L-17-197, Response to Request for Additional Information and Supplemental Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805
| ML17177A097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 06/23/2017 |
| From: | Richey M FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CAC MF3301, CAC MF3302, L-17-197 | |
| Download: ML17177A097 (165) | |
Text
FENOC' FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Marty L. Richey Site Vice President June 23, 2017 L-17-197 ATTN: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
SUBJECT:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 Beaver Valley Power Station P.O. Box4 Shippingport, PA 15077 724-682-5234 Fax: 724-643-8069 Response to Request for Additional Information and Supplemental Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 {CAC Nos. MF3301 and MF3302)
By letter dated December 23, 2013 (Accession No. ML14002A086), as supplemented by letters dated February 14, 2014; April 27, 2015; May 27, 2015; June 26, 2015; November 6, 2015; December 21, 2015; February 24, 2016; May 12, 2016; January 30, 2017; and April 21, 2017 (Accession Nos. ML14051A499, ML15118A484, ML15147A372, ML15177A110, ML15313A306, ML15356A136, ML16055A160, ML16133A340, ML17030A312, ML17111A883, ML17111A884, ML17111A885, ML17111A886, and ML17111A887, respectively), FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) to change the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 (BVPS-1) and Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2), fire protection program to one based on the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
Standard 805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants," 2001 Edition.
By letter dated March 4, 2015 (Accession No. ML15049A507), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requested additional information to complete its review. The remaining FENOC response to probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) questions 03 and 19 is included in Attachment 1 to this letter.
In previous responses to NRC questions during the review process, FENOC indicated that revisions to specific items in the license amendment request would be provided in future submittals. The enclosures to this letter replace, in their entirety, the following December 23, 2013 LAR attachments:
LAR Attachment G -
Recovery Actions Transition LAR Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 L-17-197 Page 2 LAR attachment G has been annotated to identify changes made consistent with previous FENOC responses to NRC requests for additional information (denoted by "RAI" in the right-hand margin), or other licensee-identified updates by FENOC (denoted by "LIC" in the right-hand margin). The licensee-identified updates are described in to this letter.
LAR Attachments G and W do not contain security-related information.
The information provided by this submittal does not invalidate the significant hazards consideration analysis provided in the December 23, 2013 letter.
There are no regulatory commitments included in this submittal. If there are any questions or if additional information is required, please contact Mr. Thomas A. Lentz, Manager - Fleet Licensing, at (330) 315-6810.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on June _1L, 2017.
Sincerely,
~
.....e-Ma L. Ri ey Attachments:
1. Response to RAI
- 2. Licensee-identified LAR Attachment G Update Descriptions
Enclosures:
A. LAR Attachment G -
Recovery Actions Transition B. LAR Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights cc:
NRC Region I Administrator NRC Resident Inspector NRC Project Manager Director BRP/DEP Site BRP/DEP Representative
L-17-197 Response to RAI Page 1 of 15 The NRC staffs March 4, 2015 requests for additional information are provided in bold text followed by the FENOC response.
PRA RAI 03 - Integrated Analysis Section 2.4.4.1 of NFPA-805 states that the change in public health risk arising from transition from the current fire protection program to an NFPA-805 based program, and all future plant changes to the program, shall be acceptable to the NRC. RG 1.174 provides quantitative guidelines on CDF and LERF, and identifies acceptable changes to these frequencies that result from proposed changes to the plant's licensing basis and describes a general framework to determine the acceptability of risk-informed changes. The NRC staff review of the information in the LAR has identified additional information that is required to fully characterize the risk estimates. The Unit 1 and 2 PRA methods currently under review in the LAR include:
- PRA RAI 15 regarding use of NUREG-1921
- FM RAI 1.e regarding secondary combustibles (e.g., in Fire Area 1-CR-4)
L-17-197 Page 2 of 15
- FM RAI 1.j subparts i, ii, iii, and vii regarding fire modeling to determine time to MCR abandonment due to loss of habitability Provide the following:
a) Results of an aggregate analysis that provides the integrated impact on the fire risk (i.e., the total transition CDF, LERF, CDF, LERF) of replacing any unacceptable methods identified above with alternative methods that are acceptable to the NRC. In this aggregate analysis, for those cases where the individual issues have a synergistic impact on the results, a simultaneous analysis must be performed. For those cases where no synergy exists, a one-at-a-time analysis may be done. For those cases that have a negligible impact, a qualitative evaluation may be done. It should be noted that this list may expand depending on NRC's review of the responses to other RAls in this document.
Response
Results of the aggregate analysis providing the integrated impact on the fire risk of replacing the unacceptable methods identified above with alternative methods acceptable to the NRC are provided in the updated LAR Attachment W, Tables W-2a, BVPS-1 Fire Compartment Risk Summary, and W-2b, BVPS-2 Fire Compartment Risk Summary. These values reflect the simultaneous analysis which was performed to properly capture the total impact of all cases. For convenience, the requested risk numbers are as follows:
BVPS-1 fire core damage frequency (CDF):
4.60E-05 per year (/yr)
BVPS-1 fire delta () CDF:
-3.85E-05/yr BVPS-1 fire large early release frequency (LERF): 4.56E-07/yr BVPS-1 fire LERF:
-2.14E-07/yr BVPS-2 fire CDF:
5.92E-05/yr BVPS-2 fire CDF:
-3.64E-06/yr BVPS-2 fire LERF:
1.11E-06/yr BVPS-2 fire LERF: -8.99E-07/yr PRA RAI 03 - Integrated Analysis Provide the following:
b) For each method (i.e., each bullet) above, explain how the issue will be addressed in (1) the final aggregate analysis results provided in support of the LAR; and (2) the PRA that will be used at the beginning of the self-approval of post-transition changes. In addition, provide a method to ensure that all changes will be made, that a focused-scope peer review will L-17-197 Page 3 of 15 be performed on changes that are PRA upgrades as defined in the PRA standard, and that any findings will be resolved before self-approval of post-transition changes.
Response
FENOC has addressed the listed issues in accordance with the previously-provided RAI responses regarding each individual item, and has incorporated all necessary updates into revised fire PRA models for both BVPS-1 and BVPS-2. The aggregate analysis results presented in the updated LAR Attachment W were obtained from these revised models and include the effects of updating each item as described. Specifically, the issues are addressed as follows:
PRA RAI 01.a regarding circuit failure mode likelihood The circuit failure mode likelihood analysis used in the fire PRA was updated in accordance with the guidance in NUREG/CR-7150 Volume 2, Joint Assessment of Cable Damage and Quantification of Effects from Fire (JACQUE-FIRE), and the updated values are used to perform this integrated analysis.
PRA RAI 01.d fire detection and suppression system unavailability The detailed fire modeling analyses were updated as described in the RAI response to incorporate plant-specific unavailability data for fire protection systems with historical unavailability exceeding a probability of 0.01, and the fire PRA models were updated accordingly prior to performing this integrated analysis.
PRA RAI 01.e regarding treatment of open circuits No fire PRA model updates were necessary. The failure mode in question for potentially-affected circuits was either evaluated as not credible or resulted in a modification commitment to eliminate the secondary fire potential per LAR Attachment S, Table S-3 implementation items BV1-2706 and BV2-1020.
PRA RAI 01.f regarding HRA dependency analysis No fire PRA model updates were necessary. The response to RAI 01.f.i clarified that the human error probability (HEP) consistency reviews and human reliability analysis (HRA) dependency analyses performed in response to the facts and observations (F&O) were consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-1921, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines. The response to PRA RAI 01.f.ii.01.01 clarified that FENOCs consideration of the suggested joint HEP minimum value of 1E-05 is consistent with the guidance in NUREG-1921 and NUREG-1792, Good Practices for Implementing Human Reliability Analysis. The follow-up RAI questions were primarily due to confusion stemming from use of specific terms and detailed results directly from the linked event tree software used at BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 in the initial RAI responses, which do not directly comport with the terminology and result details to be expected from use of the more common linked fault tree PRA software employed by most licensees.
L-17-197 Page 4 of 15 PRA RAI 02.b regarding common cause failure of charging pumps The fire PRA models for BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 were updated to include explicit consideration in the fault trees and split fraction boundary conditions and rules of failure of volume control tank isolation or letdown isolation as failing suction to the charging pumps in the absence of a safety injection signal. The original RAI response stated a sensitivity analysis would be performed, but the models were instead formally updated to include this failure mode so as to preclude future questions with regard to self-approval of risk-informed changes following transition.
The updated models were used to perform this integrated analysis.
PRA RAI 02.c regarding MCR HVAC dependency No fire PRA model updates were necessary. The RAI response clarified that this was a historical F&O and that the wall separating the BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 main control rooms (MCRs) has long since been removed. The air mixing intended by opening the door is now achieved inherently by the absence of the wall, and updated MCR ventilation analyses show that failure of BVPS-1 or BVPS-2 MCR heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) results in MCR ambient air temperature taking longer than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to exceed 115 degrees Fahrenheit (°F).
PRA RAI 04 regarding deviations from acceptable PRA methods The methods and analyses in question were either appropriately justified or updated using approved methods as described in the responses to PRA RAI 04 and PRA RAI 04.01, and the justified or updated methods were used to support this integrated analysis.
PRA RAI 05 regarding credit for repair No fire PRA model updates were necessary. The RAI response clarified that all such repair actions noted in Attachment G of the LAR are defense in depth recovery actions and are not credited in the fire PRA.
PRA RAI 06 regarding heat release rates (HRRs) lower than 317 kilowatts (kW) for transient sources No fire PRA model updates were necessary. The RAI response clarified that lower transient fire HRRs were used in accordance with the guidance from the June 21, 2012 memo from Joseph Giitter to Biff Bradley, Recent Fire PRA Methods review Panel Decisions and EPRI 1022993, Evaluation of Peak Heat Release Rates in Electrical Cabinets Fires.
PRA RAI 07 regarding treatment of sensitive electronics The treatment of sensitive electronics in the detailed fire modeling was reviewed and updated as necessary in accordance with frequently asked question (FAQ) 13-0004, as described in the RAI response. The updated detailed fire modeling was used to support this integrated analysis.
L-17-197 Page 5 of 15 PRA RAI 08 regarding transient fire placement The response to PRA RAI 08 clarified and appropriately justified the FENOC method of modeling transient fires, with the exception of the method of excluding transient fires from certain areas, particularly those areas behind substantial cable tray stacks deemed extremely difficult to access. This exception was the subject of two rounds of additional RAIs, PRA RAI 08.01 and PRA RAI 08.01.01. The response to PRA RAI 08.01.01 stated the BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 detailed fire models would be updated to evaluate transient fires in the spaces behind substantial cable tray stacks. The detailed fire models have been updated as described in the response to PRA RAI 08.01.01 and were used to support this integrated analysis.
PRA RAI 09 regarding propagation of fire from "well sealed" greater than (>) 440 Volt (V) electrical cabinets The detailed fire models were updated in accordance with the guidance in FAQ 14-0009 as described in the RAI response, and the updated fire models were used to support this integrated analysis.
PRA RAI 10 regarding dual MCR abandonment and CCDP No fire PRA model updates were necessary. The RAI response provided clarification and justification on BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 modeling of MCR abandonment due to loss of habitability. The RAI response also acknowledged that parameter changes due to other RAI responses may have an effect on MCR abandonment. Therefore, following other RAI responses, MCR abandonment modeling was reconsidered and determined to remain valid prior to performing this integrated analysis.
PRA RAI 11 regarding crediting MCR abandonment No fire PRA model updates were necessary. The RAI response (and subsequent response to PRA RAI 11.01) clarified and appropriately justified the BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 modeling of MCR abandonment due to loss of control.
PRA RAI 12 regarding incipient detection credit The fire PRA models were ultimately updated to credit incipient detection in accordance with the guidance presented in NUREG-2180, Determining the Effectiveness, Limitations, and Operator Response for Very Early Warning Fire Detection Systems in Nuclear Facilities (DELORES-VEWFIRE), as a sensitivity study in response to PRA RAI 27. The updated fire PRA sensitivity models were used to perform this integrated analysis. Further discussion on this topic is provided below.
PRA RAI 13 regarding fire damage effects from the opposite unit No fire PRA model updates were necessary. The RAI response clarified the treatment of fire damage effects from the opposite unit and impacts on shared systems, and established appropriate justification for the existing modeling.
L-17-197 Page 6 of 15 PRA RAI 14 regarding state of knowledge correlation (SOKC)
No fire PRA model updates were necessary. An uncertainty analysis was performed on CDF and LERF for each of the updated BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 fire PRA models used to support this integrated analysis. In both cases, the mean uncertainty values accounting for SOKC showed only a very small increase over the nominal point estimate values. Therefore, use of point estimate values is appropriately justified for the application.
PRA RAI 15 regarding use of NUREG-1921 No fire PRA model updates were necessary. The RAI response clarified that the HRA used in the fire PRA models supporting the LAR, and subsequently this integrated analysis, was performed in accordance with NUREG-1921, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines.
PRA RAI 19 regarding large risk reduction credit No fire PRA model updates were necessary. The risk reduction credit was clarified and appropriately justified for this integrated analysis.
PRA RAI 25 regarding treatment of welding and cutting cable fires As discussed in the RAI response, the approach to modeling cable fires due to cutting and welding was updated as necessary according to the guidance in FAQ 13-0005, and the updated models were used to perform this integrated analysis.
PRA RAI 26 regarding modeling the Unit 1 Main Control Board (MCB) vertical boards The modeling of time delay for fire damage progression in the MCB vertical boards was updated as described in the RAI response, and the updated fire models were used to perform this integrated analysis.
FM RAI 1.e regarding secondary combustibles (for example, in Fire Area 1-CR-4)
Previously-screened non-cable secondary combustibles were walked down and reviewed as described in the RAI response. Any non-cable secondary combustibles that were not bounded, including the battery arrays in fire compartment 1-CR-4, were added as appropriate to the associated fire growth analysis and incorporated into the revised detailed fire modeling used to support this integrated analysis.
FM RAI 1.j subparts i, ii, iii, and vii regarding fire modeling to determine time to MCR abandonment due to loss of habitability The detailed fire modeling in the MCR was updated as described in the RAI responses to account for the noted obstruction volumes in the calculation of time to abandonment, as well as the effects of fire spread to adjacent cabinets. Other aspects of the RAI were appropriately justified in the responses. The updated detailed fire models were used to support this integrated analysis.
L-17-197 Page 7 of 15 In addition to the bulleted list specifically contained in this RAI, the following items were also updated in accordance with other RAI responses:
PRA RAI 01.b - The sensitivity study required by FAQ 08-0048 comparing results using the updated fire ignition frequencies from NUREG/CR-6850, Supplement 1, Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods Enhancements, against results using the original NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities, ignition frequencies for bins in Section 6 with alpha values less than or equal to 1.0 was performed on the updated fire PRA models used to support this integrated analysis. The results are consistent with those previously reported.
For BVPS-1, the sensitivity study yields an overall CDF increase of approximately 74 percent (%), and a LERF increase of approximately 87%. These values remain within the threshold of acceptability per Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis. For BVPS-2, the sensitivity study yields an overall CDF increase of approximately 88%, and a LERF increase of approximately 61%. These values remain within the threshold of acceptability per RG 1.174. It should be noted that scenarios in fire compartments 1-CR-4, 2-CB-1, and 2-CB-6 are excluded from this sensitivity study because they were updated using fire ignition frequencies from NUREG-2169, Nuclear Power Plant Fire Ignition Frequency and Non-Suppression Probability Estimation Using the Updated Fire Events Database: United States Fire Event Experience Through 2009, as discussed later in this response. Use of NUREG-2169 does not require an attendant sensitivity study.
PRA RAI 02.f - The HEPs for operator actions OPRMA1 and OPRMA2 were updated to model system time windows and cue delay time more consistently in accordance with the response to PRA RAI 02.f, and the updated values were used to support this integrated analysis.
PRA RAI 16 - Credit for the Westinghouse reactor coolant pump (RCP) shutdown seals (Generation III) was updated in accordance with the latest guidance in PWROG-14001-P, PRA Model for the Generation III Westinghouse Shutdown Seal, and the updated model was used to support this integrated analysis.
Westinghouse recently recommended that BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 PRA models include an additional O-ring failure probability of approximately 8.0E-04 added to the seals rate of failure for model 93A RCPs. Sensitivity studies show inclusion of this factor will increase fire CDF and LERF reported in this response by less than 1% at both BVPS-1 and BVPS-2, and will therefore not noticeably affect the results.
PRA RAI 18 - LAR Attachment W, Tables W-2a and W-2b have each been updated to include a column specifying the additional risk of recovery actions as described in the response to PRA RAI 18. Similarly, Attachment G has been updated to include a column in Tables G-1 and G-2 specifying whether actions are classified as primary control station (PCS), risk reduction (RR), defense in depth (DID), or RR and DID.
Replacements for LAR Attachments G and W are included in this submittal.
L-17-197 Page 8 of 15 FM RAI 01.f - No fire PRA model updates were necessary. The RAI response explained how model assumptions regarding transient combustibles will not be violated during transition and post-transition, and justified the use of HRRs less than 317 kW in specific scenarios.
FM RAI 02.b - Cable tray covers were visually inspected for holes or gaps and the detailed fire models were updated as necessary to remove credit to delay damage for any such incomplete covers, as described in the response to FM FAI 02.b. The updated models were used to support this integrated analysis.
FM RAI 02.c - The treatment of sensitive electronics in the detailed fire modeling was reviewed and updated as necessary in accordance with FAQ 13-0004, as described in the RAI response. The updated detailed fire modeling was used to support this integrated analysis.
The updated risk and change in risk results in LAR Attachment W also include the overall effects of addressing the retirement of FAQ 08-0046 and replacing the fire PRA credit for incipient detection with the methods contained in NUREG-2180. To improve the risk results after updating the incipient detection credit, compartment 1-CR-4 at BVPS-1 and compartments 2-CB-1 and 2-CB-6 at BVPS-2 also include use of the updated parameters in NUREG-2169 and NUREG-2178, Refining And Characterizing Heat Release Rates From Electrical Enclosures During Fire (RACHELLE-FIRE) -
Volume 1: Peak Heat Release Rates and Effect of Obstructed Plume, regarding fire ignition frequencies, heat release rates, severity factors, and non-suppression probabilities, as well as the obstructed plume methodology where appropriate.
Additionally, several new modifications and operator actions were credited to reduce the risk and are discussed more fully in the response to PRA RAI 03(c).
In accordance with PRA RAI 27, these updated results in LAR Attachment W are considered as a sensitivity study. The nature of the updated fire modeling parameters used from NUREG-2169 and NUREG-2178 are such that to be fully valid they must be applied to the entire plant, but for BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 they have thus far been applied only to the compartments crediting incipient detection. LAR Attachment S, Table S-3, implementation item BV2-1750 will update the remaining areas at each unit to similarly incorporate the new parameters prior to full compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c). Based on industry experience, it is expected that incorporation of the new fire modeling parameters will result in an overall reduction in risk from the values currently presented in the updated LAR Attachment W. It is also recognized that incorporation of direct current hot short duration factors and the obstructed plume methodology constitutes a PRA upgrade requiring a focused PRA peer review to confirm proper implementation of the method. As the BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 fire PRA models are formally updated to include the new fire modeling parameters employed in this sensitivity prior to self-approval, they are subject to the conditions of FENOC procedures. As stated previously in the response to PRA RAI 24, these procedures stipulate, in part, that all PRA model upgrades (as defined per the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, or ASME, PRA Standard) require a peer review, with all resulting F&Os being appropriately L-17-197 Page 9 of 15 addressed prior to formal issuance and use of the model in question. Additionally, the response to PRA RAI 22 created LAR Attachment S, Table S-3 implementation items BVPS-3108 and BVPS-1622. These implementation items require the fire PRA models to be updated to properly reflect the as-built, as-operated plant following completion of all other items in LAR Attachment S, Tables S-2 and S-3 determined to affect the fire PRA models, prior to full compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c).
PRA RAI 03 - Integrated Analysis Provide the following:
c) In the response, explain how the RG 1.205 risk acceptance guidelines are satisfied for the aggregate analysis. If applicable include a description of any new modifications or operator actions being credited to reduce delta risk as well as a discussion of the associated impacts to the fire protection program.
Response
The updated BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 risk and change-in-risk results satisfy the RG 1.205, Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection for Existing Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants, risk acceptance guidelines for this integrated analysis by virtue of demonstrating total plant CDF less than 1.00E-04 and total plant LERF less than 1.00E-05, and total change-in-risk associated with the transition to NFPA 805 of less than 1.00E-05 CDF and less than 1.00E-06 LERF. Specific risk and change-in-risk values are provided in the updated LAR Attachment W Tables W-2a and W-2b, included with this submittal.
New modifications credited to reduce risk and delta risk include installation of certain cable tray covers, fire wrapping of certain cables, and sealing of certain cabinet penetrations as described in LAR Attachment S, Table S-2 modification items BV1-3221 and BV2-1748. Impact to the fire protection program will include any additional periodic inspections of the cable tray covers, fire wrap, and penetration seals as required by plant procedures.
Up to three new unique operator actions are credited in the fire PRA for fires in compartments 1-CR-4, 2-CB-1, and 2-CB-6. These are designated in the fire PRA as OPRD18, OPRD19, and OPRC19. OPRD18 is the operator action to use steam generator (SG) level indication at the backup indicating panel for BVPS-1 or the alternate shutdown panel for BVPS-2, given that the normal SG level instruments in the control room are all fire-affected. This allows the operators to throttle auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow as necessary to prevent overfilling the SGs in the case that the steam driven AFW pump is being relied upon in a given scenario. OPRD19 is the operator action to locally read refueling water storage tank level at the electrical penetration, given downstream fire impacts that affect indication in the control room.
L-17-197 Page 10 of 15 This allows the operators to monitor refueling water storage tank level in order to switch to containment sump recirculation when necessary. This is a long-term action, since the worst-case expected loss of coolant accident (LOCA) in the affected fire compartments would still allow approximately three hours before reaching the recirculation switchover criteria. OPRC19 is the operator action to locally align the normally-racked-out standby charging/high-head safety injection pump in the event that a spurious transfer to recirculation signal combined with a safety injection signal caused a transfer of charging pump suction to an effectively empty containment sump, failing both normally-aligned pumps on loss of net positive suction head. These actions have been considered for HEP dependencies, including the combined minimum joint HEP value, as described in the response to PRA RAI 01.f.ii.01.01 (for example, OPRD18 and OPRD19 are credited such that subsequent actions are modeled with complete dependence), and for inclusion in the updated LAR Attachment G provided with this submittal.
PRA RAI 03 - Integrated Analysis Provide the following:
d) If any of the methods not accepted by the NRC staff will be retained in the PRA that will be used to estimate the change in risk of post-transition changes to support self-approval, explain how the quantification results for each future change will account for the use of these methods.
Response
The fire PRA that will be used to estimate the change-in-risk of post-transition changes prior to full compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) will not retain any of the methods identified in this RAI as not being accepted by the NRC, as of this response. Future updates and upgrades of the BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 PRA models will be conducted in accordance with FENOC procedures as specified previously in the response to PRA RAI 24, including consideration of new methods as they become available.
PRA RAI 19-Large Reduction Credit for Modifications Section 2.4.3.3 of NFPA 805 states that the PRA approach, methods, and data shall be acceptable to the NRC. Section 2.4.4.1 of NFPA-805 further states that the change in public health risk arising from transition from the current fire protection program to an NFPA-805 based program, and all future plant changes to the program, shall be acceptable to the NRC. RG 1.174 provides quantitative guidelines on core damage frequency, large early release frequency, and identifies acceptable changes to these frequencies that result from proposed changes to the plant's licensing basis and describes a general framework to determine the acceptability of risk-informed changes. The NRC staff review of the L-17-197 Page 11 of 15 information in the LAR has identified the following information that is required to fully characterize the risk estimates.
Appreciable risk reduction credit is presented in Attachment W of the LAR for non-VFDR risk reduction modifications. Section 3.2.5 of RG 1.205 states that risk decreases may be combined with risk increases for the purposes of evaluating combined changes in accordance with regulatory positions presented in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 of RG 1.174, Revision 2, and in this case the total increase and total decrease in the CDF and LERF should be provided. Tables W-2a and W-2b of the LAR report risk values for each fire area, both before and after crediting in-cabinet incipient detection and installation of RCP shutdown seals. These tables also present the corresponding "risk offsets" (i.e., total risk decrease) associated with these risk reduction modifications.
Conservative calculation of the compliant plant CDF and LERF can lead to a non-conservative calculation of the CDF and LERF (and overestimation of risk offset). The NRC staff acknowledges that installation of incipient detection and new RCP seals represent significant risk reduction. However, given the significance of the risk reduction credited for specific modifications, and the possibility of non-conservative calculation of the CDF and LERF, address the following for both Units 1 and 2:
a) Provide (or point out if already provided) the total risk increase associated with unresolved (i.e., retained) VFDRs.
Response
The total risk increase for BVPS-1 associated with unresolved (retained) variances from deterministic requirements (VFDRs) is presented in the final row of Table W-2a of the updated LAR Attachment W as follows:
The total BVPS-1 CDF increase excluding risk offset is 5.89E-05/yr.
The total BVPS-1 CDF increase including risk offset is -3.85E-05/yr.
The total BVPS-1 LERF increase excluding risk offset is 4.31E-07/yr.
The total BVPS-1 LERF increase including risk offset is -2.14E-07/yr.
The total risk increase for BVPS-2 associated with unresolved (retained) VFDRs is presented in the final row of Table W-2b of the updated LAR Attachment W as follows:
The total BVPS-2 CDF increase excluding risk offset is 6.86E-05/yr.
The total BVPS-2 CDF increase including risk offset is -3.64E-06/yr.
The total BVPS-2 LERF increase excluding risk offset is 1.78E-06/yr.
The total BVPS-2 LERF increase including risk offset is -8.99E-07/yr.
L-17-197 Page 12 of 15 PRA RAI 19-Large Reduction Credit for Modifications b) Summarize the risk significant scenarios for fire areas in the compliant plant model that are most significantly impacted by the risk offset, and discuss the contribution of fire-induced failures for those scenarios.
Response
For BVPS-1 and BVPS-2, the risk-significant scenarios for fire compartments in the compliant plant model most significantly impacted by the risk offset are well aligned with the modifications credited to produce the risk offset. As described previously in the response to PRA RAI 20, the modifications credited for risk offset are the incipient detection system and the low-leakage Westinghouse RCP shutdown seals.
At BVPS-1, the compartments most significantly impacted by the risk offset are 1-CR-4 (process instrumentation room), 1-NS-1 (normal switchgear room), and 1-TB-1 (turbine building). The risk offset credited in 1-CR-4 is due largely to the installation of the incipient detection system in the risk-significant low-voltage electrical cabinets in the room. This serves to reduce the frequency of fires spreading to involve additional targets outside the source cabinet by increasing the frequency of fires that are extinguished prior to leaving the cabinet in which they ignite. Fires that do not spread to additional targets generally affect fewer plant systems and result in a lower conditional core damage probability (CCDP). The compliant plant model uses the cabinet scenario frequencies that would result from not having the incipient detection system installed, yielding a greater frequency of fires growing to engulf additional targets for a corresponding increase in CCDP. Thus, the risk offset from this modification is effectively a shift in the fire scenario frequencies for the affected cabinets. The other risk offset modification, installation of the low-leakage RCP shutdown seals, also contributes to the risk offset in 1-CR-4. In the compliant plant model, approximately 40% of the CDF in 1-CR-4 is attributable to sequences in which the fire damage leads to a loss of all alternating current (AC) power, which causes failure of the charging pumps and RCP seal injection. Given that RCP thermal barrier cooling is also not available due to the assumed failure of instrument air (discussed in the response to PRA RAI 19(c)), and the fact that the loss of AC power would also fail thermal barrier cooling even had it remained otherwise available, this results in a loss of all RCP seal cooling. Without credit for the shutdown seals, increased seal leakage is more likely.
With no RCS makeup capability due to the loss of all AC power, such sequences involving increased RCP seal leakage progress to core damage. Therefore, the risk offset credited here due to the low leakage shutdown seals is reasonable, since the modification in question significantly reduces the likelihood of increased RCP seal leakage and thereby directly mitigates the dominant failure mechanism driving core damage in the compliant plant model.
Fire risk in the compliant plant models for compartments 1-NS-1 and 1-TB-1 is similarly dominated by RCP seal LOCAs. The majority of the core damage sequences for scenarios in 1-NS-1 involve fire impacts to the feeder breakers for both emergency AC L-17-197 Page 13 of 15 power busses as well as both emergency diesel generators (EDGs), which result in a loss of AC power. Loss of power causes a failure of all RCP seal cooling, leading to increased seal leakage, which cannot be mitigated due to failure of RCS injection capability as the charging/high head safety injection (HHSI) pumps have no AC power.
Fire scenarios in 1-TB-1 impact the normal power AC busses and effectively induce a loss of offsite power. Random failure of the EDGs on both emergency busses leads to a loss of all AC power, which causes a seal LOCA with no ability to makeup to the RCS.
This failure mode dominates the core damage sequences for scenarios in the compliant plant model for 1-TB-1. The risk offset credit is therefore validated since the credited modification to install the low-leakage shutdown seals directly mitigates the failure mechanism leading to core damage in such cases.
At BVPS-2, the compartments most significantly impacted by the risk offset are 2-CB-1 (instrument and relay room, cable spreading room, and cable tunnel), 2-SB-4 (normal switchgear room), and 2-MS-1 (main steam valve room). Similar to 1-CR-4 at BVPS-1 as discussed above, the risk offset credited in 2-CB-1 is largely due to the installation of the incipient detection system. The most risk-significant scenarios in the compliant plant model are fires that ignite in various electrical cabinets and spread to involve additional external targets. As described above relative to BVPS-1, incipient detection significantly reduces the frequency at which such fires expand beyond the source cabinet, which serves to substantially reduce the frequency of core damage due to fires in 2-CB-1. The low-leakage shutdown seals also reduce the fire risk in 2-CB-1, because most of the remaining core damage scenarios in the compliant model involve fire impacts to the solid state protection system (SSPS) cabinets or circuits, which fail the function of the charging/HHSI pumps and cause a loss of RCP seal cooling. This results in an increased likelihood of substantial RCP seal leakage, which cannot be mitigated without the charging/HHSI pumps.
Fire risk in the 2-SB-4 compliant plant model is also dominated by RCP seal LOCAs, as more than 88% of the CDF consists of sequences driven by the loss of seal cooling combined with failure of RCS makeup capability. Fire impacts cause a loss of the normal offsite power supplies. EDG2-2 (B train) fails due to fire impacts affecting its ventilation subsystems, while EDG2-1 (A train) suffers a random failure. The resulting loss of AC power causes failure of the charging/HHSI pumps and a loss of all RCP seal cooling, leading to increased RCP seal leakage. With RCS makeup unavailable due to the loss of support power, these seal LOCA scenarios progress to core damage. The 2-MS-1 compliant plant model results are similarly driven by RCP seal LOCAs, which contribute to over 98% of the compliant CDF for the compartment. Fires in this compartment damage the main steam pressure transmitters, which results in a failure of input to SSPS. Failure of SSPS combined with failure of the operator action to manually actuate the system renders the charging/HHSI system nonfunctional and results in loss of RCP seal cooling. This leads to a probability of increased RCP seal leakage, which progresses to core damage since RCS makeup via the charging/HHSI system is failed.
Installation of the low-leakage shutdown seals greatly reduces the likelihood of increased RCP seal leakage under these circumstances and directly contributes to offsetting the attendant fire risk.
L-17-197 Page 14 of 15 It is therefore demonstrated that the modifications credited for the risk offset directly mitigate the failure modes which would otherwise drive fire risk in the compliant plant models. This serves to validate the risk offset credited for the NFPA 805 transition delta risk.
PRA RAI 19-Large Reduction Credit for Modifications c) Discuss the impact of any important modeling assumptions contributing to the risk significant scenarios for fire areas in the compliant plant model.
Specifically address conservative modeling assumptions made in the compliant plant model that may artificially reduce the calculated change-risk-risk (or result in overestimating the risk offset).
Response
There are no modeling assumptions made in the compliant plant models for BVPS-1 or BVPS-2 that may artificially reduce the calculated change in risk (or result in overestimating the risk offset). Assumptions made in the compliant plant models were also made in the transitioning plant models such that the change in risk would not be affected and are listed below.
All of these assumptions are conservative and have the effect of increasing the reported risk values; however, they are present in both the transitioning plant model and the compliant plant model and so they have no effect on the reported change in risk. No additional conservative assumptions are made in the compliant plant model that were not also made in the transitioning plant model. A more complete description of how FENOC defined the compliant plant models for use in calculating the change in risk was previously provided in the response to PRA RAI 17.
The conservative assumptions made in both the compliant plant and transitioning plant models include the following:
Instrument air and containment instrument air are assumed to fail for all fires, due to the low-temperature copper piping and soldered joints present throughout the system, which would likely fail if exposed to fire temperatures RCP thermal barrier cooling is not credited for fires, due to its dependence on instrument air Main feedwater is assumed to fail for all fires, except for the cases in which its continued operation would have a more severe consequence (the specific ability to trip the main feedwater pumps and condensate pumps is specifically modeled)
Quench spray pumps are not credited; however they are modeled for potential spurious operation L-17-197 Page 15 of 15 Emergency AC power cross-tie between BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 is not credited, due to the time required to establish the off-normal alignment and other expected effects of a fire Inside recirculation spray system is not credited (it is not modeled as spurious operation would have no consequence, aside from potentially cavitating and failing the pumps that are not credited)
RCPs are assumed to require deliberate action to trip, even if power is lost to the supporting 4160 V bus - this accounts for potential inopportune timing of failures, such that the bus may not actually fail until later in the scenario after the RCP has continued to operate long enough to induce a seal LOCA PRA RAI 19-Large Reduction Credit for Modifications d) If conservative modeling of the compliant plant is identified as contributing to under estimation of the total change-in risk, then demonstrate that the total risk increase associated with unresolved VFDRs is offset by the total risk decrease associated with risk reduction modifications even when conservative modeling is removed. Alternatively, replace the conservative modeling with realistic modeling that does not underestimate the total change-in-risk in the integrated analysis provided in response to PRA RAI 3.
Response
As discussed in the response to PRA RAI 19(c), FENOC did not employ conservative modeling of compliant plant conditions that could contribute to underestimation of the total change-in-risk.
L-17-197 Licensee-identified LAR Attachment G Update Descriptions Page 1 of 1 LIC (1): Updated by feasibility study (8700-01.062-0043, BVPS Unit 1 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Operator Manual Action Feasibility Study and 2701.620-000-049, BVPS-2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Operator Manual Action Feasibility Study).
LIC (2): Updated by DID expert panel. Operator action to block spurious safety injection system prior to battery depletion. Resolution to BV1-3129.
LIC (3): Updated by DID expert panel. Operator action if actions to prevent or reset a spurious safety injection signal are not effective.
LIC (4): Addresses IN 92-18.
LIC (5): Corrected component name.
LIC (6): Deleted VFDR. No longer in System Assurance and Fire Protection Engineering (SAFE) software due to a more detailed analysis.
LIC (7): Added by DID expert panel.
LIC (8): Added by fire PRA.
LIC (9): Updated component list based on SAFE software.
LIC (10): New VFDR for generic compartments not quantitatively screened in PRA-BV1-13-018, Rev 0, PRA Input to FRE for Generic Fire Compartments.
LIC (11): EDG HVAC cables are addressed by Licensing Action 11.05.
LIC (12): Editorial change.
LIC (13): Alternate MCR action in lieu of local action due to impacted components in the fire area.
LIC (14): Deleted VFDR based on a detailed circuit analysis.
LIC (15): VFDR-2771 is a DID recovery action for 1-DG-1 and 1-SB-GEN.
LIC (16): Modification to normal system alignment to rack out startup feed pump breaker (BV2-1749).
LIC (17): Deleted VFDR. Credited existing electrical raceway fire barrier system.
LIC (18): Not used for risk reduction.
LIC (19): Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 removed.
LIC (20): Table G-1 corrected to Table G-2 for BVPS-2 on pages G-53 through G-104.
Enclosure A L-17-197 LAR Attachment G - Recovery Actions Transition (104 pages follow)
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G.
Recovery Actions Transition 103 Pages Attached
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In accordance with the guidance provided in NEI 04-02, FAQ 07-0030, Revision 5, and RG 1.205, the following methodology was used to determine recovery actions required for compliance (i.e., determining the population of post-transition recovery actions). The methodology consisted of the following steps:
Step 1: Define the primary control station(s) and determine which pre-transition OMAs are taken at primary control station(s) (Activities that occur in the Main Control Room are not considered pre-transition OMAs). Activities that take place at primary control station(s) or in the Main Control Room are not recovery actions, by definition.
Step 2: Determine the population of recovery actions that are required to resolve VFDRs (to meet the risk acceptance criteria or maintain a sufficient level of defense-in-depth).
Step 3: Evaluate the additional risk presented by the use of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path.
Step 4: Evaluate the feasibility of the recovery actions.
Step 5: Evaluate the reliability of the recovery actions.
An overview of these steps and the results of their implementation are provided below.
Step 1 - Clearly define the primary control station(s) and determine which pre-transition OMAs are taken at primary control station(s)
The first task in the process of determining the post-transition population of recovery actions was to apply the NFPA 805 definition of recovery action and the RG 1.205 definition of primary control station to determine those activities that are taken at primary control stations. The primary control station was determined based on the definition provided in RG 1.205 and by following the additional guidance in FAQ 07-0030.
Results of Step 1:
Based on the definition provided in RG 1.205 and the additional guidance provided in FAQ 07-0030, the following locations are considered primary control stations:
BVPS-1: Backup Indicating Panel (BIP) located in Fire Compartment 1-CV-2, East Cable Vault Transfer switches are installed in the East and West Cable Vault to transfer control or instrument signals from their normal circuit to the BIP. With the control circuit or instrument loop transferred to the BIP, the circuit is disconnected from any cables leading to the Control Room or process racks and is therefore independent of the original fire areas of concern. The BIP is powered through two redundant sources (one from each train - MCC-1-E5 and MCC-1-E10) through the AC distribution panel (PNL-AC-BIP) and also provides reliable alternate power to the incore thermocouple reference junction box and to a portable source range drawer, which can be connected to the preamplifier in the East Cable Vault to monitor source range indication in the event all normal source range channels are lost as a result of the fire.
A DC distribution panel, fed from the BIP AC distribution panel via a rectifier, supplies 125VDC power to the BIP for control of RCGVS vent valves and containment air recirculation cooler inlet isolation valves.
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BVPS-2: Alternate Shutdown Panel (ASP) located in Fire Compartment 2-ASP, Alternate Shutdown Panel Room Transfer switches are installed on the ASP to transfer control signals from their normal circuit to the ASP. With the control circuit transferred to the ASP, the circuit is disconnected from any cables leading to the Control Room or process racks and is therefore independent of the original fire areas of concern. The ASP is powered from MCC2-E15 through isolation regulation transformer TRF-IRT-ASP.
Table G BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station and Table G BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station identify the activities that occur at the primary control stations for Unit 1 and Unit 2, respectively. The activities performed at the primary control stations do not require the analysis of additional risk and are compliant with NFPA 805, Section 4.2.3.1.
The Backup Indicating Panel (BIP) for BVPS-1 and the Alternate Shutdown Panel (ASP) for BVPS-2 are primary control stations only for a fire that requires Main Control Room (MCR) evacuation.
Step 2 - Determine the population of recovery actions that are required to resolve VFDRs (to meet the risk or defense-in-depth criteria)
On a fire compartment basis all VFDRs were identified in the NEI 04-02 Table B-3 (See Attachment C). Each VFDR not brought into compliance with the deterministic approach was evaluated using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4. The performance-based evaluations resulted in the need for recovery actions to meet the risk acceptance criteria or maintain a sufficient level of defense in depth.
Results of Step 2:
The final set of recovery actions is provided in Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Stations and Table G-2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Stations.
Step 3: Evaluate the Additional Risk of the Use of Recovery Actions Results were determined after consulting NFPA 805 Section 4.2.3.1 and NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4. Although NFPA 805 Section 4.2.3.1 does not allow recovery actions when using the deterministic approach, NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4 allows a risk-informed, performance-based approach, provided that the additional risk is evaluated in accordance with this section of NFPA 805.
Results of Step 3:
The set of recovery actions necessary to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria was evaluated for additional risk using the process described in NEI 04-02, FAQ 07-0030, and RG 1.205 and compared against the guidelines of RG 1.174 and RG 1.205. Other recovery actions, whether credited for defense in depth, or credited to overcome a combination of fire-induced and random failures but not involving the success path, are not evaluated for the additional risk of their use.
A discussion of the additional risk of recovery actions is provided in LAR Attachment W.
Assessment of potential adverse effects of operator actions is addressed in the development of operator actions in the fire compartment specific Fire Risk Evaluations.
SSD RAI 04(b)
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Recovery actions necessary to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria were found to be acceptable.
Step 4: Evaluate the Feasibility of Recovery Actions Recovery actions were evaluated against the feasibility criteria provided in the NEI 04-02, FAQ 07-0030, Revision 5, and RG 1.205. Note that since actions taken at the primary control station are not recovery actions their feasibility is evaluated in accordance with procedures for validation of off-normal procedures.
Results of Step 4:
Recovery actions in existing procedures have been identified and credit was taken for previous completed feasibility studies (8700-01.062-0043, BVPS Unit 1 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Operator Manual Action Feasibility Study or 2701.620-000-049, BVPS Unit 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Operator Manual Action Feasibility Study) that include these recovery actions.
Recovery actions not currently in existing Appendix R response procedures have been identified and reviewed for feasibility by an expert panel. This expert panel consisted of:
A current licensed reactor operator or a previously licensed senior reactor operator at the site, An engineer familiar with the sites Fire PRA model, specifically with how it is used to determine operator actions credited for risk reduction, A fire protection program specialist (Appendix R Program Engineer or consultant, or an NFPA 805 Program Engineer or consultant).
The expert panels consensus for feasibility took into account the feasibility criteria for recovery actions as listed in Appendix B.5.2 of NFPA 805 along with the use of training and drills as originally discussed in earlier versions of NEI 04-02 and current FAQ 07-0030.
The expert panel has determined that all recovery actions listed in Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Stations and Table G-2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Stations that are not currently in Appendix R response procedures are feasible. As part of implementation, procedure updates will be required to incorporate new recovery actions. After procedures are updated to include these additional recovery actions, confirmatory demonstration of the feasibility of these recovery actions will be performed. Training and fire brigade drills will be updated after completion of the procedures (see Attachment S, Table S-3, Implementation Items in BV1-3027).
The overall results of the feasibility assessment demonstrate that NFPA 805 recovery actions are creditable.
Step 5: Evaluate the Reliability of Recovery Actions The reliability of recovery actions modeled specifically in the Fire PRA was addressed using Fire PRA methods. The evaluation of the reliability of recovery actions depends upon its characterization.
The reliability of recovery actions that are modeled specifically in the Fire PRA will be addressed using Fire PRA methods (i.e., Human Reliability Analysis - HRA).
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The reliability of operator actions not modeled specifically in the Fire PRA is bounded by the treatment of additional risk associated with the applicable VFDR. In calculating the additional risk of the VFDR, the compliant case recovers the fire-induced failures as if the variant condition no longer exists. The resulting delta risk between the variant and compliant condition bounds any additional risk for the recovery action even if that recovery action was not modeled.
Results of Step 5:
The reliability of recovery actions modeled specifically in the Fire PRA was addressed using Fire PRA methods, as discussed in Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 PRA Notebook Task 12, Fire Human Reliability Analysis and Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 PRA Notebook Task 12 Fire Human Reliability Analysis.
An implementation item is identified to review and update (if needed) the Fire HRA upon completion of the procedure updates, modifications and training (see Attachment S, Table S-3, Implementation Items in BV1-3027).
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CO-2 1-FB-1 1-H-1 1-PA-1GA 1-PA-1GB 1-PA-1GC 1-SGPD-1 1-VP-1 1-VP-2 1-WT-1 1-WT-10 1-WT-11 1-WT-26 3-ER-3 3-IS-3 3-IS-4 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B, & C steam flow.
OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow, and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-3180 DID 1-CR-2 LI-1FW-475BP LI-1RC-460BP PI-1RC-403BP TI-1RC-410BP BIP Power SG Levels Pressurizer Level RCS Loop B WR Pressure RCS Cold Leg Loop 1A Recorder Temp BIP Power Supply Use supplementary controls and monitoring from the BIP.
BV1-2144 RA DID 1-CR-2 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B, & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow, and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2163 RA DID 1-CR-2 1VS-AC-1A 1VS-C-1A 1VS-E-4A 1VS-F-40A 1VS-P-3A System Air Handler System Air Compressor Control Area A/C Condensing Unit System Return Air Fan Control Air Conditioning Cond Pump Install 2 5200 CFM portable fans in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
- 1. Credit BV2 HVAC System if available (not a recovery action).
- 2. Install portable electric fan(s) in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
BV1-2476 RA RR SSD RAI 05 SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
LIC (7)
LIC (10)
LIC (5)
I.____I
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- ID D
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CR-2 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-630, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to the AFW pump suction.
Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2792 RA RR 1-CR-2 1-SSPS-SIS-A 1-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, then re-establish.
BV1-3146 DID 1-CR-3 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B, & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2090 RA DID 1-CR-3 4KVS-1DF 4KVS-1D-1D10 4KVS-1F-1F7 1-EE-EG-2 PNL-DG-SEQ-2 1DF 4160V 1DF Emergency Bus SS Bus Supply Breaker to the 1DF bus.
1DF Bus Normal Supply Breaker
- 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Diesel Gen Load Sequencer Align AE and DF bus loads as required.
BV1-2094 RA RR 1-CR-3 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-630, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to the AFW pump suction.
Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
LIC (1)
LIC (2)
LIC (7)
LIC (5)
LIC (5)
D
- ID IC]
D
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CR-3 4KVS-1AE-1E11-P 4KVS-1AE-1E15-P 4KVS-1DF-1F11-P 4KVS-1DF-1F15-P MOV-1SI-867A-P MOV-1SI-867B-P MOV-1SI-867C-P MOV-1SI-867D-P Spurious SI P-1A Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker P-1B Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Spurious SI Signal IF actions to prevent OR reset a spurious SI signal are not effective, then remove control power and trip the spuriously started Charging Pump Breaker(s). Manually start and stop 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to provide RCS makeup flow.
De-energize MOV-1SI-867C at MCC-1-E5 and MOV-1SI-867D at MCC-1-E6 and manually close the spuriously operated valve/valves (as required).
