ML17083A463

Suppl 10 to SER

ML17083A463
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	08/01/1980
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
NUREG-0675, NUREG-0675-S10, NUREG-675, NUREG-675-S10, TAC-51638, TAC-51994, NUDOCS 8008140214
Download: ML17083A463 (18)

Text

ATTACHMENT 4 NUREG 0575 Supplement No. 1o

+~)."Qr g ~<Jam)'~a~'Qa5 reiated Lo the operation Diablo Canyon Nuclear U)~its 1 and 2 Oocket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323 Pacific Gas and Electric Comp any Supplement iso.

10 t'~

Wa:BGQP )).

of Power Station

.Qu gus t 1980 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

~ ~ ~ ~ ~

III..EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS ANO RAOIAT:CN PROTECTION III.A.l. 1. 1 Uo rade Fmeraenc Preparedness Position Co ply ith Appendix E, "E. ergenoy Paoili.les,"

to '.0 Cyg Part SO, Regulatory O ide '.'Ol.

"Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants,"

and for the offside p)ans, neet assent!al elements of NUREG-75/111 or have a favorable finding from FFHA.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

This matter is addressed in Section III.B.l of this report.

III.A.1.2 Emorove Licensee Facilities for Respond!no to Emergencies III.A.l. 2(a) echnical"Support Center (2. 2. 2. b - NUREG-0578)

POSIT.'OM Each aoerating nuclear po~er plant shall maintain an onsite technical support center ('SC) separate from and in close proximity to the control room that has the capability to afsolay and transmit plant status to those indivic als who are knowledgeable of and responsible '

engineering and management support of reactor operations in the event'f an acc!cent.

center shall be habitable to the same degree as the control room far postulated acc cent conditions.

The licensee shall revise his emergency plans as necessary to incorporate

he role and location of the technical support -enter.

Records that pertain to the as-built conditions and layout of structures, syste...s and camponents, shall oe readily available ta persannel fn the TSC.

Ci.ARIFICATION l.

By April 1,

1980, he licensee shall -.eet the items that follow.

a.

Establish a;SC and provide a co.-.piete description.

b.

Provide plans and procedures for engineering/management support and staffing of the TSC.

c.

Install dedicated communications between the TSC and the control

roam, near site 1/

emergency operations

center, and the NRC.=

Provide monitoring (either partaole or permanent)

'.or "ath direct radiatian and airborne raaioactive contamfnants.

The nonitors shougd provide warning if the Eadiation levels in the support center are reaching potent',ally dangerous levels.

The licensee should designate act!on levels to def'-.e ren brotective measures should be taken (such as usirg breathing apparatus ard potassium iod!ce tablets.

or evacuation to the control roam).

= The aff has fuE her clarified this !n SECY 50-230 a "ec4!. e "e soplfcant

.o des!a".ate a -ear-site emergency..Perations faci 1!ty with commun!cat!ons -i:n the plant to provice chal.sation of rad!ation releases and caa-c!nation of all onsite snd of. site s'.

e SCtsi:t:eS during an PCC'dent.

~ ~ ~

~

'aE

~ Pe

e.

Assimilate or ensure acce'ss to,echnical

Oata, including the licensee's best effort to have direct disp?ay of plant parameters, necessary for assessment in the TSC.

f.

Oevelop procedures for per.orming this accident assessment function from the control room should the TSC become uninhabitable, and g.

Submit to the HRC a longer range plan for upgrading the TSC to rect all require-ments.

Each licensee is encouraged to provide aoai iona) upgrading of the TSC (i!ems 2-'0 below) as soon as practical, but no later than

.981.

2.

It is reccrmended

!hat the TSC be loca!ed onsite in close proximity to the control room.

3.

The TSC should be large enough to house 25 persons.

4.

The center should be activated in accordance with the "Alert" level as defined in the VRC document "Oraft Emergency Action

evel Guidelines, HUREG-0610," dated September 1979.

5.

The instrumentation to be located in he TSC should be qualitatively comparable to !hat in he control room.

6.

