ML16341C210

Safety Evaluation Related to the Operation of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant,Units 1 and 2.Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323.(Pacific Gas and Electric Company)

ML16341C210
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	08/15/1984
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
NUREG-0675, NUREG-0675-S27, NUREG-0675-S27-ERR, NUREG-675, NUREG-675-S27, NUREG-675-S27-ERR, NUDOCS 8409040032
Download: ML16341C210 (36)

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, O. C.'20555 I

August 15, 1984 ERRATA SHEET FOR NUREG-0675, Supplement No.

27 Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2

Ap endix A

The attached Appendix A, referenced on p.

11 of the report, was not included in the original printing.

Please add the attached appendix to NUREG-0675, Supplement No. 27, published July 1984.

DIVISION OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION AND DOCUMENT CONTROL

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Oiablo Canyon Unit 1 fs consistent with the intent of the guiCe'iines of NUREG"0612.

CONTENTS ABSTRACT o

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

1.

INTRODUCTION

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1.1 Purpose of Review..

1.2 Generic

Background

1.3 Plant-Specific

Background

2.

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2.1 Overview...

4 2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems

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4 2.3 General Guidelines

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7 2.4 Interim Protection Measures 18 3.

CONCLUDING

SUMMARY

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22 3.1 Applicable Load Handling Systems 22 3.2 Guideline Recommendations 22 4.

REFERENCES..

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31 TABLES

2. 1 Category 1 overhead handling systems

3. 1 NUREG compliance matrix..

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CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 (PHASE I) 1.

INTRODUCTION

1. 1 Purpose of Review This technical evaluation report documents the EGEG Idaho, Inc.,

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review of general load-handling policy and procedures, at Diablo Canyon Unit. 1.

This evaluation was performed with the objective of assessing conformance to the general load-handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," [1], Section

5. 1. 1.

This constitutes Phase I of a two-phase evaluation.

1.2 Generic Back round Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes to these measures.

This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 f2], to all power reactor applicants, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants."

The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential

problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load-handling accidents and should be upgraded.

in order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-phase P

objeMive using an accep ed approach or protec ion philosophy.

i>>e first portion of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Article 5. l. 1, is.o ensure that all load-handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated such that their probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are, employed.

The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Articles 5. 1.2 through 5. 1.5, is to ensure that, for load"handling systems in areas where their failure might d

result in significant consequences, either (a) features are provide in addition to those required for all load-handling

systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g.,

a single-failure-proof crane) or (b) conservative evaluations of load-handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small.

Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.

The approach used to develop the staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a load drop was based on defense in depth and is summarized as follows:

o Provide sufficient operator training, handling system

design, load-handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system o

Define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment o

Provide mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to prevent movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or in proximity to equipment associated with redundant shutdown paths.

Staff guidelines'esulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612.

1.3 Plant-Specific

Background

On Oecember 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter [3] to Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), the applicant for Oiablo Canyon, requesting that the applicant review provisions for handling and control of heayy loads at Oiablo Canyon, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent dete~mination of conformance to these guidelines.

On September 24,

1981, PG&E provided the initial response

[4] to this request.

On September 30,

1982, PG&E provided a

revised response

[9] to this request.

An additional revised response

'10]

to the request was provided by PG&E on May 9, 1983.

.Information was also sent by PG&E on October 14, 1983 [11] and June 15, 1984 [12].

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2.

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

'.1 Overview The following sections summarize Pacific Gas and Electric's review of heavy load-handling at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 accompanied by EGKG's evalua fon,'onclusions, and recommendations to the applicant.

The applicant has indicated'the weight'of a heavy load,or this facility (as defined in NUREG-0612, Ar icle 1.2) as 1813 pounds.

'.2 Heav Load 0'verhead Handlino' stems This section reviews the applicant's list 'of overhead handling systems which are subject to the criteria of NUREG'-0612 and a review of the justification for excluding overhead handling systems from the above"mentioned list.

2.2.1

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"Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all over head handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis) and justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from your list by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal."

A.

Summar of Applicant's Statements The applicant's review of overhead handling systems identified the cranes and hoists shown in Table 2. 1 as those which handle heavy loads in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment.

