ML17266A380
| ML17266A380 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 01/02/1981 |
| From: | Robert E. Uhrig FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17209A508 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.A.1.1, TASK-2.E.1.1, TASK-2.E.1.2, TASK-TM L-81-4, NUDOCS 8101060374 | |
| Download: ML17266A380 (35) | |
Text
P.O. BOX 529100 MIAMI,F L 33152 goal/p~
FLORIDAPOWER & LIGHT COMPANY January 2,
1981 L-81-4 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Eisenhut:
Re:
St. Lucie Unit 1
Docket No. 50-335 POST TMI RE UIREMENTS t)n.,'-
t5D-335'eIitfn
) 4 R'/0/ o6 037. 9 0;".~2.-
of Docomeee:
REGUUlTGRY DOCKEI fllE Florida Powe>
and Light has reviewed your letter of October 31, 1980 and submits the following enclosures as ouI reports on the indicated NUREG 0737 items:
Enclosure
.1 2
3 4
5 Item I,A.-1.1 II,E.1.1 II.E.1.2 II.K,3.2 II.K.3.17 III.D.3.4 Descri tion Shift Technical Advisor AF!J System Evaluation AFM System Initiation 5 Flow Report on PORY Failures ECC System Outages Control Room Habitability He have reviewed the generic report prepared to answer Item II.K.3.2 and have determined that it is applicable to St. Lucie Unit l. It should be noted,
, however, that whiIe the control rod drop runback has been
- removed, a runback
~ on loss of both heater drain pumps (to 92%) or loss of one main feed pump at full power (to 60%) is still incorporated.
Our report on Item III.A.2 (Improving Emergency Preparedness-Long Term) will be submitted as a separate letter.
Should you have any questions on these items we would be happy to meet with you or your staff to clarify our reports.
Je e ~
Vice President
~
Advanced Systems 8 Technology REU/PLP/mbd cc:
J.P. O'Reilly, Region II Harold F. Reis, Esquire Sl IO C'e
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ENCLOSURE 1
Re:
St.
Lucie Unit 1
Docket No.
50-335 Post TMI Requirements SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR e
The STA Training'rogram is described by St. Lucie Administrative Procedure 0005722 "Shift Technical Advisor Training Program".
The program includes training in the following areas:
1.
Reactor Theory.
This portion of the program utilizes a series of 23 videotape presentations prepared by the NUS. Corporation and is the same as that.used in the St.
Lucie Hot License Operator training.
2.
System Descriptions.'his part of the program consists of 39 lecture presentations covering St.
Lucie plant systems including plant design and layout, and the capabilities of instrumentation and controls in the control room.
Training material is the same as that of the Hot License Operator training program.
Lectures are presented by individuals possessing a St. Lucie Plant Senior Reactor Operator license.
3.
Transient and Accident Analyses.
This section of the program includes a series of 17 lecture presentations developed and given by the FPSL Nuclear Analysis Department.
The subject matter covers accidents and plant transients described in the St.
Lucie FSAR and CEN-128.
4.
Plant Procedures.
This part of the program covers St. Lucie Plant proce'dure's, including Emergency, Off-Normal, Administrative, and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
These are discussed in 13 lectures presented by'a Senior Reactor Operator licensed individual.
5.
Technical Specifications.
This section consists of two lectures given by a person holding a
SRO license and covers the St. Lucie Plant Technical Specifications.
6.
Simulator Training.
This portion of the program includes training given at the CE Simulator in Windsor, CT.
Each STA is a member of a plant training shift and recei ves the same training as the plant operators undergoing annual requalification.
The training consists of both classroom instruction and simulator practical sessions and is one weeks duration.
7.
Throughout the program STA Trainees were/are required to do extensive self study to prepare for lectures and exams.
Performance of this studying is verified by class participation, direction observation and examination.
f
Re:
St.
Lucie Unit 1
Docket No. 50-335 Post TMI Requirements Page Two During the STA Training Program a series of five written examinations is administered to the STA trainees.
These exams gage the effectiveness of the program and measure individual trainee performance.
To become qualified, each STA candidate must achieve an overall average exam score of 75 or greater.
for purposes of STA qualification, individuals who posses and maintain a
RO or SRO license can be exempted from any or all portions of the training or requalification program.
Upon satisfactory completion of the program, each STA is designated, in writing, as being qualified as a St.
Lucie Plant STA by the Plant Manager.
The STA Requalification Program is described by -Administrative Procedure 0005723, "Shift Technical Advisor Requalification Program".
The program is designed to maintain a high level of knowledge in plant systems, accident and transient analysis, procedural requi rements, and operations assessment.
To accomplish this, the following topics are covered:
1.
System Descriptions 2.
Emergency/Off-Normal Procedures 3.
Technical Specifications 4.
Administrative Procedures Lectures will be held on a bi-weekly basis.
This will allow all topics to be covered annually, with the exception of system descriptions which will be covered biannually.
Lectures will be prepared and presented by STAs themselves, as assigned.
Knowledge level will be monitored by periodic short quizzes.
Each STA will attend Combustion Engineering simulator training annually.
This will be done in conjunction with the St.
Lucie Licensed Operator'equalification program.
PJhen available, presentation of significant plant events from St. Lucie and other nuclear plants will be included in the STA requalification program.
