ML17058B640
| ML17058B640 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/09/1991 |
| From: | NRC - INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17056C371 | List:
|
| References | |
| CON-IIT07-526A-91, CON-IIT07-526B-91, CON-IIT7-526A-91, CON-IIT7-526B-91 NUREG-1455, NUDOCS 9305070266 | |
| Download: ML17058B640 (98) | |
Text
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ORlt'ieL OF PROCEEDINGS U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Incident Investigation Team TitIe:
Interview of Brian Grimes (Closed)
Bethesda,.Maryland Monday, September 9,
1991 p<0ES.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM 7
INTERVIEW OF:
8 BRIAN GRIMES 9
[CLOSED]
10 12 14 15 16 17 18 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Conference Room 100 The Woodmont Building 8120 Woodmont Avenue
- Bethesda, Maryland 19 20 21
- Monday, September 9,
1991 The above-entitled interview commenced in closed 22 session at 1:00 0'clock p.m.
23 24 25
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PARTICIPANTS:
JOSE IBARRA, IIT Team Member FRANK ASHE, IIT Team Leader RICHARD CONTE, IIT Team Leader BRIAN GRIMES, Interviewee LYNN ESTEP, Court Reporter 10 12
~s 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
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P R 0 C
E E
D I N G
S INTERVIEW OF BRIAN GRIMES
[1:00 o'lock p.m.]
MR.
CONTE:
Good afternoon.
It's almost 1:00 5
o'lock on the 9th of September.
We'e in Bethesda Maryland 6
at the Woodmont Building.
We'e conducting interviews associated with an 8
event that occurred at Nine Mile Unit 2, August 13th,
- 1991, 9
where there was a loss of power to annunciators and 10 subsequent declaration of site emergency.
We'e here with 11 Brian Grimes and we'l introduce each other.
12 My name is Richard Conte, I'm from Region I.
13 MR.
IBARRA:
Jose Ibarra, I'm a member of the 14 IIT/NRR.
15 16 MR.
ASHE:
Frank Ashe, I'm member of the IIT/NRR.
MR.
CONTE:
Brian, will you give your name and 17
,your current position?
18 MR.
GRIMES:
- Yes, Brian K. Grimes, and I'm 19 Director, Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards in 20 NRR.
21 MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
Let me just ask you what your 22 involvement -- you or your staff's involvement in the site 23 area emergency, August 13th, 1991 at Nine Mile 2?
MR.
GRIMES:
Essentially none.
As I mentioned 25 before we went on the record, I was on vacation at the time
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1 and was back briefly last week, and this was my third day in 2
the office.
So, I have just a very sketchy knowledge of the 3
incident, itself.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
How about past involvement with 5
the generic letter 83-28 on the Salem ATWS actions dealing 6
primarily with the broader scope issue of important to 7
safety and the handling of vendor-related information, as it 8
applies to the safety-related and nonsafety-related?
MR.
GRIMES:
I was involved in discussions, 10 particularly after 83-28 was first published, and we got the 11 industry responses then as to the adequacy of industry 12 responses.
We also did some vendor inspections at that time 13 which looked at vendor interface at -- vendor inspections at 14 plant sites, which looked at vendor interface and brought 15 that perspective back to the -- to the technical groups.
I 16 was also involved in discussions leading up to the 17 supplement to 83-28, where we -- we redefined our 18 expectations on what -- what should be done, in terms of 19 vendor interface information, and to what degree utilities 20 should have established relationships between the various 21 vendors themselves.
22 MR. ASHE:
Could you define the scope of that for 23 us, please?
Are you covering just safety-related equipment, 24 or were you covering safety-related and nonsafety-related, 25 in terms of vendor information?
MR.
GRIMES:
Principally, the safety-related.
2
- Although, from time to time, we d get into things which are 3
required by the NRC that are not strictly safety-related, 4
the ATWS and things that are not defined as safety-related, 5
but nevertheless, have requirements on them.
Occasionally 6
we look at that sort of thing.
In terms of the vendor branch and vendor fraud 8
- areas, we go beyond strictly safety-related at some times 9
when there's misrepresentation.
But, in general, we stick 10 to safety-related.
12 MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
How about the maintenance role?
MR.
GRIMES:
Little involvement in the maintenance 13
- role, some indirect involvement.
I have -- one of my 14 branches is the Special Inspection
- Branch, and we did a 15 couple of maintenance team inspection out of headquarters, 16 one at North Anna and one I believe at Salem in the last few 17 years.
So, I have some insight, on the development of the 18 maintenance team inspection and conduct of those, but I was 19 not involved in the current negotiations on the maintenance 20 role.
21 MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
One last question on 22 establishing the scope of your knowledge here.
In 23 particular, the IE -- I'm sorry, the NRC Information Notice 24 85-05, which dealt with the loss of annunciators to -- at 25
" three plants, that was attributed to a
common power -- a
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1 common vendor-made equipment.
Any involvement in that 2
information?
MR.
GRIMES:
You'l have to remind me what the 4
what the vendor was and the equipment
- was, because I don' 5
remember the information notice by the number.
MR.
CONTE:
There were fires in the control 7
cabinets. I'l have to look it up for you.
MR.
ASHE:
Okay.
There were fires in the control 9
cabinets, I believe, that ultimately resulted in loss of 10 annunciators and some instrumentation, that was the issue 11 that was addressed.
12 MR.
GRIMES:
I don't recall right off the top.
13 MR. ASHE:
In terms of your maintenance team 14 inspections, can you expound on that a little bit, in terms 15 of the kinds of equipment that you were primarily focusing 16 on?
Is it Class 1E stuff that's viewed as safety-related, 17 as opposed to non-Class 1E?
18 MR.
GRIMES:
The two that we did were principally 19 safety-related equipment.
The only nonsafety-related 20 emphasis that I'e been involved in in the inspection area 21 recently was about
'86 or '87 we developed a balance-of-22 plant inspection module, to assist the regions in looking at 23 nonsafety-related areas.
We did, as I recall, perhaps one 24 prototype inspection and I think one or two of the regions 25 since then have done some balance-of-plant inspections.
But
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1 there is an inspection module on balance-of-plant that I 2
think came after the Commission paper on important to 3
safety.
MR.
IBARRA:
What does that cover?
MR.
GRIMES:
I covers how you would go about 6
taking ga sample of balance-of-plant.
equipment and what sort 7
of regulatory leverage we have or don't have and from what 8
standpoint should the inspector look at it, in terms of the 9
context o the safety of the plant.
10 12 MR.
IBARRA:
Okay.
But this is an inspection?
MR.
GRIMES: It's an inspection.