TABLE 2.1 CATEGORY 1

OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS Crane C-140-01 C-140-06 C"140-13 AF-140-08 AF"115-04 AF-115-05 AF-115"10 AF"115" 11 AF"115-12 AF-115-13 AF-100"06 AF-100-07 AF-85-01 AF-85"09 AF"73-01 AF-73-02 AF"73"03 AF"73"04 AF-73-05 Descriotion 200 Containment Structure Polar Crane T

2T Reactor Head Stud Tensioner Monorail 15T Missile Shield Hoist 125 Fuel Handling Area Crane T

12 Monorail for RHR Heat Exchangers 1-1, 1-2 T

12 Monorail for RHR Heat Exchangers 2-1, 2-2 T'

Monorail for Motor-Generator Set 1-1 T

2 Monorail for Motor-Generator Set 1-2 T

3 Monorail for Motor-Generator Set 2-1 T

2 Monorail for Motor-Generator Set 2-2 T

3 Monorail for Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump 1-2

'T 3

Monorail for Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump 1-1 T

1-1/2 Monorail for Safety Injection Pumps 1-1, 1-2 T

1-1/2 Monorail for Safety Injection IPumps 2-1, 2"2 T

3 Monorail for Component Cooling Water Pumps 1-1, 1-2, 1"3 T

3 Monorail for Component Cooling Water Pumps 2-1, 2-2, 2-3 T

3 Monorail for Charging Pumps 1-1, 1-2 T

3 Monorail for Charging Pumps 2-1, 2-2 T

2 Monorail for Containment Spray Pumps 1-1, 1-2, and T

Charging Pumps 1-3

TABLE 2. 1 (Continued)

Crane AF-73-06 AF"64-04 AF-64-05 T-140"01 T-140-02 T-119"05 T"119"06 1"17.5-01 Oescriotion 2

Monorail for Containment Spray Pumps 2-1, 2-2, and T

Charging Pumps 2-3 Oual 2

Monorail for RHR Pumps 1-1, 1-2 T

Oual 2

Monorail for RHR Pumps 2-1, 2-2 T

115,Turbine Building Bridge Crane T

115 Turbine Building Bridge Crane T

20 Monorail for Moisture Separator Reheater 1-2A 3

Monorail for Building Heater Reboiler 0-1 T

50 Intake Structure Gantry Crane

The applicant has also identified rumerous other cranes thai have been excluded from satisifying the cri.eria oi the general guidelines of NUREG-0612.

The first criteria used to exclude cranes was physical separation.

The applicant defined physical separation "as horizontal offset between he load path and any target comoonent at any elevation underneath the load, accounting for the width of the load and the target."

Load-handling systems were also excluded "if the only component which could be damaged by the load drop would already be out of service, for repair, or main enance."

Systems carrying loads less than the defined heavy load of 1813 lb were also excluded.

8.

EGEG Evaluation The applicant has used criteria consistent with the in'.ent of NUREG-0612 to exclude cranes from satisfying. the criteria of the general guidelines.

C.

EGM Conclusions and Recommendations On basis of the information provided, EGM concludes that the applicant has included all applicable hoists and cranes in their list of handling systems which must comply with the requirements of the. general guidelines of NUREG-0612.

2.3 General Guidelines This section addresses the extent to 'which the applicable handling systems comply with the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1. 1.

EGKG's conclusions and recommendati9ns are provided in summaries for each guideline.

The NRC has established seven "general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense"in-dep h approach for he handling of heavy loads.

These guidelines consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:

o Guideline 1Safe Load Paths o

Guideline 2Load Handlipg Procedures o

Guideline 3Crane Operator Training o

Guideline 4Special Lifting Devices o

Guideline 5Lifting Devices (not specially designed) o Guideline 6Cranes

( Inspection,

Testing, and Maintenance) o Guideline 7"-Crane Design.

These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhead handling systems and programs in order to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent-fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop'may damage safe shutdown systems.

The succeeding paragraphs address the guidelines individually.

2.3.1 Safe Load Paths Guideline 1

NUREG-0612 Article 5. 1. 1 1

"Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent-fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment.

The path should follow, to,the extent practical, structural floor members,

beams, etc.,

such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact.

These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floo'r in the area where the load is to be handled.

Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

A.

Summar of Acol cant's Statements PG&E included in 'heir response several drawings showing load paths for the cranes listed in Table 2. 1.