The power supply to the TSC instrumentation should be reliable and of a quality compatible with the TSC jnstrumentat'.on reauirements.

7.

Each licensee should establish the technical data requirements for he TSC.

As a

minimum, data should be available o permit the assessment of:

Plant Safety Systems Parameters In-Plant Radiological Parameters Offsite Radiological Parameters 8.

Each licensee should review cuirent !echnology as regards transmission of those parameters identified for TSC display.

9.

The center should be <<ell built in ac ordance with sound engineering practice.

Hoiever

~ in the event :hat access to he center is prevented, each iicensee should prepare a backup plan for responcing o an emergency from the control room.

10.

The liCenSee ShOuld pravide prOteC!,iOn fOr he teChniCal SuppOrt Canter perSOnnel

'rOn radiolog cal hazards.

III.A-2

Discussion and Conclusion initial Technical Supoort Center TSC The sdmfnfstrat on building located west of the Turbine Building has been designated as a

temporary onsite technical support center -ecting the requirements of l.a-f above.

This facility, with the addition or extension af some telephone circui ts, portable radiation

monitors, and the provisions of a portaole clased circuit television camera, '<<ill be functional prior to fuel load.

The administration building presently conta'.ns a Records Management System ermiral providing access to plant design documents and a tfme share terminal capable of providing autput of important plant paraneters fram each Unit's P-250 computer.

Portable area type radiation nonitors with a range of 0. 1 to 1,000 millirems per hour with alarms are available onsfte.

One of these

...onitors will be placed in the temporary technical support center.

Airborne radioactivity concentrations will be monitored with a CAH (constan:

afr moni or) which will be made available far placement in the tenporary !echnical support center.

he closed circuit television system equip;.ent to be located in the permanent technical suoport center is expected to be onsite by 'uly 1, 1980.

It is intended to fnstall the caneras in the control room and to initially install the monitors in the temporary tecnnical support center.

In addition, a portable television camera would be procured for the temporary technical support center.

This camera

<<auld be utlized by a camera

-an in communication with the temporary TSC to scan the control room as reques ec to provide specific plant parametric information.

It <<ill serve as a tenporary subs itute should the permanent TV systen not be available for FL and low po~er operation.

elephone conmunication circuits currently exis between the aaministration building and the control room, the Corporate Incident Resporse Center in San Francisco, the NRC site office, and the NRC Operat,fons Center in Bethesda.

.'dditional telephone circuit modiffcat ons wil!

."e made to provide dedicated communications between the temporary TSC and the offsite Emergency

Response

Center in San Luis Obispo, the prooosed near-site Emergency Operations Facility, the Control

Roon, and the RRC Operations Center by FL.

The affsite recovery facility is some 12 miles from he site.

For a full power license !his praOOSal will need further reVieW againSt aur aCCeatanCe Criteria ~hiCh."aS been iSSued far interin use 3nd comment.

However, POSE cc.-...i!ments and arrangements are

'udged adequate

,ow po~er ooeration.

Permanent Technical Support Center he permanent echniCal Support Center meet'ng the recuirements of 2-10 bove <<ill be

'Ooatea On the upper leVelS af the bu treSSeS On tne eSt Side Of the Unit 2 turbine bui'rC and wil'. be accessible by "ersornel frcn bc:h n!ts.

The

,SC will e of suff<c!ent size !a acccmmoda e

'5 people.

The permanent TSC <<f 11 be operational by 'anuary ',

981.

1,

The TSC is designed to be habitable throughout he course of a cesign oasis accident.

The shielding is designed to the same cri er a used for the control room.

The structure is designed to Seismic Class I criteria.

The TSC will be provided with its own venti lat.'on system which is equipped with filtered in=skes.

A positive pressure will be maintained

':n the TSC so that air flow is from the office area to the outside atmosphere.

The Tsc (once ac ivated) will serve as tre

.eadquarters of the site Emergency coordinator, Liaison Coordinator, Lvaluations Coor"irat=r and heir staff during an emergency.

Provision have also been made for the establishment of an cnsi e

MRC emergency headauartars in the TSC.

