ML17192A257

Comment (1) of Michael D. Tschiltz Regarding Physical Security - Combined License and Operating Reactors

ML17192A257
Person / Time
Site:	Nuclear Energy Institute
Issue date:	07/05/2017
From:	Tschiltz M Nuclear Energy Institute
To:	Mayfield M Rules, Announcements, and Directives Branch, Office of New Reactors
References
82FR21269 00001, NRC-2017-0111
Download: ML17192A257 (10)

Text

~I MICHAEL D. TSCHILTZ Senior Director, New Plant, SMRs &

Advanced Reactors 1201 F Street, NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20004 NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE P: 202.739.8083 mdt@nei.org nei.org July 5, 2017

~1~17 :0 rn *~

~

0 Mr. Michael E. Mayfield *

-£'o2rlt~1~~r rTl VI I .

Acting Deputy Director <

Office of New Reactors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 (J) m 0:

Subject:

NEI Comments on the Proposed Revision to NUREG-0800, Section 13.6.1, "Physical Security-Combined License and Operating Reactors" [Docket ID NRC-2017-0111]

Project Number: 689 *

Dear Mr. Mayfield:

On behalf of the nuclear energy industry, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 1 appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the subject Proposed Revision to NUREG-0800, Section 13.6.1, "Physical Security-Combined License and Operating Reactors." The purpose of this letter is to provide the attached comments which recommend several changes to the document.

NRC indicates that the reason for issuing this proposed revision is to incorporate changes that "reflect the current staff reviews, methods and practices based on lessons learned from the NRC's revfews of design certification and combined license applications ... " The industry agrees that incorporating lessons learned in to NUREG-0800 is an important effort to ensure applicants have the necessary clarity of the regulatory process and in general the industry supports this proposed revision. The purpose of the comments provided in this letter is to recommend changes that the industry believes will improve the clarity and completeness of the document.

We appreciate the NRC staff's consideration of these comments. If you have any questions concerning this letter or the attached comments, please contact me or Thomas Zachariah (202.739.8058; txz@nei.org).

1 The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is the organization responsible for establishing unified industry policy on matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEI's members include all entities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect/engineering firms, fuel cycle facilities, nuclear materials licensees, and other organizations and entities involved in the nuclear energy industry.

NUCLEAR. CLEAN AIR ENERGY SUNSI Review.Complete

• template'= ADM - 013

• E~R.1os== ~olVi:.03 Add= ,£/. tl/tJ/i~ LM );>1/)

Mr. Michael E. Mayfield Julys, 2oi7 Page 2 Sincerely,

~/fZ:Y Michael D. Tschiltz Attachment c: Ms. Vanna L. Ordaz, NRO, NRC .

Ms. Deborah A. Jackson, NRO/DEIA, NRC Ms. Amy E. Cubbage, NRO/DEIA/ARPB, NRC Mr. William D. Reckley, NRO/DEIA/ARPB, NRC Mr. Mark D. Notich, NRO/DEl/NRCB, NRC Mr. Joseph Colaccino, NRO/DEI/NRCB, NRC Mr. James Anderson, NSIR/DPCP, NRC Ms. Cindy i<. Bladey, ADM/DAS/RADB, NRC NRC Document Control Desk

Industry Comments on NRC Proposed Revision to NUREG-0800, Section 13.6.1, "Physical Security- Combined License and Operating Reactors" Affected Section Comment/Basis Recommendation

'1. General There are numerous instances where the term "high The revision should clearly reference and reflect the assurance" appears in the document. The proposed commission direction provided in SRM-SECY revision does not clarify the term as compared to 0073 and state that "high assurance" of adequate "reasonable assurance" consistent with SRM-SECY protection found in security regulations is 0073 where the commission stated that "the staff should equivalent to "reasonable assurance" be mindful that the concept of "high assurance" of adequate protection found in our security regulations is equivalent to "reasonable assurance" when it comes to determining what level of regulation is appropriate."