BV1-3149 DID 1-CR-4 4KVS-1A-1A1 4KVS-1B-1B1 4KVS-1C-1C1 4KVS-1D-1D1 HYV-1FW-100A HYV-1FW-100B HYV-1FW-100C MFW Pump Motor 1A1 MFW Pump Motor 1A2 MFW Pump Motor 1B1 MFW Pump Motor 1B2 SG 1A Fast Acting Feedwater Isol SG 1B Fast Acting Feedwater Isol SG 1C Fast Acting Feedwater Isol De-energize 1FW-P-1A at 4KVS-1A & 1B and de-energize 1FW-P-1B at 4KVS-1C & 1D to stop main feedwater flow to the steam generators.
BV1-2497 RA RR 1-CR-4 1CH-E-1 MOV-1CH-378 Seal Water Heat Exchanger RCP #1 Seal Return Header Isolation MOV De-energize MOV-1CH-381 at 480VUS-1-1P-9P14 or de-energize individual breaker and manually close it, OR Manually close 1CH-214, OR Manually close 1CH-216 to isolate seal return.
BV1-2499 RA RR 1-CR-4 Spurious SI 4KVS-1AE-1E11-P 4KVS-1AE-1E15-P 4KVS-1DF-1F11-P 4KVS-1DF-1F15-P Spurious SI Signal P-1A Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker P-1B Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE OR De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to control charging/HHSI flow.
BV1-2500 RA DID 1-CR-4 4KVS-1AE 4KVS-1AE-1E7 4KVS-1AE-1E9 4KVS-1AE-1E12 4KVS-1AE-1E14-OCT 1EEEG1 PNL-DG-SEQ-1 1AE 4160V Emergency Bus Supply Breaker from "A" SS bus Supply Breaker from the #1 EDG Feed to Emergency 480V Substation 1-8 Supply to River Water Pump WR-P-1C
- 1 EDG
BV1-2501 RA RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
LIC (3)
LIC (4)
LIC (1)
LIC (5)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CR-4 4KVS-1AE-1E16 MOV-1FW-151B MOV-1FW-151D MOV-1FW-151F 3A Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker Train A AFW Valve to C SG Train A AFW Valve to B SG Train A AFW Valve to A SG Start 1FW-P-3A at 4KVS-1AE to provide train A AFW flow.
De-energize MOV-1FW-151B, D & F at 480VUS-1-1N MCC1-E5. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151F to control SG A AFW flow. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151D to control SG B AFW flow. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151B to control SG C AFW flow.
BV1-2504 RA DID 1-CR-4 MOV-1MS-105-ISOL 4KVS-1AE-1E16-P 4KVS-1DF-1F16-P MOV-1FW-151A-ISOL MOV-1FW-151B-ISOL MOV-1FW-151C-ISOL MOV-1FW-151D-ISOL MOV-1FW-151E-ISOL MOV-1FW-151F-ISOL Turb Driven AFW Pump Steam Isolation 3A Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker 3B Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker Train B AFW Valve to C SG Train A AFW Valve to C SG Train B AFW Valve to B SG Train A AFW Valve to B SG Train B AFW Valve to A SG Train A AFW Valve to A SG De-energize 1FW-P-3B at 4KVS-1DF to stop train B AFW flow. De-energize MOV-1FW-151B, D & F at 480VUS-1-1N MCC1-E5. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151F to control SG A AFW flow. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151D to control SG B AFW flow. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151B to control SG C AFW flow.
BV1-2505 RA RR 1-CR-4 LT-1QS-100A LT-1QS-100B LT-1QS-100C LT-1QS-100D 1-MTR-SIGNAL 1-CVCS-RAS RWST Level Channel I RWST Level Channel II RWST Level Channel III RWST Level Channel IV Manual Transfer to Recirc Signal Transfer to Recirc Signal De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to prevent pump damage on loss of suction.
De-energize 1SI-P-1A at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1SI-P-1B at 4KVS-1DF to stop flow from the containment sump.
De-energize MOV-1CH-115B at 480VUS-1-1N and open it to align suction to the charging pumps. Manually start 1CH-P-1A or 1CH-P-1C at 4KVS-1AE to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV1-2506 RA DID 1-CR-4 4KVS-1AE-1E2 4KVS-1AE-1E10 4KVS-1AE-1E14 1WR-P-9A breaker 1WR-P-1A Breaker 1WR-P-1C Breaker Trip the #1 diesel to prevent damage.
Align 4KVS-1AE for diesel start.
Restart the #1 diesel.
Manually start 1WR-P-1A or 1C at 4KVS-1AE.
Start other AE bus loads as required.
BV1-2507 RA DID 1-CR-4 480VUS-1-8N12 480VUS-1-9P12 480VUS-1-1B7 480VUS-1-8N13 480VUS-1-9P13 Pzr Backup Heater Group "A" Pzr Backup Heater Group "B" Pzr Control Heater Group "C" Pzr Backup Heater Group "D" Pzr Backup Heater Group "E" De-energize the A and D group heaters at 480VUS18-N, de-energize the control group heater at 480VUS11B and de-energize the B and E group heaters at 480VUS19-P to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV1-2508 RA DID 1-CR-4 480VUS-1-8N4 480VUS-1-9P5 1-CIB-SPUR 480V breakers for QS Pump 1QS-P-1A Pump Motor Breaker 480V breakers for QS Pump 1QS-P-1B Pump Motor Breaker Spurious CIB Signal De-energize 1QS-P-1A at 480VUS-1-8N4 and de-energize 1QS-P-1B at 480VUS-1-9P5 to stop quench spray flow.
BV1-2510 RA RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CR-4 4KVS-1A-1A5 4KVS-1B-1B5 4KVS-1C-1C5 PCV-1RC-455A PCV-1RC-455B RCP A Pump Motor Breaker RCP B Pump Motor Breaker RCP C Pump Motor Breaker Pzr Spray Valve from the A RCS Loop Pzr Spray Valve from the C RCS Loop De-energize 1RC-P-1A at 4KVS-1A, de-energize 1RC-P-1B at 4KVS-1B and de-energize 1RC-P-1C at 4KVS-1C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV1-2511 RA RR 1-CR-4 PCV-1MS-101A-P PCV-1MS-101B-P PCV-1MS-101C-P HCV-1MS-104-P A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually close HCV-1MS-104 to stop SG A, B, & C steam flow.
Manually close PCV-1MS-101A to stop SG A steam flow.
Manually close PCV-1MS-101B to stop SG B steam flow.
Manually close PCV-1MS-101C to stop SG C steam flow.
BV1-2515 RA RR 1-CR-4 SOV-1RC-102B SOV-1RC-103B SOV-1RC-105 LI-1FW-475BP LI-1RC-460BP NI-1NI-32A PI-1RC-403BP TI-1RC-410BP TI-1RC-29BP BIP Power RCS RX Vessel Vent SOV B Train RCS PZR Vent SOV B Train RCS Vent to CNMT SOV SG Levels Pressurizer Level Source Range NI RCS Loop B WR Pressure RCS Cold Leg Loop 1A Recorder Temp Core Exit T/C Temperatures BIP Power Supply Use supplementary controls and monitoring from the BIP.
BV1-2517 RA DID 1-CR-4 MOV-1CH-289 MOV-1CH-310 MOV-1CH-311 Normal Charging MOVNormal Chg.
Outlet MOV from NonRegen Hx.
Aux. Spray Isolation MOV De-energize MOV-1CH-289 at 480VUS-1-1N MCC1-E5 and manually close it, OR Close manual valve 1CH-30 to stop excessive RCS makeup.
BV1-2518 RA RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CR-4 MOV-1RW-103A MOV-1RW-103B MOV-1RW-103C MOV-1RW-103D MOV-1RW-106A MOV-1RW-106B MOV-1RW-114A MOV-1RW-114B MOV-1RW-104A MOV-1RW-104B MOV-1RW-104C MOV-1RW-104D MOV-1RW-104 1-CIB-SPUR RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol A Train RW To Primary CC Hx B Train RW To Primary CC Hx A Train RW To Primary CC Hx B Train RW To Primary CC Hx RS HX A inlet isolation valve RS HX B inlet isolation valve RS HX C inlet isolation valve RS HX D inlet isolation valve RW To Recirc Spray Hxs Cross X Spurious CIB Signal De-energize MOV-1RW-103A at 480VUS-1-1N, de-energize MOV-1RW-103B at 480VUS-1-1P and close both valves.
Trip the #1 diesel to prevent damage.
De-energize the following (as required) to align RW valves:
MOV-1RW-103A at 480VUS-1-1N. MOV-1RW-103B at 480VUS-1-1P. MOV-1RW-103C at 480VUS-1-1N.
MOV-1RW-103D at 480VUS-1-1P. MOV-1RW-106A at 480VUS-1-1P. MOV-1RW-106B at 480VUS-1-1P.
MOV-1RW-114A at 480VUS-1-1N. MOV-1RW-114B at 480VUS-1-1N.
Manually operate the following (as required) to align RW:
MOV-1RW-103A, MOV-1RW-103B, MOV-1RW-103C, MOV-1RW-103D, MOV-1RW-106A, MOV-1RW-106B, MOV-1RW-114A & MOV-1RW-114B.
Align 4KVS-1AE for diesel start.
Restart the #1 diesel.
De-energize MOV-1RW-102C1 at MCC1-E2 and manually close it. Manually start 1WR-P-1C at 4KVS-1AE to provide River Water flow, OR De-energize MOV-1RW-102A2 at MCC1-E1 and manually throttle 10% open THEN manually start 1WR-P-1A at 4KVS-1AE and manually open MOV-1RW-102A2 to provide River Water flow.
Start other AE bus loads as required.
BV1-2520 RA RR 1-CR-4 MOV-1RW-102A2 MOV-1RW-106A MOV-1RW-114A MOV-1RW-103A 1-CIB-SPUR 1A Pump Discharge to A Header CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV RW To Recirc Spray Hxs Header Isol Spurious CIB Signal Trip the #1 diesel to prevent damage. Deenergize MOV-1RW-106A at 480VUS-1-1P-9P9 or de-energize individual valve breaker. De-energize MOV-1RW-114A at 480VUS-1-1N-8N8 or de-energize individual valve breaker.
and Open both valves. Align 4KVS-1AE for diesel start.
Restart the #1 diesel. De-energize MOV-1RW-102C1 at MCC1-E2 and manually close it. Manually start 1WR-P-1C at 4KVS-1AE to provide River Water flow, OR De-energize MOV-1RW-102A2 at MCC1-E1 and manually throttle it 10% open THEN Manually start 1WR-P-1A at 4KVS-1AE and manually open MOV-1RW-102A2 to provide River Water flow.
Start other AE bus loads as required.
BV1-2521 RA RR 1-CR-4 MOV-1RW-113A MOV-1RW-113B EDG Inlet valves for RW Supply from Header EDG Inlet valves for RW Supply from Header Deenergize MOV-1RW-113A at MCC1-E7 and open it.
BV1-2522 RA RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CR-4 MOV-1SI-836-P MOV-1SI-869A-P MOV-1SI-869B-P MOV-1SI-867A-P MOV-1SI-867B-P MOV-1SI-867C-P MOV-1SI-867D-P Spurious SI HHSI To RCS Cold Leg Isol Valve HHSI To RCS Hot Leg Isol Valve HHSI To RCS Hot Leg Isol Valve Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank outlet Isolation Valve Spurious SI Signal De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow. Manually start and stop 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE to provide RCS makeup flow.
De-energize MOV-1SI-836, 867A 867C and 869A at 480VUS-1-1N, MCC1-E5 de-energize MOV-1SI-867B MOV-1SI-867D and 869B at 480VUS-1-1P and manually close the valves to isolate the SI flow paths. Manually start 1CH-P-1A or 1CH-P-1C at 4KVS-1AE to provide RCS makeup flow. at 480VUS-1-1P-9P14 or de-energize individual valve breakers and manually close these valves to isolate the SI flow paths (as required).
BV1-2523 BV1-2528 RA DID 1-CR-4 MOV-1SI-869B HHSI To RCS Hot Leg Isol Valve De-energize MOV-1SI-869B at 480VUS-1-1P-9P14 or de-energize individual breaker and manually throttle to provide an alternate makeup flow path.
BV1-2524 RA DID 1-CR-4 TV-1MS-101A TV-1MS-101B TV-1MS-101C A Main Steam Trip Valve B Main Steam Trip Valve C Main Steam Trip Valve Close 1IA-85-6 and open 1IA-85-53 and 1IA-85-54 to close the Main Steam Trip Valves.
BV1-2530 RA RR 1-CR-4 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-630, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to the AFW pump suction.
Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2534 RA RR 1-CR-4 PCV-1RC-455C-P PCV-1RC-455D-P PCV-1RC-456-P PT-1RC-444 PT-1RC-445 Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 455D Pressurizer PORV 456 Pzr Pressure Control Pzr Pressure Control Close PCV-1RC-455C, PCV-1RC-455D and PCV-1RC-456 at the keylock switches to stop RCS depressurization.
BV1-2535 RA RR 1-CR-4 1VS-AC-1A 1VS-C-1A 1VS-E-4A 1VS-F-40A 1VS-P-3A System Air Handler System Air Compressor Control Area A/C Condensing Unit System Return Air Fan Control Air Conditioning Cond Pump Install 2 5200 CFM portable fans in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
- 1. Credit BV2 HVAC System if available (not a recovery action).
- 2. Install portable electric fan(s) in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
BV1-2569 RA RR SSD RAI 04 SSD RAI 05 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CR-4 MOV-1CH-115C-P MOV-1CH-115E-P MOV-1CH-115B 4KVS-1AE-1E11-P 4KVS-1AE-1E15-P 4KVS-1AE-1E11 4KVS-1AE-1E15 Charging Pump Suction from VCT Charging Pump Suction from VCT Charging Pump Suction from RWST P-1A Charging Pump P-1A Breaker P-1A Charging Pump P-1C Breaker P-1A Charging Pump P-1A Breaker P-1A Charging Pump P-1C Breaker De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to prevent pump damage on loss of suction.
De-energize MOV-1CH-115B at 480VUS-1-1N and open it to align suction to the charging pumps.
Manually start 1CH-P-1B or 1CH-P-1C 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1DF 4KVS-1AE to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV1-2571 RA RR 1-CR-4 LCV-1CH-460A SW-ISO-CH460A LCV-1CH-460B TV-1CH-200A TV-1CH-200B TV-1CH-200C SW-ISO-1CH-460 Isolation Valve For Letdown Switch To Isolate Control from Control Room and Close The Valve Isolation valve for letdown Letdown Orifice Isolation Letdown Orifice Isolation Letdown Orifice Isolation Isolates Control from MCR & Fails Valve Closed Close LCV-1CH-460 at the keylock switch to isolate letdown.
BV1-2711 RA RR 1-CR-4 4KVS-1B-1B2 4KVS-1D-1D2 Condensate Pump A Breaker Condensate Pump B Breaker De-energize 1CN-P-1A at 4KVS-1B and de-energize 1CN-P-1BA at 4KVS-1DB to stop condensate flow to the steam generators.
BV1-2765 RA RR 1-CR-4 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2859 RA DID 1-CR-4 PCV-1RC-455C PCV-1RC-455D PCV-1RC-456 MOV-1RC-535-P MOV-1RC-536-P MOV-1RC-537-P Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 456D Pressurizer PORV 456 Pzr. PORV 455C block MOV Pzr. PORV 456 block MOV Pzr. PORV 455D block MOV Transfer control of reactor head vent valves SOV-RC102B SOV-1RC-102B, 103B and 105 to the BIP and open the valves as necessary for RCS depressurization.
To align Containment Sump recirculation to maintain long-term cooling, perform the following. De-energize MOV-1SI-860A and 863A at 480VUS-1-1N and open them, de-energize MOV-1SI-885A and 885C at 480VUS-1-1N and close them, de-energize MOV-1CH-115B at 480VUS-1-1N and close it and de-energize MOV-1SI-862A at 480VUS-1-1N and close it. De-energize MOV-1SI-860A and 863A at MCC1-E5 and open them. De-energize MOV-1SI-885A and 885C at MCC1-E5 and close them. De-energize MOV-1CH-115B at 480VUS-1-1N-8N8 or de-energize individual breaker and close it. De-energize MOV-1SI-862A at MCC1-E5 and close it.
BV1-2886 RA DID SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CR-4 MOV-1CH-115C Charging suction from VCT De-energize MOV-1CH-115C at 480VUS-1-1N and close it or De-energize MOV-1CH-115E at 480VUS-1-1P and close it to prevent hydrogen intrusion into the suction of the charging pumps.
BV1-2912 RA 1-CR-4 1VS-F-16A 1VS-F-55A Emergency Switchgear Exhaust Fan Emergency Switchgear Supply Fan Install portable ventilation for Emergency Switchgear.
BV1-3165 DID 1-CS-1 1VS-D-22-1B 1VS-D-22-2C 1VS-D-22-2D 1VS-F-22B D/G BLDG O.A. Exhaust Damper D/G BLDG O.A. Intake Damper D/G BLDG O.A. Intake Damper D/G Building Direct Drive Fan Install temporary ventilation for the running diesel.
BV1-1677 RR 1-CS-1 1VS-AC-1B 1VS-C-1B 1VS-E-4B 1VS-F-40B 1VS-P-3B System Air Handler System Air Compressor Control Area A/C Condensing Unit System Return Air Fan Control Air Conditioning Cond Pump Install 2 5200 CFM portable fans in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
- 1. Credit BV2 HVAC System if available (not a recovery action).
- 2. Install portable electric fan(s) in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
BV1-2478 RA RR 1-CS-1 1CH-E-1 MOV-1CH-381 Seal Water Heat Exchanger RCP #1 Seal Return Header Isolation MOV De-energize MOV-1CH-381 at 480VUS-1-P-9P14 or de-energize individual breaker and manually close it, OR Manually close 1CH-214, OR Manually close 1CH-216 to isolate seal return.
BV1-2537 RA RR 1-CS-1 4KVS-1DF-1F16 MOV-1FW-151A MOV-1FW-151C MOV-1FW-151E 3B Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker Train B AFW Valve to C SG Train B AFW Valve to B SG Train B AFW Valve to A SG Manually start 1FW-P-3B at 4KVS-1DF. De-energize MOV-1FW-151A, C & E at 480VUS-1-P-9P14 or de-energize individual breakers. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151E to control SG A AFW flow. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151C to control SG B AFW flow. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151A to control SG C AFW flow.
BV1-2540 RA DID 1-CS-1 LT-1QS-100A LT-1QS-100B LT-1QS-100C LT-1QS-100D 1-MTR-SIGNAL 1-CVCS-RAS RWST Level Channel I RWST Level Channel II RWST Level Channel III RWST Level Channel IV Manual Transfer to Recirc Signal Transfer to Recirc Signal De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to prevent pump damage on loss of suction.
De-energize 1SI-P-1A at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1SI-P-1B at 4KVS-1DF to stop flow from the containment sump.
De-energize MOV-1CH-115D at 480VUS-1-P-9P9 or de-energize individual breaker and open it to align suction to the charging pumps. Manually start 1CH-P-1B or 1CH-P-1C at 4KVS-1DF to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV1-2541 RA DID SSD RAI 04 SSD RAI 05 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CS-1 4KVS-1DF-1F2 4KVS-1DF-1F10 4KVS-1DF-1F14 1WR-P-9B breaker 1WR-P-1B breaker 1WR-P-1C breaker Trip the #2 diesel to prevent damage.
Align 4KVS-1DF for diesel start.
Restart the #2 diesel.
Manually start 1WR-P-1B or 1C at 4KVS-1DF.
Start other DF bus loads as required.
BV1-2542 RA DID 1-CS-1 480VUS-1-8N12 480VUS-1-9P12 480VUS-1-1B7 480VUS-1-8N13 480VUS-1-9P13 Pzr Backup Heater Group "A" Pzr Backup Heater Group "B" Pzr Control Heater Group "C" Pzr Backup Heater Group "D" Pzr Backup Heater Group "E" De-energize the A and D group heaters at 480VUS18-N, de-energize the control group heater at 480VUS11B and de-energize the B and E group heaters at 480VUS19-P to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV1-2543 RA DID 1-CS-1 480VUS-1-8N4 480VUS-1-9P5 1-CIB-SPUR 480V breakers for QS Pump 1QS-P-1A Pump Motor Breaker 480V breakers for QS Pump 1QS-P-1B Pump Motor Breaker Spurious CIB Signal De-energize 1QS-P-1A at 480VUS-1-8N4 and de-energize 1QS-P-1B at 480VUS-1-9P5 to stop quench spray flow.
BV1-2544 RA RR 1-CS-1 Spurious SI 4KVS-1AE-1E11-P 4KVS-1AE-1E15-P 4KVS-1DF-1F11-P 4KVS-1DF-1F15-P Spurious SI signal P-1A Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker P-1B Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE OR De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to control charging/HHSI flow.
BV1-2545 RA DID 1-CS-1 4KVS-1DF 4KVS-1DF-1F1-OCT 4KVS-1DF-1F2-OCT 4KVS-1DF-1F5 4KVS-1DF-1F7 4KVS-1DF-1F8-OCT 4KVS-1DF-1F9 4KVS-1DF-1F13-OCT 4KVS-1DF-1F15-OCT 1EE-EG-2 4KVS-1DF-F12 PNL-DG-SEQ-2 1DF 4160V Emergency Bus C CCR Pump Breaker Aux RW Pump WR-P-9B Breaker Stub Bus Breaker Bus 1DF Normal Supply Bkr SI-P-1B Breaker
- 2 EDG Output Bkr Recirc Spray Pump Breaker Alt Supply to P-1C Charging Pump Breaker C
BV1-2546 RA RR 1-CS-1 FCV-1FW-103B B AFW Pump Recirc Valve Isolate and vent the instrument air to fail FCV-1FW-103B closed to ensure adequate AFW flow.
BV1-2550 RA RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CS-1 LCV-1CH-460A LCV-1CH-460B TV-1CH-200A TV-1CH-200B TV-1CH-200C SW-ISO-CH460A SW-ISO-1CH-460 Isolation Valve For Letdown Isolation Valve for Letdown Letdown Orifice Isolation Letdown Orifice Isolation Letdown Orifice Isolation Switch to isolate control from control room and close the valve Isolates Control from MCR & Fails Valve Closed Close LCV-1CH-460 at the keylock switch to isolate letdown.
BV1-2552 RA RR 1-CS-1 MOV-1CH-115C-P MOV-1CH-115E-P MOV-1CH-115B 4KVS-1AE-1E11-P 4KVS-1AE-1E15-P 4KVS-1AE-1E11 4KVS-1DF-1F11 Charging Pump Suction from VCT Charging Pump Suction from VCT Charging Pump Suction from RWST Charging Pump P-1A Breaker Charging Pump P-1C Breaker Charging Pump P-1A Breaker Charging Pump P-1B Breaker De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to prevent pump damage on loss of suction.
De-energize MOV-1CH-115D at 480VUS-1-P-9P9 or de-energize individual breaker and open it to align suction to the charging pumps.
Manually start 1CH-P-1B(C) or 1CH-P-1C at 4KVS-1DF to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV1-2553 RA RR 1-CS-1 MOV-1CH-289 MOV-1CH-310 MOV-1CH-311 Normal Charging MOV Normal Chg. Outlet MOV from Non-Regen Hx Aux. Spray Isolation MOV De-energize MOV-1CH-289 at 480VUS-1-N-8N6 or de-energize individual breaker and manually close it, OR Close manual valve 1CH-30 to stop excessive RCS makeup.
BV1-2554 RA RR 1-CS-1 MOV-1MS-105-ISOL 4KVS-1AE-1E16-P 4KVS-1DF-1F16-P MOV-1FW-151A-ISOL MOV-1FW-151B-ISOL MOV-1FW-151C-ISOL MOV-1FW-151D-ISOL MOV-1FW-151E-ISOL MOV-1FW-151F-ISOL MOV-1MS-105 Turb Driven AFW Pump Steam Isolation 3A Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker 3B Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker Train B AFW Valve to C SG Train A AFW Valve to C SG Train B AFW Valve to B SG Train A AFW Valve to B SG Train B AFW Valve to A SG Train A AFW Valve to A SG MS isolation to 1FW-P-2 De-energize 1FW-P-3A at 4KVS-1AE and manually trip 1FW-P-2 to stop train A AFW flow. De-energize MOV-1FW-151A, C & E at 480VUS-1-P-9P14 or de-energize individual breakers. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151E to control SG A AFW flow. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151C to control SG B AFW flow. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151A to control SG C AFW flow.
BV1-2555 RA RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CS-1 MOV-1RW-103A MOV-1RW-103B MOV-1RW-103C MOV-1RW-103D MOV-1RW-106A MOV-1RW-106B MOV-1RW-114A MOV-1RW-114B MOV-1RW-104A MOV-1RW-104B MOV-1RW-104C MOV-1RW-104D MOV-1RW-104 MOV-1RW-116A MOV-1RW-116B 1-CIB-SPUR RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol A Train RW to the Primary CC Hx B Train RW to the Primary CC Hx A Train RW to the Primary CC Hx B Train RW to the Primary CC Hx RS HX A Inlet Isolation Valve RS HX B Inlet Isolation Valve RS HX C Inlet Isolation Valve RS HX D Inlet Isolation Valve RW To Recirc Spray HXS Cross X A RW Pump Sup to A HDR RP RW A RW Pump Sup to B HDR RP RW Spurious CIB Signal De-energize MOV-1RW-103C at 480VUS-1-N, de-energize MOV-1RW-103D at 480VUS-1-P and close both valves.
Trip the #2 diesel to prevent damage.
De-energize the following (as required) to align RW valves:
MOV-1RW-102B1 at 480VUS-1-1P-9P8 or de-energize individual breaker. MOV-1RW-103A at 480VUS-1-1N-8N8 or de-energize individual breaker. MOV-1RW-103B at 480VUS-1-1P-9P9 or de-energize individual breaker.
MOV-1RW-103C at 480VUS-1-1N-8N8 or de-energize individual breaker. MOV-1RW-103D at 480VUS-1-1P-9P9 or de-energize individual breaker. MOV-1RW-106A at 480VUS-1-1P-9P9 or de-energize individual breaker.
MOV-1RW-106B at 480VUS-1-1P-9P9 or de-energize individual breaker. MOV-1RW-113C at MCC1-E8. MOV-1RW-113D1 at MCC1-E8. MOV-1RW-114A at 480VUS 1N-8N8 or de-energize individual breaker. MOV-1RW-114B at 480VUS-1-1N-8N8 or de-energize individual breaker.
Manually operate the following (as required) to align RW:
MOV-1RW-103A, MOV-1RW-103B, MOV-1RW-103C, MOV-1RW-103D, MOV-1RW-106A, MOV-1RW-106B, MOV-1RW-114A & MOV-1RW-114B.
Align 4KVS-1DF for diesel start.
Restart the #2 diesel.
De-energize MOV-1RW-102B2 at 480VUS-1-1P-9P8 or de-energize individual valve and manually close it.
De-energize MOV-1RW-102B1 at 480VUS-1-1P-9P8 or de-energize individual valve and manually throttle 10% open THEN manually start 1WR-P-1B at 4KVS-1DF and manually open MOV-1RW-102B1 to provide River Water flow, OR De-energize MOV-1RW-102C2 at MCC1-E1 and manually close it. De-energize MOV-1RW-102C1 at 480VUS-1-1P-9P8 or de-energize individual valve and manually throttle 10%
open THEN manually start 1WR-P-1C at 4KVS-1DF and manually open MOV-1RW-102C1 to provide River Water flow.
Start other DF bus loads as required.
BV1-2557 RA RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CS-1 MOV-1RW-102B1 MOV-1RW-106B MOV-1RW-114B MOV-1RW-103A 1-CIB-SPUR 1B Pump Discharge to B Header CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV RW To Recirc Spray Hxs Header Isol Spurious CIB Signal Trip the #2 diesel to prevent damage.
Deenergize MOV-1RW-106B at 480VUS-1-P-9P9 or de-energize individual valve. De-energize MOV-1RW-114B at 480VUS-1-N-8N8 or de-energize individual valve. and Open both valves.
Align 4KVS-1DF for diesel start.
Restart the #2 diesel.
De-energize MOV-1RW-102B2 at MCC1-E1 480VUS-1-1P-9P8 or de-energize individual valve and manually close it.
De-energize MOV-1RW-102B1 at MCC1-E2 480VUS-1-1P-9P8 or de-energize individual valve and manually throttle it 10% open THEN manually start 1WR-P-1B at 4KVS-1DF and manually open MOV-1RW-102B1 to provide River Water flow, OR De-energize MOV-1RW-102C2 at MCC1-E1 and manually close it. De-energize MOV-1RW-102C1 at MCC1-E2 480VUS-1-1P-9P8 or de-energize individual valve and manually throttle it 10% open THEN manually start 1WR-P-1C at 4KVS-1DF and manually open MOV-1RW-102C1 to provide River Water flow.
Start other DF bus loads as required.
BV1-2558 RA RR 1-CS-1 MOV-1SI-836-P MOV-1SI-869A-P MOV-1SI-869B-P MOV-1SI-867A-P MOV-1SI-867B-P MOV-1SI-867C-P MOV-1SI-867D-P Spurious SI HHSI To RCS Cold Leg Isol Valve HHSI To RCS Hot Leg Isol Valve HHSI To RCS Hot Leg Isol Valve Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Spurious SI Signal De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow. Manually start and stop 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to provide RCS makeup flow. De-energize MOV-1SI-836, 867A 867C and 869A at 480VUS-1-N, de-energize MOV-1SI-867B and 869B at 480VUS-1-P and manually close the valves to isolate the SI flow paths. Manually start 1CH-P-1B or 1CH-P-1C at 4KVS-1DF to provide RCS makeup flow.
480VUS-1-1N-8N6 or de-energize individual valve breakers, de-energize MOV-1SI-867D and 869B at 480VUS-1-1P-9P14 or de-energize individual valve breakers and manually close these valves to isolate the SI flow paths (as required).
BV1-2559 BV1-2578 RA DID 1-CS-1 PCV-1MS-101A-P PCV-1MS-101B-P PCV-1MS-101C-P HCV-1MS-104-P A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually close PCV-1MS-101A to stop SG A steam flow.
Manually close PCV-1MS-101B to stop SG B steam flow.
Manually close PCV-1MS-101C to stop SG C steam flow.
Manually close HCV-1MS-104 to stop SG A, B, & C steam flow.
BV1-2560 RA DID SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CS-1 PCV-1RC-455C-P PCV-1RC-455D-P PCV-1RC-456-P MOV-1RC-535 MOV-1RC-536 MOV-1RC-537 PT-1RC-444 PT-1RC-445 SW-ISO-RC455C SW-ISO-RC456 Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 455D Pressurizer PORV 456 Pzr. PORV 455C Block MOV Pzr. PORV 456 Block MOV Pzr. PORV 455D Block MOV Pzr Pressure Control Pzr Pressure Control Isolates Control from MCR & Fails Valve Closed Isolates Control from MCR & Fails Valve Closed Close PCV-1RC-455C, PCV-1RC-455D and PCV-1RC-456 at the keylock switches to stop RCS depressurization.
BV1-2561 RA RR 1-CS-1 TV-1BD-100A TV-1BD-100B TV-1BD-100C TV-1BD-101A1 TV-1BD-101A2 TV-1BD-101B1 TV-1BD-101B2 TV-1BD-101C1 TV-1BD-101C2 TV-1BD-107A TV-1BD-107B TV-1BD-107C SG BLDN CNMT Isol VLV SG BLDN CNMT Isol VLV SG BLDN CNMT Isol VLV SG Blowdown Isolation SG Blowdown Isolation SG Blowdown Isolation SG Blowdown Isolation SG Blowdown Isolation SG Blowdown Isolation SG Blowdown Isolation SG Blowdown Isolation SG Blowdown Isolation De-energize TV-1BD-100A, B & C at PNL-DC-3, de-energize TV-1BD-101A1, B1 & C1 at PNL-VITBUS-1 and de-energize TV-1BD-101A2, B2 & C2 at PNL-VITBUS-2 to stop blowdown flow.
Isolate and vent air to TV-1BD-100A, B & C to close SG Blowdown Containment Isolation Valves.
BV1-2565 RA DID 1-CS-1 TV-1MS-101A TV-1MS-101B TV-1MS-101C A Main Steam Trip Valve B Main Steam Trip Valve C Main Steam Trip Valve Close 1IA-85-6 and open 1IA-85-53 and 1IA-85-54 to close the Main Steam Trip Valves.
BV1-2566 RA DID 1-CS-1 4KVS-1A-1A1 4KVS-1B-1B1 4KVS-1C-1C1 4KVS-1D-1D1 HYV-1FW-100A-ISOL HYV-1FW-100B-ISOL HYV-1FW-100C-ISOL MFW Pump Motor 1A1 MFW Pump Motor 1A2 MFW Pump Motor 1B1 MFW Pump Motor 1B2 SG 1A Fast Acting Feedwater Isol SG 1B Fast Acting Feedwater Isol SG 1C Fast Acting Feedwater Isol De-energize 1FW-P-1A at 4KVS-1A & 1B and de-energize 1FW-P-1B at 4KVS-1C & 1D to stop main feedwater flow to the steam generators.
BV1-2576 RA DID 1-CS-1 4KVS-1A-1A5 4KVS-1B-1B5 4KVS-1C-1C5 PCV-1RC-455A PCV-1RC-455B RCP A Pump Motor Breaker RCP B Pump Motor Breaker RCP C Pump Motor Breaker Pzr Spray Valve from the A RCS Loop Pzr Spray Valve from the C RCS Loop De-energize 1RC-P-1A at 4KVS-1A, de-energize 1RC-P-1B at 4KVS-1B and de-energize 1RC-P-1C at 4KVS-1C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV1-2579 RA RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CS-1 MOV-1RW-113C MOV-1RW-113D1 EDG Inlet Valves for RW Supply from Header EDG Inlet Valves for RW Supply from Header Deenergize MOV-1RW-113B MOV-1RW-113C at MCC1-E8 and open it.
BV1-2586 RA RR 1-CS-1 MOV-1SI-869B HHSI To RCS Hot Leg Isol Valve De-energize MOV-1SI-869B at 480VUS-1-P-9P14 or de-energize individual breaker and manually throttle it to provide an alternate makeup flow path.
BV1-2587 RA DID 1-CS-1 1VS-F-16B 1VS-F-55B 1VS-D-16B 1VS-D-55B 1VS-D-87A 1VS-D-87B Emergency Switchgear Exhaust Fan Emergency Switchgear Supply Fan Emergency Switchgear Exhaust Fan Damper Emergency Switchgear Supply Fan Damper Emergency Switchgear Fire Damper Emergency Switchgear Fire Damper Install portable ventilation for Emergency Switchgear.
BV1-2595 RR 1-CS-1 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2596 RR 1-CS-1 4KVS-1B-1B2 4KVS-1D-1D2 HYV-1FW-100A-ISOL HYV-1FW-100B-ISOL HYV-1FW-100C-ISOL Condensate Pump A Breaker Condensate Pump B Breaker SG 1A Fast Acting Feedwater Isol SG 1B Fast Acting Feedwater Isol SG 1C Fast Acting Feedwater Isol De-energize 1CN-P-1A at 4KVS-1B and de-energize 1CN-P-1A at 4KVS-1B 1CN-P-1B at 4KVS-1D to stop condensate flow to the steam generators.
BV1-2764 RA DID 1-CS-1 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B, & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow, and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2860 RA DID SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CS-1 PCV-1RC-455C PCV-1RC-455D PCV-1RC-456 MOV-1RC-535-P MOV-1RC-536-P MOV-1RC-537-P Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 456D Pressurizer PORV 456 Pzr PORV 455C Block MOV Pzr. PORV 456 Block MOV Pzr. PORV 455D Block MOV Transfer control of reactor head vent valves SOV-RC102B SOV-1RC-102B, 103B and 105 to the BIP and open the valves as necessary for RCS depressurization.
To align Containment Sump recirculation to maintain long-term cooling, perform the following. De-energize MOV-1SI-860B and 863B at 480VUS-1-P-9P14 or de-energize individual breakers and open them. De-energize MOV-1SI-885B and 885D at 480VUS-1-P-9P14 or de-energize individual breakers and close them. De-energize MOV-1CH-115D at 480VUS-1-P-9P9 or de-energize individual breaker and close it and de-energize MOV-1SI-862B at 480VUS-1-P-9P14 or de-energize individual breaker and close it.
BV1-2887 RA DID 1-CS-1 MOV-1CH-115C Charging suction from VCT De-energize MOV-1CH-115C at 480VUS-1-N and close it or De-energize MOV-1CH-115E at 480VUS-1-P and close it to prevent hydrogen intrusion into the suction of the charging pumps.
BV1-2920 RA SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CTP-1 1-DG-1 1-MF-1 1-MF-2 1-PA-1A 1-PA-1C 1-SB-GEN 1-TO-1 1-TR-1 1-TR-2 1-TR-3 1-TR-4 1-TR-5 1-S-1 1-S-2 1-S-3 1-S-4 1-S-5 1-WH-1 3-ADM-1 3-AIS-1 3-ER-1 3-ER-2 3-GH-1 3-IS-1 3-IS-2 3-IS-6 3-RH-1 3-SY-1 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B, & C steam flow.
OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow, and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2771 DID SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-23 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CTP-1 1-MF-1 1-MF-2 1-PA-1A 1-PA-1C 1-TO-1 1-TR-1 1-TR-2 1-TR-3 1-TR-4 1-TR-5 1-S-1 1-S-2 1-S-3 1-S-4 1-S-5 1-WH-1 3-ADM-1 3-AIS-1 3-ER-1 3-ER-2 3-GH-1 3-IS-1 3-IS-2 3-IS-6 3-RH-1 3-SY-1 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2772 RR 1-CV-1 PCV-1MS-101A-P PCV-1MS-101B-P PCV-1MS-101C-P A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Manually close PCV-1MS-101A to stop SG A steam flow.
Manually close PCV-1MS-101B to stop SG B steam flow.
Manually close PCV-1MS-101C to stop SG C steam flow.
BV1-2128 RA DID 1-CV-1 MOV1CH115CP Charging Pump Suction from VCT De-energize MOV-1CH-115D at 480VUS-1-1P-9P9 or de-energize individual breaker and open it to align suction to the charging pumps.
BV1-2129 RA DID 1-CV-1 MOV-1MS-105-ISOL 4KVS-1AE-1E16-P 4KVS-1DF-1F16-P MOV-1FW-151A-ISOL MOV-1FW-151B-ISOL MOV-1FW-151C-ISOL MOV-1FW-151D-ISOL MOV-1FW-151E-ISOL MOV-1FW-151F-ISOL Turb Driven AFW Pump Steam Isolation 3A Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker 3B Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker Train B AFW Valve to C SG Train A AFW Valve to C SG Train B AFW Valve to B SG Train A AFW Valve to B SG Train B AFW Valve to A SG Train A AFW Valve to A SG De-energize 1FW-P-3A at 4KVS-1AE and manually trip 1FW-P-2 to stop train A AFW flow. De-energize MOV-1FW-151A, C & E at 480VUS-1-1P-9P14 or de-energize individual breakers. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151E to control SG A AFW flow. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151C to control SG B AFW flow. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151A to control SG C AFW flow.
BV1-2133 RA RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CV-1 MOV-1SI-836-P MOV-1SI-869A-P 4KVS-1AE-1E11-P 4KVS-1AE-1E15-P 4KVS-1DF-1F11-P 4KVS-1DF-1F15-P MOV-1SI-867A-P MOV-1SI-867B-P MOV-1SI-867C-P MOV-1SI-867D-P Spurious SI HHSI To RCS Cold Leg Isol Valve HHSI To RCS Hot Leg Isol Valve P-1A Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker P-1B Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Spurious SI Signal De-energize MOV-1SI-836, 867A and 869A at 480VUS-1-1N and manually close them to isolate the SI flow paths.
De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow. Manually start and stop 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to provide RCS makeup flow.
De-energize MOV-1SI-836, 867C and 869A at 480VUS-1-1N-8N6 or de-energize individual valve breakers and manually close them to isolate the SI flow paths (as required).
BV1-2135 BV1-2757 RA DID 1-CV-1 4KVS-1A-1A5 4KVS-1B-1B5 4KVS-1C-1C5 PCV-1RC-455A PCV-1RC-455B RCP A Pump Motor Breaker RCP B Pump Motor Breaker RCP C Pump Motor Breaker Pzr Spray Valve from the A RCS Loop Pzr Spray Valve from the C RCS loop De-energize 1RC-P-1A at 4KVS-1A, de-energize 1RC-P-1B at 4KVS-1B and de-energize 1RC-P-1C at 4KVS-1C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV1-2138 RA RR 1-CV-1 480VUS-1-8N4 480VUS-1-9P5 1-CIB-SPUR 480V breakers for QS Pump 1QS-P-1A Pump Motor Breaker 480V breakers for QS Pump 1QS-P-1B Pump Motor Breaker Spurious CIB Signal De-energize 1QS-P-1A at 480VUS-1-8N4 and de-energize 1QS-P-1B at 480VUS-1-9P5 to stop quench spray flow.
BV1-2139 RA RR 1-CV-1 TV-1MS-101A TV-1MS-101B TV-1MS-101C A Main Steam Trip Valve B Main Steam Trip Valve C Main Steam Trip Valve Close 1IA-85-6 and open 1IA-85-53 and 1IA-85-54 to close the Main Steam Trip Valves.
BV1-2140 RA DID 1-CV-1 MOV-1CH-289 Normal Charging MOV De-energize MOV-1CH-289 at 480VUS-1-1N-8N6 or de-energize individual breaker and manually close it, OR Close manual valve 1CH-30 to stop excessive RCS makeup.
BV1-2156 RA RR 1-CV-1 FCV-1FW-103B 3B AFW Pump Recirc Valve Isolate and vent the instrument air to fail FCV-1FW-103B closed to ensure adequate AFW flow.
BV1-2158 RA RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-25 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CV-1 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-630, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to the AFW pump suction.
Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2739 RA RR 1-CV-1 4KVS-1AE-1E11-P 4KVS-1AE-1E15-P 4KVS-1DF-1F11-P 4KVS-1DF-1F15-P MOV-1SI-867A-P MOV-1SI-867B-P MOV-1SI-867C-P MOV-1SI-867D-P Spurious SI P-1A Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker P-1B Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Spurious SI Signal IF actions to prevent OR reset a spurious SI signal are not effective, then remove control power and trip the spuriously started Charging Pump Breaker(s). Manually start and stop 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to provide RCS makeup flow.
De-energize MOV-1SI-867C at 480VUS-1-1N-8N6 or de-energize individual valve breaker and MOV-1SI-867D at 480VUS-1-1P-9P14 or de-energize individual valve breaker and manually close the spuriously operated valve/valves (as required).
BV1-2757 DID 1-CV-1 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2861 RA DID SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-26 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CV-1 MOV-1RW-103A MOV-1RW-103B MOV-1RW-103C MOV-1RW-103D MOV-1RW-104A MOV-1RW-104B MOV-1RW-104C MOV-1RW-104D MOV-1RW-104 1-CIB-SPUR RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RS HX A Inlet Isolation Valve RS HX B Inlet Isolation Valve RS HX C Inlet Isolation Valve RS HX D Inlet Isolation Valve RW to Recirc Spray HXS Cross X Spurious CIB Signal De-energize MOV-1RW-103C at 480VUS-1-1N and close it.
De-energize MOV-1RW-103D at MCC1-E4 and close it.
De-energize the following (as required) to align RW valves:
MOV-1RW-103A at 480VUS-1-1N-8N8 or de-energize individual breaker. MOV-1RW-103B at 480VUS-1-1P-9P9 or de-energize individual breaker. MOV-1RW-103C at 480VUS-1-1N-8N8 or de-energize individual breaker.
MOV-1RW-103D at 480VUS-1-1P-9P9 or de-energize individual breaker.
Manually operate the following (as required) to align RW:
MOV-1RW-103A, MOV-1RW-103B, MOV-1RW-103C, MOV-1RW-103D, MOV-1RW-106A, MOV-1RW-106B, MOV-1RW-114A & MOV-1RW-114B.
Align 4KVS-1DF for diesel start.
Manually start 1WR-P-1B or 1C at 4KVS-1DF to provide River Water flow.
Start other DF bus loads as required.
BV1-2874 RA RR 1-CV-1 MOV-1RW-106B MOV-1RW-114B 1-CIB-SPUR CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV Spurious CIB Signal Deenergize MOV-1RW-114B at 480VUS-1-1N-8N8 or de-energize individual breaker. and open it.
Align 4KVS-1DF for diesel start.
Manually start 1WR-P-1B or 1C at 4KVS-1DF to provide River Water flow.
Start other DF bus loads as required.
BV1-2876 RA RR 1-CV-1 MOV-1FW-151A MOV-1FW-151C MOV-1FW-151E Train B AFW Valve to C SG Train B AFW Valve to B SG Train B AFW Valve to A SG De-energize MOV-1FW-151A, C & E at 480VUS-1-1P-9P14 or de-energize individual breakers. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151E to control SG A AFW flow. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151C to control SG B AFW flow. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151A to control SG C AFW flow.
BV1-2929 RA DID 1-CV-1 NI-1NI-32A BIP Power Source Range NI BIP Power Supply Place NI-1NI-32A in service at the BIP within 80 minutes after the trip.
BV1-3159 DID 1-CV-2 MOV-1CH-115C-P MOV-1CH-115E-P MOV-1CH-115B Charging Pump Suction from VCT Charging Pump Suction from VCT Charging Pump Suction from RWST De-energize MOV-1CH-115B at MCC1-E3 and open it to align suction to the charging pumps.
BV1-2111 RA DID 1-CV-2 PCV-1MS-101B-P PCV-1MS-101C-P B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Manually close PCV-1MS-101B to stop SG B steam flow.
Manually close PCV-1MS-101C to stop SG C steam flow.
BV1-2114 RA DID 1-CV-2 480VUS-1-8N4 480VUS-1-9P5 1-CIB-SPUR 480V breakers for QS Pump 1QS-P-1A Pump Motor Breaker 480V breakers for QS Pump 1QS-P-1B Pump Motor Breaker Spurious CIB Signal De-energize 1QS-P-1A at 480VUS-1-8N4 and de-energize 1QS-P-1B at 480VUS-1-9P5 to stop quench spray flow.
BV1-2119 RA RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-27 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CV-2 MOV-1SI-869B-P 4KVS-1AE-1E11-P 4KVS-1AE-1E15-P 4KVS-1DF-1F11-P 4KVS-1DF-1F15-P MOV-1SI-867A-P MOV-1SI-867B-P MOV-1SI-867C-P MOV-1SI-867D-P Spurious SI HHSI To RCS Hot Leg Isol Valve P-1A Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker P-1B Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Spurious SI Signal De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow. Manually start and stop 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE to provide RCS makeup flow. De-energize MCC-1-E6 at 480VUS-1-1P-9P14 to de-energize MOV-1SI-867D and 869B at 480VUS-1-1P and manually close them to isolate the SI flow paths (as required).