Additionally each STA has and will participate in the portions of the
- regular,
. operator
- (RO/SRO) requalification program in facility and procedure changes.
Each STA will be considered as a licensed operator for the purpose of participation in the Operating Experience feedback Program.
Upon satisfactory completion of the program, each STA will be designated, in writing, as being requalified as a St. Lucie Plant STA by the Plant Manager.
Re:
St. Lucie Unit 1
Docket No. 50-335 Post THI Requirements Page Three It is the position of Florida Power 8 Light that the need for Shift Technical Advisors is and will continue to be an interim requirement.
The STA program will eventually be phased out at such time as the Shift Supervisor's qualifications have been upgraded and the man - machine interface in the Control Room has been acceptably upgraded.
Therefore, the "long-term" STA program will consist of the qualification and requalification programs described above.
Selection criteria for replacement STAs, if required, will be such as to meet the requirements of an STA and those of the Plant Technical Staff since the STAs are organizationally part of that group.
NUREG 737 also requires a comparison of the proposed INPO STA program and that of the St. Lucie Plant.
A direct comparison is difficult due to the apparent difference in philosophy concerning program emphasis.
A best attempt to develop a one-to-one correlation is included as Attachment A.
RAM ELEMENT ATTACHMENT A INPO STA PROGRAM
/
ST.
LUCIE STA PROGRAM Position Description The function, general qualifications, general duties, typical responsibilities, and accountability are essentially the same for both programs.
Experience Minimum 18 months; at least two of which is at an operating nuclear plant.
No formal requirement; however for present STAs (including 5 people hired in 1980 for STA duties)
Average:
85.8 months Minimum:
48 months Maximum:
156 months-Minimum of 12 months at plant which position is to be filled No formal requirements; however, for present STAs (including 5 new hires)
Average:
33.6 Maximum:
60 Minimum:
9.5 ences from STA Duties 30 days requires training on facility procedure changes 6 months requires annual requalification training Education-Prerequi sites 270 Contact Hours beyond High School Diploma STA personnel are required to participate in the licensed operator requal program for facility and procedure change review No requirement Requires bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline Educati on-Col 1 ege Level Fundamental Education Applied Fundamentals-Plant Specific Reactor Theory Management/Supervisor Skills 520 Contact Hours 120 Contact Hours None 40 Contact Hours Requires bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline (All present STA's have degrees)
None 23 Contact Hours None Plant Systems 200 Contact Hours 43 Contact Hours
ENCLOSURE 2
Docket No. 50-335 POST TMI RE UIREMENTS AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM EVALUATION AND AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEH AUTOMATIC INITIATIONAND FLOW INDICATION This report provides the results of an evaluation assuming a pipe break anywhere in the AFW pump discharge line plus a single active failure. It also provides a description of AFW system modifica'tions to be implemented by January 1,
1982.
This augmented AFW system will have the following features; (1)
The A'FWS will have diversity in motive power sources such that system performance requirements are met with either an ac-powered flow train or a redundant dc/steam-fed flow train.
A11 valves in the turbine-driven AFW pump flowpath will be dc-powered, thus en-suring that this flowpath is independent of ac power.
(2)
The AEWS will be designed to withstand pipe rupture effects within the AFWS:
a pipe whip restraint will be, installed to pr'eclude the turbine header, from whipping into the 'motor header.
(3)
The AFWS will be capable of withstanding a single active failure, in conjunction with a postulated high-energy line break in the AFWS.
(Note that the original licensed design basis for the AFWS was, and
- remains, the capability to withstand a single active failure'oncur-rently with a postulated high-energy line break in the Hain Feedwater System.)
(4)
The AFWS will automatically initiate auxiliary feedwater flow upon receipt of an Automatic Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS).
(5)
The AFAS will automatically terminate auxiliary feedwater flow to a faulted steam generator, and automatically provide auxiliary feed-water flow to the intact steam generator.
(6)
The AFAS will automatically terminate auxiliary feedwater flow to a ruptured main feedwater line downstream of the check valve, or to a ruptured auxiliary feedwater line downstream of the isolation valves, and will provide automatic auxiliary feedwater flow through the intact main feedwater line or the intact auxiliary feedwater line(s).
(7)
The AFAS will meet the requirements of IEEE-323-1974, IEEE-344-1975 and IEEE-279-1971.
(8)
Based on the design head-flow curves, and as verified through in-situ flow tests, the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps have been ver-ified as actually supplying over 350 gpm per pump.
(Thus, the in-stalled capability of the motor-driven pumps is we11 above the design nominal capacity of 250 gpm referenced i.n the FSAR.)
Analyses by the
ATTACHMENT A Page Two RAM ELEMENT INPO STA PROGRAM ST.
LUCIE STA PROGRAM A ministrative Controls General Operating Procedure Transient/Accident Analysis and Emergency Procedures 80 Contact Hours 30 Contact Hours 30 Contact Hours 5 Contact Hours None - However, all STA's have been in the regular operator requalification program for procedure changes throughout 1980 40 Contact Hours Simulator Training al Requalification ining Trainee/instructor ratio
< 4'1 50 Contact Hours (classroom) 50 Contact Hours (simulator) 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> (lecture) 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> (simulator)
No formal requirement; however, Trainee/
instructor ratio
= 5/1 20 Contact Hours (classroom) 20 Contact Hours (simulator) 95 hours0.0011 days <br />0.0264 hours <br />1.570767e-4 weeks <br />3.61475e-5 months <br /> (estimated)
(1 ecture) 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> (simulator)
Diverse power sources will be utilized to ensure that the Auxiliary Feedwater System is capable of performing its intended safety function.