2. General The document is repetitive in several areas; for example, Suggest an editorial review to avoid repetition, it states in several places, and with several variations, that which also sho!Jld provide for making the document t.he review should ensure the design or application "meets shorter and more efficient to implement.

the applicable performance cind prescriptive regulatory requirements."

3. General "Detection, assessment, communication, and response, Incorporate guidance recognizing that design i.e., interdiction and neutralization of threats up to and performance capabilities could obviate the including the design basis threat of radiological sabotage requirement for onsite response *capability. In lieu to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel of the onsite response capability, rapid response of sabotage" is an appropriate criterion that comports with local law enforcement could be required when 10 CFR 73. However, the SRP section should acknowledge acceptable design performance capabilities such as the possibility that design features may effectively* the following are demonstrated:

preclude significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage, or the dose consequences thereof, and provide guidance for how such an application may be reviewed.

• Technology*is not susceptible to significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage, or

• Does not have achievable. target set; or

• Design features allow implementation of

Industry Comments on NRC Proposed Revision to NUREG-0800, Section l3.6:1, "Physical Security- Combined Licens.e and Operating Reactors" Affected Section Comment/Basis Recommendation mitigation strategies to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage

4. General In various places in the SRP section, th.e application is To avoid confusion, elimina.te discussion-of referred to by part number (e.g., Part 2 = FSAR). The part application "parts," or at a minimum, refer to parts designators are not always used consistently from one is "typically" oi "e.g." (not "i.e.").

application to the next, and there is.no associated*

requirement.

s. Sec. I, Areas for Here and elsewhere, RG-1.70 is cited, but NRC staff have Clarify here so that an SRP revision is not required Review, section announced their intent to supersede RG-1.70 with a when the other guidance documents are amended.

beginning with "The combination of revisions* to NUREG-0800 and RG-1.206.

NRC staff's review consists of the following," item 2

6. Sec. I, Areas for The discussion including, " ... sufficiently detailed to Clarify applicable regulatory requirement(s) or Review, Scope of the. demonstrate how regulatory requirements for rephrase to avoid implication that there are specific Technical Review for procurement. construction, and installation of PSS ... " requirements associated with how PSS are Physical Security, implies regulatory requirements associated with procured, constructed, and installed (i.e., as item 2 procurement, construction, and installation. opposed to requirements associated with what the design does and how it is operated).

7. Sec. I, Areas for The applicability of SECY-11-0024 seems incomplete and 1. Clarify that consequences of deliberate acts Review, Scope of the inconsistent here, where t~e discussion focuses on "the may factor into risk-informing the review, not Technical Review for level of review for a particular [SSC] is derived from both only in terms of the staff being open to a Physical Security, the SSC's Safety importance (i.e., whether the SSC is limited set of target sets, but also the item 3 safety-related or nonsafety-related) and risk significance," acceptability of engineered barriers that can but then "[while NUREG-0800] states that the risk- limit or preclude access to those target sets, informed review framework is applicable to the review of and understanding that if the consequence of all SSCs ... [i]n the case of physical security, the review such deliberate acts may be such that a risk-

Industry Comments on NRC Proposed Revision to NUREG-0800, Section 13.6.1, "Physical Security- Combined License and Operating Reactors" Affected Section Comment/Basis Recommendation framework involves performance and prescriptive informed (consequence-oriented) approach is regulatory requirements that do not incorporate' risk appropriate.

significance and address protection (against deliberate 2. If reconsideration is not given tci risk-informing acts such as.radiological sabotage) and prescriptive design the design and review, clarify what "safety requirements." significance of adequate technical review for physical security is the assurance of adequate The discussion goes on to say that, instead of safety protection" is intended to convey.

significance factoring into risk-informing the review for 3. Clarify "against deliberate acts that may not be physical security, instead "safety significance of adequate sgecifically considered or anal~ed elsewhere in technical review for physical security is the a*ssurance of the FSAR" adequate protection against deliberate acts, which are not I

spedflcally considered or analyzed in the FSAR."