BV1-2120 BV1-2755 RA DID 1-CV-2 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-630, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to the AFW pump suction.
Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2740 RA RR 1-CV-2 4KVS-1AE-1E11-P 4KVS-1AE-1E15-P 4KVS-1DF-1F11-P 4KVS-1DF-1F15-P MOV-1SI-867A-P MOV-1SI-867B-P MOV-1SI-867C-P MOV-1SI-867D-P Spurious SI P-1A Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker P-1B Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Spurious SI Signal IF actions to prevent OR reset a spurious SI signal are not effective, then remove control power and trip the spuriously started Charging Pump Breaker(s). Manually start and stop 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE to provide RCS makeup flow.
De-energize MOV-1SI-867C at MCC-1-E5 and de-energize MCC-1-E6 at 480VUS-1-9P14 to de-energize MOV-1SI-867D and manually close the spuriously operated valve/valves.
BV1-2755 DID 1-CV-2 MOV-1SI-869B HHSI To RCS Hot Leg Isol Valve De-energize MOV-1SI-869B at 480VUS-1-9P and manually throttle it to provide RCS makeup flow.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-28 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CV-2 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2862 RA DID 1-CV-2 MOV-1RW-103A MOV-1RW-103B MOV-1RW-103C MOV-1RW-103D MOV-1RW-104B MOV-1RW-104D MOV-1RW-104 MOV-1RW-106A MOV-1RW-114A MOV-1RW-106B MOV-1RW-114B 1-CIB-SPUR RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RS HX B Inlet Isolation Valve RS HX D Inlet Isolation Valve RW To Recirc Spray HXS Cross X CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV Spurious CIB Signal De-energize MOV-1RW-103A at MCC1-E3, de-energize MOV-1RW-103B at MCC1-E4, and close both valves.
BV1-2877 RA RR 1-CV-2 MOV-1RW-106A MOV-1RW-114A MOV-1RW-103A MOV-1RW-103B 1-CIB-SPUR CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol Spurious CIB Signal Deenergize MOV-1RW-106A at MCC1-E4, de-energize MOV-1RW-114A at MCC1-E3 and open both valves.
Align 4KVS-1AE for diesel start.
De-energize MOV-1RW-102C1 at MCC1-E2 and manually close it. Manually start 1WR-P-1C at 4KVS-1AE to provide River Water flow, OR De-energize MOV-1RW-102A2 at MCC1-E1 and manually throttle it 10% open THEN manually start 1WR-P-1A at 4KVS-1AE and manually open MOV-1RW-102A2 to provide River Water flow.
Start other AE bus loads as required.
BV1-2878 RA RR 1-CV-2 4KVS-1A-1A5 4KVS-1B-1B5 4KVS-1C-1C5 RCP A Pump Motor Breaker RCP B Pump Motor Breaker RCP C Pump Motor Breaker De-energize 1RC-P-1A at 4KVS-1A, de-energize 1RC-P-1B at 4KVS-1B and de-energize 1RC-P-1C at 4KVS-1C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV1-2973 RA RR 1-CV-2 4KVS-1DF-1F16-P MOV-1FW-151A-ISOL MOV-1FW-151C-ISOL MOV-1FW-151E-ISOL 3B Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker Train B AFW Valve to C SG Train B AFW Valve to B SG Train B AFW Valve to A SG De-energize 1FW-P-3B at 4KVS-1DF to stop train B AFW flow.
BV1-3160 RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-29 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-CV-3 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2308 RA DID 1-CV-3 1VS-D-22-1B 1VS-D-22-2C 1VS-D-22-2D 1VS-F-22B D/G Bldg O.A. Exhaust Damper D/G Bldg O.A. Intake Damper D/G Bldg O.A. Intake Damper D/G Building Direct Drive Fan Install temporary ventilation for the running diesel.
BV1-2311 RA 1-CV-3 MOV-1MS-105 MOV-1FW-151B MOV-1FW-151D MOV-1FW-151F MS isolation to 1FW-P-2 Train A AFW Valve Train A AFW Valve Train A AFW Valve Manually trip the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump to prevent SG overfill.
BV1-2927 RA 1-CV-3 1-SSPS-SIS-A 1-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, then re-establish.
BV1-3128 DID 1-DG-1 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2772 RR 1-DG-1 1-SSPS-SIS-A 1-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, then re-establish.
BV1-3126 DID 1-DG-2 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2071 RA DID SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-30 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-DG-2 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-630, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to the AFW pump suction.
Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2741 RA RR 1-DG-2 1-SSPS-SIS-A 1-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, then re-establish.
BV1-3132 DID 1-ES-1 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-1810 RA RR 1-ES-1 480VUS-1-8N12 480VUS-1-8N13 480VUS-1-9P13 Pzr Backup Heater Group "A" Pzr Backup Heater Group "D" Pzr Backup Heater Group "E" De-energize the A and D group heaters by manually stopping the #1 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the AE bus at 4KVS-1A AND de-energize the E group heater at 480VUS19-P to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV1-2052 RA DID 1-ES-1 4KVS-1A-1A1 HYV-1FW-100A HYV-1FW-100B HYV-1FW-100C MFW Pump Motor 1A1 SG 1A Fast Acting Feedwater Isol SG 1B Fast Acting Feedwater Isol SG 1C Fast Acting Feedwater Isol De-energize 1FW-P-1A at 4KVS-1A to stop main feedwater flow to the steam generators.
BV1-2054 RA DID 1-ES-1 4KVS-1A-1A5 RCP A Pump Motor Breaker De-energize 1RC-P-1A at 4KVS-1A to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV1-2055 RA DID 1-ES-1 4KVS-1AE-1E11-P 4KVS-1AE-1E15-P P-1A Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) and 1CH-P1C by manually stopping the #1 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the AE bus at 4KVS-1A to stop excessive RCS makeup.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-31 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-ES-1 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-630, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to the AFW pump suction.
Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2742 RA RR 1-ES-1 4KVS-1DF-1F11-P 4KVS-1DF-1F15-P MOV-1SI-867A-P MOV-1SI-867B-P MOV-1SI-867C-P MOV-1SI-867D-P Spurious SI P-1B Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Spurious SI Signal De-energize MOV-1SI-867A by manually stopping the #1 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the AE bus at 4KVS-1A, then manually close MOV-1SI-867A to isolate the SI flow path.
De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow. Manually start and stop 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to provide RCS makeup flow. De-energize MOV-1SI-867C by manually stopping the #1 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the AE bus at 4KVS-1A, de-energize MOV-1SI-867D at MCC1-E6 then manually close both valves to isolate the SI flow path (as required).
BV1-3000 RA DID 1-ES-1 1VS-D-266 1VS-F-55B Emergency Switchgear Supply Damper Emergency Switchgear Supply Fan Install portable ventilation for Emergency Switchgear.
BV1-3142 RR 1-ES-1 480VUS-1-8N4 1QS-P-1A Pump Motor Breaker De-energize 1QS-P-1A by manually stopping the #1 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the AE bus at 4KVS-1A to stop quench spray flow.
BV1-3155 RR 1-ES-1 4KVS-1AE-1E16-P MOV-1FW-151B-ISOL MOV-1FW-151D-ISOL MOV-1FW-151F-ISOL 3A Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker Train A AFW Valve to C SG Train A AFW Valve to B SG Train A AFW Valve to A SG De-energize 1FW-P-3A by manually stopping the #1 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the AE bus at 4KVS-1A to stop train A AFW flow.
BV1-3156 RR 1-ES-2 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow, and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-32 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-ES-2 1VS-AC-1A 1VS-C-1A 1VS-E-4A 1VS-F-40A 1VS-P-3A System Air Handler System Air Compressor Control Area A/C Condensing Unit System Return Air Fan Control Air Conditioning Cond Pump Install 2 5200 CFM portable fans in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
- 1. Credit BV2 HVAC System if available (not a recovery action).
- 2. Install portable electric fan(s) in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
BV1-2061 RA RR 1-ES-2 480VUS-1-9P12 480VUS-1-9P13 Pzr Backup Heater Group "B" Pzr Backup Heater Group "E" De-energize the B and E group heaters by manually stopping the #2 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the DF bus at 4KVS-1D to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV1-2063 RA DID 1-ES-2 4KVS-1B-1B5 4KVS-1C-1C5 RCP B Pump Motor Breaker RCP C Pump Motor Breaker De-energize 1RC-P-1B at 4KVS-1B to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV1-2066 RA RR 1-ES-2 4KVS-1DF-1F11-P 4KVS-1DF-1F15-P P-1B Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) and 1CH-P1C by manually stopping the #2 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the DF bus at 4KVS-1D to stop excessive RCS makeup.
BV1-2108 RA DID 1-ES-2 4KVS-1DF-1F16-P MOV-1FW-151A-ISOL MOV-1FW-151C-ISOL MOV-1FW-151E-ISOL MOV-1MS-105-ISOL 3B Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker Train B AFW Valve to C SG Train B AFW Valve to B SG Train B AFW Valve to A SG MS isolation to 1FW-P-2 Turb Driven AFW Pump Steam Isolation De-energize 1FW-P-3B by manually stopping the #2 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the DF bus at 4KVS-1DF to stop train B AFW flow.
BV1-2415 RA RR 1-ES-2 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-630, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to the AFW pump suction.
Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2481 RA RR 1-ES-2 4KVS-1AE 4KVS-1AE-1E7 4KVS-1AE-1E9 1EEEG1 PNL-DG-SEQ-1 4KVS-1AE-1E12 1AE 4160V emergency bus Supply breaker from "A" SS bus Supply breaker from the #1 EDG
BV1-2815 RA SSD RAI 05 SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-ES-2 4KVS-1AE-1E11-P 4KVS-1AE-1E15-P MOV-1SI-867A-P MOV-1SI-867B-P MOV-1SI-867C-P MOV-1SI-867D-P Spurious SI P-1A Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Spurious SI Signal De-energize MOV-1SI-867A by manually stopping the #1 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the AE bus at 4KVS-1A, then manually close MOV-1SI-867A to isolate the SI flow path.
IF actions to prevent OR reset a spurious SI signal are not effective, then remove control power and trip the spuriously started Charging Pump Breaker(s). Manually start and stop 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE to provide RCS makeup flow.
De-energize MOV-1SI-867DB by manually stopping the #2 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the 1DF bus at 4KVS-1D, de-energize MOV-1SI-867CA at MCC1-E5 then manually close both valves to isolate the SI flow path (as required).
BV1-3001 RA DID 1-ES-2 480VUS-1-9P5 1QS-P-1B Pump Motor Breaker De-energize 1QS-P-1B by manually stopping the #2 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the DF bus at 4KVS-1D to stop quench spray flow.
BV1-3158 RR 1-MG-1 1VS-AC-1A 1VS-C-1A 1VS-E-4A 1VS-F-40A 1VS-P-3A System Air Handler System Air Compressor Control Area A/C Condensing Unit System Return Air Fan Control Air Conditioning Cond Pump Install 2 5200 CFM portable fans in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
- 1. Credit BV2 HVAC System if available (not a recovery action).
- 2. Install portable electric fan(s) in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
BV1-2479 RA RR 1-MG-1 PNL-DG-SEQ-1 EDG 1 load sequencer Align AE and DF bus loads as required.
BV1-2597 RA 1-MG-1 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-630, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to the AFW pump suction.
Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2743 RA RR 1-MG-1 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow, and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2900 RA DID SSD RAI 05 SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-34 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-MG-1 1-SSPS-SIS-A 1-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, then re-establish.
BV1-3133 DID 1-MS-1 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2193 RA 1-MS-1 TV-1MS-101A TV-1MS-101B TV-1MS-101C A Main Steam Trip Valve B Main Steam Trip Valve C Main Steam Trip Valve Close 1IA-85-6 and open 1IA-85-53 and 1IA-85-54 to close the Main Steam Trip Valves.
BV1-2194 RA DID 1-MS-1 PCV-1MS-101A-P PCV-1MS-101B-P PCV-1MS-101C-P HCV-1MS-104-P SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually close PCV-1MS-101A to stop SG A steam flow.
Manually close PCV-1MS-101B to stop SG B steam flow.
Manually close PCV-1MS-101C to stop SG C steam flow.
Manually close HCV-1MS-104 to stop SG A B & C steam flow.
BV1-2965 RA 1-MS-1 4KVS-1A-1A5 4KVS-1B-1B5 4KVS-1C-1C5 RCP A Pump Motor Breaker RCP B Pump Motor Breaker RCP C Pump Motor Breaker De-energize 1RC-P-1A at 4KVS-1A, de-energize 1RC-P-1B at 4KVS-1B and de-energize 1RC-P-1C at 4KVS-1C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV1-2971 RA DID 1-NS-1 4KVS-1A-1A5 4KVS-1B-1B5 4KVS-1C-1C5 RCP A Pump Motor Breaker RCP B Pump Motor Breaker RCP C Pump Motor Breaker De-energize 1RC-P-1A, 1B and 1C by tripping OCB 83, OCB 92, PCB 331 AND PCB 341 at the Switchyard Relay Building to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV1-2603 RA RR 1-NS-1 4KVS-1DF 4KVS-1DF-1F7 4KVS-1DF-1F9 PNL-DG-SEQ-2 1DF 4160V Emergency Bus Supply Breaker from "D" SS Bus
BV1-2606 RA RR 1-NS-1 4KVS-1AE-1E16-P 4KVS-1DF-1F16-P MOV1FW151A-ISOL MOV1FW151B-ISOL MOV1FW151C-ISOL MOV1FW151D-ISOL MOV1FW151E-ISOL MOV1FW151F-ISOL 3A Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker 3B Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker Train B AFW Valve to C SG Train A AFW Valve to C SG Train B AFW Valve to B SG Train A AFW Valve to B SG Train B AFW Valve to A SG Train A AFW Valve to A SG De-energize 1FW-P-3B at 4KVS-1DF to stop train B AFW flow. De-energize MOV-1FW-151B, D & F at MCC1-E5.
Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151F to control SG A AFW flow.
Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151D to control SG B AFW flow.
Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151B to control SG C AFW flow.
SSD RAI 03 LIC (13)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-NS-1 480VUS-1-8N12 480VUS-1-9P12 480VUS-1-1B7 480VUS-1-8N13 480VUS-1-9P13 Pzr Backup Heater Group "A" Pzr Backup Heater Group "B" Pzr Control Heater Group "C" Pzr Backup Heater Group "D" Pzr Backup Heater Group "E" De-energize the A and D group heaters at 480VUS18-N, de-energize the control group heater by tripping OCB 83, OCB 92, PCB 331 AND PCB 341 at the Switchyard Relay Building by opening the heater breakers in PNL-1PR-HTR-C and de-energize the B and E group heaters at 480VUS19-P to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV1-2610 RA DID 1-NS-1 LI-1RC-460BP TI-1RC-410BP BIP Power Pressurizer Level RCS Cold Leg Loop 1A Recorder Temp BIP Power Supply Energize the BIP and monitor the primary parameters remotely from the BIP.
BV1-2613 RA DID 1-NS-1 4KVS-1DF-1F11-P 4KVS-1DF-1F15-P P-1B Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) and 1C at 4KVS-1DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow.
BV1-2615 RA DID 1-NS-1 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-630, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to the AFW pump suction.
Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2616 RA RR 1-NS-1 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2704 RA DID 1-NS-1 4KVS-1DF-1F10 1WR-P-1B breaker Swap River Water pump breakers at 4KVS-1DF.
Manually start 1WR-P-1C at 4KVS-1DF.
BV1-2708 RA DID 1-NS-1 MOV-1SI-867A MOV-1SI-867B MOV-1SI-867C MOV-1SI-867D Spurious SI Boron Injection Tank inlet isolation valve Boron Injection Tank inlet isolation valve Boron Injection Tank outlet isolation valve Boron Injection Tank outlet isolation valve Spurious SI Signal De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow. De-energize MOV-1SI-867A at MCC1-E5, de-energize MOV-1SI-867B at MCC1-E6 and manually close the valves to isolate the SI flow path. Manually start 1CH-P-1B or 1CH-P-1C at 4KVS-1DF to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV1-2872 RA 1-NS-1 4KVS-1DF-1F11 4KVS-1DF-1F15 P-1B Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker Manually start 1CH-P-1B(C) and 1C at 4KVS-1DF to provide RCS makeup flow.
SSD RAI 03 SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-36 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-NS-1 1-SSPS-SIS-A 1-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, then re-establish.
BV1-3135 DID 1-NS-1 4KVS-1DF-1F16 MOV-1FW-151A MOV-1FW-151C MOV-1FW-151E 3B Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker Train B AFW Valve to C SG Train B AFW Valve to B SG Train B AFW Valve to A SG Remove control power for 1FW-P-3B at 4KVS-1DF and locally start 1FW-P-3B at 4KVS-1DF. De-energize MOV-1FW-151A at MCC-1-E6 and manually throttle this valve to control flow to C SG. De-energize MOV-1FW-151C at MCC-1-E6 and manually throttle this valve to control flow to B SG. De-energize MOV-1FW-151E at MCC-1-E6 and manually throttle this valve to control flow to A SG.
BV1-3163 DID 1-PA-1E PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2009 RA DID 1-PA-1E MOV-1CH-115C-P MOV-1CH-115E-P MOV-1CH-115B Charging Pump Suction from VCT Charging Pump Suction from VCT Charging Pump Suction from RWST De-energize MOV-1CH-115D at MCC1-E4 480VUS-1-1P-9P9 and open it to align suction to the charging pumps.
BV1-2012 RA RR 1-PA-1E 4KVS-1DF 4KVS-1DF-1F1-OCT 4KVS-1DF-1F4-OCT 4KVS-1DF-1F7 4KVS-1DF-1F9 1DF 4160V emergency bus C CCR Pump Breaker B CCR Pump Breaker Bus 1DF normal supply bkr
BV1-2013 RA RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-PA-1E MOV-1RW-106B MOV-1RW-114B CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV Deenergize MOV-1RW-106B at MCC1-E4, de-energize MOV-1RW-114B at MCC1-E3 and open both valves.
Align 4KVS-1DF for diesel start. De-energize MOV-1RW-102B2 at MCC1-E1 and manually close it.
De-energize MOV-1RW-102B1 at MCC1-E2 and manually throttle it 10% open THEN Manually start 1WR-P-1B at 4KVS-1DF and manually open MOV-1RW-102B1 to provide River Water flow, OR De-energize MOV-1RW-102C2 at MCC1-E1 and manually close it. DE-energize MOV-1RW-102C1 at MCC1-E2 and manually throttle it 10% open THEN Manually start 1WR-P-1C at 4KVS-1DF and manually open MOV-1RW-102C1 to provide River Water flow. Start other DF bus loads as required.
Trip the #2 diesel to prevent damage.
Deenergize MOV-1RW-106B at 480VUS-1-1P-9P9, de-energize MOV-1RW-114B at 480VUS-1-1N-8N8 and open both valves.
Align 4KVS-1DF for diesel start.
Restart the #2 diesel.
De-energize MOV-1RW-102B2 at MCC1-E1 and manually close it. De-energize MOV-1RW-102B1 at MCC1-E2 and manually throttle 10% open THEN manually start 1WR-P-1B at 4KVS-1DF and manually open MOV-1RW-102B1 to provide River Water flow, OR De-energize MOV-1RW-102C2 at MCC1-E1 and manually close it. De-energize MOV-1RW-102C1 at MCC1-E2 and manually throttle 10% open THEN manually start 1WR-P-1C at 4KVS-1DF and manually open MOV-1RW-102C1 to provide River Water flow.
Start other DF bus loads as required.
BV1-2016 RA RR 1-PA-1E 1VS-F-55B 1VS-D-16B 1VS-F-16B Emergency Switchgear Supply Exhaust Fan Suction Dmp Emergency Switchgear Exhaust Fan Install portable ventilation for Emergency Switchgear.
BV1-2017 RA RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-38 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-PA-1E 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-630, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to the AFW pump suction.
Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2784 RA RR 1-PA-1E MOV-1RW-103A MOV-1RW-103B MOV-1RW-103C MOV-1RW-103D MOV-1RW-106A MOV-1RW-106B MOV-1RW-114A MOV-1RW-114B MOV-1RW-104A MOV-1RW-104C MOV-1RW-116A MOV-1RW-116B RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV RS HX A Inlet Isolation Valve RS HX C Inlet Isolation Valve ARW Pump Sup to A HDR RP RW ARW Pump Sup to B HDR RP RW De-energize MOV-1RW-103C at MCC1-E3 480VUS-1-1N-8N8, de-energize MOV-1RW-103D at MCC1-E4 480VUS 1P-9P9 and close both valves.
BV1-2999 RA RR 1-PA-1E 1-SSPS-SIS-A 1-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, then re-establish.
BV1-3147 DID 1-PA-1G PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-39 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-PA-1G MOV-1CH-115C-P MOV-1CH-115E-P MOV-1CH-115B Charging Pump Suction from VCT Charging Pump Suction from VCT Charging Pump Suction from RWST Rack breaker for 1CH-P-1C off of 4KVS-1DF and rack breaker for 1CH-P-1B onto 4KVS-1DF to allow the pump to be started from the Control Room.
- 1. Cooldown on natural circulation (not a recovery action).
- 2. Secure running Charging Pumps. Align Charging Pump suction via B LHSI pump from RWST. Manually start 1CH-P-1B or 1CH-P-1C at 4KVS-1DF to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV1-2024 RA DID 1-PA-1G 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-630, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to the AFW pump suction.
Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2631 RA RR 1-PT-1 PCV-1MS-101A-P PCV-1MS-101B-P PCV-1MS-101C-P HCV-1MS-104-P A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually close HCV-1MS-104 to stop SG A, B, & C steam flow.
Manually close PCV-1MS-101A to stop SG A steam flow.
Manually close PCV-1MS-101B to stop SG B steam flow.
Manually close PCV-1MS-101C to stop SG C steam flow.
BV1-2177 RA RR 1-PT-1 480VUS-1-8N4 480VUS-1-9P5 1-CIB-SPUR 480V breakers for QS Pump 1QS-P-1A Pump Motor Breaker 480V breakers for QS Pump 1QS-P-1B Pump Motor Breaker Spurious CIB Signal De-energize 1QS-P-1A at 480VUS-1-8N4 and de-energize 1QS-P-1B at 480VUS-1-9P5 to stop quench spray flow.
BV1-2179 RA RR 1-PT-1 4KVS-1AE-1E11-P 4KVS-1AE-1E15-P 4KVS-1DF-1F11-P 4KVS-1DF-1F15-P MOV-1SI-867A-P MOV-1SI-867B-P MOV-1SI-867C-P MOV-1SI-867D-P Spurious SI P-1A Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker P-1B Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Spurious SI De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow. Manually start and stop 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE to provide RCS makeup flow. De-energize MOV-1SI-867A MOV-1SI-867C at MCC1-E5, de-energize MOV-1SI-867B MOV-1SI-867D at MCC1-E6 and manually close the valves to isolate the SI flow path (as required).
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-PT-1 MOV-1CH-289 Normal Charging MOV De-energize MOV-1CH-289 at MCC1-E5 and manually close it, OR Close manual valve 1CH-30 to stop excessive RCS makeup.
BV1-2181 RA RR 1-PT-1 LT-1QS-100A LT-1QS-100B LT-1QS-100C LT-1QS-100D 1-CVCS-RAS MOV-1CH-115C-P MOV-1CH-115E-P Spurious SI RWST Level Channel I RWST Level Channel II RWST Level Channel III RWST Level Channel IV Transfer to Recirc Signal Charging Pump Suction from VCT Charging Pump Suction from RWST Spurious SIS De-energize 1SI-P-1A at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1SI-P-1B at 4KVS-1DF to stop flow from the containment sump.
De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to prevent pump damage on loss of suction. De-energize 1SI-P-1A at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1SI-P-1B at 4KVS-1DF to stop flow from the containment sump.
De-energize MOV-1CH-115B at MCC1-E3 and open it to align suction to the charging pumps.
BV1-2183 RA DID 1-PT-1 FCV-1FW-103A 3A motor driven AFW Pump Recirculation Valve Isolate and vent the instrument air to fail FCV-1FW-103A closed to ensure adequate AFW flow.
BV1-2184 RA RR 1-PT-1 MOV-1RW-103A MOV-1RW-103B MOV-1RW-103C MOV-1RW-103D MOV-1RW-104A MOV-1RW-104B MOV-1RW-104C MOV-1RW-104D MOV-1RW-104 1-CIB-SPUR RW To Recirc Spray Hxs Header Isol RW To Recirc Spray Hxs Header Isol RW To Recirc Spray Hxs Header Isol RW To Recirc Spray Hxs Header Isol RS HX A inlet isolation valve RS HX B inlet isolation valve RS HX C inlet isolation valve RS HX D inlet isolation valve RW To Recirc Spray Hxs Cross X Spurious CIB Signal De-energize MOV-1RW-103A at MCC1-E3, de-energize MOV-1RW-103B at MCC1-E4 and close both valves.
BV1-2185 RA 1-PT-1 MOV-1RW-106A MOV-1RW-114A 1-CIB-SPUR CCR Hx RW Series Isol Vlv CCR Hx RW Series Isol Vlv Spurious CIB Signal Deenergize MOV-1RW-106A at MCC1-E4, de-energize MOV-1RW-114A at MCC1-E3 and open both valves. Align 4KVS-1AE for diesel start. De-energize MOV-1RW-102C1 at MCC1-E2 and manually close it. Manually start 1WR-P-1C at 4KVS-1AE to provide River Water flow, OR De-energize MOV-1RW-102A2 at MCC1-E1 and manually throttle it 10% open THEN Manually start 1WR-P-1A at 4KVS-1AE and manually open MOV-1RW-102A2 to provide River Water flow. Start other AE bus loads as required.
BV1-2186 RA SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-PT-1 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-630, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to the AFW pump suction.
Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2746 RA RR 1-PT-1 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B, & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2863 RA DID 1-PT-1 4KVS-1DF-1F16-P MOV-1FW-151A-ISOL MOV-1FW-151C-ISOL MOV-1FW-151E-ISOL 3B Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker Train B AFW Valve to C SG Train B AFW Valve to B SG Train B AFW Valve to A SG De-energize 1FW-P-3B at 4KVS-1DF to stop train B AFW flow. De-energize 1FW-P-3A at 4KVS-1AE and de-energize MOV-1MS-105 at MCC1-E6 and manually close it to stop train A AFW flow.
BV1-3150 RR 1-QP-1 4KVS-1AE-1E16 MOV-1FW-151B MOV-1FW-151D MOV-1FW-151F 1FW-P-3A 3A Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker Train A AFW Valve to C SG Train A AFW Valve to B SG Train A AFW Valve to A SG 3A Motor Driven AFW Pump Open HYV-1FW-100A at 1FW-PNL-100A, open HYV-1FW-100B at 1FW-PNL-100B, open HYV-1FW-100C at 1FW-PNL-100C, manually open MOV-1FW-155A, manually open MOV-1FW-155B, manually open MOV-1FW-155C, manually open FCV-1FW-479, manually open FCV-1FW-489 and manually open FCV-1FW-499 to align the flow path from 1FW-P4 to the steam generators. Locally start 1FW-P-4, locally open MOV-1FW-160 and manually throttle FCV-1FW-479 to control SG A feed flow, manually throttle FCV-1FW-489 to control SG B and manually throttle FCV-1FW-499 to control SG C feed flow.
BV1-2236 RA RR 1-QP-1 480VUS-1-8N4 480VUS-1-9P5 480V breakers for QS Pump 1QS-P-1A Pump Motor Breaker 480V breakers for QS Pump 1QS-P-1B Pump Motor Breaker De-energize 1QS-P-1A at 480VUS-1-8N4 and de-energize 1QS-P-1B at 480VUS-1-9P5 to stop quench spray flow.
BV1-2237 RA RR 1-QP-1 4KVS-1AE-1E16-OCT Power supply To Steam Gen Aux Feed Pump FW-P-3A Align AE and DF bus loads as required.
BV1-2238 RA LIC (1)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-QP-1 PCV-1MS-101A-P PCV-1MS-101B-P PCV-1MS-101C-P HCV-1MS-104-P A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B, & C steam flow.
OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow, and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2241 RA DID 1-QP-1 MOV-1MS-105-ISOL 4KVS-1AE-1E16-P 4KVS-1DF-1F16-P MOV-1FW-151A-ISOL MOV-1FW-151B-ISOL MOV-1FW-151C-ISOL MOV-1FW-151D-ISOL MOV-1FW-151E-ISOL MOV-1FW-151F-ISOL Turb Driven AFW Pump Steam Isolation 3A Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker 3B Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker Train B AFW Valve to C SG Train A AFW Valve to C SG Train B AFW Valve to B SG Train A AFW Valve to B SG Train B AFW Valve to A SG Train A AFW Valve to A SG De-energize 1FW-P-3B at 4KVS-1DF to stop train B AFW flow. De-energize 1FW-P-3A at 4KVS-1AE and de-energize MOV-1MS-105 at MCC1-E6 and manually close it to stop train A AFW flow.
BV1-2242 RA RR 1-QP-1 4KVS-1AE-1E11-P 4KVS-1AE-1E15-P 4KVS-1DF-1F11-P 4KVS-1DF-1F15-P MOV-1SI-867A-P MOV-1SI-867B-P MOV-1SI-867C-P MOV-1SI-867D-P Spurious SI P-1A Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker P-1B Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Spurious SI De-energize MOV-1SI-867A MOV-1SI-867C at MCC1-E5, de-energize MOV-1SI-867B MOV-1SI-867D at MCC1-E6 and manually close the valves to isolate the SI flow path.
BV1-2243 RA DID 1-QP-1 TV-1MS-101A TV-1MS-101B TV-1MS-101C A Main Steam Trip Valve B Main Steam Trip Valve C Main Steam Trip Valve Manually isolate instrument air to the valves and open vents to fail the valves closed.
Table S-2 Item BV1-3039 will install manual valves to permit isolation of air from outside the fire compartment.
BV1-2644 RA RR 1-QP-1 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Place 1-FW-P-4 in service feeding the credited steam generators. When water is depleted from 1WT-TK-11, manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-639, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to 1FW-P-4.
BV1-2747 RR LIC (5)
SSD RAI 03 SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-QP-1 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually close throttle HCV-1MS-104 to stop control SG A, B
& C steam flow.
OR Manually close throttle PCV-1MS-101A to stop control SG A steam flow, manually close throttle PCV-1MS-101B to stop control SG B steam flow, and manually close throttle PCV-1MS-101C to stop control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2864 RA DID 1-QP-1 FCV-1FW-103A 3A motor driven AFW pump recirculation valve De-energize 1FW-P-3B at 4KVS-1DF to stop train B AFW flow.
BV1-2972 RA 1-RC-1 4KVS-1A-1A5 4KVS-1B-1B5 4KVS-1C-1C5 PCV-1RC-455A PCV-1RC-455B RCP A Pump Motor Breaker RCP B Pump Motor Breaker RCP C Pump Motor Breaker Pzr Spray Valve from the A RCS Loop Pzr Spray Valve from the C RCS Loop De-energize 1RC-P-1A at 4KVS-1A, de-energize 1RC-P-1B at 4KVS-1B and de-energize 1RC-P-1C at 4KVS-1C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV1-2149 RA RR 1-RC-1 PCV-1RC-455C-P PCV-1RC-455D-P PCV-1RC-456-P MOV-1RC-535 MOV-1RC-536 MOV-1RC-537 PT-1RC-444 PT-1RC-445 Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 455D Pressurizer PORV 456 Pzr. PORV 455C Block MOV Pzr. PORV 456 Block MOV Pzr. PORV 455D Block MOV Pzr Pressure Control Pzr Pressure Control Close PCV-1RC-455C, PCV-1RC-455D and PCV-1RC-456 at the keylock switches to stop RCS depressurization.
BV1-2150 RA RR 1-RC-1 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B & C steam flow.
OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow, and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2152 RA DID SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-RC-1 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-630, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to the AFW pump suction.
Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2835 RA RR 1-RC-1 4KVS-1AE-1E11-P 4KVS-1AE-1E15-P 4KVS-1DF-1F11-P 4KVS-1DF-1F15-P MOV-1SI-867A-P MOV-1SI-867B-P MOV-1SI-867C-P MOV-1SI-867D-P Spurious SI P-1A Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker P-1B Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Spurious SI Signal De-energize MOV-1SI-867A at MCC1-E5 and de-energize MOV-1SI-867B at MCC1-E6 and close both valves.
De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow. Manually start and stop 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE to provide RCS makeup flow. De-energize MOV-1SI-867CA at MCC1-E5, de-energize MOV-1SI-867DB at MCC1-E6, and manually close the valves to isolate the SI flow path (as required).
BV1-2873 RA DID 1-RC-1 PCV-1RC-455C PCV-1RC-455D PCV-1RC-456 MOV-1RC-535-P MOV-1RC-536-P MOV-1RC-537-P Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 456D Pressurizer PORV 456 Pzr. PORV 455C Block MOV Pzr PORV 456 Block MOV Pzr PORV 455D Block MOV Transfer control of reactor head vent valves SOV-RC102B SOV-1RC-102B, 103B and 105 to the BIP and open the valves as necessary for RCS depressurization.
BV1-2888 RA DID 1-SB-GEN 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2772 RR 1-SB-GEN NI-1NI-32A BIP Power Source Range NI BIP Power Supply Place NI-1NI-32A in service at the BIP within 80 minutes after the trip.
BV1-3125 DID LIC (1)
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 1-TB-1 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B, & C steam flow.
OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow, and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-1934 RA DID 1-TB-1 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-630, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to the AFW pump suction.
Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2618 RA RR 1-TB-1 4KVS-1DF-1F16-P MOV-1FW-151A-ISOL MOV-1FW-151C-ISOL MOV-1FW-151E-ISOL 3B Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker Train B AFW Valve to C SG Train B AFW Valve to B SG Train B AFW Valve to A SG De-energize 1FW-P-3B at 4KVS-1DF to stop train B AFW flow. De-energize 1FW-P-3A at 4KVS-1AE and de-energize MOV-1MS-105 at MCC1-E6 and manually close it to stop train A AFW flow.
BV1-3141 RR 3-CR-1 PCV-1MS-101A-P PCV-1MS-101B-P PCV-1MS-101C-P HCV-1MS-104-P A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually close HCV-1MS-104 to stop SG A, B, & C steam flow.
Manually close PCV-1MS-101A to stop SG A steam flow.
Manually close PCV-1MS-101B to stop SG B steam flow.
Manually close PCV-1MS-101C to stop SG C steam flow.
BV1-2251 RA RR 3-CR-1 4KVS-1A-1A5 4KVS-1B-1B5 4KVS-1C-1C5 PCV-1RC-455A PCV-1RC-455B RCP A Pump Motor Breaker RCP B Pump Motor Breaker RCP C Pump Motor Breaker Pzr Spray Valve from the A RCS Loop Pzr Spray Valve from the C RCS Loop De-energize 1RC-P-1A at 4KVS-1A, de-energize 1RC-P-1B at 4KVS-1B and de-energize 1RC-P-1C at 4KVS-1C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV1-2255 RA RR 3-CR-1 1CH-E-1 MOV-1CH-381 Seal Water Heat Exchanger RCP #1 Seal Return Header Isolation MOV De-energize MOV-1CH-381 at MCC1-E6. and manually close it OR Manually close 1CH-214 OR Manually close 1CH-216 to isolate seal return.
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 3-CR-1 MOV-1CH-115C-P MOV-1CH-115E-P MOV-1CH-115B 4KVS-1AE-1E11-P 4KVS-1AE-1E15-P 4KVS-1AE-1E11 4KVS-1AE-1E15 4KVS-1DF-1F11 Charging Pump Suction from VCT Charging Pump Suction from VCT Charging Pump Suction from RWST Charging Pump P-1A Breaker Charging Pump P-1C Breaker Charging Pump P-1A Breaker Charging Pump P-1C Breaker Charging Pump P-1B Breaker De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to prevent pump damage on loss of suction.
De-energize MOV-1CH-115D at 480VUS-1-P and open it to align suction to the charging pumps.
Manually start 1CH-P-1B(C) or 1CH-P-1C at 4KVS-1DF to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV1-2258 RA RR 3-CR-1 4KVS-1DF 4KVS-1DF-1F7 4KVS-1DF-1F9 1EEEG2 PNL-DG-SEQ-2 4KVS-1DF-1F12 1DF 4160V Emergency Bus Supply Breaker from "D" SS bus Supply Breaker from the #2 EDG
BV1-2259 RA RR 3-CR-1 LT-1QS-100A LT-1QS-100B LT-1QS-100C LT-1QS-100D 1-MTR-SIGNAL 1-CVCS-RAS RWST Level Channel I RWST Level Channel II RWST Level Channel III RWST Level Channel IV Manual Transfer to Recirc Signal Transfer to Recirc Signal De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to prevent pump damage on loss of suction.
De-energize 1SI-P-1A at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1SI-P-1B at 4KVS-1DF to stop flow from the containment sump.
De-energize MOV-1CH-115D at 480VUS-1-P and open it to align suction to the charging pumps.
Manually start 1CH-P-1B or 1CH-P-1C at 4KVS-1DF to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV1-2261 RA DID 3-CR-1 480VUS-1-8N12 480VUS-1-9P12 480VUS-1-1B7 480VUS-1-8N13 480VUS-1-9P13 Pzr Backup Heater Group "A" Pzr Backup Heater Group "B" Pzr Control Heater Group "C" Pzr Backup Heater Group "D" Pzr Backup Heater Group "E" De-energize the A and D group heaters at 480VUS18-N, de-energize the control group heater at 480VUS11B and de-energize the B and E group heaters at 480VUS19-P to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV1-2262 RA DID 3-CR-1 480VUS-1-8N4 480VUS-1-9P5 1-CIB-SPUR 480V breakers for QS Pump 1QS-P-1A Pump Motor Breaker 480V breakers for QS Pump 1QS-P-1B Pump Motor Breaker Spurious CIB Signal De-energize 1QS-P-1A at 480VUS-1-8N4 and de-energize 1QS-P-1B at 480VUS-1-9P5 to stop quench spray flow.
BV1-2264 RA RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-47 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 3-CR-1 LCV-1CH-460A SW-ISO-CH460A LCV-1CH-460B TV-1CH-200A TV-1CH-200B TV-1CH-200C SW-ISO-1CH-460 Isolation valve for letdown Switch to isolate control from control room and close the valve Isolation Valve for Letdown Letdown Orifice Isolation Letdown Orifice Isolation Letdown Orifice Isolation Isolates Control from MCR & Fails Valve Closed Close LCV-1CH-460 at the keylock switch to isolate letdown.
BV1-2268 RA RR 3-CR-1 MOV-1RW-103A MOV-1RW-103B MOV-1RW-103C MOV-1RW-103D MOV-1RW-106A MOV-1RW-106B MOV-1RW-114A MOV-1RW-114B MOV-1RW-104A MOV-1RW-104B MOV-1RW-104C MOV-1RW-104D MOV-1RW-104 MOV-1RW-116A MOV-1RW-116B 1-CIB-SPUR RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol RW to Recirc Spray HXS Header Isol A Train RW to the Primary CC HX B Train RW to the Primary CC HX A Train RW to the Primary CC HX B Train RW to the Primary CC HX RS HX A Inlet Isolation Valve RS HX B Inlet Isolation Valve RS HX C Inlet Isolation Valve RS HX D Inlet Isolation Valve RW TO Recirc Spray HXS Cross X A RW Pump Sup to A HDR RP RW A RW Pump Sup to B HDR RP RW Spurious CIB Signal De-energize MOV-1RW-103C at MCC1-E3, de-energize MOV-1RW-103D at MCC1-E4 and close both valves.
De-energize the following (as required) to align RW valves:
MOV-1RW-102B1 at 480VUS-1-1P.
MOV-1RW-103A at 480VUS-1-1N.
MOV-1RW-103B at 480VUS-1-1P.
MOV-1RW-103C at 480VUS-1-1N.
MOV-1RW-103D at 480VUS-1-1P.
MOV-1RW-106A at 480VUS-1-1P.
MOV-1RW-106B at 480VUS-1-1P.
MOV-1RW-114A at 480VUS-1-1N.
MOV-1RW-114B at 480VUS-1-1N.
BV1-2269 RA RR 3-CR-1 MOV-1RW-102B1 MOV-1RW-106B MOV-1RW-114B MOV-1RW-103B 1-CIB-SPUR 1B Pump Discharge to B Header CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV CCR HX RW Series Isol VLV RW To Recirc Spray Hxs Header Isol Spurious CIB Signal Trip the #2 diesel to prevent damage.
Deenergize MOV-1RW-106B at 480VUS-1-P, de-energize MOV-1RW-114B at 480VUS-1-N and open both valves.
Align 4KVS-1DF for diesel start.
Restart the #2 diesel.
De-energize MOV-1RW-102B2 at MCC1-E1 and manually close it. De-energize MOV-1RW-102B1 at MCC1-E2 and manually throttle IA10% open THEN manually start 1WR-P-1B at 4KVS-1DF and manually open MOV-1RW-102B1 to provide River Water flow, OR De-energize MOV-1RW-102C2 at MCC1-E1 and manually close it. De-energize MOV-1RW-102C1 at MCC1-E2 and manually throttle it 10% open THEN manually start 1WR-P-1C at 4KVS-1DF and manually open MOV-1RW-102C1 to provide River Water flow.
Start other DF bus loads as required.
BV1-2270 RA RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-48 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 3-CR-1 MOV-1SI-836-P MOV-1SI-869A-P MOV-1SI-869B-P MOV-1SI-867A-P MOV-1SI-867B-P MOV-1SI-867C-P MOV-1SI-867D-P Spurious SI HHSI To RCS Cold Leg Isol Valve HHSI To RCS Hot Leg Isol Valve HHSI To RCS Hot Leg Isol Valve Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Spurious SI Signal De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE and De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow. Manually start and stop 1CH-P-1B or 1CH-P-1C 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to provide RCS makeup flow. De-energize MOV-1SI-836, 867CA and 869A at 480VUS-1-N, de-energize MOV-1SI-867DB and 869B at 480VUS-1-P and manually close the valves to isolate the SI flow paths (as required).
BV1-2271 BV1-2272 RA DID 3-CR-1 MOV-1SI-869B HHSI To RCS Hot Leg Isol Valve De-energize MOV-1SI-869B at 480VUS-1-1P and manually throttle to provide an alternate makeup flow path.
BV1-2274 RA DID 3-CR-1 TV-1BD-100A TV-1BD-100B TV-1BD-100C TV-1BD-101A1 TV-1BD-101A2 TV-1BD-101B1 TV-1BD-101B2 TV-1BD-101C1 TV-1BD-101C2 TV-1BD-107A TV-1BD-107B TV-1BD-107C SG BLDN CNMT Isol VLV SG BLDN CNMT Isol VLV SG BLDN CNMT Isol VLV SG Blowdown Isolation SG Blowdown Isolation SG Blowdown Isolation SG Blowdown Isolation SG Blowdown Isolation SG Blowdown Isolation SG Blowdown Isolation SG Blowdown Isolation SG Blowdown Isolation De-energize TV-1BD-100A, B & C at PNL-DC-3, de-energize TV-1BD-101A1, B1 & C1 at PNL-VITBUS-1 and de-energize TV-1BD-101A2, B2 & C2 at PNL-VITBUS-2 to stop blowdown flow.
Isolate and vent air to TV-1BD-100A, B & C to close SG Blowdown Containment Isolation Valves.
BV1-2276 RA DID 3-CR-1 TV-1MS-101A TV-1MS-101B TV-1MS-101C Main Steam Trip Valve Main Steam Trip Valve Main Steam Trip Valve Close 1IA-85-6 and open 1IA-85-53 and 1IA-85-54 to close the Main Steam Trip Valves.
BV1-2277 RA RR 3-CR-1 4KVS-1DF-1F16 MOV-1FW-151A MOV-1FW-151C MOV-1FW-151E 3B Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker Train B AFW Valves to C SG Train B AFW Valves to B SG Train B AFW Valves to A SG Manually start 1FW-P-3B at 4KVS-1DF. De-energize MOV-1FW-151A, C & E at 480VUS-1-P. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151E to control SG A AFW flow. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151C to control SG B AFW flow. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151A to control SG C AFW flow.
BV1-2279 RA DID 3-CR-1 MOV-1CH-289 MOV-1CH-310 MOV-1CH-311 Normal Charging MOV Normal Chg. Outlet MOV from Non-Regen Hx Aux. Spray Isolation MOV De-energize MOV-1CH-289 at MCC1-E5. and manually close it, OR Close manual valve 1CH-30 to stop excessive RCS makeup.
BV1-2282 RA RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-49 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 3-CR-1 4KVS-1A-1A1 4KVS-1B-1B1 4KVS-1C-1C1 4KVS-1D-1D1 HYV-1FW-100A HYV-1FW-100B HYV-1FW-100C MFW Pump Motor 1A1 MFW Pump Motor 1A2 MFW Pump Motor 1B1 MFW Pump Motor 1B2 SG 1A Fast Acting Feedwater Isol SG 1B Fast Acting Feedwater Isol SG 1C Fast Acting Feedwater Isol De-energize 1FW-P-1A at 4KVS-1A & 1B and de-energize 1FW-P-1B at 4KVS-1C & 1D to stop main feedwater flow to the steam generators.
BV1-2331 RA DID 3-CR-1 4KVS-1DF-1F2 4KVS-1DF-1F10 4KVS-1DF-1F14 1WR-P-9B Breaker 1WR-P-1B Breaker 1WR-P-1C Breaker Trip the #2 diesel to prevent damage.
Align 4KVS-1DF for diesel start.
Restart the #2 diesel.
Manually start 1WR-P-1B or 1C at 4KVS-1DF.
Start other DF bus loads as required.
BV1-2332 RA DID 3-CR-1 PCV-1RC-455C-P PCV-1RC-455D-P PCV-1RC-456-P MOV-1RC-535 MOV-1RC-536 MOV-1RC-537 PT-1RC-444 PT-1RC-445 SW-ISO-RC455C SW-ISO-RC456 Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 455D Pressurizer PORV 456 Pzr. PORV 455C Block MOV Pzr. PORV 456 Block MOV Pzr. PORV 455D Block MOV Pzr Pressure Control Pzr Pressure Control Isolates Control from MCR & Fails Valve Closed Isolates Control from MCR & Fails Valve Closed Close PCV-1RC-455C, PCV-1RC-455D and PCV-1RC-456 at the keylock switches to stop RCS depressurization.