The design features incorporated into the Auxiliary Feedwater
- System, which assure diversity of power
- sources, are:
a.
Fwch motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is aligned. to a separate diesel generator, with its associated normally closed.,
motor-operated flow'ontrol valves being fed from the same diesel as the pump"..
e The turbine-driven pump and its associated normally closed steam inlet and discharge flow control valves will be fed from a dc power supply.
The AFW-control system shall operate as described below:
The AFWS shall automatically actuate upon receiving on Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS) within a design actuation time of 2 minutes.
The AFAS is initiated on 1ow steam generator water level.
Additionally the system control logic shall isolate feed to a steam generator with a main steam line break or high energy line break in the AFIgS+g The AFWS control logic shall provide safei
,shuthovm capabilities during steam generator low water level transients main steamI line break transients and I auxiliary feedwater high energy line'breaks (includinaI, lhreaks'n the MFS system Scwnshream of the MFS line check valves at the con4ainisent f
+penetration).
The AFFlS,'operates Suring a.steam.generator low water level transient~
I as follows:<,}
e
/
When an -AFAS is generated, all three (3)
AFW pumps are started, automatically.
The control logic aligns all pump discharge va1ves such that both steam generators will be feel>
The AFWS operates during main steam line or auxiliary feed water high energy line 'break as follows:
Upon receipt of an AFAS, all three (3)
AFW pumps are started.
The control logic automatically aligns all pump discharge valves such that the effected steam generator (or AFWeline) is isolated.
Flow shall be aligned to the intact steam generator.
A simplified control logic block diagram is provided.
(see figure 1)
Xf the auxiliary feedwater pumps are already operating and offsite power is lost, the pumps automatically restart using the diesel generator power.
The steam generated during decay heat removal and during cooldown after a loss of offsite power is discharged.
through the Main Steam Safety Valves or the atmospheric dump valves (ADVs), except for any steam used. by the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
There is one motor-operated ADV located on each main steamline.'These ADV's are sized. to pass the flow required. to bring the Reactor Coolant System to the Shutdown Cooling System entry temperature at a cooldown rate of 75 F/hr.
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Page 2
NSSS vendor have verified that this flow rate, from one motor/driven AVW pump to a steam generator, is sufficient to remove reactor decay heat and maintain the,RCS in a hot standby condition following a trip from full power.
(9)
A cross-tie will be provided from the Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank to the suction lines of the Unit 1 AFWS pumps, thereby providing an additional 150,400 gallons of demineralized water in the unlikely event of loss of the Unit 1 CST from a vertical tornado missile.
(10)
Capabi1ity for manual initiation of the AVOWS is maintained.
(11)
Testibility is maintained.
X.
DESIGN BASIS The function of the Auxiliary Feedwater a sufficient supply of cooling water to feedwater is not available.
The design Feedwater System will be as follows:
System (gZHS) is to ensure the steam generators when main bases of the augmented Auxiliary a.
Provide suff'i.cient cooling water to either one or both steam generators to ensure the following:
1.
Provide sufficient capability for the removal of decay heat from the reactor core during normal operation and under accident conditions.
2.
Reduce the Reactor Coolant System (BCS) temperature to the entry temperature (T
= '25 F) for actuating the Shutdown Cooling System (SDCS) under noxma1 conditions.
b.
Deliver auxiliary feedwater flow against the maximum steam generator pressure.
c.
Store sufficient demineralized water (116,000 gallons) in the seismic Category I Condensate Storage Tank, such that during normal operation the AFWS can cool down the RCS (at 75 7/hr) to the SDCS entry tempera-ture.
Operate automatically upon receipt of a low steam generator level signal, with loss of either offsite or onsite ac power, with no operator action required outside of the Control Boom.
e.
Ensure system performance with redundant and diverse power sources, ie, with two ac-powered motor-driven pumps and. one steam turbine-driven pllmp r Prec1ude hydraulic instabiliti,es; eg, waterhammer g.
Perform its design function following design basi,s natural phenomena (ie, following a hurxicane or a tornado, or a safe shutdown earthquake).
h.
Withstand pipe rupture effects, including pipe whip and get impingement forces.
i.
Perform its f'unction assuming a main feedwater line break concurrent wi,th a loss of offsite power and a single active failure in the AFWS.
A1though not originally a design basi.s, provide suff'icient decay heat xemoval capability through the steam generator(s) to maintain the Reactor Coolant System at hot standby, assuming a high energy break in the AFWS and. a single active fai,lure.
XX.
Summa Descri tion During normal operation, feedwater is supplied to the steam generators by the Main Peedwater System.
The Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS) is used during normal plant start-up, hot standby and cooldown.
The AFWS is not utilized during full-power operation.
During plant start-up and hot stand-by, the system provides a source of water for the steam generators.
