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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997 LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997 LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995 LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995 LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995 LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr 1999-07-20
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997 LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997 LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995 LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995 LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995 LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr 1999-07-20
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17284A9001999-10-31031 October 1999 Rev 0 to COLR 99-15, WNP-2 Cycle 15,COLR GO2-99-177, LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With1999-10-0101 October 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With ML17284A8941999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for WNP-2.With 991012 Ltr ML17284A8801999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for WNP-2.With 990910 Ltr ML17284A8691999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for WNP-2.With 990813 Ltr ML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B7271999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for WNP-2.With 990707 Ltr ML17292B6961999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for WNP-2.With 990608 Ltr ML17292B6641999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for WNP-2.With 990507 Ltr ML17292B6391999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for WNP-2.With 990413 Ltr ML17292B5871999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for WNP-2.With 990311 Ltr ML17292B5571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for WNP-2.With 990210 Ltr ML17292B5621999-01-31031 January 1999 Rev 1 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2 Cycle 14 Colr. ML17292B5341999-01-15015 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Incorrect Modeling of BWR Lower Plenum Vol in Bison.Defect Applies Only to Reload Fuel Assemblies Currently in Operation at WNP-2.BISON Code Model for WNP-2 Has Been Revised to Correct Error ML17292B5331999-01-15015 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re XL-S96 CPR Correlation for SVEA-96 Fuel. Defect Applies Only to WNP-2,during Cycles 12,13 & 14 Operation.Evaluations of Defect Performed by ABB-CE ML17292B4791998-12-31031 December 1998 Washington Public Power Supply Sys 1998 Annual Rept. with 981215 Ltr ML17292B5351998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for WNP-2.With 990112 Ltr ML17292B5741998-12-31031 December 1998 WNP-2 1998 Annual Operating Rept. with 990225 Ltr ML17284A8231998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for WNP-2.With 981207 Ltr ML17284A8081998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for WNP-2.With 981110 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7831998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for WNP-2.With 981007 Ltr ML17284A7491998-09-10010 September 1998 WNP-2 Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Refueling Outage RF13 Spring,1998. ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7681998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for WNP-2.With 980915 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7261998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for WNP-2.W/980810 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6751998-06-30030 June 1998 Ro:On 980617,flooding of RB Northeast Stairwell with Consequential Flooding of Two ECCS Pump Rooms.Caused by Inadequate Fire Protection Sys Design.Pumped Out Water from Affected Areas to Point Below Berm Areas of Pump Rooms ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17284A6491998-05-31031 May 1998 Rev 0 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2,Cycle 14 Colr. ML17292B4031998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for WNP-2.W/980608 Ltr ML17292B3921998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for WNP-2.W/980513 Ltr ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3371998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for WNP-2.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2641998-03-0404 March 1998 Performance Self Assessment,WNP-2. ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B2911998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for WNP-2.W/980313 Ltr ML17284A7971998-02-17017 February 1998 Rev 28 to Operational QA Program Description, WPPSS-QA-004.With Proposed Rev 29 ML17292B3591998-02-12012 February 1998 WNP-2 Cycle 14 Reload Design Rept. 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
ACCELERATED fTIUBUTION DEMONS+ATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9207220242 DOC.DATE: 92/07/17 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-f97 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION POWELL,P.L. Washington Public Power Supply System BAKER,J.W. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 92-028-00:on 920617,DGs declared inoperable due to plant equipment design deficiency.TS Action Statement 3.8.1.2 was entered which suspends core alterations.W/920717 ltr.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt,, etc.
NOTES:
RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 DEANiW. 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1' AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFBlo 1 1' NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB8H3: 1 1 NR~DSGJ- PLB8Dl 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN5 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EGGG BRYCE,J.H 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NSZC POORE,W. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK.
ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 32 ENCL 32
WASHINGTON'UBLICPOWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washfnglon ll'ay ~ Richland, lVashlngton 99352 July 17, 1992 G02-92-172 Docket No. 50-397 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
SUBJECT:
NUCLEAR PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.92-028 Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.92-028 for the WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the. report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.