BV1-2334 RA RR 3-CR-1 MOV-1MS-105-ISOL 4KVS-1AE-1E16-P 4KVS-1DF-1F16-P MOV-1FW-151A-ISOL MOV-1FW-151B-ISOL MOV-1FW-151C-ISOL MOV-1FW-151D-ISOL MOV-1FW-151E-ISOL MOV-1FW-151F-ISOL Turb Driven AFW Pump Steam Isolation 3A Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker 3B Motor Driven AFW Pump Breaker Train B AFW Valve to C SG Train A AFW Valve to C SG Train B AFW Valve to B SG Train A AFW Valve to B SG Train B AFW Valve to A SG Train A AFW Valve to A SG De-energize 1FW-P-3A at 4KVS-1AE and manually trip 1FW-P-2 to stop train A AFW flow. De-energize MOV-1FW-151A, C & E at 480VUS-1-P. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151E to control SG A AFW flow. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151C to control SG B AFW flow. Manually throttle MOV-1FW-151A to control SG C AFW flow.
BV1-2416 RA RR 3-CR-1 1VS-F-16B 1VS-F-55B Emergency Switchgear Exhaust Fan Emergency Switchgear Supply Fan Install portable ventilation for Emergency Switchgear.
BV1-2426 RA DID 3-CR-1 1VS-AC-1B 1VS-C-1B 1VS-E-4B 1VS-F-40B 1VS-P-3B System Air Handler System air compressor Control Area A/C Condensing Unit System Return Air Fan Control Air Conditioning Cond Pump Install 2 5200 CFM portable fans in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
- 1. Credit BV2 HVAC System if available (not a recovery action).
- 2. Install portable electric fan(s) in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
SSD RAI 05 SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-50 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 3-CR-1 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Manually open 1FW-643, manually close 1FW-630, manually open 1FW-660 and manually close 1FW-663 to align 1WT-TK-26 to the AFW pump suction.
Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2574 RA RR 3-CR-1 SOV-1RC-102B SOV-1RC-103B SOV-1RC-105 LI-1FW-475BP LI-1RC-460BP NI-1NI-32A PI-1RC-403BP TI-1RC-410BP TI-1RC-29BP BIP Power RCS RX Vessel Vent SOV B train RCS PZR Vent SOV B train RCS Vent to CNMT SOV SG Levels Pressurizer Level Source Range NI RCS Loop B WR Pressure RCS Cold Leg Loop 1A Recorder Temp Core Exit T/C Temperatures BIP Power Supply Use supplementary controls and monitoring from the BIP.
BV1-2695 RA DID 3-CR-1 Spurious SI 4KVS-1AE-1E11-P 4KVS-1AE-1E15-P 4KVS-1DF-1F11-P 4KVS-1DF-1F15-P Spurious SI signal P-1A Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker P-1B Charging Pump Breaker P-1C Charging Pump Breaker De-energize 1CH-P-1A(C) at 4KVS-1AE OR De-energize 1CH-P-1B(C) at 4KVS-1DF to control charging/HHSI flow.
BV1-2707 RA DID 3-CR-1 4KVS-1B-1B2 4KVS-1D-1D2 HYV-1FW-100A HYV-1FW-100B HYV-1FW-100C Condensate Pump A Breaker Condensate Pump B Breaker SG 1A Fast Acting Feedwater Isol SG 1B Fast Acting Feedwater Isol SG 1C Fast Acting Feedwater Isol De-energize 1CN-P-1A at 4KVS-1B and de-energize 1CN-P-1A at 4KVS-1B 1CN-P-1B at 4KVS-1D to stop condensate flow to the steam generators.
BV1-2759 RA DID 3-CR-1 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B, & C steam flow OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow, and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
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Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 3-CR-1 PCV-1RC-455C PCV-1RC-455D PCV-1RC-456 MOV-1RC-535-P MOV-1RC-536-P MOV-1RC-537-P Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 456D Pressurizer PORV 456 Pzr. PORV 455C Block MOV Pzr. PORV 456 Block MOV Pzr. PORV 455D Block MOV Transfer control of reactor head vent valves SOV-RC102B SOV-1RC-102B, 103B and 105 to the BIP and open the valves as necessary for RCS depressurization.
To align Containment Sump recirculation to maintain long-term cooling, perform the following. De-energize MOV-1SI-860B and 863B at 480VUS-1-P and open them.
De-energize MOV-1SI-885B and 885D at 480VUS-1-P and close them. De-energize MOV-1CH-115D at 480VUS-1-P and close it and de-energize MOV-1SI-862B at 480VUS-1-P and close it.
BV1-2889 RA DID 3-CR-1 MOV-1CH-115C Charging suction from VCT De-energize MOV-1CH-115C at 480VUS-1-N and close it or De-energize MOV-1CH-115E at 480VUS-1-P and close it to prevent hydrogen intrusion into the suction of the charging pumps.
BV1-2917 RA 3-TR-6 3-TR-7 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B, & C steam flow.
OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow, and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-3181 DID 3-YARD-1 4KVS-1AE 4KVS-1DF 1EE-EG-1 1EE-EG-2 1VS-D-22-1A 1VS-D-22-1B 1VS-D-22-2A 1VS-D-22-2B 1VS-D-22-2C 1VS-D-22-2D 1VS-F-22A 1VS-F-22B MOV-1RW-113A MOV-1RW-113B MOV-1RW-113C MOV-1RW-113D1 1AE 4160V Emergency Bus 1DF 4160V Emergency Bus
- 1 EDG
- 2 EDG
- 1 D/G BLDG O.A. Exhaust Damper
- 2 D/G BLDG O.A. Exhaust Damper
- 1 D/G BLDG O.A. Intake Damper
- 1 D/G BLDG O.A. Intake Damper
- 2 D/G BLDG O.A. Intake Damper
- 2 D/G BLDG O.A. Intake Damper D/G Building Direct Drive Fan D/G Building Direct Drive Fan
- 2 EDG Inlet Valves for RW Supply from Hdr Identify the emergency bus that is energized or that is to be recovered. Local manual operator action to remove all control power from the selected emergency bus, strip the emergency bus, verify that the Emergency Diesel Generator has automatically started, or manually start it, if required. Local manual operator action will be required to manually sequence on all necessary emergency bus loads, if required BV1-2493 RR SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-52 LIC (19)
Table G-1 BVPS-1 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS RR/DID 3-YARD-1 1WT-TK-10 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Makeup from 2WTD-TK23 to 1WT-TK-10 using gravity flow through pre-staged hoses.
OR Makeup from 1WT-TK-26 to 1WT-TK-10 using 1WT-P-33A or B through LCV-1WT-104A.
OR Align river water to the suction of the available AFW Pumps using the lineup directed by the Technical Support Center.
BV1-2657 RR 3-YARD-1 PCV-1MS-101A PCV-1MS-101B PCV-1MS-101C HCV-1MS-104 A SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve B SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve C SG Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Residual Heat Release Valve Manually throttle HCV-1MS-104 to control SG A, B, & C steam flow.
OR Manually throttle PCV-1MS-101A to control SG A steam flow, manually throttle PCV-1MS-101B to control SG B steam flow, and manually throttle PCV-1MS-101C to control SG C steam flow.
BV1-2901 DID SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-53 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-ASP 2CHS-AOV200A 2CHS-AOV200C 2CHS-LCV460B 2CHS-LCV460A A Letdown Orifice Isol Valve C Letdown Orifice Isol Valve Train B Pzr Letdown Isolation Valve Train A Letdown Isolation Valve De-energize 2CHS-AOV200A at PNL-DC2-11 and de-energize 2CHS-AOV200C at PNL-DC2-15 to isolate letdown flow.
OR Isolate instrument air to containment to fail 2CHS-AOV200A, B and C closed to prevent loss of RCS inventory.
BV2-0765 RA RR 2-ASP 2RCS-PCV456-P 2RCS-MOV536 Pressurizer PORV 456 Pzr. PORV 456 Block MOV Close 2RCS-PCV456 at the keylock isolation switch.
OR Perform repair procedure to allow the closing of 2RCS-MOV536 to isolate the PORV.
OR To provide a flow path from the containment sump to Charging/HHSI pump 2CHS-P21B, de-energize 2SIS-MOV8809B, 2SIS-MOV8887B, 2SIS-MOV8811B, 2RSS-MOV156D, 2SIS-MOV863B, 2RSS-MOV155D and 2SIS-MOV8890B at MCC2-E12 and then manually close 2SIS-MOV8809B, 2SIS-MOV8887B, 2RSS-MOV156D and 2SIS-MOV8890B, manually open 2SIS-MOV8811B, 2SIS-MOV863B and 2RSS-MOV155D.
BV2-0766 RA RR and DID 2-ASP 480VUS-2-8-7B 480VUS-2-8-7C Pzr. A Group B/U Heaters Pzr D Group B/U heaters De-energize the A and D backup group heaters at 480VUS28 to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV2-0768 RA DID 2-ASP 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump De-energize the A Charging/HHSI Pump 2CHS-P21A at 4KVS-2AE to stop excess charging/HHSI pump flow.
BV2-0769 RA DID 2-ASP 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-0779 RA RR 2-ASP 4KVS-2AE-2E18-P 2FWE-HCV100A-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100C-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100E-ISOL 4160V Bkr for A AFW Pump A AFW Header to the C SG C SG HCV Feed from A Train B SG HCV Feed from A Train A SG HCV Feed from A Train De-energize 2FWE-P23A at 4KVS-2AE to stop train A AFW flow.
BV2-1364 RA RR 2-ASP 2SVS-PCV101A-P 2SVS-PCV101B-P A Atmospheric Steam Dump B Atmospheric Steam Dump De-energize 2SVS-PCV101A at MCC2-E05 to stop SG A steam flow. De-energize 2SVS-PCV101B at MCC2-E13 to stop SG B steam flow.
BV2-1396 RA RR 2-ASP 2-SSPS-SIS-A 2-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, re-establish.
BV2-1677 DID LIC (1)
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SSD RAI 04 SSD RAI 08 PRA RAI 05 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CB-1 2CHS-LCV115C-P 2CHS-LCV115E-P 2CHS-LCV115B 4KVS-2AE-2E12 4KVS-2AE-2E15 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P 2QSS-LT104A 2QSS-LT104B 2QSS-LT104C 2QSS-LT104D 2-CVCS-RAS Spurious SI Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from RWST 4160V Volt Breaker for 2CHS-P21A Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Volt Breaker for 2CHS-P21C Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump RWST Level Ch I RWST Level Ch II RWST Level Ch III RWST Level Ch IV SI Recirculation Mode Transfer Signal Spurious SI Signal De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) and 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE and de-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) and 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2DF to prevent pump damage on loss of suction.
De-energize 2CHS-LCV115B at MCC2-E03 480VUS-2-8-4C or de-energize individual breaker and manually open it or open 2CHS-LCV115B from the ASP to align suction to the charging pumps.
Manually start 2CHS-P21A(C) or 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV2-0796 BV2-0805 RA RR and DID 2-CB-1 2CHS-LCV115C-P 2CHS-LCV115E-P 2CHS-LCV115B 4KVS-2AE-2E12 4KVS-2AE-2E15 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P 2QSS-LT104A 2QSS-LT104B 2QSS-LT104C 2QSS-LT104D 2-CVCS-RAS Spurious SI 2SIS-MOV867B-P 2SIS-MOV867C-P 2SIS-MOV867D-P 2SIS-MOV867A-P 2SIS-MOV836-P 2SIS-MOV840-P 2SIS-HCV868A 2SIS-HCV868B 2SIS-MOV869A 2SIS-MOV869B Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from RWST 4160V Volt Breaker for 2CHS-P21A Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Volt Breaker for 2CHS-P21C Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump RWST Level Ch I RWST Level Ch II RWST Level Ch III RWST Level Ch IV SI Recirculation Mode Transfer Signal Spurious SI Signal Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Hot Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Hot Legs Open 2CHS-LCV115B from the ASP to provide suction to Charging/HHSI pump 2CHS-P21A and start 2CHS-P21A from the ASP to provide RCS makeup.
BV2-0796 BV2-0805 BV2-0816 BV2-1390 PCS LIC (20)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-55 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CB-1 2BDG-AOV100A1 2BDG-AOV100B1 2BDG-AOV100C1 2BDG-AOV101A1 2BDG-AOV101A2 2BDG-AOV101B1 2BDG-AOV101B2 2BDG-AOV101C1 2BDG-AOV101C2 SG A BD Isol Trip Valve SG B BD Isol Trip Valve SG C BD Isol Trip Valve SG A BD Inside CNMT Isol Valve SG A BD Inside CNMT Isol Valve SG B BD Inside CNMT Isol Valve SG B BD Inside CNMT Isol Valve SG C BD Inside CNMT Isol Valve SG C BD Inside CNMT Isol Valve De-energize 2BDG-AOV101A2, B2 and C2 at PNL-DC2-10 to isolate SG A, B and C blowdown flow.
BV2-0797 RA DID 2-CB-1 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the A AFW pump.
BV2-0798 RA RR 2-CB-1 2CHS-E21 2CHS-MOV378 2CHS-MOV381 Seal Water Return Hx Seal Water Return Isol MOV Seal Water Return Isol MOV Close 2CHS-214 to isolate seal water return heat exchanger flow.
BV2-0801 RA RR 2-CB-1 2CHS-LCV115C Charging Suction from VCT De-energize 2CHS-LCV115C at MCC2-E03 480VUS-2-8-4C or de-energize individual breaker and manually close the valve OR De-energize 2CHS-LCV115E at MCC2-E04 480VUS-2 4C or de-energize individual breaker and manually close the valve to prevent hydrogen intrusion into the charging pump suction.
BV2-0806 RA RR 2-CB-1 2CHS-MOV289-ISOL Norm Charging FCV Isol Manually open 2CHS-477 to bypass the charging flow control valve. Manually close 2CHS-30. to isolate the charging flow control valve. Manually throttle 2CHS-477 to control charging flow. Provide an alternate RCS makeup flow path by de-energizing 2SIS-MOV836 at MCC2-E05 and manually throttle for RCS makeup flow.
BV2-0807 RA RR 2-CB-1 4KVS-2DF-2F18-P 2MSS-SOV102-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100A-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100B-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100C-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100D-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100E-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100F-ISOL 4160V Bkr for B AFW Pump TD AFW Pump Remote Trip SOV C SG HCV Feed from A Train C SG HCV Feed from B Train B SG HCV Feed from A Train B SG HCV Feed from B Train A SG HCV Feed from A Train A SG HCV Feed from B Train De-energize 2FWE-P23B at 4KVS-2DF to stop train B AFW flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100E to control A train SG A flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100C to control A train SG B flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100A to control A train SG C flow.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-56 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CB-1 4KVS-2DF-2F18-P 2MSS-SOV102-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100A-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100B-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100C-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100D-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100E-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100F-ISOL 4160V Bkr for B AFW Pump TD AFW Pump Remote Trip SOV A AFW Header to the C SG C SG HCV Feed from A Train B AFW Header to the C SG C SG HCV Feed from B Train B SG HCV Feed from A Train B AFW Header to the B SG B SG HCV Feed from B Train A SG HCV Feed from A Train B AFW Header to the A SG A SG HCV Feed from B Train Throttle 2FWE-HCV100E at the ASP to control SG A level.
Throttle 2FWE-HCV100C at the ASP to control SG B level.
BV2-0808 PCS 2-CB-1 2MSS-AOV101A 2MSS-AOV101B 2MSS-AOV101C A Main Steam Isol Valve B Main Steam Isol Valve C Main Steam Isol Valve De-energize 2MSS-AOV101A, B and C at PNL-DC2-10 to stop steam flow from SG A, B and C.
BV2-0809 RA RR 2-CB-1 4KVS-2A-2A6 4KVS-2B-2B6 4KVS-2C-2C6 2RCS-PCV455A 2RCS-PCV455B A RCP Feeder Breaker B RCP Feeder Breaker C RCP Feeder Breaker A Pressurizer Spray Valve B Pressurizer Spray Valve De-energize 2RCS-P21A at 4KVS-2A, de-energize 2RCS-P21B at 4KVS-2B and de-energize 2RCS-P21C at 4KVS-2C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV2-0812 RA RR 2-CB-1 2RCS-PT444 2RCS-PT445 2RCS-PCV455C-P 2RCS-PCV455D-P Pzr. Pressure Control Pzr. Pressure Control Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 455D Close 2RCS-PCV455C and 2RCS-PCV455D at the keylock isolation switches.
OR Perform repair procedure to allow the closing of 2RCS-MOV535 and 2RCS-MOV537 to isolate the PORVs.
OR To provide a flow path from the containment sump to Charging/HHSI pump 2CHS-P21A, de-energize 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2RSS-MOV156C, 2SIS-MOV863A, 2RSS-MOV155C and 2SIS-MOV8890A at MCC2-E11, de-energize 2CHS-LCV115B at MCC2-E03 480VUS-2-8-4C or de-energize individual breaker and then manually close 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2RSS-MOV156C and 2SIS-MOV8890A, manually open 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2SIS-MOV863A and 2RSS-MOV155C and then manually close 2CHS-LCV115B.
BV2-0813 RA RR and DID 2-CB-1 2SDS-AOV112A 2SDS-AOV112B 2SDS-AOV112C A Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve B Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve C Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve De-energize 2SDS-AOV112A, B and C at PNL-AC2-03 to stop steam flow from SG A, B and C.
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CB-1 Spurious SI 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P 2SIS-MOV867B-P 2SIS-MOV867C-P 2SIS-MOV867D-P 2SIS-MOV867A-P 2SIS-MOV836-P 2SIS-MOV840-P 2SIS-HCV868A 2SIS-HCV868B 2SIS-MOV869A 2SIS-MOV869B Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Hot Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Hot Legs De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) at 4KVS-2AE AND De-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow.
De-energize 2SIS-MOV836, 2SIS-MOV840, 2SIS-MOV867C and 2SIS-MOV869A at MCC2-E05 and manually close the valves and de-energize 2SIS-MOV867D and 2SIS-MOV869B at MCC2-E06 and close them to isolate spuriously opened SI flow paths.
Manually start 2CHS-P21A(C) or 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV2-0816 BV2-1390 RA DID 2-CB-1 2SWE-MOV116A-P 2SWE-MOV116B-P 2SWS-MOV102C1-P 2SWS-MOV102C2-P 2SWS-MOV103A 2SWS-MOV103B 2SWS-MOV107A 2SWS-MOV107D 2-CIB-SPUR Stby SW to the A SW Hdr Stby SW to the B SW Hdr C SW pump to A SW Hdr C SW pump to B SW Hdr A SW Hdr to RS Hx B SW Hdr to RS Hx A SW Hdr to Secondary CC B SW Hdr to Secondary CC Spurious CIB Signal If 2SWS-P21A and 2SWE-P21A are damaged, stop the 2-1 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103A at MCC2-E03 480VUS-2-8-4C or de-energize individual breaker and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWE-MOV116A at MCC2-E03 480VUS-2-8-4C or de-energize individual breaker and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWS-MOV106A at MCC2-E03 480VUS-2-8-4C or de-energize individual breaker and verify that it is open to align the A SWS flow path.
De-energize 2SWS-MOV170A at MCC2-E01 480VUS-2-8-4B or de-energize individual breaker and open it to align seal water to 2SWS-P21C. De-energize 2SWS-MOV102C1 at MCC2-E01 480VUS-2-8-4B or de-energize individual breaker, restart the diesel, manually start 2SWS-P21C while manually opening 2SWS-MOV102C1 to provide A SWS flow.
Start other AE bus loads as required.
OR If 2SWS-P21C and 2SWE-P21A are damaged, stop the 2-1 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103A at MCC2-E03 480VUS-2-8-4C or de-energize individual breaker and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWE-MOV116A at MCC2-E03 480VUS-2-8-4C or de-energize individual breaker and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWS-MOV106A at MCC2-E03 480VUS-2-8-4C or de-energize individual breaker and verify that it is open to align the A SWS flow path.
De-energize 2SWS-MOV102A at MCC2-E01 480VUS-2-8-4B or de-energize individual breaker, restart the diesel, manually start 2SWS-P21A while manually opening 2SWS-MOV102A to provide A SWS flow. Start other AE bus loads as required.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-58 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CB-1 2SWE-MOV116A-P 2SWE-MOV116B-P 2SWS-MOV102C1-P 2SWS-MOV102C2-P 2SWS-MOV103A 2SWS-MOV103B 2SWS-MOV107A 2SWS-MOV107D 2-CIB-SPUR Stby SW to the A SW Hdr Stby SW to the B SW Hdr C SW pump to A SW Hdr C SW pump to B SW Hdr A SW Hdr to RS Hx B SW Hdr to RS Hx A SW Hdr to Secondary CC B SW Hdr to Secondary CC Spurious CIB Signal Open 2SWS-MOV102A at the ASP to align the discharge path for 2SWS-P21A and start 2SWS-P21A from the ASP to provide cooling water to the required loads.
BV2-0818 PCS 2-CB-1 480VUS-2-2-2C 480VUS-2-8-7B 480VUS-2-8-7C 480VUS-2-9-7B 480VUS-2-9-7C Pzr. C Control Group Heaters Pzr. A Group B/U Heaters Pzr. D Group B/U Heaters Pzr. B Group B/U Heaters Pzr. E Group B/U Heaters De-energize the C control group heater at 480VUS22 Normal Switchgear, de-energize the A and D backup group heaters at 480VUS28 and de-energize the B and E backup group heaters at 480VUS29 to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV2-0820 RA DID 2-CB-1 480VUS-2-2-2C 480VUS-2-8-7B 480VUS-2-8-7C 480VUS-2-9-7B 480VUS-2-9-7C Pzr. C Control Group Heater Pzr. A Group B/U Heaters Pzr. D Group B/U Heaters Pzr. B Group B/U Heaters Pzr. E Group B/U Heaters Operate the A backup group heater at the ASP to control RCS pressure.
BV2-0820 PCS 2-CB-1 4KVS-1G-1G5 4KVS-2A-2A1 4KVS-2B-2B1 4KVS-2C-2C1 4KVS-2D-2D1 2FWS-HYV157A 2FWS-HYV157B 2FWS-HYV157C Startup Feed Pump bkr 2FWS-P21A1 Motor Bkr 2FWS-P21A2 Motor Bkr 2FWS-P21B1 Motor Bkr 2FWS-P21B2 Motor Bkr A SG Feed Isolation B SG Feed Isolation C SG Feed Isolation De-energize 2FWS-P21A at 4KVS-2A & 4KVS-2B and de-energize 2FWS-P21B at 4KVS-2C & 4KVS-2D to stop main feedwater pump flow to the steam generators.
BV2-0821 RA DID 2-CB-1 4KVS-2AE-2E16-OCT 2AE 4160V Bus C SW pump 2AE Breaker Align AE and DF bus loads as required.
BV2-0823 RA RR 2-CB-1 4KVS-2AE-2E2 4KVS-2DF-2F2 2-CIB-SPUR A QS Pump supply bkr 4160V Bkr for A QS Pump B QS Pump supply bkr 4160V Bkr for B QS Pump Spurious CIB Signal Trip 2QSS-P21A at 4KVS-2AE to stop A train quench spray flow and trip 2QSS-P21B at 4KVS-2DF to stop B train quench spray flow.
BV2-0824 RA DID 2-CB-1 Spurious SI 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P 4KVS-2DF-2F12-P 4KVS-2DF-2F15-P Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for B Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) at 4KVS-2AE AND De-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF to control charging/HHSI flow.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-59 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CB-1 2SWS-STRM47 2SWS-PT117A 2SWS-AOV130A A SW pump seal strainer A SW pump seal press A SW pump seal water Isol De-energize 2SWS-AOV130A at 480VUS-2-8 to restore the service water pump seal water supply.
De-energize 2SWS-AOV130A by opening Bkr 1B at MCC E09 to de-energize PNL-AC2-E3 to restore the service water pump seal water supply.
BV2-0850 RA RR 2-CB-1 2SWS-MOV102A 2SWS-MOV106A 2-CIB-SPUR A SW Pump Discharge MOV SW Header A Isol to CC Hx Spurious CIB Signal If 2SWS-P21A and 2SWE-P21A are damaged, stop the 2-1 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103A at MCC2-E03 and close it 480VUS-2-8-4C or de-energize individual breaker and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWE-MOV116A at MCC2-E03 480VUS-2-8-4C or de-energize individual breaker and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWS-MOV106A at MCC2-E03 and open it to align the A SWS flow path 480VUS-2-8-4C or de-energize individual breaker and verify that it is open to align the A SWS flow path. De-energize 2SWS-MOV170A at MCC2-E01 480VUS-2-8-4B or de-energize individual breaker and open it to align seal water to 2SWS-P21C. De-energize 2SWS-MOV102C1 at MCC2-E01 480VUS-2-8-4B or de-energize individual breaker, restart the diesel, manually start 2SWS-P21C while manually opening 2SWS-MOV102C1 to provide A SWS flow. Start other AE bus loads as required.
OR If 2SWS-P21C and 2SWE-P21A are damaged, stop the 2-1 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103A at MCC2-E03 and close it 480VUS-2-8-4C or de-energize individual breaker and close it if it spuriously opened.
De-energize 2SWE-MOV116A at MCC2-E03 480VUS-2-8-4C or de-energize individual breaker and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWS-MOV106A at MCC2-E03 and open it to align the A SWS flow path 480VUS-2-8-4C or de-energize individual breaker and verify that it is open to align the A SWS flow path. De-energize 2SWS-MOV102A at MCC2-E01 480VUS-2-8-4B or de-energize individual breaker, restart the diesel, manually start 2SWS-P21A while manually opening 2SWS-MOV102A to provide A SWS flow.
Start other AE bus loads as required.
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CB-1 4KVS-2AE-2E14 4KVS-2AE-2E18 2FWE-HCV100C 2FWE-HCV100E 480VUS-2-8-7B 2SVS-PCV101A 2SVS-PCV101B 4KVS-2AE-2E12 2CHS-FCV122 2RCS-PCV456 2CHS-LCV460A 2CHS-LCV460B 2CHS-P22A 2CHS-SOV206 2EGS-EG2-1 2FWS-LI477F 2FWS-LI487F 2MSS-PI475F 2MSS-PI485F 2RCS-LI459AF 2RCS-PI403F 2RCS-PI455F 2RCS-TI413F 2RCS-TI423F 2RCS-TI410F 2RCS-TI420F 2FWE-FI100AF 2FWE-FI100BF 2NMS-NI31BF 2NMS-NI31DF ACB-42A ACB-2A10 ACB-2E7 ACB-2E10 2SWS-MOV113A 2SWS-MOV102A 2CHS-LCV115B ASP Power Supply A Service Water Pump Breaker A AFW Pump Breaker 4160V Bkr for A AFW Pump AFW Throttle Valve To B SG B SG HCV Feed from A Train AFW Throttle Valve To A SG A SG HCV Feed from A Train Pzr A Group B/U Heaters ASDV For Steam Generator A A Atmospheric Steam Dump ASDV For Steam Generator B B Atmospheric Steam Dump A Charging Pump Breaker 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump Normal Charging FCV Pressurizer Power Relief Valve PORV 456 Train A Letdown Isolation Valve Train B Letdown Isolation Valve A Boric Acid Transfer Pump Redundant Emergency Boration Emergency Diesel Generator #1 A SG Level B SG Level A SG Pressure B SG Pressure Pressurizer Level A Loop RCS Pressure Pressurizer Pressure A Loop RCS Hot Leg Temperature B Loop RCS Hot Leg Temperature A Loop RCS Cold Leg Temperature B Loop RCS Cold Leg Temperature A SG Auxiliary Feed Flow B SG Auxiliary Feed Flow Source Range Count Rate Source Range Startup Rate SS Bus 2A Supply Breaker Bus 2AE Supply Breaker Bus 2AE Supply Breaker
- 1 EDG Supply Breaker
- 1 EDG Hx SW Supply A SW Header Isol Valve Pump Discharge MOV Charging Suction from RWST ASP Power Supply Take the plant to "Safe and Stable" utilizing selected instruments and controls at the auxiliary shutdown panel, as directed.
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CB-1 2HVC-ACU201A 2HVC-MOD205A 2HVC-MOD206A MCR A/C Unit Condenser Control Room A/C Unit Control Room A/C Unit Install 2 5000 CFM portable fans in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
- 1. Credit BV1 HVAC System if available (not a recovery action).
- 2. Install portable electric fan(s) in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
BV2-1329 RA RR 2-CB-1 4KVS-2B-2B2 4KVS-2C-2C2 4KVS-2D-2D2 2FWS-HYV157A 2FWS-HYV157B 2FWS-HYV157C 2CNM-P21A Motor Bkr 2CNM-P21B Motor Bkr 2CNM-P21C Motor Bkr A SG Feed Isolation B SG Feed Isolation C SG Feed Isolation De-energize 2CNM-P21A at 4KVS-2B, de-energize 2CNM-P21B at 4KVS-2C and de-energize 2CNM-P21C at 4KVS-2D to stop condensate flow to the steam generators.
BV2-1349 RA DID 2-CB-1 2SVS-HCV104-P 2SVS-PCV101A-P 2SVS-PCV101B-P 2SVS-PCV101C-P Residual Heat Release Valve A Atmospheric Steam Dump B Atmospheric Steam Dump C Atmospheric Steam Dump De-energize 2SVS-HCV104 at MCC2-E14 to stop SG A, B and C steam flow. De-energize 2SVS-PCV101A at MCC2-E05 to stop SG A steamflow. De-energize 2SVS-PCV101B at MCC2-E13 to stop SG B steam flow.
De-energize 2SVS-PCV101C at 480VUS28 480VUS29-5B or de-energize individual breaker to stop SG C steam flow.
THEN Manually throttle 2SVS-HCV104 to control SG A, B and C pressure.
OR Manually throttle 2SVS-PCV101A to control SG A pressure.
Manually throttle 2SVS-PCV101B to control SG B pressure.
Manually throttle 2SVS-PCV101C to control SG C pressure.
BV2-1397 RA RR 2-CB-1 2SVS-HCV104-P 2SVS-PCV101A-P 2SVS-PCV101B-P 2SVS-PCV101C-P Residual Heat Release Valve A Atmospheric Steam Dump B Atmospheric Steam Dump C Atmospheric Steam Dump Throttle 2SVS-PCV101A from the ASP to control SG A pressure and throttle 2SVS-PCV101B from the ASP to control SG B pressure.
BV2-1397 PCS 2-CB-1 2RCS-PCV455C 2RCS-PCV455D 2RCS-MOV535 2RCS-MOV536 2RCS-MOV537 Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 455D Pzr PORV 455C block MOV Pzr PORV 456 block MOV Pzr PORV 455D block MOV Perform repair procedure to allow the opening of 2RCS-MOV536. Open PORV 2RCS-PCV456 at the ASP.
BV2-1413 RA 2-CB-1 2RCS-PCV455C 2RCS-PCV455D 2RCS-PCV456 2RCS-MOV535-P 2RCS-MOV536-P 2RCS-MOV537-P Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 455D Pressurizer PORV 456 Pzr. PORV 455C Block MOV Pzr. PORV 456 Block MOV Pzr. PORV 455D Block MOV Attempt to control 2RCS-PCV456 at the ASP.
BV2-1413 PCS SSD RAI 08 SSD RAI 05 SSD RAI 04 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-62 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CB-1 2RCS-SOV200A 2RCS-SOV200B 2RCS-SOV201A 2RCS-SOV201B 2RCS-HCV250A 2RCS-HCV250B Train A head vent SOV Train B head vent SOV Train A head vent SOV Train B head vent SOV Reactor head vent Reactor head vent Perform repair procedure to provide power to the reactor vessel head vent valves.
BV2-1418 RA 2-CB-1 2CHS-FCV122 2CHS-MOV289 2CHS-MOV310 2CHS-MOV311 2SIS-HCV868A 2SIS-HCV868B 2SIS-MOV836 2SIS-MOV840 2SIS-MOV867C 2SIS-MOV867D 2SIS-MOV869A 2SIS-MOV869B Normal Charging FCV Norm Charging FCV Isol Regen HX Normal Charging Disch PRZR Aux Spray Isolation Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Hot Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Hot Legs De-energize 2CHS-MOV289 at MCC2-E05 and manually throttle for RCS makeup flow.
OR Manually close 2CHS-30, 2CHS-FCV122 Outlet Isolation Valve, and manually throttle open 2CHS-477, 2CHS-FCV122 Bypass Valve, to control RCS makeup flow.
OR Provide an alternate RCS makeup flow path by de-energizing 2SIS-MOV836 at MCC2-E05 and manually throttle for RCS makeup flow.
BV2-1713 DID SSD RAI 08 LIC (20)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-63 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CB-1 2-CB-4 2-CB-5 2-CB-6 2-CP-1 2-CTP-1 2-CV-1 2-CV-2 2-CV-3 2-CV-4 2-CV-5 2-CV-6 2-DG-1 2-DG-2 2-FB-1 2-H-1 2-MS-1 2-PA-3 2-PA-3A 2-PA-3B 2-PA-3C 2-PA-4 2-PA-5 2-PA-6 2-PA-7 2-PT-1 2-RC-1 2-S-1 2-S-10 2-S-2 2-S-3 2-S-4 2-S-5 2-S-6 2-S-7 2-S-8 2-S-9 2-SB-1 2-SB-10 2-SB-2 2-SB-3 2-ALLFAIL-SRNI BV2 Source Range NI Monitor source range indicator at ASP.
OR Borate to the required concentration to meet required shutdown margin BV2-1636 DID LIC (20)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-64 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-SB-4 2-SB-5 2-SB-6 2-SB-7 2-SB-8 2-SB-9 2-SG-1N 2-SG-1S 2-SOB-1 2-SOB-2 2-SOB-3 2-TB-1 2-TB-2 2-TR-1 2-TR-2 2-TR-3 2-TR-4 2-TR-5 2-VP-1 2-VP-2 2-WH-1 2-WT-21 2-WT-210 2-WT-211 2-WT-23 3-ADM-1 3-AIS-1 3-CR-1 3-ER-1 3-ER-2 3-ER-3 3-IS-1 3-IS-2 3-IS-3 3-IS-4 3-IS-6 3-RH-1 3-SY-1 3-TR-6 3-TR-7 3-YARD-1 BV2-1636 (Cont.)
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CB-5 2HVC-ACU201A 2HVC-MOD205A 2HVC-MOD206A 2HVC-DMPF21A 2HVC-DMPF22A 2HVC-DMPF23A 2HVC-DMPF24A MCR A/C Unit Condenser Control Room A/C Unit Control Room A/C Unit Control Rm Supply Fire Damper Control Rm Supply Fire Damper Control Rm Exhaust Fire Damper Control Rm Exhaust Fire Damper Install 2 5000 CFM portable fans in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
- 1. Credit BV1 HVAC System if available (not a recovery action).
- 2. Install portable electric fan(s) in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
BV2-1194 RA RR 2-CB-5 2-SSPS-SIS-A 2-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, re-establish.
BV2-1649 DID 2-CB-6 2CHS-LCV115C-P 2CHS-LCV115E-P 2CHS-LCV115B 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from RWST 4160V Volt Breaker for 2CHS-P21A Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Volt Breaker for 2CHS-P21C Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) and 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE and de-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) and 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2DF to prevent pump damage on loss of suction.
De-energize 2CHS-LCV115B at MCC2-E03 and manually open it or open 2CHS-LCV115B from the ASP to align suction to the charging pumps.
Manually start 2CHS-P21A(C) or 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV2-1024 RA RR 2-CB-6 2CHS-LCV115C Charging Suction from VCT De-energize 2CHS-LCV115C at MCC2-E03 and manually close the valve OR De-energize 2CHS-LCV115E at MCC2-E04 and manually close the valve to prevent hydrogen intrusion into the charging pump suction.
BV2-1026 RA RR 2-CB-6 4KVS-2AE-2E18-P 4KVS-2DF-2F18-P 2FWE-HCV100A-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100B-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100C-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100D-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100E-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100F-ISOL 4160V Bkr for A AFW Pump 4160V Bkr for B AFW Pump C SG HCV Feed from A Train C SG HCV Feed from B Train B SG HCV Feed from A Train B SG HCV Feed from B Train A SG HCV Feed from A Train A SG HCV Feed from B Train De-energize 2FWE-P23B at 4KVS-2DF to stop train B AFW flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100E to control A train SG A flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100C to control A train SG B flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100A to control A train SG C flow.
SSD RAI 04 SSD RAI 05 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CB-6 4KVS-2AE-2E18-P 4KVS-2DF-2F18-P 2FWE-HCV100A-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100B-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100C-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100D-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100E-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100F-ISOL 4160V Bkr for A AFW Pump 4160V Bkr for B AFW Pump A AFW Header to the C SG C SG HCV Feed from A Train B AFW Header to the C SG C SG HCV Feed from B Train B SG HCV Feed from A Train B AFW Header to the B SG B SG HCV Feed from B Train A SG HCV Feed from A Train B AFW Header to the A SG A SG HCV Feed from B Train Throttle 2FWE-HCV100E at the ASP to control SG A level.
Throttle 2FWE-HCV100C at the ASP to control SG B level.
BV2-1028 PCS 2-CB-6 4KVS-2A-2A6 4KVS-2B-2B6 2RCS-PCV455A 2RCS-PCV455B A RCP Feeder Breaker B RCP Feeder Breaker A Pressurizer Spray Valve B Pressurizer Spray Valve De-energize 2RCS-P21A at 4KVS-2A and de-energize 2RCS-P21B at 4KVS-2B to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV2-1029 RA RR 2-CB-6 2RCS-PT444 2RCS-PT445 2RCS-PCV455C-P 2RCS-PCV455D-P Pzr. Pressure Control Pzr. Pressure Control Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 455D Close 2RCS-PCV455C at the keylock isolation switch.
OR Perform repair procedure to allow the closing of 2RCS-MOV535 to isolate the PORV.
OR To provide a flow path from the containment sump to Charging/HHSI pump 2CHS-P21A de-energize 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2RSS-MOV156C, 2SIS-MOV863A, 2RSS-MOV155C and 2SIS-MOV8890A at MCC2-E11, de-energize 2CHS-LCV115B at MCC2-E03 and then manually close 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2RSS-MOV156C and 2SIS-MOV8890A, manually open 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2SIS-MOV863A and 2RSS-MOV155C and then manually close 2CHS-LCV115B.
BV2-1030 RA RR and DID 2-CB-6 2SDS-AOV112A 2SDS-AOV112B 2SDS-AOV112C A Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve B Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve C Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve De-energize 2SDS-AOV112A, B and C at PNL-AC2-03 to stop steam flow from SG A, B and C.
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CB-6 2SISMOV867B-P 2SISMOV867D-P 2SIS-HCV868B 2SISMOV869B Alt HHSI to RCS cold legs Norm Alt HHSI to RCS cold legs Norm HHSI to RCS cold legs Alt HHSI to RCS hot legs De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) at 4KVS-2AE AND De-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow.
De-energize 2SIS-MOV867D and 2SIS-MOV869B at MCC2-E06 and close them to isolate spuriously opened SI flow paths.
Manually start 2CHS-P21A(C) or 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE and manually throttle 2SIS-MOV867D to control RCS makeup flow.
BV2-1032 BV2-1391 RA DID 2-CB-6 2SISMOV867B-P 2SISMOV867D-P 2SIS-HCV868B 2SISMOV869B Alt HHSI to RCS cold legs Norm Alt HHSI to RCS cold legs Norm HHSI to RCS cold legs Alt HHSI to RCS hot legs De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) at 4KVS-2AE AND De-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow.
De-energize 2SIS-MOV867D and 2SIS-MOV869B at MCC2-E06 and close them to isolate spuriously opened SI flow paths.
Manually start 2CHS-P21A or 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE and manually throttle 2SIS-MOV867D to control RCS makeup flow.
OR Start 2CHS-P21A from the ASP to provide RCS makeup.
BV2-1032 BV2-1391 PCS 2-CB-6 480VUS222C 480VUS287B 480VUS297B 480VUS297C Pzr. C Control Group Heater Pzr. Group A Backup Heaters Pzr. Group B Backup Heaters Pzr. Group E Backup Heaters De-energize the C control group heater at 480VUS22, de-energize the A backup group heater at 480VUS28 and de-energize the B and E backup group heaters at 480VUS29 to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV2-1034 RA DID 2-CB-6 480VUS222C 480VUS287B 480VUS297B 480VUS297C Pzr. C Control Group Heater Pzr. Group A Backup Heaters Pzr. Group B Backup Heaters Pzr. Group E Backup Heaters Operate the A backup group heater at the ASP to control RCS pressure.
BV2-1034 PCS 2-CB-6 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P 4KVS-2DF-2F12-P 4KVS-2DF-2F15-P 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for B Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) at 4KVS-2AE AND De-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF to control charging/HHSI flow.
BV2-1037 RA DID 2-CB-6 4KVS-2DF-2F2 Feeder breaker for 2QSS-P21B 4160V Bkr for B QS Pump Trip 2QSS-P21B at 4KVS-2DF to stop quench spray flow.
BV2-1038 RA RR 2-CB-6 2HVC-ACU201A 2HVC-MOD205A 2HVC-MOD206A MCR A/C Unit Condenser Control Room A/C Unit Control Room A/C Unit Install 2 5000 CFM portable fans in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
- 1. Credit BV1 HVAC System if available (not a recovery action).
- 2. Install portable electric fan(s) in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
BV2-1334 RA RR SSD RAI 04 SSD RAI 05 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CB-6 4KVS-2AE 2AE 4160V Bus Align AE and DF bus loads as required.
BV2-1353 RA RR 2-CB-6 4KVS-2AE-2E14 4KVS-2AE-2E18 2FWE-HCV100C 2FWE-HCV100E 480VUS-2-8-7B 2SVS-PCV101A 2SVS-PCV101B 4KVS-2AE-2E12 2CHS-FCV122 2RCS-PCV456 2CHS-LCV460A 2CHS-LCV460B 2CHS-P22A 2CHS-SOV206 2EGS-EG2-1 2FWS-LI477F 2FWS-LI487F 2MSS-PI474 2MSS-PI475F 2MSS-PI484 2MSS-PI485F 2RCS-LI459AF 2RCS-PI403F 2RCS-PI455F 2RCS-TI413F 2RCS-TE413 2RCS-TI423F 2RCS-TE420 2RCS-TI410F 2RCS-TE410 2RCS-TI420F 2RCS-TE423 A Service Water Pump Breaker A AFW Pump Breaker 4160V Bkr for A AFW Pump AFW Throttle Valve To B SG B SG HCV Feed from A train AFW Throttle Valve To A SG A SG HCV Feed from A train Pzr A Group B/U Heaters ASDV for Steam Generator A A Atmospheric Steam Dump ASDV for Steam Generator B B Atmospheric Steam Dump A Charging Pump Breaker 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump Normal Charging FCV Pressurizer Power Relief Valve PORV 456 Train A Letdown Isolation Valve Train B Letdown Isolation Valve A Boric Acid Transfer Pump Redundant Emergency Boration Emergency Diesel Generator #1 A S/G Level B S/G Level A S/G Pressure A SG Pressure B S/G Pressure B SG Pressure Pressurizer Level A Loop RCS Pressure Pressurizer Pressure A Loop RCS Hot Leg Temperature A Loop RCS Hot Leg Temperature B Loop RCS Hot Leg Temperature B Loop RCS Cold Leg Temperature A Loop RCS Cold Leg Temperature A Loop RCS Cold Leg Temperature B Loop RCS Cold Leg Temperature B Loop RCS Hot Leg Temperature Take the plant to "Safe and Stable" utilizing selected instruments and controls at the auxiliary shutdown panel, as directed.
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2FWE-FI100AF 2FWE-FI100BF 2NMS-NI31BF 2NMS-NI31DF 2HVD-FN270A 2HVD-FN271A 2HVD-MOD22A 2HVD-MOD23A 2HVD-TE21A 2HVD-TH22A 2HVZ-FN261A 2HVZ-FN262A 2HVZ-MOD21A 2HVZ-MOD22A 2HVZ-MOD23A 2NME-ND52A ACB-42A ACB-2A10 ACB-2E7 ACB-2E10 2SWS-MOV113A 2SWS-MOV102A 2CHS-LCV115B ASP Power Supply A SG Auxiliary Feed Flow B SG Auxiliary Feed Flow Source Range Count Rate Source Range Startup Rate Diesel Gen Bldg Supply Fan Diesel Gen Bldg Sec. Supply Fan D.G. Bldg Modulating OS Damper D.G. Bldg Modulating Recirc Damper D.G. Bldg Pri. Inlet Air Temp.
Diesel Room A Thermostat Emerg. Swgr Supply Fan Emerg. Swgr. Exhaust Fan E. Swgr Modulating OS Air Damper E. Swgr Modulating Exhaust Damper E. Swgr Modulating Recirc. Damper Source Range Detector SS Bus 2A Supply Breaker Bus 2AE Supply Breaker Bus 2AE Supply Breaker
- 1 EDG Supply Breaker
- 1 EDG Hx SW Supply A SW Header Isol Valve Pump Discharge MOV Charging Suction from RWST ASP Power Supply BV2-1354 (Cont.)
2-CB-6 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-1356 RA RR 2-CB-6 2SVS-HCV104-P 2SVS-PCV101A-P 2SVS-PCV101B-P 2SVS-PCV101C-P Residual Heat Release Valve A Atmospheric Steam Dump B Atmospheric Steam Dump C Atmospheric Steam Dump De-energize 2SVS-HCV104 at MCC2-E14 to stop SG A, B and C steam flow and manually throttle it to control SG A, B and C pressure. De-energize 2SVS-PCV101A at MCC2-E05 to stop SG A steam flow and manually throttle it to control SG A pressure. De-energize 2SVS-PCV101B at MCC2-E13 to stop SG B steam flow and manually throttle it to control SG B pressure. De-energize 2SVS-PCV101C at MCC2-E13 to stop SG C steam flow and manually throttle it to control SG C pressure.
BV2-1398 RA RR 2-CB-6 2SVS-HCV104-P 2SVS-PCV101A-P 2SVS-PCV101B-P 2SVS-PCV101C-P Residual Heat Release Valve A Atmospheric Steam Dump B Atmospheric Steam Dump C Atmospheric Steam Dump Throttle 2SVS-PCV101A from the ASP to control SG C SG A pressure and throttle 2SVS-PCV101B from the ASP to control SG B pressure.
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CB-6 2-SSPS-SIS-A 2-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, re-establish.
BV2-1706 DID 2-CB-6 4KVS-2A-2A1 4KVS-2B-2B1 2FWS-HYV157A 2FWS-HYV157B 2FWS-HYV157C 2FWS-P21A1 Motor Bkr 2FWS-P21A2 Motor Bkr A SG Feed Isolation B SG Feed Isolation C SG Feed Isolation De-energize 2FWS-P21A at 4KVS-2A & 4KVS-2B and de-energize 2FWS-P21B at 4KVS-2C & 4KVS-2D to stop main feedwater pump flow to the steam generators.
