ML17284A405

LER 88-018-00:on 880522,noted That Green Status Indicating Light for Div Two Emergency Diesel Generator Start Circuit Not Energized.Control Power Transfer Switch Was Not in Required Position.Switch replaced.W/880621 Ltr

ML17284A405
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	06/21/1988
From:	Davison W, Powers C WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-88-018, LER-88-18, NUDOCS 8807010046
Download: ML17284A405 (5)

Text

AC CELEBRATED Ãb IBUTION DEMONSTRa ON SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8807010046 DOC.DATE: 88/06/21 NOTARIZED- NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION DAVISON,W.S. Washington Public Power Supply System POWERS,C.M. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 88-018-00:on 880522,diesel generator inoperable due to control power transfer switch in mid-position.

W/8 DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR t ENCL I SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL A PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 SAMWORTH,R 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DS P/NAS 1 1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 ARM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 7E 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 1 NRR DREP/RAB 10 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 2 2 V

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/ IB 9A 02 1

1 '

1 1

NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES TELFORD,J 1

1 1

1 E/EI B 1 RES/DRPS DEPY 1 1 RGN5 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL EG&G WILLIAMSI S 4 4 ~

FORD BLDG HOY,A 1 1 H ST LOBBY 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS,J WARD'RC PDR 1 1 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 D A

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 45 ENCL 44

NRC Form 355 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (04)31 APPROVED OMB NOi 31504104 EXPIRES: 5/31/SS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER)

FACILITY NAME II) DOCKET NUMBER (21 PAQE Si Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 s 0 0 0 397 ioF 03

"'"mergency Diesel Generator Number Two Inopera e ue to ontro ower rans er w> c in Hid-Position - Cause Unknown EVFNT DATE (51 LER NUMBER (5) REPORT DATE (7) O'THER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL E&X REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBERISI NUMBER NUMBER 0 5 0 0 0 052 288 8 8 01 0 0 0 6 2 1 8 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR ()I /Cnrck onr or more of rhr follow/op/ (11 OPERATING MODE ISI 20.402(b) 73.71(Ir) 20.405(cl 50.73(eH2Hivl PowER 20.405( ~ )(1)(il 50.35 (cl I 11 50.73(eH21(r) 73.71(cl 0 0 0 20.405(eHIHii) 50.35 (c) (2) 50.73(eH2Hrii) OTHER /Specify In Abrrrrcr (10) rrrlow rrxp /n Trxr, HIIC Form 20AOSNHlHiil) 50.73( ~ )(2HII 50.73(e H 2) (rill)I A) 36'SA/

20,405(e l(1) (iv) 50.73(e) (2)(iil 50.73(e)(2Hviiil(B) 20A05( ~ )ill(v) 50.73(eH2Hiii) 50.73( ~ )(21(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) <

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE W.S. Davison Com liance En ineer 50 93 77- 2501 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) Ext. 2 26 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC COMPONENT MANUFAC.

TUAER CAUSE SYSTEM TURER Pi9NAr%k:

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 1141 MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

YES /If yrr, comp/err EXPECTED SU84IISSIDH DATE/ NO ABSTRACT /L/mlr ro /400 /peen, /r., rpproximerrly //Arm rlnplr./peer ryprwr/rrrn linn/ (IS)

At 1012 hours0.0117 days <br />0.281 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.85066e-4 months <br /> on May 22, 1988, during a panel walkdown, the Control Room Operator (CRO) noted that the green status indicating light for the Division Two Emergency Diesel Generator (DG2) start circuit was not energized. Investigation revealed that the Diesel Generator Control Power Transfer Switch (FRTS-7) located in the Remote Shutdown Room was not in its required position. The switch, a two position GE SB-1 transfer switch, was found in a mid-position between the two active positions "Normal" and "Emergency".

Evaluation of the switch design revealed that with the switch in the mid-position, it is highly probable that. DG2 would not have responded to a start signal and was inoperable.

At this time the Division One Emergency Diesel Generator (DGl) was out of service for modification and Core Alterations, were in progress. With both Division One and Division Two Diesel Generators inoperable, the requirements specified in the WNP-2 Technical Specification 3.8. 1.2 (Electric Power Systems A.C . Sources - Shutdown) were not complied with. This resulted in the Plant being in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. ( i.e ., less than the minimum required A.C . power sources while shutdown)

Diesel Generator Control Power Transfer Switch FRTS-7 was immediately placed in the "Normal" position restoring the green status light indication and DG-2 operability. No definite cause has been established for this event. This LER will be required reading for all licensed operators and all equipment operators at WNP-2. A technical evaluation will be, completed to determine if protective barriers should be installed to prevent inadverent contact with switch FRTS-7. A technical evaluation will be completed to determine if protective barriers should be installed on the Alternate Remote Shutdown Panel. During the shutdown conditions which existed at the time of the event, the primary safety concern was maintenance of water level above the fuel. At no time during this event was there any significant increase in the potential for uncovering the fuel.

Therefore this event posed no threat to the safety of Plant personnel or the public.

