LER 92-035-01:on 920715,determined That Test Instructions Insufficient to Demonstrate Operability of SDV Vent & Drain Valves.Caused by Personnel Error & Insufficient Test Instructions.Computer Points Corrected & Procedures ChangedML17289A901 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Columbia ![Energy Northwest icon.png](/w/images/7/7c/Energy_Northwest_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
10/01/1992 |
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From: |
Reis M WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
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To: |
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Shared Package |
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ML17289A900 |
List: |
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References |
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LER-92-035, LER-92-35, NUDOCS 9210080229 |
Download: ML17289A901 (8) |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997 LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997 LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995 LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995 LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995 LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr 1999-07-20
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997 LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997 LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995 LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995 LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995 LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr 1999-07-20
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17284A9001999-10-31031 October 1999 Rev 0 to COLR 99-15, WNP-2 Cycle 15,COLR GO2-99-177, LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With1999-10-0101 October 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With ML17284A8941999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for WNP-2.With 991012 Ltr ML17284A8801999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for WNP-2.With 990910 Ltr ML17284A8691999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for WNP-2.With 990813 Ltr ML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B7271999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for WNP-2.With 990707 Ltr ML17292B6961999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for WNP-2.With 990608 Ltr ML17292B6641999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for WNP-2.With 990507 Ltr ML17292B6391999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for WNP-2.With 990413 Ltr ML17292B5871999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for WNP-2.With 990311 Ltr ML17292B5571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for WNP-2.With 990210 Ltr ML17292B5621999-01-31031 January 1999 Rev 1 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2 Cycle 14 Colr. ML17292B5341999-01-15015 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Incorrect Modeling of BWR Lower Plenum Vol in Bison.Defect Applies Only to Reload Fuel Assemblies Currently in Operation at WNP-2.BISON Code Model for WNP-2 Has Been Revised to Correct Error ML17292B5331999-01-15015 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re XL-S96 CPR Correlation for SVEA-96 Fuel. Defect Applies Only to WNP-2,during Cycles 12,13 & 14 Operation.Evaluations of Defect Performed by ABB-CE ML17292B4791998-12-31031 December 1998 Washington Public Power Supply Sys 1998 Annual Rept. with 981215 Ltr ML17292B5351998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for WNP-2.With 990112 Ltr ML17292B5741998-12-31031 December 1998 WNP-2 1998 Annual Operating Rept. with 990225 Ltr ML17284A8231998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for WNP-2.With 981207 Ltr ML17284A8081998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for WNP-2.With 981110 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7831998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for WNP-2.With 981007 Ltr ML17284A7491998-09-10010 September 1998 WNP-2 Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Refueling Outage RF13 Spring,1998. ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7681998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for WNP-2.With 980915 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7261998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for WNP-2.W/980810 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6751998-06-30030 June 1998 Ro:On 980617,flooding of RB Northeast Stairwell with Consequential Flooding of Two ECCS Pump Rooms.Caused by Inadequate Fire Protection Sys Design.Pumped Out Water from Affected Areas to Point Below Berm Areas of Pump Rooms ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17284A6491998-05-31031 May 1998 Rev 0 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2,Cycle 14 Colr. ML17292B4031998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for WNP-2.W/980608 Ltr ML17292B3921998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for WNP-2.W/980513 Ltr ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3371998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for WNP-2.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2641998-03-0404 March 1998 Performance Self Assessment,WNP-2. ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B2911998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for WNP-2.W/980313 Ltr ML17284A7971998-02-17017 February 1998 Rev 28 to Operational QA Program Description, WPPSS-QA-004.With Proposed Rev 29 ML17292B3591998-02-12012 February 1998 WNP-2 Cycle 14 Reload Design Rept. 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
LICENSEE EVEN EPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUHB R ( ) PAGE (3)
Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 I DF TITLE (4)
INADEQUATETESTING OF THE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME VENT AND DRAIN VALVES DUE TO INSUFFICIENT TEST INSTRUCTIONS EVENT DATE 5 LER NUMBER 6 REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 6 YEAR YEAR -','SEQUENT IAL EV I 5 ION HONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET, NUMBERS(S)
HONTH DAY NUMBER UHBER 050 0 0 0 7 I 5 9 2 9 2 0 3 5 0 I 1 0 0 I 9 2 050 0 0 P ERAT ING HIS REPORT IS SUBHITTEO PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)
ODE (9) 4 POWER LEVEL 20.402(b) 20.405(C) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 77.71(b) 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.73(c) 0.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) THER (Specify in Abstract
- 0. 405(a) (1) ( I I I ) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) elow and in Text, NRC
'C.. ?:
20.405(a) (I) ( iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) orm 366A) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
TELEPMOHE NUMBER NAME REA CODE M. P. Reis, Compliance Supervisor -
5 0 9 7 7 4 1 5 2 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COHPOHENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IH THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE SYSTEH ,COMPONENT MANUFACTURER EPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEH COHPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE 0 NPRDS TO HPRDS e
SUPPLEHEHTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED SUBHISSION HOHTM DAY YEAR ATE (15)
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBHISSIOH DATE) X NO ssmAcl nm On July 15, 1992, two conditions involving test instructions that were not sufficient to demonstrate operability of the scram discharge volume (SDV) vent and drain valves were identified. These conditions involved 1) stroke time testing following a recent modification, and 2) the surveillance procedures used to satisfy Technical Specification stroke time requirements. It was also determined that the plant had operated with one valve, CRD-V-181, that exceeded stroke time limits.
