ML17221A200

Attachment 3 to NWMI-LTR-2017-011 - NWMI-2013-021, Rev. 2, Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Construction Permit Application for Radioisotope Production Facility and Rev. 2 to Chapter 3.0, Design of Structures, Systems, and Components

ML17221A200
Person / Time
Site:	Northwest Medical Isotopes
Issue date:	08/05/2017
From:	Haass C Northwest Medical Isotopes
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML17221A370	List: ML17221A199 ML17221A200 ML17221A201 ML17221A202 ML17221A203
References
NWMI-LTR-2017-011 NWMI-2013-021, Rev. 2
Download: ML17221A200 (227)

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• NOllTHWfST MEDICAL ISllTOPfS ATTACHMENT 3 Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC Docket No. 50-609 Construction Permit Application for Radioisotope Production Facility Revision 1 of Chapters 10.0, 11.0, 12.0 (including Appendices 12A,12B, and 12C) and 14.0 and Revision 2 of Chapters 2.0, 3.0, 6.0, 7.0, 8.0, 13.0 of NWMl-2013-021, Construction Permit Application for Radioisotope Production (Document No. NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 1, August 2017)

Public Version Information is being provided via hard copy

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. NORTHWEST MEDICAL ISOTOPES Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Construction Permit Application for Radioisotope Production Facility NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 August 2017 Prepared by:

Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC 815 NW gth Ave , Suite 256 Corvallis, OR 97330

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics This page intentionally left blank.

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Construction Permit Application for Radioisotope Production Facility NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Date Published:

August 5, 2017 Document Number. NWMl-2013-021 I Revision Number. 2

Title:

Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Construction Permit Application for Radioisotope Production Facility Approved by: Carolyn Haass Signature:

Cw.Jr~-;/~

NWM 1-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics This page intentionally left blank.

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics REVISION HISTORY Rev Date Reason for Revision Revised By 0 1/5/2014 Initial Application Not requ ired 1 5/19/2017 Incorporate changes based on responses to C. Haass NRC Requests for Additional Information 2 8/5/2017 Modification based on ACRS comments C. Haass

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics CONTENTS 2.0 SITE CHARACTERISTICS .... .... ............................................. ................. ........ ........... .. ............. .. 2-1 2.1 Geography and Demography ........ .................... ............... ... ... ........ ... .. ........................... ... .. 2-1 2.1.1 Site Location and Description .............. ......... .......... ... ............. ............................. 2-1 2.1.1.1 Specification and Location ................................... ........................ ....... 2-1 2.1.1.2 Boundary and Zone Area Maps ................................ ................... ....... 2-4 2.1.2 Population Distribution ...................... ................... .......... ............. ....... ................. 2-9 2.1.2. l Resident Population ...... .................................... ....................... ......... 2-10 2.1.2.2 Transient Population .... ............... ....................... .................... ........... 2-20 2.1.3 Combined Resident and Transient Population ................................................... 2-33 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation, and Military Facilities ... .......... .................................. 2-41 2.2.l Location and Routes .............................. .. ....... .. ..... .............. .. ........ ...... ............... 2-41 2.2.1.1 Future Facilities ................................................................................. 2-43 2.2. 1.2 Industrial Facilities ............. ..................... ........................... .. ............. 2-45 2.2.1.3 Transportation Routes .. .. .................... ... ..... ........ ... ............................ 2-45 2.2. 1.4 Pipelines ..................... .. .................. ......... ... ....................................... 2-46 2.2.1.5 Fuel Storage ............... ........... ............................... .............. ............... 2-46 2.2.2 Air Traffic ......................... ............................. ..... ..... ..................... ........... .......... 2-47 2.2.2.1 Airports ..... .... ................................... ................................................. 2-47 2.2.2.2 Airways ............................. ............. .......... .. ..... ...... ......... .................. . 2-52 2.2.2.3 Military Airports and Training Routes .............................................. 2-53 2.2.2.4 Approach and Holding Patterns .......................... .... ............ ........ ..... . 2-53 2.2.2.5 Evaluation of Aircraft Hazard ............................... ................ ............ 2-53 2.2.3 Analysis of Potential Accidents at Facilities ................................ ...................... 2-55 2.2.3.1 Determination of Design-Basis Events .. ............ ............................... 2-55 2.3 Meteorology ..................................................................................................................... 2-69 2.3.1 General and Local Climate .................... ..... ................................. ......... .............. 2-69 2.3.1 .1 Temperature ............... ............................................................ ........... 2-70 2.3.1 .2 Precipitation ........................... .... ..... ....... ......................... ....... .. ......... 2-71 2.3.1.3 Maximum Probable Snowpack ........ .... ........... ............ ........... ........... 2-72 2.3.1.4 Humidity .......................................... ......................................... ........ 2-73 2.3. 1.5 Wind ................................................ ..... ... ... ...... .. ..... .......................... 2-73 2.3.1.6 100-YearReturn Wind Speed ..................... .... .................................. 2-76 2.3.1.7 Extreme Weather ................................ ..... ........ ..... .................. ........... 2-76 2.3.2 Site Meteorology ................... .... .... .. ...... ... .... ........ .............................................. 2-82 2.4 Hydrology ................... ....................... ............ ................................................. ................. . 2-83 2.4.1 Surface Water ... ............................... ..... ............. .. ................ ..... ..... ......... ............ 2-83 2.4.2 Ground Water ............... ..................................... ................................................. 2-86 2.4.3 Floods ............................. ... ... .......... ..................... ... ............ ........ ........ ................ 2-88 2.5 Geology, Seismology, and Geotechnical Engineering ......... .. .................................. .... .. .. 2-90 2.5.1 Regional Geology .................................. ................... ......................................... 2-90 2.5.1.1 Geomorphic Provinces .......... ............................................................ 2-90 2.5.1.2 Glacial History .................... ........................................... ... ................ 2-91 2.5. 1.3 Local Topography and Soils of Boone County .......... ....................... 2-92

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.5.2 Site Geology ..... ... .. .................. .......... ...... ............ .... ................... ........ ..... .......... . 2-92 2.5.2.1 Quaternary Age Holocene Series (Qal) ................................ ............. 2-94 2.5.2.2 Pennsylvanian Age Desmoinesian Series Marmaton Group (Pm) and Cherokee Group (Pc) ...................... ....... ............... .......... .. . 2-96 2.5.2.3 Mississippian Age Osagean Series Burlington Formation (Mo) ... ... . 2-96 2.5.2.4 Mississippian Age Kinderhookian Series Chouteau Limestone (Mk) ............................................. ............................. .. ... ..... ........ ...... 2-97 2.5.2.5 Late to Early Devonian Limestone (D) .. ..... ....... ... ... .............. ........... 2-97 2.5.2.6 Early Ordovician Age Ibexian Series Dolomites (Ojc) .... ..... ........ .... 2-97 2.5.3 On-site Soil Types ............. ........... ................ .. ......... ..... .. ........ ... .. ...... ... .......... .... 2-97 2.5.4 Seismicity ... ....... .............. ... .. .. ............ .... ................. .................................. ....... .. 2-98 2.5.5 Maximum Earthquake Potential ......... .... ........ ......... .......... ........................ ..... .. 2-103 2.5.6 Vibratory Ground Motion .................. .. .... ............. .............. ................. ... .... ... .. 2-105 2.5.7 Surface Faulting ......................... ........ .. .... .............................. ..... ..... ... ..... ........ 2-106 2.5.8 Liquefaction Potential ......... .. ..................... .. .. .... .. ... .... ............. ........................ 2-108 2.6 References ................................ ....................... ........................ .. ............. ........................ 2-110 ii

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics FIGURES Figure 2-1. 200 km (124 mi) Radius with Cities and Roads ................. ............................................. 2-2 Figure 2-2. Illustration of 8 km (5-mi) Radius from the Center of the Facility .................. ................ 2-3 Figure 2-3 . Boundaries and Zones Associated with the Facility ....................... ............... ............. ..... 2-5 Figure 2-4. Prominent Features in Site Area .. ................ ................ .................. ............. ..................... 2-6 Figure 2-5 . Topography in Site Area .................... ...... ......................... .......... ............ ............. ............ 2-7 Figure 2-6. The Rural and Urban Zones Surrounding the Radioisotope Production Faci lity ............ 2-8 Figure 2-7. Population Groupings ............ .. ........ ............ ........................................ .. .......... .............. 2-11 Figure 2-8. Resident Population Distribution - 20 10 ..................... ..... ...................................... ....... 2-13 Figure 2-9. Resident Population Distribution - 20 14 ... .... ..... .... ................ .. ... ...... ....................... ..... 2-14 Figure 2-10. Resident Population Distribution - 20 15 ... ....................... .............. ................. .. ..... .. ..... 2-15 Figure 2-11. Resident Population Distribution - 2019 ....... ........... ...................... .. ........ ...... ............... 2-16 Figure 2-12. Resident Population Distribution - 2020 ....... ..................................................... ........... 2-17 Figure 2-13. Resident Population Distribution - 2045 ......... ............................................ .................. 2-18 Figure 2-14. Resident Population Distribution - 2050 ...................................... ........ ......................... 2-19 Figure 2-15. Transient Population Distribution - 2010 ............................... ............ .... ...................... . 2-26 Figure 2-16. Transient Population Distribution - 2014 ...................................................................... 2-27 Figure 2-17 . Transient Population Distribution - 2015 .. ............................................. ............... ........ 2-28 Figure 2-18. Transient Population Distribution - 2019 ........ ................................................ .............. 2-29 Figure 2-1 9. Transient Population Distribution - 2020 .......... ................. ............... .............. .... .......... 2-30 Figure 2-20. Transient Population Distri bution - 2045 ................... .. .......... ................ ... ...... ............ .. 2-3 1 Figure 2-21. Transient Population Distribution - 2050 .......... .................. ........ ........ ..... ..................... 2-32 Figure 2-22. Combined Population Distribution -2010 .......... .. ....... .. ... .. ........ ........... ... ......... ........... 2-34 Figure 2-23. Combined Population Distribution - 2014 ................... ........ .. ......... ... .. ............ ........... .. 2-35 Figure 2-24. Combined Population Distribution - 2015 .... ......... ............ ........................................... 2-36 Figure 2-25. Combined Population Distribution -2019 ................................... .... .. ...... .... ................. 2-37 Figure 2-26. Combined Population Distribution - 2020 .... .................................................... .. .. ........ 2-38 Figure 2-27 . Combined Population Distribution - 2045 ........................ ................. ... .. .................... .. 2-39 Figure 2-28. Combined Population Distribution - 2050 ............................. ............ .. ........ ........... .. .. .. 2-40 Figure 2-29. Industrial and Transportation within 8 km (5 mi) of the Radioi sotope Production Facility Site ............................... ...... .. ................................... .. ...................................... .. 2-42 Figure 2-30. Industrial and Transportation within 16 km ( 10 mi) of the Radioisotope Production Facility Site Descriptions ............................................................................ 2-44 Figure 2-31. Wind Rose from South Farm, 2000- 2010 (University of Missouri Agricultural Experiment Station) ................................. .. ............... .......... ............. .... ........................ .. 2-74 iii

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Figure 2-32. Wind Rose from Automatic Weather Station, Columbia, Missouri , 2007-2012 (Western Regional Climate Center) .................................. ............................... .............. 2-75 Figure 2-33. Streams of Southern Boone County, Missouri ................. .......................... ................... 2-84 Figure 2-34. Map Showing Bonne Femme Watershed ............................................................... ....... 2-85 Figure 2-35 . Aquifer Map ...... ....... ............ .......................................................................................... 2-87 Figure 2-36. Federal Emergency Management Agency Flood Zones Around the Radioisotope Production Facility ........................................................... .................... .......................... 2-89 Figure 2-37. Geologic Features within an 8 km (5-mi) Radius of the Radioisotope Production Facility Site .................................................................................................................... 2-93 Figure 2-38. Map of Missouri Quaternary Age Geology ............................................... .................... 2-95 Figure 2-39. Hazard Mitigation Map ... ............................................................ ................................. 2-104 Figure 2-40. Geologic Faults Map ......... ....................... .... ................... ..... .......... ... ............. .............. 2-107 iv

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics TABLES Table 2-1. Closest Permanent Residents Within Each Compass Section Around the Proposed Site .. .. ................... .. .. ................. .................. ............. ...... ............ ......... .. ..... .. .. 2-10 Table 2-2. Resident Population Distribution within 8 km (5 mi) of the Proposed Site ................... 2-12 Table 2-3. Employers (2 pages) ............. ...... ........ ........... .... ....... ............ .... .. .......... ........ .... .... ......... 2-20 Table 2-4. Schools (2 pages) .................. ..................... .. ...................................... .............. ... .. ......... 2-22 Table 2-5. Medical Facility ........................... ........ ......................................... ... ..... .................. ....... 2-23 Table 2-6. Lodging Facilities ........................ ............................... .............................................. ..... 2-24 Table 2-7. Weighted Transient Population Estimates by Source ................ .. .................... .............. 2-25 Table 2-8. Total Project Transient Population ................................ ....... .. ........................... .... ........ 2-25 Table 2-9. Combined Resident and Transient Population ............... .. ............ ... ... ........ ...... .............. 2-33 Table 2-10. Significant Industrial Facilities within 16 km (10 mi) of the Radioisotope Production Facility Site ................................................. .............. ...... .................... ........ 2-45 Table 2-11. Hazardous Chemical Potentially Transported on Highways within an 8 km (5-mi)

Radius of the Radioisotope Production Facility .............. ..... .............. ..................... ...... 2-46 Table 2-12. Major Pipelines Located within 8 km (5 mi) of the Radioisotope Production Facility Site ................................................................................. .............. ....... .............. 2-46 Table 2-13. Major Storage Facilities Located within 8 km (5 mi) of the Radioisotope Production Facility Site ............... ................... .... ..... ..... ................................................. 2-47 Table 2-14. 200 D2 Limits ............................................................................................................. .... 2-48 Table 2-15. Orthonormal Coordinates for Columbia Regional Airport Runways to the Radioisotope Production Facility ............................................................. ...................... 2-49 Table 2-16. Probability of Crashes from Airport Operations (2 pages) ............................................ 2-49 Table 2-17. Affective Area for Helicopter .............................................. ........... .... ... .......... ...... ........ 2-52 Table 2-18 . Federal Designated Airways within 16 km (10 mi) of the Radioisotope Production Facility Site ... .............. .. ........ ...... ... ......................... .... .. ...... .............. .. ........ 2-52 Table 2-19. Effective Area Input Values and Calculated Effective Plant Area .............. .. ................ 2-54 Table 2-20. Crash Impact Probabilities ................... ........................... .......................... ....... ......... .... . 2-54 Table 2-21. Distance from the Radioisotope Production Facility where the Peak Incident Pressure is 6.9 kPa (1 lb/in.2) from an Explosion on U.S. Highway 63 ......... ................ 2-57 Table 2-22. Analysis of Hazardous Chemicals Stored Within 8 km (5 mi) of the Radioisotope Production Facility (2 pages) ............................................... ..... ...... ... ... .. ..... .................. 2-58 Table 2-23. Flammable Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis for U.S. Highway 63 ........... .................. 2-62 Table 2-24. Flammable Vapor Clouds and Vapor Cloud Explosions from External Sources (2 pages) .................... .................................... .. ... ...... .................... ....... ... .......... .............. 2-64 Table 2-25. Columbia, Missouri, Average and Extreme Monthly Climate, Historic Temperature Summary, 1969- 2012 ........................ ........................ .. .............. ............... 2-70 v

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-26. Columbia, Missouri, Five-Year Temperature Summary, 2008- 2012 ............................ 2-71 Table 2-27. Columbia, Missouri, Average and Extreme Monthly Climate, Historic Precipitation Summary, 1969- 2012 ............................................................................... 2-72 Table 2-28. 72-Hour Probable Maximum Precipitation ......... ...... ........... ... ..... ............. .......... ........ ... 2-72 Table 2-29. Relative Humidity Data for Columbia, Missouri, 2008-2012 ....... ........... ........... .......... 2-73 Table 2-30. Mean Wind Speed for Columbia, Missouri, from 2008- 2012 ....... ..................... ........... 2-73 Table 2-31. Fujita Scale and Enhanced Fujita Scales Used to Determine Tornado Intensity ........... 2-76 Table 2-32. Seasonal Frequency of Historical Tornadoes in Boone County, Missouri (1954 to 2016) .......................... ............... .. ................. ........... ............................. ............ ...... ........ 2-77 Table 2-33. Annual Frequency of Historical Tornadoes in Boone County, Missouri (1954 to 2016) .. .. ....... ................................................................................................................... 2-77 Table 2-34. Boone County Seasonal Thunderstorm Wind Events (8/29/1955 to 5/11 /2016) ........... 2-78 Table 2-35. Boone County Annual Thunderstorm Wind Events (8/29/ 1955 to 5/11 /2016) .......... ... 2-78 Table 2-36. Boone County Lightning Events (7 /5/1998 to 613012016) .. ............. .............. ................ 2-79 Table 2-37. Boone County Seasonal Hail Events 4/23/1 958 - 5/11 /2016 ... ........ ... .......... ................. 2-79 Table 2-38. Boone County Annual Hail Events 4/23/1958 - 5/11/2016 ........................................... 2-80 Table 2-39. Boone County Winter Weather Events (1 /1/1996 to 6/30/2016) (2 pages) .......... ......... 2-80 Table 2-40. Distances from Exhaust Stacks to Fence and Site Boundaries .... ..... ............... .............. 2-82 Table 2-41. Recorded Missouri Earthquake History (4 pages) ......................................................... 2-99 Table 2-42. Projected Earthquake Hazards for Boone County ............. ................. ... ... .. ................. 2-103 vi

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics TERMS Acronyms and Abbreviations 82 Rb rubidium-82 ACI American Concrete Institute ALOHA Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres BLEVE boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion CATSO Columbia Area Transportation Study Organization CFR Code of Federal Regulations CHM Children's House Montessori Early Leaming Center CONUS Continental United States COU Columbia Regional Airport CUSEC Central United States Earthquake Consortium State Geologists DHSS Department of Health & Senior Services Discovery Ridge Discovery Ridge Research Park DOA Department of Administration EF scale enhanced Fujita tornado intensity scale ESRI Environmental Systems Research Institute F scale (original) Fujita tornado intensity scale FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FIPS Federal Information Processi ng Standards GIS Geographical Information System IBC International Building Code IDLH immediately dangerous to life and health IROFS items relied on for safety ISA integrated safety analysis ISCM Islamic School of Columbia Missouri LEL lower explosion limit MDE Missouri Department of Education MDNR Missouri Department of Natural Resources MMI Modified Mercalli Intensity MMRPC Mid-Missouri Regional Planning Commission MU University of Missouri NAD National Geodetic Survey NCES National Center for Education Statistics NMSZ New Madrid Seismic Zone NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRCS Natural Resources Conservation Service NWMI Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC OGP International Association of Oil and Gas Producers RAWS Remote Automatic Weather Station RSAC Radiological Safety Analysis Computer REDI Regional Economic Development, Inc.

RPF radioisotope production facility SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act Terracon Terracon Consultants, Inc.

TNT trinitrotoluene U.S. United States U.S.C. United States Code vii

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics USCB U.S. Census Bureau USGS U.S. Geological Survey Units oc degrees Celsius op degrees Fahrenheit BTU British thermal unit cm centimeter ft feet ft2 square feet ft3 cubic feet g g-force gal gallon ha hectare hr hour in. inch in. 2 square inch kg kilogram kgal thousand gallons kip kilopound km kilometer km2 square kilometers kPa kilopascal kW kilowatt L liter lb pound m meter m2 square meter m3 cubic meter MeV million electron volt Mgal million gallons mi mile mi 2 square mile rem roentgen equivalent in man sec second yd yard yd2 square yard viii

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.0 SITE CHARACTERISTICS 2.1 GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY 2.1.1 Site Location and Description This subsection describes the location and important features of the Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC (NWMI) proposed Radioisotope Production Facility (RPF) site.

2.1.1.1 Specification and Location The proposed 3.0 hectares (ha) (7.4-acre) site is situated in Boone County, Missouri, within the University of Missouri (MU) Discovery Ridge Research Park (Discovery Ridge) in Columbia, Missouri ,

north of Discovery Ridge Drive. The site is situated in central Missouri approximately 201 kilometers (km) (125 miles [mi]) east of Kansas City and 201 km (125 mi) west of St. Louis. The site is 7.2 km (4.5 mi) south of United States (U.S .) Interstate Highway 70 just to the north of U.S. Highway 63. The Missouri River lies 15.3 km (9.5 mi) to the west of the site. The site is located 5.6 km (3.5 mi) to the southeast of the main MU campus and is shown on the map on Figure 2-1. Figure 2-2 provides the 8 km (5-mi) radius from the center of the facility and shows highways, rivers, and other local bodies of water.

The approximate center of the proposed RPF (NAD 83 , 1983) is:

Latitude and Longitude Longitude: 92° 16' 34.63" Latitude: 38° 54' 3.3 I" Universal Transverse Mercator Coordinates (meters [m])

Northing: 4306031 m Easting: 562755 m Zone: 15S Missouri State Plane Coordinates (U.S. Survey feet [ft])

North : 1116979.02 ft US East: 1704082.07 ft US FIPS Zone: Missouri Central 2402 2-1

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics IOWA K HOlllA

• RPF ite Major Ri er 0 2 Okm 124 mil ) Radiu from RP it tale Boundari ity

+

• --==--c: :J----====i---*

0 15 30 60 90 120 Miles

- - - Int tat Highv ay ark Tv ain ational F re t Figure 2-1. 200 km (124 mi) Radius with Cities and Roads 2-2

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Location Ma

• R.PF it - Inter tale Highwa 0 km ( mile) Radiu from RPF ite - Highwa City

<.J: ity Limit Mark T' ain ational Fore t

+

0 0.5 2

• -c::J**o****====-**-Miles 3 4 Jefferson City

• I URI Figure 2-2. Illustration of 8 km (5-mi) Radius from the Center of the Facility 2-3

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.1.1.2 Boundary and Zone Area Maps Figure 2-3 shows the boundaries and zones applicable to the proposed RPF site. The square area near the center of the site within which all safety-related structures are located gives the rough location and size of the operations boundary in accordance with ANSI/ ANS-15. 7, Research Reactor Site Evaluation, and ANSI/ ANS-1 5 .16, Emergency Planning for Research Reactors. The Emergency Planning Zone is encompassed by the site boundary using the guidance in:

• ANSI/ ANS-15 .16, Emergency Planning for Research Reactors

• Regulatory Guide 2.6, Emergency Planning for Research and Test Reactors

• Title 10, Code of Federal Regulation, Part 50.54 (10 CFR 50.54), "Conditions of Licenses"

• 10 CFR 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," Appendix E, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities."

The site boundary is the property line around the perimeter of the RPF site in accordance with ANSI/ANS-1 5.7 and ANSl/ANS-15.16. The controlled area (also referred to as the exclusion area) is the area within the site boundary in accordance with 10 CFR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," Subpart 20.1003, "Definitions," and 10 CFR 70.61(f), "Performance Requirements." The area directly under the facility operating license will also be delineated by the site boundary.

Figure 2-4 shows the highways, railways, and waterways within the 8 km (5 -mi) radius of the RPF site.

The approximately 3.0 ha (7.4-acre) RPF site is located entirely on property owned by MU. The site presently consists of grass fields. Access to the site is provided from Discovery Drive and Discovery Parkway. The RPF site is primarily relatively flat surfaces at an elevation of 231 m (758 ft). Figure 2-5 shows the topography within the vicinity of the RPF site.

Estimates of population density around the proposed project site included data from the most recent census year (USCB, 2010). Block groups and assoc iated populations were identified within the 8 km (5-mi) radius of the RPF site using ArcGIS 10.1 (ESRI, 2011). The associated population was divided by the calculated area (square mile [mi2 ]) of each block group. The resulting population density was used to determine if the block group could be classified as either rural or urban. Block groups with a population density of more than 500 people/mi2 were identified as urban. Block groups with a population density of lesser than 500 people/mi 2 were identified as rural. Urban or rural zones are identified in Figure 2-6.

2-4

• i*:~*:*

NWM I NClllTttWEST lllDICAt. tlOTOf'U NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Rough estimate of Operations Boundary and Emergency Planning Zone c:J Site boundary, area directly under the NRC Facility Operating License ,

Controlled Area

+0 0.03 0.06

--===--=:::J----m:========:::::.----*Miles 0.12 0.18 0.24 Figure 2-3. Boundaries and Zones Associated with the Facility 2-5

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Location Ma RP F ite - Inter tale Highway D 8 km (5 mile) Radiu fro m RPF it - Highway City

~ it Limi t Mark Twain ational Fore t

+

0 0.5 1 2 3 4

• • m::::i* *::::i* * * *==== - * * *

• Miles Jefferson City

• I UR. I Figure 2-4. Prominent Features in Site Area 2-6

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Location Ma

- Interstate Highway fro m RPF . ite

- Highway City c:ii City Limits

+

Mark T-. ain ational Forest Jefhrson City

• 0 0.5 1 2 3 4 I URI

-*::::::1*-==-***-===::::11**- Miles Figure 2-5. Topography in Site Area 2-7

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Location Ma

- Interstate Highwa s

• RPF ite

- Highways 0 8 km (5 mile) Radius from RPF Site City

- tate Routes Urban Areas (>500 people/square mile)

Rural Areas (< 500 people/square mile)

Jefferson City

• 0 0.5 2 3 4 I UR. I

• --=*--=---c::=====---*Miles Figure 2-6. The Rural and Urban Zones Surrounding the Radioisotope Production Facility 2-8

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.1.2 Population Distribution This subsection describes the population distribution within 8 km (5.0 mi) of the center point of the safety-related area at the proposed site. The information includes estimates of the resident and transient populations for the most recent census year (2010) and projections of the resident and transient populations for the following future years:

• Year submitting Construction Permit application (2015)

• Year of submitting Operating License application (2016)

• Five years after submitting Construction Permit application (2020)

• Five years after submitting Operating License application (2021)

• Approximate expected end of Operating License period (2047)

• Five years after approximate expected end of Operating License period (2052)

Estimates and projections of resident and transient populations around the proposed project site are divided into five distance bands-concentric circles at 0-1 km (0-0.6 mi), 1-2 km (0.6-1.2 mi), 2-4 km (1.2-2.5 mi), 4-6 km (2.5-3.7 mi ), and 6-8 km (3.7-5.0 mi) from the center point of the RPF-and 16 directional sectors (with each direction sector centered on one of the 16 compass points). For each segment formed by the distance bands and directional sectors, the resident population was estimated using U.S. Census Bureau 2010 census data, and the transient population was estimated using the best available data for major employers, schools, medical facilities, and lodging facilities. Collected transient population data is intended to represent 2010 population levels.

The future resident and transient population growth in each distance/direction segment was projected using specific growth rates that depend on whether the segment is located in the city of Columbia or in Boone County. The specific growth rates used in these areas are explained in the following paragraphs.

The City of Columbia comprehensive land use plan (City of Columbia, 2013), presents projections on the city's future population calculated using several possible population growth rates. The plan states that the Columbia Area Transportation Study Organization (CATSO) model projects a greater rate of population growth and is considered the most reasonable and conservative basis for estimating the city's future population. According to the plan, the CATSO model growth rate was calculated by using historic population data and land use trends, which are then projected forward to estimate future growth . Based on these projections, the CATSO model estimated that the rate of population growth (growth rate) is 1.5 percent annually. This growth rate was used to project future populations for areas within the analysis area that are within the Columbia city limits. The 2010 estimated resident and transient population in each distance/direction segment that is located partially or entirely within the city boundaries was increased by 1.5 percent each year from 2011 to 2050.

The Missouri Department of Administration (DOA) provides state and county population projections that were developed using the cohort-component method (DOA, 2008). The cohort-component method reviews recent historical patterns to determine age- and sex-specific rates of fertility, mortality, and migration. The DOA used the 2000 Census as a base for population counts. The base count is then advanced at five-year intervals to the year 2030 by using projected survival rates and net migration rates by age and sex. The DOA projections show that the population of Boone County is expected to increase by 7 .9 percent for the five-year period from 2010 to 2015 , by 7 .2 percent from 2015 to 2020, by 6.2 percent from 2020 to 2025, and by 5.0 percent for the period from 2025 to 2030. For each five-year period, the percent growth was divided by five to give the estimated annual growth rate within that period. The annual growth rates were used to project future populations for the areas around the project site that are entirely outside the boundaries of the city of Columbia. The estimated 2010 resident and transient population in each distance/direction segment that is located entirely outside of the city boundaries was increased by 1.58 percent each year from 2011to2015, by 1.44 percent from 2016 to 2020, by 1.24 percent from 2021 to 2025, and by 1.0 percent from 2026 to 2030. The growth rate of 1.0 percent was used for the period from 2031 to 2050.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics The following subsections described the resident and transient population distribution surrounding the proposed RPF site.

2.1.2.1 Resident Population The permanent residences nearest to the proposed RPF site were identified through an examination of aerial photographs and geographic information system (GIS) data files using ArcGIS 10.1 (ESRI, 2011 ).

There are two permanent residences located approximately 0.48 km (0.3 mi) from the center point, one to the south and the other to the northeast. These two houses are the closest residences to the center point of the safety-related area.

Figure 2-7 shows places of significant population Table 2-1. Closest Permanent Residents groupings (incorporated cities and unincorporated Within Each Compass Section Around the villages) within 8 km (5.0 mi) of the center point Proposed Site of the safety-related area. The map includes Nearest resident concentric circles drawn at distances of 1 km (0.6 mi), 2 km (1.2 mi), 4 km (2.5 mi), 6 km Quadrant (3.7 mi), and 8 km (5 mi) from the center point, North to North-Northeast 1.4 0.86 and is divided into 16 directional sectors, with North-Northeast to Northeast 0.6 0.36 each directional sector consisting of 22.5 degrees centered on one of the 16 compass points. Northeast to East-Northeast 2.0 1.22 Table 2-1 shows the closest permanent resident East-Northeast to East 1.1 0.7 within each of the I 6 sectors.

East to East-Southeast 1.8 1.1 The 2010 resident population within the 1 km East-Southeast to Southeast 2.0 1.24 (0.6 mi) and 2 km (1.2 mi) concentric circles was estimated based on the number of occupied houses Southeast to South-Southeast 0.9 0.55 (as identified through an examination of aerial South-Southeast to South 0.8 0.48 photographs) and the average number of people South to South-Southwest 0.4 0.27 per household (as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau). U.S. Census Bureau data indicates that South-Southwest to Southwest 1.4 0.89 Boone County has an average of 2.36 people per Southwest to West-Southwest 1.4 0.87 household (USCB, 2013).

West-Southwest to West 2.0 1.23 West to West-Northwest 0.9 0.58 West-Northwest to Northwest 1.0 0.65 Northwest to North-Northwest 1.7 1.04 North-Northwest to North 1.4 0.86 2-10

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics The 2010 resident population estimate was derived by multiplying the number of occupied houses by 2.36 people per house and rounding to the nearest whole number. The total resident population estimated in this manner for 2010 is 205 people at a distance of 0-1 km (0-0.6 mi) from the proposed site, and 1,862 people at a distance of 1-2 km (0.6-1 .2 mi). These population estimates are shown in Table 2-2, along with estimates for other distances. Figure 2-8 shows the population estimates divided into the distance/direction sections.

Table 2-2. Resident Population Distribution within 8 km (5 mi) of the Proposed Site Distance band (km)

Year Total 0-8 2010 205 1,862 7,070 16,919 21,508 47,564 2014 218 1,974 7,495 17,936 22,801 50,423 2015 221 2,004 7,608 18,205 23,143 51,181 2019 234 2,124 8,063 19,296 24,530 54,247 2020 238 2,156 8,184 19,585 24,897 55,060 2045 291 2,628 9,991 23 ,948 30,428 67,287 2050 313 2,820 10,727 25,728 32,683 72,271 The U.S. Census Bureau 2010 census block and tract data (USCB, 2012) was used to estimate the resident population within the 4 km (2.5 mi), 6 km (3.7 mi), and 8 km (5.0 mi) distance bands. For each segment formed by the distance bands and directional sectors, the percentage of each census tract's land area that falls, either partially or entirely, within that segment was calculated using ArcMap 10 GIS software (ESRI, 2011). The equivalent proportion of each census tract's population was then assigned to that segment. If portions of two or more census tracts fall within the same segment, the proportional population estimates for the census tracts were summed to obtain the population estimate for that segment.

Table 2-2 shows total 2010 population estimates within the 4 km (2.5 mi), 6 km (3.7 mi), and 8 km (5.0 mi) distance bands, and Figure 2-8 shows the population estimates divided into the distance/direction sections.

Using the methodologies described above, the 2010 resident population estimates within the distance bands and directional sectors were extrapolated to the years 2014, 2015, 2019, 2020, 2045 , and 2050.

Table 2-2 shows that total projected resident population for these years within the distance bands, and Figure 2-9 to Figure 2-14 show the projections for these years divided into the distance/direction sections.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Lo ati n Map Proposed Location

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.1.2.2 Transient Population In the addition to permanent residents around the proposed RPF site, there are people who enter thi s area temporarily for activities such as employment, education, medical care, and lodging. Although, some residents may not leave the safety-related area for any of these above activities, it is assumed that the estimated transient population estimates represent the population that is using the area temporarily. These transient populations were estimated based on data obtained from local officials, tourist boards, and government agency websites for major employers, schools, medical facilities (hospitals and nursing homes), and lodging facilities (hotels and motels) within 8 km (5.0 mi) of the center point. Transient populations using recreation sites were not used as part of the estimate because data could not be obtained for facility daily use.

Table 2-3 lists the major employers identified within 8 km (5.0 mi) of the proposed site, the directional sector and distance band within which each employer is located, and the best available estimate of the total number of people employed at that location. Data from Regional Economic Development, Inc. was used to estimate the number of employee per major employers within the safety-related area (REDI, 2011 ).

Table 2-3. Employers (2 pages)

Directional Distance Facility sector band (km) Employment ABC Laboratories, Inc. w 0 to 1 348 Discovery Office Park (2016) w 0 to 1 2503 Columbia School District - New Havenb NW 1 to 2 23 Boone County Public Works SSE 1to2 74 Central Regional Conservation Office (2013) SW 1to2 403 KOMO SE 1to2 6f Magellan Pipeline SSE 1to2 15 3 Columbia Auto Mart SE 1to2 83 Columbia School District - Cedar Ridgeb N 2 to 4 15 Jones Honda SSE 2 to 4 83 MBS Textbook Exchange NW 2 to 4 1,084 State Farm Insurance Companies WNW 2 to 4 1,043 U.S. Postal Service 341 c NW 2 to 4 43 Woodhaven WNW 2 to 4 220 Meeks Lumber SSE 2 to 4 103 MFA, Inc. NW 2 to 4 250 Equine Medical Services SSE 4 to 6 63 University ofMissourid NW 4 to 6 3,162 University ofMissourid WNW 4 to 6 611 University ofMissourid NNW 4 to 6 2 Columbia School District - Gentry Middle SchooJ b w 4 to 6 64 Columbia School District - Rock Bridgeb WSW 4 to 6 40 Columbia School District - Rock Bridge High SchooJ b w 4 to 6 107 Columbia School District - Sheppard Boulevardb NNW 4 to 6 30 Boyce and Bynum Pathology Laboratories, P.C. N 4 to 6 369 U.S. Postal Servicec w 4 to 6 43 Boone County National Bank* WNW 4 to 6 16 Boone County National Bank* NNW 4 to 6 16 2-20

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-3. Employers (2 pages)

Directional Distance Facility sector band (km) Employment Missouri Employers Mutual Insurance NNW 4 to 6 201 University of Missourid NW 6 to 8 3,273 University of Missourid WNW 6 to 8 1,581 University Hospital and Clinics - Women's and N 6 to 8 1,412 Children's Hospitalf University Hospital and Clinicsr NW 6 to 8 2,867 Columbia School District - Bentonb NNW 6 to 8 23 Columbia School District - Douglass High School b NW 6 to 8 15 Columbia School District - Grantb NW 6 to 8 23 Columbia School District - Jefferson Junior Highb NW 6 to 8 65 Columbia School District - Leeb NW 6 to 8 21 Boone Hospital Center NW 6 to 8 1,647 City of Columbia NW 6 to 8 1,286 U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs NW 6 to 8 1,250 Columbia College NW 6 to 8 490 Boone County Government NW 6 to 8 291 U.S. Postal Servicec NW 6 to 8 43 CenturyLink NW 6 to 8 230 U.S. Department of Agriculture NW 6 to 8 258 Boone County National Banke w 6 to 8 16 Boone County National Banke NW 6 to 8 16 Boone County National Banke NW 6 to 8 16 Boone County National Banke NNW 6 to 8 16 Boone County National Banke NNE 6 to 8 16 Total: 22,615 Sources:

DHS S, 2013, " DHSS Community Data Profiles - Hospita l Revenues from 20 10-201 2,"

http://health.mo.gov/data/CommunityDataProfiles/index.html, Missouri Department of Health & Senior Services, Jefferson City, Missouri , accessed September 5, 2013 .

MOE, 20 13, "District Student Staff Ratios - Columb ia 93," Missouri Department of Education, Jefferson City, Missouri .

REDI, 2011 , "2011 Fact Book Columbia/Boone County Missouri," http://www.columbiaredi .com/wp-content/upl oads/20 11 /04/REDl -Fact-Book-11.pdf, Regional Economic Development, Inc., Columbia, Missouri.

a Estimated.

b Employee estimates are based on school-to-student and admin istrator-to-student ratios. These are the estimated personnel who are most likely to be onsite 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> (hr)/day, 5 days/week.

c The total number of post office employees (341) were di vided by the total number of branches (8) located within the Co lumbia metropolitan area and distributed accordingly.

<l The total number of University of Missouri employees (8,630) is proportional to the area of the Uni versi ty of Missouri that lies within the distance/direction sector based on the area.

e The total number of Boone County National Bank employees (275) were divided by the total number of branches ( 17) and distributed accordingly.

r The total number of Uni versity Hospital and Clinics employees (4,279) is proportional to the number ofl icensed beds at the University Hospital and Clinics and the Women's and Children's Hospital.

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...*.. NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics

• ,*! NOllTHWHT M£OtCAl ISOTOf'fl MU is located in several of the distance/direction sections. For the employee estimate, the percentage of the university's area that falls, either partially or entirely, within that segment was calculated using ArcMap IO GIS software (ESRI, 2011). The equivalent proportion of university's employment was then assigned to that segment. To estimate the percentage of employees for the Columbia School District within the safety-related area, the distance/direction section for each school was noted, and the number of employees at each school was estimated using teacher-to-student and administrator-to-student ratios provided by the Missouri Department of Education (MDE, 2013). The University Hospital and Clinics operates several facilities within the safety-related area. The majority of facilities are located near MU in one distance/direction section; however, the Women's and Children's Hospital is separate from these facilities. The number of licensed rooms that are managed by the University Hospital and Clinics was used to estimate the proportion of employees at the Women's and Children's Hospital (DHSS, 2013). For the population estimate for the U.S. Postal Service and Boone County National Bank, the total number of employees was divided by the total number of branches in Boone County and then assigned to the appropriate branches within the safety-related area.

Table 2-4 lists the schools identified within 8.0 km (5 mi) of the proposed site, the directional sector and distance band within which each school is located, and the best available estimate of the total number of students at that location. MU is located in several of the distance/direction sections. For the enrollment estimate, the percentage of the university's area that falls , either partially or entirely, within that segment was calculated using ArcMap 10 GIS software (ESRI, 2011). The equivalent proportion of university's enrollment was then assigned to that segment.

Table 2-4. Schools (2 pages)

Distance Facility Directional sector band (km) Enrollment Fr. Tolton Catholic High School (2013) WSW 1 to 2 233 New Haven NW 1to2 329 Bryan University NW 2 to 4 331 Cedar Ridge N 2 to 4 196 William Woods University NW 2 to 4 1,036 Christian Chapel Academy WNW 4 to 6 153 Columbia Career Center w 4 to 6 43 Country Day School WSW 4 to 6 150 Gentry Middle School w 4 to 6 787 Rock Bridge WSW 4 to 6 524 Rock Bridge High School w 4 to 6 1,820 Sheppard Boulevard NNW 4 to 6 504 University of Missouri a NW 4 to 6 12,731 University of Missouri a WNW 4 to 6 2,458 University of Missouri a NNW 4 to 6 8 Benton NNW 6 to 8 244 Children' s House of Columbia NW 6 to 8 80 Columbia College NW 6 to 8 2,614 Columbia Independent NW 6 to 8 230 Columbia Independent School NW 6 to 8 11 7 Douglass High School NW 6 to 8 144 Field NNW 6 to 8 257 2-22

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-4. Schools (2 pages)

Distance Facility Directional sector band (km) Enrollment Grant NW 6 to 8 304 Islamic School of Columbia NW 6 to 8 54 Jefferson Junior Hi gh NW 6 to 8 812 Lee NW 6 to 8 305 Stephens College NNW 6 to 8 1,029 Stephens College Children' s School NNW 6 to 8 93 University of Missouri3 NW 6 to 8 13,180 University of Missouri a WNW 6 to 8 6,368 Total 46,751 Sources: CHM, 201 3; Columbia College, 201 3; ISCM, 201 3; MOE, 201 3; Movoto, 201 3; MU, 201 3; NCES, 201 3; New Ameri ca Foundation, 201 3; School Digger, 201 3; and US News, 20 13.

a The total Uni versity of Missouri enrollment (34,748) is proportional to the area of the Uni versity of Missouri that lies withi n the distance/direction sector based on the area.

Table 2-5 lists the medical facilities (hospitals and nursing homes) identified within 8 km (5.0 mi) of the proposed RPF site, the directional sector and di stance band within which each facility is located, and the best available estimate of the total in-patient capacity (number of licensed beds) at that location. Medical facilities that do not have licensed beds (out-patient facilities) for patients to reside for more than one day were not included in the transient population estimate because visitations for these facilities are temporary (less than 8 hr/day).

Table 2-5. Medical Facility Lenoir Manor Facility Directional sector WNW lt!r'11 1to 2 Licensed beds 84 Tiger Place NW 2 to 4 112 Lenoir Health Care Center NW 2 to 4 122 The Bluffs NW 2 to 4 132 Columbia Manor Care WNW 2 to 4 52 Bluff Creek Terrace NW 2 to 4 52 Nei ghborhoods Rehabilitation and Skilled Nursing NW 2 to 4 120 Boone Hospital Center NNW 6 to 8 400 Landmark Hospital NNW 6 to 8 42 University Hospital and Clinics NW 6 to 8 383 Women' s and Children 's Hospital 3 N 6 to 8 190 Daybreak Residential Treatment Center NW 6 to 8 14 Harambee House, Inc. NW 6 to 8 15 Columbia Healthcare Center NNW 6 to 8 97 Harry S Truman Memorial Veterans NW 6 to 8 126 Source: DHSS, 201 3, " DHSS Community Data Profi les - Hospital Revenues fro m 201 0-20 12,"

http://health .mo.gov/data/CommunityDataProfiles/index.htm l, Missouri Department of Health & Senior Services, Jefferson City, Missouri, accessed September 5, 20 13.

a In 2010, Columbia Regional Hospital became Women's and Child ren's Hospital.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-6 lists lodging facilities (hotels and motels) identified within 8 km (5 .0 mi) of the proposed site, the directional sector and distance band within which each facility is located, and the best available estimate of the lodging capacity (number of rooms) at that location.

Table 2-6. Lodging Facilities Directional Distance Facility sector band (km) Room Courtyard by Marriott NW 2 to 4 125 Hampton Inn & Suites NW 4 to 6 134 Stoney Creek Inn & Conference Center WNW 4 to 6 181 Candlewood Suites N 6 to 8 81 Baymont Inn & Suites N 6 to 8 65 Country Inn & Suites N 6 to 8 85 Fairfield Inn & Suites N 6 to 8 91 Hampton Inn N 6 to 8 120 Holiday Inn East NNE 6 to 8 126 Ramada Inn & Suites NNW 6 to 8 89 Residence Inn N 6 to 8 80 Staybridge N 6 to 8 82 Super 8 N 6 to 8 75 Super 8 East NNE 6 to 8 56 The Gathering Place NW 6 to 8 5 The Tiger Hotel NW 6 to 8 62 University Ave Bed & Breakfast NW 6 to 8 4 Wingate N 6 to 8 81 Sources:

Columbia Convention and Visitors Bureau, 2013 , " Where to stay- Hotels, Inns, and Motels,"

http://www.visitcolumbiamo.com/section/stay/, Columbia, Missouri, accessed September 9, 20 13.

Cvent, 201 3, "Hotels near Columbia MO," http://www.cvent.com/RFPNenues.aspx?ist=6&ma= 97&csn= l &vtt= l #page-6&so- l , Cvent Supplier Network, Tysons Comer, Virginia, accessed September 9, 201 3.

The estimates provided in Table 2-7 represent the total number of people expected to be at each facility for any part of the day, with no consideration of the length oftime they are likely to be there. The anticipated growth of Discovery Ridge may be underestimated using the above methodology. Developers are planning for an additional 1,000 employees supporting research at the park over the next 20 years (MMRPC, 2015). To account for this potential grow, an additional 30 new transient personnel are assumed to be employed near Discovery Ridge each year starting in 2020. This increase is spread equally between sectors over the estimating period.

To more accurately represent the transient population around the proposed site, the values in Table 2-7 were weighted according to the length oftime people could be expected to stay at each facility, assuming typical use patterns for that type of facility. The estimates for employers and schools were multiplied by a weighting factor of 0.27, which assumes that each employee or student is present at the facility 9 hr/day, 5 days/week. The estimates for medical facilities were multiplied by a weighting factor that was determined by the specific use. For hospitals/clinics, the known occupation rate for each facility was multiplied by the number oflicensed beds, which assumes at any one time a percentage of the beds are in use (DHSS, 2013).

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Nursing homes were not multiplied by any weighting factor, effectively assuming that each available room is occupied 24 hr/day and 7 days/week. The estimates for lodging facilities in the city of Columbia were multiplied by the average occupancy rate (60 percent) (Reed, 2010).

Table 2-7. Weighted Transient Population Estimates by Source Medical facilities Distance band Major (hospitals and Lodging (hotels (km) employersa Schoolsa assisted living) and motels) Totals 0-1 162 0 0 0 162 l -2 45 152 84 0 281 2-4 722 423 590 75 1,810 4-6 1,260 5,184 0 189 6,633 6-8 4,011 6,982 804 661 12,458 0-8 (Total) 6,200 12,741 1,478 925 21,344

• Updated to include new employers and schools as of June 2017.

The weighted 2010 transient population estimates calculated for each type of facility in each distance band area summarized in Table 2-7. Figure 2-15 shows the weighted 2010 transient population estimates divided into the distance/direction segments.

Using the same population projection methodologies used for resident populations, the 2010 transient population estimates within the distance bands and directional sectors were extrapolated to the years 2014, 2015, 2019, 2020, 2045, and 2050. Table 2-8 shows the total projected transient population for these years within the distance bands, and Figure 2-15 through Figure 2-21 show the population projections for these years divided into the distance/direction segments.

Table 2-8. Total Project Transient Population 2010 94 207 1,807 6,633 12,452 21,193 2014 100 395 1,912 7,033 13,207 22,647 2015 101 397 1,944 7,140 13,406 22,988 2019 107 486 2,060 7,566 14,210 24,429 2020 117 494 2,091 7,680 14,424 24,798 2045 341 657 2,562 9,426 17,669 30,447 2050 391 714 2,755 10,125 18,995 32,732

• Includes Fr. Tolton Catholic High School and the Central Regional Conservation Office starting in 20 13.

b Includes Discovery Office Park starting in 20 16.

c Includes employment growth at Discovery Ridge Research Park starting 2020.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics w 0 E s

Proposed Loc ation Location Map C:=> 1 Km from site C:=> 2 km from site

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics I

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~ 1 km from site

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~ 8 km from site Directional Sectors Incorporated Area Figure 2-21. Transient Population Distribution - 2050 2-32

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.1.3 Combined Resident and Transient Population The estimated 2010 and projected future resident and transient population values were summed to obtain an indication of the effective total population around the project site. Table 2-9 summarizes the combined resident and transient population values for all the years within the distance bands, and Figure 2-22 through Figure 2-28 show that combined populations for all years divided into the distance/directional segments.