First, the guidance seems to focus on likelihood as the sole contributor to risk, such that, because many of the physical security requirements are prescriptive, there is no opportunity to risk-inform the r~view. This is not correct.

Limited consequences from even deliberate acts should be taken into account as part of risk-informing the review, as is the case for research and test reactors.

Second,."safety significance of adequate technical review for physical security is the assurance of adequate protection" does not make sense and should be clarified.

Third, "which are not specifically considered or analyzed in the FSAR" is not accurate (as they are evaluated per the requirements of 10 CFR 73.

8. Sec. I, Areas for Regarding: "The secondary 'reviewers provide assurance Replace parenthetical with: "(e.g., safety, security,

Industry Comments on NRC Proposed Revision to NUREG-0800, Section 13.6.1, "Physical Security- Combined License and

' Operating Reactors" Affected Section comment/Basis Recommendation Review, Review that the interfaces are addressed when the SSC's designs, environmental protection, administrative controls, Interfaces, item operational requirements, and management systems are etc.)."

intended to perform multiple functions (i.e., safety, security, environmental protection, plant infrastructures,

.*work controls, configuration management, the corrective-action program, etc.)."

The parenthetical list of "multiple functions" is confusing I

and implies all-inclusiveness.

9. Sec. II Acceptance Many of these requirements are simply reiterations of the Where no additional information is being added to Criteria, regulation, which in some cases adds no value but adds clarify or focus the specific regulatory requirement, Requirements, bulk to the document. simply cite the applicable regulation that conveys a General requirement. Do not summarize a regulatory citation if no additional information or clarification is being added.

10. Sec. II Acceptance "10 CFR 73.55, beginning with" seems unnecessary here, Remove "10 CFR 73.55, beginning with" Criteria, as each of the applicable subsections of 73.55 is cited Requirements, item* individually 9

11. Sec. II, Acceptance Figure 1, "Combined License Application Referencing a Add "Figure 1" label.

Criteria, SRP Certified Design," is not labeled, Acceptance Criteria, Figure 1 Additionally, the figure, and the paragraph above it, Replace "completion" with "finalization" in figure misuse (and therefore confuses) the term "complete" and (two places) and in preceding paragraph.

"completion." "Complete" in 10 CFR 52 refers to the scope of design in terms of the SSCs included in the plant design, not (as implied here) how far the design has advanced toward readiness for construction.

Industry Comments on NRC Proposed Revision to NUREG-0800, Section 13.6.1, "Physical Security- Combined License and Operating Reactors" Affected Section Comment/Basis Recommendation

12. Sec. II, Acceptance Past practice and other staff guidance makes it clear that Expand on the final statement cited in the comment Criteria, SRP the staff's findings are expected to be supported by audits and clarify that review of applicant-maintained Acceptance Criteria, and inspections of information maintained by the applicant documentation is acceptable (and expected) in text following Figure and not necessarily included in the application itself. In , support of staff findings.

1 contrast, the text beginning with "In most cases, descriptions provide by the applicant," and proceeding for the next two paragraphs, implies virtually every detail to support staff's conclusions must be included in the application, risking a continuation of the trend toward ever-increasing volume in license applications.

"... descriptions provided by the applicant .. that do not provide sufficient descriptions and do not illustrate or demonstrate how the engineered and administrative controls and management systems will satisfy the performance or prescriptive regulatory requirement and ~

conform to SRP acce{Jtance criteria will not be acceptable... "

.. .. descriptions must provide a sufficient level of detail about the proposed physical security systems within the design for the Commission to determine that all applicable regulatory requirements will be met [including} details of how physical security systems will be designed, constructed, and installed and how operational requirements and management systems will be established, maintained, and implemented. .. "

. .. descriptions must provide sufficient details in the security plans, along with the FSAR, for the Commission to determine that all applicable regulatory requirements will

Industry Comments on NRC Proposed Revision to NUREG-0800, Section 13.6.1, "Physical Security- Combined License and Operating Reactors" Affected Section Comment/Basis Recommendation be met .. "

. .. stating only that detail for how regulatory requirements will be met and will be provided in implementing procedures or can be found in implementing procedures are not acceptable [and} do not provide adequate licensing bases for findings...