Sincerely, J. W. Baker WNP-2 Plant Manager (Mail Drop 927M)
JWB/PLP/jrd Enclosure CC: Mr. J. B. Martin, NRC - Region V Mr. C. Sorensen, NRC Resident Inspector (Mail Drop 901A, 2 Copies)
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA Mr. D. L. Williams, BPA (Mail Drop 399) r i'.l.' ':
9207220242 920717 PDR ADOCK 05000397 S PDR
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
AGILITY NAHE (I) DOCKET NUHB R ( ) AGE (3)
Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 1 OF 8 ITLE (4)
DIESEL ROOM NORMAL AIR HANDLINGFANS DO NOT AUTOMATICALLYRESTART AFTER LOOP EVENT DATE 5 LER NUHBER REPORT DATE 7 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 HONTH OAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL EVISION HONTH OAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES CKE NUMB R (5)
UHBER UHBER 5 0 0 6 1 7 9 2 9 2 0 2 8 0 0 0 7 1 7 9 2 50 PERATING HIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)
ODE (9) 5 ONER LEVEL 0.402(b) 0.405(C) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 77.71(b)
(i0) 0.405(a)(1)(i) 0.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.73(c) 0.405(a)(1)(ii) 0.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) THER (Specify in Abstract 0.405(a) (1) ( 1 1 1) 0.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) elow and in Text. NRC 0.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) orm 366A) 0.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a (2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12 TELEPHOHE HUHBER P. L. Powell, Compliance Engineer REA CODE 0 9 7 7 . 4 2 8 1 COMPLETE OHE LINE FOR EACH COHPOHEHT FAILURE DESCRIBED IH THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE SYSTEH COHPOHEHT HAHUFACTURER EPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEH COHPOHEHT HAHUFACTURER EPORTABLE 0 HPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) XPECTED SUSHISSIOH HOHYH DAY YEAR ATE (15)
YES (If es c iete EXPECTED SUBHISSIOH DATE) HO TllACT OO On June 17, 1992, Supply System personnel determined that the control configuration of the Diesel Generator (DG) room normal air handling fans DMA-FN-12, 22, and 32 precluded performance of the required design function; i.e., returning to service following a loss-of-offsite-power (LOOP). Subsequent degraded room cooling could potentially cause safety related equipment to be affected by high ambient temperature. Under these conditions, long term DG operability could not be assured. Because all three DGs have the same control configuration and LOOP response requirement, the DGs were declared inoperable.
The root cause of this event was plant equipment design deficiency in that the original Architect/Engineer design of the fan control circuitry did not provide for automatic restart post LOOP.
Immediate corrective actions were taken to minimize the impact of this condition by providing direction to ensure that the fans would be manually restarted following a LOOP event, a staffed position was identified as responsible for ensuring that the fan was restarted and appropriate training was provided to those staffing the position.
(Continued on next page)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY HAHE (1) OOCKET HUHBER (2) LER HUHBER (8 AGE (3) umber ev. Ho.
Washington Nucleai Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 2 28 0 2 F 8 ITLE (4)
DIESEL AIR HANDLING AUTONTICALLY RESTART AFTER
'j ROON NORMAL FANS DO NOT LOOP EBB~A Z (C During a follow on, review of all safety related fan response to a LOOP two additional fans were identified that were required to, but did not return to service post LOOP. These fans, WMA-FN-52A and B, provide cooling to the cable spreading and remote shutdown rooms and cable chase areas. Degraded cooling in these areas could potentially cause safety related equipment to be adversely affected by high ambient temperature. Further, returning WMA-FN-52A to service under LOOP conditions could potentially overload DG-1 and adversely impact the LOOP overall response.
The event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or plant personnel because operator actions on an auto start of the DGs assures the timely restart of both the DMA and WMA fans. Hence, the probability of long term degradation of equipment due to inadequate room cooling was not significant.
Further, the addition of WMA-FN-52A to the DG-1 load is compensated by the design of the DG HVAC room heaters. An operating DG naturally adds heat to the room and, by design, the heaters are deenergized at 78'F. Hence the load returns to below the continuous design load rating of the DG. The duration of time that both heaters and WMA fan might be carried simultaneously is insignificant compared to the 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> design rating load (4650KW) of the DGs.
In niin Power Level - 0%
Mode - 5 (Refueling)
'lant Evn D ri in On June 17, 1992, Supply System personnel determined that the control configuration of the DG room normal air handling fans DMA-FN-12, 22, and 32 precluded performance of a required design function; i.e., restarting automatically to assist in DG room cooling, following a LOOP event.
A Supply System review of the existing DG HVAC room temperature calculation, initiated in response to a recent Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection report, discovered this deficiency, Because all three DGs have the same HVAC control configuration and LOOP response requirement, the DGs were declared inoperable. Verbal notification was made to the NRC on June 17, 1992.