During cooldown, the AFWS provides the means of heat removal to bring the Reactor Coolant System to the Shutdown Cooling System actuation temperature.
With offsite power (and thus the Steam Dump and Bypass System) available, the condenser is used as the heat sink.
The major active components of the system consist of one 500-gpm design capacity steam-driven, and two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps each with over 350 gpm (installed) capacity.
Both electrical and steam-driven AFWS pumps are centrifugal units with horizontal split casing and are designed in accordance with ASME Section 3 requirements.
The largest pump is driven by a noncondensing steam turbine, which receives steam from the Main Steam lines upstream of the Main Steam Xsolation Valves and exhausts to the atmosphere.
The APWS pumps take suction from the Conden-sate Storage
- Tank, and discharge to the steam generators.
The turbine-driven pump is capable of supplying auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators for the total expected range of steam generator pressure, by means of a variable-speed turbine driver-controlled by an electronic governor.
Each motor-driven pump supplies feedwater to one steam generator.
The turbine-driven pump supplies feedwater to both steam generators by means of two separate
- lines, each with its own control valve sized to pass the full flow.
Cross connections are provided to enable the routing of the f1ow of any AFWS pump to any steam generator.
Each of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps utilizes a Class lE ac power supply (4.16 kV safety-related bus).
The turbine-driven pump train, will rely solely on a Class 1E dc power supply; the valves associated with the turbine-driven pump will also be powered from a Class 1E dc source.
The seismic Category X Condensate Storage Tank (CST) provides the water.
supply from the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
The CST is sized to provide a minimum (Technical Specification) of 116,000 gallons of a demineralized water for start-up, hot standby and cooldown operations.
The quantity of water needed for St. Lucie Unit 1 cooldown is determined assuming the unit is brought to a hot standby and held there for one hour (this procedure requires about 22,500 gallons of water); the plant is then cooled down at a maximum rate of 75 F per hour until the shutdown cooling entry temperature of 325 F is reached (about 80,000 gallons required).
SAFETY EVALUATION l
The auxiliary feedwater pumps are located underneath the Hain Steam trestle and are surrounded by a seismic Category I structure which provides protection from external, internal and tornado missiles.
The AFWS is designed to withstand design basis natural phenomena.
The Condensate Storage Tank (CST) is surrounded by a structural barrier which provides horizontal missile and tornado Protection for the tank.
An intertie from the Unit 2 CST to the suction lines of the Unit 1 AFW pumps will be installed to provide demineralized water in the unlikely event that the Unit 1 CST contents are lost due to a vertical tornado missile.
Components in the AFWS are protected from flooding as they are located above the maximum postulated flood level.
The design provisions utilized to protect the AFWS against the dynamic effects of pipe rupture and jet impingement from a Hain Feedwater System line break or a Main Steam Line break have been presented in CESAR Appendix 3C.
In addition, although the AFWS design basis did not include categori.zation as a high energy system, a pipe whip restraint wild, be installed to prevent the turbine-driven pump header from whipping into the motor-driven pump header; this ensures the integrity and operability of the motor-driven feedwater train.
Since the AFWS is located in the steam trestle area, protection from internally-generated missiles outside of containment is provided by the missile protection barriers which are around the motor-driven pumps and around the turbine-driven pump.
The auxiliary feedwater turbine-driven pump utilizes both electrical and mechanical overspeed protection with the electrical trip set at 115 percent overspeed and the mechanical trip set at 125 percent overspeed.
'I The potential for hydraulic instability has been considered i.n the original design of the Main Feedwater System and the Auxiliary Feedwater System piping.
Routing of the feedwater piping is such that draining of the feedwater line is minimized.
A check valve and a 32-foot vertical drop in the feedwater piping immediately outside the feedwater nozzles provides assurance that the piping will not drain and prevents entrapment of air.
Design provisions are also incorporated into the feedwater sparger to minimize draining.
The Axuiliary Feedwater System is designed such that no single active failiure 'precludes the capability for removal of decay heat and maintenance of the plant in a hot standby condition; capability for cooldown to the Shutdown Cooling System entry temperature is maintained for all hypothesized transients.
FSAR Table 10.5-1 is a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
The original design basis for the AFWS is a hypothetical Main Feedwater line break plus a
AFWS capability is demonstrated by FSAR Table 1-.5-1A.
The AFWS has also been reviewed for a nondesign basis high energy line break in the AFWS concurrent with a single failure.
The redesigned auxiliary feedwater system was evaluated against the following plant transient and accident conditions, for the pur-pose,. of meeting NRC standard Review Plan 10.4.9, Branch Technical position 10-1 and established AFWS design flow requirements:
1) 2)
3) 4)
5) 6)
7) 8)
9) 10)
Loss of main feed (LMFW)
LMFW with loss of offsite AC power LMFW with loss of onsite and offsite AC Power Turbine trip with and without by pass Main steam isolation valve closure Main feed line break Main steam line break Small break Loca Loss of offsite AC Power with AFW high energy line break Plant cooldown These trnsient and accident conditions were analyzed to identify the most limiting condition for the auxiliary feed water system and that condition was evaluated to certify the acceptability of the AFWS de-sign.
Our analysis identified condition 9 as the most limiting con-dition for the AFWS at PSL-1 for the following reasons.