Should the TSC become uninhaoitaole, the control

room, a three-minute '<<alking distanc.

will serve as the backup.

The TSC <<ill be provided <<ith full radio and telephone communicaticns capability with direct and dedicated lines to'he Control

Room,

"=e. ations Scooort Center, 9RC headquarters as

<<e

's various other offsite agencies including PGKE's Coroorate Resoonse Center and appropriat<<

police and civil defense agencies.

Following activation of tne

TSC,

he overall onsite assessment and recovery programs <<ill be =',rected from :his location.

,'lost, if not all, communications ith offsite locations

<<i 1'.

oe banc'gaea through tne

~ SC.

Provisions '<<ill be included to permit gers"ns in :he SC to monitor imoortant plant parsmet:

The output from each units'cmputer <<ill =e sent to :ne TSC."

o provide backup

',or the plant comouter, closed circuit 7( cameras <<ill be located

'.n :ne control room in such a

manner that the console, main ver ical bca. ds, and

.-.o. radiation moni oring system board at the rear of tne control room can be scannea from :ne TSC.

.he TSC <<ill be provided with a terminal and printer.or PGTE's ccmouteri==d ec r"s

-snagement system.

This <<ill provice the abi 1.ty to inspect and print tne '.ates=

ocies

~ 6 1 prints and reCOrCS invOlving tne pl ant.

'4e conclude that PGSE has met the require.-.

nts of I a-g above, a temporary TSC has been established with sdequate communications

!'nks and access to plant parameter data and technical information, and appropriate procedural revisions have been made to estaolish a<a man the TSC at the outset of an Emergency.

'4e further conclude that the schedule and plans for the permanent TSC provide reasonable assurance that long-term requirements of 2-10 above

<<ill be met also.

III.A.'.2(b) Ons'te Operational Support "enter (2. 2. 2. c NUREG-0578)

P55I:DN An area to be designated as the onsi e ope"ational support center shall be established.

shall be separate from the =ontrol room are shall oe the, place to which he operations support personnel will report in the emergency sit a ion.

Communications with t'h e controi room shall be provided.

The emergency plan shall be "evised to ref'ect the existence of : :

center and to es:ablish the methods and 1'-es of =:c,unication anc -,.anage,.ent.

CLARIFICAT)ON As indicated in Our generiC letter da ed 'pril 25,

3980, communications are also to be provided with the onsite technical support center and the near-site Emergency Coerations Center.

OISSCUSSIOM AND CONCL)'SIONS The security building serves as he onsite Qperationa)

Support Center (OSC).

The security building is on the southern pe,imeter of t.,e Protected Area.

The OSC serves as a staging area for support personne)

<<ho are ca1)ed into the site to provide support activities.

U e of the OSC enhances imp)ementation of personnel accountabi )i y -easures.

From this area communications are available to :he control room, other station extensions and offsite.

PGEE is preparing an administrative procecure, Emergency Procedure GA-9, "Activation of

, Operational Support Center" <<nich will establish the methods and lines of communication and management for the OSC.

The staff will review this procedure at a future date.

PGEE has met this ".equirement sub5ect to :he staff ".eview of EPGA-9.

III. A. 3 Imorovin NRC Emergency ?reoaredress III.A. 3. 3 Communications POSITION Direc. dedicated telephone lines (opx) have been installed at each ""e"at.ng power plant ann selected fue) faci)ities; these lines are.or immediate notif<cation and conti.Uous com-munication with NRC concerning facility status.

A second direct ana ceaicated network for health physics and egvironmenta) information is to be installed by ;eoruary 1990.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION The applicant currently has instal:ed a de"icated line between the site and NRC Headquarter~

(Hotline or Emergency Notification System).

Another dedicated VRC circuit, the Health Physics Network, is ins al)ed at he site.

In addition to these lines, the applicant has n

comp)ex and versatl)e system of voice and ata circuits.

This sys em can be used to establish additional circuits with the NRC as well as other agencies during an accident situation.