Table 2-9. Combined Resident and Transient Population 2010 299 2,069 8,877 23 ,553 33,968 68,766 2014 318 2,367 9,402 24,969 36,008 73,064 2015 322 2,401 9,552 25,345 36,549 74,169 2019 341 2,610 10,122 26,862 38,740 78,675 2020 355 2,650 10,275 27,265 39,321 79,858 2045 632 3,282 12,553 33,374 48,097 97,730 2050 704 3,534 13,482 35,853 51,679 105,004 2-33

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Proposed Location Location Map C) 1 km from site

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Proposed Location Location Map C) 1 km from site

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Proposed Location Location Map C::> 1 l<m from site C::> 2 km from site

• 1l 4 l<m from site 6 l<m from site

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.g uil:s 1*o*c**-===**-==::::J1 Miles Incorporated Area Figure 2-24. Combined Population Distribution - 2015 2-36

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Proposed Location Location Map

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Proposed Location Location Map C) 1 km from site C) 2 km from site

• 4 km from site 6 km from site Ml I; Ill I C) 8 km from site Combined Population Distribution - 2020 Direc tiona l Sectors

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics

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C:=:> 1 km from site C:=:> 2 km from site

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Proposed Loc ation Location Map

_... 1lo C:> 1 km from site C:> 2 km from site

• 4 km from site 6 km from site J II I l\t I u.i I 11

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.2 NEARBY INDUSTRIAL, TRANSPORTATION, AND MILITARY FACILITIES This section identifies and evaluates present and projected future industrial, transportation, and military installations and operations in the area within 8 km (5 mi) of the RPF site. In addition, facilities and activities at a greater distance than 8 km (5 mi) are also considered as appropriate to their significance.

2.2.1 Location and Routes Access to the proposed RPF site is from Discovery Ridge Drive. The site is situated in central Missouri, approximately 201 km (125 mi ) east of Kansas City and 201 km (125 mi) west of St. Louis. The site is 7.2 km (4.5 mi) south of U.S . Interstate 70, just north of U.S. Highway 63 . The Missouri River lies 15.3 km (9.5 mi) west of the site. The site is located 5.6 km (3.5 mi) southeast of the main MU campus.

An investigation of industrial , transportation and military facilities within 5 mi (8 km) of the proposed site was performed. The U .S. Environmental Protection Agency's Envirofacts Database was initially used to identify potential facilities within 8 km (5 mi). The Missouri Emergency Management Agency supplied Tier II chemical inventory reports for all of the facilities in Boone County. The following facilities were identified for further evaluation.

Industrial Facilities Transportation Routes/Facilities

• Analytical Bio Chemistry Laboratories, Inc.

• Air

• Radii Discovery Ridge State University Hospitals and Clinics

• Gates Power Transmissions Materials Center Heliport

• MU South Farm University of Missouri Heliport

• MU Woman's and Children's Hospital Boone Hospital Center Heliport

• Ryder Transportation

• Truegreen

• Land

• Schwan' s Home Service U.S. Highway 63

• Petro Mart #44 U.S. Interstate 70 State Route 163 Pipelines State Route 740

• Southern Star Central Gas Natural Gas State Route 763 Transmission Pipeline

• Magellan Pipeline Company Non-HL V product

• Waterways - None Hazardous Pipeline

• Railroads - COLT Transload

• Magellan Pipeline Company Liquid Hazardous Pipeline Military Bases

• Ameren Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline # 1

• None

• Ameren Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline #2 Fuel Storage Facilities

• Magellan Pipeline Company Breakout Tank Mining and Quarrying Operations None Figure 2-29 shows the location of the transportation and industrial facilities identified within 8 km (5 mi) of the proposed RPF site.

2-41

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Ir

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics An investigation of industrial, military, and transportation facilities from 8 km to 16 km was also conducted and identified the following transportation facilities for further evaluation. Figure 2-30 shows the airports, jet routes, and airway routes within 16 km (10 mi) of the proposed RPF site.

Industrial Facilities Airports

• 3M Company - Columbia

• Sugar Branch Airport

• AT&T, Inc.

• Cedar Creek Airport

• Columbia Municipal Power

• Columbia Regional Airport

• MPC #93 Fuel Storage Facilities Major Waterways

• Midway Auto Truck plaza

• Missouri River

• Ballenger Propane, Inc.

• Ferrellgas Pipelines

• Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline 2.2.1.1 Future Facilities A review was conducted to identify potential future facilities and transportation routes (e.g., industrial growth) that if established or constructed, could have an adverse effect on the RPF. These future facilities/routes were identified through several sources. The initial lists of local projects were identified using the City of Columbia comprehensive land use plan (City of Columbia, 2013). State and county planning documents were also reviewed, and potential projects were discussed with Regional Economic Development, Inc., to identify potential private facilities . The majority of projects identified in the City of Columbia comprehensive land use plan are infrastructure-type projects of a nature that would exclude potential accidents that could affect the RPF.

Two new projects were identified that may be constructed near the Discovery Ridge, including:

• Global PET Imaging Facility - The proposed facility is being designed and constructed to process rubidium-82 ( 82 Rb) using a 70-million electron volt (MeV) cyclotron . This facility, along with any other potential facilities that might be constructed within the Discovery Ridge, are assumed to be similar in nature to the existing facilities and RFP with similar potential hazards.

As such, accidents associated with future facilities are assumed to be similar to those currently at Discovery Ridge and are bounded within the current accident analysis.

• Odles' Discovery Park (residential/commercial development) - Proposed development would be located approximately 0.8 km (0.5 mi) west of Discovery Ridge. The development is currently planned as a housing development intermixed with commercial shops and businesses. These commercial facilities are not anticipated to store large quantities of hazardous or flammable materials and would not likely pose a hazard to the RPF.

2-43

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.2.1.2 Industrial Facilities Descriptions of the industrial and transportation facilities identified within the 8 km (5-mi) radius of the RPF are provided below. For those facilities identified for future investigation, the Tier II reports were evaluated to determine ifthe facility used or stored large amounts of hazardous materials that could have a potential impact on the RPF. Of the facilities identified in Figure 2-29, Table 2-10 provides a description of those facilities that were identified as having potentially hazardous materials onsite that could potentially affect the RPF. Table 2-10 provides a listing of these facilities, including their primary functions and major products, and the hazardous materials onsite. A detailed analysis was conducted of the potential accidents at these facilities and potential hazards and impacts to the proposed RPF.

Table 2-10. Significant Industrial Facilities within 16 km (10 mi) of the Radioisotope Production Facility Site Facility Product km mi Direction Hazardous material Gates Power Vehicle and 2.4 1.5 Northwest .. [Proprietary Information]

Transmissions Materials machinery [Proprietary Information]

Center drive belts MU South Farm Agriculture 1.6 Northwest .. [Proprietary Information]

.. [Proprietary Information]

[Proprietary Information]

[Proprietary Information]

Ryder Transportation Rental trucks 2.4 1.5 South . [Proprietary Information]

3M Company Electronic 12.9 8 North . [Proprietary Information]

components Schwan's Home Service Food service 6.8 2.4 South . [Proprietary Information]

MU = University of Missouri. RPF Radioisotope Production Facility 2.2.1.3 Transportation Routes U.S. Highway 63 runs approximately 0.4 km (0.25 mi) south of the RPF site. U.S. Highway 63 proceeds north and intersects U.S. Interstate 70 approximately 7.64 km (4.75 mi ) to the north. U .S. Highway 63 continues to Jefferson City, Missouri, approximately 50 km (31 mi) to the south.

Other highways within the 8 km (5-mi) radius of the proposed RPF site include State Highway 63 that intersects U.S. Highway 63 3.2 km (2 mi) south of the RPF and routes north approximately 4.8 km (3 mi) west of the RPF. State Highway 740 intersects U. S. Highway 63 approximately 3.7 km (2.3 mi) north of the RPF, and routes west. State Highway 763 intersects State Highway 740 5.3 km (3.3 mi ) north of the RPF and routes north to U.S. Interstate 70.

Information is not available about the materials transported on the roads in the vicinity of RPF site. To better understand the materials that could be transported over these roads, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) Title III, Tier II reports for industrial facilities within 8 km (5 mi.) of the RPF site were consulted.

The Missouri's Commercial Vehicle Regulations (MoDOT, 2013) provi ded the maximum gross vehicle weight of 36,290 kilogram (kg) (80,000 pounds [lb]) . Using the assumption that an average truck and trailer combination weighs 13,600 kg (30,000 lb), the allowable weight that a truck could carry on the highways would be 22,690 kg (50,000 lb).

2-45

NWMl-20 13-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics For analysis, all materials were assumed to travel Table 2-11. Hazardous Chemical Potentially on State Highway 63 , 0.4 km (.25 mi) south of the Transported on Highways within an 8 km (5-mi)

RPF. Table 2-11 summarizes the chemicals and Radius of the Radioisotope Production Facility anticipated amounts that are present at the industrial facilities that could pose a hazard when transported.

Ammonia 22,680 50,000 2.2.1.4 Pipelines Ammonium nitrate 22,680 50,000 Several natural gas distribution pipelines are located Chlorine 408 900 within 8 km (5 mi) of the proposed RPF site, as Diesel 22,680 50,000 depicted in Figure 2-29. Available information about these pipelines is included in Table 2-12. Gasoline 22,680 50,000 Glycol ether PM 22,680 50,000 Ameren Missouri operates a natural gas Hydrofluorosilicic acid 22,680 50,000 transmission line approximately 6.4 km (4 mi) and Hydrogen 1,497 3,300 a pipeline installed in 2016 approximately 0.64 km (0.4 mi) north of the proposed RPF site. Southern JP-4 aviation fuel 22,680 50,000 Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc. operates a natural Methyl ethyl ketone 22,680 50,000 gas transmission pipeline located approximately Oil 22,680 50,000 1.6 km (1 mi) south of the proposed site. Pentaerythritol distearate 22,680 50,000 Magellan Midstream Partners, LP operates two pipelines within 8 km (5 mi) of the site, including Petroleum naphtha 22,680 50,000 a pipeline 2.4 km (1.5 mi) to the north, which Propane 22,680 50,000 carries refined petroleum products. The company Sulfur dioxide 22,680 50,000 also maintains a recently reopened line Toluene (32-8413) 22,680 50,000 approximately 1.6 km (1 mi) south of the proposed Zetpol (all types) 22,680 50,000 RPF site.

Table 2-12. Major Pipelines Located within 8 km (5 mi) of the Radioisotope Production Facility Site l1fo!,,t§i§M Pressure (max) Distance from RPF Pipeline company Ameren Missouri Ameren Missouri Product Natural gas (# 1)

Natural gas (#2)

Southern Star Central Natural gas

[Proprietary Information]

[Proprietary Information]

[Proprietary Information]

North North South Gas Pipeline, Inc.

Magellan Midstream Refined [Proprietary Information] North Partners, LP petroleum Magellan Midstream Refined [Proprietary Information] South/east Partners, LP petroleum RPF = Radioisotope Production Facility.

2.2.1.5 Fuel Storage Two major fuel storage facilities are located within the 8 km (5-mi) radius of the proposed RPF site, and include the Magellan Pipeline Company Breakout Tank and the Ferrellgas facility. Information of each of these facilities is provided in Table 2-13.

2-46

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-13. Major Storage Facilities Located within 8 km (5 mi) of the Radioisotope Production Facility Site Volume Storage facility Product (gal) km mi Direction Magellan Pipeline Company [Proprietary [Proprietary 1.6 Southeast Breakout Tanks Information] Information]

Ferrellgas [Proprietary [Proprietary 8 5 North Information] Information]

RPF Radioisotope Production Facility.

2.2.2 Air Traffic 2.2.2.1 Airports There are three airports and three helicopter ports located within 16 km (10 mi) of the proposed RPF site.

The three airports include:

• Columbia Regional Airport (COU) (public) located approximately 10.4 km (6.5 mi) south of the RPF site

• Cedar Creek Airport (private) located approximately 10.6 km (6.6 mi) northeast of the RPF site

• Sugar Branch Airport (private) located approximately 15.6 km (9.7 mi) northwest of the RPF site These airports are identified in Figure 2-30 (Section 2.2.1.1 ).

The nearest airport to the RPF is COU, which is used by commercial and privately owned aircraft. The airport is situated on approximately 0.53 ha ( 1,314 acres) and is owned and operated by the City of Columbia. This airport is the only public use airport located in Boone County, Missouri, for which records are kept. For January through December 2016, the airport had 21,894 (22,439, including overflights) aircraft operations (Parks, 2017a), including:

• 67.6 percent general aviation

• 17.7 percent air taxi

• 9.3 percent military

• 4.8 percent air carrier Cedar Creek airport is a private, turf landing strip approximately 10.6 km (6.6 mi) northeast of the RPF site. The facility houses two private single engine aircraft. The specific number of flights to and from the facility is not available.

The Sugar Branch airport is a private, turf landing strip approximately 15.6 km (9.7 mi) northwest of the RPF site. The facility houses one single engine aircraft. The specific number of flights to and from the facility are not available.

Three helicopter ports are located within 16 km (10 mi) of the RPF site and support hospital operations, including:

• University of Missouri heliport located 6 km (3.7 mi) northwest

• Boone Hospital Center heliport located 6.3 km (3 .9 mi) northwest For calendar year 2016 (January through December), the heliports have a total of 654 flights annually, as follows:

• University of Missouri Hospital and Clinics - 308 flights (Jones, 2017)

• Boone Hospital Center heliport- 346 flights (Eidson, 2017) 2-47

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Based on NUREG-153 7, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing ofNon-Power Reactors - Format and Content, sites located between 8 km (5 mi) and 16 km (10 mi) from an existing or projected commercial or military airport with more than approximately 200 d2 (where dis the distance in kilometers from the airport to the RPF site) commercial or military aircraft movements per year, the probability of aircraft accidents is considered less than an order of magnitude of 10-7 per year.

The number of operations at the Cedar Creek and Sugar Branch airports are not available. However, daily operations were assumed based on the aircraft housed, including two operations per day from Cedar Creek (730 operations/year) and one operation per day from Sugar Branch (365 operations/year). Based on the results presented in Table 2-14, all three airports are under the 200 d2 limits.

Table 2-14. 200 D 2 Limits Distance Airport km (mi) Flights per year 200 d 2 limitsa Columbia Regional Airport 10.4 (6.5 mi) 21,894 21,632 Cedar Creek 10.6 (6.6 mi) 730 22,472 Sugar Branch 15 .6 (9.7 mi) 365 48,672 a d is the distance in kilometers fro m the airport to the RPF site (200 x distance squared).

RPF = radioisotope production facility.

Based on this requirement, COU needs to be further evaluated. The guidance also requires that special consideration be given to facilities sited within the trajectory of a runway of any airport. The RPF site is not located within a trajectory of a runway of the airport.

NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, Section 3.5.1.6, provides a methodology for determining the probability of an aircraft crash into a facility from airports. The probability of an aircraft crashing into the RPF site is estimated using the following equation.

L M Pa= LL c i=l }=1 1 NiJAJ Where:

M Number of different types of aircraft using the airport L Number of flight trajectories affecting the airport Ci Probability per square mile of a crash per aircraft movement for the j th aircraft Ni Number (per year) of operations by the jth aircraft along the ith flight path Ai Effective area (in square miles) for the jth aircraft The different aircraft using COU include those categorized as air carrier, air taxi, military, and general aviation. Military aircraft are further divided into large (bombers, cargo aircraft, and tankers) and small (fighters, attack aircraft, and trainers).

The effective area for each aircraft associated with the RPF was calculated in EDF-3124-0015, Evaluation ofAircraft Hazards . Because the probability per square mile of a crash per aircraft movement (Ci) is not available in NUREG-0800, for most aircraft at distances greater than 5 mi, the probability was calculated using DOE-STD-3014-2006, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities.

2-48

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics This methodology uses the orthonormal distance from the RPF measured as the closest point to the center of each runway at COU [f(x,y)]. The aircraft crash probability is obtained from Tables B-2 through B-13 of DOE-STD-3014-2006. If the orthonormal distance is outside the boundaries of the tables, the f(x ,y) is assumed to be zero. For military aircraft, the "pattern" side of the runways needs to be identified. For COU, the pattern side is left (AirNav, 2017). Table 2-15 provides the orthonormal coordinates for each runway.

Table 2-15. Orthonormal Coordinates for Columbia Regional Airport Runways to the Radioisotope Production Facility Runway Distance (mi) Bearing to RFP Runway bearing 20 6.69 333 .17 133.17 2.27945 6.28969 2 6.69 329.23 309.23 -1.43955 6.53328 13 6.32 329.23 199.23 1.63167 6.10574 31 6.32 329.23 19.23 -5.86812 2.34682 RPF radioisotope production facility.

Because the exact number of landings and takeoffs is not known for each aircraft, half of the operations are considered to be takeoff and halflandings. This is conservative because total operations include activities such as an aircraft contacting the tower for a change of vector. In addition, the City of Columbia has an annual airshow on Memorial weekend, this activity is included in the Columbia Regional Airport annual flights per year.

COU has two runways: 13-31 and 2-20. It is assumed that 95 percent of all aircraft currently use runway 2-20 because runway 13-31 is a crosswind runway. In addition, large aircraft currently cannot use runway 13-31. COU is currently expanding and upgrading the airport, and by 2019, runway 13-31 will be usable for large aircraft. The number of operations per year was distributed between the two runways by this percentage. Probabilities of a crash for each aircraft was calculated for each bearing associated with each runway (130, 310, 200, and 20).

The probability crash rates for each type of aircraft category is obtained from DOE-STD-3014-2006, Table B-1. The impact frequency is then calculated by multiplying the f(x,y) value by the crash rate and affective area. Table 2-16 provides the results.

Table 2-16. Probability of Crashes from Airport Operations (2 pages) 20 Runway/Type of operations

• 11111111 II .

General aviation takeoff 7,025 -2.27945 6.289691 0 2.00E-04 0.00482234 O.OOE+OO General aviation landing 7,025 -2.27945 6.289691 0 2.00E-04 0.00482234 O.OOE+OO Commercial air carrier takeoff 503 -2.27945 6.289691 0 4.00E-07 0.018606226 O.OOE+OO Commercial air carrier landing 503 -2.27945 6.289691 0 4.00E-07 0.018606226 O.OOE+OO Air taxis takeoff 1,839 -2.27945 6.289691 0 1.00E-06 0.015346798 O.OOE+OO Air Taxis landing 1,839 -2.27945 6.289691 0 l.OOE-06 0.015346798 O.OOE+OO Military large takeoff 760 -2.27945 6.289691 0 2.00E-07 0.020269746 O.OOE+OO Military large landing 760 -2.27945 6.289691 2.90E-03 2.00E-07 0.020269746 8.93E-09 2-49

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-16. Probability of Crashes from Airport Operations (2 pages) 2 Runway/Type of operations *11111111 Ill .

General aviation takeoff 7,025 -1.43956 6.533282 0 2.00E-04 0.00482234 O.OOE+OO General aviation landing 7,025 -1.43956 6.533282 0 2.00E-04 0.00482234 O.OOE+OO Commercial air carrier takeoff 503 -1.43956 6.533282 0 4.00E-07 0.018606226 O.OOE+OO Commercial air carrier landing 503 -1.43956 6.533282 0 4.00E-07 0.018606226 O.OOE+OO Air taxis takeoff 1,839 -1.43956 6.533282 0 l.OOE-06 0.015346798 O.OOE+OO Air Taxis landing 1,839 -1.43956 6.533282 0 l .OOE-06 0.015346798 O.OOE+OO Military large takeoff 760 -1.43956 6.533282 0 2.00E-07 0.020269746 O.OOE+OO Military large landing 760 -1.43956 6.533282 2.30E-03 2.00E-07 0.020269746 7.08E-09 13 General aviation takeoff 370 1.631671 -6.10574 0 2.00E-04 0.00482234 O.OOE+OO General aviation landing 370 1.631671 -6.10574 0 2.00E-04 0.00482234 O.OOE+oO Commercial air carrier takeoff 26 1.631671 -6.10574 1.1 OE-05 4.00E-07 0.018606226 2.17E-12 Commercial air carrier landing 26 1.631671 -6.10574 0 4.00E-07 0.018606226 O.OOE+OO Air taxis takeoff 194 1.631671 -6.10574 l .lOE-05 l .OOE-06 0.015346798 3.27E-11 Air Taxis landing 97 1.631671 -6.10574 0 l.OOE-06 0.015346798 O.OOE+OO Military large takeoff 40 1.631671 -6.10574 0 2.00E-07 0.020269746 O.OOE+OO Military large landing 40 1.631671 -6.10574 l.OOE-05 2.00E-07 0.020269746 l.62E-12 31 General aviation takeoff 370 -5 .86812 2.346824 0 2.00E-04 0.00482234 O.OOE+OO General aviation landing 370 -5.86812 2.346824 5.00E-04 2.00E-04 0.00482234 l.78E-07 Commercial air carrier takeoff 26 -5.86812 2.346824 0 4.00E-07 0.018606226 O.OOE+OO Commercial air carrier landing 26 -5.86812 2.346824 7.lOE-05 4.00E-07 0.018606226 l.40E-11 Air taxis takeoff 194 -5.86812 2.346824 0 l.OOE-06 0.015346798 O.OOE+OO Air Taxis landing 97 -5 .868 12 2.346824 7.lOE-05 1.00E-06 0.015346798 l.05E-10 Military large takeoff 40 -5.86812 2.346824 0 2.00E-07 0.020269746 O.OOE+OO Military large landing 40 -5.86812 2.3 46824 3.40E-03 2.00E-07 0.020269746 5.51E-10 The impact frequency for each aircraft category is as follows;

• General aviation 1.78£-07

• Commercial air carrier 1.61£-11

• Air taxis 3.27£-11

• Military large 1.66£-08 Because the three heliports are closer than 8 km (5 mi) to the RPF site, the frequency of an aircraft crashing into the site needs to be evaluated. NUREG-0800, Section 3.5.1.6, "Aircraft Hazards," provides a methodology for determining the probability of an aircraft crash into a facility from airways. However, the approach requires knowledge of the number of flights per year along the airway.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Because this information is not available for the flight paths near the RPF, DOE-STD-3014-2006 was used to determine the frequency of crashes. The following equation is used.

Fh = Nh x Phxfh(x,y)xAh Where:

Crash impact frequency Flight per year Probability of a crash Probability, given a crash, that the crash occurs in a 2.6 km 2 (1-mi 2) area surrounding the facility Effective plant area The effective area for an aircraft was determined by two components: the aircraft crashing into the facility either by skidding or by flying directly into it. The effective area was calculated based on an aircraft skidding or flying into the facility in the direction that produces the largest area (i.e., crashing in a direction perpendicular to the largest diagonal of the building).

The following formula was used to calculating the skid and fly in areas of an aircraft crashing into the facility.

Where:

(ZxlxWxWS)

Ar= (WS + R)xHxcotcp + R + LxW and:

A5 = (WS + R)xS Where:

Ar Effective fly-in area As Effective skid area ws Aircraft wingspan R Length of the diagonal of the facility= .,,/L2 + W 2 H Facility height, facility-specific cot<l> Mean of the cotangent of the aircraft impact angle L Length of facility, facility-specific w Width of facility, facility-specific s Aircraft skid distance (mean value).

DOE-STD-3014-2006 notes that in calculating an effective area, the analyst needs to be cognizant of the "critical areas" of the facility. The critical areas are locations in a facility that contain hazardous material and/or locations that, once impacted by a crash, can lead to cascading fai lures (e.g., a fire, collapse, and/or explosion that would impact the hazardous material). The critical areas of the RPF are considered to be the hot cell and waste management areas.

The critical areas dimensions are estimated at 30.5 x 24 m (100 x 80 ft) , which provides a diagonal (R) of 39 m (128 ft) . The facility height (H) of22.9 m (75 ft) was used. DOE-STD-3014-2006 provides estimates for aircraft wingspan, mean of the cotangent of the aircraft impact angle, and skid distance for five different aircraft types. For helicopters, the cot<l> value is 0.58 and the skid length is typically assumed to be 0. The effective area is calculated in Table 2-19.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-17. Affective Area for Helicopter Wing spana Skid distance3 Effective plant area Ah Aircraft ws (ft) cot<l>3 s (ft) (mi 2 )

Helicopter 50 0.58 0 0.00079 a DOE-STD-3014-2006, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., 1996 (R2006).

For a helicopter, fh(x,y) is estimated based on half the average length of a flight with the lateral variations in crash locations assumed to be 0.4 km (0.25 mi) on the average from the centerline of the flight path, or 2/L. The probability Ph (2.50E-05) is taken from DOE-STD-3014-2006, Appendix B, Table B-1. The total number of flights from the three helipads is estimated at 1,825 per year. A conservation estimate is that 5 percent of these helicopters overfly the facility. In addition, a conservative estimate of total flight path is the distance to the closest helipad or 6 km (3.7 mi).

Based on these assumptions, the helicopter impact frequency is calculated as follows:

2 Fh = 91x 2.SE- 05 x 3.7 x7.9E- 04 Fh = 9.7E - o7 The calculated crash impact frequency from the heliport is less than the requirement ofNUREG-0800 of being within an order of magnitude of 10-7 per year.

2.2.2.2 Airways There are seven federal airways located within 16 km (10 mi) of the RPF site. NUREG-1537 calls for the evaluation of frequency and type of aircraft movement, flight patterns, local meteorology, and topography. NUREG-0800, Section 3.5.1.6, was used to evaluate airways near the RPF site.

NUREG-0800 indicates that an evaluation is not required when the nearest edge of the airway is greater than 3.2 km (2 mi) from the facility. Four of the seven airways (J24, 1181, Vl2, and V63) fall within 3.2 km (2 mi) of the proposed RPF site (Table 2- 18).

Table 2-18. Federal Designated Airways within 16 km (10 mi) of the Radioisotope Production Facility Site J24 17.3 10.75 Not specified Not specified Within Within Jl81 4.8 3 Not specified Not specified Within Within Vl2 6.8 4.25 14.8 9.2 Within Within V44 11.2 7 14.8 9.2 3.8 2.4 V63 0.40 0.25 14.8 9.2 Within Within Vl75 19.3 12 14.8 9.2 11.9 7.4 V178N239 11.2 7 14.8 9.2 3.8 2.4 RPF = radioisotope production facility.

The hazards associated with these airways are evaluated in Section 2.2.2 .5. Figure 2-30 identifies the centerline offederal airways within 10 mi (16 km) of the RPF site.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.2.2.3 Military Airports and Training Routes There are no military airports or training routes located within 16 km (10 mi) of the RPF site.

2.2.2.4 Approach and Holding Patterns According to air traffic control at the Columbia Regional Airport, the controllers do not typical hold any traffic. However, if traffic is held, the aircraft are typically within their designated airspace, 8 km (5 mi)

(Figure 2-29). The hazards associated with these airways are evaluated in Section 2.2.2.5.

2.2.2.5 Evaluation of Aircraft Hazard NUREG-0800, Section 3.5 .1.6, provides a methodology for determining the probability of an aircraft crash into a facility from airways. However, the approach requires knowledge of the number of flights per year along the airway. Because this information is not available for the flight paths near the RPF, DOE-STD-3014-2006 was used.

This method uses crash rates for non-airport operations. The following formula from the DOE standard was used.

Where:

Fi Crash impact frequency J Each type of aircraft suggested in DOE-STD-3014-2006 Ni Pi Expected number of in-flight crashes per year fj(x ,y) Probability, given a crash, that the crash occurs in a l-mi2 area surrounding the facility AJ Effective plant area.

DOE-STD-3014-2006 provides estimated NjPjfj(x,y) values for general and commercial aviation, and the average continental U.S. (CONUS) values were used. The effective area, Aj, for each aircraft category is determined by two components; the aircraft crashing into the facility either by skidding or by flying directly into it. The effective area is calculated based on an aircraft skidding or flying into the facility in the direction that produces the largest area (i.e., crashing in a direction perpendicular to the largest diagonal of the building). The following formula was used to calculating the skid and fly-in areas of an aircraft crashing into the facility.

Where:

(2xLxWxWS)

Ar= (WS + R)xHxcot<f> + R + LxW and:

As= (WS + R)xS Where:

Ar Effective fly-in area As Effective skid area WS Aircraft wingspan R Length of the diagonal of the facility= .JL2 + W 2 H Facility height, facility-specific cot<l> Mean of the cotangent of the aircraft impact angle 2-53

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics L Length of facility, facility-specific w Width of facility, facility-specific s Aircraft skid distance (mean value).

DOE-STD-3014-2006 notes that in calculating an effective area, the analyst needs to be cognizant of the "critical areas" of the facility. The critical areas are locations in a facility that contain hazardous material and/or locations that, once impacted by a crash, can lead to cascading failures (e.g., a fire, collapse, and/or explosion that would impact the hazardous material). The critical areas of the RPF are considered to be the hot cell and waste management areas.

The RPF critical areas dimensions are estimated at 30.5 x 24 m (I 00 x 80 ft), which provides a diagonal (R) of 39 m (128 ft). The height (H) is 13 .7 m (45 ft). DOE-STD-3014-2006 provides estimates for aircraft wingspan, mean of the cotangent of the aircraft impact angle, and skid distance for five different aircraft types. The most conservative values were used in cases where there were more than one available for the specific aircraft. These values, along with the calculated effective plant area, are summarized in Table 2-19.

Table 2-19. Effective Area Input Values and Calculated Effective Plant Area II -

Average CONUS Effective plant Non-airport crash Aircraft values NiPif1(x,y)* .. area Ai (mi 2 )

frequency Fi Air carrier 4E-7 98 10.2 1440 0.01861 7.4E-09 Air taxi lE-6 59 10.2 1440 0.01535 l.5E-08 Large military 2E-7 223 9.7 b780 0.02027 4. IE-09 Small military 4E-6 78 10.4 c447 0.00971 3.9E-08 General aviation 2E-4 73 8.2 60 0.00482 9.6E-07 airplanes Source: EDF-3 124-00 15, Evaluation ofAircraft Hazards, Rev. 2, Portage, Inc., Idaho Falls, Idaho, 20 17.

• DOE-STD-30 14-2006, Accident Analysis/or Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., 2006.

b Takeoff c Landing CONUS = continental United States.

The crash impact probabilities from airways, airport operations, and helicopter overflights are summed together to determine the overall probability for small and large aircraft. The resulting probability is l .88E-06 (Table 2-20).

Table 2-20. Crash Impact Probabilities Airport operations Overflights Total General Aviation l .78E-07 6.77E-07 8.55E-07 Commercial Air Carrier l.61E-ll 6.27E-09 6.29E-09 Air Taxis 3.27E-11 l .3 0E-08 1.30E-08 Military Large l.66E-08 3.12E-09 l.97E-08 Military Small O.OOE+OO 2.82E-08 2.82E-08 Helicopters 9.70E-07 9.70E-07 Total l .89E-06 2-54

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics NUREG-1537 does not provide acceptance criteria to be used to evaluate the aircraft accident probability.

However, NUREG-0800 does provide criteria for assessment of aircraft accidents. For aircraft accidents, NUREG-0800, Section 3.5 .1.6, states that "Aircraft accidents that could lead to radiological consequences in excess of the exposure guidelines of 10 CPR 100 with a probability of occurrence greater than an order of magnitude of 10-7 per year should be considered in the design of the plant." The calculated crash impact probabilities from airways for all five aircraft types is slightly larger than an order of magnitude of 10-7 per year. Therefore, a general aviation crash will be evaluated as part of the integrated safety analysis (ISA) external event analysis and included in the Operating License Application.

2.2.3 Analysis of Potential Accidents at Facilities On the basis of the information provided in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, the potential accidents to be considered as design-basis events and the potential effects of those accidents on the facility, in terms of design parameters (e.g., overpressure, missile energies) or physical phenomena (e.g., impact, flammable or toxic clouds), were identified in accordance with:

• 10 CPR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation"

• 10 CPR 50.34, "Contents of Applications; Technical Information"

• Regulatory Guide 1.78, Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release

• Regul atory Guide 1.91, Evaluations of Explosions Postulated to Occur at Nearby Facilities and on Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants

• Regulatory Guide 1.206, Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants

• Regulatory Guide 4.7, General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power Stations

• NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non -

Power Reactors - Format and Content.

• NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants

• Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures (PEMA, 1989)

• NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility

• NUREG-1805 , Fire Dynamics Tools (FD'I') - Quantitative Fire Hazard Analysis Methods for the US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program

• NUREG/CR-6624, Recommendations for Revision of Regulatory Guide 1. 78 The events are discussed in the following subsections.

2.2.3.1 Determination of Design-Basis Events NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility, defines an external event as being not credible "if the event has a frequency of occurrence that can conservatively be estimated as less than once in a million years (1 o-6) ." Design-basis events external to the NWMI RPF are defined as those accidents that have a probability of radiological release to the public lxI0-6 year, or greater, with the potential consequences serious enough to affect the safety of the plant to the extent that the guidelines in 10 CPR 50.34 could be exceeded.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics The following accident categories were considered in selecting design-basis events: explosions, flammable vapor clouds (delayed ignition), toxic chemicals, and fires. The postulated accidents that would result in a chemical release were analyzed at the following locations:

• Nearby transportation routes such as U.S. Highway 63 and nearby natural gas pipelines

• Nearby chemical and fuel storage facilities .

2.2.3.1.1 Explosions The impacts associated with accidents that involve high explosives, munitions, chemicals, and liquid or gaseous fuels stored or used by facilities near the proposed RPF were evaluated to analyze the structural response to blast pressures. This analysis included the evaluation of explosions from nearby railways, highways, or facilities and the resulting blast pressure on critical plant structures to ensure that such an explosion would not adversely affect the RPF ' s operation or safe shutdown.

The Regulatory Guide 1.91 and its recommended 6.9 kilopascal (kPa) (1 pound per square inch [lb/in 2])

value of peak positive incident overpressure was used to provide guidance in defining the allowable (i .e.,

standoff) and actual distances of hazardous chemicals transported or stored. This value is considered.

Analyses that result in pressure below 6.9 kPa (1 lb/in 2) are not expected to result in significant damage.

The guide defines this standoff distance by the correlation of R > kWl/3, where R is the distance in feet from an explosion comprised of W pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT), and a constant value k.

NUREG-1805 was used to define the TNT mass equivalent (W). This guide compares the heat of combustion of the chemical is to the heat of combustion of TNT.

In some cases, the result using the NUREG-1805 methods returned standoff distances greater than the actual distance of the analyzed incident to the RPF. In those cases, a probabilistic analysis was used to show that the rate of exposure to the overpressure in excess of 6.9 kPa ( 1 lb/in 2 ) is less than 1 x 106 per year using conservative assumptions.

The conservative assumptions included an explosion yield factor, the estimation of the available combustion energy released during an explosion, of 100 percent. This accounts for an in-vessel confined explosion and is considered to be conservative because a 100 percent yield factor is not achievable.

Another conservative assumption used was that for liquids at atmospheric conditions, the storage tank was assumed to contain vapors at the upper explosive limit. Because the upper explosive limit produces the maximum explosive mass and liquid vapor explodes, not the liquid, this is considered conservative.

These assumptions are consistent with those used in Chapter 15 ofNUREG-1805. The analysis performed does not bound an explosion of the total inventory of nearby facilities . The analysis uses the largest tank for two identified facilities to determine the effect on RPF operations or safe shutdown. It was determined to be highly unlikely for the total inventory from both facilities to be involved in the explosion scenario due to the following: (1) at the MU South Farm, the closest facility, the total inventory of propane is in multiple disperse locations; and (2) for the Magellan Pipeline facility, an accidental explosion of multiple tanks at one time adding to the pressure wave is also highly unlikely.

For compressed or liquefied gases (i.e., propane, hydrogen), the entire contents of the storage vessel were assumed to be between the upper and lower explosive limits. An instantaneous depressurization of the vessel would result in vapor concentrations all within the explosive range at varying pressures and temperatures some of which would be below explosive limits. Therefore, assuming the entire contents are within the explosive limits is considered conservative.

For unconfined explosions of propane, methane, or hydrogen, the yield factor of 3 percent from the Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures (FEMA, 1989) was used.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Pipelines A stationary pipeline explosion is bounded by the delayed ignition explosion of that pipeline due to the wind is assumed to blow the release towards the RPF with a constant mass release rate from the pipeline that results in a much larger total explosive mass. Thus, the distance from the point of the explosion to the NWMI RPF is therefore much smaller for flammable vapor clouds than for pipeline explosions at the release point.

Waterway Traffic There are no navigable waterways within 8 km (5 mi) of the RPF.

Highways Hazardous materials with explosive potential that may possibly be transported on U.S. Highway 63 is shown in Table 2-21 (EDF-3124-0016, Analysis of Potential Accidents at Facilities) include [Proprietary Information]. The remaining chemicals identified in Table 2-21 are nonexplosive. The maximum quantity of the identified chemicals assumed to be transported on the highway was 22,679 kg (50,000 lb) per Regulatory Guide 1.91. The volume of hydrogen was assumed to be 1,496 kg (3 ,300 lb) on a single truck per 49 CFR 173 .318, "Cryogenic Liquids in Cargo Tanks."

Table 2-21 provides the results of the analysis using the TNT equivalency methodologies described in within this section. For all chemicals analyzed, the minimum separation distances (i.e., safe standoff distances) are less than the shortest distance (0.4 km [0.25 mi]) to a safety-related RPF structure from any point on U.S . Highway 63. The peak incident pressure is 6.9 kPa (l lb/in. 2) at a distance greater than the shortest distance from U.S . Highway 63 to a safety-related RPF structure of 0.4 km (0.25 mi).

Table 2-21. Distance from the Radioisotope Production Facility where the Peak Incident Pressure is 6.9 kPa (1 lb/in. 2) fro m an Explosion on U.S. Highway 63 Ammonia 22,680 50,000 0.27 0.17 Diesel 22,680 50,000 0.1 0.06 Gasoline 22,680 50,000 0.1 0.06 Glycol ether PM 22,680 50,000 0.1 0.06 Hydrogen 1,497 3,300 0.21 0.13 JP-4 aviation fuel 22,680 50,000 0.1 0.06 Methyl ethyl ketone 22,680 50,000 0.1 0.06 Petroleum naphtha 22,680 50,000 0.1 0.06 Propane 22,680 50,000 0.34 0.21 Toluene (32-8413) 22,680 50,000 0.1 0.06 Source: EDF-3 124-0016, Analysis ofPotential Accidents at Facilities, Rev. 2, Portage, Inc., Idaho Falls, Idaho, 20 I 7.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics A boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) is an explosion caused by the rupture of a vessel containing a pressurized liquid above its boiling point (Roberts, 2000). A BLEVE overpressure for the propane tank was analyzed in detail. The 22,680 kg (50,000 lb) propane tank, i.e., 45,425 liter (L)

(12-thousand gallon [kgal]), was assumed to fail at 55 degrees Celsius ( 0 C) (320 lb/in. 2 absolute). The entire contents of the tank (e.g., gas and liquid) were assumed to be involved in the BLEVE. The acceptable distance to 6.9 kPa (I lb/in.2) overpressure is 0.21 km (0.13 mi). The shortest distance to a safety-related RPF structure from any point on U.S. Highway 63 is 0.4 km (0.25 mi).

A BLEVE overpressure for the hydrogen tank was also analyzed in detail. The 1,497 kg (3 ,300 lb) propane tank (i.e., 45 ,425 L [12 kgal]) was assumed to fail at -240°C (183 lb/in. 2 absolute), the point before the hydrogen becomes supercritical. The entire contents of the tank (e.g., gas and liquid) were assumed to be involved in the BLEVE. The acceptable distance to 6.9 kPa (1 lb/in. 2) overpressure is 0.08 km (0.05 mi). The shortest distance to a safety-related RPF structure from any point on U.S. Highway 63 is 0.4 km (0.25 mi).

Based on the above, an explosion involving potentially transported hazardous materials on U.S.

Highway 63, would not adversely affect operation of the RPF. The results of the highway explosion analyses are provided in Table 2-21 (EDF-3124-0016).

2.2.3.1.2 Nearby Facilities Analysis identified six off-site facilities that have explosive chemicals that are identified as the bounding instances of explosion analysis. The hazardous materials stored at nearby facilities that were identified for further analysis with regard to explosive potential are identified in Table 2-22.

Table 2-22. Analysis of Hazard ous Chemicals Stored Within 8 km (5 mi) of the Rad ioisotope Production Facility (2 pages)

[Proprietary 3M Company >8 >5 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Information] Information] Information] Information]

[Proprietary Schwan's Home 3.2 2 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Service Inc. Information] Information] Information] Information]

[Proprietary Gates Power 2.4 1.5 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Transmissions Information] Information] Information] Information]

Materials Center

[Proprietary Gates Power 2.4 1.5 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Transmissions Information] Information] Information] Information]

Materials Center

[Proprietary MU South Farm 1.6 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Information] Information] Information] Information]

[Proprietary MU South Farm 1.6 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Information] Information] Information] Information]

[Proprietary MU South Farm 1.6 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Information] Information] Information] Information]

[Proprietary Ryder Transportation 2.4 1.5 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Information] Information] Information] Information]

[Proprietary Magellan Pipeline 1.7 1.1 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Company Information] Information] Information] Information]

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-22. Analysis of Hazardous Chemicals Stored Within 8 km (5 mi) of the Radioisotope Production Facility (2 pages)

[Proprietary Magellan Pipeline 1.7 1.1 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Company Information] Information] Information] Information]

Source: EDF-3124-0016, Analysis ofPotential Accidents at Facilities, Rev. 2, Portage, Inc., Idaho Fall s, Idaho, 201 7.

a Actual tank mass provided by owner was used .

b [Proprietary Information]

c [Proprietary Information]

d [Proprietary Information]

e [Proprietary Information]

MU = University of Missouri A conservative analysis using TNT equivalency methods, as described in Section 2.2.3.1 , was used to determine standoff distances for the storage of the identified hazardous materials. Table 2-22 provides the results of the analysis (EDF-3124-0016). The analysis showed that a [Proprietary Information] . The nearest tank of propane is approximately [Proprietary Information]. However, the propane at this location is stored in multiple tanks, the largest of which is [Proprietary Information] .

The results using this methodology indicate that the minimum separation distances (i.e., safe standoff distances) are less than the shortest distance from an RPF safety-related area to the storage location of the identified chemicals. Therefore, an explosion of any of these chemicals would not adversely affect operation of the RPF.

Railways The only railroad within the 8 km (5 mi) radius of the RPF is the COLT Transload, which provides service for the Columbia Municipal Power Plant and a commercial lumber facility to the north of downtown Columbia. This rail line dead-ends approximately 7.2 km (4.5 mi) from the RPF. A review of the Tier II facilities did not identify any facilities with potentially hazardous chemicals near the rail line within 8 km (5 mi) radius of the RPF .

Explosion-Related Impacts Affecting Design Regulatory Guide 1.91 cites 6.9 k:Pa (1 lb/in.2) is considered a conservative value of peak positive incident overpressure, below which no significant damage would be expected. Thus, facility is acceptable when the calculated rate of occurrence of severe consequences from any external accident is less than 1 x 1o-6 occurrences per year, and reasonable qualitative arguments can demonstrate that the realistic probability is lower. The RPF safety-related areas are designed to withstand a peak positive overpressure of at least 6.9 k:Pa (1 lb/in. 2) without loss of function/significant damage, as shown in Table 2-21 and Table 2-22. As a result, postulated explosion event scenarios will not result in severe consequences.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics On-Site Diesel Fuel Tank The RPF will have a 3, 785 L (1-kgal) tank of diesel fuel within 9 .1 m (30 ft) of the building. A tank containing 3,785 L (1 kgal) of diesel fuel is acceptable at a distance of 49.1 m (161 ft). Therefore, the on-site diesel explosion is analyzed using a probabilistic analysis. The total probability of a significant explosion is estimated using the probability of a spill and the conditional probability of an explosion given a spill.

The probability of a large release from a single-walled stationary tank at a fixed facility is 1 x 10-5 spills per year, and the probability of a spill from a double-walled stationary tank is 1 x 1o-6 spills per year (FEMA, 1989). The rate of explosions per spill from diesel tanks is very low. A report on ignition probabilities for oil and gas (OGP, 2010) states that for releases of "combustible liquids stored at ambient pressure and at temperatures below their flash point from onshore outdoor storage area" tanks, the ignition probability is at most 0.24 percent. Combined with the single-walled tank spill probability, the frequency of an ignition is 2.4 x 1o-signitions per year, significantly less than the acceptance criteria.

2.2.3.1.3 Flammable Vapor Clouds (Delayed Ignition)

When a flammable chemical (e.g., liquid or gaseous state) is released into the atmosphere and forms a vapor cloud, the chemical disperses as it travels downwind. The portions of the vapor cloud where the concentration is within the flammable range, between the lower and upper flammability limits, may burn if the cloud encounters an ignition source. Deflagration or a detonation of the vapor cloud is determined by the pace of the flame through the vapor cloud. If the cloud burns fast enough to create a detonation, an explosive force is generated.

Chemicals were evaluated to ascertain which hazardous materials had the potential to form a flammable vapor cloud or vapor cloud explosion. The chemicals identified within flammability range, the Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA) air dispersion computer model was used (ALOHA, 2008).

ALOHA was used to determine:

• The distances where the vapor cloud may exist between the upper explosion limit and the lower explosion limit (LEL), presenting the possibility of ignition and potential thermal radiation effects.

• Model the worst-case accidental vapor cloud explosion, including the standoff distances and overpressure effects at the nearest RPF safety-related area - worst-case scenario was assumed to be ignition by detonation was chosen for the ignition source with the standoff distance measured as the distance from the spill site to the location where the pressure wave is at 6.9 kPa ( 1 lb/in. 2) overpressure.

Conservative assumptions were used in both ALOHA analyses with regard to meteorological inputs and identified scenarios. The following meteorological assumptions were used as inputs to the ALOHA model:

• Pasquill Stability Class F (stable), with a wind speed of 1 meter per second (rn/sec) (3.3 ft/sec)

• Ambient temperature of 27°C (81 degrees Fahrenheit [°F])

• Relative humidity 50 percent

• Cloud cover 50 percent

• Atmospheric pressure of 1 atmosphere .

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NWM I llltOllTMWUl llE:DICAL ISOTIM'U NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Pasquill Stability Class F was selected based on local weather data. Class F represents the 5 percent worst-case weather conditions at the RPF site. For each of the identified liquid chemicals, the entire contents of the vessel were conservatively assumed to have leaked, forming a 1 centimeter (cm) (0.4-inch

[in.]) thick puddle. For gaseous chemicals, the entire contents were released instantaneously as a gas.

This provides a significant surface area to maximize evaporation and the formation of a vapor cloud in the case of liquid releases, and maximizes the peak concentration in the case of gas releases.

Pipelines There are three natural gas transmission pipelines within 8 km (5 mi) of the proposed RPF. These pipelines include the Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc. located 1.6 km (1 mi), Ameren natural gas transmission pipeline # 1 located approximately 0.64 km (0.40 mi), and Ameren natural gas transmission pipeline #2 located approximately 6.0 km (3.75 mi) from the RPF site.

Transmission pipe) ines are made of steel and generally operate at pressures ranging from 344 kPa (500 lb/in. 2) to 9,652 kPa (1,400 lb/in. 2) gauge. Pipelines can measure anywhere from 15.25 cm (6 in.) to 122 cm (48 in.) in diameter (ANL/EVS/TM/08-5 , Natural Gas Pipeline Technology Overview).

Each natural gas pipeline was modeled as a complete break, with a constant source of natural gas available to break. An analysis was performed using the ALOHA model. A summary of the results is provided below, and the calculations are provided in EDF-3124-0016):

• Southern Star Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline:

[Proprietary Information]

Highest typical transmission pipeline pressure of 9,652 kPa (1400 lb/in.2) was assumed Distance to the LEL is [Proprietary Information], which is less than the distance of

[Proprietary Information] to the RPF Results: Due to the concentration of natural gas being below the LEL at the RPF, a delayed flammable vapor cloud ignition cannot occur at the facility, and therefore, there will be no explosive overpressure.