The apolicant also stated that these'load paths were determined with the objective of avoiding the spent-fuel pool, the reactor cavity, and other safe y-related equipment where possible."

The applicant s ated that detailed procedures will identify areas of exclusion and 'other administrative requirements, The lifting procedure(s) wi 11 require the rigger-in-charge to provide visual aid to the crane operator.

B.

EG&G Evaluation PG&E has developed and shown load paths on equipment layout drawings for all of the applicable cranes.

While marking the load path on the floor is not mentioned by the applicant, they have stated that visual aid will be provided by the rigger-in-charge with the help of detailed drawings.

C.

EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Procedures and safe load paths for heavy loads at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 are consistent with the intent of Guideline 1 based on the information provided by PG&E.

2.3.2 Load-Handlin Procedures Guideline 2

NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.1 2

"Procedures should be developed to cover load-handling operations for heavy loads'hat are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment.

At a minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.

These procedures should include:

identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance critria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."

A.

Summar of Applicant's Statements PG&E uses a general procedure for handling heavy equipment (PG&E Nuclear Plant Administrative Procedure C-702).

They also stated that additional procedures "identify major lifts, handling, interlocks, and other administrative requirements."

B.

EG&G Evaluation The applicant states that load-handling procedures have been developed at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant.

These procedures were also stated to contain the information specified in the guideline.

C.

EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Diablo Canyon Uni.

1 is consistent with Guideline 2 in that procedures have been developed by the applicant to meet the criteria of this guideline.

2.3.3 Crane 0 erator Trainin Guideline 3

NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1 3

"Crane operators should be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapters 2-3 of ANSI 830.2-1976,

'Overhead and Gantry Cranes'5]."

A.

Summar of A olicant's Statements PG&E stated that "training courses; operator certification, and procedures to control operator conduct all meet the

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'equirements of ANSI 830.2"1976 without exception.

A training course for qualifying crane operators, "Maintenance Training Course H-21," has been developed as "Nuclear Plant Administrative Procedure 8-750."

In developing courses, ANSI 830.2"1976 is being followed without exceptions.

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B.

EG&G Evaluation Based on the applicant's

response, training courses, operator certification, and conduct are consistent with this guideline..

C.

EG&G Conclusion and Recommendations Oiablo Canyon Unit 1 procedures and requirements are consis ent with the requirements of Guideline 3 based on the information provided.

2.3.4 Soecial Liftin Oevices Guideline 4

NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.1 4

"Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978,

'Standard for Special Lifting Oevices for Shipping Containers Meighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials'6].

This standard should 'apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy, loads in areas as defined above.

For opera ing plants, certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard.

In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2. 1. 1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteris ics of the crane which will be used.

This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2. 1. 1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on'only the weight (static load) or the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device."

A.

Summar of Ao licant's Statements The applicant identified five special lifting devices that must conform with ANSI N14.6 requirements.

They were the reactor vessel head lifting device, the reactor internals lifting device, the reactor vessel inspection tool (RVIT) 1 lifting device, the reactor coolant pump motor (RCP) lifting

device, and the component cooling water (CCW) pump motor lifting device.

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PG&E statements regarding these lifting devices are s ated as follows:

The firs. four devices have been shown to satisfy the intent of all applicable ANSI N14.6-1978 reouirements.

PG&E is presen'y procuring a

new CCW pump motor lifting device which will meet the ANSI N14.6 structural requiremen s.

The reactor vessel head lifting device, consists of a welded and bolted structural steel frame, with suitable rigging for lifting and storing the head during refueling operations.

It is evaluated in detail against ANSI H14.6.

The reactor internals lifting device is another structural steel frame suspended from the Containment Polar Crane.

When used to remove the upper internals, it is lowered onto the guide tube suppor plate and manually bolted to the plate with three bolts.

The lower internals are removed and installed in a similar fashion, with three bolts into the support flange.

Bushings on the lifting device frame engage guide studs in the vessel flange to provide lateral guidance during removal and replacement of the internals packages.

The device's adequacy while lifting the upper internals is evaluated in detail against ANSI N14.6.

The lifting device is'not evaluated for the lower internals lift, since there is no possible safety effect from a lower internals drop.

The reactor coolant pump motor lifting device consists primarily of three sling assemblies and a spreader assembly.

The sling assemblies are 'connected at the top to a master link engaging the polar crane hook.