38070i0046 SS062l PDR ADOCK 050003'7)7 MRI'nrnv hlth nr

NRC Fons SEEA U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (843)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO. 3150M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 fACILITYNAME )ll DOCKET NUMSER )3) LER NUMBER (8) PAGE IS)

EEQVENTIAL o<M AEYIEION NVM Es:%'~ NVM E/I Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 o s o o o 39 788 018 00 02 oF 03 TEXT //F more Efooe /f Efe)reeE off arEE/O'nraf/ HRC %%dml 3//SA'f/ ) 17)

Plant Conditions a) Power Level - OX b) Plant Mode - 5 (Refueling)

Event Descri tion At 1012 hours0.0117 days <br />0.281 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.85066e-4 months <br /> on May 22, 1988, during a panel walkdown, the Control Room Operator (CRO) noted that the green status indicating light for the Division Two Emergency Diesel Generator (DG2) start circuit was not energized. Investigation revealed that the Diesel Generator, Control Power Transfer Switch (FRTS-7) located in the Remote Shutdown Room was not in its required position. The switch, a two position GE SB-1 transfer switch, was found in a mid-position between the two active positions NNormal" and "Emergency". Evaluation of the switch design performed several weeks afterward, revealed that with the switch in the mid-position, it is highly probable that DG2 to a start signal and was inoperable. At the time of this would not have responded event the Division One Emergency Diesel Generator (DGl) was out of service for modification and Core Alterations were in progress. With both Division One and Division Two Diesel Generators inoperable, the requirements specified in the WNP-2 Technical Specification 3.8. 1.2 .(Electric Power Systems A.C . Sources - Shutdown) were not complied with. This resulted in the Plant being in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (i.e., less than the minimum required A.C. power sources while shutdown, during core alterations).

Immediate Corrective Action Diesel Generator Control Power Transfer Switch FRTS-7 was immediately placed in the "Normal" position restoring the green status light indication and DG-2 operability.

Further Evaluation This event is being reported under the provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a "condition prohibited by the Plant's Technical Specifications".

2. The Division, Two Diesel Generator was potentially inoperable for a maximum period of approximately ten hours. This time .frame is based upon discussions with the operating crew on shift prior to the point of discovery that claimed Diesel Generator Two to be operable on their shift.'o

3. definite cause has been established for this event. A probable cause of switch FRTS-7 being out of position was that it was inadvertently bumped by an Equipment Operator while making his inspection tour of the Remote Shutdown room. The switch is located approximately six inches from the edge of a control panel at waist height. An individual wearing a portable radio in a hip holster can come into contact. with the switch when rounding the edge of the panel.

NRC PO/IM SEEA *U.S.OPO: IQSS&834 538/455

)843)

f NRC one SSSA U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (983)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO. 3(50-OISO EXPIRES: 8/31/88 fACILITYNAME (1) OOCKET NUMBER (Tl LER NUMBER (8) PACE (3I YEAR I)Ior: SEOVENTIAL

.<<~g REVISION NVMOER ~>>R NUMSER Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 018 0 0 3oF 03 TEXT /// more ~>>ce /o e)e/hrerL eoe odrWone/ HRC form JÃA 0/ I'Ill 4, The FRTS-7 switch position is annunciated in the Control Room to inform the Operators when. the switch is in the "Emergency" position. The mid-position interrupts the circuit for the diesel generator start circuit status and other functions but does not complete the circuit for the annunciator until the switch is positioned completely to "Emergency";

Futher Corrective Action

1. This LER wil,l be required reading for all licensed operators and all equipment operators at WNP-2.

2. A technical evaluation will be completed to determine if protective barriers should be installed to prevent inadverent contact with switch FRTS-7.,

3. A technical evaluation will be completed to determine if protective barriers should be installed on the Alternate Remote Shutdown Panel. This panel is in the same walk path on the operator tour.

Safety Si nificance At the time of this event, the Plant was shutdown for refueling with core alterations in progress (Control Rod Drive removal and replacement only). . The only action required by Plant Technical Specifications during this instance of inoperability of both Diesel Generators is to suspend core alterations. In the absence of fuel movement, the primary safety concern during shutdown conditions is maintenance of water level above the fuel. This event did not affect core water level. At no time during this event was there any significant increase: in the potential for uncovering the fuel. This event posed no threat to the safety of Plant personnel or the public.

Similar Events None EIIS Information Text Reference EIIS Reference System Component Diesel Generator One EB DG Diesel Generator Two EB DG Switch FRTS-7 EB HS r

Alternate Remote Shutdown Panel PL Control Rod Drive AA 75 NRC SO/IM SOOA *U.S.OPO:108tBHl34 838/4dd (983)

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No. 50-397 June 21, 1988 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555,

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.88-018

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.88-018 for the WNP-2 Plant.

This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours,

.M. Powers (M/D 927M)

MNP-2 Plant Manager CMP:lg

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No.88-018 cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V Mr. C.J . Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)

INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr. D.L. Williams, BPA (M/D 399)