MR.
IBARRA:
So, you actually go out there and then start looking at it?
MR.
GRIMES:
Right, yea.
It's something that' 15 put in the -- it has been put in the inspection manual as a
16 tool for people to use if they find an area in the balance-17 of-plant that they think is worthy of attention.
18 19 20 MR.
CONTE:
Do you happen to remember the number?
MR.
GRIMES:
No.
No, not off-hand.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
It's my understanding that that 21 is an initiative-type inspection.
It's not really a core-22 mandatory 23 24 25 MR.
GRIMES:
Right.
Right.
MR.
CONTE:
-- type inspection?
MR.
GRIMES: It's as needed.
As needed.
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MR.
CONTE:
So, it may or may not have been 2
implemented in--
MR.
GRIMES:
Right.
MR.
CONTE:
-- Nine Mile 2, we just don't know at 5
this point?
MR.
GRIMES:
Yes.
Right.
MR.
IBARRA:
What is the result of that so far?
MR.
GRIMES:
I am having a hard time remembering 9
which plant we did the -- we did, I think, one pilot, 10 perhaps from headquarters or with the Region -- one or more 11 pilots.
Since that time, the only recent one I remember is 12
-- it seems to me Region III did a balance-of-plant I
13 inspection someplace, perhaps at Fermi within the last year.
14 That's the last one I remember.
MR.
ASHE:
Could you expand on the leverage an 16 inspector has in that, area of BOP in such an inspection?
17 You mentioned that earlier.
18 MR.
GRIMES:
Yes.
It's not very much, but if we 19 find technical
- problems, those need to be brought to the 20 attention of the utility, and those problems generally have 21 some indirect safety significance that can be pointed out.
22 I think it kind of goes back to the overall 23 context that the NRC does have the ability to regulate in 24 the balance of planned or non safety related
- area, but we 25 have chosen to focus on a core of what we think is the most
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1 important aspects.
As we find things that require some additional 3
attention either from requirements or from an inspection 4
standpoint, we have the ability to do that, but we'e kind 5
of made the up-front decision to put our resources on this 6
predefined set of things that people have thought about as 7
the most important.
MR.
ASHE:
Do you recall a specific issue in the 9
BOP area that's come out of these maintenance inspections?
10 MR.
GRIMES:
The maintenance inspections?
MR.
ASHE:
Yes.
A specific item or issue in that 12 area.
Do you recall one which fits the category of the I
13 kinds of things that you were talking about?
14 MR.
GRIMES:
No, not under the maintenance 15 inspection offhand.
16 17 MR.
ASHE:
Okay.
MR.
CONTE:
Let's talk about that general 18 philosophy before we go into the details about the handling 19 of the vendor information and preventive maintenance 20 program.
Your name is listed on that.
We have a copy of 21 the SECY paper, 1986.
Your name is listed as a contact.
22 23 MR.
GRIMES:
Right.
MR.
CONTE:
Could you give us the flavor of what' 24 the results of that SECY paper?
All we'e got is the staff 25 recommendation for the Commission to pursue some options,
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but we don't have any documentation to tell us what ever 2
happened to it.
MR.
GRIMES:
As far as I know, it's never been 4
acted on, and it was discussed I think at the time, after it 5
went. up by the commissioners and the top staff management, 6
the EDO at the time -- probably Mr. Stello, I think -- and 7
it was decided that it was -- one of the options was to 8
leave things as they were, and I think that was the option 9
that was chosen.
10 At the time the paper was written, it was at the 1
ll Commission's request.
12 a specif ic request by 1
13 area in more detail.
14 the Commission looked It was not a staff initiative; it was the Commission to try to address this The staff took a shot at it. and when at it, I presume that they decided 15*
that maybe the status quo was okay. because they'e never 16 acted on it.
17 MR.
CONTE:
Would you know that there's a piece of 18 paper that says that, that we opted to do that?
19 MR.
GRIMES:
Not that I know of.
Not. that I know 20 of.
21 MR.
CONTE:
That's the last document in this trail 22 on the importance to safety issue?
23 MR.
GRIMES:
As far as I know.
24 MR.
IBARRA:
The model you listed'arlier, the BOP 25 inspection, wouldn't that be sort of a follow-on?
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11 MR.
GRIMES:
The BOP inspections were a follow-on.
2 After that, we decided that -- and I don't recall whether, we 3
mentioned that possibility in this paper or whether that was 4
ever--
MR.
IBARRA: I think you briefly mention it.
MR.
GRIMES:
But we went ahead and followed up and 7
did put a
BOP inspection module in place.
MR.
CONTE:
As an inspector in the field, I 9
remember getting the word -- I think it was verbal -- that 10 we were discouraged from using the term "important to 11 safety."
Was that ever written or formalized in some shape 12 or form?
And I guess it was about the time that this 13 MR.
GRIMES:
I think that you'e right.
14 MR.
CONTE:
-- second paper came out.
MR.
GRIMES:
Yes, I think you'e right, because 16 people were using it in a variety of different ways, and it 17 was easier to just talk about safety related and things that 18 were not safety related rather than to talk about a class of 19 things which wasn't very well defined.
20 MR.
CONTE:
Was that guidance ever formalized in 21 writing or was it just word of mouth to the staff?
22 MR.
GRIMES:
I don't recall any specific document, 23 but I don't recall a decision to not document it either, so, 24 you know, I suppose it could have been written down as, 25 "Stay away from this terminology because it's causing
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confusion."
But I can't recall exactly at the moment.
MR.
IBARRA: If something was written on it, whose 3
responsibility would it be, what group?
MR.
GRIMES:
Well, it could have come out, either 5
of the I&E organization at that time, or with directions to 6
inspectors, or it could have come out as something out of 7
NRR as general policy to the technical staff.
But I just 8
can't remember a specific memo.
I may have, you know, in 9
normal correspondence reemphasized the point someplace 10 myself; so there may be something
- around, but I don't recall 11 a specific memo.
12 MR.
CONTE:
Let me just make a comment.
It' 13 interesting that the paperwork from the region involved with 14 Nine Mile One -- in relation to Nine Mile One start-up as 15 the terminology>>important to safety" in it.
16 17 18 guideline'.
MR.
GRIMES: It relapsed.
MR.
CONTE:
I got the feeling it was not a written 19 Okay.
I think you'e given us enough on the 20 important to safety concept, and we were going to ask you 21 what ever happened to the SECY 86-164 proposals, and I think 22 you'e answered that.
I guess let's talk about the 23 maintenance rule.
We'e interested in some of your views on 24 specific pieces of equipment in terms of where it fits in 25 the whole scheme of things.