• Ameren Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline # 1:

[Proprietary Information]

Highest typical transmission pipeline pressure of 2,000 kPa (290 lb/in.2) was assumed Distance to the LEL is [Proprietary Information], which is much less than the [Proprietary Information] distance to the RPF Results: Due to the concentration of natural gas being below the LEL at the RPF, a delayed flammable vapor cloud ignition cannot occur at the facility; therefore, there will be no resulting explosive overpressure.

• Ameren Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline #2:

[Proprietary Information]

Highest typical transmission pipeline pressure of 9,652 kPa (1 ,400 lb/in. 2)

Distance to the LEL from the Ameren natural gas pipeline is [Proprietary Information] , which is less than the distance of [Proprietary Information] to the RPF site Results: Due to the concentration of natural gas being below the LEL at the RPF, a delayed flammable vapor cloud ignition cannot occur at the facility, and therefore, there will be no explosive overpressure.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Waterway Traffic There are no navigable waterways within 8 km (5 mi) of the RPF.

Highways The hazardous materials potentially transported on U.S. Highway 63 that were identified for further analysis are diesel, gasoline, JP-4, petroleum naphtha, toluene, glycol ether PM, methyl ethyl ketone, hydrogen, propane, and ammonia. The remaining chemicals are nonexplosive. The closest RPF safety-related area is located approximately 0.40 km (0.25 mi) from U.S. Highway 63.

Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.91, the tanker trucks are conservatively estimated, at most, to carry and release 22,680 kg (50,000 lb) of the identified chemical. The analyzed effects of flammable vapor clouds and vapor cloud explosions from external sources are summarized in Table 2-23 (EDF-3124-0016).

Table 2-23. Flammable Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis for U.S. Highway 63 Acceptable distance Ammonia Diesel Hazardous material Gasoline 22,680 22,680 22,680 Quantity 50,000 50,000 50,000 0.93 0.35 0.35 (LEL) 0.58 0.22 0.22 Probabilitya 2.2 x 10-1 Glycol ether PM 22,680 50,000 0.06 0.04 Hydrogen 1,497 3,300 1.24 0.77 3.0 x 10-1 JP-4 aviation fuel 22,680 50,000 0.35 0.22 Methyl ethyl ketone 22,680 50,000 0.19 0.12 Petroleum naphtha 22,680 50,000 0.35 0.22 Propane 22,680 50,000 1.37 0.85 > 1 x 10-6 Toluene (32-8413) 22,680 50,000 0.13 0.08 Source: EDF-3124-0016, Analysis of Potential Accidents at Facilities, Rev. 2, Portage, Inc., Idaho Falls, Idaho, 2017.

• Probability only calculated for chemicals with acceptable distances greater than 0.4 km (0 .25 mi).

LEL = lower explosion limit.

To determine the probability of an accident affecting the RPF, the number of transports per year needs to be known. The number of trucks hauling hazardous materials on U.S. Highway 63 is not available. To determine the probability that an explosion could affect the RPF, estimates of truck shipments were made based on the major uses of these materials within 8 km (5 mi) of the RPF.

The hydrogen releases from a truck on U.S. Highway 63 were analyzed using a probabilistic analysis.

The largest amount of hydrogen on a truck that was analyzed was 1,496 kg (3,300 lb). Accident data were taken from NUREG/CR-6624, Recommendations for Revision ofRegulatory Guide 1. 78, and FEMA (1989).

The accident frequency used was 2 x 1o-6 accidents per truck mile, where 20 percent of accidents result in a spill. When a spill occurs, 20 percent of the spills are between 10 and 30 percent of the contents, and 20 percent of spills are complete release. The analysis showed that a 30 percent release of hydrogen resulted in a distance to the LEL of 0.79 km (0.49 mi). The accident analysis showed that a 10 percent release of hydrogen resulted in a distance to the LEL of0.53 km (0.33 mi) (EDF-3124-0016).

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...**... NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics

• • *

• NORTMWUT Ml:OtCAL llOTOfl'ff The probability of an explosion from a hydrogen truck accident is 1.6 x 1o-8 per truck mile (e.g., 2 x 1o- 6 accidents per truck mile x 0.2 spills/accident x 0.2 spills greater than I 0 percent/spill x 0.2 ignition probability). The probability of this accident within 1.24 km (0.77 mi) of the RPF (i.e., 0.96 km [1.54 mi]

total for U.S . Highway 63) would be 2.5 x l0- 8 per truck release scenario to meet the LEL. The Colombia Municipal Power Plant is the major user of hydrogen with 1,497 kg (3,300 lb) being stored within 8 km (5 mi) radius of the RPF. This hydrogen is assumed to be used for generator cooling. The annual usage is not available; however, an assumption is made that hydrogen makeup requires the tank to be refilled monthly. This would result in 12 shipments of hydrogen potentially passing the RPF annually, and change the probability to 3.0 x 10-7 per year.

The propane releases from a truck on U.S. Highway 63 were analyzed using a probabilistic analysis.

Accident data were taken from NUREG/CR-6624 and FEMA (1989). The accident frequency used was 2 x 1o- 6 accidents per truck mile, where 20 percent of accidents result in a spill. When a spill occurs, 20 percent of the spills are between 10 and 30 percent of the contents, and 20 percent of spills are complete release. The analysis showed that a 30 percent release of propane resulted in a distance to the LEL of 0.87 km (0.54 mi). The accident analysis showed that a 10 percent release of propane resulted in a distance to the LEL of 0.58 km (0.36 mi). The probability of an explosion from a propane truck accident is 1.6 x I o-8 per truck mile (e.g., 2 x I o-6 accidents per truck mile x 0.2 spills/accident x 0.2 spills greater than 10 percent/spill x 0.2 ignition probability). The probability of this accident within 1.4 km (0.85 mi) of the RPF (e.g., 2.7 km [1.7 mi] total for U.S. Highway 63) would be 2.7 x I0-8 per truck release scenario to meet the LEL There are three propane distributers in the Columbia, Missouri area: MFA Oil Company, Ballenger' s Propane Inc., and Ferrellgas. The MFA Oil Company is located north of the RPF on U.S . Highway 63 ,

while Ballenger' s Propane Company and Ferrellgas are located north oflnterstate 70. The distribution centers can receive their propane via rail and tanker trucks from terminals located in Kearney or Moberly, Missouri, along the Mid-American Pipeline, or Jefferson City along the Gold Line pipeline. The majority of bulk propane transported to these facilities is assumed to be transported via Interstate 70 and does not bypass the RPF. However, propane could also be transported via U.S. Highway 63 from the terminal in Jefferson City to supply the distribution centers north of the RPF. The exact number of trucks transporting propane past the RFP is not known and could result in a probability exceeding 10-6 ;

therefore, this event will be evaluated as part of the ISA external event analysis and included in the Operating License Application.

The ammonia releases from a truck on U.S. Highway 63 were analyzed using a probabilistic analysis.

Accident data were taken from NUREG/CR-6624 and FEMA (1989). The accident frequency used was 2 x I o-6 accidents per truck mile, where 20 percent of accidents result in a spill. When a spill occurs, 20 percent of the spills are between IO and 30 percent of the contents, and 20 percent of spills are complete release. The analysis showed that a 30 percent release of ammonia resulted in a distance to the LEL of 0.6 km (0.37 mi). The accident analysis showed that a I 0 percent release of ammonia resulted in a distance to the LEL of 0.4 km (0.25 mi). The probability of an explosion from a propane truck accident is 1.6 x I o- 8 per truck mile (e.g., 2 x I o- 6 accidents per truck mile x 0.2 spills/accident x 0.2 spills greater than 10 percent/spill x 0.2 ignition probability). The probability of this accident within 0.93 km (0.58 mi) of the RPF (e.g., 1.9 km [1 .2 mi] total for U.S . Highway 63) would be 1.9 x 10-8 per truck release scenario to meet the LEL.

Kraft Foods stores 22,680 kg (50,000 lb) of ammonia, which is assumed to be used for refrigeration and potentially for heat pumps. In both cases, the losses and required makeup is expected to be small. A very conservative estimate of makeup would be to replace the entire 22,680 kg (50,000 lb) of ammonia monthly, or 12 shipments passing the RPF annually, and change the probability to 2.2 x 10-7 per year.

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* *! NOlllTMWt:rT MmtCAl tsOTOPU NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Nearby Facilities There are eight off-site facilities that have explosive chemicals identified as the bounding instances of explosion analysis. The hazardous materials stored at nearby facilities that were identified for further analysis with regard to explosive potential are identified in Table 2-24. The methodology presented previously in this section was used for determining the standoff distance for vapor cloud ignition and delayed vapor cloud explosion. A conservative analysis using TNT equivalency methods, as described earlier in this section, was used to determine standoff distances for the storage of the identified hazardous materials.

The distance to the LEL for the propane tank containing [Proprietary Information] of propane corresponds to more than [Proprietary Information]. The nearest tank of propane is approximately [Proprietary Information] from the RPF . However, the propane at this location is stored in multiple tanks, the largest of which is [Proprietary Information] . The maximum content of a propane tank to meet the LEL at

[Proprietary Information]. Flammable vapor clouds and vapor cloud explosions from external sources are summarized in Table 2-24 (EDF-3124-0016).

Table 2-24. Flammable Vapor Clouds and Vapor Cloud Explosions from External Sources (2 pages)

[Proprietary Plasma Motor Fuels 1.6 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary lnformati on] LLC Information] Information] Information] Information]

[Proprietary 3M Company >8 >5 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Information] Information] Information] Information]

[Proprietary Schwan's Home 3.2 2 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Service Inc. Information] Information] Information] Information]

[Proprietary Gates Power 2.4 1.5 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Transmissions Information] Information] Information] Information]

Materials Center

[Proprietary Gates Power 2.4 1.5 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Transmissions Information] Information] Information] Information]

Materials Center

[Proprietary MU South Farm 1.6 1 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Information] lnformati on] Information] Information]

[Proprietary MU South Farm 1.6 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Information] Information] Information] Information]

[Proprietary MU South Farm 1.6 1 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Information] Information] Information] Information]

[Proprietary Ryder Transportation 2.4 1.5 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Information] Information] Information] Information]

[Proprietary Magellan Pipeline 1.7 1.1 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Company Information] Information] Information] Information]

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-24. Flammable Vapor Clouds and Vapor Cloud Explosions from External Sources (2 pages)

Acceptable distance Distance Mass (LEL)

[Proprietary Magellan Pipeline 1.7 1.1 [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary [Proprietary Information] Company Information] Information] Information] Information]

Source: EDF-3 124-0016, Analysis ofPotential Accidents at Facilities, Rev. 2, Portage, Inc., Idaho Falls, Idaho, 2017.

a Actual tank mass used.

b The maximum area of a spill in ALOHA is 3 1,400 sq uare meters (m 2) - the inventory exceeds this value from a spi ll -

therefore, 31,400 m2 was used .

c [Proprietary Information]

ct [Proprietary Information]

e [Proprietary Information]

ALOHA Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres. MU Uni versity of Missouri .

LEL = lower explosion limit.

Flammable Vapor Cloud (Delayed Ignition) Related Impacts Affecting the Design Regulatory Guide 1.91 cites 6.9 kPa (1 lb/in.2) is considered a conservative value of peak positive incident overpressure, below which no significant damage would be expected. Thus, facility is acceptable when the calculated rate of occurrence of severe consequences from any external accident is less than 1 x 1o-6 occurrences per year, and reasonable qualitative arguments can demonstrate that the realistic probability is lower. The RPF safety-related areas are designed to withstand a peak positive overpressure of at least 6.9 kPa (1 lb/in. 2) without loss of function/significant damage, as shown in Table 2-21 and Table 2-22. As a result, postulated explosion event scenarios will not result in severe consequences.

2.2.3.1.4 Toxic Chemicals Impacts Affecting Design Accidents involving the release of toxic chemicals from nearby mobile and stationary sources were considered. Toxic chemicals known to be present in the vicinity of the proposed RPF site or to be frequently transported in the vicinity were evaluated.

The potential hazardous materials transported on U.S. Highway 63 were evaluated to ascertain which hazardous materials should be anal yzed with respect to their potential to form a toxic vapor cloud following an accidental release. The ALOHA air dispersion model was used to predict the concentrations of toxic chemical clouds as they di sperse downwind for all facilities and sources.

The maximum distance a cloud can travel before it disperses enough to fall below the immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) concentration in the vapor cloud was determined using ALOHA.

The ALOHA model was also used to predict the concentration of the chemical in the control room following a chemical release to ensure that, under worst-case scenarios, control room operators will have sufficient time to take appropriate action.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics The IDLH is defined by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health as a situation that poses a threat of exposure that is likely to cause death or immediate or delayed permanent adverse health effects, or one that could prevent escape from such an environment. The IDLHs determined by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health are established such that workers are able to escape such environments without suffering permanent health damage.

Conservative meteorological assumptions were used: F (stable) stability class with a wind speed of 1 m/sec, ambient temperature of 25 °C, relative humidity of 50 percent, cloud cover of 50 percent, and atmospheric pressure of one atmosphere. A Pasquill stability category "F" and a wind speed of 1 m/sec typically represent the worst 5 percent of meteorological conditions observed at a majority of nuclear plant sites. For each of the identified chemicals, the entire contents of the vessel are conservatively assumed to have leaked, forming a one-centimeter-thick puddle.

Review of the chemicals at nearby facilities did not contain any toxic materials that would be greater than those located on U.S. Highway 63 ; therefore, only toxic chemicals on U.S. Highway 63 were considered in the analysis. The toxic chemicals considered in the analysis were ammonia, chlorine, and sulfur dioxide.

• The distance to the IDHL for an ammonia release from a truck on U.S. Highway 63 is 9.7 km (6 mi). This is greater than the distance from U.S. Highway 63 to the RPF of 0.40 km (0.25 mi).

• The distance to the IDHL for a chlorine release from a truck on U.S. Highway 63 is 1.8 km (1.1 mi) .

This is greater than the distance from U.S. Highway 63 to the RPF of 0.40 km (0.25 mi).

• The distance to the IDHL for a sulfur dioxide release from a truck on U.S. Highway 63 is 3.1 km (1.9 mi). This is greater than the distance from U.S. Highway 63 to the RPF of 0.40 km (0.25 mi).

The ammonia releases from a truck on U.S. Highway 63 were analyzed using a probabilistic analysis.

Accident data were taken from NUREG/CR-6624 and FEMA (1989). The accident frequency used was 2 x 1o-6 accidents per truck mile, where 20 percent of accidents result in a spill. When a spill occurs, 20 percent of the spills are between 10 and 30 percent of the contents, and 20 percent of spills are complete release. The accident analysis showed that a 30 percent release of ammonia resulted in a distance to the IDHL of 5.3 km (3.3 mi). The accident analysis showed that a 10 percent release of ammonia resulted in a distance to the IDHL of 3.1 km (1.9 mi). The probability of a spill from an ammonia truck accident is 8 x 1o-8 per truck mile (e.g., 2 x 1o-6 accidents per truck mile x 0.2 spills/accident x 0.2 spills greater than 10 percent/spill). The probability of this accident within 9.7 km (6 mi) of the NWMI RPF (i.e., 19 km [12 mi] total for U.S . Highway 63) would be 9.6 x 10-7 per truck release scenario to meet the IDLH (EDF-3124-0016). The probability, when multiplied by 12 ammonia trucks annually, is greater than 1 x 10-6 per year; therefore, this event will be evaluated as part of the ISA external event analysis and included in the Operating License Application.

The chlorine releases from a truck on U.S. Highway 63 were analyzed using a probabilistic analysis.

Accident data were taken from NUREG/CR-6624 and FEMA (1989). The accident frequency used was 2 x 1o-6 accidents per truck mile, where 20 percent of accidents result in a spill. When a spill occurs, 20 percent of the spills are between 10 and 30 percent of the contents, and 20 percent of spills are complete release. The accident analysis showed that a 30 percent release of chlorine resulted in a distance to the IDHL of 1.2 km (0.73 mi). The accident analysis showed that a 10 percent release of chlorine resulted in a distance to the IDHL of 0.8 km (0.52 mi) . The probability of a spill from a chlorine truck accident is 8 x 1o-8 per truck mile (e.g., 2 x 1o-6 accidents per truck mile x 0.2 spills/accident x 0.2 spills greater than 10 percent/spill). The probability of this accident within 1.8 km (1.1 mi) of the RPF (i .e.,

3.6 km [2.2 mi] total for U.S. Highway 63) would be 1. 76 x 10-7 per truck release scenario to meet the IDLH (EDF-3124-0016). The probability, when multiplied by only six trucks annually, is greater than 1 x 1o-6 per year; therefore, this event will be evaluated as part of the ISA external event analysis and included in the Operating License Application.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics The sulfur dioxide releases from a truck on U.S. Highway 63 were analyzed using a probabilistic analysis.

Accident data were taken from NUREG/CR-6624 and FEMA (1989). The accident frequency used was 2 x 1o-6 accidents per truck mile, where 20 percent of accidents result in a spill. When a spill occurs, 20 percent of the spills are between 10 and 30 percent of the contents, and 20 percent of spills are complete release. The accident analysis showed that a 30 percent release of sulfur dioxide resulted in a distance to the IDHL of 1.8 km (1.1 mi). The accident analysis showed that a 10 percent release of sulfur dioxide resulted in a distance to the IDHL of 1.1 km (0.66 mi). The probability of a spill from a chlorine truck accident is 8 x 1o-s per truck mile (e.g., 2 x 1o-6 accidents per truck mile x 0.2 spills/accident x 0.2 spills greater than 10 percent/spill). The probability of this accident within 3.1 km (1.9 mi) of the RPF (i .e., 6.2 km [3.8 mi] total for U.S. Highway 63) would be 3.0 x 10-7 per truck release scenario to meet the IDLH. The probability, when multiplied by only four trucks annually, is greater than 1 x 1o-6 per year; therefore, this event will be evaluated as part of the ISA external event analysis and included in the Operating License Application.

2.2.3.1.5 Fires Fires in adjacent industrial plants and storage facilities, oil and gas pipelines, and fires from transportation accidents were evaluated as events that could lead to high-heat fluxes. Three types of fires are analyzed for high-heat flux:

• BLEVE fireballs - Occurs when a tank containing a flammable liquefied gas bursts (e.g., similar to a BLEVE overpressure, the liquefied gas flashes which has a short duration)

• Pool fires - Occurs when a chemical that is liquid at standard conditions spills and catches fire

• Jet fires - Occurs when a pipeline ruptures or pressurized tank has a hole causing the continuous release of flammable gas The limiting BLEVE fireball for the RPF is the rupture of a propane truck that contains 22,679 kg (5 0,000 lb) ofliquefied propane and is 0.4 km (0 .25 mi) from the RPF . ALOHA was used to calculate the heat flux and duration of the firebal l. The results show that the heat flux on the RPF is 8.36 kilowatt (kW)/m 2 (2,650 British thermal units [BTU]/hr*square foot [ft2]) and the duration of the fireball is 11 sec.

The American Concrete Institute has specified standards for short-term maximum bulk concrete temperatures of l 77°C (350°F) following accidents (ACI 349-06, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Concrete Structures (AC/ 349-06) and Commentary). NUREG/CR-3330, Vulnerability of Nuclear Power Plant Structures to Large External Fires , provides incident heat flux (kW/m 2 ) values and exposure times (hr) necessary for concrete to reach a temperature of l 77 °C (350°F). A heat flux of 15 kW /m2 requires 11.6 hr of exposure for concrete to reach a temperature of l 77 °C (350°F), while a heat flux of 450 kW/m2 requires I .5 hr of exposure. Therefore, the heat flux from the propane BLEVE fireball will not impact the integrity of the RPF concrete structures (EDF-3124-0016).

The limiting pool fire would come from a gasoline truck on U.S. Highway 63. The truck contains 22,680 kg (50,000 lb) of gasoline and is 0.4 km (0.25 mi) from the RPF . The ALOHA model was used to calculate the heat flux for the pool fire. The results show that the maximum heat flux is 1.36 kW /m2 (43 1.1 BTU/hr*ft2) and the duration of the fireball is 60 sec. ACI 349-06 has specified standards for short-term maximum bulk concrete temperatures of l 77 °C (350°F) following accidents. Based on the NUREG/CR-3330 incident heat flux (kW/m2) values and exposure times (hr) necessary for concrete to reach a temperature of l 77°C (350°F) discussed above, the heat flux from the gasoline pool fire will not impact the integrity of the RPF concrete structures.

The Magellan pipelines were assumed to contain [Proprietary Information]. A conservative analysis was performed using the ALOHA model. The pipelines were assumed to be breached and spill the liquid contents in the soil, resulting in a liquid puddle that is [Proprietary Information].

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics The duration of the evaporating release was 1 hr. The total release of [Proprietary Information] . Based on the guidance used by the state of California (URS, 2007), which is a liquid flow rate of 2.13 m/sec (7 ft/sec) and the known pipeline diameter of [Proprietary Information]. URS (2007) also provides guidance for the time of release, which is 15 min. The liquid flow rate, along with the 15-min release duration, would result in a total release of [Proprietary Information] . Therefore, a conservative release of

[Proprietary Information] was modeled in ALOHA based on the size of the release pool.

The distance to the LEL from the Magellan pipeline is 0.52 km (0.32 mi), which is less than the distance of 2.0 km ( 1.25 mi) to the proposed RPF site. Because the concentration of gasoline is below the LEL at the RPF, a delayed flammable vapor cloud ignition cannot occur at the facility and there will be no explosive overpressure.

The three natural gas transmission pipelines within 8 km (5 mi) of the RPF are identified in Table 2-12.

Transmission pipelines are made of steel and generally operate at pressures ranging from 344 k:Pa (500 lb/in. 2) to 9,652 k:Pa (1,400 lb/in. 2) gauge. Pipelines can measure anywhere from 15.25 cm (6 in.) to 122 cm (48 in.) in diameter (ANL/EVS/TM/08-5) . A summary of the jet fire analysis that was performed using the ALOHA model (EDF-3124-0016) is provided below. The pipeline was modeled as a complete break, with a constant source of natural gas available to the break.

• Southern Star Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline:

Pipeline diameter is [Proprietary Information]

- Highest typical transmission pipeline pressure of 9,652 k:Pa (1400 lb/in. 2) was assumed

- Distance to the LEL is [Proprietary Information], which is less than the distance of

[Proprietary Information] to the RPF Results: (1) Maximum heat flux is [Proprietary Information]; heat flux is negligible compared with the solar heat flux of approximately 1 kW/m2 (0.088 BTU/ft 2) , and (2) pipeline jet fire is not considered a threat to the RPF.

• Ameren Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline #1 :

Pipeline diameter is [Proprietary Information]

Highest typical transmission pipeline pressure of 2,000 k:Pa (290 lb/in. 2) was assumed Distance to LEL is at [Proprietary Information], which is much less than the [Proprietary Information] distance to the RPF

- Results: (I) Maximum heat flux is [Proprietary Information] at the RPF; heat flux is negligible compared with the solar heat flux of approximately 1 kW/m2 (0.088 BTU/ft 2) , and (2) pipeline jet fire is not considered a threat to the RPF.

• Ameren Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline #2 :

Pipeline diameter is [Proprietary Information]

- Highest typical transmission pipeline pressure of9,652 k:Pa (1 ,400 lb/in. 2)

Distance to the LEL from the Ameren natural gas pipeline is [Proprietary Information], which is less than the distance of [Proprietary Information] to the RPF site Results: (I) Maximum heat flux is [Proprietary Information]; heat flux is negligible compared with the solar heat flux of approximately 1 kW/m2 (0.088 BTU/ft2) , and (2) pipeline jet fire is not considered a threat to the RPF.

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• NOlmfWllT lllf:DKAL llOTOf'O Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.3 METEOROLOGY 2.3.1 General and Local Climate The purpose of this climate analysis is to provide the information that supports the dispersion analysis of airborne releases from the proposed RPF site. Local dispersion climatology includes consideration of airflow and atmospheric turbulence. The following subsections address local topography, the source of local meteorological data, wind roses, and atmospheric stability distribution.

The proposed RPF site is located in central Missouri. The purpose of conducting a climate analysis is to understand the climate (a statistical description of weather) at the local project site within the context of the climate of the broader surrounding area.

Geomorphic, or physiographic, regions are broad-scale subdivisions of the nation that are based on terrain texture, rock type, geologic structure, and history. There are eight regions, subdivided into 25 provinces, and further subdivided to 85 sections within the U.S. (Fenneman, 1946). The characteristics and locations of these landforms influence local and regional climate and weather patterns.

The RPF site lies at the southern edge of the Central Lowlands physiographic province, within a few miles of the adjacent Ozark Plateau province, both of which lie within the larger Interior Plains physiographic region. The Central Lowlands includes most of the Com Belt and lies within the heartland of America.

The RPF location places it in the Humid Continental-Warm Summer climatic zone. This type of climate has a characteristic long, warm summer with moderate relative humidity. The winters are cool to cold and mark a period of lower precipitation than during the remainder of the year. Because of its geographical location far inland, the region is subject to significant seasonal and daily temperature variations. Air masses moving over the state during the year include cold continental polar air from Canada, warm and humid maritime tropical air from the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, and dry eastward flowing air masses from the Rocky Mountains located to the west. Prolonged periods of extreme hot or cold temperatures are unusual (MU, 2006).

The general geostrophic airflow pattern and the prevailing jet stream track shuttle precipitation-producing mid-latitude cyclones (lows) across the state from west-to-east throughout the year. Consequently, precipitation events in all seasons move through from a westerly direction (MU, 2006).

Spring, summer, and early fall precipitation occurs in the form of rain and thunderstorms. Severe thunderstorms typically occur during the period from mid- to late-spring through early summer. Hail may be expected as a product of these storms. Wind speeds of up to 97 km/hr (60 mi/hr) or more may be experienced once or twice a year during a severe thunderstorm (MU, 2006).

Winter precipitation is generally light to moderate and occurs in the form ofrain or snow, or a mixture of both, with an occasional, though infrequent, thunderstorm. Occasional heavy snowfall episodes do occur, but not often, and the accumulation does not last for any significant duration. Surface temperature conditions sometimes produce freezing rain or drizzle, although normally not more than a couple times each season.

The historical climate data within this section primarily came from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) High Plains Regional Climate Center's historical climate data summaries for Columbia reporting stations 231790 and 231791. MU also has a weather station at South Farm, Jess than 1.6 km (1 mi) away from the proposed site and approximately 6.4 km (4 mi) from Columbia. The weather station is used in conjunction with the school's agricultural program, and the weather data is available on the MU website. Simple searches and averages can be obtained through this database.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Other sources, as needed, were used to augment NOAA data, particularly to better understand the immediate area around the proposed RPF site.

2.3.1.1 Temperature Though temperatures reached a record high in 2012 of 41. 7°C ( 107°F), in general, temperatures rarely exceed 38°C (100°F) in the summer and rarely fall below -18°C (0°F) in the winter. The mean maximum temperatures in Columbia, collected from the reporting station at the Columbia Regional Airport (Station 23 1791) over a 43-year period ranged from 2.8°C (37.2°F) in January to 31.4°C (88.5 °F) in July. Daily temperatures during that period showed a wider variance, from -28.8°C (-20°F) in December to 44°C (111 °F) in July. A summary of average and extreme temperature data for 1969 through 2012 is provided in Table 2-25 (WRCC, 2013a).

---

f;i.!.!lfill Table 2-25. Columbia, Missouri, Average and Extreme Monthly Climate, Historic Temperature Sum mary, 1969-2012 Measurement Average max. oc 2.9 6.1 12 .7 18.9 23.6 28 .5 31.4 30.7 26.0 19.6 12.0 5.1 18.1 temperature Of 37.2 43 .0 54.9 66.1 74.4 83 .3 88.5 87.3 78.8 67.2 53 .6 41.2 64 .6 Average min. oc -6.8 -4.3 1.2 6.8 12.1 17.0 19.6 18.4 13.7 7.4 l.5 -4.3 6.8 temperature Of 19.7 24.2 34.2 44.3 53.7 62 .6 67 .2 65.2 56.7 45.3 34.7 24.2 44.3 Daily extreme oc 23.3 27 .8 29.4 32.2 33.3 a89 43 .9 43 .3 38.3 34.4 28.3 24.4 43 .9 high Of 74 .0 82.0 85.0 90.0 92 .0 *107 111 .0 110.0 I 01.0 94.0 83.0 76.0 111.0 Daily extreme oc -28.3 -26.J -20.6 -7.2 -1.7 4.4 8.9 5.6 0.0 -5 .6 -17.8 -28.9 -28 .9 low Of -19.0 -15 .0 -5 .0 19.0 29.0 40.0 48.0 42.0 32.0 22.0 0.0 -20.0 -20.0 Average mean oc -1.9 0.9 6.9 12.9 17.8 22 .8 25.4 24.6 19.9 13 .5 6.7 0.4 12.5 Of 28 .5 33.6 44.5 55.2 64 .1 73.0 77.8 76.3 67 .8 56.3 44 .1 32.7 54.5 Source: WRCC, 20 I 3a, "Period of Record General Climate Summary - Temperature, 1969 to 2012, Station 23 1791 Columbia WSO AP," www.wrcc.dri.edu/cgi-bin/cliGCStT.pl?mo 1791 , Western Regional Climate Center, Reno, Nevada, accessed August 20 13.

• Occurred during 2008- 20 12 time period.

Average temperature data for the Columbia Missouri weather station was reviewed for the most recent five years that data were available (2008 to 2012). The lowest average temperature was -4.1 °C (24.65 °F),

recorded in January 2010, and the highest average temperature was 29.5°C (85.06°F), recorded in July 2012. The five-year annual average temperature was 13 .1°C (55 .58°F). A five-year temperature summary is presented in Table 2-26 (WRCC, 2013b).

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• i*;~:* NWM I

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• NCIRTMWHT llfDltAl ts0111'8 NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-26. Columbia, Missouri, Five-Year Temperature Summary, 2008-2012 m1m.1*1*1111mmm1111mmmmm1a.1.1*m*

oc -0.6 -0.9 6.1 11.6 17. 1 23.3 24.7 22 .8 19.0 16.0 2.4 - I. I 12.2 2008 Of 3 1.0 30.3 42 .9 52 .9 62 .8 73.9 76 .4 73.0 66.3 60.9 36.3 30.1 54.0 oc -3 .1 2.4 8.1 11.7 17.9 23.3 22.5 21.9 18.6 10.2 9.8 -I. I 11.8 2009 Of 26.5 36.3 46.5 53.1 64.2 73.9 72.5 71.4 65 .5 50.3 49.6 30.0 53 .3 oc -4 .1 -2.7 7.4 16.1 18.0 24.6 25.6 25 .5 19.8 14.8 7.6 -1.6 12.6 20 10 Of 24.7 27. 1 45.3 60.9 64.4 76 .2 78.0 77.9 67.6 58.6 45.7 29.1 54.6 oc -3 .9 -0.1 6.6 14.0 16.9 24.0 27 .5 24.9 17.6 14.2 8.9 3.1 12.8 2011 Of 24.9 31.9 43.9 57.2 62.5 75.1 81.6 76.7 63 .7 57.5 48 .1 37.5 55.0 oc 1.7 4.3 14.9 15 .0 21.6 25.0 29.5 25.8 19.6 12 .0 7.7 7.5 16. 1 20 12 Of 35 .0 39.7 58.8 59.0 70.9 77. 1 85. 1 78.5 67.3 53 .6 45 .8 45.5 61.0 oc -2.0 0.6 8.6 13.7 18.3 24.0 25 .9 24.2 18.9 12.8 8.5 -0.2 13 .1 Mean OF 28.4 33.1 47.5 56.6 64.9 75 .3 78.7 75 .5 66.1 55 .0 47.3 31.7 55.6 Source: WRCC, 20 I 3b, "Station Monthly Time Series, Columbia, Missouri, 2008-2012, Station 23 1791 Columbia WSO AP," www.wrcc.dri .edu/cgi-bi n/wea_ mnsimts. pl?laKCOU, Western Regional Climate Center, Reno, Nevada, accessed August 2013 .

The five-year average temperature, for the same time period, reported at the MU South Farm weather station was 12.3°C (54.2°F). The average minimum temperature was 6.9°C (44.5 °F) and the average maximum temperature was 17.9°C (64.3 °F) (MU, 2013).

2.3.1.2 Precipitation According to the historical data from Station 231791, precipitation in the Columbia, Missouri area averages approximately 103.1 cm (40.6 in.) per year. Of that amount, the mean snowfall is 57.7 cm (22.7 in.) per year. The city has measurable amounts of precipitation 111 days/year. The maximum annual precipitation of 159 cm (62.49 in.) was measured in 1993 , and the minimum annual precipitation of 60 cm (23.66 in.) was measured in 1980. On a monthly basis, rainfall amounts range from a high of 12.4 cm (4.89 in.) in May to a low of 4.62 cm (1.82 in.) in January (WRCC, 2013a) . The maximum probably precipitation in a one-hour period is 3.14 (NOAA Atlas 14, Precipitation-Frequency Atlas of the United States).

According to the historical data from Station 231791 , snow falls from November through April. During that period, a high of 16 cm (6.3 in.) was recorded in February 2011, and a low of I .5 cm (0.6 in.) was recorded in 1980. A summary of average and extreme precipitation data for 1969 through 20 I 2 is provided in Table 2-27 (WRCC, 20 l 3a).

A recent five-year precipitation summary of the station data was obtained and reviewed. For each month during this time period, approximately I 5 to 30 percent of the data was missing. Precipitation data from the MU South Farm weather station was also reviewed; however, the averages shown on the site were different than the Columbia weather station by a factor of five . Thus, the Columbia, Missouri weather station historical summary serves as the more complete picture of precipitation at the proposed RPF site.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-27. Columbia, Missouri, Average and Extreme Monthly Climate, Historic Precipitation Summary, 1969-2012 Measurement n1m1Em1m111mmmm1mmm1.1.11;11 Average cm 4.62 5.44 8. 10 11 .23 12.42 10.24 9.58 10.06 9.53 8.28 7.72 6.02 103.12 total precipitation in 1.82 2. 14 3.19 4.42 4.89 4.03 3.77 3.96 3.75 3.26 3.04 2.37 40.60 cm 15.09 15.70 25.63 29.69 31.27 26.11 30.84 25.88 30.63 "27.9 26.47 17.68 158.72 High in 5.94 6.18 10.09 11.69 12.3 1 10.28 12.14 10.19 12.06 "10.99 10.42 6.96 62.49 cm 0.13 0.28 1.98 2.26 "3.33 0.89 0.61 0.53 1.1 4 *0.91 1.07 1.22 60. 10 Low in 0.05 0.11 0.78 0.89 *1.3 1 0.35 0.24 0.2 1 0.45 *o.36 0.42 0.48 23.66 cm 4.47 6.10 9.98 11.43 12.14 8.15 15.09 10.85 7.11 12.40 7.04 6.88 15.09 1-day max in 1.76 2.40 3.93 4.50 4.78 3.21 5.94 4.27 2.80 4.88 2.77 2.71 5.94 Average cm 15.75 "16.00 7.37 1.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.57 12.70 57.66 total 3

snowfall m 6.20 6.3 2.90 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.80 5.00 22.70 High cm 59.69 59.18 54.86 18.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 21.08 45 .2 1 134.11 snowfall in 23 .50 23.30 21.60 7.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 8.30 17.80 52.80 Source: WRCC, 20 l 3a, "Period of Record General Climate Summary - Temperature, 1969 to 2012, Station 231791 Columbia WSO AP," www.wrcc.dri.edu/cgi -bin/cliGCStT.pl?mol 79 1, Western Regional Climate Center, Reno, Nevada, accessed August 20 13.

• Occurred during 2008- 201 2 time period.

Hydrometeorological Report No 51 , Probable Maximum Precipitation Estimates, United States East of the 105th Meridian (NOAA, 1978) provides probable maximum precipitation data for the U.S. east of the Rocky Mountains. Probable maximum precipitation values for a specific location are provided in Table 2-28 over ranges of time (6 to 72 hr) or ranges of geographic area (10 mi 2 to 20,000 mi 2).

Table 2-28. 72-Hour Probable Maximum Precipitation 10 mi 2 28 33 37 38.5 40 2

200 mi 20 24.5 26 29.5 33 2

1,000 mi 15 18.5 20.5 24 25.5 2

5,000 mi 9 12 14 17 19 2

10,000 mi 7 9.5 11.5 15 16.5 20,000 mi2 5.1 7.5 9.5 12.5 14 2.3.1.3 Maxim um Probable Snowpack NUREG-1537, Part 1, Section 2.3.1, states that the snow load should be based on the 100-year return period snow accumulation. For MU facilities, the 2012 International Building Code (IBC) (IBC, 2012) has been levied as the required building code. The ground snow load is 20 lb/ft2. To modify the snow load to be based on a 100-year return period, an importance factor of 1.2 is applied to the load determined using the nominal snow load (ASCE 7-10, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures ,

Section C7.3.3). The nominal ice thickness is 2.54 cm (1 in.) concurrent with a 64.4 km/hr (40-mi/hr),

3-sec wind gust. To modify the ice load to be based on a 100-year return period, an importance factor of 0.82 is applied to the load determined using the nominal ice load (ASCE 7-10, Section Cl0.4.4).

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• i*;h NWMI

• • *

• Nu..TtfWfn UlDtCAL ISOTOPH NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.3.1.4 Humidity Average relative humidity data for the Columbia, Missouri weather station was reviewed for 2008 to 2012. The lowest average relative humidity was 51.89 percent, recorded in August 2012, and the highest average relative humidity was 82.13 percent, recorded in September 2008. The five-year annual average was 69.18 percent. The five-year relative humidity data is summarized in Table 2-29 (WRCC, 2013b ).

2008 2009 60.51 64.95 Table 2-29 .

72.02 63 .73 Relative Humidity Data for Columbia, Missouri, 2008-2012 66 .68 63.28 64 .85 66.52 69.49 68.42 7 1.40 73.66 74 .38 74.46 78.87 76.90

82. 13 75 .92 77.52 76.62 65 .87 68.08

• .~

7 1.48 72.33

71. 18 70.41 20 10 75 .69 73.42 70.33 61.24 74.71 76.64 79.19 75 .19 76 .1 7 58 .65 64.86 72.85 71.58 2011 71.86 71.51 71.26 64.73 74.6 1 72.69 76.29 75.19 70.82 59.46 71.92 74.84 7 1.27 20 12 64 .05 63 .72 63 .58 65 .03 61.33 54.89 52.96 5 1.89 69 .64 66 .76 62 .25 70.9 1 61.46 Mean 67.41 68.88 67.03 64.47 69.71 69.86 71.46 71.61 74 .94 65.37 66.78 72.88 69.18 Source: WRCC, 20 I 3b, "Station Monthly Time Series, Columbia, Missouri, 2008 -20 12, Station 23 179 1 Columbia WSO AP," www.wrcc.dri .edu/cgi-bin/wea_ mnsimts.pl?laKCOU, Western Regional Climate Center, Reno, Nevada, accessed August 201 3.

2.3.1.5 Wind Extreme wind speeds are uncommon in central Missouri. Wind that does occur is usually caused by pressure gradients and temperature contrasts present in the mid-latitude cyclones that pass through the state. These cyclones may spawn storms that produce high winds from gust fronts, microbursts, and tornadoes. Non-storm-related extreme winds are rare. Occasionally, cold high-pressure air filling in behind a front will cause high wind, especially in the winter when temperature contrasts are large.

Average wind speed data for the Columbia, Missouri weather station was reviewed for 2008 to 2012. The lowest mean wind speed was 8.8 km/hr (5.47 mi/hr) in August 2008 and the highest was 19.1 km/hr (11.87 mi/hr) recorded in December 2008 . The five-year annual average was 14.25 km/hr (8 .86 mi/hr).

The five-year mean wind speed data is summarized in Table 2-30.

Table 2-30. Mean Wind Speed for Columbia, Missouri, from 2008-2012 lllM@NlmlmlE!IE!lllllMll!,Mll!lllJll.IBIBllmllEDtt.1.11;11 (km/hr) 18.85 17.03 16.96 17.53 15.76 13.97 11.28 8.80 10.01 11.59 14.32 19.10 14.93 2008 (mi/hr) 11.7 1 10.58 10.54 10.89 9.79 8.68 7.0 1 5.47 6.22 7.20 8.90 11 .87 9.28 (km/hr) 15.24 17.96 18.3 1 17.99 12.38 12.47 10.32 11.91 10.40 14.58 14.7 1 17.03 14.44 2009 (mi/hr) 9.47 I I.I 6 I 1.38 11.18 7.69 7.75 6.41 7.40 6.46 9.06 9.14 10.58 8.97 (km/hr) 13 .74 13.73 15.96 17.06 12.79 11.43 10.06 9.88 12. 17 16.30 14.73 13.41 13.10 2010 (mi/hr) 8.54 8.53 9.92 10.60 7.95 7. 10 6.25 6.14 7.56 10.13 9. 15 8.33 8. 14 (km/hr) 13 .63 16.87 17.08 18.49 15 .14 14.45 10.09 10.38 1 I .89 13.66 18.88 14.15 14.56 2011 (mi/hr) 8.47 10.48 10.61 11.49 9.41 8.98 6.27 6.45 7.39 8.49 11.73 8.79 9.05 (km/hr) 16.98 15.64 16.53 15.19 13.42 13.68 10.56 11 .35 11.57 13 .79 14.97 14.1 8 13.97 2012 (mi/hr) 10.55 9.72 10.27 9.44 8.34 8.50 6.56 7.05 7. 19 8.57 9.30 8.81 8.68 (km/hr) 15.69 16.24 16.96 17.25 13.90 13.20 10.46 10.46 11.20 14.08 15.92 16.25 14.26 Mean (mi/hr) 9.75 10.09 10.54 10.72 8.64 8.20 6.50 6.50 6.96 8.75 9.89 10.10 8.86 Source: WRCC, 20 l 3b, "Station Monthly Time Series, Columb ia, Missouri, 2008 -2012, Station 23 179 1 Columbia WSO AP," www.wrcc.dri .edu/cgi-bin/wea_mnsimts.pl?laKCOU, Western Regional Climate Center, Reno, Nevada, accessed August 201 3.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Wind data from the MU South Farm weather station was also reviewed. The average shown on the site was different than the Columbia weather station by a factor of two. Thus, the Columbia weather station data serves as the more complete picture of wind activity at the proposed RPF site.

Two wind roses are presented to show the general historic wind flow patterns in the immediate area and the study area. Figure 2-31 shows the wind pattern as measured at MU South Farm, located immediately north of the proposed RPF site. This data is collected by MU. Figure 2-32 shows the wind patterns recorded at the Remote Automatic Weather Station (RAWS) in Columbia.

WI OSPEEO (mph)

.0 5..0- 20 0 0 - 150 D 5. . 0 D t - ~0 c . 000.._

Figure 2-31. Wind Rose from South Farm, 2000-2010 (University of Missouri Agricultural Experiment Station) 2-74

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics COL

• A 110 H J!,. lf 1.3 - 4 92* 4 - 8 0 18% 8 - 13 13 - 19 19 - 2

~ - 3 32 - 39 39 - 7 47 +

w Figure 2-32. Wind Rose from Automatic Weather Station, Columbia, Missouri, 2007-2012 (Western Regional Climate Center)

Both wind roses show that the prevailing surface wind direction is from the south. The MU South Farm wind rose shows a total average wind speed of 11.3 km/hr (7 mi/hr), while the Columbia wind rose shows a total average speed of 14.16 km/hr (8.8 mi/hr). Both wind roses show that the average frequency of higher speed winds falls into the 24 to 40 km/hr (15 to 25-mi/hr) range.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.3.1.6 100-Year Return Wind Speed NUREG-1537, Part 1, Section 2.3.1, states that the wind load should be based on the 100-year return period wind speed. For MU facilities, IBC (2012) has been levied as the required building code. The basic wind speed for Category III and IV facilities is 193.1 km/hr (120 mi/hr). An evaluation of the effective return period for the basic wind speeds for Category III and IV facilities determined that the effective return period is 1,700 years (3 percent in 50 years, or 5.7 percent in 100 years) (ASCE 7-10, Section C26.5.1 ). Note that an event with a 100-year return period has a 63 percent chance of occurring at least once in a 100-year period.

2.3.1.7 Extreme Weather The heartland of the country has the distinction of also being known as "tornado alley," a non-meteorological term that references the area where 90 percent of tornadoes have occurred as a result of the mixing of cold, dry air from Canada and the Rocky Mountains, with warm, moist air from the Gulf of Mexico and hot, dry air from the Sonoran Desert. This area exhibits a lot of atmospheric instability, heavy precipitation, and many intense thunderstorms.

Tornados are extreme wind speed events that are classified according to the Enhanced Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale (EF scale). The scale matches wind speeds to the severity of damaged caused by a tornado. The process involves determining the degree of damage according to a predefined damage scale of 28 indicators. The observed damage is associated with estimated wind speeds during the storm, and an EF scale number is assigned. Measuring tornadoes from EF-1 to EF-5 , the scale uses more specific structural damage guidelines than the original Fujita scale (F scale), which was established in 1971.

Table 2-31 shows the F and EF scales.

Table 2-31. Fujita Scale and Enhanced Fujita Scales Used to Determine Tornado Intensity F scale EF scale Fastest 1/4-mi 3-sec gust 3-sec gust llZIJiD*llm!?JlllllZIJllllllll 11:111111 (mi/hr) 0 64 -116 40-72 72-126 45- 78 0 105-137 65-85 1 117 - 180 73- 112 127-188 79- 11 7 1 138-177 86-110 2 182- 253 113- 157 189-259 118- 161 2 178-217 111- 135 3 254- 333 158-207 260-336 162-209 3 218-265 136-165 4 334- 418 208- 260 337-420 210- 261 4 266-322 166- 200 5 419- 512 261-318 421-510 262- 317 5 Over 322 Over 200 EF scale enhanced Fujita tornado intensity scale.

F scale Fujita tornado intensity scale.

The seasonal and annual frequencies of tornadoes, thunderstorms, lighting, and hail are provided in Table 2-32 through Table 2-38 .

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-32. Seasonal Frequency of Historical Tornadoes in Boone County, Missouri (1954 to 2016)

Magnitude (Fujita Scale)

Month January 1 February March 2 April 1 2 5 May 1 1 2 June 1 1 July 2 August September 2 October 2 November 3 December Source: NOAA, 2016, "Storm Events Database," www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents, ational Centers for Environmental Information, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington, D.C., accessed ovember 2016.

Table 2-33. Annual Frequency of Historical Tornadoes in Boone County, Missouri (1954 to 2016)

Magnitude (Fujita Scale)

Year Total 1954 3 3 1956 1 1959 2 1 3 1965 1966 1972 1 1973 1 1 3 1980 1 1982 1 1 2 1984 3 3 1985 1 1987 1990 2 2 1992 2 1995 1 1998 1999 2 2 2000 1 2 2001 1 1 Source: NOAA, 20 16, "Storm Events Database," www. ncdc. noaa.gov/stormevents, National Centers for Environmental Information, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adm inistration, Washington, D.C., accessed November 2016.

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NWM l-20 13-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-34. Boone County Seasonal Thunderstorm Wind Events (8/29/1955 to 5/1112016)

Wind Velocity (mph)

Month Wl*fZMWJjajil:f.j:(ll:fj:PICliJ#if}f#iiM*IHllli}jl*kllllilljl January 2 February March 8 I 3 2 April 12 5 2 2 I May 13 7 9 3 2 I I 2 June 20 3 6 3 2 July 12 8 10 6 I 2 2 August 18 6 2 3 I September 4 I 3 October November I I December 2 Source: NOAA, 2016, "Storm Events Database," www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents, National Centers for Environmental Information, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington, D.C., accessed November 2016.

Table 2-35. Boone County Annual Thunderstorm Wind Events (8/29/1955 to 5/1112016)

Year M@§utWIE!!lmM@§.itW-M4@*itW Year *M§.lt*

1956 1971 1987 2 2002 6 1957 1972 1988 2 2003 1958 3 1973 1989 2004 8 1959 1974 1990 3 2005 7 1960 1975 1991 2006 11 1961 3 1977 1 1992 I 2007 8 1962 1978 1993 2008 6 1963 2 1979 1994 2 2009 6 1964 1980 1995 5 2010 6 1965 198 1 7 1996 2 2011 15 1966 2 1982 16 1997 1 2012 1 1967 3 1983 1 1998 9 2013 1968 1984 3 1999 1 2014 5 1969 I 1985 2000 17 2015 4 1970 1986 3 2001 6 2016 2 Source: NOAA, 2016, "Storm Events Database," www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents, National Centers for Environmental Information, National Ocean ic and Atmospheric Administration, Wash ington, D.C., accessed November 20 16.