BV2-1708 DID 2-CB-6 4KVS-2B-2B2 4KVS-2C-2C2 4KVS-2D-2D2 2FWS-HYV157A 2FWS-HYV157B 2FWS-HYV157C 2CNM-P21A Motor Bkr 2CNM-P21B Motor Bkr 2CNM-P21C Motor Bkr A SG Feed Isolation B SG Feed Isolation C SG Feed Isolation De-energize 2CNM-P21A at 4KVS-2B, de-energize 2CNM-P21B at 4KVS-2C and de-energize 2CNM-P21C at 4KVS-2D to stop condensate flow to the steam generators.
BV2-1712 DID 2-CV-1 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-0947 RA RR 2-CV-1 4KVS-2AE-2E2 4KVS-2DF-2F2 2-CIB-SPUR 4160V Bkr for A QS Pump.
4160V Bkr for B QS Pump Spurious CIB signal Trip 2QSS-P21A at 4KVS-2AE to stop A train quench spray flow and trip 2QSS-P21B at 4KVS-2DF to stop B train quench spray flow.
BV2-0950 RA RR 2-CV-1 2CHS-LCV115C-P 2CHS-LCV115E-P 2QSS-LT104A 2QSS-LT104C 2-CVCS-RAS 4KVS-2DF-2F15-P Spurious SI Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from VCT RWST Level Ch I RWST Level Ch III SI Recirculation Mode Transfer Signal 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump Spurious SI Signal De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) and 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE and de-energize 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2DF to prevent pump damage on loss of suction.
De-energize 2CHS-LCV115D at MCC2-E04 and manually open it to align suction to the charging pumps. Manually start 2CHS-P21B or 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2DF to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV2-0951 BV2-0958 RA RR and DID 2-CV-1 2BDG-AOV100A1 2BDG-AOV100B1 2BDG-AOV100C1 2BDG-AOV101A1 2BDG-AOV101A2 2BDG-AOV101B1 2BDG-AOV101B2 2BDG-AOV101C1 2BDG-AOV101C2 SG A BD Isol trip valve SG B BD Isol trip valve SG C BD Isol trip valve SG A BD inside Cnmt Isol valve SG A BD inside Cnmt Isol valve SG B BD inside Cnmt Isol valve SG B BD inside Cnmt Isol valve SG C BD inside Cnmt Isol valve SG C BD inside Cnmt Isol valve De-energize 2BDG-AOV101A2, B2 and C2 at PNL-DC2-10 to isolate SG A, B and C blowdown flow.
BV2-0952 RA 2-CV-1 2CHS-E21 2CHS-MOV381 Seal water return Hx Seal water return Isol MOV Close 2CHS-214 to isolate seal water return heat exchanger flow.
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CV-1 2CHS-LCV115E Charging suction from VCT De-energize 2CHS-LCV115C at MCC2-E03 and manually close the valve OR De-energize 2CHS-LCV115E at MCC2-E04 and manually close the valve to prevent hydrogen intrusion into the charging pump suction.
BV2-0957 RA 2-CV-1 2CHS-AOV200A 2CHS-AOV200B 2CHS-AOV200C 2CHS-LCV460B 2CHS-LCV460A A Letdown Orifice Isol Valve B Letdown Orifice Isol Valve C Letdown Orifice Isol Valve Train B Pzr Letdown Isolation Valve Train A Letdown Isolation Valve De-energize 2CHS-AOV200A, B & C at PNL-DC2-11 and de-energize 2CHS-AOV200C at PNL-DC2-15 to isolate letdown flow.
OR Isolate instrument air to containment to fail 2CHS-AOV200A, B and C closed to prevent loss of RCS inventory.
BV2-0959 RA RR 2-CV-1 2CHS-MOV289-ISOL Norm Charging FCV Isol Manually open 2CHS-477 to bypass the charging flow control valve. Manually close 2CHS-30 to isolate the charging flow control valve. Manually throttle 2CHS-477 to control charging flow.
Manually close 2CHS-30, 2CHS-FCV122 Outlet Isolation Valve, and manually throttle open 2CHS-477, 2CHS-FCV122 Bypass Valve, to control RCS makeup flow.
BV2-0960 RA RR 2-CV-1 2FWE-HCV100A 2FWE-HCV100B 2FWE-HCV100C 2FWE-HCV100D 2FWE-HCV100E 2FWE-HCV100F 4KVS-2AE-2E18-P 4KVS-2DF-2F18-P 2MSS-SOV102-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100A-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100C-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100E-ISOL C SG HCV Feed from A Train C SG HCV feed from B train B SG HCV Feed from A Train B SG HCV feed from B train A SG HCV Feed from A Train A SG HCV feed from B train 4160V bkr for A AFW Pump 4160V bkr for B AFW Pump TD AFW pump remote trip SOV C SG HCV Feed from A Train B SG HCV Feed from A Train A SG HCV Feed from A Train Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100E and 2FWE-HCV100F to control SG A AFW flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100C and 2FWE-HCV100D to control SG B AFW flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100A and 2FWE-HCV100B to control SG C AFW flow.
De-energize 2FWE-P23A at 4KVS-2AE to stop train A AFW flow.
BV2-0961 BV2-0962 RA RR and DID 2-CV-1 2HVC-ACU201B 2HVC-MOD205B 2HVC-MOD206B MCR A/C Unit condensers MCR Inlet Dampers MCR Outlet Dampers Install 2 5000 CFM portable fans in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
- 1. Credit BV1 HVAC System if available (not a recovery action).
- 2. Install portable electric fan(s) in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
BV2-0963 RA RR 2-CV-1 2MSS-AOV101A 2MSS-AOV101B 2MSS-AOV101C A Main Steam Isol Valve B Main Steam Isol Valve C Main Steam Isol Valve De-energize 2MSS-AOV101A, B and C at PNL-DC2-10 to stop steam flow from SG A, B and C.
BV2-0964 RA RR SSD RAI 04 SSD RAI 05 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CV-1 4KVS-2A-2A6 4KVS-2B-2B6 4KVS-2C-2C6 2RCS-PCV455A 2RCS-PCV455B A RCP Feeder Breaker B RCP Feeder Breaker C RCP Feeder Breaker A Pressurizer Spray Valve B Pressurizer Spray Valve De-energize 2RCS-P21A at 4KVS-2A, de-energize 2RCS-P21B at 4KVS-2B and de-energize 2RCS-P21C at 4KVS-2C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV2-0971 RA RR 2-CV-1 2SDS-AOV112A 2SDS-AOV112B 2SDS-AOV112C A Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve B Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve C Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve De-energize 2SDS-AOV112A, B and C at PNL-AC2-03 to stop steam flow from SG A, B and C.
BV2-0972 RA DID 2-CV-1 Spurious SI 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P 2SIS-MOV867A-P 2SIS-MOV867B-P 2SIS-MOV867C-P 2SIS-MOV867D-P 2SIS-MOV836-P 2SIS-MOV840-P 2SIS-HCV868A 2SIS-MOV869A 2SIS-MOV869B Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Hot Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Hot Legs De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) at 4KVS-2AE and de-energize 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow.
De-energize 2SIS-MOV836, 2SIS-MOV840, 2SIS-MOV867C and 2SIS-MOV869A at MCC2-E05 and manually close the valves 480VUS-2-8-5B or de-energize individual breakers and de-energize 2SIS-MOV867D and 2SIS-MOV869B at MCC2-E06 and close them manually close the valves to isolate spuriously opened SI flow paths. Start 2CHS-P21B or 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2DF to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV2-0973 BV2-1392 RA DID 2-CV-1 2SVS-HCV104 2SVS-PCV101A 2SVS-PCV101B 2SVS-PCV101C 2SVS-HCV104-P 2SVS-PCV101A-P 2SVS-PCV101B-P 2SVS-PCV101C-P Residual Heat Release Valve A Atmospheric Steam Dump B Atmospheric Steam Dump C Atmospheric Steam Dump Residual Heat Release Valve A Atmospheric Steam Dump B Atmospheric Steam Dump C Atmospheric Steam Dump De-energize 2SVS-HCV104 at MCC2-E14 to stop SG A, B and C steam flow. Manually close 2SVS-PCV101A to stop SG A steam flow. Manually close 2SVS-PCV101B to stop SG B steam flow. Manually close 2SVS-PCV101C to stop SG C steam flow.
De-energize 480VUS-2-8-5B to close 2SVS-PCV101A.
De-energize 480VUS-2-8-6D to close 2SVS-PCV101B &
THEN Manually throttle 2SVS-HCV104 to control SG A, B and C pressure.
OR Manually throttle 2SVS-PCV101A to control SG A pressure.
Manually throttle 2SVS-PCV101B to control SG B pressure.
Manually throttle 2SVS-PCV101C to control SG C pressure.
BV2-0974 BV2-1399 RA RR and DID LIC (20)
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CV-1 2SWS-MOV102C1 2SWS-MOV102C2 2SWSMOV103B 2-CIB-SPUR C SW pump to A SW Hdr C SW pump to B SW Hdr B SW Hdr to RS Hx Unit 2 Spurious CIB Signal If 2SWS-P21B and 2SWE-P21B are damaged, stop the 2-2 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103B at MCC2-E04 and close it. De-energize 2SWE-MOV116B at MCC2-E04 and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWS-MOV106B at MCC2-E04 and verify that it is open to align the B SWS flow path. De-energize 2SWS-MOV170B at MCC2-E02 and open it to align seal water to 2SWS-P21C.
De-energize 2SWS-MOV102C2 at MCC2-E02, restart the diesel, manually start 2SWS-P21C while manually opening 2SWS-MOV102C2 to provide B SWS flow. Start other DF bus loads as required.
OR If 2SWS-P21C and 2SWE-P21B are damaged, stop the 2-2 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103B at MCC2-E04 and close it. De-energize 2SWE-MOV116B at MCC2-E04 and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWS-MOV106B at MCC2-E04 and verify that it is open to align the B SWS flow path. Restart the diesel and start other DF bus loads as required.
BV2-0976 RA 2-CV-1 2SWS-MOV106B 2-CIB-SPUR SW Header B Isol to CC Hx Spurious CIB Signal If 2SWS-P21B and 2SWE-P21B are damaged, stop the 2-2 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103B at MCC2-E04 and close it if it to spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWE-MOV116B at MCC2-E04 and close it and de-energize 2SWS-MOV106B at MCC2-E04 and open it to align the B SWS flow path. De-energize 2SWS-MOV170B at MCC2-E02 and open it to align seal water to 2SWS-P21C.
De-energize 2SWS-MOV102C2 at MCC2-E02, restart the diesel, manually start 2SWS-P21C while manually opening 2SWS-MOV102C2 to provide B SWS flow. Start other DF bus loads as required.
OR IF 2SWS-P21C and 2SWE-P21B are damaged, stop the 2-2 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103B at MCC2-E04 and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWE-MOV116B at MCC2-E04 and close it and de-energize 2SWS-MOV106B at MCC2-E04 and open it to align the B SWS flow path. Restart the diesel and start other DF bus loads as required.
De-energize 2SWS-MOV106B at MCC2-E04.
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CV-1 480VUS222C 480VUS287B 480VUS287C 480VUS297B 480VUS297C Pzr. C Control Group heater Pzr. Group A backup heaters Pzr. Group D backup heaters Pzr. Group B backup heaters Pzr. Group E backup heaters De-energize the C control group heater at 480VUS22, de-energize the A and D backup group heaters at 480VUS28 and de-energize the B and E backup group heaters at 480VUS29 to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV2-0978 RA DID 2-CV-1 4KVS-1G-1G5 4KVS-2A-2A1 4KVS-2B-2B1 4KVS-2C-2C1 4KVS-2D-2D1 2FWS-HYV157A 2FWS-HYV157B 2FWS-HYV157C Startup Feed Pump Bkr 2FWS-P21A1 Motor Bkr 2FWS-P21A2 Motor Bkr 2FWS-P21B1 Motor Bkr 2FWS-P21B2 Motor Bkr A SG Feed Isolation B SG Feed Isolation C SG Feed Isolation De-energize 2FWS-P21A at 4KVS-2A & 4KVS-2B and de-energize 2FWS-P21B at 4KVS-2C & 4KVS-2D to stop main feedwater pump flow to the steam generators.
BV2-0979 RA RR 2-CV-1 Spurious SI 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P 4KVS-2DF-2F15-P Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) at 4KVS-2AE to control charging/HHSI flow.
BV2-0980 RA DID 2-CV-1 2RCS-PT445 2RCSPCV455D-P 2RCSPCV456-P 2RCS-MOV536 2RCS-MOV537 Pzr. Pressure control Pressurizer Power Relief Valve Pressurizer Power Relief Valve Pzr. PORV 456 Block MOV Pzr. PORV 455D Block MOV Close 2RCS-PCV455D, 2RCS-PCV455D and 2RCS-PCV456 at the keylock isolation switches.
OR Perform repair procedure to allow the closing of 2RCS-MOV537, 2RCS-MOV535 and 2RCS-MOV536 to isolate the PORVs.
Open PNL-DC2-02 breaker 8-1 to close 2RCS-PCV455C.
Open PNL-DC2-03 breaker 8-2 to close 2RCS-PCV455D.
Open PNL-DC2-03 breaker 8-1 to close 2RCS-PCV456.
OR To provide a flow path from the containment sump to Charging/HHSI pump 2CHS-P21B, de-energize 2SIS-MOV8809B, 2SIS-MOV8887B, 2SIS-MOV8811B, 2RSS-MOV156D, 2SIS-MOV863B, 2RSS-MOV155D and 2SIS-MOV8890B at MCC2-E12, de-energize 2CHS-LCV115D at MCC2-E04 and then manually close 2SIS-MOV8809B, 2SIS-MOV8887B, 2RSS-MOV156D and 2SIS-MOV8890B, manually open 2SIS-MOV8811B, 2SIS-MOV863B and 2RSS-MOV155D and then manually close 2CHS-LCV115D.
BV2-0981 RA RR and DID 2-CV-1 2SWS-STRM48 B SW Pump Seal Strainer Manually backwash the service water seal water strainer.
De-energize 2SWS-AOV118B and 2SWS-AOV130B by opening breaker E4-2 on PNL-AC2-E4 to restore the service water pump seal water supply.
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CV-1 4KVS-2B-2B2 4KVS-2C-2C2 4KVS-2D-2D2 2FWS-HYV157A 2FWS-HYV157B 2FWS-HYV157C 2CNM-P21A Motor Bkr 2CNM-P21B Motor Bkr 2CNM-P21C Motor Bkr A SG Feed Isolation B SG Feed Isolation C SG Feed Isolation De-energize 2CNM-P21A at 4KVS-2B, de-energize 2CNM-P21B at 4KVS-2C and de-energize 2CNM-P21C at 4KVS-2D to stop condensate flow to the steam generators.
BV2-1367 RA RR 2-CV-1 2RCS-PCV455D 2RCS-PCV456 2RCS-MOV535 2RCS-MOV536 2RCS-MOV537 Pressurizer PORV 455D Pressurizer PORV 456 Pzr PORV 455C block MOV Pzr PORV 456 block MOV Pzr PORV 455D block MOV Perform repair procedure to allow the opening of 2RCS-MOV536.
BV2-1414 RA 2-CV-2 2QSS-LT104B 2QSS-LT104D 2-CVCS-RAS 2CHS-LCV115E-P Spurious SI RWST Level Ch II RWST Level Ch IV SI Recirculation Mode Transfer Signal Charging Suction from VCT Spurious SI Signal De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) at 4KVS-2AE and de-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF to prevent pump damage on loss of suction.
Manually start 2CHS-P21A(C) or 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV2-1000 BV2-1001 RA DID 2-CV-2 2RCS-PCV455C-P Pzr Pressurizer PORV 455C Close 2RCS-PCV455C at the keylock isolation switch.
OR Perform repair procedure to allow the closing of 2RCS-MOV535 to isolate the PORV.
OR To provide a flow path from the containment sump to Charging/HHSI pump 2CHS-P21A, de-energize 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2RSS-MOV156C, 2SIS-MOV863A, 2RSS-MOV155C and 2SIS-MOV8890A at MCC2-E11, de-energize 2CHS-LCV115B at MCC2-E03 and then manually close 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2RSS-MOV156C and 2SIS-MOV8890A, manually open 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2SIS-MOV863A and 2RSS-MOV155C and then manually close 2CHS-LCV115B.
BV2-1003 RA RR and DID 2-CV-2 Spurious SI 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P 2SISMOV867B-P 2SIS-MOV867C-P 2SISMOV867D-P 2SIS-MOV867A-P 2SIS-HCV868B 2SISMOV869B-P Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Hot Legs De-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow.
De-energize 2SIS-MOV867D and 2SIS-MOV869B at 480VUS29-5B to deenergize MCC2-E06 and close them to isolate spuriously opened SI flow paths.
Manually throttle 2SIS-MOV867D to control RCS makeup flow.
BV2-1005 BV2-1393 RA DID SSD RAI 08 LIC (1)
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CV-2 2SVS-HCV104-P Residual Heat Release Valve De-energize 2SVS-HCV104 by opening breaker 2-9-6D on 480VUS-2-9 to de-energize MCC2-E14 and manually close 2SVS-HCV104 to stop SG A, B and C steam flow.
BV2-1006 RA DID 2-CV-2 480VUS-2-9-7B 480VUS-2-9-7C Pzr. Group B backup B Group B/U Heaters Pzr. Group E backup E Group B/U Heaters De-energize the B and E backup group heaters at 480VUS29 to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV2-1009 RA DID 2-CV-2 4KVS-2AE-2E2 4KVS-2DF-2F2 2-CIB-SPUR A QS Pump supply bkr 4160V Bkr for A QS Pump B QS Pump supply bkr 4160V Bkr for B QS Pump Spurious CIB Signal Trip 2QSS-P21A at 4KVS-2AE to stop A train quench spray flow and trip 2QSS-P21B at 4KVS-2DF to stop B train quench spray flow.
BV2-1011 RA DID 2-CV-2 4KVS-2B-2B6 4KVS-2C-2C6 B RCP Feeder Breaker C RCP Feeder Breaker De-energize 2RCS-P21B at 4KVS-2B and de-energize 2RCS-P21C at 4KVS-2C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV2-1012 RA RR 2-CV-2 Spurious SI 4KVS-2DF-2F12-P 4KVS-2DF-2F15-P Spurious SI signal 4160V Bkr for B Charging/HHSI Pump breaker 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump breaker De-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF to control charging/HHSI flow.
BV2-1013 RA DID 2-CV-2 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-1014 RA RR 2-CV-2 2MSS-SOV102-ISOL 4KVS-2DF-2F18-P 2FWE-HCV100B-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100D-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100F-ISOL TD AFW Pump Remote Trip SOV 4160V Bkr for B AFW Pump B AFW Header to the C SG C SG HCV Feed from B Train B AFW Header to the B SG B SG HCV Feed from B Train B AFW Header to the A SG A SG HCV Feed from B Train De-energize 2FWE-P23B at 4KVS-2DF to stop train B AFW flow.
BV2-1351 RA RR 2-CV-3 2QSS-LT104B 2QSS-LT104D 2-CVCS-RAS 2CHS-LCV115E-P Spurious SI RWST Level Ch II RWST Level Ch IV SI Recirculation Mode Transfer Signal Charging Suction from VCT Spurious SI Signal De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) at 4KVS-2AE and de-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF to prevent pump damage on loss of suction.
Manually start 2CHS-P21A(C) or 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV2-0923 BV2-1316 RA DID 2-CV-3 2MSS-AOV101A 2MSS-AOV101B 2MSS-AOV101C A Main Steam Isol valve B Main Steam Isol valve C Main Steam Isol valve De-energize 2MSS-AOV101A, B and C at PNL-DC2-10 PNL-DC2-11 to stop steam flow from SG A, B and C.
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CV-3 4KVS-2A-2A6 4KVS-2B-2B6 4KVS-2C-2C6 2RCS-PCV455A 2RCS-PCV455B A RCP Feeder Breaker B RCP Feeder Breaker C RCP Feeder Breaker A Pressurizer Spray Valve B Pressurizer Spray Valve De-energize 2RCS-P21A at 4KVS-2A, de-energize 2RCS-P21B at 4KVS-2B and de-energize 2RCS-P21C at 4KVS-2C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV2-0930 RA RR 2-CV-3 2RCS-PT444 2RCS-PCV455C-P 2RCS-MOV535 Pzr. Pressure Control Pressurizer PORV 455C Pzr. PORV 455C Block MOV Close 2RCS-PCV455C at the keylock isolation switch.
OR Perform repair procedure to allow the closing of 2RCS-MOV535 to isolate the PORV.
OR To provide a flow path from the containment sump to Charging/HHSI pump 2CHS-P21A de-energize 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2RSS-MOV156C, 2SIS-MOV863A, 2RSS-MOV155C and 2SIS-MOV8890A at MCC2-E11, de-energize 2CHS-LCV115B at MCC2-E03 and then manually close 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2RSS-MOV156C and 2SIS-MOV8890A, manually open 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2SIS-MOV863A and 2RSS-MOV155C and then manually close 2CHS-LCV115B.
BV2-0931 RA RR and DID 2-CV-3 2SDS-AOV112A 2SDS-AOV112B 2SDS-AOV112C A Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve B Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve C Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve De-energize 2SDS-AOV112A, B and C at PNL-AC2-03 to stop steam flow from SG A, B and C.
BV2-0933 RA DID 2-CV-3 Spurious SI 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P 2SIS-MOV867A-P 2SIS-MOV867B-P 2SIS-MOV867C-P 2SISMOV867D-P 2SIS-HCV868A 2SIS-HCV868B-P 2SISMOV869B Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs SIS Injection Hdr Xconnect HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm Alt HHSI to RCS Hot Legs De-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow.
De-energize 2SIS-MOV867D and 2SIS-MOV869B at MCC2-E06 and close them to isolate spuriously opened SI flow paths.
Manually throttle 2SIS-MOV867D to control RCS makeup flow.
BV2-0934 BV2-1394 RA DID LIC (1)
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CV-3 2SVS-HCV104-P 2SVS-PCV101A-P 2SVS-PCV101B-P 2SVS-PCV101C-P 2SVS-HCV104 2SVS-PCV101A 2SVS-PCV101B 2SVS-PCV101C Residual Heat Release Valve A Atmospheric Steam Dump B Atmospheric Steam Dump C Atmospheric Steam Dump Residual Heat Release Valve A Atmospheric Steam Dump B Atmospheric Steam Dump C Atmospheric Steam Dump Manually close 2SVS-HCV104 to stop SG A, B and C steam flow. Manually close 2SVS-PCV101A to stop SG A steam flow. Manually close 2SVS-PCV101B to stop SG B steam flow. Manually close 2SVS-PCV101C to stop SG C steam flow.
THEN Manually throttle 2SVS-HCV104 to control SG A, B and C pressure.
OR Manually throttle 2SVS-PCV101A to control SG A pressure.
Manually throttle 2SVS-PCV101B to control SG B pressure.
Manually throttle 2SVS-PCV101C to control SG C pressure.
BV2-0936 BV2-1427 RA DID 2-CV-3 480VUS-2-2-2C 480VUS-2-9-7B 480VUS-2-9-7C Pzr. C Control Group Heater Pzr. B Group B/U Heaters Pzr. E Group B/U Heaters De-energize the C control group heater at 480VUS22 Normal Switchgear and de-energize the B and E backup group heaters at 480VUS29 to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV2-0940 RA DID 2-CV-3 4KVS-1G-1G5 4KVS-2A-2A1 4KVS-2B-2B1 4KVS-2C-2C1 4KVS-2D-2D1 2FWS-HYV157A 2FWS-HYV157B 2FWS-HYV157C Startup Feed Pump Bkr 2FWS-P21A1 Motor Bkr 2FWS-P21A2 Motor Bkr 2FWS-P21B1 Motor Bkr 2FWS-P21B2 Motor Bkr A SG Feed Isolation B SG Feed Isolation C SG Feed Isolation De-energize 2FWS-P21A at 4KVS-2A & 4KVS-2B and de-energize 2FWS-P21B at 4KVS-2C & 4KVS-2D to stop main feedwater pump flow to the steam generators.
BV2-0941 RA RR 2-CV-3 4KVS-2AE-2E2 4KVS-2DF-2F2 2-CIB-SPUR A QS Pump supply Bkr 4160V Bkr for A QS Pump B QS Pump Supply Bkr 4160V Bkr for B QS Pump Spurious CIB Signal Trip 2QSS-P21A at 4KVS-2AE to stop A train quench spray flow and trip 2QSS-P21B at 4KVS-2DF to stop B train quench spray flow.
BV2-0942 RA RR 2-CV-3 Spurious SI 4KVS-2DF-2F12-P 4KVS-2DF-2F15-P Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for B Charging/HHSI Pump breaker 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump breaker De-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF to control charging/HHSI flow.
BV2-0943 RA DID 2-CV-3 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-0993 RA RR 2-CV-3 4KVS-2B-2B2 4KVS-2C-2C2 4KVS-2D-2D2 2FWS-HYV157A 2FWS-HYV157B 2FWS-HYV157C 2CNM-P21A Motor Bkr 2CNM-P21B Motor Bkr 2CNM-P21C Motor Bkr A SG Feed Isolation B SG Feed Isolation C SG Feed Isolation De-energize 2CNM-P21A at 4KVS-2B, de-energize 2CNM-P21B at 4KVS-2C and de-energize 2CNM-P21C at 4KVS-2D to stop condensate flow to the steam generators.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-79 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-CV-3 2RCS-SOV200B 2RCS-SOV201B 2RCS-HCV250A 2RCS-HCV250B Train B head vent SOV Train B head vent SOV Reactor head vent Reactor head vent Perform repair procedure to provide power to the reactor vessel head vent valves.
BV2-1420 RA 2-CV-3 2MSS-SOV102-ISOL 4KVS-2DF-2F18-P 2FWE-HCV100B-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100D-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100F-ISOL Spurious SI TD AFW Pump Remote Trip SOV 4160V Bkr for B AFW Pump B AFW Header to the C SG C SG HCV Feed from B Train B AFW Header to the B SG B SG HCV Feed from B Train B AFW Header to the A SG A SG HCV Feed from B Train Spurious SI Signal De-energize 2FWE-P23B at 4KVS-2DF to stop train B AFW flow.
BV2-1423 RA RR 2-CV-6 4KVS-2A-2A6 4KVS-2B-2B6 4KVS-2C-2C6 A RCP Feeder Breaker B RCP Feeder Breaker C RCP Feeder Breaker De-energize 2RCS-P21A at 4KVS-2A, de-energize 2RCS-P21B at 4KVS-2B and de-energize 2RCS-P21C at 4KVS-2C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV2-1050 RA RR 2-CV-6 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-1051 RA RR 2-DG-1 2-SSPS-SIS-A 2-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, re-establish.
BV2-1643 DID 2-DG-1 2-TB-1 2-TR-4 2-TR-5 3-RH-1 3-IS-2 3-SY-1 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-1705 RR 2-DG-2 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-1487 RA RR 2-DG-2 2-SSPS-SIS-A 2-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, re-establish.
BV2-1671 DID LIC (20)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-80 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-MS-1 2MSS-AOV101A 2MSS-AOV101B 2MSS-AOV101C A Main Steam Isol Valve B Main Steam Isol Valve C Main Steam Isol Valve Close 2IAS-610-37 and open 2IAS-610-36 or 2IAS-39 to fail 2MSS-AOV101A, B and C closed to stop steam flow from SG A, B and C.
De-energize 2MSS-AOV101A-C on PNL-DC2-10 and PNL-DC2-11 to fail 2MSS-AOV101A, B and C closed to stop steam flow from SG A, B and C.
BV2-1149 RA DID 2-MS-1 2SDS-AOV112A 2SDS-AOV112B 2SDS-AOV112C A Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve B Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve C Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve Close 2IAS-610-37 and open 2IAS-610-36 or 2IAS-39 De-energize 2SDS-AOV112A-C on PNL-AC2-03 to fail 2SDS-AOV112A, B and C closed to stop steam flow from SG A, B and C.
BV2-1151 RA DID 2-MS-1 2SVS-HCV104 2SVS-PCV101A 2SVS-PCV101B 2SVS-PCV101C Residual heat release valve A atmospheric steam dump B atmospheric steam dump C atmospheric steam dump De-energize 2SVS-HCV104 at MCC2-E14 to attempt to stop SG A, B and C steam flow. De-energize 2SVS-PCV101A at MCC2-E05 to attempt to stop SG A steam flow. De-energize 2SVS-PCV101B at MCC2-E13 to attempt to stop SG B steam flow. De-energize 2SVS-PCV101C at 480VUS28 to attempt to stop SG C steam flow.
THEN When the fire is out, mechanical maintenance will inspect the valves to determine valve availability or perform necessary repairs.
THEN Manually throttle 2SVS-HCV104 to control SG A, B and C pressure. Manually throttle 2SVS-PCV101A to control SG A pressure. Manually throttle 2SVS-PCV101B to control SG B pressure. Manually throttle 2SVS-PCV101C to control SG C pressure.
BV2-1152 BV2-1153 RA 2-MS-1 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-1155 RA RR 2-MS-1 Spurious SI 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P 4KVS-2DF-2F12-P 4KVS-2DF-2F15-P 2SIS-MOV867A-P 2SIS-MOV867B-P 2SIS-MOV867C-P 2SIS-MOV867D-P Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for B Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Reset spurious SI signal and secure spuriously actuated components.
OR De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) at 4KVS-2AE and de-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF. De-energize 2SIS-MOV867C at MCC2-E05 and close it and de-energize 2SIS-MOV867D at MCC2-E06 and close it to isolate the spuriously opened SI flow path.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-81 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-PA-3 2CHS-LCV115C 2CHS-LCV115E Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from VCT De-energize 2CHS-LCV115C at MCC2-E03 and manually close the valve OR De-energize 2CHS-LCV115E at MCC2-E04 and manually close the valve to prevent hydrogen intrusion into the charging pump suction.
Isolate hydrogen to the Aux Building Align and start B LHSI Pump.
BV2-0838 RA DID 2-PA-3 2CHS-LCV115C-P 2CHS-LCV115E-P 2CHS-LCV115B 2CHS-LCV115D Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from RWST Charging Suction from RWST Open and rack out the breaker for failed charging pump 2CHS-P21B or 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2DF and rack in and close the DC control power for spare charging pump 2CHS-P21B or 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2DF to allow pump start from the Control Room.
BV2-0839 BV2-1467 RA DID 2-PA-3 2SWS-MOV102A 2SWS-MOV106A 2SWS-MOV106B SW Header A Isol valve A SW Pump Discharge MOV SW Header A Isol to CC Hx SW Header B Isol to CC Hx If 2SWS-P21B and 2SWE-P21B are damaged, stop the 2-2 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103B at MCC2-E04 and close it if it spuriously opened.
De-energize 2SWE-MOV116B at MCC2-E04 and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWS-MOV106B at MCC2-E04 and open it to align the B SWS flow path.
Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100E to control SG A AFW flow.
Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100C to control SG B AFW flow.
De-energize 2SWS-MOV102C2 at MCC2-E02, restart the diesel, manually start 2SWS-P21C while manually opening 2SWS-MOV102C2 to provide B SWS flow. Start other DF bus loads as required.
OR If 2SWS-P21C and 2SWE-P21B are damaged, stop the 2-2 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103B at MCC2-E04 and close it if it spuriously opened.
De-energize 2SWE-MOV116B at MCC2-E04 and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWS-MOV106B at MCC2-E04 and open it to align the B SWS flow path.
Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100E to control SG A AFW flow.
Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100C to control SG B AFW flow.
De-energize 2SWS-MOV102B at MCC2-E02, restart the diesel, manually start 2SWS-P21B while manually opening 2SWS-MOV102B to provide B SWS flow. Start other DF bus loads as required.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-82 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-PA-3 2SWS-MOV103A 2SWS-MOV103B 2SWS-MOV107A 2SWS-MOV107D A SW Hdr to RS Hx B SW Hdr to RS Hx A SW Hdr to Secondary CC B SW Hdr to Secondary CC If 2SWS-P21B and 2SWE-P21B are damaged, stop the 2-2 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103B at MCC2-E04 and close it if it spuriously opened.
De-energize 2SWE-MOV116B at MCC2-E04 and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWS-MOV106B at MCC2-E04 and open it to align the B SWS flow path.
Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100E to control SG A AFW flow.
Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100C to control SG B AFW flow.
De-energize 2SWS-MOV102C2 at MCC2-E02, restart the diesel, manually start 2SWS-P21C while manually opening 2SWS-MOV102C2 to provide B SWS flow. Start other DF bus loads as required.
OR If 2SWS-P21C and 2SWE-P21B are damaged, stop the 2-2 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103B at MCC2-E04 to prevent spurious opening and close it if it spuriously opened.
De-energize 2SWE-MOV116B at MCC2-E04 and close it and if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWS-MOV106B at MCC2-E04 and open it to align the B SWS flow path.
Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100E to control SG A AFW flow.
Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100C to control SG B AFW flow.
De-energize 2SWS-MOV102B at MCC2-E02, restart the diesel, manually start 2SWS-P21B while manually opening 2SWS-MOV102B to provide B SWS flow. Start other DF bus loads as required.
BV2-0842 RA RR 2-PA-3 480VUS-2-8-7B Pzr Group A backup A Group B/U Heaters supply breaker De-energize the A backup group heater at 480VUS28 to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV2-0844 RA DID 2-PA-3 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-0847 RA RR 2-PA-3 4KVS-2AE 2AE 4160V Bus Align AE and DF bus loads as required.
BV2-1321 RA RR 2-PA-3 4KVS-2AE-2E18-P 2FWE-HCV100C-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100E-ISOL 4160V bkr for A AFW Pump B SG HCV Feed from A train A SG HCV Feed from A train De-energize 2FWE-P23A at 4KVS-2AE to stop train A AFW flow.
BV2-1444 RA RR 2-PA-4 2CHS-LCV115C Charging Suction from VCT De-energize 2CHS-LCV115C at MCC2-E03 and manually close the valve OR De-energize 2CHS-LCV115E at MCC2-E04 and manually close the valve to prevent hydrogen intrusion into the charging pump suction.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-83 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-PA-4 2CHS-LCV115C 2CHS-LCV115E Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from VCT Manually rack in the breaker and turn on the breaker control DC for 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2DF to allow the pump to be started from the Control Room to restore normal charging flow.
BV2-0858 RA RR 2-PA-4 2SWE-MOV116A-P 2SWE-MOV116B-P 2SWS-MOV103A 2SWS-MOV103B 2SWS-MOV107A 2SWS-MOV107D Stby SW to the A SW Hdr Stby SW to the B SW Hdr A SW Hdr to RS Hx B SW Hdr to RS Hx A SW Hdr to Secondary CC B SW Hdr to Secondary CC If 2SWS-P21A and 2SWE-P21A are damaged, stop the 2-1 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103A and 2SWE-MOV116A at MCC2-E03 and close them to prevent pump runout. Restart the diesel and manually start 2SWS-P21C to provide A SWS flow. Start other AE bus loads as required.
OR If 2SWS-P21C and 2SWE-P21A are damaged, stop the 2-1 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103A and 2SWE-MOV116A at MCC2-E03 and close them to prevent pump runout. Restart the diesel and manually start 2SWS-P21A to provide A SWS flow. Start other AE bus loads as required.
BV2-0860 RA RR 2-PA-4 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-0864 RR 2-PA-4 2-SSPS-SIS-A 2-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, re-establish.
BV2-1676 DID 2-PA-6 2CHS-LCV115C-P Charging Suction from VCT Manually rack in the breaker and turn on the breaker control DC for 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE to allow the pump to be started from the Control Room to restore normal charging flow.
BV2-1226 RA DID 2-PA-7 2CHS-LCV115E-P Charging Suction from VCT Manually rack in the breaker and turn on the breaker control DC for 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2DF to allow the pump to be started from the Control Room to restore normal charging flow.
BV2-1234 RA DID 2-PT-1 2QSS-LT104A 2QSS-LT104B 2QSS-LT104C 2QSS-LT104D 2-CVCS-RAS 2CHS-LCV115B 2CHS-LCV115C-P 2CHS-LCV115E-P Spurious SI RWST Level Ch I RWST Level Ch II RWST Level Ch III RWST Level Ch IV SI Recirculation Mode Transfer Signal Charging Suction from RWST Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from VCT Spurious SI Signal De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) at 4KVS-2AE and de-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF to prevent pump damage on loss of suction.
De-energize 2CHS-LCV115B at MCC2-E03 and manually open it to align suction to the charging pumps. Manually start 2CHS-P21A(C) or 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE. and de-energize 2SIS-MOV836 at MCC2-E05 and manually throttle it to control RCS makeup flow.
BV2-1079 BV2-1081 RA DID LIC (1)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-84 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-PT-1 2BDG-AOV100C1 2BDG-AOV101C1 2BDG-AOV101C2 SG 21C blowdown outside Isol valve SG C BD Isol Trip Valve SG 21C blowdown inside Isol valve SG C BD Inside CNMT Isol Valve SG 21C blowdown inside Isol valve SG C BD Inside CNMT Isol Valve De-energize 2BDG-AOV101C2 at PNL-DC2-10 Close 2BDG-503 to isolate SG C blowdown flow.
BV2-1080 RA DID 2-PT-1 2FWE-HCV100A 2FWE-HCV100B 2FWE-HCV100C 2FWE-HCV100D 2FWE-HCV100E 2FWE-HCV100F 2MSS-SOV102 2MSS-SOV102-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100B-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100D-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100F-ISOL 4KVS-2AE-2E18-P 4KVS-2DF-2F18-P C SG HCV feed from AFW A train C SG HCV Feed from B Train B SG HCV feed from AFW A train B SG HCV Feed from B Train A SG HCV feed from AFW A train A SG HCV Feed from B Train TD AFW Pump Remote Trip SOV TD AFW Pump Remote Trip SOV C SG HCV Feed from B Train B SG HCV Feed from B Train A SG HCV Feed from B Train 4160V Bkr for A AFW Pump 4160V Bkr for B AFW Pump De-energize 2FWE-P23A at 4KVS-2AE and manually trip 2FWE-P22 to stop train A AFW flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100F to control B train SG A AFW flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100D to control B train SG B AFW flow.
Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100B to control B train SG C AFW flow.
BV2-1083 BV2-1379 RA DID 2-PT-1 Spurious SI 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P 4KVS-2DF-2F12-P 4KVS-2DF-2F15-P 2SIS-MOV867A-P 2SIS-MOV867B-P Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for B Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Reset spurious SI signal and secure spuriously actuated components.
OR De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) at 4KVS-2AE and de-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF. De-energize 2SIS-MOV867C at MCC2-E05 and close it and de-energize 2SIS-MOV867D at MCC2-E06 and close it to isolate the spuriously opened SI flow path.
BV2-1686 DID 2-RC-1 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-0905 RA RR 2-RC-1 2RCS-SOV200A 2RCS-SOV200B 2RCS-SOV201A 2RCS-SOV201B 2RCS-HCV250A 2RCS-HCV250B Train A head vent SOV Train B head vent SOV Train A head vent SOV Train B head vent SOV Reactor head vent Reactor head vent Perform repair procedure to provide power to the reactor vessel head vent valves.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-85 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-RC-1 2RCS-PT444 2RCS-PT445 2RCS-PCV455C-P 2RCS-PCV455D-P 2RCS-PCV456-P 2RCS-MOV535 2RCS-MOV536 2RCS-MOV537 Pzr. Pressure control Pzr. Pressure control Pzr. Pressurizer PORV 455C Pzr. Pressurizer PORV 455D Pzr. Pressurizer PORV Pzr. PORV 455C Block MOV Pzr. PORV 456 Block MOV Pzr. PORV 455D Block MOV Close 2RCS-PCV455C, 2RCS-PCV455D and 2RCS-PCV456 at the keylock isolation switches.
OR Perform repair procedure to allow the closing of 2RCS-MOV535, 2RCS-MOV536 and 2RCS-MOV537 to isolate the PORVs.
OR To provide a flow path from the containment sump to Charging/HHSI pump 2CHS-P21A, de-energize 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2RSS-MOV156C, 2SIS-MOV863A, 2RSS-MOV155C and 2SIS-MOV8890A at MCC2-E11, de-energize 2CHS-LCV115B at MCC2-E03 and then manually close 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2RSS-MOV156C and 2SIS-MOV8890A, manually open 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2SIS-MOV863A and 2RSS-MOV155C and then manually close 2CHS-LCV115B.
BV2-0913 RA RR and DID 2-RC-1 4KVS-2A-2A6 4KVS-2B-2B6 4KVS-2C-2C6 2RCS-PCV455A 2RCS-PCV455B A RCP Feeder Breaker B RCP Feeder Breaker C RCP Feeder Breaker A Pressurizer Spray Valve B Pressurizer Spray Valve De-energize 2RCS-P21A at 4KVS-2A, de-energize 2RCS-P21B at 4KVS-2B and de-energize 2RCS-P21C at 4KVS-2C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV2-0914 RA RR 2-RC-1 4KVS-2AE 4KVS-2AE-2E4-OCT 4KVS-2DF 4KVS-2DF-2F4-OCT 2AE 4160V Bus Breaker for A RHS pump 2DF 4160V Bus Breaker for B RHS pump Align AE and DF bus loads as required.
BV2-1046 RA RR 2-RC-1 2CHS-AOV200A 2CHS-AOV200B 2CHS-AOV200C 2CHS-LCV460A 2CHS-LCV460B A Letdown Orifice Isol Valve B Letdown Orifice Isol Valve C Letdown Orifice Isol Valve Train A Letdown Isolation Valve Train B Pzr Letdown Isolation Valve De-energize 2CHS-AOV200A at PNL-DC2-11 and de-energize 2CHS-AOV200C at PNL-DC2-15 to isolate letdown flow.
OR Isolate instrument air to containment to fail 2CHS-AOV200A, B and C closed to prevent loss of RCS inventory.
BV2-1359 RA RR 2-RC-1 2RCS-PCV455C 2RCS-PCV455D 2RCS-PCV456 2RCS-MOV535 2RCS-MOV536 2RCS-MOV537 Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 455D Pressurizer PORV 456 Pzr PORV 455C block MOV Pzr PORV 456 block MOV Pzr PORV 455D block MOV Perform repair procedure to allow the opening of 2RCS-MOV536.
BV2-1415 RA SSD RAI 08 LIC (1)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-86 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-RC-1 Spurious SI 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P 4KVS-2DF-2F12-P 4KVS-2DF-2F15-P 2SIS-MOV867A-P 2SIS-MOV867B-P 2SIS-MOV867C-P 2SIS-MOV867D-P Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for B Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Reset spurious SI signal and secure spuriously actuated components.
OR De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) at 4KVS-2AE and de-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF. De-energize 2SIS-MOV867C at MCC2-E05 and close it and de-energize 2SIS-MOV867D at MCC2-E06 and close it to isolate the spuriously opened SI flow path.
BV2-1669 DID 2-SB-1 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-0983 RA RR 2-SB-1 2CHS-LCV115C-P 2CHS-LCV115E Spurious SI Charging Suction from VCT Charging suction from VCT Spurious SI Signal De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) and 2CHS-P21C by manually stopping the 2-1 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the AE bus at 4KVS-2A to prevent pump damage due to loss of pump suction.
BV2-0985 RA DID 2-SB-1 2CHS-AOV200A 2CHS-AOV200B 2CHS-AOV200C 2CHS-LCV460B 2CHS-LCV460A A Letdown Orifice Isol Valve B Letdown Orifice Isol Valve C Letdown Orifice Isol Valve Train B Pzr Letdown Isolation Valve Train A Letdown Isolation Valve De-energize 2CHS-AOV200A at PNL-DC2-11 and de-energize 2CHS-AOV200C at PNL-DC2-15 to isolate letdown flow.
OR Isolate instrument air to containment to fail 2CHS-AOV200A, B and C closed to prevent loss of RCS inventory.
BV2-0986 RA RR 2-SB-1 2RCS-PCV455D-P 2RCS-PCV456-P 2RCS-MOV536 2RCS-MOV537 455D (PORV) Pressurizer PORV 455D 456 (PORV) Pressurizer PORV 456 Pzr. PORV 456 Block MOV PORV 455D Block Valve Close 2RCS-PCV455D and 2RCS-PCV456 at the keylock isolation switches.
OR Perform repair procedure to allow the closing of 2RCS-MOV537 and 2RCS-MOV536 to isolate the PORVs.
OR To provide a flow path from the containment sump to Charging/HHSI pump 2CHS-P21A de-energize 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2RSS-MOV156C, 2SIS-MOV863A, 2RSS-MOV155C and 2SIS-MOV8890A at MCC2-E11, de-energize 2CHS-LCV115B at MCC2-E03 and then manually close 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2RSS-MOV156C and 2SIS-MOV8890A, manually open 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2SIS-MOV863A and 2RSS-MOV155C and then manually close 2CHS-LCV115B.
BV2-0987 RA RR and DID 2-SB-1 2SVS-PCV101A-P 2SVS-PCV101B-P 2SVS-PCV101C-P A Atmospheric Steam Dump B Atmospheric Steam Dump C Atmospheric Steam Dump Manually close 2SVS-PCV101A to stop SG A steam flow.
Manually close 2SVS-PCV101B to stop SG B steam flow.
Manually close 2SVS-PCV101C to stop SG C steam flow.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-87 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-SB-1 480VUS287B 480VUS287C Pzr Group A Backup Heaters Pzr Group D Backup Heaters De-energize the A and D backup group heaters by manually stopping the 2-1 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the AE bus at 4KVS-2A to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV2-0989 RA DID 2-SB-1 Spurious SI 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) and 2CHS-P21C by manually stopping the 2-1 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the AE bus at 4KVS-2A to control charging/HHSI flow.
BV2-0990 RA DID 2-SB-1 4KVS-2AE-2E2 4160V Bkr for A QS Pump De-energize 2QSS-P21A at 4KVS-2AE to stop quench spray flow.
BV2-0991 RA DID 2-SB-1 4KVS-2AE-2E18-P 2FWE-HCV100A-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100C-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100E-ISOL 4160V Bkr for A AFW Pump A AFW Header to the C SG C SG HCV Feed from A Train B SG HCV Feed from A Train A SG HCV Feed from A Train De-energize 2FWE-P23A by manually stopping the 2-1 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the AE bus at 4KVS-2A to stop A train AFW flow.
BV2-1424 RA RR 2-SB-1 Spurious SI 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P 4KVS-2DF-2F12-P 4KVS-2DF-2F15-P 2SIS-MOV867A 2SISMOV867C-P 2SIS-MOV867D-P Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for B Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump Alt HHSI to RCS cold legs Norm Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) and 2CHS-P21C by manually stopping the 2-1 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the AE bus at 4KVS-2A to control charging/HHSI flow. De-energize 2SIS-MOV867C at MCC2-E05 and close it to isolate the spuriously opened SI flow path.