The root causes for these conditions were: 1) incorrect incorporation of operability requirements into post-modification test instructions, and 2) development of surveillance procedures that were not technically adequate. Both conditions involved personnel errors. As corrective action, vent and drain, valves were adjusted and retested under a Special Test. Additionally, the surveillance procedure used to stroke time these valves will be corrected, a Technical Specification Amendment will be requested to allow performance of this testing in cold shutdown, plant surveillance procedures will be reviewed to verify acceptability, handling of plant deficiencies will be discussed in training, existing controls for post-modification and post-maintenance test plan changes will be reviewed and strengthened, and a description of the conditions involved in this report was.placed in required reading for engineers who are responsible for plant modification implementation.
The SDV vent and drain valves were able to close on demand, and at least one valve in each line was able to close within 30 seconds. Therefore, the conditions described in this report were not safety significant.
'72100S0229 921001 PDR ADOCK 050003c77 PDR
, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (Ol)
TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAHE (i) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 2 3 5 i 2 F 8 ITLE (4)
INADEQUATE TESTING OF THE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME VENT AND DRAIN VALVES DUE TO INSUFFICIENT TEST INSTRUCTIONS
~PI Ch i Power Level - 0%
Plant Mode - 4 (Shutdown)
Ev n De ri tion On July 15, 1992, two conditions involving test instructions that were not sufficient to demonstrate operability of the scram discharge volume (SDV) vent and drain valves were identified. The first of these conditions involved inadequate stroke time testing following a recent modification to all four of the scram discharge volume vent and drain valves. The second condition involved inadequacies in the surveillance procedure that has been used to satisfy the SDV vent and drain valve stroke time requirements of Technical Specification 4.1.3.1.4.a.l.
The post-modification testing and surveillance test procedure deficiencies were identified by a plant engineer during a follow-up evaluation that was initiated to investigate the results of a scheduled, post-scram surveillance that was performed on July 10, 1992. Based upon computer data obtained during a plant trip that occurred on July 6, 1992, the surveillance results indicated that one of the SDV drain valves, CRD-V-181, had not closed within the time required by Technical Specifications. The follow-up evaluation confirmed this observation: CRD-V-181 had required at least 33 seconds to close. Technical Specification 4.1.3.1.4.a. 1 requires that the SDV vent and drain valves must close within 30 seconds after receipt of a scram signal, from a rod density of ~50%.
Recognition that the post-modification instructions and surveillance test procedure used to stroke time the SDV vent and drain valves occurred concurrently, and coincided with identification of the excessive stroke time for CRD-V-181. As a result of these conditions, operability of CRD-V-181 was not assured during recent plant operations when it was required to be operable, and operability of the SDV vent and drain valves was not adequately demonstrated by testing during previous operating cycles.
Immediate orrective A ion Since the Plant was in Cold Shutdown when these conditions were discovered, and the SDV vent and drain valves are not required to be operable in this Operational Condition, no immediate actions were required.
. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TEXT CONTINUATION Q)
AGILITY NAHE (i) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (8) AGE (3)
C ear umber ev. No.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 2 3 5 1 3 F 8 ITLE (4)
INADE(UATE TESTING OF THE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME VENT AND DRAIN VALVES DUE TO INSUFFICIENT TEST INSTRUCTIONS Fu her Ev lu ti n n rrective Ac ion F herEv I ai n One of the conditions identified during the follow-up evaluation involved technically inadequate testing following a modification to the SDV vent and drain valves that was implemented during the previous refueling and maintenance outage (OT92). This outage ended shortly before the plant trip that occurred on July 6, 1992. The modification replaced existing needle valves in the air exhaust lines from the SDV vent and drain valves with needle valves that had better throttling characteristics. Stroke, times for the vent and drain valves are controlled by using these needle valves to throttle exhaust air from the pneumatic valve actuators.