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NWMl-201 3-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-36. Boone Co unty Lightning Events (7/5/1998 to 6/30/2016)

Location IEim Description Columbia 7/5/ 1998 Lightning strike was blamed for a fire at a residence in southwest Columbia.

Firefighters arrived to find flames shooting through a hole in the roof.

Columbia 5/22/2002 A fire started by lightning destroyed 50 percent of a home in Columbia.

Columbia 8/25/2004 Lighting strike melted power lines at Providence and Green Meadows roads. About 5,000 people were affected by the resulting power outage, including New Haven Elementary School.

Columbia 8/2 5/2004 Lightning strike started a house fire.

Columbia 6/6/2005 Lightning strike started a house fire.

Columbia 8/26/2006 Five radio stations were knocked off the air when lightning struck a Cumulus Broadcasting transmitter tower. Control boards in the studios, computers, and magnetic door locks in the building were also damaged by the strike.

Columbia 7/ 19/2007 Lightning strike started a fire at a photography studio.

Sapp 4/23/2008 Lightning strike started a house fire.

Columbia 5/30/2008 Lightning strike started a house fire.

COU Memorial 6/ 13/2008 Lightning strike started a house fire.

Airport Browns 6/ 17/2009 Lightning strike killed woman in an open field at Rocky Fork Lakes Conservation Area.

Harg 7/3/2011 Lightning strike started a house fire.

Columbia 7/23/20 11 Lightning struck cell phone being used by woman in Cosmo Park.

Source: NOAA, 2016, "Storm Events Database," www. ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents, National Centers for Environmental Information, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington, D.C., accessed November 2016.

Table 2-37. Boone County Seasonal Hail Events 4/23/1958 - 5/11/2016 Diameter (in.)

Location HllHl=lli'l'llffllt1'111tlHIHl1'1fhJP.I*ll<<*!ollll January 2 1 3 9 February 1 February 1 March 18 4 20 2 3 11 1 61 April 21 6 18 4 3 15 2 3 72 May 33 21 21 2 3 22 1 105 June 15 8 9 3 12 1 49 July 5 3 2 11 August 1 1 2 1 6 September 8 2 4 3 19 October 1 1 November 2 5 3 2 13 December 2 2 5 Source: NOAA, 2016, "Storm Events Database," www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents, ational Centers for Environmental Information, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington, D.C., accessed November 2016.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-38. Boone County Annual Hail Events 4/23/1958 - 5/11/2016 Year l{i§h?WIE!lllfl§.l?W-lfJ§.i?W Year lfl§.J?W 1958 1 1972 1987 1 2002 13 1959 1973 3 1988 5 2003 13 1960 1974 6 1989 1 2004 1959 1 1975 1 1990 4 2005 36 1961 1 1976 2 1991 5 2006 49 1962 2 1977 1 1992 7 2007 5 1963 1978 1993 4 2008 19 1964 1979 1994 3 2009 11 1965 1 1980 1 1995 10 2010 7 1966 2 1981 4 1996 5 2011 21 1967 1 1982 15 1997 1 2012 8 1968 3 1983 1998 3 2013 8 1969 1984 15 1999 7 2014 9 1970 2 1985 2 2000 13 2015 3 1971 1986 2 2001 10 2016 2 Source: OAA, 2016, "Stonn Events Database," www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stonnevents, National Centers for Environmental Information, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin istration, Washington, D.C., accessed November 20 16.

Winter weather events since 1996 in Boone County, Missouri, are provided in Table 2-39. These events include snowstorms, ice storms, and extreme cold events. The RPF is being designed to ASCE 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, to withstand expected meteorological events.

This information will be factored in the design requirements of Section 3.2.5, "Rain, Snow, and Ice Loading," for the RPF.

.. 1/2/96 113196 Table 2-39. Boone County Winter Weather Events (11111996 to 6/30/2016) (2 pages)

Storm type Winter storm Winter storm m!lllmll Im.ml 2

1 6-9 inches of snow in region 2-4 inches of snow in region Description 11 /25/96 Ice storm Numerous traffic accidents 1/8/97 Winter storm 2 5-7 inches of snow, strong winds, very cold temperatures 1/15/97 Winter storm 2 Freezing rain and sleet with 11.i to Yi in. of ice accumulation followed by 3 to 8 in. of snow in the region 1/27/97 Winter storm 1 Freezing rain with Yi to 1 in. of ice accumulation 4/ 10/97 Winter storm 1 2 to 6 in. of snow in the region 12/8/97 Winter storm 1 2 to 4 in. of snow in region 1/ 12/98 Winter storm 1 Freezing drizzle resulting in thin glaze of ice on roads 3/8/98 Winter storm 2 4 to 6 in. of snow in region 12/21 /98 Winter storm 2 Light freezing drizzle, sleet, and snow left a thin coating of ice on roads 1/1/99 Winter storm 2 6 to 10 in. of snow across region with about an inch of freezing rain and sleet; very cold temperatures 2-80

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics

.. 3/11/00 Table 2-39. Boone County Winter Weather Events (1/1/1996 to 6/30/2016) (2 pages) 1127100 Storm type Winter storm Winter storm m!l!!m 3

1 4 to 5 in. across region 4 to 7 in. of snow Description 12/ 13/00 Heavy snow 6 to 12 in. across region 12/ 16/00 Extreme 2 Wind chills from -20°F to -40°F cold/wind chill 1/29/02 Ice storm 2 1 Y<i to Y2 in. of ice accumulation; power outages 312102 Winter storm 1 Yi in. of sleet followed by 4 to 6 in. of snow; winds of 20 to 30 mi/hr 3125102 Winter storm 2 Sleet followed by snow; 3- to 4-in. accumulation of the mix 12/4/02 Winter storm 2 to 5 in. of snow across region 12/24/02 Winter storm 4 to 8 in. of snow across region 1/1/03 Winter storm 2 Sleet accumulation up to 1 in. followed by 6 to 8 in. of snow across the region 2123103 Winter storm 2 3 to 6 in. of snow across the region 12/9/03 Winter storm 2 3 to 5 in. of snow across the region 12/13/03 Winter storm 1 3 to 6 in. of snow across the region 1/25/04 Winter storm 1 Freezing rain followed by 1 to 2 in. of sleet and then 1 to 2 in.

of snow 11 /24/04 Winter storm 4 to 6 in. of snow across region 12/8/05 Winter storm 1 2 in. of snow 11 /29/06 Winter storm 3 Over a foot of snow in some areas 1112/07 Ice storm 3 Up to 1.5 in. of sleet and Y<i to Yi in. of ice accumulation in reg10n 12/8/2007 Ice storm 4 Up to a Yi in. of ice accumulated along with up to 1 in. of sleet 1/31/2011 Winter storm 2 Up to 20 in. of snow fell along with winds gusting over 40 mi/hr.

12/21/2013 Ice storm Average ice accumulation on trees and other overhead surfaces was from 0.25 to 0.30 in; about Y2 inch of sleet also fell in some locations 115/2014 Winter storm 1 6 to 9 in. of snow across with strong northerly winds produced snow drifts of 2 to 5 ft 2/4/2014 Winter storm 6 to 13 in. of snow across the region Source: NOAA, 2016, "Storm Events Database," www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents, National Centers for Environmental Information, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington, D.C., accessed November 2016.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.3.2 Site Meteorology Conservative assumptions were used, in both the Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) code to support 10 CFR 100.11, "Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, and Population Center Distance," analyses and the ALOHA air dispersion model to support the preliminary safety analysis report with regard to meteorological inputs and identified scenarios.

The RSAC code, Version 6.2, was used to determine ifthe dose rate requirements in IO CFR JOO.I I would drive the required size of the exclusion area boundary (controlled area) for the NWMI RPF.

10 CFR I 00. I 1 requires that an exclusion area be sized so that an individual located at any point on its boundary for 2 hr immediately following onset of the postulated fission product release would not receive a total radiation dose to the whole body in excess of 25 roentgen equivalent in man (rem).

In the preliminary safety analysis report, design-basis events and the potential effects of those accidents on the facility, in terms of design parameters (e.g., overpressure, missile energies) or physical phenomena (e.g., impact, flammable or toxic clouds) were identified in accordance with IO CFR 20, IO CFR 50.34, Regulatory Guide 1.78, Regulatory Guide 1.91, Regulatory Guide 1.206, Regulatory Guide 4.7, and NUREG-I537 .

Design-basis events, external to the proposed RPF, are defined as those accidents that have a probability of radiological release to the public on the order of magnitude of IE-07 per year, or greater, with the potential consequences serious enough to affect the safety of the plant to the extent that the guidelines in 10 CFR 50.34 could be exceeded.

Table 2-40. Distances from Exhaust Stacks to Chemicals were evaluated to ascertain which Fence and Site Boundaries hazardous materials had the potential to form a flammable vapor cloud or vapor cloud explosion. Compass Fence line Site boundary For those chemicals with an identified direction flammability range, the ALOHA air dispersion North 29 94 76 250 model was used to determine the distances where North Northeast 70 231 76 250 the vapor cloud may exist between the upper explosion limit and the LEL, presenting the Northeast 82 269 86 281 possibility of ignition and potential thermal East Northeast 103 338 1 IO 363 radiation effects (ALOHA, 2008). East 76 250 84 275 Conservative meteorological assumptions were East Southeast 65 213 69 225 used in both the RSAC and ALOHA analyses. Southeast 65 213 69 225 Conservative Pasquill stability classes, including F South Southeast 72 238 76 250 and G, along with a wind speeds of 1 to 2 m/sec South 110 363 118 388 were assumed for the analyses. Site-specific meteorological measurements were not necessary South Southwest 95 3I3 I56 513 to complete these bounding analyses. Southwest 80 263 149 488 West Southwest 42 138 112 369 Table 2-40 provides a tabulation of the distance West 23 75 65 213 from the exhaust stacks where airborne releases might be expected to points on the fence and site West Northwest 19 63 57 188 boundaries in each of the 16 compass directions to Northwest 19 63 57 188 support dispersion analyses of airborne releases. North Northwest 19 63 76 250 2-82

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Regional Data Sources Meteorological measurements would be available for use in responding to accidental radiological releases, other emergencies, and any other routine purposes that require access to meteorological information during the licensing period. That meteorological information would be obtained for local government weather monitoring stations that observe wind and other surface meteorological parameters on an hourly basis.

When needed during an emergency, real-time hourly surface meteorological measurements of wind direction, wind speed, air temperature, and weather type would be accessed by NWMI through Government data sources. Access would be attempted during the emergency in the following sequence, until reliable data is obtained, as fo llows:

1. Internet access to hourly surface weather observations recorded at Station 231 791, Columbia Regional Airport (wl .weather.gov/data/obhistory/KCOU.html).

2. Telephone access to an automated voice recording at (573) 499-1400 of the most recent hourly surface observations recorded at the Columbia Regional Airport.

3. If weather observations are not avail able from the station at the Columbia Regional Airport, weather information from another station with hourly meteorological data in the site climate region would be used. The following Missouri stations would be used as listed in order of increasing distance from Columbia:

a. Jefferson City Memorial Airport: wl.weather.gov/data/obhistory/KJEF.html

b. Kansas City International Airport: wl.weather.gov/data/obhistory/KMC I.html

c. Sedalia Memorial Airport: wl.weather.gov/data/obhistory/KDMO.html

d. Spirit of St. Louis Airport: wl .weather.gov/data/obhistory/KSUS.html During normal operations, data would be obtained by internet access to hourly surface weather observations recorded at the Columbia Regional Airport at w l .weather.gov/data/obhistory/KCOU.html.

2.4 HYDROLOGY 2.4.1 Surface Water Surface waters in central and southern Boone County drain into the Missouri River through a number of tributaries, including Bonne Femme, Cedar, Little Cedar, Hinkson, Jemerson, and Perche Creeks (Figure 2-33). The other major drainage feature in the county is a system of karst topography west and south of Columbia. Numerous sinkholes, some filled with water, overlie a complex network of caves and springs. Gans Creek, which drains Discovery Ridge and the proposed RPF site, is located within the Bonne Femme Watershed.

Bonne Femme Watershed The Bonne Femme Watershed is comprised of two major sub-watersheds: the Bonne Femme and the Little Bonne Femme. Topographical contours of the land define the Bonne Femme Watershed, which encompasses approximately 241 square kilometers (km 2) (93 mi2), approximately 15 percent of Boone County, including the proposed RPF site (BFSC, 2007). The RPF site is located within the northern portion of this watershed (Little Bonne Femme sub-watershed) and is approximately 0.4 km (0.25 mi) north of Gans Creek (Figure 2-34).

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics

~ trearns 0 km (5 mile) Radiu from RPF ite

- Interstate Highway Lakes N Highway

+

0 0.5

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~tU :'Ol.l '<<1.,.. _\01-1 ~ l*.. P _.Jlirllf't Figure 2-33. Streams of Southern Boone County, Missouri 2-84

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Middle-Hink en reek reek Miller r ek Bonne Femme reek Fowler RPF ite 0 km (5 mile) Radiu from RP ite Bonne l'emmc reek

- Inter tale Highway allahan Crcck-l'crche Creek Fowler Creek- edar reek

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-*o-*::::i****==== - * * - Miles Rocky Fork Creek Figure 2-34. Map Showing Bonne Femme Watershed 2-85

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Both the Bonne Femme and Little Bonne Femme creeks flow from east to west in a dendritic alignment into the Missouri River and are interconnected by the Devil 's Icebox Cave Branch. Where Gans Creek meets Clear Creek, the Little Bonne Femme begins and flows south toward the Mayhan Branch. The Little Bonne Femme enters the Missouri River approximately 0.8 km (0.5 mi) south of this confluence.

To the south, the Bonne Femme meets with the Fox Hollow Branch and then flows into the Missouri River (BFSC, 2007).

The most distinctive characteristic of the Bonne Femme Watershed is its karst topography. Within the karst terrain, the hydrology becomes complex because of losing and gaining sections of streams. Rough estimates show approximately 33 stream segments comprising approximately 37 km (23 mi) of losing streams (143 km [89 mi] of gaining stream) within the watershed. There are two main recharge areas tied to these losing and gaining sections of stream, including Devil 's Ice Box recharge zone (3,3 97 ha

[8,394 acres] of drainage), and Hunter's Cave recharge zone (3,330 ha [8,228 acres] of drainage) (BFSC, 2007).

A mixture ofland uses occurs within the Bonne Femme watershed. The predominant land use accounting for 61.5 percent of the watershed is agricultural activities, including row crop productions, pasture, and range lands. Forested areas make up nearly one-third of the watershed, mainly within the central and western portion of the watershed. These forested areas also encompass most of the publicly owned lands, including Rock Bridge Memorial State Park and Three Creeks Conservation Area (BFSC, 2007).

2.4.2 Ground Water Groundwater is the source of 74 percent of all rural domestic self-supplied water, 75 percent of all irrigation water, and 39 percent of all industrial self-supplied water, excluding water for thermoelectric power generation. The six principal aquifers in Missouri include:

• Major river valleys

• Alluvial (in southeastern Missouri)

• Wilcox and Claiborne

• McNairy

• Ozark

• Mississippian Aquifer (Kimmswick-Potosi)

The groundwater aquifer beneath the proposed RPF site is the Mississippian aquifer (also referred to as the Kimmswick-Potosi aquifer). Figure 2-35 is a map of the aquifer.

The Mississippian aquifer is the principal aquifer supplying groundwater to Boone County. The Mississippian aquifer consists of consolidated dolomite, limestone, and some sandstone beds that are generally confined. The Keokuk limestone and Burlington limestone are the principal water-yielding formations within this aquifer. Both formations consist of crystalline limestone and yield water primarily from solution cavities. In most places, the aquifer is overlain by a confining unit of Pennsylvanian shale and sandstone and glacial till. The aquifer is typically underlain by a confining unit of Mississippian shale. Recharge occurs primarily from precipitation infiltrating overlying aquifers. The top of this aquifer is approximately 548.6 m (1 ,800 ft) below-ground surface and is a primary source of water in seven counties north of the Missouri River (Miller and Appel, 1997).

In accordance with drillers ' reports generated from 1987 to 2005 , the estimated static water level in the area near the proposed site was approximately 198 m (650 ft) below-ground surface (MDNR, 2006).

During previous investigations at Discovery Ridge, groundwater was observed at depths ranging from approximately 3.7-5 .6 m (12-18 .5 ft) below-ground surface.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.4.3 Floods This subsection identifies the effects of potential floods on the proposed RPF site. Figure 2-36 provides the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) flood map of the area around the proposed RPF site. The site is located outside of the 500-year flood plain. The nearest FEMA flood zone A is located along Gans Creek located to the southeast of the site. The elevation of this zone is 242 m (795 ft). The RPF site elevation is 248 m (815 ft) . There are no water impoundments or dams upstream of the RPF site on Gans Creek that could affect the facility.

There are also two ponds located near the RPF site within Discovery Ridge. These ponds include the 7.9 ha ( 19 .6-acre) common grounds storm water management pond located to the northwest of the site.

The top of the dam for this pond is 246 m (807 ft), with the spillway at 245 m (804 ft) . The second pond, currently approximately 4 ha (I 0 acres), is located to the northeast of the site. The elevation of the dam is approximately 244 m (801 ft). Failure of either of these two ponds would not likely affect the RPF because the elevation of the dams is lower than the elevation of the RPF.

2-88

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics FEMA Flood Zones 0 8 km (5 mile) Radius from RPF Site ZO E

- Interstate Highways Zone A

- Highways ZoneAE ZoneX 0 0.5 1 2 3 4 Zone X500

• • c:::m*c:m---=====::::i--- Miles JUIAFlilodM*

Figure 2-36. Federal Emergency Management Agency Flood Zones Around the Radioisotope Production Facility 2-89

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.5 GEOLOGY, SEISMOLOGY, AND GEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING This subsection provides summary descriptions of geomorphic provinces and their tectonic development, and the glacial history responsible for surface topography features found today in the state of Missouri.

The descriptions are based on a review of relevant, readily available published reports and maps, and where available, records and unpublished reports from federal and state agencies. Information on the site characteristics has been acquired from these same sources and from site-specific investigations, including geotechnical field studies.

2.5.1 Regional Geology 2.5.1.1 Geomorphic Provinces The state of Missouri is divided into three geomorphic provinces:

• Interior Plains Province, also referred to as the Central Lowland Province (northern Missouri ,

north of the Missouri River)

• Interior Highlands (central Missouri, south of the Missouri River)

• Atlantic Plains, also referred to as the Coastal Plains Province (the "boot heel" or southeastern corner of Missouri).

The proposed RPF site is located north of the Missouri River within the Interior Plains province. The Interior Plains are defined by the general texture of the surface terrain, rock type, and geologic structure.

They are characterized by moderately dissected, glaciated, flat to rolling plains that slope gently toward the Missouri and Mississippi River valleys. Local relief is 6.1-50.3 m (20-165 ft). Drainage is dendritic, current geomorphic processes are fluvial erosion, transport and deposition, and minor mass wasting.

Elevations range from 183-457 m (600-1,500 ft) above mean sea level, with the proposed RPF site averaging 245 m (805 ft) above mean sea level (USGS, 2013a).

2.5.1.1.1 Interior Plains Province The Interior Plains Province is a vast region spread across the stable core (craton) of North America. This area formed when several small continents collided and welded together over a billion years ago, during the Precambrian Era. Precambrian metamorphic and igneous rocks now form the basement of the Interior Plains and make up the stable core of North America. Throughout the Paleozoic and Mesozoic Eras, the low lying Interior Plains remained relatively unaffected by mountain building and tectonic collisions in the western and eastern margins of the continent.

During the Mesozoic Era, the majority of the North American continental interior was above sea level, with two notable exceptions. The first occurring during the Jurassic Era (208-144 million years ago),

when rising seas flooded the low-lying areas of the continent and most of the Interior Plains were eventually submerged beneath the shallow Sundance Sea. The second exception occurred during the Cretaceous Period, when record high sea levels flooded the continental interior with shallow seas. During this time, the Interior Plains continued to receive deposits from the eroding Rocky Mountains to the west and Appalachian and Ouachita-Ozark Mountains to the east and south throughout the most recent Cenozoic Era. The flatness of the Interior Plains is a reflection of the platform of mostly flat-lying marine and stream deposits laid down in the Mesozoic and Cenozoic Eras. The overlying sedimentary rocks are composed mostly of limestone, sandstone, and shales (USGS, 2013a).

2-90

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.5.1.1.2 Interior Highlands Province The southern portion of Missouri , south of the Missouri River, is located within the Interior Highlands Province. The Interior Highlands includes the Ozark and Ouachita Mountains of southern Missouri, Arkansas, and eastern Oklahoma. The rocky outcrops that make of the core of the Interior Highlands are Paleozoic age carbonates and other sedimentary rocks that were originally deposited on the sea floor. In the Ouachita Mountains, these ancient marine rocks are now contorted by folds and faults. The ancient, eroded mountains of the Interior Highlands stand surrounded by nearly flat-lying sedimentary rocks and deposits of the Interior and Atlantic Plains provinces.

The Interior Highlands consist of thick bedrock units of sandstone and shale, with lesser amounts of chert and novaculite (a fine-grained silica rock, like flint) , deposited in a deep sea that covered the area from Late Cambrian through Early Pennsylvanian time. The area was then folded and faulted in such a manner that resistant beds of sandstone, chert, and novaculite now form long, sinuous mountain ridges that tower 152-457 m (500-1,500 ft) above adjacent valleys formed in easily eroded shale (USGS, 2013a).

2.5.1.1.3 Atlantic Plains Province The Atlantic Plain Province is the flattest of all the provinces and stretches over 3,540 km (2,200 mi) in length from Cape Cod to the border of Mexico and southward another 1,609 km (1 ,000 mi) to the Yucatan Peninsula. The Atlantic Plains slope gently seaward from the Interior Highlands in a series of terraces. The gentle sloping continues far into the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico, forming the continental shelf.

Eroded sediments from the Interior Highlands were carried east and southward by streams and gradually covered the faulted continental margin, burying it under a wedge of layered sedimentary and volcanic debris thousands of feet thick. The sedimentary rock layers that lie beneath much of the coastal plain and fringing continental shelfremain nearly horizontal or tilt gently toward the sea (USGS, 2013b).

2.5.1.2 Glacial History "Recent studies of ice cores, stalagmites, and other temperature dating methods have concluded that there have been 30 sustained periods offrigid temperatures in the last 3 million years. Of the classical glacial periods, only two: pre-Jllinoian (Nebraskan-Kansan) and Illinoian are now recognized as having left glacial deposits in the State of Missouri. The pre-Illinoian was the most severe. Amongst its legacy was the changing of the course of the Missouri River to its present location, the scouring andJU!ing ofNorthern Missouri topography, and extensive outwash gravels left to the south of the present Missouri River.

Although the Ozarks were not glaciated in the recent past, a cover ofPleistocene loess of varying thicknesses extends over all of the state except for the highest parts of the Ozark Mountains. Residuum, otherwise known as soil, clay, and rockfragments degrade from exposed and subsurface bedrock. Gravity and streams move this residuum, depositing it in sometimes graded layers. " (MDNR, 2013a)

In Boone County, the glacial till averages over 43 m (140 ft) thick in the northeastern portion of the county, and the loess material reaches a maximum depth of 6.1 m (20 ft) along the Missouri River Bluffs (Boone County, 2013).

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• ~*:~:* NWM I

• .*! #OftTHWllT MlDtCAl ISOTWU NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.5.1.3 Local Topography and Soils of Boone County The topography of Boone County ranges from highly dissected hills to flat floodplains and nearly flat uplands. Elevations range from approximately 274.3 km (900 ft) above mean sea level along the northern boundary of Boone County to about 164.6 m (540 ft) above mean sea level in the southern tip of the county. Several areas of the county contain well developed cave and sinkhole formations .

Ordovician to middle Pennsylvania-aged dolomite, limestone, sandstone, coal, and shale deposits are visible throughout Boone County in geologic outcrops and roadcuts. The Mississippian-aged Burlington limestone is easily weathered by acidic groundwater and contains some unique natural resources of Boone County, including the most famous- Devil's Ice Box cave system, which is located approximately 2.4 km (1.5 mi) southwest of the proposed RPF site. There are numerous caves in Boone County and 418 documented sinkholes (Boone County, 2013)

Pennsylvanian aged deposits are overlaid by glacial till and loess. The soils of Boone County are included in parts of two major land resource areas: the Central Claypan Area and Central Mississippi Valley Wooded Slopes.

• Central Claypan Area - The Central Claypan Area soils were formed in glacial till and cover the northeastern and east-central portions of Boone County. Claypan soils display extreme variability within the soil profile and across the landscape; therefore, plant growth within these soils must contend with distinctively contrasting physical, chemical, and hydrologic properties at different soil depths. The depth to the claypan soils varies from approximately 10 cm (3 .9 in.) on ridge tops up to 100 cm (39.4 in.) on backslopes. The soil horizons preceding the claypan are depleted of clay minerals, cations, and have a very low pH. The claypan horizon typically has an abrupt upper boundary with 100 percent more clay than the preceding horizon, and very low permeability.

• Central Mississippi Valley Wooded Slopes - This major land resource area consists of a dissected glacial till plain comprising rolling narrow ridge tops and hilly-to-steep ridge slopes.

The small streams in this area have narrow valleys with steep gradients. The major rivers have nearly level broad floodplains, and the valley floors are tens of meters below the adjoining hilltops. Most of the soils within the central Mississippi valley wooded slopes area are found in silty loess or glacial till, are moderately to fine-grained in texture with a mixed mineralogy, and are well drained to moderately well-drained. These soils are typically observed on ridge tops and support forest flora (Boone County, 2013).

The proposed RPF site is located in a tectonically stable Interior Plains Province.

2.5.2 Site Geology The stratigraphy of the geologic units that underlie the proposed RPF site and/or properties within a five-mile radius from the project site (Figure 2-37), are listed below from youngest to oldest:

• Quaternary Age Holocene Series (Qal)

• Pennsylvanian Age Desmoinesian Series Marmaton Group (Pm)

• Pennsylvanian Age Desmoinesian Series Cherokee Group (Pc)

• Mississippian Age Osagean Series Burlington Formation (Mo)

• Mississippian Age Kinderhookian Series (Mk)

• Late to Early Devonian aged (D)

• Early Ordovician Age lbexian Series (Ojc) 2-92

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Pm al

• RPF ite Geologic Feature 0 8 km (5 mile) Radiu from RPF ite Label, Rock Type I, Rock Type 2 D, lime ton . and tone

- Inter tate Highway Mk. lime tone, ilt tone

- Highway Mo. lime tone. chert

.;*l . . .

... r 1ty L1m1t Ojc. dolo tone (dolomite). sand tone 0 0.5 2 3

• -c:::-m:=----====== - - -

• Miles 4 + Pc. hale, and tone Pm, lime tone, hale Qal. clay or mud, silt Figure 2-37. Geologic Features within an 8 km (5-mi) Radius of the Radioisotope Production Facility Site 2-93

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.5.2.1 Quaternary Age Holocene Series (Qal)

The surface topography of the proposed RPF site and surrounding properties consists of Quaternary age bedrock overburden characterized by upland areas covered by a thin loess blanket and glacial drift.

Previous investigations of Discovery Ridge noted that "Highly plastic clays that exhibit volume change with variations in moisture are commonly encountered near the ground surface" (Terracon, 2011 ).

Figure 2-38 depicts the Quaternary age bedrock overburden at the proposed RPF site as clay loam till (No. 27). Clay loam till is also depicted on all adjacent properties to the north, east, south, and west.

Additional Quaternary age deposits located within an 8 km (5-mi) radius of the proposed RPF site include alluvium (No. 10), loess (No. 18), sandy clay (No. 40), and thin, cherty clay solution residuum (No. 41).

The typical Quaternary age groundcover found in Boone County consists of alluvial (stream-deposited) clays, sand, and gravels (with a few poorly consolidated sandstones); glacial tills (sand and well-sorted gravels); and eolian (windblown) clays and Joess (an extremely fine "rock flour," which forms solid masses) (MDNR, 2013b).

These glacial deposits mantle the upland areas and consist of a heterogeneous mixture of clay, sand, and pebbles of diverse rock types. The deposits vary greatly in thickness and are as much as 42.7 m (140 ft) thick in the northern portion of Boone County. This material is relatively impermeable and supplies very little water to wells (MU, 2006).

A site-specific geotechnical investigation of the RPF site will be conducted to identify specific soil characteristics. If highly plastic clays are identified at the site, the design will include excavation of the clays and then backfill with structural fill. The RPF structural design will be completed during the final design and will be included as part of the Operating License Application.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 10 41 10 41

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• uat mary of Mi ouri D 5 mile) Radiu from RP ite D RIPTI

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• • 1996 MO 1996 Quatmuif) Gcolos> t UPI Miles 41 - Thin chert cla olution re iduum (d*J*tal data( flp m..tis m1 ioun edu'pub Gcol~1 11 Gtoph) 1 11 10 1996 Quat<mal) Gcaloio p 11p Figure 2-38. Map of Missouri Quaternary Age Geology 2-95

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.5.2.2 Pennsylvanian Age Desmoinesian Series Marmaton Group (Pm) and Cherokee Group (Pc)

Pennsylvanian age strata (both Marmaton and Cherokee Groups) consists largely of clay and shale, with minor accounts of coal and thin, impure limestone beds. The total thickness may be as much as 33.5 m (110 ft). These beds produce only small quantities of water and are not used in this area as a source of supply. The water found in this unit is usually high in iron and sulfur content (MU, 2006).

Limestone and shale beds are generally thin and very widespread lateral units. Pennsylvanian deposits are quite extensive across Missouri, and they usually form thin- to medium-bedded layers of distinctive composition, called cyclothems. A cyclothem results when a sea transgresses and regresses very rapidly along a coastal area, and in a repeating pattern. Often, this pattern consists of a sandstone (beach), silty shale or siltstone (tidal), freshwater limestone (lagoon), underclay (terrestrial), coal (terrestrial swampy forest), shale (near shore tidal), limestone (shallow marine), and black shale (deep marine). This sequence can then repeat itself as the sea first regresses from the land, and then transgresses again (MDNR, 2013c).

2.5.2.3 Mississippian Age Osagean Series Burlington Formation (Mo)

The Mississippian age Burlington Formation stratum is the most extensively studied Mississippian age strata in Missouri. This crystalline, extremely fossiliferous limestone covers most of the state and extends into Iowa and Arkansas. Typical characteristics include white-to-gray, medium-to-coarsely grained layers of chert nodules, and a coarse-grained sedimentary structure called "styolites" formed from pressure solution. The pores in the styolites are often filled with chert or quartz deposits (MDNR, 2013d).

Burlington limestone is the principal limestone exposed in quarries, creek banks, and roadcuts near and around Columbia. This limestone is approximately 49 m (160 ft) thick in the Columbia area (but the thickness can vary) and may contain minor amounts of pyrite and limonite. Burlington limestone has historically been economically important as a limestone resource where exposed and as host rock for lead and zinc deposits in the presently inactive Tri-State mining district of Missouri, Kansas, and Oklahoma (MU, 2006) .

Burlington limestone contains many shallow-drilled wells and yields sufficient quantities ofrelatively hard water for rural domestic supplies. The limestone is quite soluble and contains many caverns and solutions passages. Solution features , including caves and sinkholes, are commonly present in this formation (MU, 2006). Terracon Consultants, Inc. (Terracon) reported the following:

No caves or sinkholes are known to exist, or are published to exist within approximately 1 mi of the Discovery Ridge Research Park. However, several areas ofknown karst activity are present west and southwest of this project area and are in various stages of development.

Site grading and drainage may alter site conditions and could possibly cause sinkholes in areas that have no history of this activity. (Terracon, 2011)

No sinkholes have occurred at the RPF site since the Terracon preliminary report was issued in 2011.

The most recent study (Boone County, 2015) shows that the project site is northeast of the nearest areas considered to have the potential for sinkholes. The most recent sinkhole occurred in May 2014 and was located on East Gans Creek Road, approximately 1.17 km (0.73 mi) to the southwest of the RPF site.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics A site-specific geotechnical investigation of the RPF site will be conducted to ensure that the area does not have the potential for sinkholes. If the investigation does identify the potential for sinkholes, the RPF final design would incorporate one of the following alternatives: (1) excavate site both vertically and horizontally to remove that potential and backfill with structural fill, or (2) install piers to bedrock to support the substructure if a sinkhole was to occur.

If one of these alternatives needs to be implemented, the approach will be determined after the geotechnical investigation is complete, incorporated in the final RPF design, and included in the Operating License Application.

2.5.2.4 Mississippian Age Kinderhookian Series Chouteau Limestone (Mk)

The Mississippian age Chouteau Limestone stratum is a very fine-grained carbonate and, for the most part, is an evenly bedded bluish gray limestone. The upper part is somewhat massive and high in magnesium. Chouteau limestone is relatively impermeable due to its fine texture, restricting the movement of water to joints and small fissures. This unit is a poor source of water but yields small quantities to a few wells (MU, 2006).

2.5.2.5 Late to Early Devonian Limestone (D)

Devonian limestone strata deposits greatly vary in lithology, and range from very fine-grained to coarsely textured beds. Some of the beds are slightly sandy. In some areas of Columbia, Missouri, the Devonian limestone beds are approximately 9 m (30 ft) thick; in other well locations, this limestone bed is completely absent. Devonian limestone is not a valuable water producer (MU , 2006).

2.5.2.6 Early Ordovician Age Ibexian Series Dolomites (Ojc)

Ordovician age deposits found in the Columbia area include the following, from youngest to oldest (MU, 2006):

• St. Peter Sandstone - This formation, which is a very important aquifer in eastern and northern Missouri, has no importance in the Columbia area. It is present only as localized masses in the depressions of older rocks.

• Jefferson City Formation - This predominantly dolomite formation averages approximately 122 m (400 ft) in thickness in the Columbia area, and wells drilled into it produce moderate quantities of relatively hard water. The formation probably has more rural domestic wells terminating in it than any other formation is this area.

• Roubidoux Formation - This formation consists of alternating sandstone and dolomite beds and averages approximately 30.5 m (100 ft) in thickness. The formation is a very dependable water producer.

• Gasconade Formation - This unit consists of mostly light-gray dolomite with sandstone (Gunter) at the base. The thickness is approximately 85.3 m (280 ft). This dolomite unit is very cavernous and contains many interconnected solution passages. The sandstone is approximately 4.6 m (15 ft) thick, is very permeable, has a wide aerial extent, and is a good source of water.

2.5.3 On-site Soil Types The U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) Soil Survey Geographic database for Boone County (NRCS, 2012) lists the soil type beneath the proposed RPF site as the Mexico Silt Loam.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics In 2011, Terracon completed a preliminary geotechnical investigation for the Discovery Ridge Certified Site Program, which included Lot 2 and Lots 5 through 18 of Discovery Ridge (Terracon, 2011). The proposed RPF site (Lot 15) is within the investigation area. The purpose of the investigation was to provide preliminary geotechnical recommendations concerning earthwork and the design and construction of foundations, floor slabs, and pavements for Discovery Ridge properties.

As part of the study, nine soil borings (B-1 through B-9) were installed to depths ranging from 4--6 m (13- 20 ft) below-ground surface to determine shallow subsurface soil geotechnical properties and shallow groundwater depth. Soil boring B-5 is nearest to the proposed RPF site, along the eastern boundary between Lots 14 and 15.

Discovery Ridge surface soils from 0.6-0.15 m (0.2-0.5 ft) below-ground surface were found to be brown, friable topsoil with significant amounts of organic matter. Subsurface soils from approximately 0.9- 3.6 m (3- 12 ft) below-ground surface were lean clay, Jean-to-fat clay, and fat clay with moderate-to-high plasticity. Material beneath 3.6 m (12 ft) is listed only as limestone. Plasticity and liquid limit tests were completed for soils encountered from only four soil borings.

At the time of drilling, some of the soils displayed moisture levels greater their measured plastic limits.

"Soils with moisture levels above their measured plastic limits may be prone to rutting and can develop unstable subgrade conditions during general construction operations" (Terracon, 2011 ). Moderate to high plasticity clays were observed at the site. Such soils are commonly referred to as "expansive" or "swelling" soils because they expand or swell as their moisture content increases. These soils in turn, contract or shrink as the moisture content decreases. Footings, floor slabs, and pavements supported on expansive soils often shift upward or downward causing possible distortion, cracking, or structural damage.

A site-specific geotechnical investigation of the RPF site will be conducted to identify the site-specific soil characteristics. If highly plastic clays are identified at the site, the design will include excavation of the clays and then backfill with structural fill. The structural details will be developed in the final RPF design and included in the Operating License Application .

2.5.4 Seismicity The most significant seismological feature in Missouri is the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ), located in the southeastern corner of the state and extending into parts of the contiguous states of Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Illinois. The NMSZ is the most seismically active region in the U.S. east of the Rocky Mountains and is located approximately 483 km (300 mi) southeast of the proposed RPF site.

During the winter of 1811- 1812, the NMSZ was the location of some of the highest intensity seismic events ever noted in U.S. history. Hundreds of aftershocks, some severely damaging, continued for years.

Records show that since 1900, moderately damaging earthquakes have struck the NMSZ every few decades. Prehistoric earthquakes similar in size to those of 1811-1812 occurred in the middle 1400s and around 900 A.D. Strongly damaging earthquakes struck the southwestern end of the NMSZ near Marked Tree, Arkansas, in 1843 (magnitude 6.0), and the northeastern end near Charleston, Missouri, in 1895 (magnitude 6.6) (USGS, 201 la).

The NMSZ is made up ofreactivated faults that formed when what is now North America began to split or rift apart approximately 500 million years ago. The resulting rift system died out before an ocean basin was formed, but a deep zone of weakness was created, referred to as the Reelfoot rift (USGS, 201 lb).

This fault system extends 241 km (150 mi) southward from Cairo, Illinois, through New Madrid and Caruthersville, Missouri, down through Blytheville, Arkansas, to Marked Tree, Arkansas. The Reelfoot rift dips into Kentucky near Fulton and into Tennessee near Reelfoot Lake, extending southeast into Dyersburg, Tennessee. The rift then crosses five state lines and crosses the Mississippi River in at least three places. The fault system is buried beneath as much as 8 km (5 mi) of sediment for much of the fault length and typically cannot be seen at the surface (USGS, 2011 b).

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Four of the largest faults are recognized as alignments of abundant small earthquakes, and movements along two of these faults dammed rivers and created lakes during the earthquakes of 1811 - 1812. A few more deeply buried faults were detected during oil and gas exploration, and a few small faults are known from geologic mapping (USGS, 2011 b ).

The remainder of the state, including the proposed RPF site located in central Missouri, is typical of the stable midcontinent U.S.

Earthquakes occur on faults within bedrock, usually several miles deep. According to the U.S.

Geological Survey (USGS), earthquakes in the central and eastern U.S. typically are felt over a much broader region than in the western U.S. East of the Rocky Mountains, an earthquake can be felt over an area ten times larger than a similar magnitude earthquake on the west coast.

According to information from Missouri ' s State Emergency Management Agency Earthquake Program, some of the earthquakes measure at least 7.6 in magnitude and five of them measured 8.0 or greater. The 1811 - 1812 series changed the course of the Missouri River, and some shocks were felt as far away as Washington D.C. and Boston (MMRPC, 2010). The NMSZ has experienced numerous earthquakes since the 1811 - 1812 series, and at least 35 aftershocks of intensity V or greater that have been recorded in the Missouri since 1811. Numerous earthquakes originating outside of the state's boundaries have also affected Missouri. Table 2-41 summarizes the historical earthquakes that have affected the state of Missouri.

Table 2-41. Recorded Missouri Earthquake History (4 pages)

Date Location Magnitude Recorded damage 12116/1811 New Madrid 7. 7 Generated great waves on the Mississippi River causing (1811 - 1812 Region, Missouri major flooding, high river back cave-ins. Topographic series) changes affected an area of78,000 to 130,000 km 2 (30, 116 to 50, 193 mi2). Later geologic evidence indicated that the epicenter was likely in northeast Arkansas. The main shocks were felt over an area covering at least 5, 180,000 km2 (2,000,000 mi 2). Chimneys were knocked down in Cincinnati, Ohio, and bricks were reported to have fallen from chimneys in Georgia and South Carolina. The first shock was felt distinctively in Washington, D.C., 1,127 km (700 mi) away.

12/23/1812 New Madrid, 7.5 Second major shock more violent than the first.

(1811-1812 Missouri series) 2/7/1812 New Madrid, 7. 7 Three main shocks reaching MMI of XII, the maximum on (1811 - 1812 Missouri scale. Aftershocks continued to be felt for several years after series) the initial tremor. Historical accounts and later evidence indicate that the epicenter was close to the town of New Madrid, Missouri. This quake produced the largest liquefactions fields in the world.

114/1843 New Madrid, Not listed Cracked chimneys and walls in Memphis, Tennessee, and Missouri reportedly collapsed one building. The earth sank in some places near the town of New Madrid, Missouri, and an unverified report indicated that two hunters were drowned during the formation of a lake. The total felt area included at least 1,036,000 km 2 ( 400,000 mi 2) .

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-41. Recorded Missouri Earthquake History (4 pages)

Date Location Magnitude Recorded damage 4/2411867 Eastern Kansas Not listed Reports indicated that an earthquake occurred in eastern Kansas and was felt as far eastward as Chicago, Illinois. It may have been noticeable in Columbia.

8/31/1886 Charleston, South Not listed An MMI of II earthquake recorded in St. Louis, Missouri, Carolina and was felt as far westward as Columbia. There were no reports of structural damage.

10/31 /1895 Charleston, 6.6 Largest earthquake to occur in the central Mississippi River Missouri valley since the 1811-1812 series. Structural damage and liquefaction phenomena were reported along a line from Bertrand, Missouri, in the west to Cairo, Illinois, to the east.

Sand blows were observed in an area southwest of Charleston, Puxico, and Taylor, Missouri; Alton, and Cario, Illinois; Princeton, Indiana; and Paducah, Kentucky. The earthquake caused extensive damage (including downed chimneys, cracked walls, shattered windows, and broken plaster) to schools, churches, and private residences. Every building in the commercial area of Charleston was damaged. Cairo, Illinois, and Memphis, Tennessee, suffered significant damage. Near Charleston, 1.6 ha (4 acres) of ground sank and a lake formed. The shock was felt over all or portions of 24 states and in Canada. Ground shaking was recorded along the Ohio River Valley.

1903 New Madrid, 5.1 No information given.

Missouri 4/9/1917 St. Genevieve/ St. Not listed A sharp disturbance at St. Genevieve and St. Mary's, Mary's Area, Missouri. According to the Daily Missourian, No. 187, dated Missouri April 9, 1917, the earthquake was not felt in Columbia.

However, on the following day several people reported feeling the shock and attributed it to an explosion. No damage was reported in Columbia. Reportedly felt over a 518,000 km 2 (200,000 mi 2) area from Kansas to Ohio and Wisconsin to Mississippi.

5/1/1920 Missouri or Not listed This earthquake reportedly shook buildings across St. Louis.

Illinois Two shocks were felt in Mt. Vernon, Illinois, and three were felt in Centralia, Illinois. The epicenter of this earthquake is unknown and is thought to have originated east of Columbia in Illinois. In the Evening Missourian, No. 207, dated May 1, 1920, the U.S. Weather Bureau reported that the shock was not felt in Columbia. However, in a later investigation a few people reported feeling a slight tremor.

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• N091TMWHT lllDICAl ISOTOl'U Table 2-41. Recorded Missouri Earthquake History (4 pages)

Date Location Magnitude Recorded damage 8/ 19/ 1934 Rodney, Missouri Listed as At nearby Charleston, windows were broken and chimneys strong collapsed or were damaged. Similar effects were observed in Cairo, Mounds, and Mounds City, Illinois, and at Wickliffe, Kentucky. The area of destructive intensity included more than 596 km 2 (230 mi 2) 11/2311939 Western Illinois Not listed An earthquake occurred near Red Bud, Illinois, and a reported MMI of II was recorded in Columbia, Missouri.

The approximately distance from the epicenter to Columbia was 213 km (132 mi).

3/3/1963 Near Not listed MMI of III was recorded in Columbia. The approximately Menorkanut, distance from the epicenter to Columbia was 3 I 7 km Missouri (197 mi) .

10/2111965 Eastern Missouri Not listed MMI ofV in Columbia. The approximate distance from the epicenter to Columbia was 163 km) (101 mi).

1119/ 1968 Wabash Valley 5.4 Strongest magnitude in central U.S. since the 1895 Seismic Zone, earthquake. Moderate damage to chimneys and walls at southern Illinois Hermann, St. Charles, St. Louis, and Sikeston, Missouri .

Shaking was felt. Areas include all or portions of 23 states from Minnesota to Georgia and from Pennsylvania to Kansas, and in multi-story buildings in Boston, Massachusetts and southernmost Ontario, Canada.

1987 Wabash Valley 5.0 Chimneys and bricks fell, underground pipes were damaged, Seismic Zone, and sidewalks and streets cracked in at least four cities in near Olney, Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky. Shaking was felt in Richland County, 17 states, from Pennsylvania to Kansas and from Alabama to SE Illinois Minnesota and southernmost Ontario, Canada.

2002 Wabash Valley 4.6 Moderate earthquake caused chimney damage and cracked Seismic Zone, windows in and near Evansville, Indiana. Shaking was Posey County, reported in seven states, including Missouri .

SW Indiana 8/16/2003 20 km WNW of 3.7 Minor quake, no damage reported Alton, Missouri 5/1 8/2005 Missouri 3.3 Minor quake, no damage reported 7/3112005 Missouri 3.3 Minor quake, no damage reported 6/7/2011 18 km NNW of 3.9 Minor quake, no damage reported Potosi, Missouri 9/22/2011 22 km NNE of 3.6 Minor quake, no damage reported Doniphan, Missouri 2-101

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Table 2-41. Recorded Missouri Earthquake History (4 pages)

Date Location Magnitude Recorded damage 1116/2015 15 km N of 3.5 Minor quake, no damage reported Doniphan, Missouri 10116/2015 14 km NNW of 3.2 Minor quake, no damage reported Doniphan, Missouri 7/5/2016 6 km SW of 3.0 Minor quake, no damage reported Caruthersville, Missouri Sources:

USGS, 20 13c, "Three Centuries of Earthq uakes Poster," pubs.usgs.gov/imap/i-28 12/i-28 l 2.jpg, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia, accessed July 23, 2013.

USGS, 2002, "Earthquakes in the Central United States 1699-2002," pubs. usgs.gov/imap/i-28 12/i-2812.jpg, U.S.

Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia, June 18, 2002.

MU, 2006, Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR) Safety Analysis Report, MU Project# 000763 , University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, August 18, 2006.

USGS, 20 16, "Search Earthquake Catalog," http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/search/, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia, accessed October 7, 2016.

MMI = Modified Mercalli Intensity.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.5.5 Maximum Earthquake Potential In 2002, the USGS released the following projected hazards for Boone County, if an earthquake occurred along the NMSZ in the following 50 years (MMRPC, 2012):

• 25 to 40 percent chance of a magnitude 6.0 and greater earthquake

• 7 to 10 percent chance of a magnitude 7.5 to 8.0 earthquake .

According to the USGS, Boone County is one of the 47 counties in Missouri that would be severely impacted by a 7 .6 magnitude earthquake with an epicenter on or near the NMSZ.

According to the Boone County Hazard Mitigation Plan for 2010 (MMRPC, 20 10), the Missouri State Emergency Management Agency has made projections of the highest earthquake intensities that would be experienced throughout the state of Missouri if various magnitude earthquakes occur along the NMSZ (Figure 2-39, on the next page), as measured by the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMJ) scale. The pertinent information for Boone County is summarized in Table 2-42 .

Table 2-42. Projected Earthquake Hazards for Boone County Probability of Intensity in occurrence Boone County (2002-2052) (MMI) Expected damage 6.7 25-40% VI, strong Felt by all; many frightened and run outdoors, walk unsteadily. Windows, dishes, glassware broken ; books fall off shelves; some heavy furniture moved or over-turned; a few instances of fallen plaster. Damage slight.

