SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Relief Requests 11 & 12 for Second 10-year Inservice Insp Interval for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3ML17313A900 |
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Palo Verde |
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Issue date: |
04/26/1999 |
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NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
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Shared Package |
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ML17313A899 |
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References |
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NUDOCS 9904280206 |
Download: ML17313A900 (7) |
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML17300B2991999-07-0808 July 1999 SER Accepting Exemption from Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for Plant,Units 1,2 & 3 ML17313A9001999-04-26026 April 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Relief Requests 11 & 12 for Second 10-year Inservice Insp Interval for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3 ML17313A8441999-03-0808 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to Replacement Requirements of Section III of ASME Code ML17313A7791999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Rev to Emergency Plan That Would Result in Two Less Radiation Protection Positions Immediatelu Available During Emergencies ML17313A7951999-02-0404 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensing Actions Associated with GL 92-08, Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers ML17313A7251998-12-23023 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 119 & 119 to Licenses NPF-41 & NPF-51,respectively ML20154N2751998-10-19019 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 119 to License NPF-74 ML17313A2331998-03-0404 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 115,108 & 87 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML17312B7351997-10-16016 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Licensee Request for Relief from Deferral of Reactor Vessel Exams for First 10-yr ISI Interval for Unit 1 ML20210T2251997-09-0404 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 105 to License NPF-51 ML17312B3301997-03-17017 March 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 111,103 & 83 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML17312B0161996-10-23023 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 109,101 & 81 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML17312A8031996-05-23023 May 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 108,100 & 80 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML17312A7731996-05-15015 May 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 107,99 & 79 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML17312A6751996-04-0505 April 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 105,97 & 77 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML20101Q1321996-04-0303 April 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 96 to License NPF-51 ML20101K3841996-03-26026 March 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 95 to License NPF-51 ML20101G8411996-03-23023 March 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 94 to License NPF-51 ML20095E2731995-12-0808 December 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 91 & 74 to Licenses NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML17311B1801995-09-0606 September 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 99,87 & 70 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML17311B1681995-09-0101 September 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 98,86 & 69 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-69,respectively ML17311B0401995-07-0606 July 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 94,82 & 65 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML17311A9591995-06-0202 June 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 92,80 & 63 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML17311A7181995-03-16016 March 1995 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Use of Code Case N-416-1 Provided That Addl Surface Exams Performed on Root Layer of Butt & Socket Welds on pressure-retaining Boundary of Class 3 Components When Surface Exam Method Used IAW Section III ML17311A3941994-11-0303 November 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 86,74 & 58 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML20076N3221994-11-0303 November 1994 Revised Safety Evaluation Re Amend 71 to License NPF-51 ML17311A3291994-10-0707 October 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 83,70 & 55 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML20137D7371994-09-0707 September 1994 Safety Evaluation Opposing Recommended Sys Mod to Install Automatic Feedwater Pump Trip ML20072G0201994-08-12012 August 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 65 to License NPF-51 ML17311A1871994-08-11011 August 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Request for Relief from ASME Code Requirements Re Charging Pumps ML17310B3581994-06-0707 June 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 77,63 & 49 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML17310B2351994-04-19019 April 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 74,60 & 46 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML17310B1851994-04-0606 April 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 73,59 & 45 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML20058H1321993-12-0303 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 58 to License NPF-51 ML17310A3421993-06-14014 June 1993 Safety Evaluation Re on-site Audit of Palo Verde Reload Analysis Methodology.Concludes That APS Staff Has Capability to Use CE Codes Under Discussion for non-LOCA Reload Analyses of CE-fueled PVNGS Cores ML17310A2691993-04-30030 April 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 70,56 & 43 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML17306B3661993-03-23023 March 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Actions to Resolve Postulated Rupture in Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Cooler ML17306B2281993-01-0404 January 1993 Sser Concluding That Load Testing of Alternate Ac Sources on Approx Yearly Basis Will Not Provide Sufficient Data Base to Demonstrate Required 95% Reliability of Gas Turbine Generators Under Load.Response Required ML17306B0671992-10-15015 October 1992 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 67,53 & 40 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML17306A9611992-09-0808 September 1992 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 64,50 & 37 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML17306A8041992-06-18018 June 1992 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 62,48 & 34 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML17306A6531992-04-0303 April 1992 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 61 to License NPF-41 ML17306A6691992-03-31031 March 1992 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 60,47 & 33 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74,respectively ML17306A5561992-03-0202 March 1992 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 57,44 & 30 to Licenses NPF-41,NPF-51 & NPF-74 ML17306A4641992-02-11011 February 1992 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 890414-910831 Responses & Proposed Method of Dealing W/Station Blackout Rule Contingent Upon Receipt of Confirmation That Recommendations Documented Will Be Implemented ML20083E5331991-09-19019 September 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 41 to License NPF-51 ML20082N0161991-08-27027 August 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 40 to License NPF-51 ML20077D4541991-05-20020 May 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 26 to License NPF-74 ML17305B3911991-03-12012 March 1991 Safety Evaluation Re Possible Interfacing Sys LOCA W/ Containment Bypass.Licensee Should Take Action to Provide Assurance That Radiological Consequences of HP Seal Cooler Tube Failure within Regulatory Acceptance ML20043B1951990-05-16016 May 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 34 to License NPF-51 1999-07-08
