spent over the reactor vessel, the minimum height required for obstacle clearance, and the minimum number of crane operations which require load direction changes.

l This approach of using component-specific safe load paths contained l

within the handling or maintenance procedure for each individual component was I

developed in lieu of providing fixed load paths on facility structures such as markings on floors, walls, and crane rails or supports. In lieu of permanent floor marxings, the maintenance supervisor or leadman will direct the crane O fj!.M Franklin Research Center A ChuleseR el The Fresman sumane

,,. _, _ _ -. -,. _,. -. _ _,.. _ _, _. _ - _.. _ _ _. _ _.. _ _ _ _. _.,,. -,.., _, _,. -. _,, _, _, - _ _, _.. _.,. _ _ _, ~. _., _

TER-C5506-344/345 operator and will be responsible for ensuring that heavy load handling remains within the established safe load paths. The Licensee states that, as load handling and repair procedures are revised, they will be reviewed to ensure that the signalman's responsibilities are clearly defined.

The circulating water pump and screen house crane has within its operating area only one set of safety-related equipment, the essential service water (ESW) pumps. Each of these pumps is individually located inside its own enclosed room. The crane's safe load path covers the entire area except that portion over the ESW pumps room. With the exception of a lift pertaining to the ESW pumps o; for storage on the ESW pumps room roof, there is no need or reason for a lift to pass over the ESW pumps room. This room was designed to withstand the impact of the crane falling on it while carrying a 30-ton load.

Therciore, the ESW pumps are protected from all credible load drops. A maintenance head instruction (MHI) will be prepared to address storage of heavy loads on the enclosure of the ESW pumps. The ESW p u p maintenance procedure will be revised to prevent movement of any heavy load cver an ESW pump that is in service.

For circumstances requiring deviations from established safe loc.d handling paths, an alternate safe load path will be formulated and temporarily incorporated into the handling procedure as provided in the plant manager's instruction PMI-2010. Review and approval by the plant safety review committee will be secured prior to deviation from established load paths.

Miscellaneous loads within the reactor containment building will normally be handled only when the missile shields are in place over the reactor vessel and will follow the general safe load path guidelines previously stated.

In the auxiliary building, miscellaneous loads will be handled as prescribed in procedure 12MIP 5021.001.036, " Control of Heavy Loads in the Auxiliary Building."

b.

Evaluation Development and use of component-specific load paths for individual heavy loads is consistent with the intent of this guideline:

to develop individual g

..['J Frankun Research Center o= w w P====

umma.

,______.._--_...__.-~._,___.O...c-,

._,m... _. -.. _,

TER-C550 6-344/345 load paths for heavy loads based upon review by engineering staff familiar with plant layout and system functions.

In addition, the use of load handling areas which encompass these load paths and lif't-height restrictions provides an additional factor of safety when handling these loads. Although no mention i

is made of load path drawings, it is assumed that drawings or equivalent agasures are used, based upon the Licensee's statement that the component-specific load paths are contained within procedures for individual heavy loads. Regarding deviations from these load paths, the Licensee states that, i

if required, PMI-2010 provides guidance to formulate an alternate path and directs temporary incorporation into the handling procedure; verification has been made that a formal review of this temporary deviation will be conducted by the plant safety review committee.

In addition, the use of the maintenance supervisor /leadman to direct load movements is an acceptable alternative to load path marking. The Licensee indicates that the duties and responsibilities of the maintenance supervisor relative to load handling will be specifically delineated in appropriate i

procedures to ensure that load movement is controlled within the established i

safe load paths.

+

The establishment of an exclusion area over the ESW pump room in lieu of safe load paths for the loads handled by the circulating water pump and screenhouse crane is acceptable because the excluded area is small and well defined. In addition, proper adminstrative controls have been implemented to control movement and storage of iteavy loads in the vicinity of the ESW pump enclosure.

c.

Conclusion Safe load pr.ths have been implemented at Cook Units 1 and 2 in a manner consistent with the requirements of Guideline 1 of NUREG-0612.

2.1.3 Loac Handling Procedures (Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(2)]

" Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loans that are or could be handled over or in proximity to J

..2a F enWin Research Center A Chaman of The Frauen guEtat

____L_.-.__---__.____-._____...,

TER-C5506-344/345 irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.

These procedures should includes identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance cri.teria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."

a.

Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions A detailed list of heavy loads and procedures governing the handling of each load has been supplied by the Licensee, who has stated that these proceduren partially comply with the recommendations of NUREG-0612. As the safe load paths are incorporated into procedures, additional updating will be performed to include equipment identification, inspection and acceptance criteria, step-by-step load handling sequences, and special precautions.

Also, spent fuel cask handling procedures will be developed when required and will conform to the requirements of NUREG-0612.

In addition, the Licensee stated (5):

"Each Essential Service Water Pump is accessed through the roof via its own ha,tchway. Since the exposed pump is already out for maintef nce there would be no change in system status if it was damaged. Therefore, there is no need for special procedures with respect to the Circulating Water Pump and Screen House Crane."

b.

Evaluation Load handling procedures for the auxiliary building crane and the polar crane at the D. C. Cook plant are consistent with the guidance in Section 5.1. l (2 ) of NUREG-0612 based on the Licensee's commitment to revise the listed procedures to include the following:

1.

safe load paths 2.

equipment identification 3.

inspection and acceptance criteria 4.

step-by-step load handling sequences 5.

special precautions.

-u-

.' k Fmakin Reumech Cemer

\\

a on.. w h. r

t TER-C5506-344/345 c.

Conclusion Implementation of load handling procedures at D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 is consistent with requirements of NUREG-0612, Guideline 2 in the auxiliary and reactor buildings on the basis of the Licensee's commitment to revise load handling procedures as indicated.

2.1.4 Crane Operator Training [ Guideline 3, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(3))

" Crane operators should be trained, qualified and conduct th,emselves in accordance wita Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976, Overhead and Gantry Cranes' (9).*

a.

Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions A Licensee review of crane operacor skill training lessons, quality control inspection procedures, and the safety manual used at the D. C. Cook plant for operator training, qualifications, and conduct was performed in comparison to the provisions of Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976.

In some instances, ANSI standard items are not specifically addressed, but no stated exceptions are taken. An MHI will be prepared to address ANSI B30. -1974 on operator training.

b.

Evaluation Crane operator training at the D. C. Cook plant is consistent with Section 5.1.1(3) of NUREG-0612 based on the point-by-point review of ANSI B30.2-lS76, Chapter 2-3.

Further, the Licensee has committed to prepare an MEI to fully address ANSI B30.2-1976 regarding operator training.

i c.

Conclusion Conduct of crane operator training at D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 will be performed in a manner consistent with Guideline 3 when the MEI has been prepared and implemented.

12 -

'.Tu Frenidin Research Center A h of Die /m insmage vi--w e

,+ --

cw=d*m rve

+-

---e-ve--=

u--y-wwe--wp-u--4-wt-ywmue e-egT--e--r----in--ey

.uw---

• e--yema--ev we--w---e'--e-

---gi---o7e*u-te wm MW9

--pWc-w-r+-

TER-C550 6-344/345 2.1.5 Special Lif ting Devices { Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(4)]

"Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelin'es of ANSI N14.6-1978,

' Standard fcr Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [10]. This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirerants in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteris-tics of the crane which will be used. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device."

a.

Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has, identified the follewing special lif ting devices to be subject to compliance with the requirements of NUREG-0612 and ANSI N14.6-1978:

o reactor vessel head lift rig o reactor vessel internals lift rig o load cell and load cell linkage o radiation protection shield lift beam o missile shield lifting beam.

A detailed evaluation has been performed of the reactor vessel head and internals lif t rigs to determine compliarl.e with requirements of ANSI N14. 6-1978.

Regarding design compliance of the head and internals lif t rigs, the Licensee concludes that requirements for design, fabrication, and quality assurance are generally in agreement. ANSI criteria for stress limits associated with certain stress design factors are adequately satisfied with noted exceptions. The following are brief discussions of ANSI design requirements:

l.

Designer's Responsibilities - No design specification was prepared.

However, review of drawings and purchase documents has noted the following:

o Mate 2ial specifications of most critical load path components refer to ASTM, ASME, or other special listed requirements. 4s dd Franicin Research Center

• :w=

• w e,

,,, - - -, -,. -, -,- -..- - - --- - ---~

TER-C5506-344/345 '

o Welding was specified to be in accordance with Boiler and Pressure vessel (B&PV) Code Section IX.

o Special nondestructive examination (NDE) was specified for critical load path items.

Letters of compliance for materials and specifications were required o

for verification with original specifications.

In addition, a stress report was not originally r. quired but has been prepared, as has a critical items list.