7.6 7- 10% VII, very strong Difficult to stand; significant damage to poorly or badly designed buildings, adobe houses, old walls, spires, and other; damage would be slight to moderate in well-built buildings; numerous broken windows; weak chimneys break at roof lines; cornices from towers and high buildings fall; loose bricks fall from buildings; heavy furniture is overturned and damaged; and some sand and gravel streambanks cave in.

Source: MMRPC, 20 10, Boone County Hazard Mitigation Plan , www. mmrpc.org/the-region/boone-county, Mid-Misso uri Regional Plann ing Commission, State of Missouri Emergency Management Agency, Ashland, Missouri, Jul y 15, 2010.

MMI = Modified Mercalli Intensity. NMSZ = New Madrid Seismi c Zone.

The USGS National Seismic Hazard Maps di splay earthquake ground motions for various probability levels across the U.S. and are applied in seismic provisions of building codes, insurance rate structures, risk assessments, and other public policy. Updates to these maps incorporate new findings on earthquake ground shaking, faults , seismicity, and geodesy. The resulting maps are derived from seismic hazard curves calculated on a grid of sites across the U.S. that describe the frequency of exceeding a set of ground motions. In accordance with the 2008 USGS Scientific Investigation Map (No. 3 I 95)

(USGS , 2008), the proposed RPF site is within the third lowest earthquake hazard area with peak acceleration potentials of 2- 3 (Petersen et al., 2011 ). This category indicates an estimated horizontal ground-shaking level between 8-in-100 to 16-in-100 chance of being exceeded in a 50-year period.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics R

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- Highway I - trong ounty Boundaric 11 - Very trong Cit Ill - De tructi e 0 20 40 80 120 160 Miles IX - Ruinou 1smocllalard<M.op Boone ourtt)" :':01: #1."f()ltt' f '"'"" lla:rwJ \11t1KiJllOlf /lJ.ut !0/0 X - Di a trou Figure 2-39. Hazard Mitigation Map 2-104

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• NOllTIIWUl llfDKAL lSOTIN'U NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics According to MMRPC (20I 0), the entire county is at risk for effects of an earthquake along the NMSZ.

Areas near the Missouri River could be particularly vulnerable due to the soil or alluvium along river channels being susceptible to liquefaction from amplification waves.

2.5.6 Vibratory Ground Motion NUREG-I 537, Part I , Section 3.4 requires that seismic design for non-power reactors should, at a minimum, be consistent with local building codes and other applicable standards. For MU facilities, the 20I2 IBC has been levied as the required building code. Therefore, seismic design parameters for the proposed project are discussed in terms of the 20I2 IBC and associated standards .

Seismic provisions in 20 I 2 IBC, Chapter 16,Section I 3, "Earthquake Loads," and ASCE 7- I 0, Chapter I I, are based on 5 percent damped spectral accelerations for a maximum-considered earthquake with a return period of 2,475 years (equivalent to a ground motion with a 2 percent probability of exceedance in 50 years). Spectral acceleration values for the maximum considered earthquake are for soil Site Class B (rock). The short- (Ss) and long- (S1) period spectral accelerations for rock sites are provided by Boone County and are based on USGS (2009) data.

In the 20 I 2 IBC, Site Class B soil conditions require modification for other soil site classes by the application of the site coefficients Fa (site coefficient for 0.2-sec period) and Fv (site coefficient for I-sec period). Soil-modified Ss becomes SMs (maximum-considered earthquake spectral response for 0.2 sec modified for soil Site Class) and soil-modified S1 become SM1 (maximum-considered earthquake spectral response for 1-sec period modified for soil Site Class) where SMs = Ss x Fa and SM1 = S1 x Fv (Equations 16-36 and I6-37 in IBC, 20I2). Boone County, Missouri indicates Ss and SI values of 0.2 I 3 g-force (g) and 0.093 g, respectively (Fa and Fv = I) for the site.

The Boone County site is classified as soil Site Class C, which is defined as soils predominately of very dense glacial tills, sands, and gravels, and soil sites with very shallow rock often qualify.

NWMI has committed to using the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, for the final seismic design. The estimated maximum ground acceleration at the RPF site will meet Regulatory Guide 1.60 free-field response spectrum anchored to a peak ground acceleration of 0.20 g. The Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectrum eliminates the need for soil classifications used as part of the IBC methodology.

In addition, Chapter 3.0, Sections 3.4 and 3.5 provide design criteria and the analysis methodology for seismic events, including a safe shutdown earthquake. The seismic design of the RPF and associated items relied on for safety (IROFS) will ensure the functionality and/or integrity of structures, systems, and components required to prevent radiological release below the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. Additional information on the seismic requirements and evaluations of the RPF and associated IROFS will be provided in the Operating License Application.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.5. 7 Surface Faulting There is one major fault zone located within a five-mile radius of the proposed RPF site (Figure 2-40).

The Fox Hallow Fault is located approximately 5.6 km (3 .5 mi) southeast of the proposed RPF site. The Fox Hollow Fault is a small fault, striking northeast, and fades into a monocline at its two ends. The fault is reportedly a normal fault with a throw of approximately 37 m (120 ft) down to the southwest, and shows Mississippian-aged Chouteau limestone beds faulted against Ordovician-aged Jefferson Dolomite (Union Electric Company, 2008).

During the Union Electric Company study, the Fox Hollow fault was investigated at six waypoints where visual observations of the fault were made. These, plus other road cuts in the local area, were investigated for evidence of offsets and shears. No new roads have been cut or significant new development has occurred recently in the area.

At Waypoint 1, which is in Fox Hollow where the valley runs normal to the Fox Hollow Fault, the valley is heavily vegetated and reworked for agriculture. An outcrop of Jefferson Dolomite, about 91 m (300 ft) long, was observed on the north side of the valley. The Jefferson is dipping about 5 degrees to the west on the west flank or down-dipping of a monocline.

At the other waypoints along the fault alignment, the vegetation was heavy and the ground surface had been reworked for agriculture. No evidence of the fault was observed in any road cuts in the area, and no surface manifestation of the fault was observed at any of the waypoints.

The field investigation was expanded to the east of the fault along State Highway 63, which runs sub-parallel to the main feature and reportedly on the up-thrown side. Depending on the location, State Highway 63 runs about 4.8 to 5.6 km (3 to 3.5 mi) to the east of the feature. All road cuts along State Highway 63 , and the east-west roads running from the fault to State Highway 63, were examined for offsets, abrupt changes in dip, and evidence of shearing. In each case, questionable features were Jinked to non-tectonic causes, primarily erosion or slumping associated with the road itself. Based on the Union Electric Company investigation, the fault was inactive at the time of their study.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 1 r**-..*-**1:

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics 2.5.8 Liquefaction Potential Liquefaction is a process by which water-saturated sediment temporarily loses strength and acts as a fluid when exposed to strong seismic shaking. The shaking causes the grains to lose grain-to-grain contact, so the sediment tends to flow. Liquefaction most likely occurs in loose sandy soil with a shallow water table (which is common for areas around floodplains or bays). Liquefaction often leads to overpressured fluids that can erupt to the surface, forming features known as sand blows.

The 1811- 1812 earthquakes caused ground subsidence by soil liquefaction across the Mississippi River flood plain and along tributaries to the Mississippi River over at least 15,000 km 2

• Liquefaction along the Mississippi River Valley during the 1811-1812 earthquakes created one of the world's largest sand blown fields. According to the USGS, recent sand blows dot the landscape surrounding New Madrid, Missouri (USGS, 201 lb).

The Association of Central United States Earthquake Consortium State Geologists (CUSEC) established regional maps identifying areas of higher and lower potential for amplification of earthquake ground motion by soils or liquefaction of the soils. The areas were defined on the basis of the geology of the upper 15 m (50 ft) . Their map identifies the RPF area as an area of having lower potential for amplifying earthquake ground motions or liquefaction (CUSEC, 1999).

The Terracon (2011) preliminary geotechnical investigation for the Discovery Ridge Certified Site Program included Lot 2 and Lots 5 through 18 of the Discovery Ridge Research Park. The proposed RPF site (Lot 15) is located within Terracon' s project area. As part of their study, Terracon installed nine soil borings (B-1 through B-9) to depths ranging from 4 to 6 m (13 to 20 ft) below-ground surface. Soil boring B-5 was drilled nearest to the proposed RPF site and was installed along the eastern boundary between Lots 14 and 15.

Soils - Terracon described the subsurface soils in soil boring B-5 as listed below:

• 6-9.1 cm (0.2-0.3 ft) below-ground surface; brown, friable topsoil with significant amounts of organic matter

• 9.1-91 cm (0.3-3.0 ft) below-ground surface; lean clay (CL), brown, stiff, water content 24 percent, dry unit weight 98 lb/ft 3 , and unconfined strength 4,000 kilopounds per square foot (kip/ft 2)

• 0.9-2.4 m (3.0-8 .0 ft) below-ground surface; fat clay (CH), gray with red, stiff, water content 31 percent, dry unit weight 91 lb/ft 3, and unconfined strength 4,000 kip/ft2

• 2.4-3.7 m (8.0-12.0 ft) below-ground surface; fat clay (CH), reddish brown and light gray, trace sand and gravel, possible cobbles, stiff (glacial drift), water content 16 percent, dry unit weight l 16 lb/ft 3, and unconfined strength 7,000 kip/ft 2

• 3.7-5 .2 m (12.0-17 ft) below-ground surface; sandy lean to fat clay (CL-CH), reddish brown with light gray, trace gravel, possible cobbles, stiff (glacial drift), water content 21 percent, and unconfined strength 4,000 kip/ft2.

• 5.2-6.l m (17-20 ft) below-ground surface; fat clay (CH), reddish brown and light gray, trace sand and gravel, possible cobbles, very stiff (glacial drift), standard penetration test blow count =

19, water content 18 percent, and unconfined strength 7,500 kip/ft2.

Laboratory testing indicated that the lean clay tested from soil boring B-5, 0.3-0.91 m (1-3 ft) below-ground surface, had a liquid limit of 31 percent, a plastic limit of 21 percent, and a plasticity index of 10 percent.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 2.0 - Site Characteristics Groundwater level - Shallow groundwater encountered at the time of drilling in soil boring B-5 was at 5 m (16.5 ft) below-ground surface and the static water level stabilized at 3.7 m (12.0 ft) below-ground surface. Shallow groundwater was not encountered in soil boring B-6 (located on Lot 10) during the drilling operation, but later stabilized at 5.6 m (18.5 ft) below-ground surface.

Liquefaction potential - Based on the preliminary geotechnical study conducted by Terracon (2011 ),

liquefaction of soils at the proposed RPF site cannot be determined. Contradictory information is listed below:

• In accordance with liquefaction potential screening techniques, cohesive soils with fines content greater than 30 percent and fines that are either classified as clays based on the Unified Soil Classification System or have a plasticity index greater than 30 percent with natural water contents lower than 90 percent, can be considered nonliquefiable. Soils logged in soil boring B-5 are listed as clays under the Unified Soil Classification System; however, the plasticity index is only 10 percent, with water contents ranging from 16 to 31 percent.

• Depth below-ground surface - A soil layer within 50 ft of the ground surface is more likely to liquefy than deeper layers.

• Soil penetration resistance - Soil layers with a normalized standard penetration test blow count less than 22 have been known to liquefy. The standard penetration test blow count listed for soil boring B-5 is 19. In accordance with the statement above, this would depict soils susceptible to liquefaction.

Additional geotechnical analysis will be conducted at the RPF site to determine the liquefaction potential of the soils onsite and included in the Operating License Application.

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. NORTHWEST MEDICAL ISOTOPES Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components Construction Permit Application for Radioisotope Production Facility NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 August2017 Prepared by:

Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC 815 NW gth Ave , Suite 256 Corvallis , Oregon 97330

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components Construction Permit Application for Radioisotope Production Facility NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Date Published:

August 5, 2017 Document Number. NWMl-2013-021 I Revision Number. 2

Title:

Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Construction Permit Application for Radioisotope Production Facility Approved by: Carolyn Haass Signature:

C wJ?c...;/~

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components REVISION HISTORY Rev Date Reason for Revision Revised By 0 6/29/2015 Initial Application Not required 1 6/26/2017 Incorporate changes based on responses to C. Haass NRC Requests for Additional Information 2 8/5/2017 Modifications based on ACRS input C. Haass

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components CONTENTS 3.0 DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS .... .. .... ....... ... .... ..... ............... 3-1 3.1 Design Criteria .............. .......... ........ ........ ............ ... ... .......... .... ....... .... .... .... ...... ............ .. 3-4 3.1.1 Radioisotope Production Facility Structures, Systems, and Components ..... ...... 3-4 3.1.2 Code of Federal Regulations .......... .............. ....... .. ........... .... ..... .... ... ............ .... 3-8 3.1.3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ... ...... ........ ...... ....... ...... .. .... ...... .............. 3-8 3.1.4 Other Federal Regulations, Guidelines, and Standards ...... .... ...... .... .... ............ 3-10 3.1.5 Local Government Documents ....................................................................... 3-10 3.1.6 Discovery Ridge/University ofMissouri ....... ..... ..... ........... ..... ......... ............. .. 3-11 3.1. 7 Codes and Standards ............ ......... ........... .... ................................ ..... ............. 3-12 3.2 Meteorological Damage .. ..... .............. ...... ...... ........ .... .......... .. ...... .. ..... ... ...... .... ............ 3-24 3.2.1 Combinations of Loads .. ....... ... .................... .... ... ............... ..... .. ..................... 3-25 3.2. 1.1 Nuclear Safety-Related Structures, Systems, and Components ..... ... 3-26 3.2.1.2 Commercial and Nuclear Non-Safety-Related Structures, Systems, and Components .............................................................. 3-26 3.2.2 Combinations for Serviceability Based Acceptance Criteria ............................ 3-27 3.2.3 Normal Loads ... .................................... .... .......... ...... ...... .. ..... ......... ............... 3-27 3.2.4 Wind Loading .............. ........... ....... .... .......... ..... ............. ..... ..... ... ......... .......... 3-30 3.2.4. 1 Wind Load ........................ .... .................... .. ........ ... .... ...... ... ... ... ..... 3-30 3.2.4.2 Tornado Loading ...... ... ........ ... ........... ... .. ..... ....... .. ...... .. ....... ... ....... 3-30 3.2.4.3 Effect of Failure of Structures, Systems, or Components Not Designed forTornadoLoads .... ........ ..... ...... ... ...... .. ........... .... ......... .. 3-32 3.2.5 Rain, Snow, and Ice Loading ................... ... ................. .. ........ .. ........... ............ 3-33 3 .2.5.1 Rain Loads .. ........ .. ........... ... .. .. ....... ..... ... ..... ......... ...... ..... ............... 3-33 3.2. 5.2 Snow Load ............ .. ........ ...... ....... ...... ..... ..... .. ...... .......... ..... ......... .. 3-33 3.2.5.3 Atmospheric Ice Load ......... .......... ... ............. .. ........ .... ... ..... ........... 3-34 3.2.6 Operating Thermal/Self-Straining Loads ............. ... ..... ....... .. .. ..... ...... ........... .. 3-35 3.2.7 Operating Pipe Reaction Loads .... .. .. ......... ...... ....... .. ...................................... 3-35 3.2.8 External Hazards ............................................................................ ... ...... ....... 3-35 3.3 Water Damage .... ............................. ... .......... ......... ..... ........ ..... .. ....... ........................... 3-36 3.3.1 Flood Protection ............................................................................. .... .... ........ 3-36 3.3.1.1 Flood Protection Measures for Structures, Systems, and Components ......................... ........ ...... ... .......... .... ......... .............. .... 3-36 3.3.1 .2 Flood Protection from External Sources ... ..... .. ...... ..... ....... ......... ..... 3-37 3.3.1.3 Compartment Flooding from Fire Protection Discharge .......... ......... 3-38 3.3.1.4 Compartment Flooding from Postulated Component Failures .......... 3-38 3.3.1.5 Permanent Dewatering System ............. .. ........ .... ..... ... .. ..... ............. 3-38 3.3 .1.6 Structural Design for Flooding ........ ........ ... .... ... .... ............ ... ........ .. 3-38 3.4 Seismic Damage ..................... ....................... ............................ ....... ........................... 3-39 3.4.l Seismic Input ....... .. .......................... ..... .............................................. ........... 3-39 3.4.1.1 Design Response Spectra .. ..... ......... .......... .... ....... .......................... 3-39 3.4.1.2 Method of Analysis .. ............. .............. ....... ... .. .. .... .......... ..... ... .... ... 3-40 3.4.2 Seismic Qualification of Subsystems and Equipment.. .... ... ............................. 3-41 3.4.2.1 Qualification by Analysis ..... ................................... ... ..... ... ..... ....... 3-41 3.4.2.2 Qualification by Testing ...... ................. .... .... ..... ...... ............. .......... 3-42 3.4.3 Seismic Instrumentation ........................ ........... ....... ..... ... ..... ...... .................... 3-42 3.4.3.1 Location and Description ...... ............. ..... .... .... .. ...... ....................... 3-43 3.4.3.2 Operability and Characteristics ............. .............. .... ..... .... ............... 3-43 3-i

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~* *~ ' NORTHWEST MCDfCAl ISOTOPES Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components NWMl-2013-021 , Rev . 2 3.5 Systems and Components ........ ......................... .. .......................................................... 3-44 3.5.1 General Design Basis Information ... .. .... ... ........ .. ....... ... ..... .. .......... .. ............ .... 3-44 3.5. 1.1 Classification of Systems and Components Important to Safety ...... . 3-44 3.5 .1.2 Classification Definitions .................. ...... ...... .. ... ... .......... ... ............ 3-44 3.5.1.3 Nuclear Safety Classifications for Structures, Systems, and Components ......................... ..... ..... ......... .... ...... .. ......... ......... ......... 3-45 3.5.2 Radioisotope Production Facility ....................... ........ ....... ..... .. ..... .......... ... ... .. 3-48 3.5 .2.1 System Classification ......................... ..... .... .... ...... .... ..... .... .. .. ........ 3-53 3.5 .2.2 Classification of Systems and Components Important to Safety ...... 3-53 3.5 .2.3 Design Basis Functions, Values, and Criteria .. ............ ................... 3-55 3.5.2.4 System Functions/Safety Functions .... .. ........ ..... ... ..... ....... ...... ... ..... 3-55 3.5.2.5 Systems and Components ..... ......... .. ..... ........ ... .... .. ....... .................. 3-55 3.5.2.6 Qualification Methods ............................. ....... .. .. ... ............ .. ........... 3-56 3.5.2.7 Radioisotope Production Facility Specific System Design Basis Functions and Values .. .. .. .. ...................... ........ ... ....... ........... ..... ..... 3-56 3.6 References ... ... .. ........ ... ...... ......... ..................... ..... ....... .. .......... .... .... ....... .. ........ .. ........ . 3-67 3-ii

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components TABLES Table 3-1. List of System and Associated Systems and Construction Permit Application Crosswalk (2 pages) ......... .... ......................... .... ........ .................... .... .... ... ................... 3-4 Table 3-2. Summary ofltems Relied on for Safety Identified by Accident Analyses (3 pages) .. ............... ........... .. .................... ................... ....... ..... ......... ....... ...... .. .. ..... ..... 3-5 Table 3-3. Relevant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Guidance (3 pages) ... ... .. ...... ......... ..... 3-8 Table 3-4. Other Federal Regulations, Guidelines, and Standards ....... ....... .. ...... ....... .. ...... .. ..... ... 3-10 Table 3-5. Local Government Documents (2 pages) ....... .................................... .................. ...... 3-11 Table 3-6. Discovery Ridge/University of Missouri Requirements .... ..... .. ..... ..... ................... .. .... 3-11 Table 3-7. Design Codes and Standards (12 pages) ................. .. .................................. ................ 3-12 Table 3-8. Load Symbol Definitions (2 pages) ........................... ... .................. .. ...... .. ...... ...... ...... 3-24 Table 3-9 . Load Combinations for Strength Based Acceptance Criteria, Nuclear Safety-Related .. ....... ................... .. ............... .......... ........................ ......... .............................. 3-26 Table 3-10. Load Combinations for Strength Base Acceptance Criteria, Commercial ................... 3-27 Table 3-11. Load Combinations for Serviceability Based Acceptance Criteria .............................. 3-27 Table 3-12 . Lateral Earth Pressure Loads ............................ ................. ...... ........ .. ... .. .. ...... ... ... ..... 3-28 Table 3-13. Floor Live Loads .......... .. ..... ... ..................... .................... ... ..... ........ .. ...... ............ ...... 3-29 Table 3-14. Crane Load Criteria ......... .. ..... .... ............... ........... ...... ... ...................... ... ..... ... ........... 3-29 Table 3-15. Wind Loading Criteria ............ ... ............... .. ........... ... ... ..... .... .. .... .... ...... ... ... ............... 3-30 Table 3-16. Design-Basis Tornado Field Characteristics ...... ...... ... ........ ...... ... ...... ...... ... ..... ........... 3-31 Table 3-17. Design-Basis Tornado Missile Spectrum ........ ........ ........ .... ... ... .... .. ...................... ..... 3-32 Table 3-18. Rain Load Criteria ......... ................................. ...... ........ ............. ..... .... ... ..... ......... ...... 3-33 Table 3-19. Snow Load Criteria ....................................... ... ........ ..... ....... ..................................... 3-34 Table 3-20. Extreme Winter Precipitation Load Criteria .. ...... .. ......................... .. ................ ... ... ... . 3-34 Table 3-21. Atmospheric Ice Load Criteria ................. ............. .... ......... ........................................ 3-34 Table 3-22. Design Criteria Requirements (4 pages) ................ .... ....... ... .... ........................ ... ........ 3-48 Table 3-23. System Classifications ...... ... ...... ... ....................... .............. ........ ... .... .... ... .................. 3-53 Table 3-24. System Safety and Seismic Classification and Associated Quality Level Group (2 pages) ........... ... ................... ........................ ......... ... ..... ......................................... 3-53 Table 3-25. Likelihood Index Limit Guidelines ..................... ..... .... ............. ... .............................. 3-54 3-iii

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• • • NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components

' ~* * ~ ' NOlmfWUT MEOK:AL ISOTOP(S TERMS Acronyms and Abbreviations 99 Mo molybdenum-99 AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials ACGIH American Conference on Governmental Industrial Hygienists ACI American Concrete Institute AHRI Air Conditioning, Heating and Refrigeration Institute AISC American Institute of Steel Construction ALARA as low as reasonably achievable AMCA Air Movement and Control Association ANS American Nuclear Society ANSI American National Standards Institute ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers ASHRAE American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air-Conditioning Engineers ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASNT American Society for Nondestructive Testing ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials AWS American Welding Society BMS building management system CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CFR Code of Federal Regulations CRR Collected Rules and Regulations CSR Missouri Code of State Regulations Discovery Ridge Discovery Ridge Research Park DBE design basis event DBEQ design basis earthquake DOE U.S . Department of Energy EIA Electronic Industries Alliance ESF engineered safety feature FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FPC facility process control FSAR final safety analysis report H2 hydrogen gas HR hydrometeorological report HV AC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning I&C instrumentation and control IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IBC International Building Code ICC International Code Council ICC-ES International Code Council Evaluation Service IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IES Illuminating Engineering Society IFC International Fire Code IROFS items relied on for safety ISA International Society of Automation ISG Interim Staff Guidance IX ion exchange LEU low enriched uranium MDNR Missouri Department of Natural Resources Mo molybdenum 3-iv

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~ * *! NOATHWUT MEDICAL ISOTOPES NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components MO DOT Missouri Department of Transportation MRI mean recurrence interval MU University of Missouri MURR University of Missouri Research Reactor NECA National Electrical Contractors Association NEMA National Electrical Manufacturers Association NEP normal electrical power NESHAP National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants NETA InterNational Electrical Testing Association NFPA National Fire Protection Association N10SH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NS non-seismic NSR non-safety-related NWMI Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC NWS National Weather Service PMF probable maximum flood PMP probable maximum precipitation PMWP probable maximum winter precipitation QA qua lity assurance QAPP qua lity assura nce program plan RCA radiologically controlled area RPF Radioisotope Production Facility SEP standby electrical power SMACNA Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association SNM special nuclear material SR safety related SSC structures, systems and components TIA Telecommunications Industry Association U.S. United States UL Underwriters Laboratory UPS uninterruptible power supply USGS U.S. Geological Survey Units oc degrees Celsius op degrees Fahrenheit

µ micron cm centimeter cm 2 square centimeters ft feet ft2 square feet ft3 cubic feet g acceleration of gravity gal gallon hp horsepower hr hour

m. inch in. 2 square inch kg kilogram 3-v

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...... NWMl-2013-021 , Rev . 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components

!* *~ ' NOmfWUT MEDICAl ISOTOPES kip thousand pounds-force km kilometer kW kilowatt L liter lb pound lbf pound-force m meter m2 square meter m1 mile mi 2 square mile mm minute MT metric ton rad absorbed radiation dose sec second 3-vi

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.0 DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS This chapter identifies and describes the principal architectural and engineering design criteria for the facility structures, systems and components (SSC) for the Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC (NWMI)

Radioisotope Production Facility (RPF). The information presented emphasizes the safety and protective functions and related design features that help provide defense-in-depth against the uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment. The bases for the design criteria for some of the systems discussed in this chapter are developed in other chapters of the Construction Permit Application and are appropriately cross-referenced, when required.

NWMI's RPF design is based on applicable standards, guides, codes, and criteria and provides reasonable assurance that the RPF SSCs, including electromechanical systems, are:

• Built and will function as designed and required by the analyses in Chapter 13 .0, "Accident Analysis"

• Built to have acceptable protection of the public health and safety and environment from radiological risks (e.g., radioactive materials, exposure) resulting from operations

• Protected against potential meteorological damage

• Protected against potential hydrological (water) damage

• Protected against seismic damage

• Provided surveillance activities and technical specifications required to respond to or mitigate consequences of seismic damage

• Based on technical specifications developed to ensure that safety-related functions of electromechanical systems and components will be operable and protect the health and safety of workers, the public, and environment The design of the RPF and SS Cs are based on defense-in-depth practices.

The NRC defines design-in-depth as the following:

An approach to designing and operating nuclear facilities that prevents and mitigates accidents that release radiation or hazardous materials. The key is creating multiple independent and redundant layers of defense to compensate for potential human and mechanical failures so that no single layer, no matter how robust, is exclusively relied upon.

Defense in depth includes the use of access controls, physical barriers, redundant and diverse key safety functions, and emergency response measures.

Defense-in-depth is a design philosophy, applied from the outset and through completion of the design, that is based on providing successive levels of protection such that health and safety are not wholly dependent on any single element of the design, construction, maintenance, or operation of the facility.

The net effect of incorporating defense-in-depth practices is a conservatively designed faci lity and systems that exhibit higher tolerances to failures and external challenges. The risk insights obtained through performance of accident analysis can then be used to supplement the final design by focusing attention on the prevention and mitigation of the higher risk potential accidents.

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~ * ,* ~ NORTMWEST MEOtCAl ISOTOPU This application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) seeks to obtain a license for a production facility under Title 10, Code ofFederal Regulations (CFR), Part 50 (10 CFR 50), "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities." Embedded in the 10 CFR 50-licensed facility will be several activities subject to 10 CFR 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material," to receive, possess, use, and transfer special nuclear material (SNM) and 10 CFR 30, "Rules of General Applicability to Domestic Licensing of Byproduct Material," to process and transport molybdenum-99 (99 Mo) for medical applications.

This 10 CFR 50 license application for the RPF follows the guidance in NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non Power Reactors - Format and Content, that encompasses activities regulated under different NRC requirements (e.g., 10 CFR 70 and 10 CFR 30), in accordance with 10 CFR 50.31 , "Combining Applications," and 10 CFR 50.32, "Elimination of Repetition."

The NRC has determined that a radioisotope separation and processing facility, which also conducts separation of SNM, will be considered a production facility and as such, will be subject to licensing under 10 CFR 50. The operation of the NWMI RPF will primarily be focused on the disassembly of irradiated low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets, separation and purification of fission product 99Mo, and the recycle of LEU that is licensed under 10 CFR 50.

RPF operations will also include the fabrication of LEU targets, which will be licensed under 10 CFR 70.

These targets will be shipped to NWMI's network of research or test reactors for irradiation (considered a connected action) and returned to the RPF for processing. The LEU used for the production of LEU target materials will be obtained from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and from LEU reclaimed from processing the irradiated targets.

NWMI's licensing approach for the RPF defines the following unit processes and areas that fall under the following NRC regulations:

• 10 CFR 50, " Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities" Target receipt and disassembly system Target dissolution system Molybdenum (Mo) recovery and purification system Uranium recovery and recycle system Waste management system Associated laboratory and support areas

• 10 CFR 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material" Target fabrication system Fresh LEU (from DOE) receipt area Associated laboratory and support areas

• 10 CFR 30, "Rules of General Applicability to Domestic Licensing of Byproduct Material" Any byproduct materials produced or extracted in the RPF Design information for the complete range of normal operating conditions for various facility systems is provided throughout the Construction Permit Application, and includes the following.

• RPF-specific design criteria (e.g., codes and standards, NRC guidelines) for SSCs are provided in Sections 3 .1.

• NRC general design criteria and associated applicability to the RPF SSCs are addressed in Section 3.5.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components

• RPF description is presented in Chapter 4.0, "Radioisotope Production Facility Description."

• Postulated initiating events and credible accidents that form the design basis for the SSCs are discussed in Chapter 13.0.

• Potential hazards and credible accidents that could be encountered in the RPF during operations involving SNM, irradiated and unirrradiated, Mo recovery and purification, uranium recovery and recycle, waste management, and/or the use of hazardous chemicals relative to these radiochemical processes that form the bases for the SSCs located in the RPF, are discussed in Chapter 13.0.

• Design redundancy of SSCs to protect against unsafe conditions with respect to single failures of engineered safety features (ESF) and control systems are described in Chapter 6.0, "Engineered Safety Features," and Chapter 7.0, "Instrumentation and Control System," respectively.

• ESFs are described in Chapter 6.0, and the administrative controls are discussed in Chapter I 4.0, "Technical Specifications."

• Quality standards commensurate with the safety functions and potential risks that were used in the design of the SSCs are described in Table 3-7 (Section 3.1.7).

• Hydrological design bases describing the most severe predicted hydrological events during the life of the facility are provided in Chapter 2.0, "Site Characteristics," Section 2.4.

• Design criteria for facility SSCs to withstand the most severe predicted hydrological events during the lifetime of the facility are provided in Section 3.3.

• Seismic design bases for the facility are provided in Chapter 2.0, Section 2.5. Seismic design criteria for the facility SSCs are provided in Section 3.4.

• Analyses concerning function, reliability, and maintainability of SSCs are described throughout the Construction Permit Application.

• Meteorological design bases describing the most severe weather extremes predicted to occur during the life of the facility are provided in Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3. Design criteria for facility SSCs to withstand the most severe weather extremes predicted to occur during the life of the facility are provided in Section 3.2.

• Potential conditions or other items that will be probable subjects of technical specifications associated with the RPF structures and design features are discussed in Chapter 14.0.

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• NOltTHWEIT MEDICAL ISOTOPES NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.1 DESIGN CRITERIA Section 3.1 describes the design criteria applied to the RPF and SSCs within the facility. The principal design criteria for a production facility establish the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements for SSCs important to safety (i.e., those that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of workers and the public).

The systems associated with the RPF are identified. Those items relied on for safety (IROFS) are identified in Chapters 6.0 and 13 .0 . Requirements are derived from :

• Code of Federal Regulations

• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• Federal regulations, guidelines, and standards

• Local government regulations and requirements

• Discovery Ridge Research Park (Discovery Ridge) covenants

• University of Missouri System (MU) requirements

• Other codes and standards 3.1.1 Radioisotope Production Facility Structures, Systems, and Components Table 3-1 lists the RPF systems and identifies the RPF material accountability area and the Construction Permit Application reference chapter that provides the associated detailed system descriptions.

Table 3-1. List of System and Associated Systems and Construction Permit Application Crosswalk (2 pages)

Construction Permit Application reference Primary structure and associated systems (primary references)

Radioisotope Production Facility (RPF - primary structure) 10 CFR 70" Target fabrication Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.1 and 4.4 10 CFR sob Target receipt and disassembly Chapter 4.0, Section 4.1.3.2, 4.3.2, and 4.3.3 Target dissolution Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.3 and 4.3.4 Molybdenum recovery and purification Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.4 and 4.3.5 Uranium recovery and recycle Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.5 and 4.3 .6 Waste handling Chapter 4.0, Section 4.1.3.6; Chapter 9.0, Section 9. 7.2 Criticality accident alarm Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.3.1; Chapter 7.0, Section 7.3.7 Radiation monitoring Chapter 7.0, Section 7.6; Chapter 11.0, Section 11.1.4 Normal electrical power Chapter 8.0, Section 8.1 Standby electrical power Chapter 8.0, Section 8.2 Process vessel ventilation Chapter 9.0, Section 9.1 Facility ventilation Chapter 9.0, Sectioo 9.1 Fire protection Chapter 9.0, Section 9.3 Plant and instrument air Chapter 9.0, Section 9. 7.1 Emergency purge gas Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2.1. 7.5 Gas supply Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 3-4

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-1. List of System and Associated Systems and Construction Permit Application Crosswalk (2 pages)

Construction Permit Application reference Primary structure and associated systems (primary references)

Process chilled water Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7. 1 Facility chilled water Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 Facility heated water Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 Process stream Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 Demineralized water Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 Chemical supply Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.4 Biological shield Chapter 4.0, Section 4.2 Facility process control Chapter 7.0, Section 7.2.3

• I 0 CFR 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material ," Code ofFederal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

b 10 CFR 50, " Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Faci lities," Code ofFederal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended .

In addition to Table 3-2, NWMI-2015-LIST-003, NWMI Radioisotope Production Facility Master Equipment List, provides a summary of the RPF systems, components, and equipment used in the RPF design.

Table 3-2 provides a summary of the IROFSs identified by the accident analyses in Chapter 13.0, and a crosswalk to where the IROFSs are described in the Construction Permit Application. Chapter 13.0 also provides the associated detailed descriptions. Table 3-2 also identifies whether the IROFS are considered ESFs or administrative controls. Additional IROFS may be identified (or the current IROFS modified) during the RPF final design and development of the Operating License Application.

Table 3-2. Summary of Items Relied on for Safety Identified by Accident Analyses (3 pages)

IROFS Construction Permit Application designator Descriptor ESF AC crosswalk (primary references)

RS-01 Hot cell liquid confinement boundary ,/ Chapter 6.0, Sections 6.2.1.1 - 6.2.1.6 Chapter 13.0,Section I 3.2.2.8 RS-02 Reserved" RS-03 Hot cell secondary confinement boundary ,/ Chapter 6.0, Sections 6.2. I . I - 6.2. I .6 Chapter I 3.0, Sections I 3.2.2.8, I 3.2.3.8 RS-04 Hot cell shielding boundary ,/ Chapter 6.0, Sections 6.2.1.1 - 6.2.1.6 Chapter 13.0, Sections 13.2.2.8, 13.2.4.8 RS-05 Reserved" RS-06 Reserved" RS-07 Reserved" RS-08 Sample and analysis of low-dose waste tank ./ Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.1 dose rate prior to transfer outside the hot cell shielded boundary 3-5

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-2. Summary of Items Relied on for Safety Identified by Accident Analyses (3 pages)

IROFS Construction Permit Application designator Descriptor ESF AC crosswalk (primary references)

RS-09 Primary offgas reli ef system ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2. l .7 Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.3.8 RS-10 Active radiation monitoring and isolation of ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2. l .7 low-dose waste transfer Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7. l RS-11 Reserved*

RS-12 Cask containment sampling prior to closure ,/ Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.1 lid removal RS-1 3 Cask local ventilation during closure lid ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2. l .7 removal and docking preparations Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2. 7.l RS-14 Reserved*

RS-1 5 Cask docking port enabling sensor Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2. l. 7 Chapter 13.0, Secti on 13.2.7.1 CS-01 Reserved" CS-02 Mass and batch handling limits for uraniwn Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2 .7.2 metal, uranium ox ides, targets, and laboratory sample outside process systems CS-03 Interaction control spacing provided by ,/ Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.2 administrative control CS-04 Interaction control spacing provided by ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.1.2 passively designed fix tures and workstati on Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2. 7.2 placement CS-05 Container batch volume limit ,/ Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2. 7.2 CS-06 Pencil tank, vessel, or piping safe geometry ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3. l .2 confinement using the diameter of tanks, Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.4.8 vessels, or piping CS-07 Pencil tank and vessel spacing control using ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.1 .2 fixed interaction spacing of individual tanks Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.2.8 or vessels CS-08 Floor an d sump geometry control of slab ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.1.2 depth, sump diameter or depth for fl oor spill Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.2.8 containment berms CS-09 Double-wall piping ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2.1.7 Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.2.8 CS-10 Closed safe geometry heating or cooling loop ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3. 1.2 with monitoring and alarm Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.4.8 CS-11 Simple overflow to normally empty safe ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.1.2 geometry tank with level alarm Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.2 CS-1 2 Condensing pot or seal pot in ventilation vent ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3. l .2 line Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.2 CS-13 Simple overflow to normally empty safe ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.1 .2 geometry floor with level alarm in the hot cell Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.2 containment boundary 3-6

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-2. Summary of Items Relied on for Safety Identified by Accident Analyses (3 pages)

IROFS Construction Permit Application designator Descriptor ESF AC crosswalk (primary references)

CS-14 Active discharge monitoring and isolation ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.1 .2 Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2. 7.2 CS-15 Independent active discharge monitoring and ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.1.2 isolation Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.2 CS-16 Sampling and analysis ofuraniwn mass or ,/ Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.2 concentration prior to discharge or disposal CS-17 Independent sampling and analysis of ,/ Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2. 7.2 uranium concentration prior to discharge or disposal CS-18 Backflow prevention device ,/ Chapter 6.0, Sections 6.2.1.7 and 6.3.1.2 Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.4.8 CS-19 Safe-geometry day tanks ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.1.2 Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.4.8 CS-20 Evaporator or concentrator condensate ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.1 .2 monitoring Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.4.8 CS-21 Visual inspection of accessible surfaces for ,/ Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.2 foreign debris CS-22 Gram estimator survey of accessible surfaces ,/ Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.2 for gamma activity CS-23 Nondestructive assay of items with ,/ Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.2 inaccessible surfaces CS-24 Independent nondestructive assay of items ,/ Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.2 with inaccessible surfaces CS-25 Target housing weighing prior to disposal ,/ Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.2 CS-26 Processing component safe volwne ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.1.2 confinement Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.2 CS-27 Closed heating or cooling loop with ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.1.2 monitoring and alarm Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.4.8 FS-01 Enhanced lift procedure ,/ Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.2.8 and 13.2.7.1 FS-02 Overhead cranes ,/ Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.3 FS-03 Process vessel emergency purge system ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2.1.7 Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.3 FS-04 Irradiated target cask lifting fixture ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2. l. 7 Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.6.5 FS-05 Exhaust stack height ,/ Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2.1. 7 Chapter 13.0, Section 13.2.7.3

• Reserved - lROFS designator currently unassigned.

AC administrative control. lROFS items relied on for safety.

ESF = engineered safety feature.

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' * *! . NORTHWEST MfDICAl ISOTOPES 3.1.2 Code of Federal Regulations NWMI-DRD-2013-030, NWMI Radioisotope Production Facility Design Requirements Document, summarizes the CFR design inputs (in whole or in part) for the RPF, which include the following:

• 10 CFR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation"

• 10 CFR 30, "Rules of General Applicability to Domestic Licensing of Byproduct Material "

• 10 CFR 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities"

• 10 CFR 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material"

• 10 CFR 71, "Energy: Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material"

• 10 CFR 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials"

• 10 CFR 74, "Material Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material"

• 10 CFR 851, "Worker Safety and Health Program"

• 21 CFR 210, "Current Good Manufacturing Practice in Manufacturing, Processing, Packaging, or Holding of Drugs'

• 21 CFR 211, "Current Good Manufacturing Practice for Finished Pharmaceuticals"

• 29 CFR 1910, " Occupational Safety and Health Standards"

• 40 CFR 61, "National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP)"

• 40 CFR 63 , "NESHAP for Source Categories"

• 40 CFR 141 , "National Primary Drinking Water Regulations" 3.1.3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Table 3-3 lists the NRC design inputs for the RPF identified in NWMI-DRD-2013-030. The RPF system design descriptions identify the specific requirements for that system produced by each applicable reference.

Table 3-3. Relevant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Guidance (3 pages)

Title Docket Number: Final Interim Staff Guidance Augmenting NUREG-153 7, "Guidelines for Preparing and NRC-2011-0135 Reviewing Applications for the Licensing ofNon-Power Reactors," Parts 1and 2,for (NRC, 2012) Licensing Radioisotope Production Facilities and Aqueous Homogeneous Reactors NRC Regulatory Guides - Power Reactors (Division 1)

Regulatory Guide 1.29 Seismic Design Classification Regulatory Guide 1.53 Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Safety Systems, 2003 (R201 l)

Regulatory Guide 1.60 Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, 2014 Regulatory Guide 1.61 Damping Values of Seismic Design ofNuclear Power Plants Regulatory Guide I .76 Design Basis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants, 2007 Regulatory Guide 1.92 Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis Regulatory Guide 1.97 Criteria fo r Accident Monitoring Instrumentation for Nuclear Power Plants, 2006 (R2013)

Regulatory Guide 1.100 Seismic Qualification ofElectrical and Active Mechanical Equipment and Functional Qualification ofActive Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants, 2009 Regulatory Guide I. I 02 Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Regulatory Guide 1.122 Development ofFloor Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Floor-Supported Equipment or Components 3-8

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-3. Relevant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Guidance (3 pages)

CF Ra Title Regulatory Guide 1.152 Criteria for Use of Computers in Safety Systems ofNuclear Power Plants, 2011 Regulatory Guide 1.166 Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Post Earthquake Actions, 1997 Regulatory Guide 1.167 Restart ofa Nuclear Power Plant Shut down by a Seismic Event, 1997 Regulatory Guide 1.208 Peiformance Based Approach to Define the Site-Specific Earthquake Ground Motion, 2007 NRC Regulatory Guides - Fuels And Materials Facilities (Division 3)

Regulatory Guide 3.3 Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Fuel Reprocessing Plants and for Plutonium Processing and Fuel Fabrication Plants, 1974 (R2013)

Regulatory Guide 3.6 Content of Technical Specification for Fuel Reprocessing Plants, 1973 (R2013)

Regulatory Guide 3 .10 Liquid Waste Treatment System Design Guide for Plutonium Processing and Fuel Fabrication Plants, 1973 (R2013)

Regulatory Guide 3.18 Confinement Barriers and Systems for Fuel Reprocessing Plants, 1974 (R2013)

Regulatory Guide 3.20 Process Ojfgas Systems for Fuel Reprocessing Plants, 1974 (R2013)

Regulatory Guide 3.71 Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards fo r Fuels and Materials Facilities, 2010 NRC Regulatory Guides - Materials and Plant Protection (Division 5)

Regulatory Guide 5.7 Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas, May 1980 (R2010)

Regulatory Guide 5 .12 General Use ofLocks in the Protection and Control of Facilities and Special Nuclear Materials, 1973 (R2010)

Regulatory Guide 5.27 Special Nuclear Material Doorway Monitors, 1974 Regulatory Guide 5 .44 Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Systems, 1997 (R2010)

Regulatory Guide 5.57 Shipping and Receiving Control of Strategic Special Nuclear Material, 1980 Regulatory Guide 5.65 Vital Area Access Control, Protection ofPhysical Security Equipment, and Key and Lock Controls, 1986 (R2010)

Regulatory Guide 5.71 Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities, 20 10 NUREG-0700, Human-System Inteiface Design Review Guidelines NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, LWR Edition Section 2.3.l "Regional Climatology," Rev. 3, March 2007 Section 2.3.2 "Local Climatology," Rev. 3, March 2007 Section 3.3.1 "Wind Loading," Rev. 3, March 2007 Section 3.3.2 "Torn ado Loading," Rev. 3, March 2007 Section 3.7.1 "Seismic Design Parameters," March 2007 Section 3.7.2 "Seismic System Analysis," Rev. 4, September 20 13 Section 3.7.3 "Seismic Subsystem Analysis," Rev. 4, September 2013 NUREG-1513, Integrated Safety Analysis Guidance Document NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility Part 3, Appendix D "Natural Hazard Phenomena" NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors

- Format and Content, Part 1 3-9

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• HORTifWEST MEDICAl ISOTOP£S Table 3-3. Relevant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Guidance (3 pages)

CF Ra Title NUREGICR-4604, Statistical Methods/or Nuclear Material Management NUREGICR-6410, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility Accident Analysis Handbook Process hazard analysis "Development of Quantitative Risk Analyses" NUREGICR-6463, Review Guidelines on Software Languages for Use in Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems -

Final Report NUREGICR-6698, Guide for Validation of Nuclear Criticality Safety Calculational Methodology

• Complete references are provided in Section 3.6.

3.1.4 Other Federal Regulations, Guidelines, and Standards Table 3-4 lists other Federal design inputs for the RPF (NWMI-DRD-2013-030). The RPF system design descriptions identify the specific requirements for that system produced by each applicable reference.

Table 3-4. Other Federal Regulations, Guidelines, and Standards Referencea Title Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

NIA National Flood Insurance Program, Flood Insurance Rate Map, Boone County, Missouri and Incorporated Areas" National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

Hydrometeorological Probable Maximum Precipitation Estimates, United States East of the 105th Meridian Report No. 51 Hydrometeorological Application of Probable Maximum Precipitation Estimates, United States East of the J05th Report No. 52 Meridian Hydrometeorological Seasonal Variation of JO-Square-Mile Probable Maximum Precipitation Estimates, United Report No. 53 States East of the 105th Meridian U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)

NIA "2008 U.S. Geological Survey Nati onal Seismic Hazard Maps" Open-File Report Documentation for the 2008 Update of the United States National Seismic Hazard Maps 2008-1128 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)

NIOSH 2003-136 Guidance for Filtration and Air-Cleaning Systems to Protect Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Attacks

• Complete references are provided in Section 3.6 CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency. Administration.

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and USGS U.S. Geological Survey.

Health.

3.1.5 Local Government Documents Table 3-5 lists the design inputs for the RPF from the State of Missouri, City of Columbia, and Boone County government sources (NWMl-DRD-2013-030). The RPF system design descriptions identify the specific requirements for that system produced by each applicable reference.

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Referencea Title Missouri Code of State Regulations (CSR), Title 10 10 CSR 10-6.01 Ambient Air Quality Standards Missouri CSR, Title 20 20 CSR 2030-2.040( I) Evaluation Criteria for Building Design Missouri Department of Transportation (MODOT) Standards and Specifications Missouri Department of Natural Resources (MDNR)

Missouri State Adopted International Code Council (ICC) Building Code Set 2012 Boone County Building Code City of Columbia, Missouri, Code of Ordinances Article II - Building and Fire Codes Section 6-16, Adopted Building Code Section 6-17, Amendments Building Code Section 9-21 Fire Code Section 9-22 Fire Code

• Complete references are provided in Section 3.6 CSR Code of State Regulations. MDNR Missouri Department of Natural Resources.

ICC = International Code Council. MO DOT Missouri Department of Transportation .

3.1.6 Discovery Ridge/University of Missouri Table 3-6 lists the MU system requirements and Discovery Ridge covenants design inputs for the RPF identified in NWMI-DRD-2013-030. The RPF system design descriptions identify the specific requirements for that system produced by each applicable reference.

Table 3-6. Discovery Ridge/University of Missouri Requirements Requirements Reference section/requirement 3 Civil Design and construction of the civil system is regulated by the NRC as required by Discovery Ridge/MU.