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17300B3811999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 991007 Ltr ML17300B3271999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3 05000528/LER-1999-002-01, :on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with1999-08-27027 August 1999
- on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with
05000528/LER-1996-009, :on 961027,identified That TS Violation May Have Occurred Due to Missed Surveillance Test.Caused by Personnel Error.Setpoint for Limit Switches for Valve 1SIAUV647 Corrected to Achieve 1-inch Stroke Length1999-08-18018 August 1999
- on 961027,identified That TS Violation May Have Occurred Due to Missed Surveillance Test.Caused by Personnel Error.Setpoint for Limit Switches for Valve 1SIAUV647 Corrected to Achieve 1-inch Stroke Length
ML17313B0611999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990810 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure 05000529/LER-1999-005, :on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure1999-07-16016 July 1999
- on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure
ML17300B2991999-07-0808 July 1999 SER Accepting Exemption from Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for Plant,Units 1,2 & 3 ML17300B3151999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With ML17313A9921999-06-21021 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990525,RMS mini-computer Was Removed from Service to Implement Yr 2000 Mod & Was OOS Longer than 72 H Allowed.Caused by Planned Y2K Mods.Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program Was Initiated ML17313A9911999-06-18018 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990510,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 2 Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Mineral Cable Connector to Accelerometer.Licensee Will Implement Modifications Which Will Enhance loose-part Detection Sys ML17313A9731999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 05000529/LER-1999-004, :on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs1999-05-0707 May 1999
- on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs
ML17313A9201999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With ML17313A9001999-04-26026 April 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Relief Requests 11 & 12 for Second 10-year Inservice Insp Interval for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3 05000528/LER-1999-003, :on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked1999-04-14014 April 1999
- on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked
ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc 05000530/LER-1998-003-02, :on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc1999-04-13013 April 1999
- on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc
05000528/LER-1999-001-02, :on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with1999-04-0909 April 1999
- on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with
ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17313A8801999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990412 Ltr ML17300B3071999-03-31031 March 1999 Seismic Portion of Submittal-Only Screening Review of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units Ipeee. ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML20207H7471999-03-10010 March 1999 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise 99-E-AEV-03003 ML17313A8441999-03-0808 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to Replacement Requirements of Section III of ASME Code 05000529/LER-1999-001-01, :on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With1999-03-0101 March 1999
- on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With
ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A8501999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.With 990311 Ltr ML17313A7791999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Rev to Emergency Plan That Would Result in Two Less Radiation Protection Positions Immediatelu Available During Emergencies ML17313A7951999-02-0404 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensing Actions Associated with GL 92-08, Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers ML17313A8061999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990218 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised 05000528/LER-1996-008, :on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised1999-01-15015 January 1999
- on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised
ML17313A7381998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990113 Ltr ML20206H2101998-12-31031 December 1998 SCE 1998 Annual Rept ML17313A7251998-12-23023 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 119 & 119 to Licenses NPF-41 & NPF-51,respectively ML17313A7031998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Pvngs,Unit 1,2 & 3. with 981209 Ltr ML17313A6701998-11-0404 November 1998 Rev 2 to PVNGS Unit 2 Colr ML17313A6741998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 981109 Ltr ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements 05000528/LER-1998-008, :on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements1998-10-24024 October 1998
- on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements
ML20154N2751998-10-19019 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 119 to License NPF-74 ML17313A6561998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for PVNGS Units 1,2 & 3.With 981007 Ltr 05000530/LER-1998-002-02, :on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired1998-09-14014 September 1998
- on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired
ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters 05000529/LER-1998-003, :on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters1998-09-0808 September 1998
- on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters
ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr 05000530/LER-1998-001-02, :on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to Svc1998-08-28028 August 1998
- on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to Svc
1999-09-30
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2055&4001 SAFETY EVALUATIONBYTHE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATEDTO INSERVICE INSPECTION RELIEF RE UESTS NOS. 11 AND 12 ARIZONAPUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ET AL.