Each sling assembly consists of a sling, a pair of shackles, and a

turnbuckle, all general-purpose catalogue items.

The slings are now being replaced with new slings, each rated at 20 tons under ANSI B30.9-1971.

Design safety margins for these items were derived by comparing the rated loads, proof 12

loads, and the ultimate'loads against

.he actual lifted loads.

The spreader assembly consis.s of thro e tubular members attached end to end to form a triangle.

Three side plates are bent around and welded at the corners.

The sling assemblies, spread by the triangular structure, bear against these side plates.

The lift rig was supplied by Westinghouse, who performed a design evaluation recently to verify its compliance to NUREG-0612 and ANSI N14.6-1978 requirements.

The evaluation results, modified for the new 20-ton slings, are presented in detail.

PG&E plans to contract out the reactor vessel inspection to specialized contractors, and to require the contractor's RVIT lifting device to comply with all applicable portions of ANSI N14.6.

PGKE's present reactor vessel inspection contractor is Westinghouse Nuclear Services Division (WNSD).

The lifting device consists of a double tripod of structural steel with a central hook.

Once the hook engages the eye at the top center of the RYIT, the feet of the lower tripod are forced down onto three steadying pads by the hydraulically-actuated upper tripod, forming a rigid unit.

WNSD has qualified this lifting device under ANSI N14.6.

The calcula.ions are filed at the WNSD offices in Pittsburgh, PA, in file 95041-9, with reference number PDC-TSST-C-80-157.

They are available on request.

The CCW pump motor lifting device is'used to transmit the motor weight from the two liftpoints to the hook of the monorail hoist above.

It is required because o'f the limited headroom beneath the hoist.

A new device will be built before the next CCW pump motor lift.

The new device will satisfy the requirements of ANSI N14.6.

The CCM pump motor is not a critical load as defined in Section 2 of ANSI N14.6, so Section 6 requirements do not apply.

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The remaining special lifting devices are not important to safety.

They do not carry loads over spent fuel, or over safe-shu-down components except those that are needed to serve the lif ed equipment.

These lifting devices are thus excluded from the ANSI N14.6 evaluation.

B.

'EG&G Evaluation I

The applicant identified five special lifting devices.

In EG&G's judgment, PG&E's evaluation of these devices is consistent with the intent of this guideline and the requirements of ANSI N14.6.

PG&E evaluation showed that in one case the stress design factors of ANSI N14.6 are not satisfied.

However, the design factors in all cases meet AISC allowables.

EG&G feels that for the case where ANSI N14.6 stress design factors are not satisfied, a testing and inspection program with special at ention to those parts which have lower

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safety factor is consistent with the intent of the guideline.

Also, procedures to reduce the possibility of impact or dynamic loads should be used for this device.

PG&E has stated that they will restric. the hoist speed of all cranes to 20 ft per minute, and that this will reduce the dynamic load with this device.

C.

EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is consistent with the intent of Guideline 4 and ANSI N14.6-1978.

PG&E commitments to this guideline should be complete for each special lifting device before it is used to lift a heavy load near fuel or safety-related equipment.

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2.3.5 Lif.in Devices Not Soeciall Oesioned Guideline 5

NUREG-0612, Ar.icle 5.1.1 5)

"Lifting devices

.hat are not specially designed should be insta.lied and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, 'Slings'7].

However, in selec.ing the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the sta:ic and maximum dynamic load.

The rating identified'on the sling should be in terms of the 'sta ic load'hich produces the maximum static and dynamic load.

Where this restricts slings to use on only certain

cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."

A.

Summar of Applicant's Statements The applicant states that all slings used at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 meet or exceed the requirements of ANSI B30.9-1971, except that approximately half of the slings were proof-tested and tagged since they had not been tagged prior to the applicant's initial response.

The applicant also states tha-dynamic loads are accounted for in sling marking and use.

B.

EG&G Evaluation The applicant's response provides sufficient information for EG&G to state that they are consistent with Guideline 5.

C.

EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations The Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant is consiste'nt with Guideline 5.

2.3.6 Cranes Ins ection Testin and Maintenance Guideline 6

NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.1 6

"The crane should be imspected,

tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976,

'Overhead and Gantry Cranes,'ith the exception that tests and inspections

should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to me t he frequencies of ANSI B30.2 or periodic inspec.ion and

test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspec-ion and tes-frequency (e.g.,

the polar crane inside a

P'w'R containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation.