2.

Design Criteria - As previously noted, a stress design report has been prepared to demonstrate the capability of these devices to satisfy ANSI criteria. High-strength material was used for critical items such as pins and the Icad cell. Although fracture toughness was not determined, materials were selected on the basis of their fracture toughness characteristics.

Drop weighc and Charpy impact tests were not performed; however, material specification of the upper and lower clevis of the internals lif t rig required selection in accordance with an ASME specification requiring Charpy tests.

Stress design facters of the reactor vessel head lif t rig and load cell are in compliance with ANSI N14.6-1978.

The internals lift rig is in compliance with ANSI N14.G-1978, with the exceptions of the hook side plate, the lower clevis, and the lower clevis spacer. The hook side plate exceeds the allowable yield stress by 10% but satisfies the ANSI ultimate stress requirements. The lower clevis and spacer do not satisfy ANSI yield or ultimate stress requirements but are designed in accordance with AISC allowable ratios. The Licensee does not believe these design deficiencies to be of significance since the design of the device is based upon the weight of the lower internals, which is approximately twice the weight of the heavy load of concern (the upper internals). Therefore, when considering the upper internals, stresses would be reduced by 50% and are considered to be within the ANSI criteris for stress design fact' ors.

3.- Fabrication - A formal quality assurance program was not specifically r equired. However, quality control requirements originally imposed by the manufacturer, including welding procedures, n.aterials compliance, in-process

. Dj FranWin Research Center 4c nerne % mm

TER-C5506-344/345 checks, and inspections, provide reasonable assurances of confornance with' the design specification.

In the areas of testing and continuing compliance, the Licensee states that the lif ting devices are not in strict compliance with ANSI requirements.

Maintenance and inspection procedures will be revised to incorporate ANSI requirements. Operations and maintenance instructions will be reviewed to ensure that appropriate records of repairs and testing are maintained.

Initial acceptance testing of these devices required only a 100% load test for 30 minutes, visual inspections during the load test, and subsequent NCE of all critical welds. No annual inspections are intended by the Licensee, who states that a 10-year program o' NCE of load-bearing welds will be conducted similar to that identified in the B&PV Code for Class 2 supports.

No dimensional checks will be perfor:ned due to the size of the structures involved (14 ft diameter by 40 f t high). Other checks of critical load path components (i.e., pins) are not included in this progren as examination would require disassembly.

For the radiation protection shield and missile shield lifting beam's, which have factors of safety of 1.5 and 2.0, respectively, new lif t beam assemblies have been designed. A new missile shield lifting beam will be purchased. The Licensee is currently evaluating purchase of a new radiation protection shield lifting beam or modifications to reinforce the existing lifting beam.

b.

Evaltation Information provided by the Licensee indicates that these lif ting devices were designed, fabricated, and tested in a manner that provides load handlir.g reliability consistent with that of ANSI N14.6-1978.

Fur ther, it is agreed that the stress design factors of the internals lif t rig are consistent with ANSI requirements for the lifting device of concra:n.

Eegarding acceptance and continuing compliance testing, the Licensee's programs satisfactorily demonstrate the reliability of the special lif ting devices. Althougn a 150% load test was not performed, the use of a 100% load -

RJ Franidin Research Center 4m ew

~

i TER-C5506-344/345 test, a relatively simple design, and fabrication records of all critical welds on the devices provides a similar degree of reliability. The Licensee's proposed inspection program over a 10-year period is also consistent with ANSI requirements based upon the limited use of these devices.

The Licensee's proposed actions for the missile shield and radiation pro-tection shield lifting beams are also consistent with ANSI requirenents. The Licensee should ensure that testing and continued compliance programs for the new or modified devices are in accordance with the programs identified above.

c.

Conclusion Design and continued compliance testing of special lifting devices at' D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 are consistent with the requirements of Guideline 4.

2.1.6 Lifting Devices (Not Scecially Designed) (Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(5)]

" Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings' (111 However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used shculd be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the

• sling should be in terms of the static load' which produces the maximum static and dynamic lead. Where this restricts slings to use on enly certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cre es with which they may be used."

a.

Summarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Routine lifting devices (slings, ropes, chains, etc.) follow the guide-lines set forth in Handbook for Riggers by W. G. Newberry, revised edition, 1977. This handbook meets the intent of ANSI B30.9-1971.