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS.
1 2 AND3 DOCKET NOS. STN 50-528 STN 50-529 AND STN 50-530
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Re ulations (10 CFR), Section 50:55a, requires that inservice inspection (ISI) of certain American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Code) and applicable addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i).
In 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3), it states that alternatives to the requirements of paragraph (g) may be used, when authorized by the NRC, if(1) the proposed alternatives would provide an acceptable level of quality and safety or (2) compliance with the specified requirements would result in hardship or unusual difficultywithout a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4), ASME Code Class 1,'2, and 3 components (including supports) shall meet the requirements, except the design and access provisions and the pre-service examination requirements, set forth in the ASME Code,Section XI, "Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components," to the extent practical within the limitations of design, geometry, and materials of construction of the components.
The regulations require that inservice examination of components and system pressure tests conducted during the first 10-year interval and subsequent intervals comply with the requirements in the latest edition and addenda of Section XI of the ASME Code incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a(b) 12 months prior to the start of the 120-month interval, subject to the limitations and modifications listed therein. The applicable edition of Section XI of the ASME Code for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS), Units 1, 2, and 3, for the second 10-year ISI interval is the 1989 Edition.
By letters dated April20 and 21, 1999, Arizona Public Service Company (the licensee) requested approval to use two alternatives to the requirements of Section XI to the ASME Code, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i).
Relief Request No. 11 requests approval to use an alternative to IWA-5242(a) of Section XI to the ASME Code, which requires that insulation be removed from pressure-retaining bolted connections during the pressure test of systems borated for reactivity control. The proposed alternative would-allow insulation removal and visual examination of the bolted connections to be done earlier in the refueling outage while the system is depressurized.
Relief Request No. 12 requests approval to use an altem'ative to IWA-5250(a) which requires that bolting be removed and visually inspected when leakage is detected at a bolted connection during
'P904280206 990426 PDR ADOCK 05000528 P
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I the conduct of the system pressure test. The proposed alternative would allow an evaluation of other factors concerning the leakage joint as a possible alternative to disassembly and visual examination of the bolting.
2.0
. EVALUATIONOF RELIEF RE UESTS 2.1 Relief Re uest No. 11 - Examination of Bolted Connections on Class 1 Borated S stems Used for Reactivi Control ASME Code,Section XI, IWA-5242(a), requires that insulation shall be removed from pressure-retaining bolted c'onnections for VT-2 visual examination in systems borated for the purpose of controlling reactivity. This examination is to be performed once every refueling outage at a test pressure not less than the nominal operation pressure associated with 100 percent rated reactor power.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i), the licensee has proposed the following alternative to the Code requirement to remove insulation at bolted connections for VT-2 examination during system pressure testing (as stated):
PVNGS will perform a system pressure test and VT-2 examination each refueling outage without removal of insulation.
In addition PVNGS willremove insulation from the bolted connections, and perform a VT-2 visual examination each refueling outage but the connections willnot be required to be pressurized for this examination.