But what is your involvement or
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what was your involvement with the maintenance rule as it 2
relates to your current function?
MR.
GRIMES:
As I indicated, I have had very 4
little involvement with the maintenance rule itself, but. we 5
did do a couple of maintenance team inspections which have 6
fed information into that.
So we did use the maintenance 7
- tree, the tree concept to evaluate maintenance programs and 8
things like that at at least two facilities.
MR.
CONTE:
It's our understanding that those 10 maintenance team inspections, I guess, spoke to utilities 11 and vendors?
Is that. correct 12 MR.
GRIMES:
No.
13 MR.
CONTE:
-- that they involved the vendors?
14 15 16 MR.
GRIMES:
No.
MR.
CONTE:
They were just MR.
GRIMES:
Maintenance team inspections were 17 strictly utilities.
18 MR.
CONTE:
Just utilities.
Okay.
I guess the 19 benefit in those maintenance team inspections were reliance 20 by the Commission that they don't need to get into the 21 details of how to maintain things.
Is that a fair 22 characterization?
23 MR.
GRIMES:
Yes.
I think it was establishing 24 some confidence that there were industry programs in place 25 to perform the principal important functions in the
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14 1
maintenance
- area, and that these were generally being 2
implemented in the field.
That's what the inspection did.
3 It looked both at the programmatic and the implementation 4
aspects of a variety of different subparts of the 5
maintenance program.
MR.
CONTE:
Do you have any information on the 7
apparent di-pole of the staff and the Commission on the 8
maintenance rule as to why they were -- it seems like the 9
Commission wants the rule and the staff didn',
and yet the 10 Commission obviously overruled.
Is there a reason why that 11 difference of opinion?
12 MR.
GRIMES:
My impression at the time was that 13 there was just a difference of opinion on how sure the NRC 14 needed to be that there was future leverage on utilities in 15 the long-term, that the Staff, I think, felt very 16 comfortable with an ongoing process and ongoing relationship 17 with the industry that they didn'0 see changing that much, 18 and Chairman Carr, in particular, worried about the future 19 in terms of making sure that what was done now was going to 20 stay in place.
And I think that was the main thing.
21 I have no insight as to how the current Commission 22 proposal got developed.
That was done kind of at the 23 Commission level.
24 MR.
CONTE:
Do you think that the maintenance rule 25 will solve the problem of poor maintenance practices dealing
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15 1
with non-safety-related equipment?
MR.
GRIMES:
Non-safety-related equipment, of 3
- course, there was some attempt, I know, to expand the 4
definition of what maintenance should cover in the 5
maintenance
- rule, and I guess I didn't study it well enough 6
to say how it would match against the old definitions we had 7
proposed previously.
But it looked to me like there was an 8
attempt. to expand beyond safety-related certainly.
MR.
CONTE:
Just for everybody's benefit, I 10 participated in Mr. Ader s transcript, his interview this ll
- morning, and he's very heavy into that.
And the way he 12 characterizes it is that it's clear the maintenance rule 13 applies to safety-related equipment.
The extent that it 14 applies to non-safety-related equipment is based on some 15 analysis of the availability or unavailability of that 16 equipment, a monitoring function, if you will.
17 And he acknowledges, going from memory, that that 18 would not necessarily -- you know, if there's an urgent 19 preventive maintenance recommendation for a piece of non-20 safety-related equipment, the maintenance rule may or may 21 not pick that up.
1 22 You'e got to wait for it to fail or become 23 unavailable, and then go into some kind of analysis before 24 it gets picked up.
25 MR.
GRIMES:
Yes.
I'm just not familiar with
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MR.
CONTE:
The maintenance rule.
MR.
GRIMES:
-- the maintenance rule itself.
I 3
haven't really studied it.
MR.
CONTE:
Well, how about -- you'e dealing with 5
vendors; is that correct?
MR.
GRIMES:
Right.
And the licensees.
MR.
CONTE:
Can you characterize that interchange 8
in a non-safety
- area, equipment that's classified non-9 safety in terms of how those preventive maintenance 10 recommendations or good operating practices or training are 11 transcribed into the plant?
12 14 MR.
GRIMES: It's highly dependent upon the utility.
Some utilities, as I recall TMI is one of them, treat most everything like it was safety-related, and so 15 they have a
common process for procurement and treating 16 these things in terms of experience.
17 Other plants draw very sharp lines and pay almost 18 no attention to the non-safety-related class of equipment.
19 And there's a third class that's kind of in-20 between.
As things come up that give them problems, they'l 21 feed that into their programs and pay more attention to 22 them.
23 So I'd say there's a pretty wide spectrum of how 24 people handle this.
25 MR.
CONTE:
I think I'd like to go into some of
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the specific equipment. that we'e been looking at with you 2
two guys in the electrical area.
But before we do that, let me ask another general 4
question.
Does your group have any recent maintenance 5
involvement, aside from the Regional implementation of an 6
MTI, at Nine Mile-2?
Do you have any recent information 7
about maintenance practices at Nine Mile-2?
MR.
GRIMES:
The last thing we did at Nine Mile 9
there's a couple things we did at Nine Mile-2, but they'e 10 more than a year old, I think.
MR.
CONTE:
What were they?
12 MR.
GRIMES:
We did a -- the Special Inspection 13
- Branch, we did an inspection.
I think it was in the winter 14 of either
'89 or '90 when Nine Mile was in the midst of its 15 problems with the Headquarters team inspection.
They did 16 one at Calvert Cliffs in a similar timeframe.
17 MR.
CONTE: It was a Special Inspection Branch?
18 MR.
GRIMES:
Yes.
19 20 MR.
CONTE:
What was the focus of it?
MR.
GRIMES: It was on -- it was a mini-diagnostic 21 type of thing to try to determine what some of the root 22 causes of the problems were.
23 MR.
CONTE:
This is the problem that led to the 24 shutdown of Unit-1?
Is that 25 MR.
GRIMES:
I think we were there just after.
J y
18 MR.
CONTE: It was applied to both units, Unit-1 2
and Unit-2?
MR.
GRIMES:
Yes.
We looked at both units.
MR.
CONTE:
Do you remember any MR.
GRIMES:
But I don't remember.
I'd have to 6
pull out the report to say what we did in maintenance.
I 7
don't really recall what we did in maintenance.
I know 8
there were substantially different attitudes between the 9
two, the two units, on operations and maintenance
- matters, 10 but that's about all I can recall.
MR.
CONTE:
We have access to NUDOCs, but not the 12 microfiche themselves at this point.
Could I ask you to t
13 commit to getting that report out?
14 MR.
GRIMES:
Sure.
