LER-1998-006, Forwards LER 98-006-01,discussing Results of Root Cause Analysis & Addl Corrective Actions Taken to Rectify Deficiencies in Wnp,Unit 2,10CFR50,App R High Impedance Fault Calculations |
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CATEGORY 1 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9808030029 DOC.DATE-98/07/23 NOTARIZED: NO FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BEMIS,P.R, Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP. NAME
'ECIPIENT AFFILIATION Records Management Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT: Forwards LER 98-006-01,discussing results of root cause analysis
& addi corrective actions taken to rectifiy deficiencies in WNP,Unit 2,10CRF,App R high impedance fault calculations.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR i ENCL i
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TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
NOTES:
DOCKET 05000397 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD4-2 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HOHB NRR/DRPM/PECB RES/DET/EIB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POORE,W.
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RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME POSLUSNY,C AEO D/RAB NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RGN4 FILE 01 LITCO BRYCE,J H NOAC QUEENER,DS NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)
ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968
~ Richlnutl, IVashittgtow 99352-0968 July 23, 1998 G02-98-133 Docket No. 50-397 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
Subject: 'NP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 98-006-01 Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 98-006-01 for WNP-2.
This supplemental report discusses the results of the root cause analysis and additional corrective actions taken to rectify deficiencies in the WNP-2 10 CFR 50 Appendix R high impedance fault calculations.
This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 and discusses the items ofreportability, corrective action taken, and action to preclude recurrence.
Should you have any questions or desire additional information pertaining to this letter, please call me or Mr. P. J. Inserra at (509) 377-4147.
Respectfully,
/R. B is Mice P sident, Nuclear perations MailDrop PE23 Attachment EW MerschofF-NRC RIV DF Kirsch - NRC, WCFO C Poslusny, Jr. - NRR INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA NRC Senior Resident Inspector - MD927N (2)
DLWilliams - BPA, 1399 PD Robinson - Winston &, Strawn 9808030029 980723 PDR ADQCK 05000397 8
PDR
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| 05000397/LER-1998-001, :on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was Initiated |
- on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1998-002, :on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D |
- on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D
| | | 05000397/LER-1998-003, :on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced Scram Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting Scram Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy Implemented |
- on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced Scram Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting Scram Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1998-004, :on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 Circuit |
- on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 Circuit
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000397/LER-1998-005, :on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of Limitation |
- on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of Limitation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000397/LER-1998-006, :on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes |
- on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(vii)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(ii)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(x) | | 05000397/LER-1998-006-01, Forwards LER 98-006-01,discussing Results of Root Cause Analysis & Addl Corrective Actions Taken to Rectify Deficiencies in Wnp,Unit 2,10CFR50,App R High Impedance Fault Calculations | Forwards LER 98-006-01,discussing Results of Root Cause Analysis & Addl Corrective Actions Taken to Rectify Deficiencies in Wnp,Unit 2,10CFR50,App R High Impedance Fault Calculations | | | 05000397/LER-1998-007, :on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review Event |
- on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review Event
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1998-008, :on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing Lines |
- on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing Lines
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(vii)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(iv)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(iii) | | 05000397/LER-1998-009, :on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in Preparation |
- on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in Preparation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000397/LER-1998-010, :on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP Tubing |
- on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP Tubing
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | | 05000397/LER-1998-011, :on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted |
- on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1998-012, :on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With |
- on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(vii)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000397/LER-1998-013, :on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With |
- on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1998-014, :on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With |
- on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1998-015, :on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With |
- on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) |
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