ANSi B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly.

For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections,

est, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use)."

A.

Summar of Ao licant's Statements Crane inspection,

testing, and maintenance meets or will meet the requirements of ANSI B30.2 except for certa n tes.

frequencies which cannot be met due to inaccessibility as noted in NUREG-0612 Guideline 6.

B.

EG&G Evaluation The applicant states that PG&E's crane inspection, testing, and maintenance program is based on ANSI B30.2-1976.

C.

EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations The Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant Unit 1 is.cons stent with Guideline 6.

The crane inspection,

testing, and maintenance programs are based on the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976.

2Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI B30.2-1976.</br></br>2" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process..3.7 Crane Desian Guideline 7

NUREG-0612 Article S. 1. 1 7 "The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976,

'Overhead and Gantry Cranes,'nd of CMAA-70, 'Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes'8].

An alternative to a

specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied."

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A.

Summar of Applicant's Statements Bridge cranes at Diablo Canyon were designed prior to publishing of CMAA-70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI 30.2-1967.

The main code used in their design was the "Specification for Electrical Overhead Traveling Cranes for Steel Mill Service," Association of Iron and Steel Engineers Standard No.

6 (tentative) dated May 1, 1969.

Specific differences, between the design codes used and those required by Guideline 7, identified by the applicant include the following:

( 1)

Welding on the cranes was done in accordance with AWS D.2.0 rather than AWS D.14.1, (2)

Impact loading requirements are different, but all the cranes conform to the CMAA 70 specification at their rated capacity.

(3)

CMAA 70 requires higher moments of inertia for longitudinal stiffeners than the AISE code, but load testing has not indicated any problems.

(4)

Nominal allowable stresses vary between the before-mentioned standards.

The applicant justified some differences by comparing crane use and loading criteria between the standards and by stating that cranes have been successfully tested to 125K of rated capacity.

(5)

Mechanical differences in required horsepower, tolerances for wheels, and clearances between wheels and rails were also noted and deemed not to be significant.

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Monorails and hoists which do not fall into classifications of which CMAA.70 and ANSI S30.2 apply were compared to other sim; lar codes and s andards.

The monorai ls and hoists were stated to satisfy he requirement of these standards, except for five monorails which do not satisfy'ISC allowable stresses.

The mororails are being modified to satisfy the AISC requirements.

8.

EGEG Evaluation The cranes at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant Unit 1 were procured to industrial standards of the time.

Based on PELE's comparison of differences, EG8G would concur that the cranes which PG&E included in their response meet the intent of Guideline 7.

Monorails and other cranes which do not easily fall into the classifications for which CMAA 70 and ANSI 830.2 apply were compared to similar standards, and were stated to comply with those standards, or that modifications were being done-to ensure compliance.

C.

EG8G Conclusions and Recommendations Diablo Canyon Unit I overhead bridge or gantry cranes are consistent with Guideline 7 on the basis of compliance to AISE Standard No.

6 criteria.

Information available on design standards for the cranes listed as being subject to the guidelines shows that they are consistent with standards comparable to those specified by the guideline.

2.4 Interim Protection Measures The NRC s aff has established (NUREG-0612, 'Article 5.3) six interim protection measures to be implemented at operating nuclear power

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plants to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy loads will be handled over the spent-fuel pool and that measures exist to reduce the potential for accidental load drops to impact on fuel in the core or spent-fuel pool.

Four of the six interim measures of the report consist of Guideline 1,

Safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Load-Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes

( Inspection,

Testing, and Maintenance).

The two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria:

o Heavy load technical specifications o

Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.

The applicant's implementation and evaluation of these interim protection measures are contained in the succeedings paragraphs of this section.

2.4.1 Interim Protection Measure 1Technical Specifications "Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-fai lure"proof overhead crane in the fuel storge pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,

'Crane Travel -Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building,'or PWRs and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2,

'Crane Travel,'or BWRs, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool un il implementation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5,1."

A.

Summar of A licant's Statements Station maintenance procedures prohibit movement of heavy loads over the spent-fuel storage pools or the open reactor cavity except under detailed procedures.

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B.