He conclude that PGEE has met the require.,ents of the III.A.3.3 position as s

a ed above.

I

III.8 Emercencv Pre aredness of State and 'eal Gover",rents III.B.1 Near-Term Actions (III.A.1. 1 - NCREG-0860)

POSITION For fuel loading and low power operation, tne coaoined appl!cant,=State and 'ocal emergency plans nus neet:

a.

Current regulatory requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.

b.

Regulatory position statements in Regulatory Guice 1.101, "Emergency?ianning

.or Nuclear Power Plants," Revision

.,'~arcn 1977.

c.

Essential planning elements and Evaluation of State and in vtREG 75/11a.

"Guide and checklist for ceveiccment L ca Gover"caen Racioiogical Emergency Resoonse Plans in Suooort of Fixed Nuclear Facii!tfes,"'-.c'ing upplement No. 'hereto atao march 15, 977.

0 ISCUSSION AND CONC'SIONS The staff's review of the applicant's emergency ol>>ns

>-:ent No.

Z.

'<<'e have determined that :he plans meet the requ.'rements of Appendfx o

13

,=R ?art 50, and conform to the reguiatory h

position staterents in Rev!sion 1 to Regu at.r.

Su!c>>

.101.

,he abplicant's emergency plan includes prc;!sicns

,'or coping with emergencies within :.e boundary of the plant, site.and in environs of tne pian

site, and for the prcmpt not'.f!ca-tion of offsite officials responsible for c".s>>eminat',ng protective actfon instruction to he general populace.

Responsibility for piarning and

!moi ment',ng all emergency measures within the site boundaries rests with the aoplicant.

he planning and implea entation of measures to cope with plant-related emergenc!es outsice the site boundary are a coordinated effort involving tie applicant and local, State and Federal agencies having emergency resoonsibilities.

The emergency plan cescr!bes the.oordination of the arrangements and agreements between he applicant and these agenc'.es.

Provisions nave been made

'.or a

per'.odic review of he emergency plan and 'or periodic testing,

updating, and i..proving procedures based on training, drills, and exercises.

The State Of CalifOrnia VuClear ?Ower Plant EmergenCy ReSpOnSe Plan (CERP), dated July 1975 and revised August '978, was reviewed agairs the gu!'eline standards of the IVuclear Regulatory Commission's "Guide and Checklis

'.or.eve!"oment and Evaluation of State and 'cal cover~ment Radiological Enercenc:

Resocnse

-" ans

!n u.port of F!xed Nuclear Facilities." (NURFG-75/111) frcluding Supp'.ament Vo.

to t..at publication dateo Marco 15, 977.

wniCh i entif!eS thOSe

!temS eSSent!ai fcr VRC'S :OnCurrente in a Sta e plan.

AS a

resuit of this "ev ew., and in accordance <<'th prov',slobs of t".e :ederal Regis er Not',ce (yoiume aO,,vo.

"-'8. 3ecember 24, '975) he NRc - ncur"ea for",aiiy in the GERp on 'ugust '5, 1978.

A report, entit)ed "A Study of Postulated Accidents at California,'luclear Power Plants",

was published for the State of California by Science Applications, Inc.

on June 23, 1980.

Sasec on this report, the State Office of Emergency Services (OES), in a document dated July 15, 1980.

recommended that emergency planning ones be extended beyond the nominal 10-mile radius in some sectors.

For Oiablo Canyon, the OES reconmended that the plume exposure EPI be extended beyond the nominal '0-nile radius to various distances, and as much as 20 mi)es in the general direction of Santa Haria.

In addition to extending the plume exposure

EPZ, the OES has recommended that certain areas beyond 20 miles be designated as hose requiring sheltering and subsequent relocation.

Such recommendations to increase the llRC-established 10-mile plume exposure EP2 do not change our findings and conclusions for low-power license regarding the applicant's and State's emergency preparedness plans..