Collected Rules and Regulations (CRR)

Structural CRR Section 70.060.1, "Codes and Standards" -Adopts ICC codes University of Missouri, Consultant Procedures and Design Guidelines Electrical Section 2.4.2, "Building Codes and Standards for University Facilities" HV AC CPDG Division 23, "Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC)"

Instrumentation Section 2.4.2, "Building Codes and Standards for University Facilities" and Controls Planning CPDG Section 2.4, "Planning, Design and Contract Document Development Guidelines for Master Construction Delivery Method" Plumbing CPDG Division 22, "Plumbing" Process Section 2.4.2, "Building Codes and Standards for University Facilities" University of Missouri, Facilities Management Policy and Procedures Manual Electrical Chapter 2, "Design and Construction Policy" 3-11

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-6. Discovery Ridge/University of Missouri Requirements Requirements Reference sectionlrequirementa Instrumentation Chapter 2, "Design and Construction Policy" and Controls Structural Section 3.A, Refers to CRR 70.060 for the Basic Building Code Section 3.0, Refers to the University Building Adopted Codes for currently adopted codes University Building Adopted Codes IMC-2012 International Mechanical Code Structural Adopts IBC 2012

• Complete references are provided in Section 3.6 CRR Collected Rules and Regulations. MU University of Missouri .

IBC International Building Code. NRC U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ICC = International Code Council.

3.1. 7 Codes and Standards Table 3-7 lists design inputs for the RPF identified in NWMI-DRD-2013-030 . The RPF system design descriptions identify the specific requirements for that system produced by each applicable reference.

The Construction Permit Application and associated preliminary design documents identify codes, standards, and other referenced documents that may be applicable to the RPF. The specific RPF design codes, standards, and other referenced documents, including exceptions or exemptions to the identified requirements, will be finalized in the RPF final design and provided to the NRC. In addition, the codes, standards, and referenced documents for the RPF safety SSCs that are needed to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements will be identified and committed to in the Operating License Application.

Table 3-7. Design Codes and Standards (12 pages)

Document numbera Document title American Concrete Institute (ACI)

ACI 349 Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures and CommentGJy, 2013 American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC)

ANSI/AISC N690 Spec(fi.cationfor Safety-Related Steel Structures for Nuclear Facilities, 2012 Air Movement and Control Association (AMCA)

AMCA Publication 201 Fans and Systems, 2002 (R2011)

AMCA Publication 203 Field Performance Measurement of Fan Systems, 1990 (R201 l)

ANSl/AMCA 210 Laboratory Methods for Testing Fans for Aerodynamic Performance Rating, 2007 AMCA Publication 211 Certified Ratings Program - Product Rating Manual for Fan Air Performance, 2013 AMCA Publication 311 Certified Ratings Program - Product Rating Manual for Fan Sound Performance, 2006 (R2010)

American Conference on Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH)

ACGIH 2097 Industrial Ventilation: A Manual of Recommended Practice for Design, 2013 American National Standards Institute (ANSI)

ANSl/ITSDF B56. l Safety Standard for Low Lift and High Lift Trucks 3-12

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' Document number* Document title ANSI/IEEE C2 201 2 National Electrical Safety Code (NESC), 2012 ANSI C84.l American National Standard for Electric Power Systems and Equipment - Voltage Ratings (60 Hertz) , 2011 ANSI N13 series Addresses radiation monitoring equipment ANSIN13.1 Sampling and Monitoring Releases ofAirborne Radioactive Substances from the Stacks and Ducts ofNuclear Facilities 2011 ANSI N323D American National Standard fo r Installed Radiation Protection Instrumentation, 2002 ANSl/AIHA/ASSE Z9.5 Laboratory Ventilation, 2012 ANSI/NEMA Z535. l Saf ety Colors, 2006 (R2011 )

ANSI/NEMA Z535.2 Environmental and Facility Safety Signs, 2011 ANSI/NEMA Z535 .3 Criteria for Safety Symbols, 2011 ANSIINEMA Z535.4 Product Safety Signs and Labels, 2011 ANSI/ AMCA 204 Balance Quality and Vibration Levels f or Fans, 2005 (R201 2)

ANSI/AMCA 210 Laboratory Methods of Testing Fans for Aerodynamic Performance Rating, 2007 ANSI/ AHRI Standard 390 Perfo rmance Rating of Single Package Vertical Air-Conditioners and Heat Pumps, 2003 ANSI/AHRI Standard 410 Forced-Circulation Air-Cooling and Air-Heating Coils, 2001 ANSI/ AHRI Standard 430 Performance Rating of Central Station Air-Handling Units, 2009 ANSI/AHRI Standard 850 Performance Rating of Commercial and Industrial Air Filter Equipment, 2013 ANSI/HI 3.1-3. 5 Rotary Pumps, 2008 ANSI N42.17B American National Standard Performance Specifications for Health Physics Instrumentation - Occupational Airborne Radioactivity Monitoring Instrumentation, 1989 ANSI N42.18 Specification and Performance of On-Site Instrumentation f or Continuously Monitoring Radioactivity in Effluents, 2004 ANSI/IEEE N320 American National Standard Performance Specifications for Reactor Emergency Radiological Monitoring Instrumentation, 1979 American Nuclear Society (ANS)

ANSI/ANS-2.3 Estimating Tornado, Hurricane, and Extreme Straight Line Wind Characteristics at Nuclear Facility Sites, 2011 ANSI/ANS-2.26 Categorization ofNuclear Facility Structures, Systems, and Components for Seismic Design, 2004 (R2010)

ANSI/ANS-2.27 Criteria/or Investigations ofNuclear Facility Sites for Seismic Hazard Assessments, 2008 ANSI/ ANS-2.29 Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis, 2008 ANSI/ANS-6.4 Nuclear Analysis and Design of Concrete Radiation Shielding for Nuclear Power Plants, 2006 3-13

NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-7. Design Codes and Standards (12 pages)

Document numbera Document title ANSI/ANS-6.4.2 Specification for Radiation Shielding Materials, 2006 ANSI/ANS-8.l Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors, 1998 (R2007) (W2014)

ANSI/ANS-8.3 Critically Accident Alarm System, 1997 (R2012)

ANSl/ANS-8.7 Nuclear Criticality Safety in the Storage ofFissile Materials, 1998 (R2007)

ANSI/ANS-8. I 0 Criteria for Nuclear Criticality Control in Operations with Shielding and Confinement, 1983 (R2005)

ANSI/ANS-8.19 Administrative Practices for Nuclear Criticality Safety, 1996 (R2014)

ANSI/ ANS-8 .20 Nuclear Criticality Safety Training, 1991 (R2005)

ANSI/ANS-8.21 Use ofFixed Neutron Absorbers in Nuclear Facilities Outside Reactors, 1995 (R201 l)

ANSI/ ANS-8.24 Validation ofNeutron Transport Methods for Nuclear Criticality Safety Calculations, 2007 (R2012)

ANSI/ANS-10.4 Verification and Validation ofNon-Safety-Related Scientific and Engineering Computer Programs for the Nuclear Industry, 2008 ANSI/ANS-10.5 Accommodating User Needs in Computer Program Development, 2006 (R201 l)

ANSl/ANS-15.17 Fire Protection Program Criteria for Research Reactors, 1981 (R2000) (W2010)

ANSI/ ANS-40.3 7 Mobile Low-Level Radioactive Waste Processing Systems, 2009 ANSI/ANS-55.l Solid Radioactive Waste Processing System for Light Water Cooled Reactor Plants, 1992 (R2009)

ANSI/ ANS-5 5 .4 Gaseous Radioactive Waste Processing Systems for Light Water Reactor Plants, 1993 (R2007)

ANSI/ANS-55.6 Liquid Radioactive Waste Processing System for Light Water Reactor Plants, 1993 (R2007)

ANSI/ANS-58.3 Physical Protection for Nuclear Safety-Related Systems and Components, 1992 (R2008)

ANSI/ANS-58.8 Time Response Design Criteria for Safety-Related Operator Actions, 1994 (R2008)

ANSI/ANS-59.3 Nuclear Safety Criteria for Control Air Systems, 1992 (R2002) (W2012)

Design Guides for Radioactive Material Handling Facilities and Equipment, Remote Systems Technology Division, 1988, Air Conditioning, Heating and Refrigeration Institute (AHRI)

ANSI/AHR1 Standard 365 Performance Rating of Commercial and Industrial Unitary Air-Conditioning Condensing Units, 2009 ANSI/AHR1 Standard 410 Forced-Circulation Air-Conditioning and Air-Heating Coils, 2001 American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)

ASCE4 Seismic Analysis of Safety-Related Nuclear Structures and Commentary, 2000 ASCE 7 Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, 2005 (R2010)

ASCE43 Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Facilities, 2005 3-14

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Document number* Document title ASCE Manual of Practice Design and Construction of Sanitary and Storm Sewers, 1969 37 American Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE)

ANSI/ASHRAE Standard Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems, 2013 15 ANSI/ASHRAE 51-07 Laboratory Methods of Testing Fans for Certified Aerodynamic Performance Rating, 2007 ANSI/ ASHRAE Standard Method for Testing General Ventilation Air Cleaning Devices for Removal 52 .2 Efficiency by Particle Size, 2007 ANSI/ASHRAE Standard Thermal Environmental Conditions for Human Occupancy, 2013 55 ANSl/ASHRAE Standard Ventilation for Acceptable Indoor Air Quality, 20 10 62 .1 ASHRAE Standard 70 Method of Testing the Performance ofAir Outlets and Air Inlets, 2011 ANSI/ ASHRAE/IES Energy Standard for Buildings Except Low-Rise Residential Buildings, 2010 Standard 90.1 ANSI/ ASHRAE 110 Method of Testing Petformance ofLaboratory Fume Hoods, 1995 ANSI/ASHRAE 111 Measurement, Testing, Adjusting and Balancing of Building Heating, Ventilation, Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration Systems, 2008 American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

ASMEA1 7.l Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators, 2013 ASMEAG-1 Code on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment, 2012 ASME Bl6.5 Pipe Flanges and Flanged Fittings: NPW Yi through 24, 2003 ASME B20.l Safety Standard for Conveyors and Related Equipment, 2012 ASME B30.17 Overheard and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Single Girder, Underhung Hoist), 2006 ASME B30.20 Below-the-Hook Lifting Devices, 2013 ASME B31 .3 Process Piping, 2014 ASME B31.9 Building Services Piping, 2011/2014 ASME B31.12 Hydrogen Piping and Pipelines, 2014 ASME B40. l 00 Pressure Gauges and Gauge Attachments, 2013 ASME B40.200 Thermometers, Direct Reading and Remote Reading, 2013 ASME Boiler and Pressure Section VIII Division 1, 2010/2013 Vessel Code Section IX ASME HST-1 Petformance Standard/or Electric Chain Hoists, 2012 ASMEN509 Nuclear Power Plant Air-Cleaning Units and Components, 2002 (R2008)

ASME N510 Testing ofNuclear Air-Treatment Systems, 2007 ASME NQA-1 Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications, 2008 with NQA-la-2009 addenda 3-15

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' ~* *~ ' NOflTHWf:ST MEDICAl ISOTOPES Table 3-7. Design Codes and Standards (12 pages)

Document numbera Document title ASME QME-1 Qualification ofActive Mechanical Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Plants, 2012 American Society for Nondestructive Testing (ASNT)

SNT-TC-lA Recommended Practice No. SNT-TC-JA : Personnel Qualification and Certification in Nondestructive Testing, 2011 American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)

ASTM Cl055 Standard Guide fo r Heated System Surf ace Conditions that Produce Contact Burn Injuries, 2003 (2014)

ASTMC1217 Standard Guide for Design ofEquipment for Processing Nuclear and Radioactive Materials, 2000 ASTM C1533 Standard Guide fo r General Design Considerations fo r Hot Cell Equipment, 2015 ASTM C1554 Standard Guide for Materials Handling Equipment for Hot Cells, 2011 ASTM Cl572 Standard Guide for Dry Lead Glass and Oil-Filled Lead Glass Radiation Shielding Window Components f or Remotely Operated Facilities, 2010 ASTM C1615 Standard Guide for Mechanical Drive Systems for Remote Operation in Hot Cell Facilities, 2010 ASTM Cl661 Standard Guide f or Viewing Systems f or Remotely Operated Facilities, 2013 ASTM E493 Standard Practice for Leaks Using the Mass Spectrometer Leak Detector in the Inside-Out Testing Mode, 2011 ASTM F l471 Standard Test Method for Air Cleaning Performance ofHigh-Effic iency Particulate Air-Filter System, 2009 American Welding Society (AWS)

A WS B2.l/B2.1M Specification f or Welding Procedure and Performance Qualification , 2009 AWS Dl.1 / Dl.lM Structural Welding Code -Steel, 2010 A WS Dl.3/Dl.3M Structural Welding Code - Sheet Steel, 2008 AWS Dl.6/Dl.6M Structural Welding Code - Stainless Steel, 2007 AWS D9.1 / D9.1M Sheet Metal Welding Code, 2006 AWS QCl Standard for A WS Certification of Welding Inspectors, 2007 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)

DHHS (NIOSH) Publication Guidance for Filtration and Air Cleaning Systems to Protect Building Environments No. 2003-136 from Airborne Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Attacks, 2003 Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA)/Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA)

ANSI/TIA-568-C.1 Commercial Building Telecommunications Cabling Standard, 2012 ANSI/TIA-568-C.2 Balanced Twisted-Pair Telecommunications Cabling and Components Standards, 2014 ANSl/TIA-568-C.3 Optical Fiber Cabling and Components Standard, 2011 ANSI/TIA-569 Telecommunications Pathway s and Spaces, 2013 ANSl/TIA-606 Administration Standard for Commercial Telecommunications Infrastructure, 2012 3-16

NWMl-2013-021, Rev . 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-7. Design Codes and Standards (12 pages)

Document numbera Document title ANSl/TIA-607 Commercial Building Grounding (Earthing) and Bonding Requirements f or Telecommunications, 2013 ANSI/TIA-758-A Customer-Owned Outside Plant Telecommunications Infrastructure Standard, 2004 International Code Council ICCA117.1 Accessible and Usable Buildings and Facilities Standard, 2009 IECC 20I 2 International Energy Conservation Code, May 2011 IMC 20I 2 International Mechanical Code, June 2011 IPC International Plumbing Code, April 2011 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)

IEEE 7-4.3.2 Standard Criteria f or Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2003 IEEE 141 Recommended Practice for Electric Power Distribution for Industrial Plants (Red Book), 1993 (Rl999)

IEEE 142 Recommended Practice f or Grounding ofIndustrial and Commercial Power Systems (Green Book), 2007 IEEE 241 Recommended Practice for Electric Power Systems in Commercial Buildings (Gray Book), 1990 (Rl997)

IEEE 242 Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems (Buff Book), 2001 IEEE 308 Standard Criteria for Class IE Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2012 IEEE 315 Graphic Sy mbols fo r Electrical and Electronics Diagrams, 1975 (RI 993)

IEEE 323 Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2003 IEEE 336 Recommended Practice for Installation, Inspection, and Testing/or Class IE Power, Instrumentation, and Control Equipment at Nuclear Facilities, 2010 IEEE 338 Standard for Criteria for the Periodic Surveillance Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems, 2012 IEEE 344 Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment f or Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2013 IEEE 379 Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems, 2014 IEEE 384 Standard Criteria f or Independence of Class I E Equipment and Circuits, 2008 IEEE 399 Recommended Practice for Power Systems Analysis (Brown Book) , 1997 IEEE 446 Recommended Practice for Emergency and Standby Power Systems for Industrial and Commercial Applications (Orange Book), 1995 (R2000)

IEEE 493 Recommended Practice for the Design ofReliable Industrial and Commercial Power Systems (Gold Book), 2007 3-17

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Document numbera Document title IEEE 497 Standard Criteria for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2010 IEEE 519 Recommended Practice and Requirements for Harmonic Control in Electrical Power Systems, 2014 IEEE 535 Standard for Qualification of Class JE Lead Storage Batteries fo r Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2013 IEEE 577 Standard Requirements for Reliability Analysis in the Design and Operation of Safety Systems for Nuclear Facilities, 2012 IEEE 603 Standard Criteria f or Safety Systems f or Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2009 IEEE 650 Standard for Qualification of Class JE Static Battery Chargers and Inverters for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2006 IEEE 739 Recommended Practice fo r Energy Management in Industrial and Commercial Facilities (Bronze Book), 1995 (R2000)

IEEE 828 Standard for Configuration Management in Systems and Software Engineering, 2012 IEEE 829 Standard for Software and System Test Documentation, 2008 IEEE 902 Guide for Maintenance, Operation, and Safety ofIndustrial and Commercial Power Systems (Yellow Book), 1998 IEEE 946 Generating Stations, 2004 IEEE 1012 Standard Criteria for Software Verification and Validation, 2012 IEEE 1015 Recommended Practice Apply ing Low-Voltage Circuit Breakers Used in Industrial and Commercial Power Systems (Blue Book), 2006 (C2007)

IEEE 1023 Guide for the Application ofHuman Factors Engineering to Systems, Equipment, and Facilities ofNuclear Power Generating Stations, 2004 (R2010)

IEEE 1028 Standard for Sof tware Reviews and Audits, 2008 IEEE 1046 Application Guide for Distributed Digital Control and Monitoring/or Power Plants, 1991 (Rl 996)

IEEE 1050 Guide for Instrumentation and Control Equipment Grounding in Generating Stations, 2004 IEEE 1100 Recommended Practice for Powering and Grounding Electronic Equipment (Emerald Book) , 2005 IEEE 1289 Guide for the Application ofHuman Factors Engineering in the Design of Computer-Based Monitoring and Control Displays fo r Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 1998 (R2004)

IEEE 1584 IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, 2002 ANSI/IEEE C2 201 2 National Electrical Saf ety Code (NESC), 2012 Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (JES)

IES-2011 The Lighting Handbook, 2011 ANSI/IES RP-1-12 American National Standard Practice for Office Lighting, 2012 3-18

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Document number3 Document title IES RP-7 American National Standard Practice for Lighting Industrial Facilities, 1991 (W2001)

International Society of Automation (ISA)

ANSI/ISA-5.1-2009 Instrumentation Symbols and Identification, 2009 ISA-5.3-1983 Graphic Symbols for Distributed Control/Shared Display Instrumentation, Logic, and Computer Systems, 1983 ISA-5.4-1991 Instrument Loop Diagrams, 1991 ISA-5.5-1985 Graphic Symbols for Process Displays, 1985 ANSl/ISA-5.06.01-2007 Functional Requirements Documentation for Control Software Applications, 2007 ANSI/ISA 7.0.01-1996 Quality Standard for Instrument Air ANSI/ISA-12.01.01-20 13 Definitions and Information Pertaining to Electrical Equipment in Hazardous (Classified) Locations, 2013 ISA-18.1-1979 Annunciator Sequences and Specifications, 1979 (R2004)

ISA-TR20.00.01-2007 Specification Forms for Process Measurement and Control Instruments Part 1:

General Considerations Updated with 27 new specification forms in 2004-2006 and updated with 11 new specification forms in 2007 ISA-RP60.1-1990 Control Center Facilities, 1990 ISA-67.01.01-2002 Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications, 2002 (R2007)

ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2006 Setpointsfor Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation, 2006 (R2011)

ISA-RP67.04.02-2010 Methodologies for the Determination of Setpointsfor Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation, 2010 ANSI/ISA-75.05.01-2000 Control Valve Terminology, 2000 (R2005)

ANSl/ISA-82.03-1 988 Safety Standard for Electrical and Electronic Test, Measuring, Controlling, and Related Equipment, 1988 ISA-TR84.00.04-201 l Part 1 Guideline for the Implementation ofANSIIISA-84.00.01-2004 (!EC 61511),

2011 ISA-TR84.00.09-2013 Security Countermeasures Related to Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS), 2013 ISA-TR91.00.02-2003 Criticality Classification Guideline for Instrumentation, 2003 ANSI/ISA-TR99.00.01- Security Technologies for Industrial Automation and Control Systems, 2007 2007 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

IAEA-TECDOC-1250 Seismic Design Considerations ofNuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, 2001 IAEA-TECDOC-1347 Consideration ofExternal Events in the Design ofNuclear Facilities Other Than Nuclear Power Plants, With Emphasis on Earthquakes, 2003 IAEA-TECDOC-1430 Radioisotope Handling Facilities and Automation of Radioisotope Production , 2004 International Code Council (ICC)

IBC 2012 International Building Code, 2012 IFC 2012 International Fire Code, 2012 3-19

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Document number3 Document title IMC 2012 International Mechanical Code, 2012 International Code Council Evaluation Service (ICC-ES)

ICC-ES AC156 "Acceptance Criteria for Seismic Certification by Shake-Table Testing of Nonstructural Components," 20 I 0 National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA)

NECA 1 Standard Practice of Good Workmanship in Electrical Construction , 2010 NECA 90 Recommended Practice for Commissioning Building Electrical Systems (ANSI),

2009 NECA JOO Symbols for Electrical Construction Drawings (ANSI), 2013 NECA 101 Standard for Installing Steel Conduits (Rigid, IMC, EMI) (ANSI), 2013 NECA/AA 104 Standard for Installing Aluminum Building Wire and Cable (ANSI) , 2012 NECA/NEMA 105 Standard for Installing Metal Cable Tray Systems (ANSI), 2007 NECA 111 Standard for Installing Nonmetallic Raceways (RNC, ENT, LFNC) (ANSI), 2003 NECA 120 Standard for Installing Armored Cable (Type AC) and Metal-Clad Cable (Type MC)

(ANSI), 2013 NECA 202 Standard for Installing and Maintaining Industrial Heat Tracing Systems (ANSI),

2013 NECA 230 Standard for Selecting, Installing, and Maintaining Electric Motors and Motor Controllers (ANSI), 2010 NECAIFOA 301 Standard for Installing and Testing Fiber Optics, 2009 NECA331 Standard for Building and Service Entrance Grounding and Bonding, 2009 NECA 400 Standard for Installing and Maintaining Switchboards (ANSI), 2007 NECA402 Standard for Installing and Maintaining Motor Control Centers (ANSI), 2007 NECA/EGSA 404 Standard for Installing Generator Sets (ANSI), 2014 NECA407 Recommended Practice for Installing and Maintaining Pane/boards (ANSI), 2009 NECA 408 Standard for Installing and Maintaining Busways (ANSI) , 2009 NECA409 Standard for Installing and Maintaining Dry-Type Transformers (ANSI), 2009 NECA410 Standard for Installing and Maintaining Liquid-Filled Transformers (ANSI), 2013 NECA411 Standard for Installing and Maintaining Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS)

(ANSI), 2006 NECA420 Standard for Fuse Applications (ANSI), 20 14 NECA430 Standard for Installing Medium-Voltage Metal-Clad Switchgear (ANSI), 2006 NECA/IESNA 500 Recommended Practice for Installing Indoor Lighting Systems (ANSI), 2006 NECA/IESNA 501 Recommended Practice for Installing Exterior Lighting Systems (ANSI), 2006 NECA/IESNA 502 Recommended Practice for Installing Industrial Lighting Systems (ANSI), 2006 NECA/BICSI 568 Standard for Installing Building Telecommunications Cabling (ANSI), 2006 3-20

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Document numbera Document title NECA/NCSCB 600 Recommended Practice for Installing and Maintaining Medium-Voltage Cable (ANSI), 2014 NECA/NEMA 605 Installing Underground Nonmetallic Utility Duct (ANSI) , 2005 National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)

NEMAMG-1 Motors and Generators, 2009 InterN ational Electrical Testing Association (NET A)

ANSI/NETA ATS-2013 Standard for Acceptance Testing Specifications for Electrical Power Distribution Equipment and Systems, 2013 ANSI/NETA ETT-2010 Standard for Certification of Electrical Testing Technicians, 2010 ANSI/NETA MTS-2011 Maintenance Testing Specifications for Electrical Power Distribution Equipment and Systems, 2011 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 1 Fire Code, 2015 NFPA 2 Hydrogen Technologies Code, 2011 NFPA4 Standard for Integrated Fire Protection and Life Safety System Testing, 2015 NFPA 10 Standard f or Portable Fire Extinguishers, 2013 NFPA 13 Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 2013 NFPA 14 Standard f or the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems, 2013 NFPA20 Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection, 2013 NFPA 22 Standard f or Water Tanks fo r Private Fire Protection , 2013 NFPA 24 Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances, 2013 NFPA 25 Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems, 2014 NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, 2015 NFPA 37 Standard fo r the Installation and Use of Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines, 201 5 NFPA45 Standard on Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals, 2015 NFPA 55 Compressed Gases and Cryogenic Fluids Code, 2013 NFPA68 Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting, 2013 NFPA 69 Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems, 2014 NFPA 70 National Electrical Code (NEC), 2014 NFPA 70B Recommended Practice f or Electrical Equipment Maintenance, 2013 NFPA 70E Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, 2015 NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 201 3 NFPA 75 Standard for the Fire Protection of Information Technology Equipment, 2013 NFPA 79 Electrical Standard for Industrial Machinery, 2015 NFPA 80 Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives, 2013 3-21

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' ~ *.*! . NORTHWEST MEDICAL ISOTOHS NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-7. Design Codes and Standards (12 pages)

Document numbera Document title NFPA 80A Recommended Practice for Protection ofBuildings from Exterior Fire Exposures, 2012 NFPA86 Standard for Ovens and Furnaces, 2015 NFPA 86C Standard for Industrial Furnaces Using a Special Processing Atmosphere, 1999 NFPA90A Standard for the Installation ofAir-Conditioning and Ventilating System, 2015 NFPA 90B Standard for the Installation of Warm Air Heating and Air-Conditioning Systems, 2015 NFPA 91 Standard for Exhaust Systems for Air Conveying of Vapors, Gases, Mists, and Noncombustible Particulate Solids, 2015 NFPA 92 Standard for Smoke Control Systems, 2012 NFPA 92A Standard for Smoke-Control Systems Utilizing Barriers and Pressure Differences, 2009 NFPA 92B Standard for Smoke Management Systems in Malls, Atria, and Large Spaces, 2009 NFPA lOlB Code for Means ofEgress for Buildings and Structures, 2002 (W-Next Edition)

NFPA 105 Standard for the Installation of Smoke Door Assemblies and Other Opening Protectives, 2013 NFPA 110 Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems, 2013 NFPA 111 Standard on Stored Electrical Energy Emergency and Standby Power Systems, 2013 NFPA 170 Standard for Fire Safety and Emergency Symbols, 2012 NFPA 204 Standard for Smoke and Heat Venting, 2012 NFPA220 Standard on Types ofBuilding Construction, 2015 NFPA 221 Standard for High Challenge Fire Walls, Fire Walls, and Fire Barrier Walls, 2015 NFPA 262 Standard Method of Test for Flame Travel and Smoke of Wires and Cables for Use in Air-Handling Spaces, 2015 NFPA 297 Guide on Principles and Practices for Communications Systems, 1995 NFPA 329 Recommended Practice for Handling Releases of Flammable and Combustible Liquids and Gases, 2015 NFPA 400 Hazardous Materials Code, 2013 NFPA 496 Standard for Purged and Pressurized Enclosures for Electrical Equipment, 2013 NFPA 497 Recommended Practice for the Classification of Flammable Liquids, Gases, or Vapors and of Hazardous (Classified) Locations for Electrical Installations in Chemical Process Areas, 2012 NFPA 704 Standard System for the Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response, 2012 NFPA 730 Guide for Premises Security, 2014 NFPA 731 Standard for the Installation ofElectronic Premises Security Systems, 2015 NFPA 780 Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems, 2014 NFPA 791 Recommended Practice and Procedures for Unlabeled Electrical Equipment Evaluation, 201 3-22

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' ~ *.*! . NORTHWEST MEDtCAL ISOTOPES NWMl-2013-021 , Rev . 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-7. Design Codes and Standards (12 pages)

Document numbera Document title NFPA 80 1 Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials , 2014 Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA)

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

NOAA Atlas 14 Precipitation-Frequency Atlas of the United States, Vol. 8 Version 2.0, 2013 SMACNA 1143 HVAC Air Duct Leakage Test, 1985 SMACNA 1520 Round Industrial Duct Construction Standard, 1999 SMACNA 1922 Rectangular Industrial Duct Construction Standard, 2004 SMACNA 1966 HVAC Duct Construction Standard - Metal and Flexible, 2006 SMACNA-2006 HVAC Systems Duct Design, 2006 ANSI/SMACNA 001-2008 Seismic Restraint Manual: Guidelines for Mechanical Systems, 2008 U.S. Weather Bureau Technical Paper No. 40 Rairifall Frequency Atlas of the United States for Durations from 30 Minutes to 24 Hours and Return Periods from 1to100 Years, 1963 Underwriters Laboratory, Inc. (UL) Federal Specifications UL 181 Standard for Factory-Made Air Ducts and Connectors, 2013 UL499 Standard for Electric Heating Appliances, 2014 UL 555 Standard for Fire Dampers, 2006 UL586 Standard for High Efficiency, Particulate, Air Filter Units, 2009 UL900 Standard for Air Filter Units, 2004 UL 1995 Heating and Cooling Equipment, 2011

• Complete references are provided in Section 3.6 ACGIH American Conference on Governmental lAEA lnternational Atomic Energy Agency.

Industrial Hygienists . ICC International Code Council.

AC! American Concrete lnstitute. ICC-ES International Code Council Evaluation Service.

AHR! Air Conditioning, Heating and Refrigeration lEEE lnstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.

Institute. rES Ill uminati ng Engineering Society.

AISC American lnstitute of Steel Construction. ISA lntemational Society of Automation .

AMCA Air Movement and Control Association . NECA National Electrical Contractors Association .

ANS American Nuclear Society. NEMA National Electrical Manufacturers Association.

ANS I American National Standards lnstitute. NETA lnterNational Electrical Testing Association.

ASCE American Society of Civi l Engi neers. NFPA National Fire Protection Association.

ASHRAE American Society of Heating, Refrigeration N IOSH National lnstitute for Occupational Safety and and Air-Conditioning Engineers. Health.

ASM E American Society of Mechanical Engineers. NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric ASNT American Society for Nondestructive Administration Testing. SMACNA Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials. National Association.

AWS American Weldi ng Society. TIA Telecommun ications lndustry Association .

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. UL Underwriters Laboratory.

ElA Electronic Industries Alli ance .

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.2 METEOROLOGICAL DAMAGE RPF meteorological accidents with radiological consequences are evaluated in NWMI-2015-SAFETY-011, Evaluation ofNatural Phenomenon and Man-Made Events on Safety Features and Items Relied on for Safety. The basis for the structural design of the RPF is described in NWMI-2013-043 , NWMI Radioisotope Production Facility Structural Design Basis.

Updates and development of technical specifications associated with the meteorological design of the RPF SSCs will be provided in Chapter 14.0 as part of the Operating License Application.

The demands on structural elements due to applied loads are evaluated using the criteria and methodology discussed below. The effect of each load case is determined separately, and total demand is determined by combining the load effects using the load combinations for evaluating strength and evaluating the serviceability criteria given below.

Four categories of load cases are used: normal, severe environmental, extreme environmental, and abnormal loads. The definition of each load is the following:

• Normal loads are loads that are expected to be encountered during normal plant operations and shutdown, and load due to natural hazard phenomena likely to be encountered during the service life of the facility.

• Severe environmental loads are loads that may be encountered infrequently during the service life of the facility.

• Extreme environmental loads are loads that are credible but are highly improbable to occur during the service life of the facility.

• Abnormal loads are loads generated by a postulated high-energy pipe break accident used as a design basis.

Definitions of load case symbols are provided in Table 3-8.

Table 3-8. Load Symbol Definitions (2 pages)

Symbol Definition Normal Load Cases D Dead loads due to the weight of the structural elements, fixed-position equipment, and other permanent appurtenant items; weight of crane trolley and bridge F Load due to fluids with well-defined pressures and maximum heights H Load due to lateral earth pressure, groundwater pressure, or pressure of bulk materials L Live load due to occupancy and moveable equipment, including impact L, Roof live load C0 , Rated capacity of crane (will include the maximum wheel loads of the crane and the vertical, lateral, and longitudinal forces induced by the moving crane)

S Snow load as stipulated in ASCE 7" for risk category IV facilities R Rain load T0 Self-staining load, thermal effects, and loads during normal operating, startup, or shutdown conditions, based on the most critical transient or steady-state condition 3-24

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NORTHWEST MEOICA.L ISOlOHS NWMl-2013-021 , Rev . 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-8. Load Symbol Definitions (2 pages)

Symbol Definition Ro Pipe reactions during normal operating, startup, or shutdown conditions, based on the most critical transient or steady-state condition Severe Environmental Load Cases Di Weight of ice Fa Flood load W Load due to wind pressure Wa Load based on serviceability wind speed Wi Wind-on-ice E0 Where required as part of the design basis, loads generated by the operating basis earthquake, as defined in IO CFR 50,b Appendix S, "Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," or as specified by the authority having jurisdiction Extreme Environmental Load Cases S, Weight of the 48-hour probable maximum winter precipitation superimposed on S W1 Loads generated by the specified design basis tornado, including wind pressures, pressure differentials, and tornado-borne missiles, as defined in NUREG-0800,c or as specified by the authority having jurisdiction Ess Loads generated by the safe shutdown, or design basis earthquake, as defined in IO CFR 50,b Appendix S, or as specified by the authority having jurisdiction Abnormal Load Cases Pa Maximum differential pressure load generated by the postulated accident Ra Pipe and equipment reactions generated by the postulated accident, including Ro Ta Thermal loads generated by the postulated accident, including T0 Yi Jet impingement load generated by th e postulated accident Ym Missile impact load, such as pipe whip generated by or during the postulated accident Y, Loads on the structure generated by the reaction of the broken high-energy pipe during the postulated accident

• ASCE 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, American Society of Civi l Engineers, Reston, Virginia, 2005 (R20 I 0).

b I 0 CFR 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utili zation Facilities," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

c NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, LWR Edition, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Washington, D.C., 1987.

3.2.1 Combinations of Loads Load combinations used for evaluating strength and serviceability are given in the following subsections.

Combinations for strength-based acceptance criteria are given for both nuclear safety-related SSCs and for commercial SSCs.

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' ~ * .* ~ . HOflTHWHT MEDtCIJ. ISOTOPES NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.2.1.1 Nuclear Safety-Related Structures, Systems, and Components For nuclear safety-related SSCs, the loading combinations from ACI 349, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures and Commentary, are used. The load combinations from ACI 349 are essentially identical to the combination from ANSI/ AISC N690, Specification for Safety-Related Steel Structures for Nuclear Facilities. Table 3-9 presents nuclear safety-related SSC loads. In addition, the load combination for extreme winter precipitation load (Sr) takes DC/COL-ISG-007, Interim Staff Guidance on Assessment ofNormal and Extreme Winter Precipitation Loads on the Roofs of Seismic Category I Structures, guidance into account.

Table 3-9. Load Combinations for Strength Based Acceptance Criteria, Nuclear Safety-Related Combination *43fH+ ANSl/AISC N690b Normal Load Combinations 1.4(0+F +Ro)+To (9-1) (NB2-1) 1.2(0 + F + T0 + Ro)+ 1.6(L + H) + 1.4Ccr + 0.5(Lr or S or R) (9-2) (NB2-2) 1.2(0 + F + Ro) + 0.8(L + H) + 1.4Ccr + l .6(Lr or S or R) (9-3) (NB2-3)

Severe Environmental Load Combinations 1.2(0 + F + Ro) + l.6(L + H + Eo) (9-4) (NB2-4) 1.2(0 + F + Ro) + 1.6(L + H + W) (9-5) (NB2-5)

Extreme Environmental and Abnormal Load Combinations 0 + F + 0.8L + Ccr + H + To+ Ro+ Ess (9-6) (NB2-6) 0 + F+ 0.8L+ H +To+ Ro+ W1 (9-7) (NB2-7) 0 + F + 0.8L + Ccr + H +Ta+ Ra+ 1.2Pa (9-8) (NB2-8) 0 + F + 0.8L + H +Ta+ Ra+ Pa+ Yr+ Yj + y m + Ess (9-9) (NB2-9)

O + F + 0.8L+ Ccr+ H+ To+ Ro+ Sr a AC! 349, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures and Commentary, American Concrete Institute, Farmington Hills, Michigan, 2013 .

b ANSI/ AI SC N690, Specification for Safety-Related Steel Structures for Nuclear Facilities, American Institute of Steel Construction, Chicago, Illinois, January 31, 2012 .

3.2.1.2 Commercial and Nuclear Non-Safety-Related Structures, Systems, and Components For commercial and nuclear non-safety-related SSCs, the loading combinations from American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 7, Chapter 2 are used. When the loading includes earthquake effects, the special seismic load combinations are taken from ASCE 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, Chapter 12. The basic load combinations for the strength design of commercial type and non-safety-related nuclear SSCs are given in Table 3-10. The combinations listed are obtained from the 2012 International Building Code (IBC) and ASCE 7. The crane live load case (Ccr) is separated from other live loads in the combinations for design purposes.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-10. Load Combinations for Strength Base Acceptance Criteria, Commercial Combination IBC* ASCE 7b Basic Load Combinations l.4(D +F) (16-1) I l .2(D + F) + l .6(L + Ccr + H) + 0.5(L, or S or R) (16-2) 2 1.2(D + F) + l.6(Lr or Sor R) + l.6H + l/1(L + Ccr) or 0.5W] (16-3) 3 l.2(D + F) +I. OW + /1(L + Ccr) + l.6H + 0.5(L, or Sor R) (16-4) 4 l.2(D + F) +I.OE+ f 1(L + Ccr) + l.6H + fzS (16-5) 5 0.9D+ I .OW+ 1.6H (16-6) 6 0.9(D + F) + I.OE+ l.6H (16-7) 7 Load Combinations, including Flood Load l .2D + (O.SW + I .OF.)+ L + 0.5(L, or Sor R) § 1605.2.1 §2.3.3.2 0.9D + (0.5W + I.OF a) § 1605.2. 1 §2.3.3.2 Load Combinations, including Atmospheric Ice l .2D + 1.6L +(0.2D; + 0.5S) § 1605.2. 1 §2.3.4.l 1.2D + L + (D; + W; + 0.5S) §1605.2.1 §2.3.4.2 0.9D + (D; + W;) § 1605.2.1 §2.3.4.3 Where :

fl = 0.5 for other live loads.

t2 = 0.7 for flat roof configurations, which do not shed snow, and 0.2 for other roof confi gurations a IBC 201 2, lnternational Building Code, International Code Council , lnc., Washington D.C.

b ASCE 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, American Society of Civi l Engi neers, Reston, Virginia, 20 I 0.

3.2.2 Combinations for Serviceability Based Acceptance Criteria Based on ASCE 7, Appendix C Commentary, Table 3-11. Load Combinations for Serviceability the load combinations given in Table 3-11 are Based Acceptance Criteria used when evaluating serviceability based acceptance criteria. Combination ASCE7 Short-Term Effects 3.2.3 Normal Loads D +L (CC-la)

The RPF is required to resist loads due to: D + 0.5 S (CC-lb)

Creep, Settlement and Similar Long-Term of Permanent

• Operating conditions of the systems Effects and components within the RPF D + 0.5L (CC-2)

• Normal and severe natural phenomena Drift of Walls and Frames hazards, remaining operational to D + 0.5L + W. (CC-3) maintain life-safety and safety-related Seismic Drift SS Cs Per ASCE 7, Section 12.8.6

• Extreme natural phenomena hazards,

• Appendix C, Commentary, of ASCE 7, Minimum Design maintaining life-safety and safety- Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, American Society of related SSCs Civil Engineers, Reston, Virginia, 201 3.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Structural loads are due to the following:

• Self-weight of building materials and SS Cs

• Occupancy and normal use of the RPF

• Off-normal conditions and accidents

• Natural phenomena hazards Section 3.1 describes the structural discipline source requirements for these criteria. Structural load criteria are summarized below. Site-specific natural phenomena hazard criteria are based on the physical location of the RPF given in Chapter 2.0, Sections 2.3 and 2.5.

3.2.3.1.1 Dead Loads Dead loads consist of the weight of all materials of construction comprising the building, including walls, floors, roofs, ceilings, confinement doors, stairways, built-in partitions, wall and floor finishes , and cladding. Dead loads also consist of the weight of fixed equipment, including the weight of cranes. The density of all interconnections (e.g. , heating, ventilation, and air conditioning [HVAC] ductwork, conduits, cable trays, and piping) between equipment will be conservatively estimated and included in the final design for dead load for fixtures attached to ceilings or anchored to floors in the RPF.

3.2.3.1.2 Lateral Earth and Ground Water Pressure Loads Lateral earth and groundwater pressure loads are lateral pressures due to the weight of adjacent soil and groundwater, respectively. The design lateral earth load is a function of the composition of the soil. The Discovery Ridge Phase 1 Environmental Assessment (Terracon, 2011 a) indicates that the soils present are clayey gravels consistent with the Unified Soil Classification "GC." In addition, the assessment indicates that expansive soils are present. Chapter 2.0, Section 2.5.3 presents additional on-site soil information.

The design lateral earth pressure load for the RPF is based on ASCE 7, Table 3.2.1, and has been augmented to account for the expansive soils (e.g. , surcharge load is applied to account for the weight of the facility above the soils adjacent to the tank hot cell) .

The design groundwater depth is estimated to be Table 3-12. Lateral Earth Pressure Loads approximately 5.5 meters (m) (18 feet [ft]) below-ground surface and will be verified pending final Element Value geotechnical investigation. Additional information Base design lateral soil load 45 lb/ft 2 per ft is presented in Chapter 2.0, Section 2.4.2.

Design lateral load (expansive increase) 60 lb/ft2 per ft The lateral earth pressure loads for the RPF are Reference : Table 3 .2-1 of ASCE 7, Minimum Design Loads presented in Table 3-12. fo r Buildings and Other Structures, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, Virgini a, 2013 .

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~* * ~ . NORTMWlST MEDICAi. tsOTOPlS 3.2.3.1.3 Live Loads Floor Live Load Table 3-13. Floor Live Loads Live loads are produced by the use and occupancy Description Uniform Concentrated of the RPF , and as such, different live load 2

magnitudes are appropriate for different areas of Production area 250 lb/ft 3,000 lb the facility. Design floor loads provided in Hot cell roof TBD TBD Table 3-13 are based on ASCE 7, Sections 4.3 and Cover block laydown TBD TBD 4.4, and Section C4.3 Commentary. 2 Mechanical rooms 200 lb/ft 2,000 lb During the structural analysis, unknown loads 2 Laboratory I 00 lb/ft 2,000 lb (e.g., hot cell roof in Table 3-13) will have a 2

conservative value assumed and marked with Office 50 lb/ft 2,000 lb 2

"(HOLD). " As the design matures, the actual Office partitions 20 lb/ft values will be inserted in the analysis and the Corridors I 00 lb/ft2 HOLDs removed. Final design media cannot be Truck bay Per AASHTO issued if there are HOLDs identified. The facility live loads will be established during the Based on Sections 4.3, 4.4, and C4.3 Commentary of ASCE 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, completion of the final facility design and American SocietyofCivil Engineers, Reston, Virginia, 20 13.

provided as part of the Operating License Application. AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Offici als.

Roof Live Load TBD to be determined.

The minimum roof live load (Lr) prescribed by the City of Columbia is 20 pounds (lb)/square foot (ft 2),

non-reducible (Ordnance No. 21804, Section 6-17). Snow loads (e.g., normal and extreme rain-on-snow) are discussed separately in Section 3.2.5.2.

Crane Loads The design basis crane load criteria are given in Table 3-14. Crane Load Criteria Table 3-14 and are based on a preliminary quote provided in NWMI-2015-SDD-001 , RPF Facility Element Value SDD. The crane design is to run a top-running Crane capacity 75 ton (150 kip) bridge crane with a remotely operated, powered Crane weight (with hoists) 69,990 lbf bridge and hoist.

Bridge weight 62,330 !bf The crane design basis will be refined in the final Hoist and trolley weight 7,660 lbf design and Operating License Application to account for the following: Wheel load (static) 54.3 kip

• ASCE 7, Chapter 3 - Include weights of crane and runway beams in dead loads

• ASCE 7, Chapter 4 - Increase wheel load by 25 percent to account for vertical impact

• ASCE 7, Chapter 4- Determine lateral force by multiplying sum of hoist and trolley weight and rated capacity of crane by 20 percent

• ASCE 7, Chapter 4 - Determine longitudinal force by multiplying the wheel load by 10 percent 3-29

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.2.4 Wind Loading 3.2.4.1 Wind Load Per NUREG-1537, Section 2.3.1, "General and Local Climate," wind loads will be based on the 100-year return period wind speed. In addition, based on NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, Section 3.3.1 , the wind speed will be transformed to equivalent pressure per ASCE 7-05. For RPF SSCs per current applicable 2012 IBC guidance, ASCE 7-10 is used for this transformation of wind speed to equivalent pressure. From Table 1.5-1 of ASCE 7-10 and based on use and occupancy of the RPF, a Risk Category IV is assigned to RPF SSCs.

Figure 26.5-lB for a Risk Category IV building of ASCE 7-10 is used to obtain the basic wind speed for the RPF site.

The mean recurrence interval (MRI) of the basic wind speed for Risk Category IV buildings is 1,700 years. Since the MRI stipulated in ASCE 7-10 is more stringent than NUREG-1537 100-year wind speeds, wind loads will be determined in accordance with ASCE 7-10, Chapters 26 through 30, as applicable, for a Risk Category IV building.

The surface roughness surrounding RFP SSCs Table 3-15. Wind Loading Criteria is currently Surface Category C, which in turn Element Value indicates Exposure Category C for the RFP per Basic wind speed, V 193.1 km/hr (120 mi/hr)

ASCE 7-10. The RPF main building is an Exposure category c enclosed building. The wind loading criteria Enclosure classification Enclosed are provided in Table 3-15. The basic wind Risk category IV speed given in Table 3-1 5 is a 3-second (sec) gust wind speed at 10 m (33 ft) aboveground Source: ASC E 7-10, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, American Soci ety of Civil Engineers, Reston, for Exposure Category C and Risk Category IV.

Virginia, 20 I 0.

The wind loading criteria will be updated in the Operating License Application.

3.2.4.2 Tornado Loading Tornado loads are a combination of tornado wind effects, atmospheric pressure change, and tornado-generated missile impact effects and are discussed separately in the following sections. NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility, Part 3, Appendix D, states that an annual exceedance probability of 10-5 may need to be considered. The maximum tornado wind speed from NRC Regulatory Guide l.76, Design-Basis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants, for Region I, has an annual exceedance probability of 10-7 that is significantly lower than the target probability stated in NUREG-1520.

For the RPF preliminary safety analysis report, the maximum tornado wind speed from NRC Regulatory Guide 1. 76 for Region I will be used. The tornado load criteria will be updated by using tornado loading in accordance with 10-5 annual probability of exceedance in the Operating License Application.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.2.4.2.1 Maximum Tornado Wind Speed Tornado wind field characteristics used to Table 3-16. Design-Basis Tornado Field Characteristics calculate tornado wind pressures on the RPF are provided in Table 3-16 per NRC Description Value Regulatory Guide 1. 76. The maximum Tornado region Region I tornado wind speed has two components: Maximum wind speed 370.1 km/hr (230 mi/hr) translational and rotational. The maximum total tornado wind speed is the Translational speed 74.0 km/hr (46 mi/hr) sum of these two components and is Radius of maximum rotational speed 45. 7 m (150 ft) applied to the RPF building from each Pressure drop, t.P ( 1.2 lb/in. 2) direction separately. Based on Source: NRC Regulatory Guide 1.76, Design-Basis Tornado and NUREG-0800, Section 3.3.2, ASCE 7-05 Tornado Missiles/or Nuclear Power Plants , Rev. I, U.S . Nuclear may be used to transform maximum Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., March 2007.

tornado wind speed to equivalent pressure.

For RPF SSCs per current applicable 2012 IBC guidance, Chapters 26 and 27 of ASCE 7-10 is used for this transformation of tornado wind speed to equivalent pressure. From Table 1.5-1 of ASCE 7-10 and based on use and occupancy of the RPF, a Risk Category IV is assigned to RPF SSCs. Per NUREG-800, Section 3.3.2, tornado wind speed is assumed not to vary with the height aboveground. Additional information is provided in Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.1.5, and Chapter 13.0, Section 13 .2.6.1.

3.2.4.2.2 Atmospheric Pressure Change NRC Regulatory Guide 1.76 provides guidance for determining the pressure drop and the rate of pressure drop caused by the passing of a tornado. Depending on the final design of the RPF building and whether it is enclosed (unvented) or partially enclosed (vented structure), the procedures outlined in NUREG-800 Section 3.3.2 will be used to account for atmospheric pressure change effects. At the preliminary stage of the design, the RPF building is known not to be open. The value for atmospheric pressure drop, corresponding to the design-basis tornado is given in Table 3-16 .