Condition 1, loss of main feed, was assumed to occur concurrent with a high energy line break in the AFWS and resulted in a condition only as limiting as condition 9.
Condition 2, LMFW with. loss of offsite power, was assumed to occur concurrent with a high energy line break in the AFWS and resulted in a condition that was less limiting than condition 9
because there are no reactor coolant pumps operating to supply addi-tional heat imput.
Condition 3, LMFW with loss of onsite and offsite AC power, was not assumed to occur concurrent with a high energy line break in the AFWS since loss of onsite diesel generators were the assumed failures; this resulted in the availability of the steam driven AFW pump with a 500 GPM capacity.
Conditions 4 and 5, turbine tiip with or without bypass and main steam isolation valve closure, was assumed to occur concurrent with the AFWS pipe break and resulted in
Conditions 6, 7 and 8, main steam line break or main feed line break or small break LOCA, were not assumed to occur concurrent with an AFWS pipe break and therefore the entire capacity the AFWS is available.
Condition 10, plant cooldown, was assumed to occur concurrent with an AFWS pipe break and this resulted in a less limiting condition than condition 9 because offsite AC power is avail-able to operate MFW pumps.
The detailed evaluation of condition 9 is presented below.
Evaluation of Loss of Offsite AC Power with hi h ener line break in the AFWS.
Loss of offsite AC Power in effect results in loss of main feed water, reactor trip due to low steam generator level, turbine trip and the necessity to power the AFWS-components from emergency buses A (AC), B(AC)and AB-DC tie.
The most limiting single active failure is failure of either "A" or "B" battery.
This failure of battery "A" will result in failure of "A" AC motor driven pump and the AB-DC tie bus to the A bus.
Thus when evaluating the proposed AFWS auto-matic initiating control system against BTP 10-1, high energy line break should be considered with the single active failure of battery "A".
As a result, two postulated break locations are identified as "most limiting".
Each case is further evaluated below; Condition A - high energy line break at turbine pump discharge concurrent with single active failure (Break at C
in Fig.
1)
For this case the automatic initiated control logic for the AFWS will align all pump discharges to the steam generators.
This will result in one motor driven pump (pump B) feeding B steam generator.
Pump flow will initiate well with in the design actuation time for the system of 2 minutes.
In attachment 1 we have provided the results of our analysis which demonstxates the adequacy of one motor driven pump to remove decay heat and place the plant in a safe shutdown con-dition.
Condition B high energy line break at "B" pump discharge concurrent with sin'gle-active failure (break-at B in Fig."1)
For this case the operators have 13 minutes to initate AFW flow, via the turbine, by transferring electrical DC loads from the dead "A"
bus to the energized "B" bus.
This transfer, as presented in chapter 10.4 of PSL-1 FSAR, is conservatively assumed to take a maximum of 5 minutes'."if necessary.
Plant cooldown is accomplished for condition A and B using either motor driven pump 'or turbine driven pump.
Conclusion and result of Evaluation:
The augmented AFWS for St. Lucie Unit No.
1 will meet all"the acceptance criteria of Standard Review Plan (SRP) 10.4.9 (Revision 1) and Branch Technical Position (BTP)
ASB 10-1 (Revision 1).
Appendix A, also attached herewith, presents the demonstration of the AFWS acceptability as a line-up against the SRP and BTP.
0
ATTACHMENT 1
)
Combustion Engineering, the NSS supplier for the St. Lucie Plant was commissioned to evaluate and provide FPL minimum flow rate requirements for the augmented AFWS as described in section II.
The system Slow rate requirements as presented here represent the result of this evaluation.
System Flow Requirements Minimum system flow rate requirements corresponding to the augmented AFWS design fuctions have been determined based on worst case plant heat loads.
These requirements are presented below:
AFWS REQUIRED PLOW RATES Flow Rate 350 gpml Automatically maintain sufficient inventory in steam generator for residual heat removal.
500 gpm2 Maintain steam generator level constant during a 75oF/hr cooldown (operator action required).
320gpm supplied within 120 sec. of actuation signal.
350gpm supplied within 30 minutes of actuation signal (operator action required).
2Provides bases for 100% rating of AFWS pumps.
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APPENDIX A ST LUCIE UNIT I AUCHKNTFD AUXllIARY FEKDNATKR SYSTFM SRP 10.4.9 ACCRPTANCI) CRlTFRIA COMP lIANCE RF.HARKS Acceptability oE the design of the nuxilinry feiilwater system, ns de-scribed in the applicant's safety analysis repas t (SAR), is hnscil on speci llc Ri.iii rnl design crltcrin nnd rcgulntory guides.
An additional basin for dctrrmining the accept-ability of thc AFS is thc di.grec of similinrity oE the design with that Eor previously reviewed plants with satisfactory operating expericncc.
Listed below nre the specific criteria The Unit 1 Anxiliary Feeilwntrr Svstrm (AFMS) will be augmented ns drscribed
~su ra in thc System Description nnd Safety Evaluation.
Following is n re-view oE thnt anpmenti.d AFWS which de-scribes hnw the system meets present NRC StnfE criteria.
as they rclnl.c to the AFS.
1 ~
Ccncrnl Design Criterion 2, as related to strnctures housing thr systi'.m and the system itself 1.