BV2-1563 RA DID 2-SB-1 4KVS-2B-2B2 4KVS-2C-2C2 4KVS-2D-2D2 2FWS-HYV157A 2FWS-HYV157B 2FWS-HYV157C 2CNM-P21A Motor Bkr 2CNM-P21B Motor Bkr 2CNM-P21C Motor Bkr A SG Feed Isolation B SG Feed Isolation C SG Feed Isolation De-energize 2CNM-P21A at 4KVS-2B, de-energize 2CNM-P21B at 4KVS-2C and de-energize 2CNM-P21C at 4KVS-2D to stop condensate flow to the steam generators.
BV2-1660 DID 2-SB-10 480VUS-2-2-2C Pzr. C Control Group C Heaters De-energize the C control group heater at 480VUS22 Normal Switchgear to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV2-1243 RA DID 2-SB-10 4KVS-2A-2A6 4KVS-2B-2B6 4KVS-2C-2C6 A RCP Feeder Breaker B RCP Feeder Breaker C RCP feeder breaker De-energize 2RCS-P21A at 4KVS-2A, de-energize 2RCS-P21B at 4KVS-2B and de-energize 2RCS-P21C at 4KVS-2C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-88 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-SB-2 2RCSPCV455C-P 2RCS-MOV535 Pressurizer Power Relief Valve Pzr. PORV 455C Block MOV Close 2RCS-PCV455C at the keylock isolation switch.
OR Perform repair procedure to allow the closing of 2RCS-MOV535 to isolate the PORV.
OR To provide a flow path from the containment sump to Charging/HHSI pump 2CHS-P21A, de-energize 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2RSS-MOV156C, 2SIS-MOV863A, 2RSS-MOV155C and 2SIS-MOV8890A at MCC2-E11, de-energize 2CHS-LCV115B at MCC2-E03 and then manually close 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2RSS-MOV156C and 2SIS-MOV8890A, manually open 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2SIS-MOV863A and 2RSS-MOV155C and then manually close 2CHS-LCV115B.
BV2-1092 RA RR and DID 2-SB-2 2SVS-HCV104 Residual Heat Release Valve Manually close 2SVS-HCV104 to stop SG A, B and C steam flow.
BV2-1095 RA RR 2-SB-2 Spurious SI 4KVS-2DF-2F12-P 4KVS-2DF-2F15-P Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for B Charging/HHSI Pump breaker 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump breaker De-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) and 2CHS-P21C by manually stopping the 2-2 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the DF bus at 4KVS-2D to control charging/HHSI flow.
BV2-1096 RA DID 2-SB-2 480VUS287B 480VUS287C 480VUS297B 480VUS297C Pzr Group A Backup Heaters Pzr Group D Backup Heaters Pzr Group B Backup Heaters Pzr Group E Backup Heaters De-energize the B and E backup group heaters by manually stopping the 2-2 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the DF bus at 4KVS-2D, and de-energize the A and D backup group heaters at 480VUS28 to prevent RCS overpressurization.
BV2-1097 RA DID 2-SB-2 4KVS-2DF-2F2 Feeder breaker for 2QSS-P21B 4160V Bkr for B QS Pump De-energize 2QSS-P21B by manually stopping the 2-2 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the DF bus at 4KVS-2D to stop quench spray flow.
BV2-1098 RA DID 2-SB-2 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-1099 RA RR 2-SB-2 2CHS-LCV115E-P Spurious SI Charging Suction from VCT Spurious SI Signal De-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) and 2CHS-P21C by manually stopping the 2-2 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the DF bus at 4KVS-2D to prevent pump damage due to loss of suction.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-89 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-SB-2 4KVS-2DF-2F18-P 2FWE-HCV100B-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100D-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100F-ISOL 4160V Bkr for B AFW Pump B AFW Header to the C SG C SG HCV Feed from B Train B AFW Header to the B SG B SG HCV Feed from B Train B AFW Header to the A SG A SG HCV Feed from B Train De-energize 2FWE-P23B by manually stopping the 2-2 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the DF bus at 4KVS-2D to stop B train AFW flow.
BV2-1425 RA RR 2-SB-2 Spurious SI 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P 2SIS-MOV867A-P 2SIS-MOV867B-P 2SIS-MOV867C-P 2SISMOV867D-P Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs De-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) and 2CHS-P21C by manually stopping the 2-2 diesel generator and de-energizing off-site power to the DF bus at 4KVS-2D to control charging/HHSI flow. De-energize 2SIS-MOV867D at MCC2-E06 and close it to isolate the spuriously opened SI flow path.
BV2-1564 RA DID 2-SB-3 2CHS-LCV115E-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P Charging Suction from VCT 4160 Volt Breaker for 2CHS-P21C Manually start 2CHS-P21A(C) or 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV2-1054 RA DID 2-SB-3 2MSS-SOV102-ISOL 4KVS-2DF-2F18-P 2FWE-HCV100A-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100C-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100E-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100B-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100D-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100F-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100A 2FWE-HCV100B 2FWE-HCV100C 2FWE-HCV100D 2FWE-HCV100E 2FWE-HCV100F TD AFW Pump Remote Trip SOV 4160V Bkr for B AFW Pump C SG HCV Feed from A Train B SG HCV Feed from A Train A SG HCV Feed from A Train C SG HCV Feed from B Train B SG HCV Feed from B Train A SG HCV Feed from B Train C SG HCV Feed from A train C SG HCV Feed from B train B SG HCV Feed from A train B SG HCV Feed from B train A SG HCV Feed from A train A SG HCV Feed from B train De-energize 2FWE-P23B at 4KVS-2DF to stop train B AFW flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100E to control A train SG A AFW flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100C to control A train SG B AFW flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100A to control A train SG C AFW flow.
BV2-1056 BV2-1426 RA RR and DID 2-SB-3 2HVC-ACU201A MCR A/C Unit Condenser Install 2 5000 CFM portable fans in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
- 1. Credit BV1 HVAC System if available (not a recovery action).
- 2. Install portable electric fan(s) in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
BV2-1057 RA RR SSD RAI 04 SSD RAI 05 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-90 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-SB-3 2RCS-PCV455C-P 2RCS-PCV456-P 2RCS-MOV535 Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 456 Pzr. PORV 455C Block MOV Close 2RCS-PCV455C at the keylock isolation switch.
OR Perform repair procedure to allow the closing of 2RCS-MOV535 to isolate the PORV.
OR To provide a flow path from the containment sump to Charging/HHSI pump 2CHS-P21A, de-energize 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2RSS-MOV156C, 2SIS-MOV863A, 2RSS-MOV155C and 2SIS-MOV8890A at MCC2-E11, de-energize 2CHS-LCV115B at MCC2-E03 and then manually close 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2RSS-MOV156C and 2SIS-MOV8890A, manually open 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2SIS-MOV863A and 2RSS-MOV155C and then manually close 2CHS-LCV115B.
BV2-1060 RA RR and DID 2-SB-3 Spurious SI 2SIS-MOV867B 2SISMOV867D 2SIS-HCV868A 2SIS-HCV868B Spurious SI Signal Alt HHSI to RCS cold legs Norm HHSI to RCS cold legs Norm HHSI to RCS cold legs SIS injection Hdr Xconnect De-energize 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE OR Trip 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow.
De-energize 2SIS-MOV867D at MCC2-E06 and close it to isolate spuriously opened SI flow paths. Manually throttle 2SIS-MOV867D to control RCS makeup flow.
BV2-1062 RA 2-SB-3 2SVS-HCV104 2SVS-PCV101A 2SVS-PCV101B 2SVS-PCV101C 2SVS-HCV104-P 2SVS-PCV101A-P 2SVS-PCV101B-P 2SVS-PCV101C-P Residual Heat Release Valve A Atmospheric Steam Dump B Atmospheric Steam Dump C Atmospheric Steam Dump Residual Heat Release Valve A Atmospheric Steam Dump B Atmospheric Steam Dump C Atmospheric Steam Dump Manually close 2SVS-HCV104 to stop SG A, B and C steam flow and manually throttle it to control SG A, B and C pressure. De-energize 2SVS-PCV101A at MCC2-E05 to stop SG A steam flow and manually throttle it to control SG A pressure. De-energize 2SVS-PCV101B at MCC2-E13 to stop SG B steam flow and manually throttle it to control SG B pressure. De-energize 2SVS-PCV101C at MCC2-E13 to stop SG C steam flow and manually throttle it to control SG C pressure.
BV2-1063 BV2-1400 RA RR and DID 2-SB-3 480VUS-2-2-2C 480VUS-2-9-7B 480VUS-2-9-7C Pzr C Control Group C Heaters Pzr Group B Backup B Group B/U Heaters Pzr Group E Backup C Group B/U Heaters De-energize the C control group heater at 480VUS22 Normal Switchgear and de-energize the B and E backup group heaters at 480VUS29 to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV2-1065 RA DID 2-SB-3 4KVS-2A-2A6 4KVS-2B-2B6 4KVS-2C-2C6 A RCP Feeder Breaker B RCP Feeder Breaker C RCP Feeder Breaker De-energize 2RCS-P21A at 4KVS-2A, de-energize 2RCS-P21B at 4KVS-2B and de-energize 2RCS-P21C at 4KVS-2C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-91 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-SB-3 Spurious SI 4KVS-2DF-2F12-P 4KVS-2DF-2F15-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for B Charging/HHSI Pump breaker 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump breaker 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump De-energize 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE OR Trip 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF to control charging/HHSI flow.
BV2-1067 RA DID 2-SB-3 4KVS-2DF-2F2 Feeder breaker for 2QSS-P21B 4160V Bkr for B QS Pump Trip 2QSS-P21B at 4KVS-2DF to stop quench spray flow.
BV2-1068 RA DID 2-SB-3 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-1332 RA RR 2-SB-3 2-SSPS-SIS-A 2-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, re-establish.
BV2-1698 DID 2-SB-4 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-0784 RA RR 2-SB-4 480VUS-2-2-2C Pzr C Control Group heater De-energize the C control group heater at The Switchyard.
BV2-0785 RA 2-SB-4 4KVS-2A-2A6 4KVS-2B-2B6 4KVS-2C-2C6 A RCP feeder breaker B RCP feeder breaker C RCP feeder breaker De-energize 2RCS-P21A, 1B and 1C at the Switchyard to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV2-0795 RA 2-SB-4 2-SSPS-SIS-A 2-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, re-establish.
BV2-1674 DID 2-SB-4 2SVS-HCV104-P Residual Heat Release Valve Manually close 2SVS-HCV104 to stop SG A, B and C steam flow.
BV2-1739 RR 2-SB-6 480VUS287B 480VUS287C Pzr. Group A Backup Heaters Pzr. Group D Backup Heaters De-energize the A and D backup group heaters at 480VUS28 to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV2-1250 RA DID 2-SB-6 4KVS-2AE-2E18-P 2FWE-HCV100A-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100C-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100E-ISOL 4160V Bkr for A AFW Pump A AFW Header to the C SG C SG HCV Feed from A Train B SG HCV Feed from A Train A SG HCV Feed from A Train De-energize 2FWE-P23A at 4KVS-2AE to stop train A AFW flow.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-92 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-SB-6 2-SSPS-SIS-A 2-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, re-establish.
BV2-1683 DID 2-SB-8 480VUS-2-9-7B 480VUS-2-9-7C Pzr. Group B backup B Group B/U Heaters Pzr. Group E backup E Group B/U Heaters De-energize the B and E backup group heaters at 480VUS29 to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV2-1134 RA DID 2-SB-8 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-1136 RA RR 2-SB-8 4KVS-2AE-2E18-P 2FWE-HCV100A-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100B-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100D-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100F-ISOL 4160V Bkr for A AFW Pump C SG HCV Feed from A Train C SG HCV Feed from B Train B SG HCV Feed from B Train A SG HCV Feed from B Train De-energize 2FWE-P23A at 4KVS-2AE and manually trip 2FWE-P22 to stop train A AFW flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100F to control B train SG A flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100D to control B train SG B flow.
Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100B to control B train SG C flow.
BV2-1659 RR 2-SB-8 2-SSPS-SIS-A 2-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, re-establish.
BV2-1679 DID 2-SG-1N 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-1256 RR 2-SG-1N 2-SSPS-SIS-A 2-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, re-establish.
BV2-1673 DID LIC (20)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-93 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2-SG-1S 2MSS-SOV102-ISOL 4KVS-2AE-2E18-P 2FWE-HCV100A-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100B-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100C-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100D-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100E-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100F-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100B 2FWE-HCV100D 2FWE-HCV100F TD AFW Pump Remote Trip SOV 4160V Bkr for A AFW Pump A AFW Header to the C SG C SG HCV Feed from A Train B AFW Header to the C SG C SG HCV Feed from B Train A AFW Header to the B SG B SG HCV Feed from A Train B AFW Header to the B SG B SG HCV Feed from B Train A AFW Header to the A SG A SG HCV Feed from A Train B AFW Header to the A SG A SG HCV Feed from B Train C SG HCV Feed from B Train B SG HCV Feed from B Train A SG HCV Feed from B Train De-energize 2FWE-P23A at 4KVS-2AE and manually close 2MSS-15 to trip 2FWE-P22 to stop train A AFW flow.
Manually throttle 2FWE-38 to control B train AFW flow.
BV2-1126 BV2-1460 RA DID 2-SG-1S 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
BV2-1129 RA RR 2-SG-1S 2-SSPS-SIS-A 2-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, re-establish.
BV2-1681 DID 2-TB-1 4KVS-2C-2C6 C RCP Feeder Breaker De-energize 2RCS-P21C at 4KVS-2C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV2-1637 RR 2-TB-2 4KVS-2C-2C6 C RCP Feeder Breaker De-energize 2RCS-P21C at 4KVS-2C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
BV2-1638 DID 3-CR-1 2BDG-AOV100A1 2BDG-AOV100B1 2BDG-AOV100C1 2BDG-AOV101A1 2BDG-AOV101A2 2BDG-AOV101B1 2BDG-AOV101B2 2BDG-AOV101C1 2BDG-AOV101C2 SG A BD Isol Trip Valve SG B BD Isol Trip Valve SG C BD Isol Trip Valve SG A BD Inside CNMT Isol Valve SG A BD Inside CNMT Isol Valve SG B BD Inside CNMT Isol Valve SG B BD Inside CNMT Isol Valve SG C BD Inside CNMT Isol Valve SG C BD Inside CNMT Isol Valve De-energize 2BDG-AOV101A2, B2 and C2 at PNL-DC2-10 to isolate SG A, B and C blowdown flow.
BV2-0865 RA DID 3-CR-1 2CHS-E21 2CHS-MOV378 2CHS-MOV381 Seal Water Return Hx Seal Water Return Isol MOV Seal Water Return Isol MOV Close 2CHS-214 to isolate seal water return heat exchanger flow.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-94 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 3-CR-1 2CHS-LCV115C Charging Suction from VCT De-energize 2CHS-LCV115C at MCC2-E03 and manually close the valve OR De-energize 2CHS-LCV115E at MCC2-E04 and manually close the valve to prevent hydrogen intrusion into the charging pump suction.
BV2-0871 RA DID 3-CR-1 2CHS-LCV115C-P 2CHS-LCV115E-P 2CHS-LCV115B 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P Spurious SI Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from RWST 4160V Volt Breaker for 2CHS-P21A Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Volt Breaker for 2CHS-P21C Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump Spurious SI Signal De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) and 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE and de-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) and 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2DF to prevent pump damage on loss of suction.
Open 2CHS-LCV115B from the ASP to align suction to the charging pumps OR De-energize 2CHS-LCV115B at MCC2-E03 and manually open it.
Manually start 2CHS-P21A or 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE Start 2CHS-P21A from the ASP to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV2-0873 RA RR and DID 3-CR-1 2CHS-LCV115C-P 2CHS-LCV115E-P 2CHS-LCV115B 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P Spurious SI 2SIS-MOV836-P 2SIS-MOV840-P 2SIS-MOV867A-P 2SIS-MOV867B-P 2SIS-MOV867C-P 2SIS-MOV867D-P 2SIS-HCV868A 2SIS-HCV868B-P 2SIS-MOV869A 2SIS-MOV869B Spurious SI Signal Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from VCT Charging Suction from RWST 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160 Volt Breaker for 2CHS-P21A 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump 4160 Volt Breaker for 2CHS-P21C Spurious SI Signal Norm Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Hot Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Hot Legs Open 2CHS-LCV115B from the ASP to align suction to the charging pumps OR De-energize 2CHS-LCV115B at MCC2-E03 and manually open it.
Start 2CHS-P21A from the ASP to provide RCS makeup.
BV2-0873 BV2-0881 BV2-1395 PCS LIC (20)
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 3-CR-1 4KVS-2AE-2E18-P 4KVS-2DF-2F18-P 2MSS-SOV102-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100A-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100B-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100C-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100D-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100E-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100F-ISOL 4160V Bkr for A AFW Pump 4160V Bkr for B AFW Pump TD AFW Pump Remote Trip SOV C SG HCV Feed from A Train C SG HCV Feed from B Train B SG HCV Feed from A Train B SG HCV Feed from B Train A SG HCV Feed from A Train A SG HCV Feed from B Train De-energize 2FWE-P23B at 4KVS-2DF to stop train B AFW flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100E to control A train SG A flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100C to control A train SG B flow. Manually throttle 2FWE-HCV100A to control A train SG C flow.
Throttle 2FWE-HCV100E from ASP to control A train SG A flow. Throttle 2FWE-HCV100C from ASP to control A train SG B flow.
BV2-0874 RA RR 3-CR-1 4KVS-2AE-2E18-P 4KVS-2DF-2F18-P 2MSS-SOV102-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100A-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100B-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100C-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100D-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100E-ISOL 2FWE-HCV100F-ISOL 4160V Bkr for A AFW Pump 4160V Bkr for B AFW Pump TD AFW Pump Remote Trip SOV A AFW Header to the C SG C SG HCV Feed from A Train B AFW Header to the C SG C SG HCV Feed from B Train B SG HCV Feed from A Train B AFW Header to the B SG B SG HCV Feed from B Train A SG HCV Feed from A Train B AFW Header to the A SG A SG HCV Feed from B Train Throttle 2FWE-HCV100E at the ASP to control SG A level.
Throttle 2FWE-HCV100C at the ASP to control SG B level.
BV2-0874 PCS 3-CR-1 2MSS-AOV101A 2MSS-AOV101B 2MSS-AOV101C A Main Steam Isol Valve B Main Steam Isol Valve C Main Steam Isol Valve De-energize 2MSS-AOV101A, B and C at PNL-DC2-10 to stop steam flow from SG A, B and C.
BV2-0875 RA RR 3-CR-1 4KVS-2A-2A6 4KVS-2B-2B6 4KVS-2C-2C6 2RCS-PCV455A 2RCS-PCV455B A RCP Feeder Breaker B RCP Feeder Breaker C RCP Feeder Breaker A Pressurizer Spray Valve B Pressurizer Spray Valve De-energize 2RCS-P21A at 4KVS-2A, de-energize 2RCS-P21B at 4KVS-2B and de-energize 2RCS-P21C at 4KVS-2C to prevent an RCP seal LOCA.
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 3-CR-1 2RCS-PT444 2RCS-PT445 2RCS-PCV455C-P 2RCS-PCV455D-P Pzr. Pressure Control Pzr. Pressure Control Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 455D Close 2RCS-PCV455C and 2RCS-PCV455D at the keylock isolation switches.
OR Perform repair procedure to allow the closing of 2RCS-MOV535 and 2RCS-MOV537 to isolate the PORVs.
OR To provide a flow path from the containment sump to Charging/HHSI pump 2CHS-P21A de-energize 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2RSS-MOV156C, 2SIS-MOV863A, 2RSS-MOV155C and 2SIS-MOV8890A at MCC2-E11, de-energize 2CHS-LCV115B at MCC2-E03 and then manually close 2SIS-MOV8809A, 2SIS-MOV8887A, 2RSS-MOV156C and 2SIS-MOV8890A, manually open 2SIS-MOV8811A, 2SIS-MOV863A and 2RSS-MOV155C and then manually close 2CHS-LCV115B.
BV2-0878 RA RR and DID 3-CR-1 2SDS-AOV112A 2SDS-AOV112B 2SDS-AOV112C A Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve B Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve C Steam Drain Orifice Bypass Valve De-energize 2SDS-AOV112A, B and C at PNL-AC2-03 to stop steam flow from SG A, B and C.
BV2-0880 RA DID 3-CR-1 Spurious SI 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P 2SIS-MOV836-P 2SIS-MOV840-P 2SIS-MOV867A-P 2SIS-MOV867B-P 2SIS-MOV867C-P 2SIS-MOV867D-P 2SIS-HCV868A 2SIS-HCV868B-P 2SIS-MOV869A 2SIS-MOV869B Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Hot Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Hot Legs De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) at 4KVS-2AE AND De-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF to stop excessive RCS makeup flow.
De-energize 2SIS-MOV836, 2SIS-MOV840, 2SIS-MOV867C and 2SIS-MOV869A at MCC2-E05 and manually close the valves and de-energize 2SIS-MOV867D and 2SIS-MOV869B at MCC2-E06 and close them to isolate spuriously opened SI flow paths.
Manually start 2CHS-P21A(C) or 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE and manually throttle 2SIS-MOV836 to control RCS makeup flow.
BV2-0881 BV2-1395 RA DID 3-CR-1 2SVS-HCV104-P 2SVS-PCV101A-P 2SVS-PCV101B-P 2SVS-PCV101C-P Residual Heat Release Valve A Atmospheric Steam Dump B Atmospheric Steam Dump C Atmospheric Steam Dump Throttle 2SVS-PCV101A from the ASP to control SG C SG A pressure and throttle 2SVS-PCV101B from the ASP to control SG B pressure.
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 3-CR-1 2SVS-HCV104-P 2SVS-PCV101A-P 2SVS-PCV101B-P 2SVS-PCV101C-P Residual Heat Release Valve A Atmospheric Steam Dump B Atmospheric Steam Dump C Atmospheric Steam Dump De-energize 2SVS-HCV104 at MCC2-E14 to stop SG A, B and C steam flow. and manually throttle it to control SG A, B and C pressure. De-energize 2SVS-PCV101A at MCC2-E05 to stop SG A steam flow and manually throttle it to control SG A pressure. De-energize 2SVS-PCV101B at MCC2-E13 to stop SG B steam flow and manually throttle it to control SG B pressure. Throttle 2SVS-PCV101A from the ASP to control SG A pressure and throttle 2SVS-PCV101B from the ASP to control SG B pressure. De-energize 2SVS-PCV101C at MCC2-E13 to stop SG C steam flow. and manually throttle it to control SG C pressure.
BV2-0882 RA DID 3-CR-1 2SWE-MOV116A-P 2SWE-MOV116B-P 2SWS-MOV102C1-P 2SWS-MOV102C2-P 2SWS-MOV103A 2SWS-MOV103B 2SWS-MOV107A 2SWS-MOV107D 2-CIB-SPUR Stby SW to the A SW Hdr Stby SW to the B SW Hdr C SW Pump to A SW Hdr C SW Pump to B SW Hdr A SW Hdr to RS Hx B SW Hdr to RS Hx A SW Hdr to Secondary CC B SW Hdr to secondary CC Unit 2 Spurious CIB Signal If 2SWS-P21A and 2SWE-P21A are damaged, stop the 2-1 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103A at MCC2-E03 and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWE-MOV116A at MCC2-E03 and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWS-MOV106A at MCC2-E03 and verify that it is open to align the A SWS flow path.
De-energize 2SWS-MOV170A at MCC2-E01 and open it to align seal water to 2SWS-P21C. De-energize 2SWS-MOV102C1 at MCC2-E01, restart the diesel, manually start 2SWS-P21C while manually opening 2SWS-MOV102C1 to provide A SWS flow. Start other AE bus loads as required.
OR If 2SWS-P21C and 2SWE-P21A are damaged, stop the 2-1 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103A at MCC2-E03 and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWE-MOV116A at MCC2-E03 and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWS-MOV106A at MCC2-E03 and verify that it is open to align the A SWS flow path.
De-energize 2SWS-MOV102A at MCC2-E01, restart the diesel, manually start 2SWS-P21A while manually opening 2SWS-MOV102A to provide A SWS flow. Start other AE bus loads as required.
Stop the 2-1 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103A, 2SWE-MOV116A and 2SWS-MOV106A at MCC2-E03. Transfer and control 2SWS-MOV102A at ASP, restart the diesel, start 2SWS-P21A at ASP to provide A SWS flow. Start other AE bus loads as required.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-98 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 3-CR-1 2SWE-MOV116A-P 2SWE-MOV116B-P 2SWS-MOV102C1-P 2SWS-MOV102C2-P 2SWS-MOV103A 2SWS-MOV103B 2SWS-MOV107A 2SWS-MOV107D 2-CIB-SPUR Stby SW to the A SW Hdr Stby SW to the B SW Hdr C SW Pump to A SW Hdr C SW Pump to B SW Hdr A SW Hdr to RS Hx B SW Hdr to RS Hx A SW Hdr to Secondary CC B SW Hdr to Secondary CC Unit 2 Spurious CIB Signal Open 2SWS-MOV102A at the ASP to align the discharge path for 2SWS-P21A and start 2SWS-P21A from the ASP to provide cooling water to the required loads.
BV2-0883 PCS 3-CR-1 480VUS-2-2-2C 480VUS-2-8-7B 480VUS-2-8-7C 480VUS-2-9-7B 480VUS-2-9-7C Pzr. C Control Group Heaters Pzr. A Group B/U Heaters Pzr. D Group B/U Heaters Pzr. B Group B/U Heaters Pzr. E Group B/U Heaters De-energize the C control group heater at 480VUS22 Normal Switchgear, de-energize the A and D backup group heaters at 480VUS28 and de-energize the B and E backup group heaters at 480VUS29 to prevent RCS overpressure.
BV2-0884 RA DID 3-CR-1 480VUS-2-2-2C 480VUS-2-8-7B 480VUS-2-8-7C 480VUS-2-9-7B 480VUS-2-9-7C Pzr. C Control Group Heater Pzr. A Group B/U Heaters Pzr. D Group B/U Heaters Pzr. B Group B/U Heaters Pzr. E Group B/U Heaters Operate the A backup group heater at the ASP to control RCS pressure.
BV2-0884 PCS 3-CR-1 Spurious SI 4KVS-2AE-2E12-P 4KVS-2AE-2E15-P 4KVS-2DF-2F12-P 4KVS-2DF-2F15-P Spurious SI Signal 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for B Charging/HHSI Pump 4160V Bkr for C Charging/HHSI Pump De-energize 2CHS-P21A(C) at 4KVS-2AE AND De-energize 2CHS-P21B(C) at 4KVS-2DF to control charging/HHSI flow.
BV2-0886 RA DID 3-CR-1 2CHS-MOV289-ISOL Norm Charging FCV Isol Manually open 2CHS-477 to bypass the charging flow control valve. Manually close 2CHS-30 to isolate the charging flow control valve. Manually throttle 2CHS-477 to control charging flow.
De-energize 2CHS-MOV289 at MCC2-E05 and manually close.
BV2-0887 RA RR 3-CR-1 4KVS-1G-1G5 4KVS-2A-2A1 4KVS-2B-2B1 4KVS-2C-2C1 4KVS-2D-2D1 2FWS-HYV157A 2FWS-HYV157B 2FWS-HYV157C Startup Feed Pump bkr 2FWS-P21A1 Motor Bkr 2FWS-P21A2 Motor Bkr 2FWS-P21B1 Motor Bkr 2FWS-P21B2 Motor Bkr A SG Feed Isolation B SG Feed Isolation C SG Feed Isolation Isolate air by closing 2IAS-609 and vent to close 2FWS-FCV478, 2FWS-FCV488, 2FWS-FCV498, 2FWS-FCV479, 2FWS-FCV489, & 2FWE-FCV499.
De-energize 2FWS-P21A at 4KVS-2A & 4KVS-2B and de-energize 2FWS-P21B at 4KVS-2C & 4KVS-2D to stop main feedwater pump flow to the steam generators. when personnel are available.
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 3-CR-1 4KVS-2AE-2E2 4KVS-2DF-2F2 2-CIB-SPUR A QS Pump supply bkr 4160V Bkr for A QS Pump B QS Pump supply bkr 4160V Bkr for B QS Pump Spurious CIB Signal Trip 2QSS-P21A at 4KVS-2AE to stop A train quench spray flow and trip 2QSS-P21B at 4KVS-2DF to stop B train quench spray flow.
BV2-0890 RA RR 3-CR-1 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
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Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 3-CR-1 4KVS-2AE-2E14 4KVS-2AE-2E18 2FWE-HCV100C 2FWE-HCV100E 480VUS-2-8-7B 2SVS-PCV101A 2SVS-PCV101B 4KVS-2AE-2E12 2CHS-FCV122 2RCS-PCV456 2CHS-LCV460A 2CHS-LCV460B 2CHS-P22A 2CHS-SOV206 2EGS-EG2-1 2FWS-LI477F 2FWS-LI487F 2MSS-PI474 2MSS-PI475F 2MSS-PI484 2MSS-PI485F 2RCS-LI459AF 2RCS-PI403F 2RCS-PI455F 2RCS-TI413F 2RCS-TI423F 2RCS-TI410F 2RCS-TI420F 2RCS-TE413 2RCS-TE420 2RCS-TE410 2RCS-TE423 A Service Water Pump Breaker A AFW Pump Breaker 4160V Bkr for A AFW Pump AFW Throttle Valve to B SG B SG HCV Feed from A Train AFW Throttle Valve To A SG A SG HCV Feed from A Train Pzr A Group B/U Heaters ASDV for Steam Generator A A Atmospheric Steam Dump ASDV for Steam Generator B B Atmospheric Steam Dump A Charging Pump Breaker 4160V Bkr for A Charging/HHSI Pump Normal Charging FCV Pressurizer Power Relief Valve Pressurizer PORV 456 Train A Letdown Isolation Valve Train B Letdown Isolation Valve A Boric Acid Transfer Pump Redundant Emergency Boration Emergency Diesel Generator #1 A SG Level B SG Level A SG Pressure A SG Pressure B SG Pressure B SG Pressure Pressurizer Level A Loop RCS Pressure Pressurizer Pressure A Loop RCS Hot Leg Temperature B Loop RCS Hot Leg Temperature A Loop RCS Cold Leg Temperature B Loop RCS Cold Leg Temperature A Loop RCS Hot Leg Temperature B Loop RCS Cold Leg Temperature A Loop RCS Cold Leg Temperature B Loop RCS Hot Leg Temperature Take the plant to "Safe and Stable" utilizing selected instruments and controls at the auxiliary shutdown panel, as directed.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-101 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 2HVD-FN270A 2HVD-FN271A 2HVD-MOD22A 2HVD-MOD23A 2HVD-TE21A 2HVD-TH22A 2HVZ-FN261A 2HVZ-FN262A 2HVZ-MOD21A 2HVZ-MOD22A 2HVZ-MOD23A 2FWE-FI100AF 2FWE-FI100BF 2NMS-NI31BF 2NMS-NI31DF ACB-42A ACB-2A10 ACB-2E7 ACB-2E10 2SWS-MOV113A 2SWS-MOV102A 2CHS-LCV115B ASP Power Supply Diesel Gen Bldg Supply Fan Diesel Gen Bldg Sec. Supply Fan D.G. Bldg Modulating OS Damper D.G. Bldg Modulating Recirc Damper D.G. Bldg Pri. Inlet Air Temp.
Diesel Room A Thermostat Emerg. Swgr Supply Fan Emerg. Swgr. Exhaust Fan E. Swgr Modulating OS Air Damper E. Swgr Modulating Exhaust Damper E. Swgr Modulating Recirc. Damper A S/G Auxiliary Feed Flow B S/G Auxiliary Feed Flow Source Range count rate Source range startup rate SS Bus 2A Supply Breaker Bus 2AE Supply Breaker Bus 2AE Supply Breaker
- 1 EDG Supply Breaker
- 1 EDG Hx SW Supply A SW Header Isol Valve A SW Pump Discharge MOV Charging Suction from RWST ASP Power Supply BV2-0892 (Cont.)
3-CR-1 2SWS-STRM47 2SWS-PT117A 2SWS-AOV130A A SW pump seal strainer A SW pump seal press A SW pump seal water Isol De-energize 2SWS-AOV130A at 480VUS-2-8 to restore the service water pump seal water supply.
De-energize 2SWS-AOV130A by opening breaker E3-2 on PNL-AC2-E3 to restore the service water pump seal water supply.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-102 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 3-CR-1 2SWS-MOV102A 2SWS-MOV106A 2-CIB-SPUR A SW Pump Discharge MOV SW Header A Isol to CC Hx Spurious CIB Signal If 2SWS-P21A and 2SWE-P21A are damaged, stop the 2-1 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103A at MCC2-E03 and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWE-MOV116A at MCC2-E03 and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWS-MOV106A at MCC2-E03 and open it to align the A SWS flow path. De-energize 2SWS-MOV170A at MCC2-E01 and open it to align seal water to 2SWS-P21C. De-energize 2SWS-MOV102C1 at MCC2-E01, restart the diesel, manually start 2SWS-P21C while manually opening 2SWS-MOV102C1 to provide A SWS flow. Start other AE bus loads as required.
OR IF 2SWS-P21C and 2SWE-P21A are damaged, stop the 2-1 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103A at MCC2-E03 and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWE-MOV116A at MCC2-E03 and close it if it spuriously opened. De-energize 2SWS-MOV106A at MCC2-E03 and open it to align the A SWS flow path. De-energize 2SWS-MOV102A at MCC2-E01, restart the diesel, manually start 2SWS-P21A while manually opening 2SWS-MOV102A to provide A SWS flow. Start other AE bus loads as required.
Stop the 2-1 diesel to prevent overheating. De-energize 2SWS-MOV103A, 2SWE-MOV116A and 2SWS-MOV106A at MCC2-E03. Transfer and control 2SWS-MOV102A at ASP, restart the diesel, start 2SWS-P21A at ASP to provide A SWS flow. Start other AE bus loads as required.
BV2-0894 RA RR 3-CR-1 4KVS-2AE 2AE 4160V Bus Align AE and DF bus loads as required.
BV2-1327 RA RR 3-CR-1 2HVC-ACU201A 2HVC-DMPF21B 2HVC-DMPF24B MCR A/C Unit Condenser Control Rm Supply Fire Damper Control Rm Exhaust Fire Damper Install 2 5000 CFM portable fans in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
- 1. Credit BV1 HVAC System if available (not a recovery action).
- 2. Install portable electric fan(s) in the Control Room doorway to supply temporary ventilation.
BV2-1328 RA RR 3-CR-1 4KVS-2B-2B2 4KVS-2C-2C2 4KVS-2D-2D2 2FWS-HYV157A 2FWS-HYV157B 2FWS-HYV157C 2CNM-P21A Motor bkr 2CNM-P21B Motor bkr 2CNM-P21C Motor bkr A SG Feed Isolation B SG Feed Isolation C SG Feed Isolation Isolate air by closing 2IAS-609 and vent to close 2FWS-FCV478, 2FWS-FCV488, 2FWS-FCV498, 2FWS-FCV479, 2FWS-FCV489, & 2FWE-FCV499.
De-energize 2CNM-P21A at 4KVS-2B, de-energize 2CNM-P21B at 4KVS-2C and de-energize 2CNM-P21C at 4KVS-2D to stop condensate flow to the steam generators when personnel are available.
SSD RAI 04 SSD RAI 05 PRA RAI 18(b)
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-103 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 3-CR-1 2RCS-PCV455C 2RCS-PCV455D 2RCS-MOV535 2RCS-MOV536 2RCS-MOV537 Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 455D Pzr. PORV 455C Block MOV Pzr. PORV 456 Block MOV Pzr. PORV 455D Block MOV Perform repair procedure to allow the opening of 2RCS-MOV536. Open PORV 2RCS-PCV456 at the ASP.
BV2-1416 RA 3-CR-1 2RCS-PCV455C 2RCS-PCV455D 2RCS-MOV535 2RCS-MOV536 2RCS-MOV537 Pressurizer PORV 455C Pressurizer PORV 455D Pzr. PORV 455C Block MOV Pzr. PORV 456 Block MOV Pzr. PORV 455D Block MOV Attempt to control 2RCS-PCV456 at the ASP.
BV2-1416 PCS 3-CR-1 2RCS-SOV200A 2RCS-SOV200B 2RCS-SOV201A 2RCS-SOV201B 2RCS-HCV250A 2RCS-HCV250B Train A head vent SOV Train B head vent SOV Train A head vent SOV Train B head vent SOV Reactor head vent Reactor head vent Perform repair procedure to provide power to the reactor vessel head vent valves.
BV2-1422 RA 3-CR-1 2CHS-FCV122 2CHS-MOV289 2CHS-MOV310 2CHS-MOV311 2SIS-HCV868A 2SIS-HCV868B 2SIS-MOV836 2SIS-MOV840 2SIS-MOV867A 2SIS-MOV867B 2SIS-MOV867C 2SIS-MOV867D 2SIS-MOV869A 2SIS-MOV869B Normal Charging FCV Norm Charging FCV Isol Regen HX Normal Charging Disch PRZR Aux Spray Isolation Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Cold Legs Norm HHSI to RCS Hot Legs Alt HHSI to RCS Hot Legs Provide an alternate RCS makeup flow path by de-energizing 2SIS-MOV836 at MCC2-E05 and manually throttle for RCS makeup flow.
BV2-1714 DID 3-IS-3 2-SSPS-SIS-A 2-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, re-establish.
BV2-1678 DID 3-IS-4 2-SSPS-SIS-A 2-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, re-establish.
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Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 FENOC Attachment G - Recovery Action Transition Beaver Valley Page G-104 LIC (19)
Table G-1 2 BVPS-2 Recovery Actions and Activities Occurring at the Primary Control Station(s)
Fire Compartment Component ID Component Name Recovery Actions VFDR RA or PCS PCS/RR/DID 3-YARD-1 2CHS-LCV115B 2CHS-LCV115D Charging suction from RWST Charging suction from RWST De-energize 2CHS-LCV115B at MCC2-E03 and manually open it to align suction to the charging pumps. Manually start 2CHS-P21A or 2CHS-P21C at 4KVS-2AE to provide RCS makeup flow.
BV2-1109 RA 3-YARD-1 2-SSPS-SIS-A 2-SSPS-SIS-B SIS Train A Signal SIS Train B Signal In the event of loss of one entire train of power, prior to battery depletion (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), disable Auto Safety Injection Signal actuation from powered SSPS cabinet. If RCP Seal Injection, Letdown, CCW to containment are lost, re-establish.
BV2-1654 DID Generic 2-DG-1 2-TB-1 2-TR-4 2-TR-5 3-RH-1 3-IS-2 3-SY-1 2FWE-TK210 Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Provide an alternate suction to the AFW pumps.
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Enclosure B L-17-197 LAR Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights (41 pages follow)
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValleyPageW1
W.FirePRAInsights
40PagesAttached
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValleyPageW2 W.1FirePRAOverallRiskInsights RiskinsightsweredocumentedaspartofthedevelopmentoftheBVPS1andBVPS2FPRAs.Thetotal plantfirecoredamagefrequency(CDF)andlargeearlyreleasefrequency(LERF)foreachplantwere derivedusingtheNUREG/CR6850methodologyforFPRAdevelopmentandtheseriskmetricsareusedin identifyingtheareasoftheplantwherefireriskisgreatest.Theriskinsightsgeneratedwerealsousedin identifyingareaswherespecificcontributorsmightbemitigatedviamodificationsorothermeasures,and inunderstandingtherisksignificanceofMSOcombinations.
UsingthedefinitionofsignificantfromthecombinedASME/ANSPRAStandardRASa2009(forthe termssignificantaccidentsequenceandsignificantaccidentprogressionsequence),thefirescenariosthat sumto95%ofthecollectivefireCDF/LERForthosewhosecontributionismorethan1%ofthetotalfire CDF/LERFareconsideredtorepresentthesignificantfirescenarios.
ForBVPS1:
Thereare220firescenarioscomprising90%ofthecollectivefireCDFand306scenarioscontributingto thetop95%.Ofthese,only19scenarioscontributemorethan1%onanindividualbasistothecollective fireCDF.Thescenarioscontributingmorethan1%ofthecalculatedfireCDFonanindividualbasisare describedinTableW1a.
Thereare144firescenarioscomprising90%ofthecollectivefireLERFand225scenarioscontributingto thetop95%.Ofthese,only12scenarioscontributemorethan1%onanindividualbasistothecollective fireLERF.Thescenarioscontributingmorethan1%ofthecalculatedfireLERFonanindividualbasisare describedinTableW1c.
SimilarlyforBVPS2:
Thereare251firescenarioscomprising90%ofthecollectivefireCDFand332scenarioscontributingto thetop95%.Ofthese,only11scenarioscontributemorethan1%onanindividualbasistothecollective fireCDF.Thescenarioscontributingmorethan1%ofthecalculatedfireCDFonanindividualbasisare describedinTableW1b.
Thereare123firescenarioscomprising90%ofthecollectivefireLERFand201scenarioscontributingto thetop95%.Ofthese,only15scenarioscontributemorethan1%onanindividualbasistothecollective fireLERF.Thescenarioscontributingmorethan1%ofthecalculatedfireLERFonanindividualbasisare describedinTableW1d.
W.2RiskChangeDuetoNFPA805Transition InaccordancewiththeguidanceinRegulatoryPosition2.2.4.2ofRG1.205Revision1:
ThetotalincreaseordecreaseinriskassociatedwiththeimplementationofNFPA805 fortheoverallplantshouldbecalculatedbysummingtheriskincreasesanddecreases foreachfirearea(includinganyriskincreasesresultingfrompreviouslyapproved recoveryactions).Thetotalriskincreaseshouldbeconsistentwiththeacceptance guidelinesinRegulatoryGuide1.174.NotethattheacceptanceguidelinesofRegulatory Guide1.174mayrequirethetotalCDF,LERF,orboth,toevaluatechangeswherethe
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValleyPageW3 riskimpactexceedsspecificguidelines.Iftheadditionalriskassociatedwithpreviously approvedrecoveryactionsisgreaterthantheacceptanceguidelinesinRegulatory Guide1.174,thenthenetchangeintotalplantriskincurredbyanyproposed alternativestothedeterministiccriteriainNFPA805,Chapter4(otherthanthe previouslyapprovedrecoveryactions),shouldberiskneutralorrepresentarisk decrease.
TablesW2aandW2bprovidetheriskincreasesassociatedwiththeVFDRsforBVPS1andBVPS2, respectively.ThetransitiontoNFPA805initiallyresultedinacollectiveriskincrease(CDF/LERF)abovethe thresholdforselfapproval.AsallowedbyRG1.205,creditforadditionalmodificationsthatdonotbring thefireareaintocompliancebutimprovetheFPRAresultshasbeenshowntomorethanoffsettherisk increaseasdemonstratedinTablesW2aandW2b.Specifically,theseadditionalmodifications,listedin AttachmentS,TableS1,ItemsBV13062andBV11875forBVPS1andBV20828andBV20829forBVPS 2, include the installation of replacement Reactor Coolant Pump seals with a low leakage design to minimizethelikelihoodandsizeofLOCAuponlossofallsealcooling,andtheinstallationofVEWFDS incipientdetectioninlowvoltagecabinetslocatedinfirecompartments1CR4,2CB1,and2CB6to reduce the likelihood of fire propagation outside the cabinets. It is important to note that the risk reductionisbasedsolelyonthescopeoffireinitiatingevents.Anyadditionalplantriskreductionsthat mayresultfromtheinternaleventsPRAhavenotbeenincluded.
ForBVPS1thetotalchangeinriskassociatedwiththetransitiontoNFPA805resultsinanetriskdecrease inbothCDFandLERF.ForBVPS2thetotalchangeinriskassociatedwiththetransitiontoNFPA805also resultsinanetriskdecreaseinbothCDFandLERF.Furthermore,forbothplantunitsthetotalplantrisk (includingallinternalandexternalinitiators)isbelow1E4forCDFand1E5forLERF.Thereforethese changesareallowableperRG1.174.
RG1.205alsorequiresthelicenseetocalculatetheadditionalriskofrecoveryactions.Thedevelopment oftheFireRiskEvaluationsanddataforTablesW2aandW2btreatedallpreviouslyapprovedrecovery actionsasnew.Thus,theCDFandLERFforallrecoveryactionsareincludedintheFireRiskEvaluation resultspresentedinTablesW2aandW2b.ThetotaladditionalriskfromrecoveryactionsforBVPS1is 1.91E05peryearand3.79E07peryearforCDFandLERFrespectively,andforBVPS2thevaluesare 3.26E05peryearand2.63E07peryearforCDFandLERF,respectively.Whilethesevaluesareabovethe RG1.174guidelinesforacceptableincreasesinrisk(lessthan1E05peryearforCDFand1E06peryear forLERF),itshouldbenotedtheseadditionalriskofrecoveryactionvaluesdonotcredittheriskoffsetor anyriskreductionachievedthroughtheplantmodificationstoinstallWestinghousereactorcoolantpump shutdownsealsandtheveryearlywarningfiredetectionsystem.
Application of the RG 1.205 guidance quoted above to recovery actions means that the proposed additionalriskofrecoveryactionsisacceptableifthenetchangeinriskisriskneutralorrepresentsarisk decrease.Basedonthenegativenetchangeinriskvalues(overallriskdecrease)reportedinTablesW2a and W2b, the additional risk of recovery actions, while independently exceeding the acceptance guidelines,isacceptableaspartoftheoveralltransitiontoNFPA805duetotheoffsettingriskdecreases alsoassociatedwiththetransition.
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PageW4 TableW1aBVPS1SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofCDF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative FCV205 H2AHY101BFDS4/8 3.58%
3.58%
SpuriousSIandcontainmentisolationsignalCIB duetofiredamagetoContainmentPressure Transmitters(PTLM100B,100D).Firedamageto MCCs(MCC1E3,E14,E4)resultsinfailureofboth OrangeandPurpleTrainEmergencyMCCpower.
FailureofMCCs(E03,E11,E04,E12)resultsin failureofHHSIpumpsduetolossofsuctionfrom theRWST.FirecausesspuriousopeningofRV HeadVent,PressurizerVentandAssociated PRT/ContainmentIsolationValves(SOVRC102B, 103Band105),whichleadstoasmallRCSLOCA.
InadditionfiredamageresultsinlossofRCPseal injectionandfailuretotripRCPs;howevertheseal LOCAislimitedduetosuccessfulactuationof ShutdownSeals.RCSissuccessfullydepressurized andlowheadinjectionisinitiallysuccessful,but eventuallyfailsduetofailureofmakeuptothe RWSTandfailureofthecontainmentsumpsuction valvesforlongtermrecirculation,whichleadsto coredamage.