Stroke time requirements for the SDV vent and drain valves are derived from two sources: 1) the WNP-2 ASME Section XI Pump and Valve Inservice Test Program Plan (P&V), and 2) the plant Technical Specifications. Following implementation of the needle valve modification, the only stroke time testing performed for the vent and drain valves prior to returning them to service was conducted in accordance with the procedure that is used to satisfy P&V stroke time requirements.
This testing was performed prior to Plant restart, and a baseline stroke time was obtained to support future testing.
The P&V test is based upon a WNP-2 request for relief that was previously reviewed and approved.
This relief recognizes site specific attributes of the WNP-2 SDV vent and drain valve position indication design. The SDV drain line and vent line are each equipped with a pair of valves that are arranged in series. Main control board red (open) and green (closed) position indicating lights are configured such that there is a single green light and a single red light for each pair of vent valves, and a single green light and a single red light each pair of drain valves.
As a result of this configuration, position indication lights for the SDV vent and drain valves do not provide position indication for individual vent and drain valves, Instead, these lights essentially provide indication of whether the associated vent or drain line is open or closed. The relief allows the combined position indication lights to be used for quarterly stroke time testing of the vent and drain valves; however, it only pertains to ASME Section XI testing requirements.
Although the test method employed by the P&V test procedure satisfies ASME testing requirements, it is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Technical Specification 4.1.3.1.4.a.l. Technical Specifications require that the vent and drain valves are individually tested, and that the period of time from receipt of a scram signal until the valves receive a closure signal is considered in the stroke time calculation. These factors are not considered in the P&V test procedure. Consequently, a separate procedure exists to demonstrate Technical Specification stroke time requirements.
, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LOI)'EXT CONTINUATION ACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 I 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 2 35 1 4 F 8 ITLE (4)
INADE(UATE TESTING OF THE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME VENT AND DRAIN VALVES DUE TO INSUFFICIENT TEST INSTRUCTIONS Testing requirements within the work package associated with the vent and drain valve modification were changed after approval to perform work on the modification was obtained. The change specified performance of the P&V test in lieu of the originally prescribed testing. This change was made in order to address concerns regarding the ability of the original testing plan to demonstrate P&V stroke time requirements.
Substitution of P&V testing in lieu of the originally prescribed test plan was due to a communication error involving the engineer who was responsible for development of testing requirements for the vent and drain valve modification and licensed control room personnel. The engineer who was responsible for development of post-modification testing requirements believed that he had authorized P&V testing as a supplement to the originally prescribed testing, and not as a replacement. However, the personnel who initiated the change understood that approval had been granted to replace the original test requirements with the P&V procedure. Personnel involved in this change did not recognize that the modified test plan would not satisfy Technical Specification stroke time requirements.
The originally specified testing plan required local timing of the vent and drain valves in order to verify that they stroked in less than 30 seconds. However, this testing plan would not have satisfied either the P&V requirements or the stroke time requirements of Technical Specification 4.1.3.1.4.a.l. The originally prescribed testing is different than the normal P&V testing method, and therefore would not have provided a baseline measurement that could be used to trend subsequent valve stroke times. Additionally, the originally prescribed testing would not have satisfied Technical Specification requirements because it did not include the period of time from the receipt of a signal for control rods to scram until the valves receive a closure signal in the stroke time calculation.
Equipment associated with the SDV vent and drain valve modification was declared operable based upon the previously described post-modification testing on June 9, 1992, and the modification package was documented as complete on June 30, 1992. WNP-2 entered Operational Condition 2 at 1339 hours0.0155 days <br />0.372 hours <br />0.00221 weeks <br />5.094895e-4 months <br /> on July 4, 1992, and Operational Condition 1 at 0010 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> on July 5, 1992. The plant was manually scrammed at 0458 hours0.0053 days <br />0.127 hours <br />7.572751e-4 weeks <br />1.74269e-4 months <br /> on July 6, 1992. The plant re-entered Operational Condition 2 at 1915 hours0.0222 days <br />0.532 hours <br />0.00317 weeks <br />7.286575e-4 months <br /> on July 10, 1992, and Operational Condition 1 at 1230 hours0.0142 days <br />0.342 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.68015e-4 months <br /> on July 11, 1992. The plant was manually scrammed at 1338 hours0.0155 days <br />0.372 hours <br />0.00221 weeks <br />5.09109e-4 months <br /> on July 11, 1992.