- System, including the instrumcntatinn nnd controls thereto, is dusipnnted
- 1. Also sce System Description nnd Safety Evnluntion discussions in main text.
being cnpable of withstanding the e ffrcts of natural phenomena such ns earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes nnd finnds, ns cstnb-lished in Chapters 2 anil 3 of seismic Category I, designed to withstand tornadoes and hurricanes nnd lncnted nt nn elevatinn above the prnbnhlc mnximum Elood level.
hce FSAR Sbbscction 10.5.3.
the SAR.
APPENDIX A ST LUCIK UNIT 1
AUCHENTED AUXILIARY FEKDWATKR SYSTFH (Cont'd)
SRP 10.4.9 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA COHP I IANCK REMARKS 2.
General Design Criterion 4, with 2.
The AFWS is located in an outdoor respect to structures housing the system and the system itself be-ing capable of withstanding the effects of external missiles and internally generated
- missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement forces associated
<<ith pipe breaks.
area below the main feedwater and main steam lines, and is sur-rounded by tornado missile-resistant shielding.
The turbine-drivcn pump is missile shielded from thc motor-driven pumps.
The only high-energy lines traversing the AFS area arc the Main Stcam and Hain Feedwater lines above thc AFW pumps.
A discussion of the jet impingcmcnt forces from a HSLB or HFlB is provided in FSAR Appendix 3C.
A review nf the AFWS has been performed in light of current NRC
- criteria, and a pipe whip restraint will be installed which prccludcs thc turbine-driven pump header from whipping into thc motor-driven header.
- 2. The Unit I AFWS was not catcgorixed as a high-energy system nor was the the Staff Safety Evaluation Report predicated on this basis; howe ver, the AFWS meets thc llglB criteria, account ing for n s ingle acti vr failure, as discussed in BTP ASB 10-1 position 5, below.
APPENDIX A ST IUGIE UNIT 1 AUCHENTED AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEH (Cont'd)
SRP 10.4.9 hCCEPFANGE CRITERIA COHP 1 IANCE tion of system components.
8.
Regulatory Guide 1.26, as related 8.
The AFWS is designed 1)uaiity Croup tn the quality group classifica-G in accordance with R.C.
1.26.
REHARKS 8.
Those portions of the AFWS connected to the Hain Feedwater line are QC B tn the isolation valve(s) 9.
Regulatory Guide 1.29, as related 9.
Thc AFWS is designated seismic to thc sc ismic design classifica-tion of system components.
Category I in accordance with R.C.
1.29.
10 Regulatory Guide 1.62, as re"
- 10. Thc AFWS will meet the rcquire-lated to dcsipn provisions made for manual initiation of each protective action.
ments of Regulatory Guide 1.62.
The operator may manually ini-tiate the Automatic water Actua-tion Signal (AFAS) from an easily accessible location in the con-trol room.
Hanua1 initiation ensures that protective action goes to completion.
ll. Regulatory Guide 1.102, as re-structures,
- systems, and cora-ll. All AFWS components are located above the maximum probable flood poncnts important to safety from the effects of flooding.
levc l.
0
APPEHDIX A ST LUCIE UNIT 1
AUCHFHTED AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEll (Cont'd)
SRP 10.4.9 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA COHPLIANCE REHARKS 3 ~
General Design Criterion 5, as related to the capability of shared systems and components important to safety to perform require<l safety f>>nctions.
3.
Thc SL 1
AFWS has no structures, systems or components important to safety which are shared with Unit 2.
- However, a Condition of License for Sl 1 includes n
commitmcnt'o provide an intertie with the Unit 2 Condcnsatc Storage 3.
The Unit 2 CST intertie is rr-quired
~onl in the event that a tornado missile somehow pcnctrates thc top of thn Unit 1
CST (which is protected on all si les by a 2-loot thick concrete tornado missile barrier to a Tank (CST).
- Thus, thc only "shared" component in the AFWS is thc Unit 2 CST (capacity 400,000 gal.).
A connection from the Unit 2 CST will be provided to the suction.of the Unit 1
AFWS pumps for the unlikely event that a tornado missile penetrates the top of thc Unit 1
CST and destroys that source of ~ster.
height of 30 fact) and penetrates throngh the CST water, and pcnetrates thc CST tank wall.
This scenario is highly unlikely.
The connection for Unit 1 is of sufficiently high elevation up the Unit 2 tank to assure an adequate condensate supply for Unit 1
(150,400 gal.)e
APPENDIX A ST LUCIE UNIT l AUCHENTED AUXIIIARY FEEDWATER SYSTFM (Cont'd)
SRP I0.4.9 ACCEPfANCE CRITERIA COHPI.IANCE REHARKS
- 3. (Cunt'd) while providing Unit 2 with a suffi-cient quantity (150<400 gal.) to safely shut down also, assuming a
hypothetical loss of the Unit I CST to a tornado missile.
4.
Ccncral Design Criterion l9, as 4
related tn thc design capability of system instrumentation and cnotrols for prompt hot shutdown ol'he reactor and potential cap-ability for subsequent cold shut-down.
Adcquatc instrumentation and con-trols are provided to assure thc plant is brought to a hot standby condition and subsequent cold shutdown during both normal opera-tion and under accident conditions, including s LOCA.