FEHA/INTERIH AGREEHENT ON CRITERIA FOR LQlre

>0'4'ER TFSTING AT NEW COHHERCIAL NUCLEAR FACILITIES The FEMA/NRC Steering Committee has agreed that for the purposes of low power testing (up to 5 percent power) at new commercial facilities that the public health and safety is adequatel protectea if such facility is located in a State which had received a concurrence under the previous voluntary concurrence

program, acministered by the NRC and based on evaluation by a

multi-agency Federal Regional Advisory Con mittee.

In addition, operator plans at individua'1 sites must be consistent with both he existing llRC Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and NRC Regulatory Guide 1. 101 in order to assure adequate protection of the puolic health and safe y prior to low po~er testing.

NRC ana FEHA agree that State, local and nuclear facility ooerator

',ans must be aaeouate when sudged against the criteria contained in NUREG-0654 and FEHA/REP-1 prior o fu)1 scale commercial operation.

This agreenent is based on the consicerat'ons discussed tn the exchange of letters between H. Oenton, NRC and J. HcConnell, FEHA, both dated February '4, 1980.

The parties

[NRC and FEHA] note that he North Anna, Salem and Oiablo Canyon sites are located in Virginia, New Jersey and California respective)y, all of which have received prior NRC concurrence in State Plans.

The Salem facility is locatea near the Oelaware border; the radiological emergency plan of the State of Oe)aware l.as also received prior NRC concurrence.

NRC stipulates hat individual nuclear facility operator plans at these plants are in compliance with Appendix E and are consistent with Regulatory Guiae

1. 101.

In summary, based on our review of the combined applicant, State and local emergency plans.

we conclude that, the current plan provides sn acceptable state-of-emergency prepareaness d'or a fuel loaa and low power license.

RE UIREHENTS FOR A FULL oOMER LICENSE As a result of the Commission's action plan for Promptly Upgradirg Emergency Precaredness a

Power Reactors (SECY 79-450),

the Emergency P)arming Review Team conauc ea a site visit a.;d technical meeting with the apolicant, State and focal officials.

'.n response to our visit.

the aop))cant has submitted a proposed "ev"sion dated February 2,

1980, to :he Oiablo Caryon Nuclear mower'P)ant Energency Plan.

This =reposed revised plan is nder "eview bv the S aff.

'<<'e <<1)) repOrt n the reSultS Of O

." reView Of the prOOOSed "eViSiOn priOr O

granting s full po<<er

-)cense.

" 8-2

Efforts by the staff, the Commission and FERA to upgraae rules and guidance in the area of emergency planning have resulted in definitive and uniform acceptance criter a

(!IUREG 0654/

FEHA-REP-1) and publication of proposed

c. anges to Appendix E to 0

CFR Part 50 (Federal i

Register.'iotice, 'lol. 44, No. 245, Cecember 19, 1979).

The requirements of the final rule change:o Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, <<hich <<ill include implementation schedules for app'licants as well as licensees, coupled with he criteria contained in

.RUREG 0654/FEN-RE?-: <<ill be the basis for evaluating the emergency plans applicable to the Oiablo Canyon leuc'.ear Power Plant.

In the meantime, the,'ERR starf has informed L'<<R applicants and licensees of fts new requirements in the emergency planning area by means of various letters and orders.

Highlights of these current staff requirements which have not yet been accommodated in the emergency plans for the plant are:

(a)

Demonstration of he ability to fully implement tihe final approved emer"ency plans.

(b)

Upgrade the Califarnia State and lOCal emergenCy planS far the Site in aCCOrdanCe <<ith the criteria contained in NUREG-0654'ERA-REP-including:

(1)

Adoption of the predetermined e...e gency'Ce:ection/c!!ssification/notification/

immediate action scheme in iNURE:.-'510, and provision of corresponding emergency action levels.

(2)

Provisions of capability to noti y the :colic <<ithin 10 miles of the s ation in ;n expeditious fashion (i.e., within 15 minutes of notification of offsite authorities by the ooerator) in the event of s sa"ious accident.

(c)

Estaolisnment of a near-site emergency aper at',ons facili:y, includirg all required appointments.

(d) implementation of an acceptable public information program.

"'33

C