Im i rr iv A i Technical Specification Action Statement 3.8.1.2 was entered which suspends core alterations, handling of irradiated fuel in the secondary containment, operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel and crane operations over the spent fuel storage pool. None of these evolutions were in progress at the time of discovering the deficiency.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NANE (1) OOCKET NUNBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 2 28 0 3 F '8 ITLE (4)
DIESEL ROOM NORMAL AIR HANDLING FANS DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY RESTART AFTER'LOOP Immediate direction was provided to the operators to ensure that the affected fans were manually restarted in the event of a LOOP. Further, a continuously staffed position, separate from the control room operators, was identified as responsible for this action and training was provided to ensure timely restart of the affected fans until a design modification was implemented.
With implementation of the above compensatory actions and discussion with the NRC, the DGs were declared operable for Modes 4 and 5. Accordingly, Technical Specification Action Statement 3.8.1.2 was exited at approximately 1800 (PDT) June 17, 1992.
F hrEv in n rr iveA n A. Further Evaluation
- 1. This event is considered reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v) as a condition. that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
The DMA fans (DMA-FN-12, 22, 32) are normally in operation and trip upon a LOOP.
The design intent was that in response to a LOOP the start of the associated DG would start standby room cooling exhaust fan (DEA-FN-11, 21, 31) and supply fan (DMA-FN-11, 21, 31 also normally in standby) and restart the tripped DMA fans (DMA-FN-12, 22, 32) thus providing cooling to the associated DG room. Left uncorrected this condition had the potential for causing safety related equipment in the DG room to be adversely affected due to the resultant high ambient room temperature. Hence, with potentially degraded room cooling the DGs were declared inoperable and verbal notification to the NRC was made per 10CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iii) on June 17, 1992. The follow on discovery of the WMA fans was verbally reported on July 9, 1992.
- 2. The root cause of both DMA and WMA fans failing to auto start post LOOP is Plant Equipment Design Deficiency. A review of the original system design has shown that both DMA and WMA fan circuitry were never provided an automatic restart capability. Also, plant design documents did not reflect an auto start capability. With deficient design documentation any review of the system without consideration of the heat loads and cooling requirements in the room would not have recognized the deficiency. Further, plant procedures and activities based on the design documentation alone would have continued to propagate this deficiency as shown in the example below.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY HAHE (1) DOCKET HOH8ER (2) LER NUHBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. Ho.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 I 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 2 28 0 4' 8 ITLE (4)
DIESEL ROOM NORMAL AIR HANDLING FANS DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY RESTART AFTER LOOP.
- 3. Further evaluation of the surveillance test procedure for confirming operability of the DGs during LOOP conditions has identified a situation warranting attention. Upon the DG start under LOOP conditions, the test procedure directs those conducting the test to "Initiate log readings as soon after the start as possible and hourly thereafter". The log lists the normal condition for DMA-FN-12, 22, 32 as "RUNNING". As reported above the as built configuration precludes DMA-FN-12, 22 or 32 from being automatically energized under post LOOP conditions. Hence it must be concluded that the individual initially completing the log readings has been encountering the DMA fan in an "OFF" condition and manually restarting the fan.
The procedure, with only a statement that the fan be "RUNNING", does not provide sufficient guidance or emphasis to those conducting the test that the condition of the fan not running is off normal. Without this emphasis, the expected response is to start the fan manually. Hence compliance to the Supply System policy and guidance to document off normal conditions for investigation and potential corrective action was subverted by the lack of specificity in the procedure.
Hence inadequate design documentation, as discussed in paragraph A.2 above, and procedure inadequacy are not the total causes for failing to correct this situation. The off normal condition; a fan in "OFF" that is annotated in a procedure as "running" should elicit an inquiry from the individuals conducting the test despite the procedure not emphasizing the correct status. Management guidance and Supply System policy expects that personnel react to off normal conditions by documenting the condition for evaluation and potential corrective action. In this manner, the DMA fan deficiency could have been identified earlier. A combination of inadequate design documentation, procedural inadequacy and acceptance of an off normal condition contributed to failing to recognize and correct this deficiency.
- 4. A review of the conditions encountered to date with regard to DG room temperatures under post LOOP conditions has not identified a trend towards increasing temperatures. With the fan being restarted manually within one hour as stated in paragraph A.3 above, degraded cooling conditions were not being observed. Additionally, DMA-FN-12, 22 and 32 are small capacity units (20,000 SCFM) compared to the standby exhaust and supply units (56,000 and 36,000 CFM respectively). Hence some cooling is supplied by the exhaust fan pulling air through the air handling units that would normally be supplied from DMA-FN-12, 22, or 32.
In this manner some cooling is provided through the air handling unit despite the supply fan being deenergized. A trend of increasing temperatures has not been observed.
These two conditions, either singly or together, may have contributed towards minimizing the impact of the deenergized DMA fans on DG room temperature during post LOOP conditions.
LfCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTlNUATION AGILITY HAHE (1) OOCKET HUH8ER (2) LER HUH8ER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. Ho.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 2 28 0 5 F 8 1TLE (4)
DIESEL ROOM NORMAL AIR HANDLING FANS DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY RESTART AFTER LOOP
- 5. A follow on review of all safety related fan response to a LOOP event identified two fans, WMA-FN-52A and B, that are required to, but did not automatically return to power post LOOP. These fans provide cooling to the cable spreading and remote shutdown rooms and cable chase area. The fans are redundant with either fan capable of meeting the design cooling requirements for these areas. Review of the heat loads and equipment in these areas has concluded that without cooling being reestablished within a reasonable time period safety related equipment operability could be impaired.
In contrast to the opportunity to discover the DMA-FN-12, 22, and 32 lack of auto restart condition, WMA-FN-52A and B are not described in LOOP test procedures as normally "RUNNING". Hence there is no expected status provided to compare with the as found condition of the fan. There is an alarm on increased temperatures in the cable'spreading room and a trouble alarm for the HVAC system that identifies a loss of power to the fan.
These alarms are not seismically qualified but would be available to the operator under LOOP test conditions. The associated procedure for power loss directs that the redundant fan be started and power be returned to the deenergized fan as soon as possible, The high temperature alarm procedure directs that the ventilation to the area be checked. Both procedures would return the WMA fans to service within a reasonable time. Additionally hourly tours through these areas would note the increasing temperatures. As a result corrective actions would be commenced far before ambient conditions in the areas threatened the long term operability qualification of the equipment in the area.
- 6. During the root cause analysis of this event it was also discovered that DEA-FN-12, 22, and 32, (the DG fuel oil day-tank room exhaust fans) also did not return to service post LOOP as intended by design. A review of original design documents has lead to the same root cause as for the DMA and WMA fans. However a review of the analysis of the heat loads in this area has determined that cooling in this area post LOOP was not necessary to support the plant response to the LOOP.
- 7. There were no structures, components or systems that were inoperable prior to the start of this event which contributed to the event.
B. iv A i Tkn An urgent Plant Modification Request (PMR) was completed prior to completion of the refueling outage which modified the starting circuitry so that the DMA fans automatically start post LOOP upon bus energization by the associated DG. Because this modification satisfies the design requirement, the starting directions to the operators and the trained, continuously staffed, position responsible for starting the DMA fans are no longer necessary.
The PMR also corrected the design documentation for the DMA fans.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAHE (i) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No.
Washington Nucleaz Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 2 28 0 6 F 8 1TLE (4)
DIESEL ROOM NORMAL AIR HANDLING FANS DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY RESTART AFTER LOOP
- 2. For the WMA fans procedures have been modified to direct the operators to restart the fans post LOOP. For WMA-FN-52A, heaters to the DG-1, room HVAC system have been tagged out to compensate for the additional load represented by WMA-FN-52A.
f
- 3. An Engineering evaluation has been performed on all HVAC fans that are required to be operating post LOOP to determine if a design deficiency similar to that found on DMA-FN-12, 22, and 32 exists. This evaluation resulted in the discovery of WMA-FN-52A 52B discussed in paragraph A.5 above.
'nd C. hr rr iv A in
- 1. The LOOP test procedure will be revised to include verification that necessary support systems are 'returned to service upon bus energization. This action is to be completed by March 1, 1993.
2., For the WMA fans a Technical Evaluation Request (TER) has been initiated to evaluate modifying the control circuitry to auto start the fans post LOOP. This evaluation is scheduled for completion by September 1, 1992.
1I
- 3. The DG-1 loading calculation will be reevaluated prior to September 1, 1992, to justify adding the tagged out DG-1 room HVAC system. heaters prior to environmental conditions warranting the need for the heaters. The heaters are needed to maintain minimum temperatures in the DG-1 room. Presently there is no need for the heaters because summer weather conditions preclude the need for heaters in the DG HVAC system to maintain minimum temperatures.