Technical Specifications require that the SDV vent and drain valves stroke close within 30 seconds following receipt of a signal for the'control rods to scram, and that these valves be operable in Operational Conditions 1 and 2. A Surveillance Requirement exception is provided that allows entry into Operational Condition 2 without prior demonstration of vent and drain valve stroke times provided that this testing is performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after achieving a rod density of ~50%.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT )
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (8) PAGE (3)
Year umber ev. No.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 2 035 01 5 OF 8 TITLE (4)
INADE(UATE TESTING OF THE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME VENT AND DRAIN VALVES DUE TO INSUFFICIENT TEST INSTRUCTIONS During the two plant startups that followed implementation of the vent and drain valve modification, a rod density of ~50% was not achieved until after Operational Condition 1 was entered.
Therefore, the plant was operated in a condition where the SDV vent and drain valves were required to be operable from 0010 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> on July 5, 1992 to 0458 hours0.0053 days <br />0.127 hours <br />7.572751e-4 weeks <br />1.74269e-4 months <br /> on July 6, 1992 (28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br />, 48 minutes), and 0715 hours0.00828 days <br />0.199 hours <br />0.00118 weeks <br />2.720575e-4 months <br /> to 1338 hours0.0155 days <br />0.372 hours <br />0.00221 weeks <br />5.09109e-4 months <br /> (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, 23 "minutes) on July 11, 1992.
The root cause for the condition involving inadequate post-modification testing was insufficient incorporation of operability requirements into both the original and modified post-modification test instructions. Inadequacies in the post-modification test instructions involved personnel errors by both the plant engineer who was responsible for developing the original post-modification test plan, and the personnel who revised the test plan. Substitution of inadequate test instructions for the originally prescribed testing was a contributing cause to this condition, but did not alone cause the post-modification test plan to be inadequate. The communication error that resulted in incorrect replacement of test instructions resulted from weakness in the management system used to control changes to post-modification test plans..
A second condition was identified that involved technical inadequacies in the surveillance procedure that was normally used to demonstrate the 30 second stroke time requirement of Technical Specification 4.1.3.1.4.a.1. The stroke timing method employed in this procedure has been used since initial plant operation, and used data extracted from computer points to determine valve stroke time. The stroke time was based upon the elapsed time between receipt of a scram signal and the "closed" position indication.
Each vent and drain valve has an assigned computer point that obtains its input from a limit switch on the associated valve. Although computer points for the vent and drain valves were programmed to display either an "open" or "closed" indication, the limit switch contact that provides the "closed" position indication also provides the "open" position indication. As a result, the vent and drain valve computer points were only capable of providing indication that the valve was either "open" or "not fully open". Due to this testing methodology inadequacy, previously performed stroke timing for the SDV vent and drain valves only recorded the time required for the valves to close from the "open" position to the "not fully open" position, and the 30 second stroke time requirement of Technical Specification 4.1.3.1.4.a. 1 was not demonstrated.
The root cause for the condition involving inadequate surveillance testing of the SDV vent and drain valves during previous operating cycles was insufficient incorporatiori of system design features and Technical Specification operability requirements into surveillance procedures. Inadequacies in the test procedure used to satisfy Technical Specification stroke time requirements involved an error by the personnel who were originally responsible for developing the surveillance test procedure.
. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LII)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
Year umber ev. No.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 0 0 3 9 0 5 7 2 35 01 6 F B ITLE (4)
INADEQUATE TESTING OF THE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME VENT AND DRAIN VALVES DUE TO INSUFFICIENT TEST INSTRUCTIONS An opportunity to identify and correct the condition created by inadequate post-modification testing was missed prior to the plant startup on July 11, 1992, when the significance of data from a failed surveillance test that was performed on July 10, 1992, was not fully recognized or adequately documented. On July 10, 1992, the plant engineer who identified that CRD-V-181 was out of specification turned the situation over to the system engineer for resolution. Within the memo used to perform the turnover, the plant engineer stated that the excessive stroke time for CRD-V-181'as not a restart issue. This was technically correct since the testing could be performed after entering Operational Condition 2. However, the system engineer incorrectly understood that the identified condition would have no impact on plant startup and operation.
As a result of this misunderstanding, stroke time testing activities were not rescheduled for the July 11 startup, investigation of the excessive stroke time was not initiated until July 13, 1992, and discovery and documentation of the post-modification and surveillance testing inadequacies described in this report was delayed until July 15, 1992. Delayed discovery of the conditions described in this report also allowed the plant to restart on July 11, 1992, in a condition that was not in accordance with Technical Specifications. The communication error and documentation omission were due, in .
part, to the fact that the plant was in an Operational Condition where the vent and drain valves were not required to be operable when the excessive stroke time was discovered. Indoctrination on the importance of properly documenting and handling plant deficiencies is the current topic in industry events training for plant employees.