Give me a piece of paper.
15 16
[Pause.]
MR.
GRIMES:
The other thing, the other 17 involvement with Nine Mile has been through the Vendor 18 Branch where there have been a few problems in terms of 19 equipment, and I think it was electrical equipment, and this 20 dealt with General Electric and how well General Electric 21 qualified the equipment, I believe, or dedicated commercial 22 grade equipment for safety-related purposes.
23 So there probably -- probably is an inspection 24 report or two that would relate to that, if you'e 25 interested.
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19 MR.
ASHE:
Do you recall the specific pieces of 2
equipment you'e talking about installed by GE?
MR.
GRIMES:
No.
MR.
ASHE:
Or any specific piece of equipment?
MR.
GRIMES:
No.
Again, it was a couple years 6
ago.
But it was electrical, in the electrical area.
MR.
ASHE:
All right.
For this mini-diagnostic, 8
who was the Team Leader?
Do you recall the guy on the 9
Special Inspection mini-diagnostics, as you characterized 10 it; do you recall the name of the Team Leader on that?
12 0-
[Pause.]
MR.
ASHE:
You don't recall at the moment?
MR.
GRIMES:
No.
I know I went up for part of the 14 inspection.
15 16 17 MR.
CONTE:
That will be obviously in the report.
MR.
GRIMES: It will be in the report.
MR.
IBARRA:
On that paper, can you also give us a
18 copy of the BOP module inspection?
19 20 module.
MR.
GRIMES:
Yes.
Yes, I'l get you the BOP 21 MR.
IBARRA:
- Brian, can you tell us the Branches 22 under you, please?
23 MR.
GRIMES:
Yes.
The Special Inspection
- Branch, 24 the Vendor Inspection
- Branch, and the Reactor Safeguards 25 Branch.
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20 MR.
IBARRA:
When we'e talking about, the vendor 2
inspection, do you all do hardware as much as also 3
procedures?
MR.
GRIMES:
Oh, yes.
In fact, much of our 5
activities are reactive, and we go out when something fails.
6 For example, we went to ASCO in August, because in early 7
August there was a report -- I think it involved perhaps 8
Calvert Cliffs -- that the calibration seemed to be or 9
something -- it was off when they used it, used the -- when 10 they did their DC -- checked their DC system or something.
Anyway, the Vendor Branch sent one or two people 12 out and determined that the vendor was using -- had the 13 wrong value in the vendor manual.
They had used an AC value 14 for DC solenoid valves.
15 So the vendor has committed by the end of 16 September to, you know, determine what the right value is 17 and get to their customers and to report back to us.
18 So a lot of the vendor activity is reactive to 19 specific hardware problems rather than procedural.
Now when 20 we'e out there, we also look at their Part 21 reporting 21 evaluations and try to make sure that that threshold is 22 right and they'e doing -- notifying their customers of 23 problems.
24 But often it's triggered not by the fact that we 25 haven't been there for awhile, but rather by the fact that
21 1
there's some specific events that we can use as examples to 2
dig into with the vendor.
MR.
IBARRA:
When the NSSS vendors did their EOP 4
revisions or their initial EOPs right after TMI, was your 5
group ever involved into looking into the integration aspect 6
of it?
In other words, when they were doing the EOPs do 8
we know if they had specialists in'I&C, electrical, human 9
factors and so forth in the development of those EOPs?
10 MR.
GRIMES:
I guess we didn't look at that 11 particular aspect and we did get involved after the EOPs 12 were put in place.
We did about 13 inspections of the Mark 13 I facilities, not including Nine Mile.
14 I think that was done by Region I but we did a 15 number of field inspections of how these things were 16 implemented in the field and whether the plant matched the 17 procedures and whether the procedures were doable, whether 18 the operators were trained, and observed simulator exercises 19 but we didn't go into the actual base recommendation of the 20 EOPs.
21 MR.
ASHE:
You mentioned something about vendor 22 inspections.
23 24 Are most of these at the vendor's facility?
MR.
GRIMES:
Most of them are but a few a year are 25 at power plants and there we look both at commercial grade
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22 1
dedication and using commercial grade items and sa fety-2 related things, things that, were not produced under an 3
Appendix B manufacturing process but rather by commercial 4
grade and then special tests done.
That's part is vendor interface, 83-28 for 6
- example, aspects.
In the last year or so our focus has been 7
almost exclusively on the commercial grade.
When we first 8
started in the '86 time frame it was more on the -- '85-'86 9
time frame, I guess it was more on the vendor interface 10 aspects but we -- for the most part people now have systems 11 that you evaluate at least for safety-related aspects with 12 the vendor information when it comes in the door and have it 13 processed and distributed to the right technical folks.
14 This eventually gets into the manuals they use for 15 maintenance on the equipment.
16 MR.
ASHE:
You mentioned that the vendor 17 inspection branch is reactive, suggesting that you wait 18 until something happens and then you go out and do 19 something.
20 21 Is there any activities that are proactive?
MR.
GRIMES:
Yes, there are a few and that are 22 related more to the utility inspections, particularly for 23 example commercial grade dedication, that consciously went 24 to a few plants and inspected them and then that resulted in 25 enough pressure that NUMARC started an initiative in that
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23 area.
We backed off for a year and we'e been doing some assessments.
Now we'e ready to go back to inspections, so that's been a conscious area where we planned to look at a
particular area.
Other than that, I guess there's one, there's two other areas that -- two other places we'e been, GE and Westinghouse, where we have gone in with the idea specifically of looking at their threshold for reporting.
9 That was partly because of past experience but partly 10 because we made a conscious decision that we should, they 11 were pretty important players and that we should look at 12 14 15 16 17 18 that area.
MR.
IBARRA:
Was your branch involved in any of the EQ inspections?
MR.
GRIMES:
Yes.
When I was in IGE we did all the, essentially all the EQ inspections on a fairly rapid schedule.
MR.
IBARRA:
When we were looking at those 19 inspections did we make sure -- was there ever any 20 connection with the EOPs whatsoever?
21 22 Was there any tie-up?
MR.
GRIMES:
I don't recall a direct tie-up.
The 23 EQ scope is a little bit broader or can be a little bit 24 broader than strictly safety-related but I think we relied 25 on the NRR SER to define the scope and then we just went out
~
~
24 1
and looked at the implementation of the things that had been 2
agreed that fell within the scope, so I don't think we were, 3
looking at what should be or should not be inside because 4
they were relied on, the EOPs.
MR.
IBARRA:
Under your programs under the Special 6
Inspection Branch have a term called vertical slice, right, 7
or team inspections, which is a very good mechanism for 8
integration but do all your team inspections include an 9
electrical and an I&C engineer?
