ML17279A941

Amend 52 to License NPF-21,revising Tech Specs Section 3.7.1.3 to Permit Two Spray Ponds That Comprise Ultimate Heat Sink to Be Used Individually for Dissipation of Heat During Refueling Operational Mode

ML17279A941
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	04/04/1988
From:	Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML17279A942	List: ML17279A941 ML17279A943
References
TAC-61014, NUDOCS 8804120136
Download: ML17279A941 (14)

Text

~

gp,S RECy, P0 Op

~i I

ClO I

cA O

Y/+~

~O

+>>*<<+

t UNITED STATES t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DOCKET NO. 50-397 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 52 License No.

NPF-21 l.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment filed by the Washington Public Power Supply System (the licensee) and supplemental

material, dated March 21, April 20, and June 5, 1986 and March 13, 1987 comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance:

(i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifica-tions as'4)tIdicated in the enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2)iof..- the Facility Operating License No.

NPF-21 is hereby amended to read as-,follows:

(2)

Technical S ecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 52, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

8804i20i36 880404 PDR ADOCN. 05000397 P

PDR

I s

~

r I

<<pg og gfl9'la."'>(j9

3.

This amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION George W. Knighton, Director Project Directorate V

Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

April 4, 1988

April 4, 1988 ENCLOSURE TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 52 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.

NPF-21 DOCKET NO. 50-397 Replace the following page of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed page.

The revised page is identified by Amendment number and contains a vertical line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE 3/4 7-4 83/4 7-1 83/4 7-2 83/4 7-2a 83/4 7-3 83/4 7-4 INSERT 3/4 7-4 83/4 7-1 83/4 7-2 83/4 7-3 83/4 7-4 83/4 7-5 Overleaf page 3/4 7-3 is provided for document completeness.

I

'L

PLANT SYSTEMS HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SERVIC". WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3. 7. 1.2 The high pressure core spray (HPCS) service water system (serves Division 3 diesel generator) shall be OPERABLE with the system comprised of:

I a.'ne OPERABLE HPCS service water pump, and b.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the ultimate heat sink and transferring the water to the HPCS diesel generator.

APPLICABILITY:

When the diesel generator is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

With the HPCS service water system inoperable, declare the HPCS diesel generator inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specifications 3.8. 1. 1 and 3.8. 1.2, as applicable.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7. 1.2 The HPCS service water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a4 b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each'valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed,,or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct position on a service water actuation test signal.

WASHINGTON NUCLEAR " UNIT 2 3/4 7-3

PLANT SYSTEMS ULTIMATE HEAT SINK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3. 7. 1.3 The ultimate heat sink consisting of two separate spray ponds with redundant pumping and spray facilities shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

A minimum water level at elevation 432 ft 9 in.

Mean Sea Level, USGS datum, and b.

A water temperature of less than or equal to 77'F.

c.

A maximum average sediment depth of less than or equal to 0.5 ft'n the floors of the spray ponds.

APPLICABILITY: In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and ".

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied:

a.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5, declar'e the SW system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.1.

C.,

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION ", declare the SW system(s) associated with the inoperable spray pond(s) inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7. 1. 1.

The provisions of Specifica-tion 3. 0. 3 are not applicable.

d.

With the average sediment depth of either of the spray ponds greater than or equal to 0.5 ft but less than 1.0 ft, the ponds shall be cleaned within 30 days to reduce the average sediment depth to less than or equal to O.l ft.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7. 1.3 The ultimate heat sink shall be determined OPERABLE at least once per:

a.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the water temperature and water level to be within their limits.

b.

92 days by verifying that the average sediment depth in each of the spray ponds is less than or equal to 0.5 ft.

"When handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment.

WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2 3/4 7-4" Amendment No.

52

3/4. 7 PLANT. SYSTEMS L ~

~

.BASES 3/4.7. 1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the service water systems ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equip-ment during normal and accident conditions.

The redundant cooling capacity of these

systems, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident conditions within acceptable limits.

During periods of low ambient temperatures, when the possibility of freez-ing exists if the sprays were to be operated, the discharge of each spray cooling division is typically aligned directly into the pond (spray bypass mode).

Safety analysis has shown that several hours are available for realign-ment to spray following the design basis LOCA accident in conjunction with extreme meteorological conditions.

A 72 F alarm requiring action for realign-ment provides 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before 77~F would be exceeded, based on accident heat loads.

With the pond temperature below 77'F and the spray headers in service the safety analysis provided in FSAR Section 9.2.5 is bounding and the system therefore remains operable in the spray or bypass mode of operation.