- 4. Management will reiterate to appropriate Plant personnel the necessity of recognizing off normal conditions and documenting them for evaluation and corrective action. This action is to be completed by September 1, 1992.
fe i i n On an auto start of the DGs plant procedures direct the Operator to commence taking hourly log readings of various DG and room cooling parameters. Because the log describes the DMA fans as running, the Operator manually starts the fan. As a result, the fan has been returned to service during the hourly log readings. Degraded room cooling conditions have not been observed. With hourly readings required it is not credible that the DMA fans could have remained in uoff'or an extended period of time.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY HAHE (1) OOCKET HUHBER (2) LER HUHBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. Ho.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 2 28 0 7 F 8 ITLE (4)
DIESEL ROOM NORMAL AIR HANDLING FANS DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY RESTART AFTER LOOP Further, under post LOOP conditions DMA-FN-12, 22, 32 (20,000 CFM each) and standby DMA-FN-11, 21, 31 (36,000 CFM each) were to be operating as supply fans with standby DEA-FN-11, 21, 31 (56,000 CFM each) as an exhaust fan. Because DMA-FN-12, 22, 32 were not returning to service, post LOOP testing, a mismatch in flow in the DG rooms existed prior to the operator manually starting the affected fan. The mismatch in flow volume resulted in flow being pulled through the air handling unit associated with the deenergized DMA fan. Because the air handling unit is lined up for operation with correct damper positions and cooling water supply, air cooling is still provided through the unit.
With the operator directed to commence log taking and subsequently starting the affected fan and the cooling provided by the flow mismatch, degraded cooling conditions in the DG rooms have not been observed.
Room temperature conditions are controlled to limit the potential for long term degradation of equipment in the rooms. Accelerated aging and equipment failure is thereby avoided. Because long term degraded cooling conditions are not credible due to both the hourly logs ensuring that the DMA fan is restarted and the cooling provided by the flow mismatch, a long term impact due to high ambient temperatures is not credible. Therefore, this condition is considered to have had negligible safety significance.
The safety significance of the WMA fans not returning to power post LOOP is minimal. The areas cooled by these fans have routinely been and are on an hourly fire tour. The individual conducting the tour would hav'e noted any increasing temperatures long before the ambient, conditions reach a magnitude capable of threatening the long term operability qualification of the equipment in the areas. As a result corrective actions would have been taken to investigate the cause and return the fan to service. Hence normal operator actions would have precluded the degraded cooling (WMA fans not returning to service) from jeopardizing the operability of the equipment in the area, Further, although not seismically qualified, two alarms are provided to alert the operator that an abnormal condition exists with respect to cooling in the cable spreading and remote shutdown rooms and cable chase area. A "CABLE RM HVAC DIV. 1 (2) OUT OF SERVICE" alarm alerts the operator that HVAC to these areas has malfunctioned. The cable spreading room has redundant temperature alarms that alert the operator that temperatures in the room have exceeded 90'F. The "CABLE RM HVAC DIV. 1 (2) OUT OF SERVICE" alarm procedure will lead to another alarm panel that states "WMA-FN-52APwr Loss" and procedures direct that the alternate fan be started and power restored to the deenergized fan as soon as possible. The cable spreading room temperature alarm will cause investigation as to the cause of the increased temperature and directs that ventilation for the room be checked. Either alarm will cause cooling to be restored in a timely manner. In summary, the normal fire tour would have noted the increased temperatures and commenced corrective actions or the alarms, if available, would have alerted the operator to restore cooling. As such a long term impact due to high ambient temperatures is not credible.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No.
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 2 28 0 8 F 8 ITLE (4)
DIESEL ROOM NORMAL AIR HANDLING FANS DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY RESTART AFTER LOOP The impact of returning the WMA fans to service also has minimal safety significance. Each fan is rated at 12.9KW. The WMA-FN-52B load has been considered in the loading calculations for DG-2 hence returning it to service has no impact, The increased load of WMA-FN-52A on DG-1 had not been considered. With addition of WMA-FN-52A to DG-1 the continuous load design rating of 4400KW would be exceeded. However the 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> load design rating of 4650KW is not jeopardized. A DG start will increase room temperatures to the point at which the DR room HVAC heaters atomically deenergize (78'F). The heaters are a 35KW load. Hence deenergization of the heaters provides margin in the load to accommodate the WMA fan load (12.9KW). The load on DG-1 is then below the continuous load design rating. The duration of time that both heaters and WMA fan might be energized simultaneously is not significant in comparison to the 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> load design rating (4650KW). Therefore returning WMA-FAN-52Ato service under post LOOP conditions has minimal safety significance.
imil r Ev n There are no similar events in which a common mode design deficiency ~ternin HVAC systems caused the safety related equipment in the spaces to be d'eclared inoperable.
II Infrm in f
Q~m~nn Diesel Generator HVAC VJ Diesel Generators EK DG DG Mixing Air Handling Fans VJ FAN (DMA-FN-12,22 and 23)
Secondary Containment NH Spent Fuel Storage Pool DA DG Room Exhaust Fans (DEA-FN-11, 21, 31) VJ FAN DG Room Air Handing Fans VJ FAN (DMA-FN-11, 21, 31)
Radwaste Mixing Air Handling Fans VJ FAN (WMA-FN-52Aand 52B)