10 MR.
GRIMES:
No.
The recent inspections by the 11 Regions we have a current area of emphasis, which is the 12 electrical area, so all of the current major -- a lot of the t
13 current major team inspections are in the electrical area so 14 every plant, and we have been to about 30 I think so we are 15 about half-way through but every plant will have an 16 electrical/vertical slice by early '93, early calendar
'93, 17 and we found a number of problems.
18 In fact we just had a counterpart meeting last 19 week and one day it was devoted to the electrical team 20 inspections, and should we -- one of the questions was 21 should we call a halt now and draw some general relations or 22 should we go on?
23 The consensus was we should go on and do every 24 plant because they are mostly implementation questions.
They 25 aren't questions of telling somebody to do something.
They
I ~
~ ~
25 1
are how somebody implemented what they were supposed to do 2
and the errors they made.
For example, 7 out of 21 I think was the 4
statistics under voltage problems but that wasn' 5
everybody had agreed to take care of under voltage grid 6
problems but the way they did it in detail, engineering 7
- detail, based on their specific systems turned out to not be 8
adequate.
10 Those don't have an I&C component, for example.
Some of our vertical slices cover several 11 different areas, the SSFIs, the electrical and mechanical 12 systems and often they will have an I&C component also t
13 not always but quite frequently.
14 MR.
IBARRA:
For Instrumentation and Control 15 itself, are there any plans for a functional inspection just 16 dealing with instrumentation?
17 MR.
GRIMES:
Yes.
Region V, as a result of a 18 vertical slice we did at San Onofre, one of the pilots for 19 the electrical inspection was a vertical slice.
SSFI at San 20 Onofre had an I&C component.
And out of that inspection, we 21 found enough problems that about a year later, Region V
22 went and looked strictly at I&C and found some, you know, 23 interesting things.
24 My understanding of where that stands is we'e had 25 discussions with the Electrical Branch in Region V, and I
~ ~
26 1
guess the I&C Branch has gotten involved, also.
And I think 2
the thought is to do one or two more pilots with that, with 3
the I&C thing, but, the consensus was it wasn't a big enough 4
safety payoff.
While there were a lot of small findings, it 5
wasn't clear there would be a big enough saving payoff to do 6
it as a major, major thing.
But we are planning to do one 7
or two more pilots with I&C as the focus.
MR.
IBARRA:
Team., inspections, do they include a
9 human factors engineer?
10 MR.
GRIMES:
Not always.
When we did the EOP 11 inspections, we did take along human factors folks, for 12 example.
I think perhaps on the Nine-Mile diagnostic there 13 may have been a human factors person.
It just depends on 14 the scope of the inspection.
But not as a normal, as a
15 normal thing.
16 We get some, I was going to say we get input on 17 PRA from the PRA folks when we go out, as to where they 18 would suggest we focus in terms of importance for that 19 particular plant.
But. we don't usually get human factors 20 input unless it's a human factors-type problem.
21 MR.
CONTE:
Let me see if I can give you some 22 feedback here.
23 You'e saying that the current electrical 24 functional inspections that you'e doing right now are 25 mostly focused on power to the equipment rather than power
~ ~
27 1
on the instruments?
Is that what I'm hearing?
MR.
GRIMES:
Well, I would say yes.
MR.
CONTE:
And you'e kind of piloting this I&C 4
component?
MR.
GRIMES:
We also, of course, worry about 6
whether the operators have the information to take the 7
actions.
But the I&C look was more, in a little more detail 8
as to when the sequence of valve openings, it was 9
mechanical-electrical things.
For example, switching from 10 injection to re-circ.
mode.
You have to look at all the 11 delay times, and you have to determine whether the setpoints 12 take into account all the uncertainties and all the 13 different possible conditions.
14 MR.
CONTE:
So this is looking at the instrument 15 loops themselves, not so much the power supplies to the 16 instrument loops?
17 MR.
GRIMES:
Right.
The I&C really focuses on 18 that.
The electrical inspection, certainly from the 19 standpoint of whether or not the operator has information, 20 they would look at it that far,.but they would not go into 21 the actual instrument loop, they would take a load path.
22 They would come from the switchyard and under both offsite 23 available and offsite power not available, or testing during 24 a diesel test configuration.
What if something happens at 25 that point; how does the system react?
28 Then they go through all the, take at least a load 2
path through all the different voltage levels and then look 3
at the actual calculations that support the adequacy of 4
- that, and they draw some conclusions, and if they find 5
problems they ask the licensee to expand and check other 6
similar things.
MR.
ASHE:
When you say that you find problems 8
during these inspections, what kind of problems are you 9
talking about?
Are you talking hardware
- problems, are you 10 talking software problems?
And if so, could you give us a
11 percentage on each in raw figures?
12 MR.
GRIMES:
In terms of software, you mean t
13 computer software?
14 MR.
ASHE:
No.
I mean paper problems as opposed 15 to hard'ware problems which require hardware to be fixed.
16 That is to say you change a line, the cable is too small, 17 bus is not adequate, has to be replaced; as opposed to doing 18 other calculations, analysis, this, that, or the other.
19 MR.
GRIMES:
I'd say the first attempt, when we 20 identify a problem, is to sharpen the pencil and see if they 21 can make it go away.
22 I would say on these under-voltage
- problems, most 23 of those are resulting in actual changes to procedures, as 24 temporary fixes, and eventual hardware changes.
For example, Susquehanna, which had a setpoint to
~
~
29 1
switch over, which was, I can't remember the numbers, 85 2
- percent, and they needed 92 percent, to run the, all the 3
equipment.
It was in their tech.
spec's that 85 percent was 5
okay.
They clearly could not run the equipment if the grid 6
had degraded
- there, so they put in temporary administrative 7
controls to switch over to the diesels, if the grid fell 8
that low, and they'e got a longer-term hardware fix.
There are a number of other undervoltage problems 10 where similar things are being done.
Hatch had to put in an 11 administrative fix.
Dresden had to, I think, also.
12 MR.
ASHE:
In terms of percentages, did you take l
13 the total number of problems identified in electrical, and 14 just give a broad over-figure, would you say 80 percent are 15 paper problems as opposed to 20 percent being hardware 16 problems?
Paper problem being defined as the guy can' 17 demonstrate to you how he did the analysis to come up with 18 the hardware he has or something like that.
19 MR.
GRIMES:
I guess we don't really call it a 20 finding until we get down to the bottom of that trail.