Although detailed procedures are not required to be submitted. .. the. applicant [must describe] the licensing bases for how procedures will address regulatory requirements; how procedures will implement management measures and define the conduct of security operations; how those procedures will be established; how those procedures will be maintained and revised and how those revisions will be controlled. "

13. Sec. II, Acceptance Recognizing it is cited directly from the regulation, Item Clarify or delete from SRP Criteria, Specific SRP 4.E is nonetheless out of date:

Acceptance Criteria, item4 The TVA Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, holding a current construction permit under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50, shall meet the reyised requirements in paragraphs (a) through (r}, as applicable to the descriptions ofphysical security required to meet the requirements for a construction permit under the provision of 10 CFR Part 50 (10 CFR 73.55(a)(5J).

14. Sec. II, Acceptance "The acceptable descriptions of designs and specifications Restate with objective, defined criteria Criteria, following of physical security systems in submitted COL applications "Specific SRP is a minimum of 30 percent of a final or 100 percent of a Acceptance Criteria," *detailed design ... " is based on a subjective metric with no in section beginning regulatory basis. There is no NRC guidance on what

(

Industry Comments on NRC Proposed Revision to NUREG-0800, Section 13.6.1, "Physical Security- Combined License and Operating Reactors" Affected Section .Comment/Basis Recommendation with "Here is the constitutes or defines "final design" or "detailed design."

technical rationale for the application of these acceptance criteria," item 4

15. Sec. II, Acceptance* The item 3. statement, "The reviewer should evaluate only This sort of guidance conveys the staff's mistaken Criteria, following information that has been submitted by the applicant or belief that no information can be relied upon unless "Specific SRP licensee.on the docket," is incorrect and has no regulatory on the docket. The time has* long since passed that Acceptance Criteria," basis.. Coupled with the statement in item 4, "The review NRC !'ienior management and the Commission must in section beginning of design descriptions includes drawings (plan and section take up this matter and resolve the "level of detail" with "The following views), line and block diagrams, system and component issue, balancing the need for transparency in factors are in the schematics, system locations and configurations, review with the need for regulatory efficiency.

staff's generic performance specifications for material and structural review," items 3 and construction, specificati~ns for performance, and intended Clarify this guidance to make it unambiguous that 4 security functions," implies a* breathtaking level of detail Staff are ~xpected to review information maintained required in the application or otherwise docketed. The by the applicant and may rely on findings reached increase in level of detail expectations as part of the during such reviews.

application, or in docketed submittals that accompany the application, has resulted in the purported obligation for applicants to submit hundreds of thousands of pages of information, in contrast to past practice and staff guidance indicating that review of information maintained by the applicant is acceptable and expected. Recent claims by the staff that information "must be on the docket in order to be relied upon," based in large part by staff's fears of having to defend findings before the ACRS and/or ASLB, are resulting in excessive and undue regulatory burden.

16. Page 19, Section 4.E This paragraph discusses security requirements during Remove.this paragraph.

construction of Watts Bar 2. That unit is now operating.

I

Industry Comments on NRC Proposed Revision to NUREG-0800, Section 13.6.1, "Physical Security- Combined License and

. Operating Reactors" Affected Section Comment/Basis Recommendation

17. Page 21, Section Editorial- Double period at the end of this paragraph. Remove second period.

5.B.(ii).b

18. Page 29, Section Editorial- "excepted" appears, where it should be Replace "excepted" with "exempted".

11.D "exempted"

19. Page 39, Section 7 Editorial- Double period and extra space at the end of the Remove second period and extra space.

second to last sentence ..

20. Page 61, Section 17 Editorial- Struck-out words remains in text. Remove struck-out words.