3/4.7.2 'ONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the control room emergency filtration system ensures that (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations per-sonnel during and following all design basis accident conditions.

Continuous operation of the system with the heaters OPERABLE for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> during each 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters.

The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rems or less whole body,.or its equivalent.

This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.7.3 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system is provided to assure adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel without requiring actuation of -any of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) equipment.

The RCIC system is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor pressure exceeds 150 psig.

This pressure is substantially below that for which the low pressure core cooling systems can provide adequate core cooling for events requiring the RCIC system.

The RCIC system specifications are applicable during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 when reactor vessel pressure exceeds 150 psig because RCIC is the primary non-ECCS source of emergency core cooling when the reactor is pressurized.

WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2.

B 3/4 7"1 Amendment No.

52

~

~

g

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

g

~

~

~ '

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

)

0 I

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~ ~

~

~

~

I

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~ ~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

I

~

~

~

~

I

~

~

~

I o

~

II

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

I ~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

I

~

~

~

~

I

~

~

~

~

~

I

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

I ~

~

~

~

~

0

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

I

~

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4. 7.4 SNUBBERS (Continued) failures and initiating events is constant with time and that the failure of any snubber on that system could cause the system to be unprotected and to result in failure during an assumed initiating event.

Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection.

However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed, (nominal time less 25K) may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval.

Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

The acceptance criteria are to be used in the visual inspection to deter-mine OPERABILITY of the snubbers.

For example, if a fluid port of a hydraulic snubber is found to be uncovered, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and shall not be determined OPERABLE via functional testing.

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability, one of three functional testing methods are used with the stated acceptance criteria:

1. 'unctionally test 10K of a type of snubber with an additional 10K tested for each functional testing failure, or 2.

Functionally test a sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using Figure 4.7-1, or MASHINGTON NUCLEAR " UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-3 Amendment No.

52

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES SNUBBERS (Continued}

3.

Functionally test a representative sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using the stated equation.

Figure 4.7-1 was developed using "Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Plan" as described in "guality Control and Industrial Statistics" by Acheson J.

Duncan.

Permanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for individual snubbers may be granted by the Commission if a justifiable basis for exemption is presented and, if applicable, snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify the snubbers for the applicable design conditions at either the com-pletion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date.

Snubbers so exempted shall be listed in the list of individual snubbers indicating the extent of the exemptions.

The service life of a snubber is established via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and associated installation hnd maintenance records (newly installed snubbers, seal

replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area,. etc.}.

The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions.

These records will provide statis-tical bases for future consideration of snubber ser vice life.

3/4.7.5 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak

testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c} limits for plutonium.

This limitation will ensure that leakage from byproduct,

source, and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values.

Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with surveillance requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group.

Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not.

Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism, i. e., sealed sources within radiation monitoring devices, are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.

3/4 7.6 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the fire suppression systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety-related equipment is located.

The fire suppression system consists of the water system, spray and/or sprinkler

systems, CO< systems, Halon systems, and fire hose stations.

The collective capability of the fire suppression systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety-related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program.

WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-4 Amendment No. 52

RLANT SYSTEMS BASES In the event that portions of the fire suppression systems are inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected areas until the inoperable equipment is restored to service.

When the inoperable fire fighting equipment is intended for use as a backup means of fire suppression, a longer period of time is allowed to provide an alternate means of fire fighting than if the inoperable equipment is the primary means of fire suppression.

The surveillance requirements provide assurances that the minimum OPERABILITY requirements of the fire suppression systems are met.

An allowance is made for ensuring a sufficient volume of Halon in the Halon storage tanks by verifying the weight and pressure of the tanks.

In the event the fire suppression water system becomes inoperable, immediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant.

3/4.7.7 FIRE-RATED ASSEMBLIES The OPERABILITY of the fire barriers and barrier penetrations ensure that fire damage will be limited.

These design features minimize the possibility of a single fire involving more than one fire area prior to detection and extinguishment.

The fire barriers, fire barrier penetrations for conduits, cable trays and piping, fire windows, fire dampers, and fire doors are periodically inspected to verify their OPERABILITY.

3/4.7.8 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING The area temperature limitations ensure that safety-related equipment will not be subjected to temperatures in excess of their environmental qualification temperatures.

Exposure to excessive temperatures may degrade equipment and can cause loss of its OPERABILITY.

3/4.7.9 MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM

-The main turbine bypass system is required to be OPERABLE consistent with the assumptions of the feedwater controller failure analysis of the cycle.

specific analysis.

The main turbine bypass system provides pressure relief during the feedwater controller failure event so that the safety limit MCPR is not violated.-

WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2

.B 3/4 7-5 Amendment No. 52

F