21 InN other words, if he just has a problem showing 22 us some unresolved item until he shows us one way or 23
- another, then when he shows us it's okay, then that goes 24 away. If he can't show it's okay, then he's got to do 25 something about it.
~
E
~
~
30 Probably if you'e interested, the easiest thing 2
to do is we'e got the inspection results today to compile a
3 computer listing and categorize a couple of different ways, 4
and we'e still working on the program, but we do have a
5 printout of the electrical.
MR.
ASHE:
Do you recall the primary consultants 7
you are using to do these inspections with?
MR.
GRIMES:
- Well, we use AECL, Atomic Energy of 9
- Canada, Limited, as the prime contractor, and we'e gone 10 through a number of people, some who we use again, some of 11 whom we don'.
They also sub to several people that, we'e 12 used in the past.
So we'e got some pretty good consultants 13 identified by this time to assist us in the details.
And 14 the regions, I was impressed at this counterpart
- meeting, 15 each of the regions got up and gave a presentation on a
16 particular technical area that was of interest to them, or 17 had given them problems, and each region demonstrated a
18 really in-depth, better than I thought they would, knowledge 19 of electrical theory and the safety significance.
20 MR.
ASHE:
What's the driving point behind that?
21 Obviously you feel that something is driving that, because 22 otherwise, it wouldn't be so widespread, the EDSFIs.
Is 23 that simply based on the nature and number of problems that 24 you'e found in your pilot inspection
- programs, or is it 25 based on something else?
Ll
~
~
%1 I
31 MR.
GRIMES: It came out of the SSFIs, partly, the 2
problems identified there, over the last few years.
It also 3
came out of a study that Bill Johnson from Region I did, and 4
I think he came down to Headquarters and compiled the 5
experience information, and that was part of the input.
And 6
I think that study is referenced in the temporary 7
instruction that's out to the Regions, if you want to 8
consult that.
It was based on experience, essentially.
MR.
CONTE:
Who can we contact about the computer 10 listing you just mentioned?
MR.
GRIMES:
Let's see.
I was trying to think who 12 is -- Gene Imbro is the branch chief, and Anil Gautam I 13 think is the best guy to talk to.
14 MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
What's being found on 15 uninterruptible power supplies?
Has that topic come up 16 recently in any of these electrical distribution SSFIs?
17 Just your nature of your work in dealing with the vendors.
18 MR.
GRIMES:
Well, the power supplies, whether 19 they'e called uninterruptible or not doesn't matter too 20 much to us, and so I guess I don't have an impression on 21 that particular item.
22 I know we'e had a lot of problems on bus 23 transfers from one power supply to another, so that that is 24 a problem.
Transferring among the power supplies is 25 something that comes up.
's
32 MR.
CONTE:
How about with the -- to focus that 2
down a little better, where the ACs and DCs are being 3
provided as back-ups to one another, and the inverter 4
battery charger MR.
GRIMES:
I think you'e going beyond my 6
electrical engineering expertise.
I m a chemical engineer.
7 MR.
CONTE:
So in your division, you haven' 8
really heard of an issue at this point with inverters, power 9
supplies 10 MR.
GRIMES:
Oh, yes.
I hear all of those things 11 as problems at various times, but I can't say there's an 12 overwhelming pattern like there is on under-voltage 13 problems.
I think when you look at the computer list, 14 you'l be able to pick off, you know, a few of each of 15 those.
16 MR.
ASHE:
Are you planning to do any inspection 17 of Exide as a result of the Nine Mile Point occurrence?
18 19 thing.
MR.
GRIMES:
I haven't really looked into the 20 MR.
ASHE:
Are any of your people -- have they 21 touched base with Exide about uninterruptible power 22
- supplies, as far as you know?
23 24 MR.
GRIMES:
Not as far as I know.
MR.
CONTE:
Would you characterize Exide as a
25 problem vendor?
~
~
33 MR.
GRIMES:
I don't think we'e dealt with them.
2 I guess the one thing that surprised me in the trade press 3
was that Nine Mile was having trouble getting information 4
from Exide, but that to me is telling me we really ought to 5
have a relationship with a vendor that is willing to give us 6
the full design information on its product.
MR.
CONTE:
I went out and got this Information 8
Notice 88-05.
It's Electro Devices, Incorporated of St.
9 Louis, Missouri.
Apparently, the three plants affected had 10 fires.
The fires, at least from the information notice, 11 it's not clear what caused the fires, but the commonality 12 there is all the power supplies were manufactured by Electro 13
- Devices, Incorporated.
Any knowledge on them?
14 MR.
GRIMES:
No, I don't recall that specific one.
15 We might have done an inspection, then in which case there 16 would be an inspection report, but the guys listed here were 17 not in the vendor branch, they were in the branch that 18 evaluated operating information.
But we could take a look 19 and see if we'e got any inspection reports on them.
20 21 MR.
CONTE:
Would you do that for us, please?
MR.
GRIMES:
Yes.
And what was the number on 22 that?
23 24 25 MR.
CONTE:
Information 88-05.
MR.
GRIMES:
88-05.
MR.
CONTE:
And the company is Electro
II
~ ~
34 MR.
GRIMES:
Electro.
MR.
CONTE:
-- Devices, Incorporated, of St.
3 Louis, Missouri.
MR.
GRIMES:
Yes.
That's easy enough.
MR.
CONTE:
By the way, whatever you provide us, 6
please provide in duplicate.
That's the standard rule.
MR.. GRIMES:
Okay.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
Anymore specific questions?
MR.
ASHE:
Yes.
On this Item 4, we have a
10 standard list.
I don't know -- it may -- certainly, if you 11 don't have a response, perhaps you'd like to say that.
I'm 12 just going to read it really right off here.
13 For each of the following equipment, should that 14 equipment, be considered safety related, non safety related, 15 or important to safety, and why or why not?
The first item 16 on the list is rod position, sensing
- elements, indicators 17 and their power supplies.
In your mind, should that be 18 safety related, non safety related, important to safety, and 19 why or why not?
20 MR.
GRIMES:
I don't have enough information on 21 that.
I guess you can read the rest of them, but I suspect 22 that I'm not going to have any strong opinions.
23 MR.
ASHE:
Okay.
All right.
All instrumentation 24 used to verify the reactor
- shutdown, to verify the reactor 25 shutdown?
The same response?
~ ~
35 MR.
GRIMES:
Same response except "all" is a very 2
big word.
Generally, you can get away with less.
MR.
ASHE:
Most EOP used parameters and indicators 4
and equipment.
MR.
GRIMES:
In general, my experience is they are 6
not.
There is a reliance in EOPs on both safety related and 7
non safety related equipment, with the realization that they 8
fall back to the safety related in a pinch.
