ML17305B141

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Forwards Page 7 of LER 90-003-01,inadvertently Omitted from 900929 Rept
ML17305B141
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 10/05/1990
From: James M. Levine
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17305B142 List:
References
192-00698-JML-T, 192-698-JML-T, NUDOCS 9010260267
Download: ML17305B141 (6)


Text

ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTFMTION SYSTEM REGULAT(Q INFORMATION DISTRZBUTZONOi'STEM (RIDE)

ACCESSION NBR:9010260267 DOC.DATE: 90/10/05 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi 05000529 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Forwards Page 7 of LER 90-003-01,inadvertently omitted from 900929 rept.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: ZE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR g ENCL Q SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Standardized plant. 05000529 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 PETERSONFS. 1 1 TRAMMELLFC. 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFBll 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB SD 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E 1 1 NBR//DST:SPLBSDI 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1

~BEG FILE~0:2+ 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN5 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCE,J.H 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYSFG 1 1 NSIC MURPHYFG.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTES: 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACI'HE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK.

ROOM PI-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 34 ENCL 34

Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O, BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072-2034 192-00698-JML/TRB/RKR JAMES M. LEVINE VICE PRESIDENT October 5, 1990 NUCLEAR PRODUCTION U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Mail Station Pl-37 Washington, DC 20555

Reference:

Letter from J . M. Levine, Vice President Nuclear Production, 'APS,

~

to Document Control Desk, NRC, dated September 29, 1990 (192-00694'-JML/TRB/RKR)

Dear Sirs:

Sub) ect: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50-529 (License No. NPF-51)

Licensee Event Report 90-003-01 File: 90-020-404 Attached please find Page 7 of 7 to Supplement Number 1 to Licensee Event Report (LER) No.90-003 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73. This page was inadvertantly omitted from the report mailed to your, office on September 29, 1990. A complete copy of the report is enclosed for your reference.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (602) 393-2521.

Very truly yours, JML/TRB/RKR/dmn Attachment

'7010260267 90f005 PDR ADOCK 05000528

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NRC FOAM36fA U.S. NUCLEAR AEGULATORY COIAMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.3(50dlOB (669) 6 XPI R ES: 6/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PEA RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECOADS TEXT CONTINuATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (PCi30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150d106), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITYNAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LEA NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR X(g SEOUENTIAL;BIO NUM ER REVISION NUMBER Palo Verde Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 9 9 0 003 OF TEXT ///m<<o NNOB /I r<</Irr)<</ IrJO Oddro'ooo///RC F<<m 366AB/ (17) sample system. Implementation of this change is expected by December 1990. Since this change has not been installed in the unit, it did not prevent the event described in this LER.

3. LER 530/88-007 described an event where the alternate sampling system for the Condenser Vacuum Pump/Gland Seal Exhaust Radiation Monitor (RU-141) became electrically disconnected from a nearby electrical outlet and thus,'rendered inoperable. As action to prevent recurrence, the involved individual was counseled, additional training was performed, and enhanced labeling for the sample cart was developed. The counseling, training, and labeling would not have prevented the event described in this LER.

4, LER 528/89-003 described an event where the alternate sampling system for the Fuel Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor (RU-145) became inoperable when the circuit breaker opened. As corrective action to prevent recurrence, a Design Modification was issued to supply dedicated power to the alternate sample system.

Implementation of this change is expected by December 1990. Since this change has not been installed in the unit, it did not prevent this event.

LER 529/89-005 described an event where the alternate sampling system for the Normal Plant Ventilation Radiation Monitor (RU-143) became inoperable when the circuit breaker opened due to an overload condition. As corrective action to prevent recurrence, a Design Modification was issued to supply dedicated power to the alternate sample system. Implementation of this change is expected by December 1990. Since this change has not been installed in the unit, it did not prevent this event.

Additionally as an interim corrective action in LER 89-005, PASP equipment was to be electrically powered such that a loss of this power would provide an alarm in the control room. Preplanned bus outages during the refueling outage resulted in loss of power to several radiation monitors. In accordance with TS ACTION requirements, PASP equipment was placed in service to provide alternate sampling for the monitors out of service. However, the alarm computer in the control room has limited capacity and could not accept all of the alarms. The alternate sample cart for radiation monitor RU-145 was not connected to the alarm computer in the control room since other higher priority PASP equipment were connected instead. Therefore, this corrective action did not prevent this event.

NRC Form 366A (669)

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