The control of AFWS flow and SG level is accom-plished by control room operated valves;
- however, local control stations are also provided, In-strumentation is also provided at
- 4. The augmented AFWS will be designed such that an Automatic Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS) auto-matically starts all three AFWS pumps snd opens the valves for both trains to both SCs.
In the event of a Hain Feedwater line rupture, or an AFWS line
- break, thc AFAS will automatically isolate thc affected SC and will antomstical ly f<'ed to the intact SC(s).
the remote Nor Shutdown Panel, as indicated at FSAR Subsection 7.4.1.8, which provided capability for a prompt hot shutdown and capability
. for subsequent cold shutdown using appropriate proccdur<.s.
APPENDIX A ST LUCIE UNIT 1
AUGHENTED AUXILIARY FEED'WATER SYSTEM (Cont'd)
SRP 10.4.9 ACCEPIANCE CRITERIA 5.
Cencral Design Criterion 44, to assure:
a.Thc capability to transfer heat loads from the reactor system to a heat sink under both normal opera t ing and ace ident condi-tions.
COHPLIANCE 5a.
During normal operation, the AFWS provides a <<ster inventory to the SCs for removal of decay and sensible heat to thc Steam Dump and Bypass System (SUBS).
Under accident conditions heat removal is via the SDBS or to the atmos" phere via the Hain Steam Safety RF.HARKS 5.a The motor-driven AFW pump capacity has been tested and sho<<s s fin<<-
rate in excess of 350 gpm per pump.
Analyses demonstrate that this Elo<<rate is adequate for de-cay heat removal.
Valves or the Atmosphere Dump valves.
b.
Redundancy oE components so that Sb.
The AFWS is designated as seismic 5b.
The design basis for the Sl-1 under accident conditions the safety function can be pcrEormed assuming a single active compon-ent failure..
(This may be co-incident <<ith the loss of oEfsite po<<cr for certain events.)
Category I, Safety Class 3 and capable of <<ithstanding a
single active component failure.
A single failure analysis of the AFWS, including loss of offsite po<<er, is provided ln FSAR Table 10.5-1.
AFWS is HFW rupture
<<1th loss of oEEsite pn<<er plus AFW single active Esilure.
This is satisEicd by the design; see FSAR Table 10.5-1A.
Also sce BTP ASB 10-1, position 5.
The capability to isolate compon-5c. SuEficient remote-manual features 5c.
Scc FSAR Tables 10.5-1 and 10.5-1A.
- cnts, subsystems, or piping if required so that the system safety
.I Ennction <<ill bc maintained.
are provided to permit isolation of failed comp'nncnts and maintain AF'W Elo<< to the stcam generators
~
The proposed AFAS logic <<ill detect a rupture in a HFW line or AFWS line and isolate that line sn that AFW fin<< is maintained to the intact steam generator(s).
APPENDTX A ST LUCIE UNlT AUCHENTED AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEH (Cont'd)
SRP 10.4.9 ACCEPrANCE CRlTERfA COHPLIANCE REHARKS 6.
General Design Criterion 45, as relatrd to design provisions made to permit periodic in-acrvicc inspection of system components and cqulpmcnt.
6.
Design provisions arc provided to assure periodic ISl of the system as required, i.e.,
removable insulation on Class 2 components to test veld>>', only visual inspec-tion required on Class 3 components.
6.
FP6L's inservice inspection and testing program haa been sub-mitted to NRC.
7.
General Design Criterion 46, 7.
Design provisions are provided to 7.
FP6l's inservicc inspection and as related to design provisions made to permit appropriate functional testing of the systems and components to assure struc-tural integrity and leak-tight-
- ness, operability and performance of active components, and cap" ability nf thc integrated system assure that thc Auxiliary Fecdvater System can be tested by flov trans-mitters to test
- pumps, pressure indicators to test integrity, and remote"manual means to activate
. valves from the control room.
testing program haa bean sub-mitted to NRC.
tn function as intcndcd during
- normal, shutdovn, and accident conditions.
APPENDIX A ST LUCIE UHIT 1 AUCMENTED AUXIIIARYFEEOWATPR SYSTEM SRP 10.4.9 ACCPPTAHCF. CRI'CERIA
- 12. Regulatory Guide 1.117, as re-lated to the protection of structures, systems and com-ponnnts important to safety from the effects of tornado missiles.
COMPLIANCE 12.
The AFWS is protected from the effects of tornado missiles as described in item 2 'and in the Safety Evaluation.
REMARKS 12.
See position of 2 SRP 10 4 9 above.
3-1 anil MFB 3-1, as related to breaks in high and moilerate energy piping systims outside containment.
or licensed as a high-energy sys-tem; nonetheless the AFWS meets these criteria.
13.
Branch Technical Positions ASB 13.
The SL I AFWS uas not categorited 13.
See position 5 of BTP ASB 10-1, uhich is part of this Appendix.
14.
Branch Technical Position ASB 10-1, as related to auxiliary feeduater pump drive and poucr supply diversity.
14.
The augmented AFWS vill have the turbine-driven train uholly in-dependent of ac pover.
- 14. Refer to lineup given for BTP ASB 10-1, uhich is part of this Appendix.