The conditions described in this report are reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) because they resulted in plant operation that was not in accordance with the plant Technical Specifications.
As a result of post-modification testing inadequacies, inoperability of CRD-V-181 was unrecognized during operations when it was required to be operable. Additionally, both of the conditions described in this report involved operation of the plant without sufficient demonstration of operability for the SDV vent and drain valves. The conditions described in this report could not have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
The conditions described in this report were not contributed to by any structures, systems, or components that were inoperable prior to the start of this condition.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT l)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3)
Year umber ev. No.
Washington Nuclea'r Plant - Unit 2 0 9 0 5 0 0 3 7 2 035 01 7 F 8
, TITLE (4)
"TO INADE(UATE TESTING OF THE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME VENT AND DRAIN VALVES DUE INSUFFICIENT TEST INSTRUCTIONS Further orrective Action m le ed Following stroke time adjustments, testing of the four SDV drain and vent valves was performed as part of the July 18, 1992, plant startup under a Special Test procedure. The SDV vent and drain valve were returned to operable status at 0001 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> on July 18, 1992. This testing satisfied Technical Specification requirements for demonstrating that the SDV vent and drain valves closed within 30 seconds after receipt of a signal for control rods to scram from a control rod density of (50%.
Additionally, the computer points that disp}ay position information for the SDV vent and drain valves have been corrected to indicate that the valves are either "open" or "not fully open", and a description of the circumstances involved in this event has been provided as required reading for Plant Engineers who are responsible for implementing plant modifications.
Fur her orrective Ac i n The following activities will also be undertaken as corrective actions: 1) plant procedures will be changed, as necessary, to provide required testing of the SDV vent and drain valves, 2) a Technical Specification Amendment request will be submitted to allow performance of this testing with the Plant in a cold shutdown condition, 3) existing methods for controlling changes to post-modification and post-maintenance test plans will be reviewed and strengthened, and 4) a team of engineers will be assigned to perform a technical and compliance review of Plant surveillance procedures. This review of surveillance procedures will ensure that surveillance procedures are technically accurate and that each surveillance requirement is satisfied within the plant procedures.
Changes to plant procedures are scheduled for completion by March 30, 1993 Initiation of the
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technical and compliance review of Technical Specification surveillance procedures is scheduled for November 1, 1992, and submittal of the Technical Specification change request is scheduled for December 31, 1992. Review existing controls for post-modification and post-maintenance test plan changes is scheduled for completion by 12/1/92.
~Sf i if'he SDV vent and drain valves are designed to close on a reactor scram and contain water discharged from the control rod drive mechanisms within the SDV. The SDVs are sized to completely accommodate water discharged from the control rod drive mechanisms during a scram. Although flow through the vent lines is not normally expected, any flow through the vent and drain lines flow would be directed to the radioactive equipment drain system.
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TEXT CONTINUATION Q)
AGILITY NAME (1 DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No.
Wash'ington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 2 35 1 8 F 8 ITLE (4)
INADEQUATE TESTING 'OF THE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME VENT AND DRAIN VALVES DUE TO INSUFFICIENT TEST INSTRUCTIONS There are redundant valves on each vent line and drain line. The inboard valve on each vent and drain line is set to close in approximately two seconds, while the outboard valve is set to close in 25-30 seconds.
Consequently, closure of the outboard valve in slightly greater than 30 seconds, does not adversely affect isolation of the SDV following a scram. Quarterly P&V testing of the four vent and drain valves verified that the valves would close on demand.
'fThe conditions described in this report did not involve failure of an inboard valve to close however, even they had, closure of the outboard valve in greater than 30 seconds would only -result in a small discharge of Control Rod Drive Hydraulic water to the radioactive drain system, which is designed to receive this water. Additionally, the Reactor Building, which is where these drains are located, is serviced by a safety-related, filtered and monitored ventilation system. As a result,,the conditions described in this report were not safety significant.
imilar Event LERs91-013, 018, 019, 028, 036, and 92-002 identified instances of failures to meet the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements. These LERs documented specific corrective actions, and discussed the Quality Action Team (QAT) authorized to address potential improvements in Technical Specification compliance at WNP-2. The surveillance review team described in the further corrective action section above is a direct result of the QAT recommendations.
EII Informati n T~f $ g~tem EIIS Reference
~om'~nen CRD-V-181 AA ISV Scram Discharge Volume Drain Valve AA ISV Scram Discharge Volume Vent Valve AA VTV Control Rod Drive Mechanisms AA 75 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic AA 75 Reactor Building NG Reactor 'Building Drains WK