3.11E06 5.29E01 1.64E06 1.81E03 5.63E09 FMCR05 BBA5 2.36%
5.94%
ASafetyInjectionsignaloccursduetofiredamage tothePORVcontrolpressuretransmitter(PTRC 444)andfireinducedspuriousopeningofthe auxiliarypressurizersprayvalve(MOVCH311).
LOCAoccursduetofailureofpressurerelief resultingfromfiredamagetoPORVs,whichfailto open,andrandomfailureofsafetyvalves(RVRC 551A/B/C)torecloseafterpassingwater.In additionfiredamagecauseslossofRCPseal injectionandfailuretotriptheRCPs;howeverthe sealLOCAislimitedduetosuccessfulactuationof theShutdownSeals.Firedamagesthenormal SafetyInjectionandAlternateInjectionflowpath MOVs(MOVSI867A/B/C/DandMOVSI836),
resultinginlossofHighHeadSafetyInjection.
Bothtrainsoflowheadsafetyinjectionarelost duetofireinducedspuriousclosureofthemini flowvalves(MOVSI885B/D)resultinginlossof therecirculationpath.FailureofHHSIandLHSI 6.11E06 1.77E01 1.08E06 1.26E03 7.67E09
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PageW5 resultinlossofRCSmakeupcapability,whichin combinationwiththeLOCAresultsincoredamage.
FCS181 TS23ABIN7FDS1/2 2.27%
8.21%
NormalBusNAandNDfailduetobreakers(OCB 83,OCB92)andtransformers(TR1AandTR1B) firedamage.EEEG1failsduetononrecoverable firedamagetobreakersorRWValves.Spurious SafetyInjectionconditionoccursduevariousfire impactsincludingdamagetoPressurizerSpray MOVCH311,PressurizerTransmitterPTRC444, andMainSteamIsolationValvesTVMS101A/B/C.
PORVs(PCVRC455C,455Dand456)aresubjected towaterchallengeandstickopen.PORVblock valveMOVRC535failstoclosewhichleadsto PORVLOCA.Firealsocausesspuriousopeningof RVHeadVentValvesandPressurizerVentValves leadingtoadditionalRCSleakagepaths.HHSI injectionflowpathfailsduetofireimpactson valvesMOVSI867B/867C/867D.TrainBLowhead injectionissuccessful,howeversuctionfromthe containmentsumpfailsduetofiredamageto MOVSI885B.Firealsodamagesriverwater valves(MOVRW103A/103B/103C/103D/
106A/106B/114A/114B)whichleadstolossof RiverWatercoolingtotheRecirculationSprayHXs.
FailureofHHSIandlongtermLHSIsuctionalong withthefailureofheatremovalfromthe containmentsumpleadstocoredamage.
1.15E06 9.08E01 1.04E06 3.67E03 4.22E09 FMCA07 1TB13CR1 2.08%
10.29%
SIFunctiondefeatedduetodamageto ContainmentPressureTransmitters,RCSPressure Transmitters,andSGLevelTransmitters.Normal BussesNAandNDfailduetobreakers(OCB83, 92)andtransformers(TR1A,1B)firedamage.
EmergencyDieselpowertoBusses1AEand1DF failsduetononrecoverablefiredamageto breakersresultinginstationblackout.MSIVsfail tocloseduetolossofactuationsignal.ALOCA occursduetoRVHeadVentValveorPressurizer VentValveandassociatedPRT/Containment IsolationValvespuriouslyopening,ordueto failureofthePORVstoopenandthePressurizer SafetyValvesfailingtorecloseafterwater challenge.Inadditionfiredamageresultsinlossof RCPsealinjectionandfailuretotriptheRCPs; 9.55E07 1.00E+00 9.55E07 7.10E03 6.78E09
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PageW6 howeverthesealLOCAislimitedduetosuccessful actuationofShutdownSeals.SteamdrivenAFW pumpfailsduetolossofsteamasaresultofMSIVs failingtoclose.HHSIandLHSIfailduetolossofAC powersupport.FailuretodepressurizetheRCS duetolossofHHSI/LHSIalongwiththefailureof secondaryheatremovalleadstohighRCSpressure andcoredamage.
FCR4E8 RKREACPROTBFDS3 2.06%
12.35%
SpuriousCIBsignalduetofiredamageto ContainmentPressureTransmittersorSpurious ManualContainmentIsolationsignal.SpuriousSI signalduetofireimpactstoContainmentPressure, PressurizerPressure,SteamlinePressure,or ManualSIactuationcircuit.FailuretoopenofHHSI valvesMOVSI867A/B/C/DleadstoHHSIinjection failure.PORVsfailtoopenautomaticallydueto firedamagetoPressurizerPressureTransmitters, causingthesafetyvalvestoopenandstickopen afterpassingwater.Alternatively,thePORVs (PCVRC455C,455Dand456)spuriouslyopenand stickopenafterpassingwater,andBlockValves (MOVRC535,536and537)failtocloseeither caseleadstoaprimaryLOCA.LowHeadPumps failduetospuriousclosureofsuctionorminiflow valves.TheLOCAcombinedwithfailureofRCS injectioncapabilityresultsincoredamage.
3.40E06 2.78E01 9.45E07 1.96E03 6.65E09 FCR301 EmergencyDiesel GeneratorRackFDS2/5 1.75%
14.10%
NormalBusNAandNDfailduetobreakers(OCB 83,OCB92)andtransformers(TR1AandTR1B) firedamage.EEEG1failsduetononrecoverable firedamagetobreakers.Stationblackoutoccurs onfailureofBTrainRiverwaterheadersupplydue tofiredamagetoMCC1E2resultinginlossof pumpsWRP1Band1C,coupledwiththeoperator failuretostarttheAuxRWpumpWRP9B.Steam drivenAFWpumpFWP2failsrandomlyordueto firedamageresultingfromlossofcontrolofAFW feedflowcontrolvalvescoupledwithoperator failuretoisolateflow,resultingintotalofAFW.
HHSIandLHSIfailduetolossofsupport.Failureto depressurizetheRCSduetofailureofHHSI/LHSI, alongwiththefailureofsecondaryheatremoval leadstohighRCSpressureandcoredamage.
1.42E04 5.63E03 8.01E07 4.01E05 5.70E09
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PageW7 FCR4K1 INVCMP(Replacement Unit)FDS2 1.74%
15.84%
NormalBusNAandNDfailduetobreakersand transformers(TR1Aand1B)firedamage.Station blackoutoccursduetorandomfailureofEDGEE EG1andnonrecoverablefiredamageto Emergency4KVBus1DFbus,breakers,andEDG EEEG2.ThesteamdrivenAFWpumpfailsdueto randomfailureofpumporfiredamagewhich preventsclosingtheMainFWFastActingHydraulic Valves(HYVFW100A/B/C)ortrippingMFWPump breakers(SWBD15failed)andoperatorfailsto tripMFWfromoutsidetheMCR,resultingintotal lossofAuxFeedwater.Failuretodepressurizethe RCSduetofailureofHHSI/LHSI,alongwiththe failureofsecondaryheatremovalleadstohigh RCSpressureandcoredamage.
1.75E05 4.55E02 7.96E07 2.89E04 5.06E09 FNS165 4KVS1D5;6;7;8 (HEAF)FDS3/6 1.61%
17.45%
NormalBusesNAandNDfailduetospurious openingofSwitchyardbreakers(OCB83,92),bus breakers,andSSTransformers(TR1A,1B).Fire damagefailstheEmergency4KVBus1AEbus, breakers,andEDGEEEG1;howeverPurpleTrain powerremainsavailable.AuxFeedwaterfailsdue tofailureofthesteamdrivenpumpFWP2to start/run,withspuriousclosureofAFWthrottle valves(MOVFW151A/C/E),plusFWP3Afailsdue tolossofthe1AEbusandpumpFWP3Bfailsdue tofireimpactstoitssupplybreaker4KVS1DF 1F16.DedicatedAFWpumpFWP4isnot availableduetolossofpower.Firedamageto PORVPCVRC455Cincombinationwithfire damagetoOrangeTrainpowerresultsinfailureof theprimaryBleedpath(forbleedandfeed operations).FailuretodepressurizetheRCSdue tofailureofbleedandfeedalongwiththefailure ofallsecondaryheatremovalleadstohighRCS pressureandcoredamage.
4.85E05 1.52E02 7.39E07 6.87E05 3.33E09 FRH1 3RH1WHOLEROOM 1.58%
19.03%
NormalBussesNAandNDfailduetofiredamage totheincomingbreakers(OCB83,92).Station Blackoutoccursduetorandomfailureofboth EDGstostartandrun.ThesteamdrivenAFW pumpfailsduerandomfailureorfailureofthe operatoractiontopreventSGoverfill,whichfails allAFW.DedicatedAFWpumpFWP4failsdueto lossofpower.HHSIandLHSIfailduetolossofAC 3.78E03 1.91E04 7.24E07 1.33E06 5.03E09
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PageW8 powersupport.FailuretodepressurizetheRCS duetofailureofHHSI/LHSI,alongwiththefailure ofsecondaryheatremovalleadstohighRCS pressureandcoredamage.
FCV123 MCC1E5FDS2/61CV1 1.46%
20.50%
Spuriouscontainmentisolationsignalduetofire damagetoContainmentPressuretransmitters(PT LM100A,100C).FiredamagesMCCs(MCC1E5, E11),whichresultsinfailureofOrangeTrain EmergencyMCCpower.BothRiverWatertrains failduetodeadheadingresultingfromspurious closureofMOVRW104C/105Cinconjunction withthespuriousCIBsignalandfailureofthe operatoractiontorecoverproperriverwater systemalignment.PressurizerPressure TransmittersPTRC444,445arespuriously affectedwhichleadstoPORVs(PCVRC455C, 455Dand456)opening,passingwater,andsticking open.PORVblockvalveMOVRC535failstoclose andoperatorfailstoisolatethePORVswhichleads toPORVLOCA.Inadditionfiredamageresultsin lossofRCPsealinjectionandfailuretotripRCPs; howeverthesealLOCAislimitedduetosuccessful actuationofShutdownSeals.Highheadinjection failsduetofailureofcoolingfromtheRiverWater system.RCSissuccessfullydepressurizedandlow headinjectionisinitiallysuccessful,buteventually failsduetofailureofmakeuptotheRWST.
Containmentsumprecirculationfailsduetofailure ofsumpsuctionvalvesandlossofRiverWaterfor cooling,whichleadstocoredamage.
7.50E06 8.93E02 6.70E07 3.05E04 2.28E09 FNS185 TRANS14GFDS5/10 1.41%
21.91%
NormalBusesNAandNDfailduetospurious openingofSwitchyardbreakers(OCB83,92),bus breakersandSSTransformers(TR1A,1B).Fire damagefailstheEmergency4KVBus1AEbus, breakers,andEDGEEEG1;howeverPurpleTrain powerremainsavailable.AuxFeedwaterfailsdue tofailureofthesteamdrivenpumpFWP2to start/run,withspuriousclosureofAFWthrottle valves(MOVFW151A/C/E),plusFWP3Afailsdue tolossofthe1AEbusandpumpFWP3Bfailsdue tofireimpactstoitssupplybreaker4KVS1DF 1F16.DedicatedAFWpumpFWP4isnot availableduetolossofpower.Theoperator 5.83E05 1.11E02 6.48E07 5.82E05 3.39E09
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW9 actiontoinitiateprimarybleedandfeedoftheRCS fails.FailuretodepressurizetheRCSdueto failureofbleedandfeed,alongwiththefailureof secondaryheatremoval,leadstohighRCS pressureandcoredamage.
FNS161 4KVS1D5;6;7;8 FDS5/10 1.29%
23.21%
NormalBussesNAandNDfailduetospurious openingofSwitchyardbreakers(OCB83,92),bus breakers,andSSTransformers(TR1A,1B).Fire damagefailsEmergency4KVBus1AEbus, breakers,andEDGEEEG1;howeverPurpleTrain (1DF)powerremainsavailable.AuxFeedwater failsduetofailureofthesteamdrivenpumpFWP 2tostart/run,withspuriousclosureofAFW throttlevalves(MOVFW151A/C/E),plusFWP3A failsduetolossofthe1AEbusandpumpFWP3B failsduetofireimpactstoitssupplybreaker4KVS 1DF1F16.DedicatedAFWpumpFWP4isnot availableduetolossofpower.Firedamageto PORVPCVRC455Cincombinationwithfire damagetoOrangeTrainpowerresultsinfailureof theprimaryBleedpath(forbleedandfeed operations).FailuretodepressurizetheRCSdue tofailureofbleedandfeedalongwiththefailure ofallsecondaryheatremovalleadstohighRCS pressureandcoredamage.
3.89E05 1.52E02 5.93E07 6.86E05 2.67E09 FQP107 FWP3AFDS1 1.20%
24.40%
FiredamagetoMSIVsTVMS101BandCresultsin failureofMainSteamIsolationwhichinturn resultsinthelossofthesteamsupplytothesteam drivenAFWpumpFWP2.Firedamagetoboth motordrivenAFWpumpscausescompletefailure ofAFW.DedicatedAFWpumpFWP4isnot availableduetofailureoftheoperatoractionto alignthepump'sflowpath.Theoperatoractionto initiateprimarybleedandfeedoftheRCSalso fails.FailuretodepressurizetheRCSduetofailure ofbleedandfeed,alongwiththefailureof secondaryheatremoval,leadstohighRCS pressureandcoredamage.
1.21E04 4.53E03 5.49E07 1.69E05 2.05E09 FNS164 4KVS1D1;2;3;4;4A (HEAF)FDS3/6 1.19%
25.59%
NormalBusesNAandNDfailduetospurious openingofSwitchyardbreakers(OCB83,92),bus breakersandSSTransformers(TR1A,1B).Fire damagefailstheEmergency4KVBus1AEbus, breakers,andEDGEEEG1;howeverPurpleTrain 6.06E05 8.98E03 5.44E07 4.48E05 2.71E09
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW10 powerremainsavailable.AuxFeedwaterfailsdue tofailureofthesteamdrivenpumpFWP2to start/run,withspuriousclosureofAFWthrottle valves(MOVFW151A/C/E),plusFWP3Afailsdue tolossofthe1AEbusandpumpFWP3Bfailsdue tofireimpactstoitssupplybreaker4KVS1DF 1F16.DedicatedAFWpumpFWP4isnot availableduetolossofpower.Theoperator actiontoinitiateprimarybleedandfeedoftheRCS fails.FailuretodepressurizetheRCSdueto failureofbleedandfeed,alongwiththefailureof secondaryheatremoval,leadstohighRCS pressureandcoredamage.
FCV206 H2AHY101BFDS5/9 1.11%
26.70%
SpuriousSIandcontainmentisolationsignalCIB duetofiredamagetoContainmentPressure transmitters(PTLM100B,100D).Firedamageto MCCs(MCC1E3,E14,E4)resultsinfailureofboth OrangeandPurpleTrainEmergencyMCCpower.
FailureofMCCs(E03,E11,E04,E12)resultsin failureofHHSIpumpsduetolossofsuctionfrom theRWST.FirecausesspuriousopeningofRV HeadVent,PressurizerVentandAssociated PRT/ContainmentIsolationValves(SOVRC102B, 103Band105),whichleadstosmallRCSLOCA.In additionfiredamageresultsinlossofRCPseal injectionandfailuretotripRCPs;howevertheseal LOCAislimitedduetosuccessfulactuationof ShutdownSeals.RCSissuccessfullydepressurized andlowheadinjectionisinitiallysuccessful,but eventuallyfailsduetofailureofmakeuptothe RWSTandfailureofthecontainmentsumpsuction valvesforlongtermrecirculation,whichleadsto coredamage.
9.64E07 5.26E01 5.08E07 1.75E03 1.69E09 FTB109 1SAC1AFDS0/2/3 1.09%
27.79%
NormalBussesNAandNDfailduetospurious openingofSwitchyardbreakerOCB92,bus breakers,andSSTransformers(TR1A,1B).Station BlackoutoccursduetorandomfailureoftheEDGs tostartandrun.ThesteamdrivenAFWpumpfails duetorandomfailuresorfailureoftheoperator actiontopreventSGoverfill,whichfailsallAFW.
DedicatedAFWpumpFWP4failsduetofire inducedfailuretoopenofthedischargevalve MOVFW160.HHSIandLHSIfailduetolossof 2.15E03 2.33E04 5.01E07 1.60E06 3.45E09
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW11 support.FailuretodepressurizetheRCSdueto failureofHHSI/LHSI,alongwiththefailureof secondaryheatremovalleadstohighRCSpressure andcoredamage.
FTB110 1SAC1BFDS0/2/3 1.09%
28.89%
NormalBussesNAandNDfailduetospurious openingofSwitchyardbreakerOCB92,bus breakers,andSSTransformers(TR1A,1B).Station BlackoutoccursduetorandomfailureoftheEDGs tostartandrun.ThesteamdrivenAFWpumpfails duetorandomfailuresorfailureoftheoperator actiontopreventSGoverfill,whichfailsallAFW.
DedicatedAFWpumpFWP4failsduetofire inducedfailuretoopenofthedischargevalve MOVFW160.HHSIandLHSIfailduetolossof support.FailuretodepressurizetheRCSdueto failureofHHSI/LHSI,alongwiththefailureof secondaryheatremovalleadstohighRCSpressure andcoredamage.
2.15E03 2.33E04 5.01E07 1.60E06 3.45E09 FMCR19 VBB1VBB2VBC1 1.07%
29.96%
SpuriousSIresultsfromfiredamagetoPressurizer pressuretransmitterPTRC444.Highhead Injectionfailsduetoprematureswitchoverofthe suctionfromRWSTtotheContainmentsumpasa resultoffiredamagetotheRWSTlevel transmitters(LTQS100A,100B,100C).ALOCA occursduetofiredamagewhichpreventsthe PORVs(PCVRC455C,455D,456)fromopeningon demand,andtheSafetyValvessubsequentlyfailto recloseafterpassingwater.FailureoftheRWST supplyalsofailsLowHeadInjection.Failureof HHSIandLHSIresultsinthelossofallRCSmakeup capabilityandinabilitytomitigatetheLOCA,which leadstocoredamage.
1.79E06 2.74E01 4.90E07 9.56E04 1.71E09 FCR48A RKREACPROT(B)FDS0 1.03%
30.99%
SpuriousCIBsignalduetofiredamageto ContainmentPressureTransmittersorSpurious ManualContainmentIsolationsignal.SpuriousSI signalduetoContainmentPressure,Pressurizer Pressure,SteamlinePressure,orManualSI actuationimpacts.PrimaryLOCAresultingfrom PORVsfailingtoopenautomaticallyduetofire damagetoPTRC455/456/457andSafetyvalves failtorecloseafterpassingwater.Alternatively, PORVPCVRC455Cspuriouslyopenswhichleads towaterchallengeandsubsequentsticksopen.
6.96E05 6.81E03 4.74E07 5.10E05 3.55E09
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW12
(1)Totalscenariofrequency(Ignitionfrequency*[Severityfactor*Probabilityofnonsuppression]*Plantavailabilityfactor)
OperatorfailstoclosetheblockvalveMOVRC 535,whichresultsinaPORVLOCA.RWSTlevel instrumentsLTQS100A,100B,100Cand100D spuriouslyfaillowwhichleadstoapremature transfertorecirculationsignalwithSIcondition andfailureofHHSIandLHSI.Inadditionfire damageresultsinlossofRCPsealinjectionand failuretotripRCPs;howeverthesealLOCAis limitedduetosuccessfulactuationofShutdown Seals.FailureofRCSinjectioncapabilityin combinationwithaLOCAresultsincoredamage.
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW13 TableW1bBVPS2SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofCDF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative FCR102 FIRE-BenchboardSections A&B 4.40%
4.40%
Firestartsinunit2controlroombenchboard sectionsA&B,whichcausesspuriousCIB actuation.TwooutofthreePORVs(2RCSPCV455C and455D)andpressurizertransmitters(2RCS PT456and457)failalongwiththePORVblock valves(2RCSMOV535,536and537),whichleads toPORVLOCA.HHSIinjectionflowpathfailsdueto failureof2SISMOV867A,867B,867C&867D.LHSI TrainsA&Balsofailduetofailureof2SIS MOV863A,863B,8809Aand8809B.PORVLOCA withthefailureofRCSinjectionleadstocore damage.
3.47E06 7.51E01 2.60E06 5.47E03 1.89E08 FCB614 FIRE2CB6_PNL 2SHUTDN_FDS0 4.17%
8.57%
Firein2CB6_PNL2SHUTDNcausesfailureof SwitchyardBreakersOCB85andOCB94,which leadstolossofnormaloffsitepowersupply.Fire alsocausesatotallossofPrimaryComponent Coolingduetofailuresofbreakers4KVS2AE2E3, 2E5,4KVS2DF2F3and2F5.Firedamagesthe EmergencyShutdownPanel,whicheventually causestheoperatorstotransferthecontrolsfrom theMainControlRoomtotheAlternateShutdown Panel;howeverthisactionfails.Failuretoinitiate controlfromtheASPresultsinlossofRCS inventorycontrolandlossoflongtermcore cooling/recirculationcapabilities,leadingtocore damage.
2.04E05 1.21E01 2.46E06 3.59E04 7.31E09 FCR101 FIREBenchboardSectionC 3.84%
12.41%
FirestartsinUnit2ControlRoomBenchboard SectionCandcausesaspuriousSIScondition.
Componentfailureofsystemstationtransformer 2AandSwitchyardBreakerOCB94leadstototal lossofnormaloffsitepowersupply.Random failureofthediesel2EGSEG21leadtoafailureof ACemergencyorangepower.Firealsodamages theturbinedrivenAFWpump2FWEP22andtheB TrainmotordrivenAFWpump2FWEP23Bbreaker 4KVS2DF2F18andAFWthrottlevalves2FWE HCV100A,100B,100D,&100Fwhichleadstototal lossofAuxFeedwater.Thesecondarysidecannot becooleddownanddepressurizedduetothe 3.89E05 5.85E02 2.27E06 4.64E04 1.80E08
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW14 TableW1bBVPS2SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofCDF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative failureofAFWtoSGs.Failuretodepressurizethe RCSwiththefailureofsecondaryheatremoval leadstohighRCSpressureandcoredamage.
FCB1AA FIRERK*2RCPRTA:FDS0:
w/IncipientDetection(ie=0if notcreditingIncip) 3.49%
15.90%
Firein2CB1_RK*2RCPRTAcausesaspurious failureofContainmentPressure,Pressurizer PressureandSteamLinePressuretransmitters (2LMSPT950/951/952/953,2RCSPT455,456,457, 2MSST474/475/476/484/485/486/494/495/496),
whichleadstospuriousSIandCIBactuation.
PORVsaresubjectedtowaterchallengeandstick open.PORVblockvalves2RCSMOV536and537 failtoclose,whichleadstoPORVLOCA.The operatorfailstotransferthecontrolsfromthe MainControlRoomtotheAlternateShutdown Panel.FailuretoinitiatecontrolfromtheASP wouldresultinlossofRCSinventorycontroland lossoflongtermcorecooling/recirculation capabilities,leadingtocoredamage.
6.43E05 3.20E02 2.06E06 7.49E05 4.82E09 FCB1FA FIRERK2RCPRTB:FDS0:
w/IncipientDetection(ie=0if notcreditingIncip) 2.73%
18.63%
Firein2CB1_RK2RCPRTBcausesaspurious failureofContainmentPressure,Pressurizer PressureandSteamLinePressuretransmitters (2LMSPT950/1/2/3,2RCSPT455,456,457,2MSS PT474/475/476/484/485/486/494/495/496),
whichleadstospuriousSIandCIBactuation.
PORVsaresubjectedtowaterchallengeandstick open.PORVblockvalve2RCSMOV535failsto close,whichleadstoPORVLOCA.Theoperators failtotransferthecontrolsfromtheMainControl RoomtotheAlternateShutdownPanel.Failureto initiatecontrolfromtheASPresultsinlossofRCS inventorycontrolandlossoflongtermcore cooling/recirculationcapabilities,leadingtocore damage.
5.47E05 2.94E02 1.61E06 6.63E05 3.63E09 FCB631 FIREPNL2SHUTDNFDS22 CB61 1.93%
20.56%
Firein2CB6_PNL2SHUTDNFDS2causesfailureof SwitchyardBreakersOCB85andOCB94,which leadstolossofnormaloffsitepowersupply.Fire alsocausesatotallossofPrimaryComponent Coolingduetofailuresofbreakers4KVS2AE2E3, 2E5,4KVS2DF2F3and2F5.ThePressurizer 3.60E06 3.16E01 1.14E06 1.79E03 6.43E09
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW15 TableW1bBVPS2SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofCDF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative PressureandSteamLinePressuretransmitters (2RCSPT444,445,455,456,457,2MSS PT474/475/485/495/496)spuriouslyfail,which leadstospuriousSIactuation.PORVs2RCS PCV455Cand455Dalsospuriouslyopen,which leadstowaterchallengeandsubsequentstuck openPORVs.PORVblockvalve2RCSMOV535fails toclose,whichresultsinaPORVLOCA.Firecauses failureof2RSSFT157C,2RSSMOV157C,2RSS MOV155D,2SWSMOV104D,2SWSMOV105Dand 4KVS2DF2F17,whichleadstofailureof RecirculationSprayTrainsC&D.Firealsofailsthe longtermmakeuptotheRWST.FailureofRCS injectionduetoRWSTfailureaswellaslossoflong termcorecooling/recirculationcapabilitiesresults incoredamage.
FMS101 FIREFULLCOMPARTMENT:
MainSteamValveArea 1.44%
22.00%
Fireburnsthewholeroomforthemainsteam valveroom.Themainsteamisolationvalvesfailto closeandatmosphericsteamdumpvalves spuriouslyopenduetothefire.Firecausesthe failureofSteamLinePressuretransmitters(2MSS PT474/475/476/484/485/486/494/495/496) resultinginthefailureofSSPSTrainsAandB(SA andSB).Thiscombinedwiththeoperatorfailure toinitiatesafetyinjectionleadstofailureofAux Feedwater,HHSI,LHSI.Thereisalsoafailureto cooldownanddepressurizethesecondarysidedue tofailureofAFWtoSGs.Failuretodepressurize theRCSalongwiththefailureofsecondaryheat removalleadstohighRCSpressureandcore damage.
2.32E03 3.67E04 8.51E07 1.50E05 3.49E08 FRH101 FIREFULLCOMPARTMENT:
SwitchyardRelayHouse 1.42%
23.43%
Fireinswitchyardrelayhouseleadstowhole compartmentburn.NormaloffsiteACpowerfails.
Emergency480VMCCsE05,E06,E13,E14randomly failalongwithnormalpowerfailure.DCpower (DO,DP,D3,D4)andvitalbuschannelsIandIIfail duetooffsitepowerandemergencyMCCsfailures.
DieselgeneratorsfailduetothelossofDCpower, whichleadstoastationblackoutcondition.Steam 3.85E03 2.19E04 8.41E07 3.97E06 1.53E08
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW16 TableW1bBVPS2SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofCDF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative DrivenAuxFeedpump2FWEP22failsdueto steamsupplyfailure.Coredamageresultsfrom thelossofsecondaryheatremovalcapability.
FCB1X8 FIRE2CB1_RK2CMP AT_FDS0 1.26%
24.69%
Firein2CB1_RK2CMPATcausesaspuriousfailure ofPressurizerPressuretransmitters(2RCSPT444, and445),whichleadstospuriousSIdueto actuationofnormalsprayvalve2RCSPCV455A.
PORVs2RCSPCV455Cand455Dalsospuriously open,creatingawaterchallengeafterwhichthey stickopen.Operatoralsofailstolocallyclosethe PORVsusingthekeylockisolationswitch,which resultsinaPORVLOCA.Theoperatorsfailto transferthecontrolsfromtheMainControlRoom totheAlternateShutdownPanel.Failureto initiatecontrolfromtheASPresultsinlossofRCS inventorycontrolandlossoflongtermcore cooling/recirculationcapabilities,leadingtocore damage.
6.61E05 1.13E02 7.44E07 1.70E07 1.13E11 FCB1W9 FIRE2CB1_RK2PTST A_FDS0 1.25%
25.94%
Firein2CB1_RK2PTSTAcausesaspuriousfailure ofContainmentPressure,PressurizerPressureand SteamLinePressuretransmitters(2LMS PT950/1/2/3,2RCSPT455,456,457,2MSS PT474/475/476/484/485/486/494/495/496),
whichleadstospuriousSIandCIBactuation.
PORVsaresubjectedtowaterchallengeandstick open.PORVblockvalves2RCSMOV536and537 failtoclose,whichleadstoPORVLOCA.The operatorsfailtotransferthecontrolsfromthe MainControlRoomtotheAlternateShutdown Panel.FailuretoinitiatecontrolfromtheASP resultsinlossofRCSinventorycontrolandlossof longtermcorecooling/recirculationcapabilities, leadingtocoredamage.
2.31E05 3.19E02 7.37E07 7.35E05 1.70E09 FCV319 FIRESSPC2RD1BD:FDS3 1.06%
26.99%
FirestartsinSSPC2RD1BDandgrowsin2CV3.
Firedamages3outof4containmentpressure transmitters(2LMSPT950,951and953)aswellas thePressurizerPressureandSteamLinePressure transmitters(2RCSPT444,456,2MSS PT474/475/476/484/485/486/494/495/496),
1.35E06 4.62E01 6.23E07 1.79E03 2.42E09
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW17 TableW1bBVPS2SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofCDF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative whichleadstospuriousSIandCIBactuation.
Spuriousopeningofvalves2RCSSOV250A,250B, 200Band201BleadstosmallRCSleakagefromthe reactorvesselheadvents.2outof4RWSTlevel instruments2QSSLT104B,104Dspuriouslyfaillow whichleadstoaprematuretransferto recirculationsignalwithSIconditionandfailureof HHSIandLHSI.FailureofRCSinjectioncapability resultsinlossofcorecooling/inventorymakeup capabilitiesleadingtocoredamage.
(1)Totalscenariofrequency(Ignitionfrequency*[Severityfactor*Probabilityofnonsuppression]*Plantavailabilityfactor)
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW18 TableW1cBVPS1SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofLERF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative FMCR25 Unit1BuildingServicesPanel 1&2 33.20%
33.20%
ThisfirescenarioproducesarequirementforMCR abandonmentduetoadverseenvironmental conditions.Unlikemostscenariosofthistype whichmetthecriteriaforscreening,thisscenario felljustabovethecriteriaandisincludedinthe model.However,duetoitslowrisksignificance (andthegeneralphilosophythatBV1operators willnotabandontheMCR)itwastreated conservativelyasanassumedfailure,leading directlytoCDF/LERF.
1.51E07 1.00E+00 1.51E07 1.00E+00 1.51E07 FMCR24 Unit1MCBsectionsaffecting smokepurge:BBA2orBBA3 3.50%
36.70%
ThisfirescenarioproducesarequirementforMCR abandonmentduetoadverseenvironmental conditions.Unlikemostscenariosofthistype whichmetthecriteriaforscreening,thisscenario felljustabovethecriteriaandisincludedinthe model.However,duetoitslowrisksignificance (andthegeneralphilosophythatBV1operators willnotabandontheMCR)itwastreated conservativelyasanassumedfailure,leading directlytoCDF/LERF.
1.59E08 1.00E+00 1.59E08 1.00E+00 1.59E08 FMCA18 1TB11PT1 3.11%
39.80%
NormalBussesNAandNDfailduetospurious openingofSwitchyardbreakerOCB92,bus breakers,andSSTransformers(TR1A,1B).
Emergencydieselssuccessfullystartalthough purpletrainMCCsaredamagedbythefire.The highheadinjectionsystemsuctionswitches prematurelytothecontainmentsumpduetofire damagetoRWSTlevelinstruments(LTQS 100A/B/C/D),failingtheinjectionsystems.
AuxiliaryFeedwaterfailsduetoacombinationof firedamagetominiflowvalvesandSGfeedflow valvescoupledwithrandomfailuresofthesteam drivenandmotordrivenAFWpumps.The dedicatedAFWpumpFWP4failsduetolossof power.WithnoinjectiontosupportBleedand Feedoperations,andnoAFWavailable,core damageoccurs.Failureoftheoperatortolocally closecontainmentisolationvalvesleadstoLERF.
3.75E08 3.76E01 1.41E08 3.77E01 1.41E08
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW19 TableW1cBVPS1SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofLERF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative FCR435 ComputerCabinetsRKCMP DIN4;TERM2;IPCCAB05; RKCMPTERM1FDS2 2.62%
42.42%
SpuriousCIBsignalduetofiredamageto ContainmentPressureTransmittersorSpurious ManualContainmentIsolationsignal.SpuriousSI signalduetofiredamagetoContainmentPressure Transmitters,SteamlinePressureTransmitters,or ManualSIactuationcircuit.LOCAresultingfrom thePORVsfailuretoopenautomaticallyduetofire damagetoPressurizerPressureTransmitters, PORVs,andBlockValves,followedbythesafety valvesfailingtorecloseafterpassingwater.HHSI failsduetofailureofComponentCooling(isolated onCIB)combinedwithfailureoftheoperator actiontoisolateRCPSealReturn.Cooldownand depressurizationactionssucceed;howeverlow pressureinjectiontrainBfailsintherecirculation modeduetofiredamagewhichresultsinlossof trainBRiverWateranddamagetothe recirculationvalveMOVSI885Cplusrandom failureofMOVSI885BorMOVSI860B.LERF occursduetofiredamagetoSSPSTrainsAandB, andMOVCH378,combinedwithfailureofthe operatoractiontoisolatethesealreturnpath.
3.83E05 1.17E02 4.49E07 3.12E04 1.19E08 FMCR05 BBA5 1.69%
44.11%
AfireinducedSIsignalresultsfromfiredamageto thePORVcontrolpressuretransmitter(PTRC444) andfireinducedspuriousopeningoftheauxiliary pressurizersprayvalve(MOVCH311).LOCA occursduetofailureofpressurereliefresulting fromfiredamagetoPORVs,whichfailtoopenon demand,andrandomfailureofsafetyvalves(RV RC551A/B/C)torecloseafterpassingwater.In additionfiredamageresultsinlossofRCPseal injectionandfailuretotriptheRCPs;howeverthe sealLOCAislimitedduetosuccessfulactuationof theShutdownSeals.FiredamagefailstheSafety InjectionandAlternateInjectionflowpathMOVs (MOVSI867A/B/C/DandMOVSI836)andcauses lossofHighHeadSafetyInjection.Bothtrainsof lowheadsafetyinjectionarelostduetofire inducedspuriousclosureoftheminiflowvalves 6.11E06 1.77E01 1.08E06 1.26E03 7.67E09
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW20 TableW1cBVPS1SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofLERF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative (MOVSI885B/D)resultinginlossofthe recirculationpath.FailureofHHSIandLHSIresults inlossofRCSmakeupcapabilitywhich,in conjunctionwiththeLOCA,leadstocoredamage.
Operatorssubsequentlyfailtolocallyclose containmentisolationvalves,resultinginLERF.
FMCA07 1TB13CR1 1.49%
45.60%
SIFunctionfailsduetodamagetoContainment PressureTransmitters,RCSPressureTransmitters, andSGLevelTransmitters.NormalBussesNAand NDfailduetofiredamagetobreakers(OCB83, 92)andtransformers(TR1A,1B).Emergency DieselpowertoBusses1AEand1DFfailsdueto nonrecoverablefiredamagetobreakers,resulting instationblackout.MSIVsfailtocloseduetoloss ofautoactuationsignal.ALOCAdevelopsdueto RVHeadVentValveorPressurizerVentValveand associatedPRT/ContainmentIsolationValve spuriouslyopeningorduetoPressurizerSafety Valvesfailingtorecloseafterawaterchallenge.In addition,firedamagecausesalossofRCPseal injectionandfailuretotriptheRCPs;howeverthe sealLOCAislimitedduetosuccessfulactuationof theShutdownSeals.ThesteamdrivenAFWpump failsduetolossofsteamasaresultoftheMSIVs failingtoclose.DedicatedAFWpumpFWP4fails duetolossofpower.HHSIandLHSIfailduetoloss ofACpowersupport.Failuretodepressurizethe RCSduetofailureofHHSI/LHSI,alongwiththe failureofsecondaryheatremoval,leadstohigh RCSpressureandcoredamage.Operatorfailure toisolatetheRCPsealreturncontainment isolationvalvesleadstocontainmentbypass resultinginLERF.
9.55E07 1.00E+00 9.55E07 7.10E03 6.78E09 FCR4E8 RKREACPROTBFDS3 1.46%
47.06%
SpuriousCIBsignalduetofiredamageto ContainmentPressureTransmittersorSpurious ManualContainmentIsolationsignal.SpuriousSI signalduetofireimpactstoContainmentPressure, PressurizerPressure,SteamlinePressure,or ManualSIactuationcircuit.FailuretoopenofHHSI 3.40E06 2.78E01 9.45E07 1.96E03 6.65E09
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW21 TableW1cBVPS1SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofLERF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative valvesMOVSI867A/B/C/DleadstoHHSIinjection failure.PORVsfailtoopenautomaticallydueto firedamagetoPressurizerPressureTransmitters, causingthesafetyvalvestoopenandstickopen afterpassingwater.Alternatively,thePORVs (PCVRC455C,455Dand456)spuriouslyopenand stickopenafterpassingwater,andBlockValves (MOVRC535,536and537)failtocloseeither caseleadstoaprimaryLOCA.LowHeadPumps failduetospuriousclosureofsuctionorminiflow valves.TheLOCAcombinedwithfailureofRCS injectioncapabilityresultsincoredamage.
OperatorfailuretoisolatetheRCPsealreturn containmentisolationvalvesleadstocontainment bypassresultinginLERF.
FCR301 EmergencyDieselGenerator RackFDS2/5 1.25%
48.31%
NormalBussesNAandNDfailduetofiredamage tobreakers(OCB83,OCB92)andtransformers (TR1AandTR1B).EEEG1failsduetonon recoverablefiredamagetobreakers.Station blackoutoccursduetofailureofBTrainRiver waterheadersupplycausedbyfiredamageto MCC1E2whichfailspumpsWRP1Band1C, coupledwithfailureoftheoperatoractiontostart theAuxRWpumpWRP9B.SteamdrivenAFW pumpFWP2failsrandomlyorduetofiredamage resultinginlossofcontrolofAFWfeedflow controlvalves.Inconjunctionwithoperatorfailure toisolateAFWflow,thisresultsinatotallossof AFW.DedicatedAFWpumpFWP4failsdueto lossofpower.HHSIandLHSIfailduetolossof support.FailuretodepressurizetheRCSdueto failureofHHSI/LHSI,alongwiththefailureof secondaryheatremovalleadstohighRCSpressure andcoredamage.Operatorfailuretoisolatethe RCPsealreturncontainmentisolationvalvesleads tocontainmentbypassresultinginLERF.
1.42E04 5.63E03 8.01E07 4.01E05 5.70E09 FCV205 H2AHY101BFDS4/8 1.24%
49.55%
SpuriousSIandcontainmentisolationsignalCIB duetofiredamagetoContainmentPressure transmitters(PTLM100B,100D).Firedamages 3.11E06 5.29E01 1.64E06 1.81E03 5.63E09
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW22 TableW1cBVPS1SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofLERF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative MCCs(MCC1E3,E14,E4)whichresultsinfailure ofbothOrangeandPurpleTrainEmergencyMCC power.FailureofMCCsalsoresultsinfailureof HHSIpumpsduetolossofsuctionfromtheRWST.
FirecausesspuriousopeningofRVHeadVent, PressurizerVent,andassociatedPRT/Containment IsolationValve(SOVRC102B,103Band105),
whichleadstoasmallRCSLOCA.Inadditionfire damageresultsinlossofRCPsealinjectionand failuretotripRCPs;howeverthesealLOCAis limitedduetosuccessfulactuationofthe ShutdownSeals.TheRCSissuccessfully depressurizedandlowheadinjectionisinitially successful,buteventuallyfailsintherecirculation phaseduetofiredamagetotheMCCssupplying powertocontainmentsumpsuctionMOVs.
FailureofHHSIandLHSIresultsinthelossofRCS makeupcapability,whichinconjunctionwiththe LOCAleadstocoredamage.Operatorfailureto isolatethecontainmentisolationvalvesleadsto containmentbypassresultinginLERF.
FCR450 RKCMPTERM3;4FDS2 1.20%
50.75%
SpuriousCIBsignalduetofiredamageto ContainmentPressureTransmittersorSpurious ManualContainmentIsolationsignal.SpuriousSI signalduetofiredamagetoContainmentPressure Transmitters,SteamlinePressureTransmitters,or ManualSIactuationcircuit.LOCAresultingfrom thePORVsfailuretoopenautomaticallyduetofire damagetoPressurizerPressureTransmitters, PORVs,andBlockValves,followedbythesafety valvesfailingtorecloseafterpassingwater.HHSI failsduetofailureofComponentCooling(isolated onCIB)combinedwithfailureoftheoperator actiontoisolateRCPSealReturn.Cooldownand depressurizationactionssucceed;howeverlow pressureinjectiontrainBfailsintherecirculation modeduetofiredamagewhichresultsinlossof trainBRiverWateranddamagetothe recirculationvalveMOVSI885Cplusrandom 1.75E05 1.17E02 2.05E07 3.12E04 5.45E09
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW23 TableW1cBVPS1SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofLERF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative failureofMOVSI885BorMOVSI860B.LERF occursduetofiredamagetoSSPSTrainsAandB, andMOVCH378,combinedwithfailureofthe operatoractiontoisolatethesealreturnpath.
FCR4K1 INVCMP(ReplacementUnit)
FDS2 1.11%
51.86%
NormalBussesNAandNDfailduetobreakersand transformers(TR1Aand1B)firedamage.Station blackoutoccursduetorandomfailureofEDGEE EG1andnonrecoverablefiredamageto Emergency4KVBus1DFbus,breakers,andEDG EEEG2.ThesteamdrivenAFWpumpfailsdueto randomfailureofthepumporfiredamagewhich preventsclosingtheMainFWFastActingHydraulic Valves(HYVFW100A/B/C)ortrippingMFWPump breakers(SWBD15failed)combinedwith operatorfailuretotripMFWfromoutsidethe MCR,resultingintotallossofAuxFeedwater.
FailuretodepressurizetheRCSduetofailureof HHSI/LHSI,alongwiththefailureofsecondaryheat removalleadstohighRCSpressureandcore damage.OperatorfailuretoisolatetheRCPseal returncontainmentisolationvalvesleadsto containmentbypassresultinginLERF.
1.75E05 4.55E02 7.96E07 2.89E04 5.06E09 FRH1 3RH1WHOLEROOM 1.11%
52.97%
NormalBussesNAandNDfailduetofiredamage tobreakers(OCB83,92).StationBlackoutoccurs duetorandomfailureoftheEDGstostartandrun.
ThesteamdrivenAFWpumpfailsduerandom failuresorfailureoftheoperatoractiontoprevent SGoverfill,whichresultsinfailureofallAFW.The dedicatedAFWpumpFWP4failsduetolossof power.HHSIandLHSIfailduetolossofACpower support.FailuretodepressurizetheRCSdueto failureofHHSI/LHSI,alongwiththefailureof secondaryheatremovalleadstohighRCSpressure andcoredamage.Operatorfailuretoisolatethe RCPsealreturncontainmentisolationvalvesleads tocontainmentbypassresultinginLERF.
3.78E03 1.91E04 7.24E07 1.33E06 5.03E09 (1)Totalscenariofrequency(Ignitionfrequency*[Severityfactor*Probabilityofnonsuppression]*Plantavailabilityfactor)
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW24 TableW1dBVPS2SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofLERF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative FMCA29 FIREMultiCompartment:
Exposing2CV3to2CB1 22.15%
22.15%
Fireinmulticompartmentexposing2CV3to2 CB1.FirecausesaspuriousCIBactuation.All normaloffsiteACpowerandallfourvitalbusses fail.Firecausesfailureofbreakers(4KVS2AE 2E16,2E19)and2SWSP21A,P21C,alongwiththe randomfailureof2SWSP21Band2SWEP21B leadstofailureofbothtrainsofServiceWater System.HHSIandLHSIfailduetolossofSWS support.PORVs(2RCSPCV455Cand455D)are subjectedtowaterchallengeandstickopen.
PORVblockvalves2RCSMOV535,536and537fail toclose,whichleadstoPORVLOCA.RWSTlevel instruments2QSSLT104A,100B,100Cand104D spuriouslyfaillowwhichleadstoapremature transfertorecirculationsignal.Coredamage resultsfromthePORVLOCAandlossofallmakeup capability.Lossofallvitalbuspowerandoperator failuretoclosethecontainmentisolationvalves leadstocontainmentbypassresultinginLERF.
3.07E07 7.91E01 2.43E07 7.91E01 2.43E07 FCB161 FIREPNL2LEFM:FDS3/4:
w/IncipientDetectionFactor 6.97%
29.12%
Firein2CB1_PNL2LEFMcausesaspuriousfailure ofContainmentPressure,PressurizerPressure,and SteamLinePressuretransmitters(2LMS PT950/1/2/3,2RCSPT455,456,457,2MSS PT474/475/476/484/485/486/494/495/496),
whichcausesspuriousSIandCIBactuation.The firecausesfailureofSwitchyardBreakerOCB94 andtransformerTR2A,whichleadstolossof normaloffsitepowersupply,andallfourvital bussesadditionallyfail.HHSIfailsduetofailureof SSPSTrainsA&B(SA,SB),andtheoperatorfailure tomanuallyinitiateSIduetototallossofvital buses.FiredamagealsoresultsinlossofRCPseal injection,andtheoperatorsfailtotriptheRCPs; howeverthesealLOCAislimitedduetosuccessful actuationoftheShutdownSeals.Lossofallvital bussescausesfailuretocooldownand depressurizeboththeprimaryRCSandthe secondarysideSGs(duetolossofinstruments),
whichresultsinlossofsecondaryheatremoval 1.11E07 6.90E01 7.63E08 6.92E01 7.65E08
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW25 TableW1dBVPS2SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofLERF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative capabilityandhighpressurecoredamage.Lossof allvitalbuspowerandfailureoftheoperator actiontoclosethecontainmentisolationvalves leadstocontainmentbypassresultinginLERF.
FMCA19 FIREMultiCompartment:
Exposing2CV1to2PT1 4.08%
33.20%
Fireinmulticompartmentexposing2CV1to2 PT1.FirecausesaspuriousCIBactuation.All normaloffsiteandemergencyACpowerand orangetrainDC(DOandD3),andallfourvital bussesfailwhichleadstoastationblackout situation.PORVs(2RCSPCV455Dand456)are subjectedtowaterchallengeandstickopen.