But they 9
generally use everything they'e got.
10 MR.
ASHE:
And do you think that's adequate?
MR.
GRIMES:
Well, I think it's a good practice to 12 have your EOPs consider everything that's available.
13 Whether we'e made the right. delineation as between safety 14 related and non safety related, I think that's going to take 15 some more thinking.
16 MR. ASHE:
Okay.
And the last item on the list is 17 the power supplies to control annunciators and balance of 18 plant instrumentation.
Should it be safety related, non 19 safety related, important to safety, and if so, why or why 20 not?
21 MR.
GRIMES:
I guess annunciators are not safety 22
- related, and I think it's appropriate to have special 23 procedures if you lose them to be able to know when you have 24 trouble with them.
But you can make a reasonable case that 25 they don't have to be safety related, but again you could
ky
36 1
take some detailed failure analysis and decisions on how 2
often you run into that kind of thing before you make a
3 final decision, I think.
MR.
CONTE:
Do you have any general guidance for 5
us in this list of all these instrumentations?
Some of 6
- them, the instrument strings perform safety related 7
functions directly.
They cause actuations, they cause 8
trips.
In other cases, they'e used by the operators to 9
verify, to monitor.
Any guidance in your mind for us what 10 should be safety related?
MR.
GRIMES:
Well, current definitions, safety 12 related would not necessarily include things that provide 13 information, things that can cause problems or whose failure 14 could cause
- problems, or -- which is directly relied on in 15 an accident.
So if you broaden the definition, you'e 16 sweeping in a lot of other equipment, and the question is 17 does that dilute our attention?
You can pour a lot of 18 attention on a small island, whereas we might not be able to 19 put that much attention on everything.
On the other hand, 20 it's good to treat everything like it was significant.
21 MR.
CONTE:
As you can gather, we'e dealing with 22 non safety related equipment.
23 24 25 MR.
GRIMES:
I know.
MR.
CONTE:
That is why all these questions.
MR.
IBARRA:
Let me ask you an additional
P ~
37 1
question.
You mentioned EDSFI has come out of the SSFI 2
area.
And you also mentioned that Scott Newberry has said 3
that there wasn't very much to be gained from a safety point 4
of view.
We looked at Instrumentation and Control.
But are 5
we really going that extra mile?
Because I think electrical 6
stops at the bus.
And yet we'e dealing in incidents like 7
this at the instrument level, where they failed.
Are we missing the link here?
MR.
GRIMES:
I don't know.
I guess I'd want to 10 look at the TI and see how far down we actually have people 11 taking this.
Maybe the TI is something else.
But I think 12 we are looking at a lot of different failure modes.
And 13 when the electrical inspectors look at this they postulate 14 all kinds of different initiating events and what-if events 15 to test the adequacy of the setup.
16 But generally, the problems don't come from how 17 you bought the equipment, but from how you engineered the 18 equipment, and not even whether it's redundant or not, but 19 whether the engineer hooked it up right or not.
20 So often there's better payoff looking at the 21 details and the implementation of the details and the 22 calculations that support the coordination of breakers or 23 whatever it is, or getting the voltage there, than there is 24 defining something in a particular safety class.
- That, 25 assures redundancy and maybe some quality and higher
38 1
reliability, but it doesn't assure that the engineer hooks 2
it up right.
In this case, it may be a case of somebody not 4
paying enough attention to batteries or whatever it was in 5
terms of making sure the configuration stayed okay.
And 6
maybe you buy something by making sure your maintenance 7
program covers a broad area.
MR.
IBARRA:
Previous to getting on Nine-Mile 9
Point, I was involved in a study, and I'e been talking to 10 Gene Imbro and Anil.
But it was looking at instrumentation 11 and the type of problems that are being encountered.
We are 12 seeing a lot of design-type issues that I think might have a
13 direct bearing with Nine-Mile Point.
14 So we are concerned with non-safety-related 15 equipment. that is being used by the operators, and them not 16 realizing what they had.
17 MR.
GRIMES:
I think if you get some insights out 18 of this IIT, the way I'd like to approach this kind of 19 problem is not blanket regulation, but targeting focus of 20 inspection or review.
So if you get some insights as to how 21 we might focus a couple of inspections, we would be happy to 22 look at those and work with the technical branches, maybe 23 shape an inspection to look at some areas and see what we 24 find when we dig into a different plant in that area.
MR.
ASHE:
to your knowledge, is there anybody in
> ~
39 1
the NRC looking at upgrading the power supplies for selected 2
equipment?
MR.
GRIMES: It doesn't ring a bell.
MR.
IBARRA:
Like I mentioned before, your Special 5
Inspections Branch do a very good job on integration because 6
of the vertical slice technique, but from your understanding 7
of the staff itself, the NRC, is there the
- same, is there a
8 like mechanism that is taking care not only on a spot basis, 9
but overall?
Is anybody looking at the whole integration 10 aspect?
12 14 MR.
GRIMES:
PRA is supposed to do part of that, supposed to give you relative importance of various systems and various failure modes and things.
So from one standpoint, from a kind of an overview, a single-line 15 diagram standpoint, PRA kind of does that.
And there are 16 some interfaces on particular problems between the technical 17 branches and things.
I don't think there's any, there's no 18 vertical slice branch setups there.
But that is a powerful 19 technique, as you said, to look at the integration of 20 various disciplines in
- a. team-type fashion.
21 MR.
ASHE:
Do you give any special attention to 22 common cause problems that you identified in your various 23 inspections?
24 MR.
GRIMES:
That's something we worry about if we 25 can find, if we find something that we think is a
common
)
A ~
40 1
mode between things, and sometimes design errors are common 2
under voltage.
MR.
ASHE:
But no special treatment?
MR.
GRIMES:
Give me an example of a common cause 5
and I can maybe better MR.
ASHE:
Okay.
Five pieces of equipment go down 7
because you wired them wrong.
MR.
GRIMES:
That's what I mean by design, if you 9
got sloppy design or whatever.
If we find poor design 10 implementation in one area, we'd probably ask the utility to 11 check other similar areas to see if the same problem was 12 there.
So from that standpoint, vertical slice finds a
13 particular problem, then asks the horizontal problem.
14 Doesn't apply to other areas.
15 MR.
IBARRA:
Do you perform those design 16 inspections?
18 19 MR.
GRIMES:
Yes.
MR.
IBARRA:
Under your branch?
MR.
GRIMES:
Yes.
Yes.
And the Regions do, also.
20 The module is there for the regions to use, or for us to 21 use.
22
- Now, we also do NTOL design inspections, 23 integrated design inspections, or overview of IDVPs, by the 24 utilities.