3.2.4.2.3 High Straight-Line Winds Similar to the tornado, high straight-line winds can also damage the facility structure, which in turn can lead to damage to SSCs relied on for safety. This evaluation demonstrates how the facility design addressed straight-line winds with a return interval of 100 years or more, as required by building codes.

The RPF is designed as a Risk Category IV structure, a standard industrial facility with equivalent chemical hazards, in accordance with ASCE 7. The return frequency of the basic (design) wind speed for Risk Category IV structures is 5.88 x l0 4 /year (MRI = 1,700 year). The provisions of ASCE 7, when used with companion standards such as American Concrete Institute (ACI) 318, Building Code Requirements for Structural Concrete, and American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) 360, Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, are written to achieve the target maximum annual probabilities of established in ASCE 7. The highest maximum probability of failure targeted for Risk Category IV structures is 5.0 x10'6 .

3.2.4.2.4 Tornado-Generated Missile Impact Effects The missile is assumed rigid in this analysis for maximum penetration. Note that in Columbia, Missouri, the location of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) facility, the expected speed of tornado missiles is larger than the expected speed of any hurricane-generated missiles at the same annual frequency of exceedance (NUREG/CR-7005 , Technical Basis for Regulatory Guidance on Design-Basis Hurricane Wind Speeds for Nuclear Power Plants).

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components

• • *

• NORTHWEST MEDICAL ISOTOPES Tornado-generated missile impact effects are based on the standard design missile spectrum from NRC Regulatory Guide 1. 76 and are presented in Table 3-17. In addition, wind velocities in excess of 34 m/sec (75 mi/hr) are capable of generating missiles from objects lying within the path of the tornado wind and from the debris of nearby damaged structures per Regulatory Guide I. 76.

These requirements are considered more severe than the characteristics from DOE-STD-1020, Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities , that are cited in NUREG-1520, Section 3. The recommended RPF roof and wall system design criteria are also taken from DOE-STD-1020, Table 3-4.

Table 3-17. Design-Basis Tornado Missile Spectrum Description Automobile emn* 4,000 lb Dimensions 16.4 ft x 6.6 ft x 4.3 ft Horizontal velocity 92 mi/hr Vertical velocity 62 mi/hr Pipe 287 lb 6.625 in. diameter x 15 ft long 92 mi/hr 62 mi/hr Steel Sphere 0.147 lb 1.0 in. diameter 18 mi/hr 12 mi/hr Source: NRC Regulatory Guide 1.76, Design-Basis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., March 2007.

The impact-type missile, an automobile is limited to a height of no more than 9.1 m (30 ft) above-grade.

Structural wall openings are subjected to the impact of a 0.25 centimeters (cm) (I-inch [in.]) diameter steel sphere. The vertical velocities are taken as 0.67 of the horizontal velocity. For an automobile and pipe missile, a normal impact is assumed. The tornado load criteria will be updated by using tornado loading in accordance with 10-5 annual probability of exceedance in the Operating License Application and accordingly, the design-basis tornado missile spectrum will also be updated. Note that in Columbia, Missouri, the location of the MURR facility, the expected speed of tornado missiles is larger than the expected speed of any hurricane-generated missiles at the same annual frequency of exceedance (NUREG/CR- 7005).

3.2.4.2.5 Combined Tornado Load Effects After tornado-generated wind pressure effects, atmospheric pressure change effects and missile impact effects are determined; the combination thereof will be established in accordance with procedures outlined n NUREG-800, Section 3.3.2. The effect of atmospheric pressure drop by itself will be considered, and the total effects of wind pressure and missile impact effects with one-half of the atmospheric pressure drop effects will be considered jointly.

3.2.4.3 Effect of Failure of Structures, Systems, or Components Not Designed for Tornado Loads SSCs, in which failure during a tornado event could affect the safety-related portions of the RPF, are either designed to:

• Resist the tornado loading or the effect on the safety-related structures from the failure of these SS Cs

• Be bounded by the tornado missile or aircraft impact evaluations The effects and mitigations of failure of SSCs not designed for tornado loads will be developed during final design and the Operating License Application.

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• NORTHWHT MEDtCAL lSOTOPlS NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.2.5 Rain, Snow, and Ice Loading 3.2.5.1 Rain Loads From the National Weather Service (NWS)/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

Hydrometeorological Report No. 51, Probable Maximum Precipitation Estimates, United States East of the 105th Meridian, the probable maximum precipitation (PMP) is defined as "theoretical greatest depth of precipitation for a given duration that is physically possible over a particular drainage area at a certain time of year."

Per NUREG-1537, Section 2.3.1, "General and Local Climate," rain loads will be based on the estimate of the weight of the 48-hour (hr) probable maximum precipitation, as specified by the U.S. Geological Survey. This rain load estimate is compared with the local building code rain load (i.e., ASCE 7-10), and the greater value is used in design of the RPF roof.

The roof of the RPF is designed to prevent rainwater from accumulating on the roof. In accordance with 2012 IBC and ASCE 7-10, the roof structure is designed to safely support the weight of rainwater accumulation with the primary drainage system blocked and the secondary drainage system at its design flow rate when subjected to a rainfall intensity based on the 48-hr probable maximum precipitation.

Rain loads are determined by the amount Table 3-18. Rain Load Criteria of water that can accumulate on the undeflected building roof if the primary Element Value drainage system becomes blocked (static Static head 5 cm (2-in) head), plus a uniform depth of water above Hydraulic head TBD the inlet of the secondary drainage system Rainfall inten sity 3 .14 in./hr" at its design flow (hydraulic head). The a NOAA Atlas 14, Precipitation-Frequency Atlas of the United rain load criteria are determined per States, Volume 8, Version 2.0 : Midwestern States, National Oceanic and ASCE 7-10, Chapter 8, and are provided Atmospheric Admin istration, Silver Spring, Maryland, 20 13.

in Table 3-18. TBD = to be determined.

The hydraulic head is dependent on the roof drain size, roof area drained, and the rainfall intensity. The rainfall intensity used to determine the hydraulic head is taken from NOAA Atlas 14, Precipitation-Frequency Atlas of the United States , web tool for the 100-year storm, 1-hr duration.

The rain load criteria will be updated in the Operating License Application.

3.2.5.2 Snow Load Per the guidance in DC/COL-ISG-007, two types of snow load are considered: normal snow load and the extreme winter precipitation load. The normal snow load will be included in normal load combinations given below. Per the guidance in the DC/COL-ISG-007, the extreme winter precipitation load is included in the extreme environmental load combinations.

The snow load criteria will be updated in the Operating License Application.

3.2.5.2.1 Normal Snow Load Per NUREG-1537, Section 2.3.1 and DC/COL-ISG-007, the normal snow load is the 100-year ground snow, modified using the procedures of ASCE 7 to determine the roof snow load, including snow drifting.

The 100-year ground snow load is calculated by factoring the ground snow load stipulated in the City of Columbia Code of Ordinances amendments (City of Columbia, 2014) and IBC 2012 and is equivalent to the mapped ground snow load from Figure 7-1 of ASCE 7. This information is determined using the conversion factor provided in ASCE 7, Table C7-3.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components The exposure factor provided in ASCE 7, Table 3-19. Snow Load Criteria Table 7-2, for partially exposed roof in terrain Element category C is similar with the exposure used Mapped ground snow load (50-year) for determining wind loads. Since the RPF does not fall into any of the special cases Conversion factor, 100-year to 50-year indicated in ASCE 7, Table 7-3 , the thermal Design ground snow load, pg (100-year) 24.4 lb/ft 2 factor is assumed to be I .0. Exposure factor (Ce) 1.0b Thermal factor (C) I.Ob The importance factor is taken to be unity Importance factor 1.0b from ASCE 7-10, Table 1.5-2, for the RPF ,

• City of Columbia, "City of Columbi a Code of Ordinances,"

which is designated Risk Category IV. www.gocolumbiamo.com/Counci I/Code_ of_ Ordinances_ PDF/,

Snow load criteria are summarized in accessed September 8, 2014.

Table 3-19. b ASCE 7, Minimum Design Loads / or Buildings and Other Structures, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, Virginia, 2013 .

3.2.5.2.2 Extreme Winter Precipitation Load Per NUREG-153 7, Section 2.3. I and DC/COL-ISG-007, the extreme winter precipitation load is the normal snow load as presented in Section 3.2.5.2. 1, plus the liquid weight of the 48-hr probable maximum winter precipitation (PMWP).

The 48-hr PMWP is determined from the Table 3-20. Extreme Winter Precipitation Load NOAA/NWS Hydrometeorological Report Criteria (HR) 53 , Seasonal Variation of 10-Square-Mile Probable Maximum Precipitation Element Value Estimates, United States East of the 105th 2 24-hr, 10-mi PMWP 46.7 cm (18.2 in.)*

Meridian , for a 1O-mi 2 area. HR 53 gives mid- 2 72-hr, 1O-mi PMWP 56.9 cm (22.5 in.)*

month PMP estimates for six 24- and 72-hr 2

durations. Using the NOAA web tool for 48-hr, 1O-mi PMWP (interpolated) 22.2 cm (8.73 in .)

Columbia (NOAA, 2017), a two-day (48-hr) Weight of 48-hr PMWP 106 lb/ft 2 average l 00-year rain is 8. 73 in. precipitation.

• NWS/N OAA HR 53, Seasonal Variation of JO-Square-Mile To determine the PMWP, the months of Probable Maximum Precipitation Estimates, United States East of December, January, February, and March are the 105th Meridian, National Oceanic and Atmospheric considered. Using HR 53 , Figures 26 through Administration, Sil ver Spring, Maryland, 1980.

45 , the PMWP was determined to occur in the PMWP probable maximum winter precipitation .

month of March. The PMWP criteria are given in Table 3-20.

Winter weather events since 1996 in Boone County, Missouri , are provided in Chapter 2.0, Table 2-36.

3.2.5.3 Atmospheric Ice Load Table 3-21. Atmospheric Ice Load Criteria Element Value*

For SSCs to be considered sensitive to ice, the ice thickness and concurrent wind loads are Ice thickness (50-year) 2.54 cm (1 in.)

determined using the procedures in ASCE 7, Concurrent wind speed 64.4 km/hr (40 mi/hr)

Chapter 10. Consistent with the requirements Ice thickness MRI multiplier 1.25 for snow and wind loads, the mapped values Wind speed MRI multiplier 1.00 are converted to 100-year values using the Importance factor 1.00 MRI multipliers given in ASCE 7, Table Cl0-1.

• ASC E 7, Minimum Design Loads fo r Buildings and Other Criteria for ice loading are given in Structures, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, Virginia, 201 3.

Table 3-21. MRI = mean recurrence interva l.

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~* * ~ NOflTHWUT MEDICAl ISOTOPES 3.2.6 Operating Thermal/Self-Straining Loads The operating thermal/self-straining loads will be evaluated in the Operating License Application. These loads will be consistent with the requirements of ACJ 349 or ANSI/ AISC N690, as applicable to the material of construction.

3.2. 7 Operating Pipe Reaction Loads The operating pipe reaction loads will be evaluated in the Operating License Application. These loads will be consistent with the requirements of applicable American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) B3 l , Standards ofPressure Piping, codes.

3.2.8 External Hazards External hazards include aircraft impact, external explosions, and external fire. The RPF is a production facility, as opposed to a nuclear power reactor, as such JO CFR 50.150(a)(3) is interpreted to mean that the requirement for the aircraft impact assessment is not applicable to this facility. Sources of accidental external explosions have been considered and were found to not be an accident of concern. The RPF is constructed of robust, noncombustible materials, and adequate setbacks from transportation routes and landscaping consisting of fire fuels are provided such that externals fires are not an accident of concern.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.3 WATERDAMAGE This section identifies the requirements and guidance for the water damage design of the RPF SSCs.

NUREG-1520 and ASCE 7, Chapter 5, provide guidance on flood protection of nuclear safety-related SSCs. Updates and development of technical specifications associated with the water damage design of the RPF SSCs will be provided in Chapter 14.0 as part of the Operating License Application.

3.3.1 Flood Protection This subsection discusses the flood protection measures that are applicable to safety-related SSCs for both external flooding and postulated flooding from failures of facility components containing liquid. A compliance review will be conducted of the as-built design against the assumptions and requirements that are the basis of the flood evaluation presented below.

Additional information is presented in Chapter 2.0, Section 2.4.3 and Chapter 13.0, Section 13 .2.6.4.

This as-built evaluation will be documented in a flood analysis report and be part of the Operating License Application.

3.3.1.1 Flood Protection Measures for Structures, Systems, and Components 3.3.1.1.1 Flooding from Precipitation Events Regional flooding from large precipitation events raising the water levels of local streams and rivers to above the 500-year flood level can have an adverse impact on the structure and SSCs within. These impacts include the structural damage from water and the damage to power supplies and instrument control systems for SSCs relied on for safety. The infiltration of flood water into the facility could cause the failure of moderation control requirements and lead to an accidental nuclear criticality. Direct damage or impairment of SSCs could also be caused by flooding in the facility.

The site will be graded to direct the stormwater from localized downpours with a rainfall intensity for the 100-year storm for a 1-hr duration around and away from the RPF. Thus, no flooding from local downpours is expected based on standard industrial design. Rainwater that falls on the waste management truck ramp and accumulates in the trench drain has low to no consequence for radiological, chemical, and criticality hazards.

Situated on a ridge, the RPF will be located above the 500-year flood plain according to the flood insurance rate map for Boone County, Missouri, Panel 295 (FEMA, 2011). The site is above the elevation of the nearest bodies of water (two small ponds and a lake), and no dams are located upstream on the local streams. This data conservatively provides a 2x 10*3 year return frequency flood, which can be considered an unlikely event according to performance criteria. However, the site is located at an elevation of 248.4 m (815 ft), and the 500-year flood plain starts at an elevation of 231.6 m (760 ft) , or 16.8 m (55 ft) below the site. Since the site, located only 6.1 m (20 ft) below the nearest high point on a ridge (relative to the local topography), is well above the beginning of the 500-year flood plain, and is considered a dry site, the probable maximum flood from regional flooding is considered highly unlikely, without further evaluation. 1 1

The recommended standard for determining the probably maximum flood, ANS 2.8, Determining Design Basis Flooding at Power Reactor Sites, has been withdrawn.

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Per NUREG-1520, Section 3.2.3.4(1)(c), and ASCE 7, Chapter 5, flood loads will be based on the water level of the I 00-year flood (one percent probability of exceedance per year). The facility has been determined to be above both the I 00-year and the 500-year flood plain. Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3, provides additional detail for flood protection measures.

Postulated flooding from component failures in the building compartments will be prevented from adversely affecting plant safety or posing any hazard to the public. Exterior or access openings and penetrations into the RPF will be above the maximum postulated flooding level. Therefore, flood loads are considered highly unlikely and are not considered design loads.

3.3.1.1.2 Flooding from Inadvertent Discharge of Fire Protection System Water Design of fire suppression systems using water (e.g., automatic sprinklers, hose stations) includes elements such as the grading and channeling of floors, raising of equipment mounts above floors ,

shelving and floor drains, and other passive means. These features will ensure sufficient capacity for gravity-driven collection and drainage of the maximum water discharge rate and duration to avoid localized flooding and resulting water damage to equipment within the area. In addition, particularly sensitive systems and components, whether electrical, optical, mechanical and/or chemical, are typically protected within enclosures designed for the anticipated adverse environmental conditions resulting from these types of water discharges. If critical for safety, these water-sensitive systems and components will be installed within the appropriate severe environment-rated enclosures in accordance with the relevant industry standard(s) (e.g., National Electrical Manufacturers Association [NEMA] enclosure standards).

Selection of specific fire suppression systems for facility locations will be guided by recommendations in relevant industry standards (e.g., NFPA 801, Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials) and will depend on the level of fire hazards at those locations, as determined from the final facility and process systems designs. These final detailed designs will include any facility design elements and sensitive equipment protection measures deemed necessary for addressing the maximum inadvertent rate and duration of water discharges from the fire protection systems. The final comprehensive facility design, along with commitments to design codes, standards, and other referenced documents (including any exceptions or exemptions to the identified requirements), will be identified and provided as part of the Operating License App lication.

3.3.1.2 Flood Protection from External Sources Safety-related components located below-grade will be protected using the hardened protection approach.

The safety-related systems and components will be protected from external water damage by being enclosed in a reinforced concrete safety-related structure. The RPF will have the following characteristics:

• Exterior safety-related walls below-grade will be 0.61 m (2-ft) thick minimum

• Water stops will be provided in all construction joints below-grade

• Waterproof coating will be applied to external surfaces below-grade and as required above-grade

• Roofs will be designed to prevent pooling of large amounts of water in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.102, Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Waterproofing of foundations and walls of safety-related structures below-grade will be accomplished primarily by the use of water stops at expansion and construction joints. In addition to water stops, waterproofing of the RPF will be provided to protect the external surfaces from exposure to water. The level above the RPF first level where waterproofing is to be used will be determined in the Operating License Application.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components The flood protection measures that are described above will also guard against flooding from the rupture of the on-site fire protection water storage tank (if future design development determines that a fire protection storage tank is necessary). Any flash flooding that may result from tank rupture will drain away from the RPF and thereby cause no damage to facility equipment.

3.3.1.3 Compartment Flooding from Fire Protection Discharge The total discharge from the failure of fire protection piping consists of the combined volume from any sprinkler and hose systems. The sprinkler system, if used, is capable of delivering a water density of 20 gallons per minute (gal/min) (76 liters per minute [L/min]) over a 139 m2 (1,500 ft 2) design area; therefore, the sprinkler system is calculated to have a flow rate of 1, 136 L/min (300 gal/min). The hose stream will be a manually operated fire hose capable of delivering up to 946 L/min (250 gal/min). In accordance with NFPA 801, Section 5 .10, the credible volume of discharge is sized for the suppression system operating for a duration of 30 min. The design of water-sensitive, safety-related equipment will ensure that potential flooding from sprinkler discharge will not adversely affect the safety features. For example, equipment may be raised from the floor sufficiently such that the potential flooding due to sprinkler discharge will not impact the criticality analyses.

Outside of the radiologically controlled area (RCA), as defined in Chapter 11 .0, "Radiation Protection and Waste Management," there is limited water discharge from fire protection systems. Any water-sensitive, safety-related equipment will be installed above the floor slab at-grade to ensure that the equipment remains above the flooded floor during sprinkler discharge.

3.3.1.4 Compartment Flooding from Postulated Component Failures Piping, vessels, and tanks with flooding potential in the safety-related portions of the RPF will be seismically qualified. Water-sensitive, safety-related equipment will be raised above the floor. The depth of water on the floor will be minimized by using available floor space to spread the flood water and limiting the water volumes. Analyses of the worst flooding due to pipe and tank failures and their consequences will be developed in the Operating License Application.

3.3.1.4.1 Potential Failure of Fire Protection Piping The total discharge from the operation of the fire protection system bounds the potential water collection due to the potential failure of the fire protection piping.

3.3.1.5 Permanent Dewatering System There is no permanent dewatering system provided for the flood design.

3.3.1.6 Structural Design for Flooding Since the design PMP elevation is at the finished plant-grade and the probable maximum flood (PMF) elevation is approximately 6.1 m (20 ft) below-grade, there is no dynamic force due to precipitation or flooding. The lateral surcharge pressure on the structures due to the design PMP water level is calculated and does not govern the design of the below-grade walls. The load from buildup of water due to discharge of the fire protection system in the RCA is supported by slabs-on-grade, with the exception of the mezzanine floor. Drainage is provided for the second level in the RCA to ensure that the second level slab is not significantly loaded. The second level slab is designed to a live load of 610 kilograms (kg)/m2 (125 lb/W); therefore, the slab is capable of withstanding any temporary water collection that may occur while water is draining from that floor.

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• e *

• NORTifWU:T MEDICAL ISOTOPES 3.4 SEISMIC DAMAGE Seismic analysis criteria used for the RPF will conform to IAEA-TECDOC-1347, Consideration of External Events in the Design ofNuclear Facilities Other Than Nuclear Power Plants, with Emphasis on Earthquakes. This report provides requirements and guidance for the seismic design of nuclear facilities other than nuclear power plants. NUREG-0800 and other NRC Regulatory Guides provide additional detailed guidance for the seismic analysis and design of the RPF . Additional information is provided in Chapter 2.0, Section 2.5.4, and Chapter 13.0, Section 13 .2.6.5 . Updates and development of technical specifications associated with the seismic damage design of the RPF SSCs will be provided in Chapter 14.0 as part of the Operating License Application.

3.4.1 Seismic Input 3.4.1.1 Design Response Spectra Safe-Shutdown Earthquake The NRC has recommended using Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design ofNuclear Power Plants, for radioisotopes production facilities (e.g., 10 CFR 50). NWMI will use a spectrum anchored to 0.20 g peak ground acceleration for the RPF design basis. Regulatory Guide 1.60 is not indexed to any specific soil type, with its frequency content sufficiently broad to cover all soil types.

Therefore, soil type for the RPF will not be a parameter used to determine the RPF's design response spectra. The composition of soil in which the RPF is embedded will be included in the soil-structure-interaction analysis as part of the building response analysis. This information will be provided in the final safety analysis report (FSAR) as part of Operating License Application.

This peak ground acceleration matches that of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (Adams, 2016) and the Calloway Nuclear Generating Station, which both are within 80.5 km (50 mi) of the RPF, as suggested by the NRC staff during the November 10, 2016 Public Meeting. The analysis procedure develops ground motion acceleration time histories that match or exceed the Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectrum as input to the building finite element model. Structural damping will follow the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.61 , Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, which range from about 3 to 7 percent.

Response spectra corresponding to the recommended damping values of Regulatory Guide 1.61 will be used to derive seismic loads. Damping varies depending on the type of SSC. Structural damping will follow Regulatory Guide 1.61 guidance (ranging from about 3 to 7 percent). Plotting response spectra at 5 percent damping for purposes of illustration is a convention within the nuclear industry, but for analysis loads, damping will vary depending on the earthquake level (operating basis earthquake or safe-shutdown earthquake) and the type of SSC.

Soil-Structure Interaction and Dynamic Soil Pressures The structure is supported on a shallow foundation system on stiff competent soils. The Phase 1 Assessment (Terracon, 201 la/b) stated the site is classified as Site Class C. Prescribed in ASCE 7, Table 20.3-1, the typical shear wave velocities for the soils present at the site are 1,200 to 2,500 ft/sec.

Typical practice is to define competent soil as having a shear wave velocity greater than 1,000 ft/sec. The analysis of the RPF building structure to the safe shutdown earthquake will include the effects of a soil-structure interaction. Dynamic soil pressures were determined using ASCE 4, Seismic Analysis of Safety-Related Nuclear Structures and Commentary, Section 3.5.3.2, and applied to the earth retaining walls in the hot cell area.

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' ~ * .* ~ NotmfWUT MEDICAL ISOTOPES Operating Basis Earthquake For preliminary design, the operating basis earthquake was selected to be one-third the safe-shutdown earthquake defined previously (based on Regulatory Guide 1.61 ). Since this option was selected, explicit design and analysis of the facility structure for the operating basis earthquake ground-motion is not required.

3.4.1.2 Method of Analysis The effect of loads other than earthquake-induced (seismic) loads is determined by static analysis methods in accordance with ASCE 7 and the fundamental principles of engineering. Seismic analysis of SSCs will be performed by either equivalent-static methods or dynamic analysis methods in accordance with ASCE 4 and ASCE 43, Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Facilities. The equivalent-static and dynamic seismic analysis methods are discussed below.

3.4.1.2.1 Equivalent-Static Analysis Equivalent-static seismic analysis of commercial type structure will be performed in accordance with ASCE 7, Section 12.8.

Direction of Seismic Loading Design ofIROFS will consider seismic loads in all three directions using a combination of square-root-of-the-sum-of-squared or 100/40/40 methodologies per Regulatory Guide 1.92, Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis. The 100/40/40 methodology will be used in the development of the final RPF design and included as part of the Operating License Application.

3.4.1.2.2 Dynamic and Static Analysis Dynamic analyses are only used for the evaluation of RPF structural components. A static analysis will be completed during final design by using a combination of static load computations to ensure the SSCs remain in place and intact, and a combination of existing shake table test data and existing earthquake experience to ensure that the equipment functions following the earthquake. The analysis of safety-related structures may be either completed by the:

• Linear-elastic response spectra method performed in accordance with ASCE 4, Section 3.2.3.1, and ASCE 43, Section 3.2.2

• Linear-elastic time history method performed in accordance with ASCE 4, Section 3.2.2, and ASCE 43, Section 3.2.2 Damping - The damping values used for dynamic analysis for the structural system considered will be taken from Regulatory Guide 1.6 1. Inelastic energy adsorption factors and damping values used for the analysis of nuclear safety-related structures will be selected from ASCE 43 , Table 5-1.

Modeling - Finite element models will only be used for the RPF building structures. The mesh for plate elements and member nodes will be selected to provide adequate discretization and distribution of the mass. Further, the aspect ratio of plate elements will be limited to no greater than 4: 1 to ensure accurate analysis results.

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!* *~ NOmfWEST MlDtCAl lSOTOPH Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Direction of seismic loading - Three orthogonal directions of seismic loading are used in the RPF design, two horizontal and one vertical. The modal components of the dynamic analysis and the spatial components of response analysis are combined as described below.

• Modal combinations - The structure of the RPF is designed to be relatively stiff, and components are combined using the complete quadratic combination method.

• Spatial component combinations - Spatial components are calculated separately and combined using the square-root-sum-of-the-squares method to determine the combined earthquake effect and resulting demands.

3.4.2 Seismic Qualification of Subsystems and Equipment This subsection discusses the methods by which the RPF systems and components are qualified to ensure functional integrity. Based on the characteristics and complexities of the subsystem or equipment, seismic qualification will be done by a combination of static load computations to ensure that the SSCs remain in place and intact, and a combination of existing shake table test data and existing earthquake experience to ensure that the equipment functions following the earthquake.

3.4.2.1 Qualification by Analysis NWMI will define specific acceptable qualification methods in the procurement packages to demonstrate seismic qualifications. Seismic qualification ofIROFS will include three options of: (1) calculations and verification that the main structural components of the SSC can withstand the seismic loads derived from the in-structure floor response spectra at the damping value derived from Regulatory Guide 1.61, (2) reference to available shake table testing that demonstrates the seismic capacity of the SSC or of multiple similar items, and (3) demonstration of the seismic capacity through the performance of the type of SSC in actual earthquakes.

3.4.2.1.1 Equivalent Static Analysis The equivalent static analysis of nuclear safety-related subsystems and equipment is performed in accordance ASCE 43, Section 8.2.1.1. The equivalent static analysis of subsystems and equipment that are not relied on for nuclear safety but are designated as a component of a seismic system per IBC 2012, Chapter 17, is performed in accordance with ASCE 7, Chapter 13 .

3.4.2.1.2 Static Analysis The static analysis of non-structural, safety-related subsystems and equipment is performed in accordance ASCE 4, Section 3 .2.3.1 , and ASCE 43 , Section 8.2.1.2. A portion of the seismic qualification process will involve simple static analysis of the main structural elements (anchorage and primary framing) of IROFS components, using seismic loads from in-structure response spectra derived from the RPF building structure dynamic response analysis. In-structure response spectra are determined using ASCE 4, Section 3.4.2, and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.122, Development of Floor Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Floor-Supported Equipment or Components. In-structure floor response spectra will be developed through a finite element model of the RPF building using an artificial time history that matches or envelops the Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectrum at a peak ground acceleration = 0.20 g.

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~* * ~* NOfmfWEST MlDtC.Al ISOTOPES NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.4.2.2 Qualification by Testing NWMI will define specific acceptable qualification methods in the procurement packages to demonstrate seismic qualifications. Seismic qualification ofIROFS will include three options of: (1) calculations and verification that the main structural components of the SSC can withstand the seismic loads derived from the in-structure floor response spectra at the damping value derived from Regulatory Guide 1.61, (2) reference to available shake table testing that demonstrates the seismic capacity of the SSC or of multiple similar items, and (3) demonstration of the seismic capacity through the performance of the type of SSC in actual earthquakes.

Per NRC Regulatory Guide 1.100, Seismic Qualification ofElectrical and Active Mechanical Equipment and Functional Qualification ofActive Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants:

• Active mechanical equipment relied on for or important to nuclear safety will be required to be seismically qualified in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.100.

• Active electrical equipment important to or relied on for nuclear safety will be required to be seismically qualified in accordance with IEEE 344, IEEE Standard for Seismic Qualification of Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.

Subsystems and equipment not relied on for nuclear safety but designated as a component of a seismic system per IBC 2012, Chapter 17, will be required. Existing databases of past shake table tests will be used, such as the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development database provided by the state of California. These tests have typically been done based on the ICC-ES AC 156, "Acceptance Criteria for Seismic Certification by Shake-Table Testing of Nonstructural Components," spectrum.

The capacity of the standard support design for overhead fixtures mounted above RPF IROFS will be checked to ensure that the supports can withstand the seismic loads derived from the floor spectra (e.g.,

remain stable during and after postulated earthquake effects) of the attachment floor slab. This information will be provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.

The RPF seismic design will also include a check to ensure that pounding or sway impact will not occur between adjacent fixtures (e.g., rattle space). Estimates of the maximum displacement of any fixture can be derived from the appropriate floor response spectrum and an estimate of the fixture's lowest response frequency. This information will be provided as part of the Operating License Application.

3.4.3 Seismic Instrumentation Seismic recording instrumentation will be triaxial digital systems that record accelerations versus time accurately for periods between 0 and 10 sec. Recorders will have rechargeable batteries such that if there is a loss of power, recording will still occur. All instrumentation will be housed in appropriate weather and creature-proofed enclosures. As a minimum, one recorder should be located in the free-field mounted on rock or competent ground generally representative of the site. In addition, at sites classified as Seismic Design Category D, E, or Fin accordance with ASCE 7, Chapter 11 , using Occupancy Category IV, recorders will be located and attached to the foundations and roofs of the RPF and in the control room.

The systems will have the capability to produce motion time histories. Response spectra will be computed separately.

The purpose of the instrumentation is to (1) permit a comparison of measured responses of C-I structures and selected components with predetermined results of analyses that predict when damage might occur, (2) permit facility operators to understand the possible extent of damage within the facility immediately following an earthquake, and (3) be able to determine when an safe-shutdown earthquake event has occurred that would require the emptying of the tank(s) for inspection as specified in NFPA 59A, Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling ofLiquefied Natural Gas, Section 4.1.3.6( c).

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Seismic instrumentation for the RPF site is not an IROFS; it provides no safety function and is therefore not "safety-related." Although the seismic recorders have no safety function, they must be designed to withstand any credible level of shaking to ensure that the ground motion would be recorded in the highly unlikely event of an earthquake. This capability requires verification of adequate capacity from the manufacturer (e.g., prior shake table tests of their product line), provision of adequate anchorage (e.g.,

manufacturer-provided anchor specifications to ensure accurate recordings), and a check for seismic interaction hazards such as water spray or falling fixtures. With these design features, the instrumentation would be treated as if it were safety-related QL-2. Additional information on seismic instruction will be provided as part of the Operating License Application.

3.4.3.1 Location and Description Seismic instrumentation is installed for structural monitoring. The seismic instrumentation consists of solid-state digital, tri-axial strong motion recorders located in the free-field, at the structure base, and at the roof of the RPF.

3.4.3.2 Operability and Characteristics The seismic instrumentation operates during all modes of RPF operations. The maintenance and repair procedures provide for keeping the maximum number of instruments in service during RPF operations .

The instrumentation installation design includes provisions for in-service testing. The instruments selected are capable of in-place functional testing and periodic channel checks during normal facility operation.

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• NORTHWEST MEDICAL ISOTOPES 3.5 SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS Certain systems and components of the RPF are considered important to safety because they perform safety functions during normal operations or are required to prevent or mitigate the consequences of abnormal operational transients or accidents. This section summarizes the design basis for design, construction, and operating characteristics of safety-related SS Cs of the RPF.

3.5.1 General Design Basis Information 3.5.1.1 Classification of Systems and Components Important to Safety The RPF systems and components will be classified according to their importance to safety, quality levels, and seismic class. The guidance used in developing these classifications during preliminary design with the support ofregulatory guidance reviews, hazards and operability analysis, accident analysis, integrated safety analysis, and national consensus code requirements is presented below.

The RPF systems identified in Table 3-1 and their associated subsystems and components are discussed in the subsections that follow.

3.5.1.2 Classification Definitions The definitions used in the classification of SSCs include the following.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.2, "Definitions," design basis refers to information that identifies the specific functions to be performed by an SSC of a facility and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for design. These values may be:

• Restraints derived from generally accepted state-of-the-art practices for achieving functional goals

• Requirements derived from analysis (e.g., calculation, experiments) of the effects of a postulated accident for which a SSC must meet its functional goals These reference bounds are to include the bounding conditions under which SSCs must perform design basis functions and may be derived from normal operation or any accident or events for which SSCs are required to function, including anticipated operational occurrences, design basis accidents, external events, natural phenomena, and other events specifically addressed in the regulations.

Safety-related is a classification applied to items relied on to remain functional during or following a design basis event (DBE) to ensure the:

• Integrity of the facility infrastructure

• Capability to shut down the facility and maintain it in a safe-shutdown condition

• Capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential off-site exposures comparable to the applicable guideline exposures set forth in 10 CFR 70.61 ,

"Performance Requirements," as applicable Design basis accident is a postulated accident that a nuclear facility must be designed and built to withstand, without loss to the SSCs necessary to ensure public health and safety.

Design basis event (DBE) is an event that is a condition of normal operation (including anticipated operational occurrences), a design basis accident, an external event, or natural phenomena for which the facility must be designed so that the safety-related functions are achievable.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Design basis accidents and transients are those DBEs that are accidents and transients and are postulated in the safety analyses. The design basis accidents and transients are used in the design of the facility to establish acceptable performance requirements for SSCs.

Single failure is considered a random failure and can include an initiating event (e.g.,

component failure, natural phenomenon, external man-made hazard) or consequential failures.

Mechanical, instrumentation, and electrical systems and components required to perform their intended safety function in the event of a single failure are designed to include sufficient redundancy and independence. This type of design verifies that a single failure of any active component does not result in a loss of the capability of the system to perform its safety functions.

Mechanical, instrumentation, and electrical systems and components are designed to ensure that a single failure, in conjunction with an initiating event, does not result in the loss of the RPF's ability to perform its intended safety function . Design techniques such as physical separation, functional diversity, diversity in component design, and principles of operation, will be used to the extent necessary to protect against a single failure.

An initiating event is a single occurrence, including its consequential effects, that places the RPF (or some portion) in an abnormal condition. An initiating event and its resulting consequences are not considered a single failure.

Active components are devices characterized by an expected significant change of state or discernible mechanical motion in response to an imposed demand on the system or operation requirements (e.g., switches, circuit breakers, relays, valves, pressure switches, motors, dampers, pumps, and analog meters). An active component failure is a failure of the component to complete its intended safety function(s) on demand.

Passive components are devices characterized by an expected negligible change of state or negligible mechanical motion in response to an imposed design basis load demand on the system.

Defense-in-depth is an approach to designing and operating nuclear facilities that prevents and mitigates accidents that release radiation or hazardous material through the creation of multiple independent and redundant layers of defense to compensate for potential human and mechanical failures so that no single layer, no matter how robust, is exclusively relied on. Defense-in-depth includes the use of access controls, physical barriers, redundant and diverse key safety functions , and emergency response measures.

The RPF structure and system designs are based on defense-in-depth practices. The RPF design incorporates:

• Preference for engineered controls over administrative controls

• Independence to avoid common mode failures

• Other features that enhance safety by reducing challenges to safety-related components and systems Safety-related systems and components identified in this section are described in Chapters 4.0; 5.0, "Coolant Systems;" 6.0; 7.0; 8.0, "Electrical Power Systems;" and 9.0, "Auxiliary Systems," as appropriate.

3.5.1.3 Nuclear Safety Classifications for Structures, Systems, and Components SSCs in the RPF are classified as safety-related and non-safety-related. The safety-related SSCs include IROFS to meet the performance requirement of 10 CFR 70.61 and other safety-related SSCs to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 20. The purpose of this section is to classify SSCs according to the safety function being performed.

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' ~* *~ NORTHWEST MEDICAl ISOTDHS In addition, design requirements will be placed on SSCs to ensure the proper performance of their safety function, when required.

• Safety-related is a classification applied to items relied on to remain functional during or following a postulated DBE to ensure the:

Integrity of the facility infrastructure Capability to shut down the facility and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition Capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents identified through accident analyses that could result in potential offsite and worker exposures comparable to the applicable guideline exposures set forth in IO CFR 70.6l(b), IO CFR 70.6I(c), and IO CFR 70.61 (d)

Operation of the facility without undue risk to the health and safety of workers, the public, and the environment to meet I 0 CFR 20 normal release or exposure limits for radiation doses and applicable limits for chemical exposures

• Safety-related IROFS - SSCs identified through accident analyses that are required to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.6l(b), 10 CFR 70.6l(c), and 10 CFR 70.6l(d) (Table 3-2).

• Safety-related Non-IROFS - SSCs that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of workers, the public, and environment, and includes SSCs to meet I 0 CFR 20 normal release or exposure limits.

• Non-safety-related - SSCs related to the production and delivery of products or services that are not in the above safety classifications 3.5.1.3.1 Quality Group Classifications for Structures, Systems, and Components The assignment of safety-related classification and use of codes and standards conforms to the requirements NWMI's Quality Assurance Program Plan (QAPP) for the development of a Quality Group classification and the use of codes and standards. The classification system provides a recognizable means of identifying the extent to which SSCs are related to safety-related and seismic requirements, including ANS nuclear safety classifications, NRC quality groups, ASME Code Section III classifications, seismic categories, and other applicable industry standards, as shown in Table 3-7.

Quality assurance (QA) requirements are defined in the NWMI QAPP (Chapter 12.0, "Conduct of Operations," Appendix C). The definitions of QA Levels I , 2, and 3 are provided below.

QA Level 1 will implement the full measure of the QAPP and will be applied to IROFS . IROFS are QA Level I items in which failure or malfunction could directly result in a condition that adversely affects workers, the public, and/or environment, as described in I 0 CFR 70.61 . The failure of a single QA Level I item could result in a high or intermediate consequence. The failure of a QA Level 2 item, in conjunction with the failure of an additional item, could result in a high or intermediate consequence. All building and structural IROFS associated with credible external events are QA Level I. QA Level I items also include those attributes of items that could interact with IROFS due to a seismic event and result in high or intermediate consequences, as described in 10 CFR 70.61. Examples include:

• Items to prevent nuclear criticality accidents (e.g., preventive controls and measures to ensure that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical)

• Items credited to withstand credible design-bases external events (e.g., seismic, wind) 3-46

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• Items to prevent degradation of structural integrity (e.g., failure or malfunction of facility)

QA Level 2 will be applied to non-QA Level 1 safety SSCs. The QA program is important to the acceptability and suitability of the item or service to perform as specified. Acceptance methods shall be specified (including acceptance and other applicable performance criteria), documented, and verified before use of the item or service. Some of the required characteristics may be examined less rigorously than for QA Level 1. Examples of QA Level 2 items include:

• SSCs to meet 10 CFR 20 normal release or exposure limits

• Fire protection systems

• Safeguards and security systems

• Material control and accountability systems QA Level 3 will include non-safety-related quality activities performed by NWMI that are deemed necessary to ensure the manufacture and delivery of highly reliable products and services to meet or exceed customer expectations and requirements. QA Level 3 items include those items that are not classified as QA Level 1 or QA Level 2. QA Level 3 items are controlled in accordance with standard commercial practices.

These quality activities are embodied in NWMI's QAPP and will be further specified in the Operating License Application, and when necessary.

3.5.1.3.2 Seismic Classification for Structures, Systems, and Components SSCs identified as IROFS will be designed to satisfy the general seismic criteria to withstand the effects of natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes, tornados, hurricanes, floods) without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. ASCE 7, Chapter 11, sets forth the criteria to which the plant design bases demonstrate the capability to function during and after vibratory ground-motion associated with the safe-shutdown earthquake conditions.

The seismic classification methodology used for the RPF complies with the preceding criteria, and with the recommendations stated in Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification. The methodology classifies SSCs into three categories: seismic Category I (C-1), seismic Category II (C-11), and non-seismic (NS).

Seismic C-1 applies to both functionality and integrity, while C-11 applies only to integrity. SSCs located in the proximity ofIROFS, the failure of which during a safe-shutdown earthquake could result in loss of function of IROFS , are designated as C-11. Specifically:

• C-1 applies to IROFS. C-1 also applies to those SS Cs required to support shutdown of the RPF and maintain the facility in a safe shutdown condition

• C-11 applies to SSCs designed to prevent collapse under the safe-shutdown earthquake. SSCs are classified as C-11 to preclude structural failure during a safe-shutdown earthquake, or where interaction with C-1 items could degrade the functioning of a safety-related SSC to an unacceptable level or could result in an incapacitating injury to occupants of the main control room.

• NS SSCs are those that are not classified seismic C-1 or C-11.

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• • ~**: Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.5.2 Radioisotope Production Facility Systems and components within the RPF are presented in Section 3.5.1. The RPF design basis evaluated the general design criteria from 10 CFR 70.64, "Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities." This evaluation is presented in Table 3-22. These general design criteria provide a rational basis from which to initiate design but are not mandatory. There are some cases where conformance to a particular criterion is not directly measurable. For each of the criteria, a specific assessment of the RPF design is made, and a complete list of references is included to identify where detailed design information pertinent to each criterion is treated. The Chapter 13.0 accident sequences for credible events define the DBE. The safety-related parameter limits ensure that the associated design basis is met for the events presented in Chapter 13 .0.

Table 3-22. Design Criteria Requirements (4 pages)

Design criteria and description Application and compliance 10 CFR 70.64, "Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities"*

Quality standards and records

• SSCs important to safety will be designed, fabricated, erected, tested, operated,

• Develop and implement design in and maintained to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the accordance with management safety functions to be performed. Where generally recognized codes and measures to ensure that IROFS are standards are used, they will be identified and evaluated to determine their available and reliable to perform their applicability, adequacy, and sufficiency and will be supplemented or modified as function when needed. necessary to ensure a quality product in keeping with the required safety function .

• Maintain appropriate records of these items by or under the control of the

• NWM l's QAPP wi ll be establ.ished and implemented to provide adeq uate licensee throughout the life of the assurance that SSCs satisfactorily perform their safety functions.

facility.

• Appropriate records of design, fabrication, erection, and testing of SSCs important to safety wi ll be maintained by or under control ofNWMl for the life of RPF.

• NWMI will use a graduated QAPP that links quality classification and associated documentation to safety classification and to the manufacturing and delivery of highly reliable products and equipment.

• The NWMI QAPP will provide details of the procedures to be applied, including quality and safety level classifications.

Natural phenomena hazards

• SSCs important to safety wi ll be designed, fabricated, erected, tested, operated, Provide for adequate protection against and maintained to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the natural phenomena, with consideration safety functi ons to be performed. Where generall y recognized codes and of the most severe documented standards are used, they will be identified and evaluated to determine their historical events for the site. applicability, adequacy, and sufficiency and will be suppl emented or modified as necessary to ensure a quality product in keeping with the req uired safety function.

• The design basis for these SSCs w ill include:

- Appropriate considerati on of the most severe natural phenomena that have been histori cally reported for the RPF site and surrounding area, including sufficient margi n for limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time for whi ch hi storical data has been accumulated

- Appropriate combinations of natural phenomena effects during normal and accident operating conditions

- Importance of the safety functions to be performed

• Specific RPF design criteri a and NRC general design criteria are discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.5, respecti vely.

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Design criteria and description Application and compliance Fire protection

• SSCs important to safety will be designed and located throughout the RPF to Provide for adequate protection against minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions fires and explosions.

• Noncombustible and heat resistant materials will be used wherever practical throughout the RPF, particularly in locations such as confinement and the control room.

• Fire detection and suppression systems of appropriate capacity and capability will be provided and designed to minimize the adverse effects of fires on SSCs important to safety.

• Firefighting systems will be designed to ensure that their rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly impair the safety capability of these SSCs.

• Where necessary, within zoned areas or where criticality and access are an issue, required systems will be manually initiated by operations after review of a detection signal.

• RPF fire protection system will be designed such that a failure of any component will not impair the ability of safety-related SSCs to safel y shut down and isolate the RPF or limit the release of radioactivity to provide reasonable assurance that the public will be protected from radiological ri sks resulting from RPF operations

• RPF fire protection system will be designed to provide reasonable assurance that the public will be protected from radiological risks resulting from RPF operations (e.g., failure of any component will not impair the ability of safety-related SSCs to safel y shutdown and isolate the RPF or limit the release of radioactivity).

• Chapters 6.0 and 9.0 provide additional information.

Environmental and dynamic effects

• SSCs important to safety are designed to accommodate effects of, and to be Provide for adequate protection from compatibl e with, the environmenta l cond iti ons associated wi th normal operation, environmental cond iti ons and dynami c maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents. Due to low temperature and effects associated wi th normal pressure RPF processes, dynami c effects due to pipe rupture and di scharging operati ons, maintenance, testing, and flu ids are not appli cable to the RPF.

postulated accidents that could lead to loss of safety fun ctions Chemical protection

• Chemical protection in the RPF will be provided by confinement isolation Provide for adequate protection against systems, liquid retention features, and use of appropriate personal protective chemical risks produced from licensed equipment.

material, facility conditions that affect

• Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2. 1, provides additional information.

the safety of licensed material, and hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material Emergency capability

• Emergency procedures will be developed and maintained for the RPF to control Provide for emergency capability to SNM and hazardous chemi cals produced from the SNM.

maintain control of:

• A pre liminary Emergency Preparedness Plan is provided in Chapter 12.0, Appendix B.

• Licensed material and hazardous chemi cals produced from licensed material

• Evacuation of on-site personne l

• On-site emergency fa cilities and services that facilitate the use of ava ilable off-s ite services 3-49

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• NOmtWEST MEDtCAl. ISOTOPES Table 3-22. Design Criteria Requirements (4 pages)

Design criteria and description Application and compliance Utility services

• The RPF is designed for passive, safe shutdown and to prevent uncontrolled Provide for continued operation of release ofradioactive material ifnormal electric power is interrupted or lost.

essential utility services

• A standby diesel generator will be provided for asset protection of selected RPF systems.

• Uninterruptable power supplies will automatically provide power to systems that support the safety functions protecting workers and the public.

• A combination ofuninterruptable power supplies and a standby electrical power system will provide emergency electrical power to the RPF. A 1,000 kW

( J,341 hp) diesel generator will provide facility electric power.

• Chapter 8.0, Section 8.2 provides additional information.

Inspection, testing, and maintenance

• The RPF is designed to provide access and controls for testing, maintenance, and Provide for adeq uate inspection, testing, inspection of safety-related SSCs, as needed, throughout the RPF.

and maintenance of IROFS to ensure

• Chapters 4.0, 6.0, 7.0, and 9.0 provide additional information.

availability and reliability to perform their function when needed Criticality control

• The RPF design will provide adequate protection against criticality haz,ards related Provide for criticality control, including to the storage, handling, and processing ofSNM, which will be accomplished by:

adherence to the double-contingency - Including equipment, facilities, and procedures to protect worker and public principle health and to minimize danger to life or property Ensuring that the design provides for criticality control, including adherence to the double-contingency principle

- Incorporating a criticality monitoring and alarm system into the facility design

• Compliance with the requirements of criticality control, including adherence to the double-contingency principle, are described in detail in Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.

Instrumentation and control

• RPF SNM processes wi ll be enclosed predominately by hot cells and glovebox The design must provide for inclusion of designs except for the target fabrication area.

l&C systems to monitor and control the

• The FPC system will provide monitoring and control of safety-related components behavior of items relied on for safety. and process systems within the RPF.

• The BM S (a subset of the FPC system) will monitor the RPF venti lation system and mechanical utility systems.

• ESF systems will operate independently from the FPC system or BMS. Each ESF safety function wi ll use hard-wired analog controls/interlocks to protect workers, the public, and environment. The ESF parameters and alarm functions wi ll be integrated into and monitored by the FPC system or BMS.