APPFNDIX A ST l,UCIE UNIT 1
AUGHENTED AUXIIIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEH BTP ASB 10-1 BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION:
COHPLIANCE REHARKS should consist of at least two full-capacity, indcpcndcnt systems that include diverse power sources.
(AFWS) consists of two full capacity motor-operated pumps in one train and another redundant full capacity turbine driven pump in the other system.
One system is ac powered and the other is steam/dc power.
1.
Thc auxiliary fccdwater system 1.
The Auxiliary Feedwater System 1.
The augmented AFWS will power the steam inlet vs'ives and AFW turhinc pump flowpath ontlet valves by dc
- power, thus being independent of ac power.
auxiliary feedwater system should also use the concept of separate and multiple sources of motive energy.
An example of the re" quired diversity would be two separate auxiliary feedwater
- trains, each capable of removing the aftcrhcat load of thc reactor valves) is powered by the ac system whereas the turbine driven system (pumps, valves) wi.ll be wholly powcrcd by the dc system and stcam.
Either train provides sufficient capability of cooling thc RCS to the temperature and pressure required for initiation of shutdown cooling.
2.
Other powered components of the 2.
The motor driven system'(pumps, 2.
Analyses performed by the reactor vendor demonstrate that one mntor-driven pump, with an installed capacity of over 350 gpm, is cnpsble of nf removing reactor decay heat.
- system, having one separate train powered from either of two ac sources and the other train wholly powered by steam and dc electric I
powers I
APPENDIX A ST LUCIE UNIT I AUGHENTED AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEH (Cont'd)
BTP ASB 10-1 BRANCH TECIH(ICAL POSITION:
COUP 1 lANCE take and discharge, for each train should b>> designed to per-mit th<. pumps to supply fecdwater to any combination of stcam gene-rators.
This arranpement should take into account pipe failure>
active component failure, power supply failure, or control system failure that could prevent system function.
One arrangemcnt that would bc acceptable is crossover piping containing valves that can be opcrat<.d by remote control from the control room, using thc power diversity principle Eor the valve operators and actuation systems.
take and discharge, permits feedwater to any combinstinn oE SCs.
SL 1 uses the crossover piping scheme, so as to withstand s ing1 e active component Ea 1 lure where the flow path will bc arranged by remote control from the control room which will use the power diversity principle. Local control provisions enable system function upon loss of control failure.
For power supply failure the design will provide diversity by having ac powered and dc/steam powered trains.
Additionally, upon loss oE offsite power, ac power is supplied by the diesel generators..
3.
The piping arrangemcnt, both in-3.
The piping arrangcmcnt, both in-REHhRKS 3.
Power diversity is arranged such that motor-<lr<vcn AFWS train "h"
~
is powered by ac safety hus "SA" which is automatically loaded nn diesel generator lA; th>> similar train "8" is on bus "SB" and loaded on DG 1B.
The turbine-drivcn pump 1C is on dc swing bus "AB" and can be aligned to>>ither "SA" or "SB".
The augmented AFWS
<<ill have
<lc power to all valves in the turbine-driven flow path.
Pipe failure oE the AFWS is addressed in position 5 below.
should bc designed with suitable redundancy to oEfset thc conse-qucnccs of any single active com-I poncnt Enilurc, however, each train nce<l not contain redundant active failures are accommodated as pcr FSAR Table 10.5-1.
The cross ties and valves are arranged'such that single active failure oE a component is accommodated.
For 4.
The Auxiliary Fcedwatcr System 4.
The AFWS is design<.d such that single 4 ~
The augmented AFWS will contain dc-powered valves jn thc turbine-driven pump flowpath.
active components.
cx amp 1c, on failure o E a va 1ve
APPENDIX A ST LUCIK UNIT I AUCHEHTED AUXILIARY FKKDWATCR SYSTCH (Cont'd)
BTP ASB lo-I BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION:
COHPLIANCE RKHARKS (root'd) in a motor-driven pump line to open, or on failure oE a motor-drivcn pump to start, the turbine-driven pump supplies both SCs', or on failure of a valve/pump in the turbine-driven train, the motor-driven pumps supply both SCs.
5.
When considering a high energy linc break, thc system should be so arranged as to permit the cap-ability of supplying necessary emergency Ecedvater to thc steam generators, despite the postu-lated rupture of any high energy section of the system, assuming a cncurrcnt single active fail-5.
Postulation of an HFLB in thc Auxiliary Feedvater System uas never a design basis for St. Lucie Unit l.
Nevertheless, t'e system has been revieved for this postulate also assuming a con" current single active failure.
Results for the vorst cases in-dicate that the unEaultcd SC is aluays fcd by at least onc motor" driven pump, and Eor most single Eailures the unfaultcd SC is fcd by at least one motor-driven and the turbine-driven pump, nr bnth motor-driven pumps.
5.
Design criteria for Unit l uas HFW rupture and single failure in AFWS.
The AFAS vill detect thf rupture in the <<Efectrd linc and and close the appropriate valves to isolate the ruptured linn.
As-built capacity oE the motor-driven pump is over 35O gpm.
Analyses indicate that this ia sufEicinnt Elov to rcmnvr RCS decay heat and remain at hot standby conditions.
For nn AFWS HELD, hot standby is the safe condition.