This alternative is consistent with Code Case N-533.
C The licensee's proposed alternative is equivalent to Code Case N-533, Alternative Requirements for VT-2 Visual Examinafj'on of Class 1 Insulated Pressure-Retaining Bolted Connections,Section XI, Division 1. The licensee's proposed alternative provides a thorough approach to ensuring the leak-tight integrity of systems borated for the purpose of controlling reactivity. First, the visual examination during the pressure test provides a means of detecting any significant leakage with the insulation in place.
Second, by removing the insulation each refueling outage, the licensee willbe able to detect minor leakage indicated by the presence of boric acid crystals or residue.
This two-phase approach provides an acceptable level of quality and safety for bolted connections in borated systems.
Therefore, the licensee's proposed alternative is authorized pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i) for use on Class 1 systems for the remainder of the second 10-year ISI interval.
2.2 Relief Re uest No. 12 - Examination of Code Class 1 2 and 3 Pressure-Retainin Bolted Connections ASME Code,Section XI, IWA-5250(a)(2), requires that ifleakage occurs at a bolted connection in ASME Section XI components, the bolting shall be removed, VT-3 examined for corrosion, and evaluated in accordance with IWA-3100. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i),
the licensee proposed to use alternative requirements regarding corrective actions for leakage at bolted connections in lieu of the examination requirements defined in IWA-5250(a)(2). The licensee stated:
e PVNGS proposes the following alternative methodology to the requirements of IWA-5250(a), either the requirements of (a) or (b) below willbe met for leakage at bolted connections:
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It (a) The leakage shall be stopped, and the bolting and component material shall be evaluated forjoint integrity as described in (c) below.
(b) Ifthe leakage is not stopped, the joint shall be evaluated in accordance with IWB-3142.4 forjoint integrity. This evaluation shall include the considerations listed in (c) below.
(c) The evaluation for (a) and (b) above, is to determine the susceptibility of the bolting to corrosion and failure. This evaluation will, at a minimum, consider the following factors:
(1)
The number and service age of bolts, (2)
Bolt and component material, (3)
Corrosiveness of the process fluid, (4)
Leakage location and system function, (5)
Leakage history at connection or other system components, and (6)
Visual evidence of corrosion at connection (while the connection is assembled).
Ifthe evaluation of the variables above indicates the need for further,evaluation, then a bolt closest to the source of leakage shall be removed.
The bolt will receive a VT-1 examination and be evaluated and dispositioned in accordance with IWB-3517 of the ASME Code,Section XI. Ifthe removed bolting shows evidence of rejectable degradation, all remaining bolts shall be removed and receive a VT-1 examination in accordance with IWB-3140. Ifthe leakage is identified when the bolted connection is in service and the information in the engineering evaluation is supportive, the removal of the bolt for the VT-1 examination may be deferred until the next refueling outage..
In accordance with IWA-5250(a)(2), ifleakage occurs at a bolted connection, the bolting must be removed, VT-3 visually examined for corrosion, and evaluated in accordance with IWA-3100. In lieu of this requirement, the licensee has proposed to evaluate the bolting to determine its susceptibility to corrosion. The proposed evaluation willconsider, as a minimum, bolting materials, the corrosive nature of the process fluid, the leakage location and history, the service age of the bolting materials, visual evidence of corrosion at the assembled conhection and plant/industry studies of similar bolting materials in similar environments.
Based on the items included in the evaluation process, the staff determined that the evaluation proposed. by the licensee presents a sound engineering approach and provides an acceptable level of quality and safety.
In addition, ifthe initial evaluation indicates the need for a more detailed analysis, the bolt nearest to the source of leakage willbe removed, visually examined, and evaluated in accordance with IWB-3517. Therefore, the licensee's proposed alternative is authorized pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i) for the remainder of the second 10-year ISI interval.
~ 3.0 CONCLUSION The staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal and concludes that the licensee's proposed alternatives willprovide an acceptable level of quality and safety.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i), both relief requests are authorized for the remainder of the second 10-year ISI interval.
Principal Contributor: Mel B. Fields Date: April26, 1999
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