• RPF designs are based on defense-in-depth practices and incorporate a preference for engi neered controls over admini strative controls, independence to avoid common mode fai lures, and incorporate other features that enhance safety by reducing challenges to safety-related components and systems.

• The FPC system will provide the capability to monitor and control the behavior of safety-related SSCs. These systems ensure adequate safety of process and utili ty service operations in connecti on with their safety function. Controls are provided to maintain these variables and systems within the prescribed operating ranges under all normal conditions.

• The FPC system is designed to fail to a safe-state or to assume a state demonstrated to be acceptable if conditions such as loss of signal, loss of energy or motive power, or adverse environments are experienced.

• Chapter 7.0 provides additional I&C system information . Safety-related SSCs are described in Section 3.5 and Chapters 4.0, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, and 8.0.

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~* * ~ NORTHWf.ST MEDICAL ISOTOPES Table 3-22. Design Criteria Requirements (4 pages)

Design criteria and description Application and compliance Defense-in-depthb

• Defense-in-depth is a design philosophy that NWMI has applied from the Base facility and system design and beginning of the project and will continue through completion of a design that is facility layout on defense-in-depth based on providing successive levels of protection such that health and safety are practices. The design must incorporate, not wholly dependent on any single element of the design, construction, to the extent practicable: maintenance, or operation of the RPF.

• Preference for the selection of

• NWMI's risk insights obtained through performance of the accident analysis will engineered controls over be used to supplement the final design by focusing attention on the prevention and administrative controls to increase mitigation of the higher risk potential accidents.

overall system reliability

• Chapter 6.0 and 13 .0 provide additional information.

• Features that enhance safety by reducing challenges to IROFS

• 10 CFR 70.64, " Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities," Code of Federal Regulations ,

Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

b As used in I 0 CFR 70.64, requirements for new facilities or new processes at existing facilities, defense-in-depth practices means a design philosophy, applied from the outset and through completion of the design, that is based on providing successive levels of protection such that health and safety will not be wholly dependent on any single element of the design, construction, maintenance, or operation of the facility. The net effect of incorporating defense-in-depth practices is a conservatively designed facility and system that will exhibit greater tolerance to failures and external chal lenges.

BMS building management system . NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

CFR Code of Federal Regulations. NWMI Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC .

ESF engi neered safety feature. QAPP quality assurance program plan .

FPC facility process control. RPF Radioisotope Production Facility.

J&C instrumentation and control. SNM special nuclear material.

IROFS items relied on for safety. SSC structures, systems, and components.

The criteria are generic in nature and subject to a variety of interpretations ; however, they also establish a proven basis from which to provide for and assess the safety of the RPF and develop principal design criteria. The general design criteria establish the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements for SSCs important to safety (i.e., SSCs that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of workers, the public, and environment).

Safety-related SSCs that are determined to have safety significance for the RPF will be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested as required by the NWMI QAPP, described in Chapter 12.0, Appendix C. In addition, appropriate records of the design, fabrication, erection, procurement, testing, and operations of SSCs will be maintained throughout the life of the plant.

The RPF design addresses the following:

• Radiological and chemical protection

• Natural phenomena hazards

• Fire protection

• Environmental and dynamic effects

• Emergency capability (e.g., licensed material, hazardous chemicals, evacuation of on-site personnel, on-site emergency facilities/ off-site emergency facilities)

• Utility services

• Inspection, testing, and maintenance

• Criticality safety 3-51

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• Instrumentation and controls

• Defense-in-depth Safety-related systems and components will be qualified using the applicable guidance in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard IEEE 323, IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. The qualification of each safety-related system or component needs to demonstrate the ability perform the associated safety function:

• Under environmental and dynamic service conditions in which they are required to function

• For the length of time the function is required Additionally, non-safety-related components and systems will be qualified to withstand environmental stress caused by environmental and dynamic service conditions under which their failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of the safety-related functions.

The RPF instrumentation and control (I&C) system (also known as the facility process control [FPC]

system) will provide monitoring and control of the process systems within the RPF that are significant to safety over anticipated ranges for normal operations and abnormal operations. The FPC system will perform as the overall production process controller. This system will monitor and control the process instrumented functions within the RPF, including monitoring of process fluid transfers and controlled inter-equipment pump transfers of process fluids.

The FPC system will also ensure that process and utility systems operate in accordance with their safety function. Controls will be provided to maintain variables and systems within the prescribed operating ranges under all normal conditions. In addition, the FPC system is designed to fail into a safe state or to assume a state demonstrated to be acceptable if conditions such as loss of signal, loss of energy or motive power, or adverse environments are experienced.

The building management system (BMS) (a subset of the FPC system) will monitor the RPF ventilation system and mechanical utility systems. The BMS primary functions will be to monitor the facility ventilation system and monitor and control (turn on and oft) the mechanical utility systems.

ESF systems will operate independently from the FPC system or BMS. Each ESF safety function will use hard-wired analog controls/ interlocks to protect workers, the public, and environment. The ESF parameters and alarm functions will be integrated into and monitored by the FPC system or BMS .

The fire protection system will have its own central alarm panel. The fire protection system will report the status of the fire protection equipment to the central alarm station and the RPF control room.

This integrated control system will be isolated from safety-related components consistent with IEEE 279, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. In addition, the RPF is designed to meet IEEE 603, Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, for separation and isolation of safety-related systems and components. Chapter 7.0 provides additional details on the integrated control system.

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' ~ * *! . NORTifWHT MEDfCAL ISOTOPES NWMl-2013-021 , Rev . 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.5.2.1 System Classification Table 3-23. System Classifications The RPF is classified as a non-reactor Classification nuclear production facility per 10 CFR 50. description Classification Source In addition, a portion of the RPF will Hazard category Intermediate hazard NRC fabricate LEU targets, similar to fuel Occupancy type Mixed, A-2, B, F-1 , IBC 2012" fabrication per 10 CFR 70. Due to the H-3 and H-4 nature of the work performed within facility, a hazardous occupancy applies. Construction type II-B IBC 20 12" Table 3-23 provides the RPF classification Risk category IV ASCE 7b for hazards occupancy, construction, risk, Seismic design category c ASCE 7b and seismic design categories.

• !BC 2012, "International Building Code," as amended, International Code Council , Inc., Washington, D.C., February 201 2.

3.5.2.2 Classification of Systems and b ASC E 7, Minimum Design Loads /or Buildings and Other Components Important to Structures, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, Virginia, 2013.

Safety NRC = U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commi ssion .

RPF SSCs, including their foundations and supports, designed to remain functional in the event of a DBE are designated as C-1. SSCs designated IROFS are also classified as C-1. SSCs co-located with C-I systems are reviewed and supported in accordance with II over I criteria. This avoids any unacceptable interactions between SSCs.

C-1 structures should be designed using dynamic analysis procedures, or when justified, equivalent static procedures using both horizontal and vertical input ground motions. For dynamic analyses, either response spectra or time history analyses approaches may be used. Dynamic analysis should be performed in accordance with the procedures of ASCE 4, with the exception of the damping limitations presented in Section 3 .4.1.

Table 3-24 lists the RPF SSCs and associated safety and seismic classifications and quality level group for the top-level systems. Subsystems within these systems may be identified with lower safety classifications. For example, the day tanks of the chemical supply system are IROFS, whi le the rest of the chemical supply system is classified as safety-related or not-safety-related.

Table 3-24. System Safety and Seismic Classification and Associated Quality Level Group (2 pages)

Highest safety Seismic Quality level System name (code) classification* classificationb group Facility structure (RPF) IROFS C-1 QL-1 Target fabrication (TF) IROFS C-1 QL-1 Target receipt and disassembly (TD) IROFS C-1 QL- 1 Target dissolution (DS) IROFS C-1 QL-1 Mo recovery and purification (MR) IROFS C-1 QL-1 Uranium recovery and recycle (UR) IROFS C-1 QL-1 Waste handling (WH) IROFS C-1 QL-1 Criticality accident alarm (CA) IROFS C-1 QL-1 Radiation monitoring (RM) IROFS C-1 QL-1 Standby electrical power (SEP) IROFS C-1 QL-1 Normal electrical power (NEP) SR C-1 QL-1 3-53

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• NOITHWUT MEDtCAl ISOTOHS Table 3-24. System Safety and Seismic Classification and Associated Quality Level Group (2 pages)

Highest safety Seismic Quality level System name (code) classification* classificationb group Process vessel ventilation (PVV) IROFS C-1 QL-1 Facility venti lation (FV)c IROFS C-1/11 QL-1/2 Fire protection (FP) SR C-11 QL-2 Plant and instrument air (PA) NSR C-11 QL-2 Emergency purge gas (PG) IROFS C-1 QL-1 Gas supply (GS) NSR C-11 QL-2 Process chilled water (PCW) IROFS C-1 QL-1 Facility chilled water (FCW) NSR C-11 QL-2 Facility heated water (HW) NSR C-11 QL-2 Process steam IROFS C-1 QL-1 Demineralized water (DW) NSR C-11 QL-2 Chemical supply (CS) IROFS C-1 QL-1 Biological shield (BS) IROFS C-1 QL-1 Faci lity process control (FPC) SR C-11 QL-2 a Safety classification accounts for highest classification in the system. Systems that are classified as safety-related may include both safety-related and non-safety-related components. Only safety-related components will be used to satisfy the safety functions of the system, whereas non-safety-related components can be used to perform non-safety functions. For example, there are non-safety-related components, such as fans, within the safety-related ventilation systems that perform non-safety-related functions.

b Seismic category may be locally revised to account for II over I design criteria and to eliminate potential system degradation due to seismic interactions.

c Ventilation zone classifications vary - Ventilation Zone I and II are considered safety-related, C-1 and QL-1; Ventilation Zone III and IV are considered non-safety-related, C-11 and QL-2.

JROFS = items relied on for safety. RPF = Radioisotope Production Facility.

NSR = non-safety related. SR = safety-related (not JROFS) .

SSCs that must maintain structural integrity post-DBE, but are not required to remain functional are C-II.

All other SSCs that have no specific NRC-regulated requirements are designed to local jurisdictional requirements for structural integrity and are C-III. All C-1 SSCs are analyzed under the loading conditions of the DBE and consider margins of safety appropriate for that earthquake. The margin of safety provided for safety-class SSCs for the DBE are sufficient to ensure that their design functions are not put at risk. Table 3-25 presents the likelihood index limit guidelines and associated event frequency and risk index limits.

Likely normal facility process condition Table 3-25. Likelihood Index Limit Guidelines Not unlikely (frequent facility process condition) 4 3

Event frequency limits Multiple events per year 4

More than 10 per event, per year

.. > or= 0

>-4 <O 4 5 Unlikely (infrequent facility process condition) 2 Between I 0- and 10- per event, -4 to 5 per year Highly unlikely (limiting facility process condition) Less than 10-5 per event, per year < -5 3-54

NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.5.2.3 Design Basis Functions, Values, and Criteria The design basis for systems and components required for safe operation and shutdown of the RPF are established in three categories, which are described below. The preliminary design basis functions and values for each major system are provided in the following subsections.

Design Basis Functions

• License conditions, orders, or technical specifications

• Functions credited in the safety analysis to ensure safe shutdown of the facility is achieved and maintained, prevent potential accidents, or mitigate the potential consequences of accidents that could result in consequences greater than applicable NRC exposure guidelines Design Basis Values

• Values or ranges of values of controlling parameters established as reference bounds for RPF design to meet design basis function requirements

• Values may be established by an NRC requirement, derived from or confirmed by the safety analysis, or selected by the designer from an applicable code, standard, or guidance document Design Basis Criteria

• Code-driven requirements established for the RPF fall into seven categories, including fabrication, construction, operations, testing, inspection, performance, and quality

• Codes include national consensus codes, national standards, and national guidance documents

• Design of safety-related systems (including protection systems) is consistent with IEEE 379, Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems, and Regulatory Guide 1.53, Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems

• Protection system is designed to provi de two or three channels for each protective systems and functions and two logic train circuits:

Redundant channels and trains wi ll be electrically isolated and physically separated in areas outside of the RPF control room Redundant design will not prevent protective action at the system level 3.5.2.4 System Functions/Safety Functions The NWMI RPF will provide protection against natural phenomena hazards for the personnel, SNM, and systems within the facility. The facility will also provide protection against operational and accident hazards to personnel and the public. Table 3-2 lists the IROFS defined by the preliminary hazards analys is.

3.5.2.5 Systems and Components 3.5.2.5.1 Mechanical RPF C-1 mechanical equipment and components (identified in Table 3-24) will be qualified for operation under the design basis earthquake (DBEQ) seismic conditions by prototype testing, operating experience, or appropriate analys is. The C-1 mechanical equipment is also designed to withstand loadings due to the DBEQ, vibrational loadings transmitted through piping, and operational vibratory loading, such as floor vibration due to other operating equipment, without loss of function or fluid boundary. This analysis considers the natural frequency of the operating equipment, the floor response spectra at the equipment location, and loadings transmitted to the equipment and the equipment anchorage.

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~* *~ NOITHWEO MlDICAl ISOTOPlS The qualification documents and all supporting analysis and test reports will be maintained as part of the permanent plant record in accordance with the requirements of the NWMI QAPP .

The safety-related equipment and components within the RPF will be required to function during normal operations and during and following DBEs. This equipment will be capable of functioning in the RPF environmental conditions associated with normal operations and design basis accidents. Certain systems and components used in the ESF systems will be located in a controlled environment. This controlled environment is considered an integral part of the ESF systems.

3.5.2.5.2 Instrumentation and Electrical C-1 instrumentation and electrical equipment (identified in Table 3-24) is designed to resist and withstand the effects of the postulated DBEQ without functional impairment. The equipment will remain operable during and after a DBEQ. The magnitude and frequency of the DBEQ loadings that each component experiences will be determined by its location within the RPF. In-structure response curves at various building elevations will be developed to support design. The equipment (e.g., batteries and instrument racks, control consoles) has test data, operating experience, and/or calculations to substantiate the ability of the components and systems to not suffer Joss of function during or after seismic loadings due to the DBEQ. This information will be completed during final design of the RPF and provided in the Operating License Application.

This certification of compliance with the specified seismic requirements, including compliance with the requirements ofIEEE 344, is maintained as part of the permanent plant record in accordance with the NWMIQAPP.

3.5.2.6 Qualification Methods Environmental qualification of safety-related mechanical, instrumentation, and electrical systems and components is demonstrated by tests, analysis, or reliance on operating experience. Qualification method testing will be accomplished either by tests on the particular equipment or by type tests performed on similar equipment under environmental conditions at least as severe as the specified conditions. The equipment will be qualified for normal and accident environments. Qualification data will be maintained as part of the permanent plant record in accordance with the NWMI QAPP.

3.5.2.7 Radioisotope Production Facility Specific System Design Basis Functions and Values The design basis functions and values for each system identified in Table 3-1 are discussed in the following subsections. Additional details for each system described below will be updated during the development of the Operating License Application.

3.5.2.7.1 Target Fabrication System An overview and detailed description of the target fabrication system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3 .1 and 4.4, respectively.

Design Basis Functions

• Store fresh LEU, LEU target material, and new LEU targets

• Produce LEU target material from fresh and recycled LEU material

• Assemble, load, and fabricate LEU targets

• Reduce or eliminate the buildup of static electricity

• Minimize uranium losses through target fabrication

• Safety-related functions:

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~* * ~ NotmfWtST M£DtCAL lSOTOPf.S Maintain subcriticality conditions within target fabrication system Prevent flammable gas composition within target fabrication system Limit personnel exposure to hazardous chemicals and offgases Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g. , pumps)

• Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs 3.5.2. 7.2 Target Receipt and Disassembly System An overview and detailed description of the target receipt and disassembly system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Section 4.1.3 .2, and Sections 4.3.2/4.3.3, respectively.

Design Basis Functions

• Handle irradiated target shipping cask, including all opening, closing, and lifting operations

• Retrieve irradiated targets from a shipping cask

• Disassemble targets and retrieving irradiated target material from targets

• Reduce or eliminate the buildup of static electricity

• Safety-related functions:

Provide radiological shielding during receipt and disassembly activities Maintain subcriticality conditions within target receipt and disassembly system Prevent radiological materials from being released during target receipt and disassembly operations to limit the exposure of workers, the public, and environment to radioactive material Maintain positive control of radiological materials (LEU target material and radiological waste)

Protect personnel and equipment from industrial hazards associated with system equipment (e.g., moving parts)

Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life

• Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs

• Crane designed for anticipated load (e.g., hot cell cover block) of approximately 68 metric tons (MT) (75 ton) 3.5.2. 7.3 Replace Target Dissolution (DS)

An overview and detailed description of the target dissolution system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1 .3.3 and 4.3.4, respectively.

Design Basis Functions

• Fill the dissolver basket with the LEU target material

• Dissolve the LEU target material within dissolver basket

• Treat the offgas from the target dissolution system

• Handle and package solid waste created by normal operational activities 3-57

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• Safety-related functions:

Provide radiological shielding during target dissolution activities Control and prevent flammable gas from reaching lower flammability limit conditions Maintain subcriticality conditions through inherently safe design of target dissolution equipment Maintain positive control of radiological materials (LEU target material and radiological waste)

Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)

• Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs

• Prevent radiological materials from being released during target dissolution operations to limit the exposure of workers, the public, and environment to radioactive material per 10 CFR 20 3.5.2. 7.4 Molybdenum Recovery and Purification (MR)

An overview and detailed description of the Mo recovery and purification system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.4 and 4.3.5 , respectively.

Design Basis Functions

• Recovery of Mo product from a nitric acid solution created from dissolved irradiated uranium targets

• Purification of the recovered Mo product to reach specified purity requirements, followed by shipment of the Mo product

• Safety-related functions:

Maintain subcriticality conditions through inherently safe design of components that could handle high-uranium content fluid Prevent radiological materials from being released by containing fluids in appropriate tubing, valves, and other components Control and prevent flammable gas from reaching lower flammability limit conditions Maintain positive control of radiological materials (9 9Mo product, intermediate streams, and radiological waste)

Provide appropriate containers and handling systems to protect personnel from industrial hazards such as chemical exposure (e.g., nitric acid, caustic, etc.)

Design Basis Values

• Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)

• Replace consumables after each batch 3.5.2.7.5 Uranium Recovery and Recycle (UR)

An overview and detailed description of the uranium recovery and recycle system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3 .5 and 4.3.6, respectively.

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• Receive and decay impure LEU solution

• Recover and purify impure LEU solution

• Decay and recycle LEU solution

• Transfer process waste

• Safety-related functions :

Provide radiological shielding during uranium recovery and recycle system activities Prevent radiological release during uranium recovery and recycle system activities Maintain subcriticality conditions through inherently safe design of the uranium recovery and recycle equipment Control and preventing flammable gas from reaching lower flammability limit conditions Maintain positive control of radiological materials Protect personnel and equipment from industrial hazards associated with the system equipment, such as moving parts, high temperatures, and electric shock Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)

• Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs 3.5.2.7.6 Waste Handling An overview and detailed description of the waste handling system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Section 4.1.3.6 and Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.2, respectively.

Design Basis Functions

• Receive liquid waste that is divided into high-dose source terms and low-dose source terms to lag storage

• Transfer remotely loaded drums with high-activity solid waste via a solid waste drum transit system to a waste encapsulation cell

• Encapsulate solid waste drums

• Load drums with solidification agent and low-dose liquid waste

• Load high-integrity containers with solidification agent and high-dose liquid waste

• Handle and load a waste shipping cask with radiological waste drums/containers

• Safety-related functions:

Maintain subcriticality conditions through mass limits Prevent spread of contamination to manned areas of the facility that could result in personnel exposure to radioactive materials or toxic chemicals Provide shielding, distance, or other means to minimize personnel exposure to penetrating radiation Design Basis Values

• Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3-59

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~* *~ . NORTHWEST MEDICAL ISOTOPES 3.5.2. 7. 7 Criticality Accident Alarm System Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.3.1 , and Chapter 7.0, Section 7.3.7, provide descriptions of the criticality accident alarm system.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide analysis for criticality accident alarm system coverage in all areas where SNM is handled, processed, or stored

• Provide for continuous monitoring, indication, and recording of neutron or gamma radiation levels in areas where personnel may be present and wherever an accidental criticality event could result from operational processes.

• Provide both local and remote annunciation of a criticality excursion

• Remain operational during DBEs Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life

• Capable of detecting a criticality accident that produces an absorbed dose in soft tissue of 20 absorbed radiation dose (rad) of combined neutron or gamma radiation at an unshielded distance of 2 m from reacting material within one minute 3.5.2. 7.8 Continuous Air Monitoring System Chapter 7.0, Section 7.6, and Chapter 1 I .0, Section 11 .1.4, provide detailed descriptions of the RPF continuous air monitoring system.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide real-time local and remote annunciation of airborne contamination in excess of preset limits

• Provide real-time local and remote annunciation ofradiological dose of excess of preset limits

• Provide environmental monitoring of nuclear radioactive stack releases

• Provide the capability to collect continuous samples

• Remain operational during DBEs Design Basis Values

• Activate when airborne radioactivity levels exceed predetermined limits

• Activate when radiological dose levels exceed predetermined limits

• Adjust volume of air sampled to ensure adequate sensitivity with minimum sampling time 3.5.2.7.9 Standby Electrical Power Chapter 8.0, Section 8.2 provides a detailed description of the RPF standby electrical power (SEP) system.

Design Basis Functions SEP includes two types of components: uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) and a standby diesel generator :

• UPS - Provides power when normal power supplies are absent

• Standby diesel generator - Provides power when normal power supplies are absent to allow continued RPF processing 3-60

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' ~* * ~ NORTHWEST MEI>>CAl ISOTOPES Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life

• Maintain power availability for a minimum of 120 min post-accident (UPS)

• Maintain power availability for 12 hr (diesel generator) 3.5.2.7.10 Normal Electrical Power Chapter 8.0, Section 8.1 provides a detailed description of the RPF normal electrical power (NEP) system.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide facility power during normal operations Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life 3.5.2.7.11 Process Vessel Ventilation System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.1 provides a detailed description of the process vessel ventilation system.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide primary system functions to protect on-site and off-site personnel from radiological and other industrial related hazards

• Collect air in-leakage sweep from each of the numerous vessels and other components in main RPF processes and maintain hydrogen concentration process tanks and piping below lower flammability limit

• Minimize reliance on administrative or complex active engineering controls to provide a confinement system as simple and fail-safe as reasonably possible Design Basis Values

• Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs

• 30-year design life

• Contain and store noble gases generated in the RPF to meet 10 CFR 20 requirements 3.5.2. 7.12 Facility Ventilation System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.1 provides a detailed description of the facility ventilation system.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide confinement of hazardous chemical fumes and airborne radiological materials and conditioning of RPF environment for facility personnel and equipment

• Prevent release and dispersal of airborne radioactive materials (e.g., maintain pressure gradients to ensure proper flow of air from least potentially contaminated areas to most potentially contaminated areas) to protect health and minimize danger to life or property

• Maintain dose uptake through ingestion to levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)

• Provide makeup air and condition the RPF environment for process and electrical equipment

• Process exhaust flow from the process vessel ventilation system 3-61

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• Provide confinement of airborne radioactive materials by providing for the rapid, automatic closure of isolation dampers within confinement zones for various accident conditions

• Provide conditioned air to ensure suitable environmental conditions for personnel and equipment inRPF Design Basis Values

• Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs

• Provide an integrated leak rate for confinement boundaries that meets the requirements of accident analyses that comp I ies with 10 CFR 10.6 1

• 30-year design life

• Maintain occupied space at 24 degrees Celsius (0 C) (75 degrees Fahrenheit [°F]) (summer) and 22°C (72°F) (winter), with active ventilation to support workers and equipment

• Maintain air quality that complies with 10 CFR 20 dose limits for normal operations and shutdown 3.5.2.7.13 Fire Protection System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.3 provides a detailed description of the RPF fire protection system.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide detection and suppression of fires

• Generate alarm signals indicating presence and location of fire

• Execute commands appropriate for the particular location of the frre (e.g. , provide varying levels of notification of a fire event and transmitting notification to RPF central alarm station and RPF control room)

• Provide fire detection in RPF and initiate fire-rated damper closures

• Remain functional during DBEs Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life

• Provide a constant flow of water to an area experiencing a fire for a minimum of 120 min based on the size of the area per International Fire Code (IFC, 2012)

• Provide sprinkler systems, when necessary, per National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems 3.5.2.7.14 Plant and Instrument Air System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 provides a detailed description of the RPF plant and instrument air system.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide small, advective flows of plant air for several RPF activities (e.g. , tool operation, pump power, purge gas in tanks, valve actuation, and bubbler tank level measurement)

• Provide plant air receiver buffer capacity to make up difference between peak demand and compressor capacity 3-62

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• Provide plant air to instrument air subsystem for bubblers and valve actuation

• Provide instrument air receiver buffer capacity to make up difference between peak demand and compressor capacity Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)

• Provide instrument air dried in regenerable desiccant beds to a dew point of no greater than -40°C

(-40°F) and filtered to a maximum 40 micron(µ) particle size 3.5.2. 7.15 Emergency Purge Gas System Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2.1.7.5 provides a detailed description of the emergency purge gas system.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide > 12 hr of nitrogen to the emergency purge gas system

• Emergency purge gas system to provide nitrogen to the required process tanks

• Remain functional during DBEs Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts

• Maintain hydrogen gas (H2) concentrations Jess than 25% of the lower flammability limit 3.5.2.7.16 Gas Supply System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 provides a detailed description of the gas supply system.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide helium, hydrogen, and oxygen in standard gas bottles

• Provide nitrogen from a tube truck to the chemical supply room where manifold piping will be used to distribute the gas

• Provide adequate flow to ensure that the accumulation of combustible gases is below hazardous concentrations and reduces radiological hazards due to accumulation of gaseous fission products Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g. , pumps)

• Provide standard gas bottles, with capacity of approximately 8,495 L (300 cubic feet [ft3])

3.5.2. 7.17 Process Chilled Water System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 provides a detailed description of the RPF chilled water system.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide process chilled water loop for three secondary loops heat exchangers One large geometry secondary loop in hot cell One criticality-safe geometry secondary loop in hot cell One criticality-safe geometry secondary loop in target fabrication area

• Provide monitoring of chilled water loops for Joss of primary containment 3-63

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• Provide cover gas to prevent flammable conditions in secondary loops Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)

• Chilled water to various process equipment at no greater than 10°C (50°F) during normal operations

• Maintain the hydrogen concentration in the coolant system at less than 25 percent of the lower flammability limit of 5 percent H2 3.5.2.7.18 Facility Chilled Water System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1.2.2 provides a detailed description of the RPF facility chilled water system.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide cooling media to heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system

• Supply HV AC system with cooling water that is circulated through the chilled water coils in air-handling units Design Basis Values

• Provide cooling water at a temperature of 9°C (48°F) to the HV AC air-handling unit cooling coils

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3.5.2.7.19 Facility Heated Water System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1.2.2 provides a detailed description of the RPF heated water system.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide heated media to HV AC system

• Supply the HV AC system with heated water that is circulated through the heated water coils in the air-handling units Design Basis Values

• Provide heated water at a temperature of 82°C (I 80°F) to HV AC air-handling unit heating coils and reheat coil

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3.5.2. 7.20 Process Steam System - Boiler Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 provides a detailed description of the RPF process steam system for the boiler.

Design Basis Functions

• Generate low- and medium-pressure steam using a natural gas-fired package boiler

• Provide a closed loop steam system for the hot cell secondary loops that meets criticality control requirements

• Provide monitoring of steam condensate for loss of primary containment

• Limit sludge or dissolved solids content with automatic and makeup water streams in the boiler 3-64

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• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)

• Provide saturated steam at 1. 7 kg/square centimeters (cm 2) (25 lb/square inch [in. 2]) and 4.2 kg/cm2 (60 lb/in. 2) gauge to various process equipment 3.5.2. 7.21 Process Steam System - Hot Cell Secondary Loops Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 provides a detailed description of the RPF process steam system for the hot cell secondary loops.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide a closed loop steam system for the hot cell secondary loops

• Generate low-pressure steam using a vertical shell-and-tube heat exchanger

• Provide monitoring of steam condensate for loss of primary containment Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3.5.2.7.22 Demineralized Water System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 provides a detailed description of the RPF demineralized water system.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide demineralized water to RPF except for administration and truck bay areas

• Remove mineral ions from municipal water through an ion exchange (IX) process and accumulate in a storage tank

• Provide regenerable IX media using a strong acid and a strong base

• Feed acids and bases from local chemical drums by toe pumps Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)

• Provide the water at 4.2 kg/cm 2 (60 lb/in. 2) gauge 3.5.2. 7.23 Supply Air System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.1.2 provides a detailed description of the supply air system. The design basis functions and values are identified in Section 3.5.2.7.12.

3.5.2. 7.24 Chemical Supply System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.4 provi des a detailed description of the chemical supply system.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide storage capability for nitric acid, sodium hydroxide, reductant, and nitrogen oxide absorber solutions, hydrogen peroxide, and fresh uranium IX resin

• Segregate incompatible chemicals (e.g., acids from bases)

• Provide transfer capability for chemical solutions mixed to required concentrations and used in target fabrication, target dissolution, Mo recovery and purification, and waste management systems 3-65

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• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3.5.2. 7.25 Biological Shielding System Chapter 4.0, Section 4.2, provides a detailed description of the RPF biological shielding.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide biological shielding from radiation sources in the hot cells for workers in occupied areas of theRPF

• Limit physical access to hot cells

• Remain functional through DBEs without loss of structural integrity Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life

• Provide dose rates consistent with ALARA goals for normally occupied areas 3.5.2. 7.26 Facility Process Control System Chapter 7.0, Section 7.2.3 provides a description of the FPC system.

Design Basis Functions

• Perform as overall production process controller

• Monitor and control process instrumented functions within the RPF (e.g. , process fluid transfers, controlled inter-equipment pump transfers of process fluids)

• Provide monitoring of safety-related components while BMS (a subset of the FPC system) monitors ventilation system and mechanical utility systems

• Ensure ESF systems operate independently from FPC system or BMS

• Use hard-wired analog controls/interlocks for each ESF safety function to protect workers, public, and environment

• Integrate into and monitor ESF parameters and alarm functions by FPC system or BMS

• Initiate actuation of isolation dampers for hot cell area or analytical area on receipt of signals from fire protection system Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., controllers) 3-66

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3.6 REFERENCES

10 CFR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

10 CFR 30, "Rules of General Applicability to Domestic Licensing of Byproduct Material," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

10 CFR 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

IO CFR 50.2, "Definitions," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

JO CFR 50.31 , "Combining Applications," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

10 CFR 50.32, "Elimination of Repetition," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

I 0 CFR 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

I 0 CFR 70.61, "Performance Requirements," Code ofFederal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

10 CFR 70.64, "Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

10 CFR 71 , "Energy: Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material ," Code ofFederal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

I 0 CFR 73 , "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," Code ofFederal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

10 CFR 74, " Material Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

10 CFR 851, "Worker Safety and Health Program," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

10 CSR 10-6.01 , "Ambient Air Quality Standards," Missouri Code of State Regulations, as amended.

20 CSR 2030, "Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers, Professional Land Surveyors, and Landscape Architects," Code ofState Regulations, Jefferson City, Missouri, as amended.

21 CFR 210, "Current Good Manufacturing Practice in Manufacturing, Processing, Packaging, or Holding of Drugs," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

21CFR211, "Current Good Manufacturing Practice for Finished Pharmaceuticals," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

29 CFR 1910, "Occupational Safety and Health Standards," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

40 CFR 61 , "National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

40 CFR 63, "NESHAP for Source Categories," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 40 CFR 141, "National Primary Drinking Water Regulations," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.

ACGIH 2097, Industrial Ventilation: A Manual ofRecommended Practice for Design, 28 1h Edition, American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, Cincinnati, Ohio, 2013.

ACI 318, Building Code Requirements for Structural Concrete Commentary, American Concrete Institute, Farmington Hills, Michigan, 2014.

ACI 349, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures and Commentary, American Concrete Institute, Farmington Hills, Michigan, 2013.

Adams, A., 2016, "Re: University of Missouri at Columbia - Staff Assessment of Applicability of Fukushima Lessons Learned to University of Missouri - Columbia Research Reactor," (Letter to R. Butler, University of Missouri Research Reactor, December 8), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., 2016.

AISC 360, Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, American Institute of Steel Construction, Chicago, Illinois, 2010.

AMCA Publication 201, Fans and Systems, Air Movement and Control Association International, Inc. ,

Arlington Heights, Illinois, 2002 (R2011).

AMCA Publication 203, Field Performance Measurement of Fan Systems, Air Movement and Control Association International, Inc., Arlington Heights, Illinois, 1990 (R201 l).

AMCA Publication 211 , Certified Ratings Program - Product Rating Manual for Fan Air Performance, Air Movement and Control Association International, Inc. , Arlington Heights, Illinois, 2013.

AMCA Publication 311, Certified Ratings Program - Product Rating Manual for Fan Sound Performance, Air Movement and Control Association International, Inc., Arlington Heights, Illinois, 2006 (R2010).

ANS 2.8, Determining Design Basis Flooding at Power Reactor Sites, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois, 1992 (W2002).

ANSI C84.1, American National Standard for Electric Power Systems and Equipment - Voltage Ratings (60 Hertz), American National Standards Institute, Inc., Washington, D.C. , 2011.

ANSI Nl3.1 , Sampling and Monitoring Releases ofAirborne Radioactive Substances from the Stacks and Ducts ofNuclear Facilities, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois, 2011.

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~ * *! NOklHWHT MlDtCAl. ISOTOPES ANSI/ AHRI Standard 410, Forced-Circulation Air-Cooling and Air-Heating Coils, Air-Conditioning, Heating, and Refrigeration Institute, Arlington, Virginia, 2001.

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0 NORTHWEST MEDIW ISOTOHS NWMl-2013-021 , Rev . 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components ANSI/ANS-8.24, Validation ofNeutron Transport Methods for Nuclear Criticality Safety Calculations, American National Standards Institute/ American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois, 2007 (R2012).

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NECA 120, Standard for Installing Armored Cable (Type AC) and Metal-Clad Cable (Type MC) (ANSI) ,

National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2013 .

NECA 202, Standard for Installing and Maintaining Industrial Heat Tracing Systems (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2013.

NECA 230, Standard for Selecting, Installing, and Maintaining Electric Motors and Motor Controllers (A NSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2010.

NECA 331 , Standard for Building and Service Entrance Grounding and Bonding, National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2009.

NECA 400, Standard for Installing and Maintaining Switchboards (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2007 .

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• NWM I NORTHWEST MEDtCAl ISOTOPES NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components NECA 402, Standard for Installing and Maintaining Motor Control Centers (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2007.

NECA 407, Recommended Practice for Installing and Maintaining Panel boards (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2009.

NECA 408, Standard for Installing and Maintaining Busways (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2009.

NECA 409, Standard for Installing and Maintaining Dry-Type Transformers (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2009.

NECA 410, Standard for Installing and Maintaining Liquid-Filled Transformers (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2013.

NECA 411, Standard for Installing and Maintaining Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) (ANSI) ,

National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2006.

NECA 420, Standard for Fuse Applications (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2014.

NECA 430, Standard for Installing Medium-Voltage Metal-Clad Switchgear (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2006.

NECA/AA 104, Standard for Installing Aluminum Building Wire and Cable (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2012.

NECA/BICSI 568, Standard for Installing Building Telecommunications Cabling (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2006.

NECA/EGSA 404, Standard for Installing Generator Sets (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2014.

NECA/FOA 301, Standard for Installing and Testing Fiber Optics, National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2009.

NECA/IESNA 500, Recommended Practice for Installing Indoor Lighting Systems (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2006.

NECA/IESNA 501, Recommended Practice for Installing Exterior Lighting Systems (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2006.

NECA/IESNA 502, Recommended Practice for Installing Industrial Lighting Systems (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2006.

NECA/NCSCB 600, Recommended Practice for Installing and Maintaining Medium-Voltage Cable (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2014.

NECA/NEMA 105, Standard for Installing Metal Cable Tray Systems (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2007.

NECA/NEMA 605, Installing Underground Nonmetallic Utility Duct (ANSI), National Electrical Contractors Association, Bethesda, Maryland, 2005.

NEMA MG-1 , Motors and Generators, National Electrical Manufacturers Association, Rosslyn, Virginia, 2009.

NFPA 1, Fire Code, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2015.

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' ~ e *! NORTHWUT MEDtCAI. lSOTOPU NFPA 2, Hydrogen Technologies Code, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2011.

NFPA 4, Standard for Integrated Fire Protection and Life Safety System Testing, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2015 .

NFPA IO, Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013 .

NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation ofSprinkler Systems, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013.

NFPA 14, Standard for the Installation ofStandpipe and Hose Systems, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013.

NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation ofStationary Pumps for Fire Protection , National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013.

NFPA 22, Standard for Water Tanks f or Private Fire Protection, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 201 3.

NFPA 24, Standard f or the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances , National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013.

NFPA 25 , Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2014.

NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2015 .

NFPA 37, Standard for the Installation and Use of Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2015.

NFPA 45, Standard on Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2015.

NFPA 55, Compressed Gases and Cryogenic Fluids Code, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013.

NFPA 59A, Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013 .

NFPA 68, Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013.

NFPA 69, Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2014.

NFPA 70, National Electrical Code (NEC) , National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2014.

NFPA 70B, Recommended Practice f or Electrical Equipment Maintenance, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013 .

NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2015 .

NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013 .

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~* * ~ . NOfllTHWEST MEDICAL ISOTOPES NFPA 75, Standard for the Fire Protection of Information Technology Equipment, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013.

NFPA 79, Electrical Standard for Industrial Machinery, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2015.

NFPA 80, Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013.

NFP A 80A, Recommended Practice for Protection of Buildings from Exterior Fire Exposures, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2012.

NFPA 86, Standard for Ovens and Furnaces, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2015.

NFP A 86C, Standard for Industrial Furnaces Using a Special Processing Atmosphere, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 1999.

NFPA 90A, Standard for the Installation ofAir-Conditioning and Ventilating System, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2015.

NFPA 90B, Standard for the Installation of Warm Air Heating and Air-Conditioning Systems, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2015.

NFPA 91, Standard for Exhaust Systems for Air Conveying of Vapors, Gases, Mists, and Noncombustib le Particulate Solids, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2015.

NFPA 92, Standard for Smoke Control Systems, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2012.

NFPA 92A, Standard for Smoke-Control Systems Utilizing Barriers and Pressure Differences, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2009.

NFPA 92B, Standard for Smoke Management Systems in Malls, Atria, and Large Spaces, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2009.

NFPA 101 , Life Safety Code, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2015.

NFPA 101B, Code for Means of Egress for Buildings and Structures, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2002 (W-Next Edition).

NFPA 105, Standard for the Installation ofSmoke Door Assemblies and Other Opening Protectives, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013.

NFPA 110, Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013.

NFPA 111, Standard on Stored Electrical Energy Emergency and Standby Power Systems, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013.

NFP A 170, Standard for Fire Safety and Emergency Symbols, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2012.

NFPA 204, Standard for Smoke and Heat Venting, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2012.

NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2015.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components NFPA 221 , Standard for High Challenge Fire Walls, Fire Walls, and Fire Barrier Walls , National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2015.

NFPA 262, Standard Method of Test for Flame Travel and Smoke of Wires and Cables for Use in Air-Handling Spaces, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2015.

NFPA 297, Guide on Principles and Practices for Communications Systems , National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 1995.

NFPA 329, Recommended Practice for Handling Releases of Flammable and Combustible Liquids and Gases, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2015.

NFPA 400, Hazardous Materials Code, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013.

NFPA 496, Standard/or Purged and Pressurized Enclosures for Electrical Equipment, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2013.

NFP A 497, Recommended Practice for the Classification of Flammable Liquids, Gases, or Vapors and of Hazardous (Classified) Locations for Electrical Installations in Chemical Process Areas ,

National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2012.

NFPA 704, Standard System for the Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2012.

NFPA 730, Guide/or Premises Security, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2014.

NFPA 731, Standard for the Installation ofElectronic Premises Security Systems, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 20 15.

NFPA 780, Standard for the Installation ofLightning Protection Systems , National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2014.

NFP A 791, Recommended Practice and Procedures for Unlabeled Electrical Equipment Evaluation, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2014.

NFP A 801 , Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 20 14.

NIOSH 2003-136, Guidance for Filtration and Air-Cleaning Systems to Protect Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Attacks, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Cincinnati, Ohio, 2003.

NOAA, 2017, "NOAA Atlas 14 Point Precipitation Frequency Estimates: Mo,"

https://hdsc.nws.noaa.gov/hdsc/pfds/pfds_map_cont.html?bkmrk=mo, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Silver Spring, Maryland, accessed 2017.

NOAA Atlas 14, Precipitation-Frequency Atlas of the United States, Volume 8, Version 2.0: Midwestern States, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Silver Spring, Maryland, 2013.

NRC, 2012, Final Interim Staff Guidance Augmenting NUREG-153 7, "Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing ofNon-Power Reactors," Parts 1 and 2, for Licensing Radioisotope Production Facilities and Aqueous Homogeneous Reactors, Docket Number:

NRC-2011-0135, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., October 30, 2012.

NUREG-0700, Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines, Rev. 2, U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Washington, D.C., 2002.

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NWMl-2013-021, Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, LWR Edition, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Washington, D.C., 1987.

NUREG-1513, Integrated Safety Analysis Guidance Document, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Washington, D.C., May 2001.

NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility, Rev. 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Washington, D.C., May 2010.

NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing a/Non-Power Reactors - Format and Content, Part 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D.C., February 1996.

NUREG/CR-4604/PNL-5849, Statistical Methods for Nuclear Material Management, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington, December, 1988.

NUREG/CR-6410, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility Accident Analysis Handbook, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. , 1998.

NUREG/CR-6463, Review Guidelines on Software Languages for Use in Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems - Final Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Washington, D.C., 1996.

NUREG/CR-6698, Guide for Validation ofNuclear Criticality Safety Calculational Methodology, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Washington, D.C., January 2001.

NUREG/CR-7005 , Technical Basis for Regulatory Guidance on Design-Basis Hurricane Wind Speeds for Nuclear Power Plants, U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., 2011.

NWMI-2013-043 , NWMI Radioisotope Production Facility Structural Design Basis, Rev. B, Northwest Medical Isotopes, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015.

NWMI-2015-LIST-003 , NWMI Radioisotope Production Facility Master Equipment List, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015 .

NWMI-2015-SAFETY-Ol l , Evaluation a/Natural Phenomenon and Man-Made Events on Safety Features and Items Relied on for Safety, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015 .

NWMI-2015-SDD-001, RPF Facility SDD, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015 .

NWMI-DRD-2013-030, NWMI Radioisotope Production Facility Design Requirements Document, Rev. B, Northwest Medical Isotopes, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015.

Open-File Report 2008-1128, Documentation for the 2008 Update of the United States National Seismic Hazard Maps, U.S. Geological Survey, Washington, D.C., 2008.

Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification, Rev. 3, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., September 1978.

Regulatory Guide 1.53, Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Safety Systems, Rev. 2, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. , November 2003 (R201 l).

Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants , Rev. 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., July 2014.

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~ * *! NOllTHWUT MEDfCAl ISOTOPlS Regulatory Guide 1.6I, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. I, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., March 2007 (R20I 5).

Regulatory Guide 1.76, Design-Basis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. I, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., March 2007.

Regulatory Guide I .92, Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis, Rev. 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., July 2006.

Regulatory Guide 1.97, Criteria for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation for Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 4, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. , June 2006 (R20I3).

Regulatory Guide I . I 00, Seismic Qualification of Electrical and Active Mechanical Equipment and Functional Qualification ofActive Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 3, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., September 2009.

Regulatory Guide 1. I 02, Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Standards Development, Washington, D.C., September 1976.

Regulatory Guide I. I22, Development of Floor Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Floor-Supported Equipment or Components, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Standards Development, Washington, D.C., February 1978.

Regulatory Guide 1.152, Criteria for Use of Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 3, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., July 2011.

Regulatory Guide 1. I 66, Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Post Earthquake Actions, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., March I997.

Regulatory Guide I . I67, Restart ofa Nuclear Power Plant Shut down by a Seismic Event, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., March 1997.

Regulatory Guide 1.208, Performance Based Approach to Define the Site-Specific Earthquake Ground Motion, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., March 2007.

Regulatory Guide 3.3, Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Fuel Reprocessing Plants and for Plutonium Processing and Fuel Fabrication Plants, Rev. I, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., March 1974 (R2013).

Regulatory Guide 3.6, Content of Technical Specification for Fuel Reprocessing Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., April 1973 (R2013).

Regulatory Guide 3. I 0, Liquid Waste Treatment System Design Guide for Plutonium Processing and Fuel Fabrication Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., June I973 (R2013).

Regulatory Guide 3. I 8, Confinement Barriers and Systems for Fuel Reprocessing Plants, U. S Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., February I974 (R2013).

Regulatory Guide 3.20, Process Offgas Systems for Fuel Reprocessing Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., February I 974 (R2013).

Regulatory Guide 3.7I, Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards for Fuels and Materials Facilities, Rev. 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., December 20IO.

Regulatory Guide 5.7, Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas, Rev. 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. , May 1980 (R20IO).

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NWMl-2013-021 , Rev. 2 Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Regulatory Guide 5.12, General Use ofLocks in the Protection and Control of Facilities and Special Nuclear Materials, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., November 1973 (R2010).

Regulatory Guide 5.27, Special Nuclear Material Doorway Monitors, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., June 1974.

Regulatory Guide 5.44, Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Systems, Rev. 3, U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., October 1997 (R2010).

Regulatory Guide 5.57, Shipping and Receiving Control ofStrategic Special Nuclear Material, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., June 1980.

Regulatory Guide 5.65, Vital Area Access Control, Protection ofPhysical Security Equipment, and Key and Lock Controls, U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., September 1986 (R2010).

Regulatory Guide 5.71 , Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., 2010.

SMACNA 1143, HVAC Air Duct Leakage Test, Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors' National Association, Chantilly, Virginia, 1985 .

SMACNA 1520, Round Industrial Duct Construction Standard, Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors ' National Association, Chantilly, Virginia, 1999.

SMACNA 1922, Rectangular Industrial Duct Construction Standard, Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors ' National Association, Chantilly, Virginia, 2004.

SMACNA 1966, HVA C Duct Construction Standard - Metal and Flexible, Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors' National Association, Chantilly, Virginia, 2006 .

SMACNA-2006, HVAC Systems Duct Design, Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors' National Association, Chantilly, Virginia, 2006.

SNT-TC-lA, Recommended Practice No. SNT-TC-lA: Personnel Qualification and Certification in Nondestructive Testing, American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Columbus, Ohio, 2011 .

Technical Paper No. 40, Rainfall Frequency Atlas of the United States for Durations from 30 Minutes to 24 Hours and Return Periods from 1to100 Years, Weather Bureau, U.S . Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 1963.

Terra con, 2011 a, Phase I Environmental Site Assessment Discovery Ridge Lots 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, l 0, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, Terra con Consultants, Inc., prepared for University of Missouri and Trabue, Hansen & Hinshaw, Inc., Terracon Project No. 09117701, March 23 , 2011.

Terracon, 2011 b, Preliminary Geotechnical Engineering Report Discovery Ridge- Certified Site Program Lots 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, Terracon Consultants, Inc., prepared for University of Missouri and Trabue, Hansen & Hinshaw, Inc., Terracon Project No. 09105094.1, February 11 , 2011.

UL 181 , Standard for Factory-Made Air Ducts and Connectors, Underwriters Laboratories, Washington, D.C., 2013 .

UL 499, Standard for Electric Heating Appliances, Underwriters Laboratories, Washington, D.C., 2014.

UL 555, Standard for Fire Dampers, Underwriters Laboratories, Washington, D.C., 2006.

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• NORTHWEST MEDICAL ISOtoPfS UL 586, Standard for High Efficiency, Particulate, Air Filter Units , Underwriters Laboratories, Washington, D.C., 2009.

UL 900, Standard for Air Filter Units, Underwriters Laboratories, Washington, D.C., 2004.

UL 1995, Heating and Cooling Equipment, Underwriters Laboratories, Washington, D.C., 2011.

USGS, "2008 U.S. Geological Survey National Seismic Hazard Maps," U.S . Geological Survey, Rolla, Missouri, 2008.

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