EG&G Evaluation 0:ablo Caryon Unit 1 meets the intent of the requiremen s of Interim Protec ion Measure 1 because he reac or cavity and the fuel pool area are restricted areas unless a detailed procedure has been written directing or permitting such action.

The applicant should review administrative con'rois to ensure that the previous statement is true for all cases.

C.

EG&G Conclusion and Recommendations Oiablo Canyon Unit 1 complies with Interim Protection Measure 1, based on the above evaluation and recommendation.

2.4.2 Interim Protection Measures 2

3 4

and 5Administrative Controls h

"Procedural or administrative measures

[including safe load

paths, load"handling p'ocedures, crane opera or training, and crane inspection]...

can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section

5. 1 of [NUREG-0612]

A.

Summar of Ao licant's Statements Summaries of applicant's statements are contained in discussions of the respective general. guidelines in Sections 2.3. 1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.6, respectively.

B.

EG&G Evaluations Conclusions and Recommendations EG&G evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.3..1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.6.

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2.4.3 Interim Protection Measure 6Soecial Rev!ews for Heav Loads Over the Core A.

"Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools.

This special review should include the fol',owing for these loads:

(a) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise; (b) visual inspections of load-bearing components of cranes,

slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (c) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (d) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g.,

hand

signals, conduct of operations, and content of procedures."

Summar of A olicant's Statements The applicant has stated that the intent of this action has been met by the development of detailed procedures.

These procedures require, pre-lift visual inspection of the crane and all special lifting devices.

In addition, pre-lift meetings will be held to review the procedure.

B.

EGEG Evaluation and Conclusion Diablo Canyon Unit I complies with the intent of Interim Protection Measure 6.

21

3.

CONCLUD1NG

SUMMARY

3. 1 A olicable Load-Hardlino S

s ems The list of cranes and hoists supplied by the aoolicant as being subject to the provisions of NUREG-0612 is adequate (see Section 2.2.1).

3.2 Guideline Recommendations Compliance with the seven NRC guidelines for heavy load-handling (Section 2.3) is satisfied at Diablo Canyon Unit 1.

This conclusion is represented in tabular form as Table 3. 1.

Guideline Recommendation 1.

(Section 2.3.1) a.

Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is consistent with this guideline.

2.

(Section 2.3.2) a.

Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is consistent with this guideline.

3.

(Section 2.3.3) a.

Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is consistent with this guideline.

4.

(Section 2.3.4) a.

Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is consistent with the intent of this guideline.

22

TABLE 3.1 1)<

CANYON COHPLIANCE HATRI Ã Equipment Desi nation C-140-01 Contairm<ent

. Polar,Crane (200T

.Gantry) 1

~ 8

~,

Iieav Loads 1.

Reactor head w/CRDH lifting device

.',."2.'pper Internals w/

'ifting device 3.

Lower internals w/

Ilfting dev ice 4.. Hissile shield 5.

Internals lifting

.,device 6.

Reactor head

. lifting device 7.

Reactor coolant pump motor 8.

Reactor coolant pump Internals lieiqht OI Capac ity J t~ons 142.ST T.5T 12.5T 3.8T 43 8T Safe Load Paths Procedures Guide I ine I Guide l lne 2 Guideline 3 Crane Operator Trainlna4

~

Guidel i<a! 4 Spec ia I L lft lnq Devices Iuiide I ln! 5 S I ines Gu i<I<!I lne 6<

Gran<!-Test ul<I Inspect inn G<ui<I< ~ I llu! I

.I:r!nn Ih s I<!n 9.

Reactor coolant pump flywheel 10 ~ Reactor coolant

.pump hatch

11. Containment fan cooler motor

12. Iiead bolts and nuts 6.4T C

1.5T 2T 5.4T

TABLE 3.1 (i:d)

Equipment Desi nation CF-140-06 He~d Stud Tensioner (2

Honorall)

AF-140-08 Fuel Handling Area Crane (125T-Br idge)

AF-II5-N and -05

'RHRPeat Exchangers (12 Honora I Is)-

AF-115-10, -11,

-If and -13 HG-Sets (2 -'Honora I ls)

Iieav Loads

13. Reactor vessel Inspection tool

14. Hain hoist load block Tensloner 1.

, lieu fuel In shipping containers 2.

Spent-fuel

shipping cask 3.