At present, slings at the Cook plant are selected after the rigger has estimated the load weight to be lifted and the rigging arrangement that is to be used.

l l

Lifting capacity of the wire rope slings is identified by the diameter of rope and lifting arrangement charts peceided at each crib. The Tuflex slings are color-coded according to capacity, and the nylon straps are rated by width 16-EU F snnlin Researen Center 4 >

.t nw r-F-*-

c--

yw -

--c-e p

.-A-.w w-iy-~

.e-

--p.-+rw*-f

.-w-- - -. - -,

i-e nu.e.-.

-we,----wy-wey--mea--ee+y

--*vy--wp.-

--w

-wow.m.w,-c 9.we

,-i-4ye7-w-

.we-.--we

TER-C550 6-344/345 for their lif ting capacities. Ropes and slings throughout the plant are generally used for 'one particular job (i.e., turbine work, vertical walls, missile blocks, etc.) and are stored in the general area close to the equipment that is lifted.

Marking of slings would require a great deal of time and effort and wo'11d not completely eliminate the possibility of selecting an incor' rect sling.

Further, markings on nylon slings would become obscured as they accumulate grease.

It is the Licensee's opinion that "any further marking of tha slings will not provide further assurance of the proper sling being chosen for a particular task."

In addition, the Licensee does not believe that it is practical or necessary to account for a dynamic load factor. Presumably, if such a factor were a real safety concern, the universally accepted ANSI standards would require it.

This belief is based on the following factors:

first, the hoisting speeds at the Cook plant are relatively slow and any contribution from a dynamic effect would not be significant; second, critical lifts (e.g.,

reactor vessel head or missile shield) are always done at very slow speeds.

b.

Evaluation The D. C. Cook plant substantially satisfies the requirements of this guideline on the basis that slings are selected and used in accordance with ANSI B30.9-1971. A review of available information indicates that the maximum hoist speeds for the cranes subject to NUREG-0612 are relatively slow:

o Polar crane main hoist - 4.75 fpm auxiliary hoist - 31 fpm o Auxiliary building crane main hoist - 4.5 fpm auxiliary hoist - 35 fpm o Circulating water pump and screen house crane - 18.75 fpm.

. Os

.00 Franklin."Research Center a ca n

n

TER-C5506-344/345 Therefore, dynamic loads imposed on these slings are reasonably small and may be disregarded when determining the static load to be used when selecting and using slings.

Use of wire rope diameter or nylon sling width is an acceptacle means of determining sling capacity; however, the Licensee should ensure that this determination is based upon the tables contained in ANSI B30.9-1971.

c.

Conclusion Installation and use of slings at the D. C. Cook plant are performed in a manner consistent with Guideline 5 of NUREG-0612.

2.1.7 Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) (Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(611 "The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use wnere it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or wheie frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspecticn and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use)."

a.

Summarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has stated that crane inspection, testing, and maintenance at the D. C. Cook plant is primarily controlled by MHI 5030, the AEP safety manual, maintenance procedures, pre-operational test procedures, quality control inspection procedures, and the crane manufacturer's parts list and operation and maintenance instructions. These documents were reviewed against the criteria set forth in Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976. As a result of this evaluation, the Licensee considers crane inspection, testing, and maintenance to be in close agreement with ANSI B30.2 with few exceptions.

. f.dj Frankun Research Center aom n.#n r

-.-..-_,_.-_--.-..__._.m._-.,

m.-.

1 TER-C5506-344/345 Crane repair and maintenance have been restricted to those items described in Paragraph 2-2.3.3 (c) of ANSI B30.2-1976, and maintenance procedures will be upgraded to include these requirements. The maintenance outlined in Paragraphs 2-2.3.1 and 2-2.3.2, as well as the wire rope

, inspection, replacement, and maintenance of 2-2.4, will also be incorporated into appropriate maintenance procedures.

b.

Evaluation Crane inspection, testing, and maintenance at D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 is consistent with Guideline 6 in that the Licensee employs a program in close agreement with ANSI B30.2.

Crane raintenance procedures have been upgraded to incorporate the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976 for component repair and replacement (Articles 2-2.3.3.C, 2-2.3.1, 2-2.3.2) and wire rope maintenance (Articles 2-2.4.2 and 2-2.4.3).

c.

Conclusion Crane component inspection and testing programs at D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 are consistent with the requirements of Guideline 6 of NUREG-0612.

2.1.8 Crane Design [ Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(7)1 "The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' (12]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied."

a.

Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has stated that the auxiliary building crane, the two polar cranes, and the circulating water pump and screen house crane were designed and manufactured in 1969-1970 by the idhiting Corporation according to the guidelines of ECCI Specification 61 and ANSI B30.2-1967.

In order to

. dEJ F anklin Reseeren Center s es

. % r

., u.

TER-C5506-344/345 determine compliance, the specifications under which the cranes werc designed were compared item-by-item against the most recent versions of the present specifications.

The study addressing the ANSI standard and the resulting analysis of the cranes in the areas of discrepancy indicated that the cranes were in

~

compliance. The study comparing CMAA-70 and EOCI-61 was performed by Whiting Corporation and indicated twelve areas in which the cranes did not meet CMAA-70 (1975) design standards:

150/20-Ton Auxiliarv Buildino Crane 1.

"The drum pinion strength of the main hoist extra reduction gearing is exceeded by 8% and the gear durability is exceeded by 454."

Disposition - Load lifting will be limited to 75 tons maximum until the drum pinion and drum gear are replaced. Upon completion of component replacement, a load test will be performed to reestablish

~

crane capacity at 150 tons.

2.

"The main block bronze sheave bushing is overstressed by 28%."

Disposition - Whiting states that the 1,000-psi working pressure stated in CMAA-70, Rev. 75 is not related to any specific type of bearing material supplied. The existing bushings in the block sheaves are $79 bronzoid, which has an ultimate compressive stress rating of 10,000 psi; Whiting futher states that, at a safety factor of 5 as specified by CMAA-70, the bushing should be adequate for working loads up to compressive stresses of 2,000 psi. Therefore, the bushing is satisfactory.

3.

"The auxiliary hoist sheave material is Class 35 cast iron with an ultimate tensile strength of 35,000 psi, instead of the Class 40 cast iron with an ultimate tensile strength of 40,000 psi as specified in CMAA-70."

Disposition - Whiting states that sheaves are generally stressed in compression between their rope contact area and hub. Tensile stresses are usually of minor consequence at bearing hubs and at rope entry points in their flanges. The Licensee concurs that the sheave material is satisfactory.

4.

"The horsepower and torque rating of the auxiliary hoist motor is exceeded by 1.5% when handling a rated load of 20 tons."

_b hf k kf

. -.,.. ~, -,,., _, _. -.

TER-C550 6-344/345 Disposition - The horsepower and torque rating of the auxiliary hoist motor is exceeded because the weight of the load block was added to the 20-ton capacity of the hoist. The gears, bearings, and crake are all adequate for the additional load. Therefore, no modification is necessary sinco, at worst, the motor would stall when attempting to lift a full-capacity load.

5.

"The longitudinal stiffensrs are not located properly and do not meet moment of inertia requirements."

Disposition - Additional longitudinal stiffeners have been installed to conform to C.M -70 specifications.

6.

"In the event of an axle failure, the bridge end truck may drop 1-7/8 inch, instead of the allowed 1 inch."

Disposition - Bars have been welded to the end truck plates across the runway rail head near each bridge wheel to limit the potential end truck drop.

250/35 Ton Containment Polar Cranes 7.

"The auxiliary hoist sheave material is Class 35 cast iron with an ultimate tensile strength of 35,000 psi, instead of the Class 40 cast iren with an ultimate tensile strength of 40,000 psi as specified in CMAA-70."

Disposition - Same as Item 3 above; no modification is necessary.

8.

"The girder longitudinal stiffener is not located properly."

Disposition - According to the evaluation by Whiting, the location of the longitudinal stiffeners was determined by the weld length required to transfer bridge rail loadings through the intermediate short depth stiffeners to both webs of each girder, as well as the overall depth required in these short depth stiffeners tc transfer the rail load moment across the span between girder webs. Whiting believes that the longitudinal stiffener location specified in CMAA-70 has been established based on the extreme case where only full depth internal stiff 9ners may be used and that it neglects the reduction in effective unsupported web panel lengths provided by the short depth internal stiffeners. The Licensee concurs with Whiting 's conclusion that the probability of web buckling in this critical web compression area is reduced to an extent equal to or exceeding the reinforcement required by the present specification. Therefore, girder stiffener :nodification is not needed.

Jhb Franklin Researen Center 4 me w w

TER-C5506-344/345 30-Ton Circulating water Pumos and Screen House Crane 9.