PORVblockvalves2RCSMOV536and537failto closewhichleadstoPORVLOCA.RWSTlevel instruments2QSSLT104A,100B,100Cand104D spuriouslyfaillowwhichleadstoapremature transfertorecirculationsignalwithSIcondition andfailureofHHSIandLHSI.Coredamageresults fromthePORVLOCAandlossofallmakeup capability.Lossofallvitalbuspowerandoperator failuretoclosethecontainmentisolationvalves leadstocontainmentbypassresultinginLERF.
4.48E08 1.00E+00 4.48E08 1.00E+00 4.48E08 FMCA14 FIREMultiCompartment:
Exposing2CV1to2CB1 3.85%
37.04%
Fireinmulticompartmentexposing2CV1to2 CB1.FirecausesaspuriousCIBactuation.All normaloffsiteACpower,orangetrainDC(DOand D3)power,andallfourvitalbussesfail.PORVs (2RCSPCV455C,455Dand456)aresubjectedto waterchallengeandstickopen.PORVblockvalves 2RCSMOV535,536and537failtoclose,which leadstoPORVLOCA.RWSTlevelinstruments 2QSSLT104A,100B,100Cand104Dspuriouslyfail lowwhichleadstoaprematuretransferto recirculationsignalwithSIconditionandleadsto failureofHHSIandLHSI.Coredamageresultsfrom thePORVLOCAandlossofallmakeupcapability.
Lossofallvitalbuspowerandoperatorfailureto closethecontainmentisolationvalvesleadsto containmentbypassresultinginLERF.
4.67E08 9.03E01 4.22E08 9.05E01 4.22E08 FMCA61 FIREMultiCompartment:
Exposing2SB3to2SB1 3.71%
40.75%
Fireinmulticompartmentexposing2SB3to2 SB1.Firecausesaspurioussafetyinjectionsignal.
4.07E08 1.00E+00 4.07E08 1.00E+00 4.07E08
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW26 TableW1dBVPS2SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofLERF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative AllnormaloffsiteandemergencyACpowerandDC powerfailsincludingthedieselgeneratorsand leadstostationblackout.Allfourvitalbussesfail.
HHSIandLHSIfailduetolossofsupport(AC power).SteamDrivenAuxFeedpump2FWEP22 failsduetosteamsupplyfailure.RCPsfailtotripin timewhichleadstoasmallRCPsealLOCA.Core damageresultsfromtheLOCAandlossofall makeupcapability,andlossofsecondaryheat removal.Lossofallvitalbuspowerandoperator failuretoclosethecontainmentisolationvalves leadstocontainmentbypassresultinginLERF.
FMCA65 FIREMultiCompartment:
Exposing2SB3to2SB6 3.37%
44.12%
Fireinmulticompartmentexposing2SB3to2 SB6.Firecausesaspurioussafetyinjectionsignal.
Allnormaloffsite,DC(DO,DP,D3,D4)and emergencyACpowerfailsleadingtostation blackout.Allfourvitalbusesfail.HHSIandLHSI failduetolossofsupport.SteamDrivenAuxFeed pump2FWEP22failsduetosteamsupplyfailure.
RCPsfailtotripintimewhichleadstoasmallRCP sealLOCA.CoredamageresultsfromtheLOCA andlossofallmakeupcapability,andlossof secondaryheatremoval.Lossofallvitalbus powerandoperatorfailuretoclosethe containmentisolationvalvesleadstocontainment bypassresultinginLERF.
3.71E08 9.99E01 3.70E08 9.98E01 3.70E08 FMCA63 FIREMultiCompartment:
Exposing2SB3to2PT1 3.37%
47.49%
Fireinmulticompartmentexposing2SB3to2 PT1.Firecausesaspurioussafetyinjectionsignal.
AllnormaloffsiteandemergencyACpowerfails duetotiebreakersfailing(4KVS2A2A10,4KVS 2AE2E7,4KVS2D2D10,4KVS2DF2F7)which leadstostationblackout.3of4vitalbussesfail.
HHSIandLHSIfailduetolossofsupport(ACpower andRWSTleveltransmitters).SteamDrivenAux Feedpump2FWEP22failsduetosteamsupply failure.RCPsfailtotripintimewhichleadstoa smallRCPsealLOCA.Coredamageresultsfrom theLOCAandlossofallmakeupcapability,and lossofsecondaryheatremoval.Lossof3of4vital 3.71E08 9.99E01 3.70E08 9.98E01 3.70E08
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW27 TableW1dBVPS2SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofLERF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative buspowerandoperatorfailuretoclosethe containmentisolationvalvesleadstocontainment bypassresultinginLERF.
FPA302 FIRE2CCPP21A:FDS2/5/7 3.33%
50.82%
Firein2CCPP21A:FDS2/5/7.Firecausesa spurioussafetyinjectionsignal.Allnormaloffsite andemergencyACpowerfailsduetodiesel generators2EGSEG21and2EGSEG22failingdue tolossof2HVDTE21Bandoperatorfailuretoalign temporaryventilation,leadingtostationblackout.
2of4vitalbussesfail.HHSIandLHSIfaildueto lossofsupport.RCPsealinjectionfailsalongwith RCPsfailingtotripintimewhichleadstoalarge RCPsealLOCA.TheLOCAwithlossofRCSmakeup capabilityresultsincoredamage.Lossof2of4 vitalbussesandoperatorfailuretoclosethe containmentisolationvalvesleadstocontainment bypassresultinginLERF.
1.93E07 1.89E01 3.66E08 1.89E01 3.66E08 FMS101 FIREFULLCOMPARTMENT:
MainSteamValveArea 3.18%
54.00%
Fireburnsupwholeroomforthemainsteamvalve room.Themainsteamisolationvalvesand atmosphericsteamdumpvalvesspuriouslyopen duetothefire.FirecausesthefailureofSteam LinePressuretransmitters(2MSS PT474/475/476/484/485/486/494/495/496) resultinginthefailureofSSPSTrainsAandB(SA andSB).OperatorfailuretoisolatetheRCPseal returnalongwiththefailureofprimary componentcoolingCCPcausestheHHSIpumpsto failduetoheatupofthepumpsuction.The resultingsealinjectionfailurealongwithShutdown Sealsrandomfailuretoactuateresultsina182 gpmSealLOCA.Operatorfailuretoclosethe containmentisolationvalvesleadstocontainment bypassresultinginLERF.
2.32E03 3.67E04 8.51E07 1.50E05 3.49E08 FMCA16 FIREMultiCompartment:
Exposing2CV1to2PA3 2.64%
56.64%
Fireinmulticompartmentexposing2CV1to2 PA3.FirecausesaspuriousCIBactuation.All normaloffsiteandemergencyACpowerand orangetrainDC(DOandD3),andallfourvital bussesfailwhichleadstoastationblackout situation.PORVs(2RCSPCV455Dand456)are 2.90E08 9.99E01 2.89E08 1.00E+00 2.89E08
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW28 TableW1dBVPS2SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofLERF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative subjectedtowaterchallengeandstickopen.
PORVblockvalves2RCSMOV536and537failto close,whichleadstoPORVLOCA.RWSTlevel instruments2QSSLT104A,100Cand104D spuriouslyfaillowwhichleadstoapremature transfertorecirculationsignalwithSIcondition andfailureofHHSIandLHSI.Coredamageresults fromthePORVLOCAandlossofallmakeup capability.Lossofallvitalbuspowerandoperator failuretoclosethecontainmentisolationvalves leadstocontainmentbypassresultinginLERF.
FCR102 FIRE-BenchboardSections A&B 1.72%
58.36%
Firestartsinunit2controlroombenchboard sectionsA&B,whichcausesspuriousCIB actuation.TwooutofthreePORVs(2RCSPCV455C and455D)andpressurizerpressuretransmitters (2RCSPT456and457)failalongwiththePORV blockvalves(2RCSMOV535,536and537)fail, whichleadstoPORVLOCA.HHSIinjectionflow pathfailsduetofailureof2SISMOV867A,867B, 867C&867D.LHSITrainsA&Balsofaildueto failureof2SISMOV863A,863B,8809Aand8809B.
CoredamageresultsfromthePORVLOCAandloss ofallmakeupcapability.Firealsocausedmultiple containmentisolationvalves(2CHSMOV378/381) tofailwhichleadstocontainmentbypassresulting inLERF.
3.47E06 7.51E01 2.60E06 5.47E03 1.89E08 FCR101 FIRE-BenchboardSectionC 1.64%
60.00%
FirestartsinUnit2ControlRoomBenchboard SectionCandcausesaspuriousSIScondition.
Componentfailureofsystemstationtransformer 2AandSwitchyardBreakerOCB94leadstototal lossofnormaloffsitepowersupply.Firecaused failureofbreakers(4KVS2AE2E16,2E19,4KVS 2DF2F14,2F16and2F19),alongwiththerandom failureof2SWSP21A,leadtofailureofbothtrains ofServiceWaterSystemandeventuallyleadto SBO.HHSIandLHSIfailedduetolossofsupport.
Thisfirerequirescontrolroomabandonment,but theoperatorsfailtotransferthecontrolsfromthe MainControlRoomtotheAlternateShutdown 3.89E05 5.85E02 2.27E06 4.64E04 1.80E08
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW29 TableW1dBVPS2SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofLERF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative Panel.FailuretoinitiatecontrolfromtheASPis treatedasguaranteedcoredamageandwould eventuallyleadtolossofRCSinventorycontrol andlossoflongtermcorecooling/recirculation capabilitiesandleadtohighRCSpressure.High RCSpressureandtemperaturealsoleadto temperatureinducedsteamgeneratortube ruptureandLERF.
FMCA03 FIREMultiCompartment:
Exposing2ASPto2CB1 1.40%
61.40%
Fireinmulticompartmentsexposing2ASPto2 CB1.FirecausesaspuriousCIBactuation.All normaloffsiteACpower,orangetrainDC(DOand D3)power,andallfourvitalbussesfail.PORVs (2RCSPCV455C,455Dand456)aresubjectedto waterchallengeandstickopen.PORVblockvalves 2RCSMOV535,536and537failtoclose,which leadstoPORVLOCA.RWSTlevelinstruments 2QSSLT104A,100B,100Cand104Dspuriouslyfail lowwhichleadstoaprematuretransferto recirculationsignalwithSIconditionandleadsto failureofHHSIandLHSI.Coredamageresultsfrom thePORVLOCAandlossofallmakeupcapability.
Lossofallvitalbuspowerandoperatorfailureto closethecontainmentisolationvalvesleadsto containmentbypassresultinginLERF.
1.72E08 8.95E01 1.54E08 8.98E01 1.54E08 FRH101 FIREFULLCOMPARTMENT:
SwitchyardRelayHouse 1.39%
62.79%
Fireinswitchyardrelayhouseleadstowhole compartmentburn.NormaloffsiteACpowerfails.
Emergency480VMCCsE05,E06,E13,E14randomly failalongwithnormalpowerfailure.DCpower (DO,DP,D3,D4)andvitalbuschannelsIandIIfail duetooffsitepowerandemergencyMCCfailures.
DieselgeneratorsfailduetothelossofDCpower, whichleadstoastationblackoutcondition.Steam DrivenAuxFeedpump2FWEP22failsdueto steamsupplyfailure.Coredamageresultsfrom thelossofsecondaryheatremovalcapability.
HighRCSpressureandtemperatureleadto inducedsteamgeneratortuberuptureandLERF.
3.85E03 2.19E04 8.41E07 3.97E06 1.53E08 FMCA72 FIREMultiCompartment:
Exposing2SG1Sto2PT1 1.36%
64.15%
Fireinmulticompartmentexposing2SG1Sto2 PT1.FirecausesaspuriousSIScondition,and2of 3.35E07 9.99E01 3.35E07 4.44E02 1.49E08
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW30 TableW1dBVPS2SignificantFireInitiatingEvents(Scenarioscontributing>1%ofLERF)
Scenario Description Contribution RiskInsights IF(1)
CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Scenario Cumulative 4vitalbusses(IW,IY)fail.RWSTlevelinstruments 2QSSLT104A,100B,100Cand104Dspuriouslyfail lowwhichleadstoaprematuretransferto recirculationsignalwithSIconditionandfailureof HHSIandLHSI.AuxFeedwaterSystemfailsdueto failureofcontrolvalves(2FWEHCV100A,100B, 100C,100D,100E,100F).WithnoAFW,effortsto cooldownanddepressurizethesecondarySGsand primaryRCSarenotsuccessful.Coredamage resultsfromlossofallsecondaryheatremoval capability.HighRCSpressureandtemperature alsoleadtotemperatureinducedsteamgenerator tuberuptureandLERF.
(1)Totalscenariofrequency(Ignitionfrequency*[Severityfactor*Probabilityofnonsuppression]*Plantavailabilityfactor)
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
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PageW31 TableW2aBVPS1FireCompartmentRiskSummary Fire Compartment Compartment Description NFPA 805 Basis VFDR Y/N ExcludingRiskOffset(2)
IncludingRiskOffset Fire Compartment CDF/LERF RAs (Y/N)
FireRisk Evaluation CDF/LERF AdditionalRiskof RAsCDF/LERF RiskOffset CDF/LERF NetDeltarisk Transitioning PlantCDF/LERF 1CR2 ControlRoomHVAC EquipmentRoom 4.2.4 Y
6.71E09/
3.52E11 Y
1.18E09/
6.47E11 6.45E10/
6.34E11 3.76E09/
2.27E11 2.58E09/
4.20E11 2.95E09/
1.25E11 1CR3 Communications EquipmentandRelay Room 4.2.4 Y
1.04E05/
7.51E08 Y
7.23E07/
5.15E09 6.23E07/
4.54E09 7.77E06/
5.68E08 7.05E06/
5.16E08 2.60E06/
1.84E08 1CR4 Process InstrumentationRoom 4.2.4 Y
3.98E05/
3.16E07 Y
3.39E05/
3.15E07 1.06E05/
3.12E07 2.79E05/
2.17E07 5.97E06/
9.76E08 1.19E05/
9.82E08 1CS1 CableSpreadingRoom 4.2.4 Y
4.92E06/
2.37E08 Y
3.54E06/
2.35E08 1.63E06/
2.35E08 1.84E06/
7.28E09 1.69E06/
1.62E08 3.08E06/
1.64E08 1CV1 WestCableVault 4.2.4 Y
1.94E06/
6.35E09 Y
1.51E06/
5.56E09 5.54E07/
1.95E09 3.05E07/
1.26E09 1.20E06/
4.31E09 1.64E06/
5.09E09 1CV2 EastCableVault 4.2.4 Y
1.24E05/
4.49E08 Y
5.83E06/
2.06E08 7.83E07/
2.68E09 8.83E06/
3.29E08 3.01E06/
1.23E08 3.55E06/
1.20E08 1DG1 DieselGenerator CubicleA 4.2.4 Y
1.73E06/
1.02E08 Y
2.69E08/
8.55E11 2.40E10/
Epsilon 1.15E06/
7.21E09 1.13E06/
7.12E09 5.74E07/
2.97E09 1DG2 DieselGeneratorRoom TrainB 4.2.4 Y
1.38E06/
8.75E09 Y
1.18E08/
3.97E11 9.20E10/
Epsilon 8.67E07/
5.99E09 8.55E07/
5.95E09 5.16E07/
2.75E09 1ES1 EmergencySwitchgear TrainA 4.2.4 Y
3.24E06/
1.41E08 Y
1.95E06/
7.27E09 3.77E08/
1.11E10 2.30E07/
1.05E09 1.72E06/
6.22E09 3.01E06/
1.30E08 1ES2 EmergencySwitchgear RoomTrainB 4.2.4 Y
2.00E06/
1.21E08 Y
1.84E07/
1.29E09 1.68E07/
1.22E09 2.77E07/
1.11E09 9.32E08/
1.82E10 1.72E06/
1.10E08 1MG1 MotorGenerator Room 4.2.4 Y
2.45E08/
1.12E10 Y
8.60E10/
5.38E11 5.73E10/
5.45E11 1.33E08/
6.91E11 1.24E08/
1.53E11 1.13E08/
4.33E11 1NS1 NormalSwitchgear Room 4.2.4 Y
1.73E05/
1.16E07 Y
4.29E06/
2.26E08 1.65E06/
1.16E08 1.08E05/
7.76E08 6.48E06/
5.50E08 6.57E06/
3.81E08 1PA1E PrimaryAuxiliary Building735'6" 4.2.4 Y
2.43E07/
9.37E10 Y
1.95E07/
7.77E10 1.21E07/
5.23E10 2.28E07/
8.68E10 3.22E08/
9.11E11 1.57E08/
6.91E11 1PA1G PrimaryAuxiliary Building722'6" 4.2.4 Y
4.81E07/
1.73E09 Y
4.05E07/
1.46E09 5.12E10/
Epsilon 4.63E07/
1.67E09 5.78E08/
2.08E10 1.81E08/
5.88E11 1PT1 PipeTunnel 4.2.4 Y
7.55E07/
2.90E09 Y
7.25E07/
2.74E09 4.21E07/
1.59E09 6.13E07/
2.40E09 1.12E07/
3.41E10 1.42E07/
5.00E10
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW32 TableW2aBVPS1FireCompartmentRiskSummary Fire Compartment Compartment Description NFPA 805 Basis VFDR Y/N ExcludingRiskOffset(2)
IncludingRiskOffset Fire Compartment CDF/LERF RAs (Y/N)
FireRisk Evaluation CDF/LERF AdditionalRiskof RAsCDF/LERF RiskOffset CDF/LERF NetDeltarisk Transitioning PlantCDF/LERF 1QP1 QuenchSpray/AFW PumpRoom 4.2.4 Y
1.23E06/
4.64E09 Y
1.08E06/
4.05E09 4.62E07/
1.74E09 3.80E09/
1.65E11 1.08E06/
4.03E09 1.23E06/
4.62E09 1SBGEN ServiceBuildingand PipeChase 4.2.4 Y
6.32E08/
2.66E10 Y
8.45E10/
Epsilon Epsilon/
Epsilon 1.89E08/
9.20E11 1.81E08/
9.07E11 4.43E08/
1.74E10 1RC1 ReactorContainment Building 4.2.4 Y
1.81E06/
5.38E09 Y
1.42E06/
3.99E09 6.47E07/
1.50E09 1.43E09/
Epsilon 1.42E06/
3.99E09 1.81E06/
5.40E09 1TB1 TurbineBuilding 4.2.4 Y
3.29E05/
2.11E07 Y
1.33E07/
3.70E10 Epsilon/
Epsilon 3.08E05/
1.98E07 3.07E05/
1.97E07 2.14E06/
1.38E08 3CR1 ControlRoom 4.2.4 Y
3.04E06/
1.82E07 Y
2.79E06/
1.52E08 1.30E06/
1.51E08 7.48E07/
3.55E09 2.05E06/
1.17E08 2.29E06/
1.79E07 3YARD1 Manholesand DuctlinesintheYard 4.2.4 Y
1.03E07/
5.78E10 Y
3.47E09/
Epsilon 3.98E10/
Epsilon 6.16E08/
3.83E10 5.81E08/
3.74E10 4.12E08/
1.95E10 1CTP1 CoolingTowerPump HouseandCooling Tower 4.2.4 Y
4.82E08/
2.29E10 Y
5.15E10/
Epsilon 5.15E10/
Epsilon 2.07E08/
1.10E10 2.02E08/
1.09E10 2.75E08/
1.20E10 1PA1A PrimaryAuxiliary Building(768'7")
4.2.4 Y
2.90E08/
1.19E10 Y
3.67E10/
Epsilon 3.67E10/
Epsilon 9.44E09/
4.45E11 9.08E09/
4.40E11 1.95E08/
7.43E11 1PA1C PrimaryAuxiliary Building(752'6")
4.2.4 Y
2.59E08/
1.06E10 Y
3.24E10/
Epsilon 3.24E10/
Epsilon 8.62E09/
4.05E11 8.29E09/
4.01E11 1.73E08/
6.56E11 1TO1 TurbineOilStorage Room 4.2.4 Y
1.29E08/
5.19E11 Y
1.54E10/
Epsilon 1.54E10/
Epsilon 4.20E09/
1.95E11 4.05E09/
1.94E11 8.70E09/
3.24E11 1TR1 Unit1Main Transformer(TRMT1) 4.2.4 Y
3.44E08/
1.41E10 Y
4.40E10/
Epsilon 4.40E10/
Epsilon 1.12E08/
5.30E11 1.08E08/
5.23E11 2.32E08/
8.85E11 1TR2 Unit1UnitStation ServiceTransformer 1D 4.2.4 Y
2.97E08/
1.22E10 Y
3.77E10/
Epsilon 3.77E10/
Epsilon 9.67E09/
4.55E11 9.29E09/
4.50E11 2.00E08/
7.61E11 1TR3 Unit1UnitStation ServiceTransformer1C 4.2.4 Y
2.97E08/
1.22E10 Y
3.77E10/
Epsilon 3.77E10/
Epsilon 9.67E09/
4.55E11 9.29E09/
4.50E11 2.00E08/
7.61E11 1TR4 Unit1SystemStation ServiceTransformer1A 4.2.4 Y
1.44E07/
5.70E10 Y
4.27E09/
1.31E11 4.27E09/
1.31E11 1.13E07/
4.48E10 1.08E07/
4.35E10 3.11E08/
1.22E10 1TR5 Unit1SystemStation ServiceTransformer1B 4.2.4 Y
1.12E07/
4.70E10 Y
2.09E09/
Epsilon 2.09E09/
Epsilon 8.03E08/
3.43E10 7.82E08/
3.37E10 3.16E08/
1.27E10
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW33 TableW2aBVPS1FireCompartmentRiskSummary Fire Compartment Compartment Description NFPA 805 Basis VFDR Y/N ExcludingRiskOffset(2)
IncludingRiskOffset Fire Compartment CDF/LERF RAs (Y/N)
FireRisk Evaluation CDF/LERF AdditionalRiskof RAsCDF/LERF RiskOffset CDF/LERF NetDeltarisk Transitioning PlantCDF/LERF 1WH1 Unit1Warehouseand ShopArea 4.2.4 Y
9.94E08/
4.17E10 Y
1.85E09/
Epsilon 1.85E09/
Epsilon 7.13E08/
3.04E10 6.95E08/
2.99E10 2.81E08/
1.13E10 3AIS1 AlternateIntake Structure 4.2.4 Y
2.85E08/
1.16E10 Y
3.41E10/
Epsilon 3.41E10/
Epsilon 1.05E08/
4.77E11 1.02E08/
4.74E11 1.80E08/
6.80E11 3ER1 ERFSubstation 4.2.4 Y
1.91E06/
1.32E08 Y
2.30E08/
1.10E10 2.30E08/
1.10E10 1.46E06/
1.01E08 1.44E06/
1.00E08 4.45E07/
3.09E09 3ER2 ERFDieselGenerator Building 4.2.4 Y
2.77E08/
1.13E10 Y
3.50E10/
Epsilon 3.50E10/
Epsilon 9.03E09/
4.25E11 8.68E09/
4.20E11 1.87E08/
7.09E11 3IS1 IntakeStructure Cubicle1 4.2.4 Y
4.41E08/
1.64E10 Y
2.38E10/
Epsilon 2.38E10/
Epsilon 3.69E08/
1.37E10 3.67E08/
1.37E10 7.20E09/
2.70E11 3IS2 IntakeStructure Cubicle2 4.2.4 Y
2.14E08/
8.02E11 Y
1.32E10/
Epsilon 1.32E10/
Epsilon 1.64E08/
6.16E11 1.62E08/
6.18E11 5.05E09/
1.87E11 3IS6 IntakeStructure(all areasexcept3IS1,2, 3,4) 4.2.4 Y
3.61E08/
1.49E10 Y
4.63E10/
Epsilon 4.63E10/
Epsilon 1.18E08/
5.57E11 1.13E08/
5.50E11 2.43E08/
9.30E11 3RH1 SwitchyardRelay House 4.2.4 Y
3.10E06/
2.15E08 Y
3.74E08/
1.84E10 3.74E08/
1.84E10 2.37E06/
1.65E08 2.34E06/
1.63E08 7.24E07/
5.03E09 3SY1 MainSwitchYard 4.2.4 Y
1.41E07/
8.79E10 Y
1.03E09/
Epsilon 1.03E09/
Epsilon 9.10E08/
5.43E10 9.00E08/
5.40E10 4.96E08/
3.36E10 1CO2 CO2StorageandPG WaterPumpRoom 4.2.4 Y
7.07E09/
6.50E11 Y
7.07E09/
6.50E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 1CV3 CableTunnel 4.2.4 Y
1.70E08/
2.23E12 Y
1.70E08/
Epsilon N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 1FB1 FuelHandling/Decon Buildings 4.2.4 Y
1.46E08/
1.07E10 Y
1.46E08/
1.07E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 1H1 BulkHydrogenStorage TanksinBV1YardArea 4.2.4 Y
7.56E09/
6.95E11 Y
7.56E09/
6.95E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 1MS1 MainSteamValve Room 4.2.4 Y
4.13E08/
6.83E12 Y
4.13E08/
Epsilon N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 1PA1GA ChargingPumpCubicle 1A 4.2.4 Y
8.43E09/
2.61E11 Y
8.43E09/
2.61E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1)
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW34 TableW2aBVPS1FireCompartmentRiskSummary Fire Compartment Compartment Description NFPA 805 Basis VFDR Y/N ExcludingRiskOffset(2)
IncludingRiskOffset Fire Compartment CDF/LERF RAs (Y/N)
FireRisk Evaluation CDF/LERF AdditionalRiskof RAsCDF/LERF RiskOffset CDF/LERF NetDeltarisk Transitioning PlantCDF/LERF 1PA1GB ChargingPumpCubicle 1B 4.2.4 Y
6.52E09/
2.55E11 Y
6.52E09/
2.55E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 1PA1GC ChargingPumpCubicle 1C 4.2.4 Y
2.86E09/
2.45E11 Y
2.86E09/
2.45E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 1SGPD1 SteamGenerator BlowdownArea(752' 6")
4.2.4 Y
1.85E09/
1.70E11 Y
1.85E09/
1.70E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 1VP1 RiverWaterValvePit TrainA 4.2.4 Y
3.56E09/
3.53E11 Y
3.56E09/
3.53E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 1VP2 RiverWaterValvePit TrainB 4.2.4 Y
4.74E09/
3.53E11 Y
4.74E09/
3.53E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 1WT1 RefuelingWater StorageTankArea (1QSTK1) 4.2.4 Y
1.10E09/
8.33E12 Y
1.10E09/
Epsilon N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 1WT10 PrimaryPlant DemineralizedWater StorageTank(1WTTK 10) 4.2.4 Y
9.46E10/
8.71E12 Y
9.46E10/
Epsilon N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 1WT11 TurbinePlant DemineralizedWater StorageTank(1WTTK 11) 4.2.4 Y
1.82E09/
1.68E11 Y
1.82E09/
1.68E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 1WT26 Auxiliary DemineralizedWater StorageTank(1WTTK 26) 4.2.4 Y
9.46E10/
8.71E12 Y
9.46E10/
Epsilon N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 3ER3 EmergencyResponse Facility 4.2.4 Y
1.55E08/
1.43E10 Y
1.55E08/
1.43E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 3IS3 IntakeStructure Cubicle3 4.2.4 Y
8.20E09/
4.71E11 Y
8.20E09/
4.71E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 3IS4 IntakeStructure Cubicle4 4.2.4 Y
6.12E09/
5.55E11 Y
6.12E09/
5.55E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1)
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW35 TableW2aBVPS1FireCompartmentRiskSummary Fire Compartment Compartment Description NFPA 805 Basis VFDR Y/N ExcludingRiskOffset(2)
IncludingRiskOffset Fire Compartment CDF/LERF RAs (Y/N)
FireRisk Evaluation CDF/LERF AdditionalRiskof RAsCDF/LERF RiskOffset CDF/LERF NetDeltarisk Transitioning PlantCDF/LERF 3TR6 ERFOffsitePower Transformer(TRF ERFS3B) 4.2.4 Y
1.77E08/
1.63E10 Y
1.77E08/
1.63E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 3TR7 ERFOffsitePower Transformer(TRF ERFS3A) 4.2.4 Y
1.77E08/
1.62E10 Y
1.77E08/
1.62E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1)
MultiCompartment RiskContribution(4)
1.41E06/
2.40E08
Total
5.89E05/
4.31E07 1.91E05/
3.79E07 9.72E05/
6.44E07 3.85E05/
2.14E07 4.60E05/
4.56E07
(1)Compartmentscreenedfromfinalfireriskmodelandscreeningvaluenotreevaluatedfortransitioningplant.However,riskislowerthanforcasewithoutriskoffsetandtherefore negligiblecomparedwithothercontributors (2)DoesnotcreditnewRCPshutdownsealsornewincabinetincipientdetection(thelatterisapplicableto1CR4only)
(3)RiskoffsetisriskreductionachievedbyinstallationofWestinghouseRCPsealsandincipientdetection.TheseplantmodificationswerenotaccountedforwhendefiningVFDRsor evaluatingtheirassociateddeltariskoradditionalriskofrecoveryactions (4)TheFireMultiCompartmentRiskisincludedtoshowtheoverallriskcontributionfromfires.Thedeltariskcontributionfromthecompartmentsdoesnotincludethecontributionfrom MCAscenarios;however,theircontributionhasbeenshowntobesmall(lessthan1%)comparedwiththecontributionfromintracompartmentscenarios.
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW36
TableW2bBVPS2FireCompartmentRiskSummary Fire Compartment Compartment Description NFPA 805 Basis VFD R
Y/N ExcludingRiskOffset(2)
IncludingRiskOffset Fire Compartment CDF/LERF RAs (Y/N
)
FireRisk Evaluation CDF/LERF AdditionalRisk ofRAsCDF/LERF RiskOffset CDF/LERF NetDeltarisk Transitioning PlantCDF/LERF 2ASP AlternateShutdown PanelRoom 4.2.4 Y
3.34E07/
5.62E09 Y
2.22E09/
1.14E09 2.22E09/
1.14E09 3.14E08/
1.60E10 2.91E08/
9.77E10 3.03E07/
5.46E09 2CB1 ControlBuilding (InstrumentandRelay Room,CableSpreading Room,CableTunnel) 4.2.4 Y
4.94E05/
9.48E07 Y
3.50E05/
2.36E07 2.79E05/
1.71E07 2.83E05/
7.47E07 6.65E06/
5.11E07 2.11E05/
2.01E07 2CB6 WestCommunications Room 4.2.4 Y
9.12E06/
4.20E08 Y
2.59E06/
1.11E08 1.72E06/
5.57E09 2.98E06/
2.22E08 3.84E07/
1.11E08 6.14E06/
1.98E08 2CV1 WestCableVault&
RodControlRoom 4.2.4 Y
5.77E06/
3.98E08 Y
5.26E06/
3.66E08 9.23E07/
2.60E08 2.67E06/
1.07E08 2.59E06/
2.59E08 3.09E06/
2.91E08 2CV2 EastCableVault&Rod ControlArea 4.2.4 Y
9.86E07/
9.79E09 Y
6.27E07/
3.93E09 1.80E09/
2.00E11 4.81E07/
3.37E09 1.46E07/
5.67E10 5.05E07/
6.43E09 2CV3 CableVault&Rod ControlArea 4.2.4 Y
5.28E06/
3.16E08 Y
4.93E06/
2.72E08 7.11E07/
9.06E09 8.27E07/
4.05E09 4.10E06/
2.32E08 4.46E06/
2.75E08 2CV6 CableVault&Rod ControlRelayRoom (7556) 4.2.4 Y
1.11E08/
8.14E11 Y
1.30E09/
Epsilon 7.00E10/
Epsilon 5.59E09/
3.14E11 4.29E09/
2.98E11 5.46E09/
5.00E11 2DG1 DieselGenerator CubicleA 4.2.4 Y
1.86E06/
1.66E08 Y
2.72E08/
4.87E10 2.68E08/
4.87E10 1.42E06/
9.44E09 1.39E06/
8.96E09 4.40E07/
7.15E09 2DG2 DieselGenerator CubicleTrainB 4.2.4 Y
7.74E07/
6.15E09 Y
1.64E08/
2.95E10 1.64E08/
2.95E10 6.64E07/
4.40E09 6.48E07/
4.11E09 1.10E07/
1.75E09 2MS1 MainSteamValveArea 4.2.4 Y
2.27E05/
1.81E06 Y
1.61E05/
1.39E06 6.80E09/
5.50E10 2.19E05/
1.78E06 5.84E06/
3.87E07 8.51E07/
3.49E08 2PA3 AuxiliaryBuilding GeneralArea(710'6",
718'6",735'6")
4.2.4 Y
4.65E07/
3.91E08 Y
2.08E08/
6.86E10 1.03E08/
6.50E10 2.66E07/
1.15E09 2.46E07/
4.66E10 1.99E07/
3.79E08 2PA4 AuxiliaryBuilding GeneralArea(7556) 4.2.4 Y
4.85E08/
3.33E10 Y
2.45E08/
1.98E10 2.45E08/
1.98E10 3.65E08/
2.08E10 1.20E08/
1.04E11 1.20E08/
1.25E10
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW37 TableW2bBVPS2FireCompartmentRiskSummary Fire Compartment Compartment Description NFPA 805 Basis VFD R
Y/N ExcludingRiskOffset(2)
IncludingRiskOffset Fire Compartment CDF/LERF RAs (Y/N
)
FireRisk Evaluation CDF/LERF AdditionalRisk ofRAsCDF/LERF RiskOffset CDF/LERF NetDeltarisk Transitioning PlantCDF/LERF 2RC1 ReactorContainment Building 4.2.4 Y
1.85E07/
9.02E10 Y
1.83E07/
8.89E10 9.85E08/
5.81E10 7.00E09/
5.02E11 1.76E07/
8.38E10 1.78E07/
8.52E10 2SB1 ServiceBuilding EmergencySwitchgear TrainA 4.2.4 Y
7.53E06/
6.31E08 Y
4.99E08/
2.60E08 1.64E08/
2.56E08 7.84E07/
3.96E09 7.34E07/
2.20E08 6.75E06/
5.91E08 2SB2 ServiceBuilding EmergencySwitchgear TrainB 4.2.4 Y
1.05E06/
1.04E08 Y
4.40E08/
5.39E10 3.13E08/
4.82E10 4.57E07/
2.71E09 4.13E07/
2.17E09 5.88E07/
7.72E09 2SB3 ServiceBuildingCable SpreadingArea 4.2.4 Y
6.62E07/
5.00E09 Y
4.56E07/
3.19E09 2.96E08/
2.01E10 1.08E07/
7.60E10 3.48E07/
2.43E09 5.54E07/
4.24E09 2SB4 ServiceBuilding NormalSwitchgear 4.2.4 Y
8.52E06/
8.05E08 Y
5.84E07/
4.77E09 5.30E07/
4.08E09 5.52E06/
4.01E08 4.94E06/
3.53E08 3.00E06/
4.05E08 2SB8 ServiceBuilding BatteryRoom22 4.2.4 Y
3.64E07/
1.96E09 Y
5.29E10/
1.05E11 5.26E10/
1.07E11 3.30E07/
1.46E09 3.30E07/
1.45E09 3.43E08/
5.01E10 2SG1N NorthSafeguardsArea 4.2.4 Y
8.10E09/
8.65E11 Y
8.86E10/
1.43E11 8.86E10/
1.43E11 4.39E09/
2.89E11 3.50E09/
1.46E11 3.71E09/
5.76E11 2SG1S SouthSafeguardsArea 4.2.4 Y
8.68E08/
1.16E09 Y
1.77E09/
2.90E11 1.77E09/
2.90E11 7.07E09/
4.88E11 5.30E09/
1.98E11 7.98E08/
1.11E09 2TB1 TurbineBuilding GeneralArea 4.2.4 Y
5.08E07/
4.44E09 Y
3.14E09/
5.55E11 3.14E09/
5.55E11 2.60E07/
1.63E09 2.57E07/
1.57E09 2.48E07/
2.82E09 3CR1 MainControlRoom 4.2.4 Y
5.63E06/
4.55E08 Y
2.50E06/
2.74E08 5.18E07/
1.54E08 4.43E07/
7.06E09 2.06E06/
2.04E08 5.18E06/
3.84E08 2TR4 SystemStationService Transformer2B 4.2.4 Y
1.62E06/
1.74E08 Y
1.55E08/
2.46E10 1.55E08/
2.46E10 1.10E06/
8.01E09 1.08E06/
7.77E09 5.20E07/
9.41E09 2TR5 SystemStationService Transformer2A 4.2.4 Y
1.62E06/
1.74E08 Y
1.55E08/
2.46E10 1.55E08/
2.46E10 1.10E06/
8.01E09 1.08E06/
7.77E09 5.20E07/
9.41E09 3IS2 IntakeStructure Cubicle2 4.2.4 Y
6.03E07/
5.24E09 Y
5.26E09/
1.10E10 5.26E09/
1.10E10 5.10E07/
3.72E09 5.05E07/
3.61E09 9.33E08/
1.52E09 3RH1 SwitchyardRelay House 4.2.4 Y
2.62E06/
2.83E08 Y
2.51E08/
4.03E10 2.51E08/
4.03E10 1.78E06/
1.30E08 1.75E06/
1.26E08 8.42E07/
1.53E08 3SY1 MainSwitchYard 4.2.4 Y
7.86E08/
Y 7.27E10/
7.27E10/
5.34E08/
5.27E08/
2.52E08/
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW38 TableW2bBVPS2FireCompartmentRiskSummary Fire Compartment Compartment Description NFPA 805 Basis VFD R
Y/N ExcludingRiskOffset(2)
IncludingRiskOffset Fire Compartment CDF/LERF RAs (Y/N
)
FireRisk Evaluation CDF/LERF AdditionalRisk ofRAsCDF/LERF RiskOffset CDF/LERF NetDeltarisk Transitioning PlantCDF/LERF 8.24E10 Epsilon Epsilon 3.79E10 3.69E10 4.45E10 2CB4 ControlBuilding ComputerRoom(735 6) 4.2.4 Y
6.35E10/
2.43E11 Y
6.35E10/
2.43E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2CP1 CondensatePolishing Building 4.2.4 Y
8.36E09/
3.21E10 Y
8.36E09/
3.21E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2CTP1 CoolingTowerPump HouseandCooling Tower 4.2.4 Y
7.45E09/
2.89E10 Y
7.45E09/
2.89E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2FB1 FuelHandling&
Decontamination Building 4.2.4 Y
8.62E09/
1.99E10 Y
8.62E09/
1.99E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2H1 BulkHydrogenStorage TanksinBV2YardArea 4.2.4 Y
2.40E09/
9.20E11 Y
2.40E09/
9.20E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2PA5 AuxiliaryBuilding GeneralArea 4.2.4 Y
4.81E09/
1.74E10 Y
4.81E09/
1.74E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2SB7 ServiceBuilding BatteryRoom23 4.2.4 Y
2.18E10/
7.91E12 Y
2.18E10/
Epsilon N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2SB9 ServiceBuilding BatteryRoom24 4.2.4 Y
3.60E09/
7.66E11 Y
3.60E09/
7.66E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2TR1 Unit2Main Transformer(TRMT2) 4.2.4 Y
5.31E09/
2.04E10 Y
5.31E09/
2.04E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2TR2 Unit2UnitStation ServiceTransformer2C 4.2.4 Y
4.57E09/
1.75E10 Y
4.57E09/
1.75E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2TR3 Unit2UnitStation ServiceTransformer2D 4.2.4 Y
4.57E09/
1.75E10 Y
4.57E09/
1.75E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2VP1 ServiceWaterValvePit EastTrainA 4.2.4 Y
9.30E10/
2.17E11 Y
9.30E10/
2.17E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2VP2 ServiceWaterValvePit WestTrainB 4.2.4 Y
3.32E10/
1.21E11 Y
3.32E10/
1.21E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1)
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW39 TableW2bBVPS2FireCompartmentRiskSummary Fire Compartment Compartment Description NFPA 805 Basis VFD R
Y/N ExcludingRiskOffset(2)
IncludingRiskOffset Fire Compartment CDF/LERF RAs (Y/N
)
FireRisk Evaluation CDF/LERF AdditionalRisk ofRAsCDF/LERF RiskOffset CDF/LERF NetDeltarisk Transitioning PlantCDF/LERF 2WH1 Unit2WasteHandling Building(AllLevels) 4.2.4 Y
3.50E09/
1.34E10 Y
3.50E09/
1.34E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2WT21 RefuelingWater StorageTankArea (2QSSTK21) 4.2.4 Y
8.83E10/
1.08E09 Y
8.83E10/
1.08E09 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2WT210 PrimaryPlant DemineralizedWater StorageTank 4.2.4 Y
5.69E10/
9.94E12 Y
5.69E10/
Epsilon N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2WT211 TurbinePlant DemineralizedWater StorageTank(2WTD TK211) 4.2.4 Y
2.59E10/
9.94E12 Y
2.59E10/
Epsilon N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2WT23 DemineralizedWater StorageTank(2WTD TK23) 4.2.4 Y
2.59E10/
9.94E12 Y
2.59E10/
Epsilon N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 3AIS1 AlternateIntake Structure 4.2.4 Y
4.32E09/
2.39E10 Y
4.32E09/
2.39E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 3ER1 ERFSubstation 4.2.4 Y
4.55E09/
1.75E10 Y
4.55E09/
1.75E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 3ER2 ERFDieselGenerator Building 4.2.4 Y
4.39E09/
1.68E10 Y
4.39E09/
1.68E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 3ER3 EmergencyResponse Facility 4.2.4 Y
5.40E09/
2.07E10 Y
5.40E09/
2.07E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 3IS1 IntakeStructure Cubicle1 4.2.4 Y
1.41E09/
5.40E11 Y
1.41E09/
5.40E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 3IS6 IntakeStructure(All areasexcept3IS1,2, 3,4) 4.2.4 Y
5.71E09/
2.19E10 Y
5.71E09/
2.19E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 3TR6 ERFOffsitePower Transformer(TRF ERFS3B) 4.2.4 Y
3.81E09/
1.46E10 Y
3.81E09/
1.46E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1)
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW40 TableW2bBVPS2FireCompartmentRiskSummary Fire Compartment Compartment Description NFPA 805 Basis VFD R
Y/N ExcludingRiskOffset(2)
IncludingRiskOffset Fire Compartment CDF/LERF RAs (Y/N
)
FireRisk Evaluation CDF/LERF AdditionalRisk ofRAsCDF/LERF RiskOffset CDF/LERF NetDeltarisk Transitioning PlantCDF/LERF 3TR7 ERFOffsitePower Transformer(TRF ERFS3A) 4.2.4 Y
3.81E09/
1.46E10 Y
3.81E09/
1.46E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2CB5 ControlBuildingFan Room(7356) 4.2.4 Y
2.67E08/
2.52E09 Y
2.67E08/
2.52E09 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2CV4 SouthCableVaultand RodControlArea(773 6) 4.2.4 Y
9.99E10/
3.83E11 Y
9.99E10/
3.83E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2CV5 NorthCableVaultand RodControlArea(773 6) 4.2.4 Y
3.90E10/
1.49E11 Y
3.90E10/
1.49E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2PA3A ChargingPumpCubicle A(7356) 4.2.4 Y
2.80E10/
1.78E11 Y
2.80E10/
1.78E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2PA3B ChargingPumpCubicle B(7356) 4.2.4 Y
3.07E10/
1.48E11 Y
3.07E10/
1.48E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2PA3C ChargingPumpCubicle C(7356) 4.2.4 Y
3.07E10/
1.48E11 Y
3.07E10/
1.48E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2PA6 AuxiliaryBuildingMCC RoomTrainA(7556) 4.2.4 Y
1.33E08/
2.09E10 Y
1.33E08/
2.09E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2PA7 AuxiliaryBuildingMCC RoomTrainB(7556) 4.2.4 Y
2.57E09/
5.07E11 Y
2.57E09/
5.07E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2PT1 PipeTunnelArea 4.2.4 Y
2.72E09/
4.85E11 Y
2.72E09/
4.85E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2SB10 ServiceBuildingNon SafetyRelatedBattery Room25(7606) 4.2.4 Y
4.35E10/
1.48E11 Y
4.35E10/
1.48E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2SB5 ServiceBuildingMFRV Room 4.2.4 Y
5.22E10/
2.00E11 Y
5.22E10/
2.00E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 2SB6 ServiceBuilding BatteryRoom21 (7306) 4.2.4 Y
1.56E08/
3.90E10 Y
1.56E08/
3.90E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1)
FENOC Attachment W - Fire PRA Insights
BeaverValley
PageW41 TableW2bBVPS2FireCompartmentRiskSummary Fire Compartment Compartment Description NFPA 805 Basis VFD R
Y/N ExcludingRiskOffset(2)
IncludingRiskOffset Fire Compartment CDF/LERF RAs (Y/N
)
FireRisk Evaluation CDF/LERF AdditionalRisk ofRAsCDF/LERF RiskOffset CDF/LERF NetDeltarisk Transitioning PlantCDF/LERF 2TB2 TurbineBuilding BatteryRoom26 4.2.4 Y
2.39E10/
8.18E12 Y
2.39E10/
Epsilon N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 3IS3 IntakeStructure Cubicle3 4.2.4 Y
4.93E09/
8.62E11 Y
4.93E09/
8.62E11 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 3IS4 IntakeStructure Cubicle4 4.2.4 Y
9.87E09/
1.77E10 Y
9.87E09/
1.77E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1) 3YARD1 ManholesandDuct linesintheYard 4.2.4 Y
8.66E09/
1.09E10 Y
8.66E09/
1.09E10 N/A N/A(1)
(1)
(1)
MultiCompartment RiskContribution(4)
3.21E06/
5.35E07
Total
6.86E05/
1.78E06 3.26E05/
2.63E07 7.20E05/
2.67E06 3.64E06/
8.99E07 5.92E05/
1.11E06
(1)Compartmentscreenedfromfinalfireriskmodelandscreeningvaluenotreevaluatedfortransitioningplant.However,riskislowerthanforcasewithoutriskoffsetandthereforenegligible comparedwithothercontributors (2)DoesnotcreditnewRCPshutdownsealsornewincabinetincipientdetection(thelatterisapplicableto2CB1&2CB6only)
(3)RiskoffsetisriskreductionachievedbyinstallationofWestinghouseRCPsealsandincipientdetection.TheseplantmodificationswerenotaccountedforwhendefiningVFDRsorevaluating theirassociateddeltariskoradditionalriskofrecoveryactions (4)TheFireMultiCompartmentRiskisincludedtoshowtheoverallriskcontributionfromfires.ThedeltariskcontributionfromthecompartmentsdoesnotincludethecontributionfromMCA scenarios;however,theircontributionhasbeenshowntobesmall(lessthan1%)comparedwiththecontributionfromintracompartmentscenarios.