RCP motor Hain hoist load block Ilatch Cover Ileat.Exchangers (Shell and Tubes)

Hotor

.Generator Weight or Capac Ity J t~ons 5.25' 3T 3r 3T 43.BT 2.5T 4

3 11.55T 1.25T

<2T Safe Load Paths Procedures Guideline I Guide 1 ine 2 Guide I ine 3 Crane Operator IraInino Gulde 1 lne 4 Spec lal L Ift lng Oev ines

=Guideline 5

S I lngs Gu idol Inc 6 I:rane-Test and I nsnect Inn Guideline 7

I'.r.snr. Dris iqn

TASLE 3+I ii iued) fquIpment

~Oesl nation AF-100-06 Hotor Driven Auxlliar~ Feed Pujaps (3 Honora I 1)

AF-100-07 Turbine Or Iven Aux I I iary Feed Pup) iio. 1-1 (3

Honorall)

(n AF-85-01 and -09 Safety In)ection Pumps

( I-I/2 Honoralls)

Heav~tnads Hotor Turbine Hotor Ilelght or Capacity

~tons }

2.0T

2. 3T 2.75T 1.25T 1.04T 1

33T Guideline I

Guideline 2

Safe Load Paths Procediires C

C Guideline 3

Crane Operatnr Tralninn Guideline 4

Spec ia1 L ifting Oev Ici.s Guide I ini 5

5 linas Gin ide I lne 6 i:rane-Test anil Inspect ion I'iu iiieI inn 7

Crane Onslqn AF-73-01 and -02 Coaponent Cool)ng Mater Pumps (3 Nonorail)

AF-73-03 and -04 Charging Pumps I-I I-f, 2-1, and 2-2 (3

Honora I I)

Hotor Hotor 2 95 2.15 3 75T 1.95T

TABLE 3.1 (t.i oed)

Equi plaent Desi natIon Ifeight OI Capacity

~tonst Safe Load Paths Procedurns Guide 1 ine I

Gulde I ine 2

Guide l lne 3 Crann.

Operator Traininu Guideline 4

Spec ia I L Iftinq Oev lCeS Guideline 5

S linus Gui<<el inn 6 Croon-Tost slnli Inspect inn Guideline 1

Crane Oes lan AF-73-05 and -06 Containtnent Spray Puays l-l, 1-2, 2-1, and 2-2 and Charging Pixnps 1-3 and 2-3 (2'onoralI) r AF-64-04 and -05 Residual Heat Rival Ponps (4

IIonorail)

T-140-01 and -02 2-115.

Turb lne Bul ldlng Bridge Cranes Contairvaent spray puxtp alotor Contalrxxent spray puap Rec lprocat lng charging pump motor Reciprocating charging f luld drive Iiotor el th lapel ler 1-35T 0.95T 2 IT C

C I ~

Generator rotor 192 C

(96 each crane) 2.

Exc Iter hous lng 3.

Exc Iter 4.

LP turbine crossover tee 5.

LP rotor B.5T 40T 22T 10ST II/A

'/A C

6.

HP turbine rotor 55T N/A

TAaLE 3.1 (i.

!d)

Equipment

~Oesi nation Heav Loads 1.

HP outer cover;-

8.

F.II. puep turbine cover 9.

F.II. pump turbine roto'r 10.

LP turbine outer covcl

11. LP turhlne cylinder cover No.

I 12.

LP turbine cylinder cover No.

2

13. Turbine hearing covers

14. Turbine blade rings Hohlle crane Condensate puay motor Hain hojst load block 3!

Height ol Capacity

~tons~

as>

gT 1.9T TOT 28T ss.sT 2T (max) 4.2ST 20T s.sT Safe Load Paths Proceiiurcs Guide l inc I Guideline 2

Guidr.l inc 3 Crane Oprratnr iralninq Guiiicl inc 4 Silei: Ia I L ifting Ocv icos N/A N/A N/A G!iiiicI Inc 5 S I inns 4

I'iniiii!I inc 6 Grani!-fest a lill Insnect Inn Gii! 1(ii!I Inc 7

Crane I!cs Iqn T-119-05 Hoisture Separator IIeh~ater No.