"The hoist sheave material is ASTM A48 Class 35 cast iron instead of steel or ASTM A48-64 or later Class 40 iron, as specified in CMAA-70."

Disposition - A design change will be initiated to install new sheaves. Please note that the reason why the sheaves are being replaced on this crane but not on the containment polar cranes or on the auxiliary building crane is that the sheaves on the circulating water pump and screen house crane are smaller and thus the compression stress is larger.

10.

"The horsepower and torque rating of the hoist motor is exceeded by 4.75% when handlin; a rated load of 30 tons."

Disposition - The motor has a 70*C at 60 minutes temperature rise rating at the rated 40 hp.

At the required 41.9 hp, the motor has a 77*C temperature rise at 60 minutes. The CMAA standards for Class F insulation allow a 105'C temperature rise. Therefore, the motor will meet the temperature rise limitations and is adequate.

11.

"The required her.st brake torque exceeds the rated torque by 2%.*

Disposition - A design change will be initiated to modify the existing brake so that it will meet the required torque rating.

11.

"The longitudinal stiffeners do not meet the moment of inertia r equir ements. "

Disposition - A design change will be initiated to add longitudinal i

stiffeners to meet the acment of inertia requirements.

The above review indicates that the containment polar cranes are entirely adequate. Two modifications have been N de for the auxiliary building crane:

installation of additional longitudinal stiffeners and installation of bars to reduce end-truck drop.

The following modifications will be made to the circulating water pump and screenhouse crane:

(1) replacement of the hoist sheaves, (2) modification of the hoist brake, and (3) installation of additional longitudinal stiffeners.

b.

Evaluation Design of the polar cranes at D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 is consistent with Guideline 7 of NUREG-0612 since deviations frca CMAA-70 identified in the

. @A".; Fraeklin Research Center

~'

A Cammme af % 7'usuem ansamme

d TER-C5506-344/345 detailed analysis performed by the Licensee and by Whiting Corporation are not expected to result in crane reliability significantly less than that provided by full ccmpliance with CMAA-70.

The auxiliary building crane is not in verbatim compliance with the crane design criteria of CMAA-70; however, the Licensee has demonstrated the adequacy of the present design and has modified the longitudinal stiffeners and installed bars to reduce bridge end truck drop. The Licensee's intent to limit the auxiliary building crane to a 75-con maximum lif t (normally 150 tons maximum! until the drum pinion strength and gear durability questions are resolved is also consistent with Guideline 7.

Similarly, the circulating water pump and screen house crane is not in verbatim compliance with the crane design criteria of CMAA-70; again, however, the Licensee has demonstrated the adequacy of the current design and committed to the following modifications:

(1) the hoist sheaves will be replaced with stronger material, (2) the hoist brake design will be modified to improve braking torque, and (3) longitudinal stiffeners will be added to meet mcment of inertia requirements.

c.

Conclusion and Recommendations Design of the polar and the auxiliary building cranes at D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 is consistent with the requirements of Guideline 7 of NUPEG-0612.

Contingent upon completion of modifications proposed for the circulating water pump and screen house crane, design of this crane will also comply with this guideline. However, the auxiliary building crane should be restricted to a capacity of 75 tons until the drum pinion and gear are replaced.

2.2 INIT. RIM PROIECTION MEASURES The NBC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented at operating nuclear power plants to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy loads will be handled over the spent fuel pool and that measures exist to reduce the potential for accidental load drops to impact on fuel in the core or spent fuel pool. Four of the six interim measures of the report consist of general Guideline 1, Safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Load Handling e

_ _e

TER-C5506-344/345 Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training *; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance). The two remaining interim measures

~

cover the following criteria:

1.

Heavy load technica1' specifications 2.

Special review for. heavy loads handled over the core.

Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection measures are contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.

2.2.*

Technical Scecifications (Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 (1))

" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-prcof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,

' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building,' for PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2,

' Crane Travel,' for BWR's, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implemen-tation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1."

a.

Evaluation The Technical Specifications for D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 inc.ade a requirement in paragrcph 3.9.7 which prohibits the movement of loads in excess of 2500 lb over spent fuel in the storage pool.

Since the intent of this interim action is to limit the unnecessary movement of heavy loads over spent fuel in the storage pool, D. C. Cook Cnits 1 and 2 satisfy this requirement.

b.

Conclusion D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 comply with Interim Protection Measure 1.