1-2A (20 Honorail)

High pressure tube bundle Lou pressure tube bundle 14 5T g.asT

TABLE 3.1 t..nued)

Equipment Oesf nation T-119-06 Building Nea)fng Re-Boiler (3 Honor a I 1 )

T-J1.5-01 50'ntake Structure Gantry Crane

~lleav Loads Tube bundle 1.

C frculat fng water pump motor rotor and shaft 2.

Circulating water puap motor stator and winding 3.

C frculat lng water pump shaFt and impeller 4.

C frculat ing water pump hatch cover 5.

Circulating water discharge valve 6.

AuxIIfary salt

~ater pump motor l.

Auxil fary salt water motor 8.

Auxillar y sal t water pump hatch cover ffefqht or Capacity

@tons) 1.08T 34.75T 32.5T 24.5T 8.5T 2.6T 2.6T 1.3T Safe Load Paths Procedures Guideline 1

Gufrfel fnn 2 Ciu Idol fno 3 Crane Operator lraininn Gufdnl lui! 4 Sncc fa I Liftfnq Devices N/A N/A N/A N/A Ciir Id@I fni. 5 Sl inns rhildfiolinc fi Cranir-f<<st villif Insnuct fnn C

Gir filialinc 7

Cr.hand. Oi.s iqn C.

ii P

TABLE 3.1 (4~

ad)

Equip<<<ent Oesi nation Heav Loads 9.

Bar racks

10. Circulating water traveling screens ll. Auxiliary salt water traveling screens

12. Screen wash pump o<otor

13. Screen wash pump

14. Auxiliary salt water gates

15. Screen gates l6. Load block lieight or 4.5'3.0T 13 '5T 1.2T 1.8T 3T 6T 1.7T Safe Load Paths Procedures Guideline 1

Guidel ine 2 Guideline 3

Crane Operator Traininn Guideline 4

Special Lift ing Oev lees N/A Guide I inn 5 Slinns 0<<< i<tel in<. 6 Cfan<.'-I<<st and Insj>ect Inn Gu l<l<<1 ln>>

1 Cran<~ Oes i<in C

Applicant action compiles with NUREG-0612 Guideline.

NC ~ Applicant action docs not comply with NUREG-0612 Guideline.

~ Applican't has proposed revisions/<<x<dlf ications designed to comply with NURKG-0612 Guideline.

I

~ lnsuff icient !nformation provided by the Applicant.

Guideline Recommendation 5.

(Section 2.3.5) a.

Diablo Canyon Unit 1 slings are consistent with this guideline.

6.

(Section 2.3.6) a..

PGKE's crane inspection testing and maintenance program is consistent with this guideline.

7.

(Section 2.3.7) a.

Cranes and hoists at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 are consistent with the intent of this guideline.

The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Article 5.3) that certain measures should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5. 1 is complete.

Specified measures include the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit the handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool; compliance with Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section

5. 1. 1; a review of load-handling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes,

slings, and special lifting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure.

The evaluation of information provided by the applicant indicates that, Diablo Canyon Unit 1 complie's with the staff's measures for interim protection.

30

4.

REFERENCES 1.

NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, NRC.

2.

V. Stello, Jr.

(NRC), Letter to all applicants.

Subject:

Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Nea>

Spent

Fuel, NRC, 17 May 1978.

3.

USNRC, Letter to PG&E.

Subjec NRC Request'or Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel,

NRC, 22 Oecember 1980.

5.

P.

A. Crane, Jr.

(PG&E), Letter to F. J. Miraglia, Jr.

(NRC).

Subject:

Response

Request for Additional Information, PG&E, 24 September 1981.

ANSI 830.2-1976, "Overhead and Gantry Cranes."

6.

ANSI N14.6-1978, "Standard for Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or more for Nuclear Materials."

7.

ANSI 830.9-1'971 "Slings "

8.

CMAA-70, "Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes."

9.

P. A. Crane, Jr.

(PG&E), Letter to F. J. Miraglia, Jr.

(NRC).

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads, PG&E, 30 September 1982.

10.

P.

A. Crane, Jr.

(PG&E), Letter to G.

W. Knighton (NRC).

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads, PG&E, 9 May 1983.

11.

J. 0. Schuyler (PG&E), Letter to G.

W. Knighton (NRC).

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads, PG&E, 14 October 1983.

12.

J. 0. Schuyler (PG&E), Letter to G:

W. Knighton (NRC).

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads, PG&E, 15 June 1984.

23349 31