2.2.2 A[ ministrative Controls [ Interim Protection Measures 2, 2, 4, and 5, EJEEG-0612, Sections 5.3 (2)-5.3 (5))

" Procedural or administrative measures (including safe load paths, load handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection]...

can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines cf Section 5.1 of (NUEEG-0612]."

e 2Jh Franklin Research Center A Osumen of Tne F*uuan m

+ $+*

b

((gf NE' * '%

IMAGE EVALUATION

<f ig k/f7p \\T $h/

ig,% e/'f,'f?

/g, TEST TARGET (MT-3)

,y g,,

+

s 1.0 lf 2 2 y lj ll!!lsa j,i ['

lim l.8 1.25 1.4 g

150mm 6"

1. ?%,

/b

• SF b///

'tk4;;&$h hp,

%v 1

TER-C5506-344/345 a.

Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Summaries of Licensee statements and conclusions are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7.

b.

Evaluations, Conclusions, and Recommendations Evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7.

2.2.3 Special Reviews for Heavy Loads Over the Core (Interim Protection Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 (6))

"Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include the following for these loads:

(1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise; (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (3 ) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been j

properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures usec in l

handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operations, and l

content of procedures."

a.

Evaluation 1

Although no information has been provided by the Licensee, it is apparent from the responses to Guidelines 2 and 3 that procedures for handling loads over the core and operator training have been reviewed and upgraded as appropriate. In addition, the design of polar cranes and special lifting devices at the D. C. Cook plant has been reviewed and found to comply with NUREG-0612.

b.

Conclusion l

The D. C. Cook plant complies with Interim Protection Measure 6.

. 4 t

DJ Frank 4in riesearen Center h wNrw

TER-C550 6-3 44/34 5 4

3.

CONCLUSION l

1 l

This summary is provided to consolidate the results of the evaluation contained in Section 2 concerning individual NBC staff guidelines into an overall evaluation of heavy load handling at D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2.

Overall conclusions and recommended Licensee actions, where appropria'te, are I

provided with respect to both general provisions for load handling (NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1) and completion of the staff recommendations for interim protection (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3).

3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR LOAD HANDLING The Nic staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for handling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent fuel, or in other areas where an accidental load drop could cam ga equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The intent of these guidelines is twofold. A plant conforming to these guidelines will have developed and implemented, through procedures and operator training, safe load travel paths such that, to the maximum extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. A plant conforming to these guidelines will also have provided sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system. As detailed in Section 2, it has been found that load handling operations at D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 can be expected to be conducted in a highly reliable manner consistent with the staff's objectives as expressed in these guidelines.

3.2 INTERIM PROTECTION.*EASURES In NUREG-0612, Section 5.3, the NBC staff has established certain measures that should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 is complete.

Specified measures include:

the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit

. '...d Franidin Research Center a on n.# m r

TER-C5dO 6-344/345 the handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool; compliance with Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load handling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure. The evaluation of information provided indicates that the Licensee has satisfactorily complied with the Interim Protection Measures.

e O

e...J F snkiin Researen Center acm nw n r

TER-C550 6-344/345 1

4.

REFERENCES 1.

NRC

" Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" July 1980 NUREG-0 612 2.

V. Stello, Jr. (NRC)

Letter to all Licensees

Subject:

Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel May 17,1978 3.

D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)

Letter to All Operating Reactors

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads December 22, 1980 4.

R. S. Hunter (IMEC)

Letter to H. R. Denton (NBC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads July 31, 1981 5.

R. S. Hunter (IMEC)

Letter to H. R. Denton (NBC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads June 18, 1982 6.

R. S. Hunter (IMEC)

Letter to H. R. Denton (NBC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads September 29, 1982 7.

M. P. Alexich (IMEC)

Letter to H. R. Denton (NBC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads July 5, 1983 8.

M. P. Alexich (IMEC)

Letter to H. R. Denton (NBC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads August 4,1983 9.

American National Standards Institute

" Overhead and Gantry Cranes" New York:

1976 ANSI B30.2-1976

. nklin Research Cer'er A Onamen af The Fw amumme

TER-C5506-344/345 10.

American National Standards Institute

" Standard for i,1f ting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" ANSI N14.6-1978 11.

American National Standards Institute

" Slings" ANSI B30.9-1971 12.

Crane Manufacturers Association of America, Inc.

" Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" Pittsburgn, PA CMAA-70 l

l l

i nkiin Research C.

4:n aw w r enter

__