We probably are going to down to Unit 2 at 25 Comanche Peak this Fall to take a look at construction and
1
.4 ~
41 1
design.
MR.
CONTE:
What is the NRC's position or policy 3
on vendor-related recommendations, the tech.
manual 4
requirements on preventive maintenance, or what have you, as 5
it applies to safety, non-safety, and what's our source, 6
what's our regulatory basis for that?
Do you understand 7
what I'm driving at?
Do we expect utilities to implement 8
everything that's in a vendor manual from a preventive 9
maintenance program?
Do we have a position on that:?
Do we 10 ask utilities to evaluate that, apply as appropriate, what 11 is our position?
12 MR.
GRIMES:
With respect to safety-related 13 equipment, the position clearly is they must take the 14 information they have from the vendor, evaluate it, and 15 determine to what extent it applies to them and do it.
We 16 do not expect them to implement everything the vendor says, 17 but to consciously decide whether indeed it applies, on an 18 engineering
- basis, does it apply to their situation.
19 MR.
CONTE:
Is that policy in the recent generic 20 letter that modified the scope of the Salem ATWS; it's a 90-21 03 something?
22 MR.
GRIMES:
I don't know.
That's more to do with 23 how often you check with your vendor to find out whether 24 he's got new information for you.
25 MR.
CONTE:
Where's the written document on this
A lr
42 1
policy?
MR.
GRIMES:
83-28 I thought covered it to some 3
extent with respect to having an engineering process to 4
consider this.
MR.
CONTE:
How about non-safety?
MR.
GRIMES:
None-safety, I don'.
know if there' 7
a written policy.
8 MR.
CONTE:
- Well, we do know that 83-28 loosely 9
tried to broaden the actions to the important-to-safety.
It 10 uses those words.
Any licensee response was, basically from 11 what we can get, it was accepted.
- Yes, we have that or we 12 don't need it.
13 I think I'e got that straight.
Thank you.
What 14 else?
15 MR.
ASHE:
Is there a more detailed interface 16 between your groups and the various other NRR technical 17 review groups, other than what you'e already said.
From 18 time to time, you said you talked to Newberry and a few more 19 others.
20 MR.
GRIMES:
Yes.
In particular, when we 21 developed, for example, electrical module, there was a great 22 deal of sharing of the draft inspection procedure and 23 working with the electrical branch.
We also encourage 24 people to come up on our inspections.
We don't get a lot of 25
- that, but we get some.
43 MR.
ASHE:
Is there a formal mechanism of sharing 2
your inspection findings with the various NRR groups that 3
may be interested in some findings that you would have?
MR.
GRIMES:
Just the availability of the 5
inspection reports, mainly.
MR. ASHE:
So, there's no formal mechanism?
MR.
GRIMES:
We -- we -- the other mechanism is 8
periodically, we write information notices.
For example, 9
this last winter we wrote an information notice on initial 10 results of the electrical inspections.
That gets 11 distributed to everybody.
Other than that, the formal 12 mechanism is -- there are a couple of mechanisms, one is the e
13 technical systems request from the regions.
When we run 14 into a problem where there's no clear guidance, the regions 15 will write in, if they'e doing an inspection, or we'l 16 write it if we'e doing the inspection, to the technical 17 branch and say we need some interface on this particular 18 subject.
19 As we see general areas come up, we occasionally 20 write.
In fact we just got a response on testing of 21 breakers or something, what, should be expected.
When that 22 area isn't clear, we'l try to flush that out of the 23 technical branches.
But, the availability of the inspection reports is 25 the principal thing and the NRR weekly highlights, of
~
7
1
- course, carries the results of headquarters inspections to 2
the other branches.
MR.
ASHE:
Do you have anything else to offer?
4 I'l just take any positive or negative that you feel that 5
we haven't covered or we didn't cover it adequately, or 6
questions that we should have asked and that we did not ask.
MR.
GRIMES:
I don't know enough about the Nine 8
Mile event to really make a judgment in that. area.
I guess 9
I would re-emphasize, just based on 20-some years of 10 experience in this place that the biggest safety pay-off 11 comes when you find problems and focus in on them, as 12 opposed to trying to find a new definition that will fit everything in the world.
I find we get a lot more safety 14 payoff if power supplies are the problems or whatever, that 15 we then devote some resources to them and the details of 16 that particular thing, rather than trying to redefine the 17 world.
18 MR.
CONTE:
Yes.
I think what you'e saying is 19 let me summarize for you -- to focus on the treatment of the 20 equipment rather than the classification of it.
That's good 21 advice.
Thank you.
Frank?
22 23 24 25 MR.
ASHE:
I don't have anything.
MR.
CONTE:
Jose?
MR.
IBARRA: I don't have anything else.
MR.
CONTE:
I don't have anything else.
We -- I
1 do want to summarize here.
We have to be somewhat formal in 2
our request for documents, so we'e going to follow-up our 3<<
request here with a listing.
And you'l see something faxed 4
to you.
MR.
GRIMES:
Okay.
MR.
CONTE:
But I wanted to make sure we got the list of documents straight.
MR.
GRIMES:
Here's my list.
10 12 14 MR.
CONTE:
I was taking notes here.
Correct.
me if I'm wrong guys.
You'e going to provide the BOP module.
We asked for that.
The special inspection that was done, in the winter of '89 or '90 at Nine Mile.
Nine Mile Point vendor inspection reports.
MR.
GRIMES: If we have any vendor inspection 15 reports that relate to Nine Mile.
At GE we talked about 16 that.
17 MR.
CONTE:
Thanks.
And the TI on the EDSFI, and 18 any information on Electro Devices -- any inspection report 19 which is related to the information notice 88-05.
I heard 20 somebody say something about a computer listing of problems 21 or something?
22 MR.
GRIMES:
Yes.
Findings -- computer list of 23 EDSFI findings.
24 MR.
ASHE:
I think he wanted to make it a little 25 broader than that because he was interested in I&C also.
I
46 2
got.
MR.
GRIMES:
That's the only computer list I'e MR.
CONTE:
Just to make sure we'e got the right 4
words, I'm going to xerox a copy of this paper when we go 5
- out, and I'l give this back to you and you'l see the 6
follow-up.
MR.
GRIMES:
Okay.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
With that, let's go off the 9
record.
10
[Whereupon, at 2:03 o'lock p.m. the above-11 entitled interview was concluded.]
12
~s 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
~)
(I
REPORTER'8 CERTXPICAT8 Thi>> ie to certify that the attached proceed-ing>> befor>> th>> United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ia th>> matter of:
NhME Ot PROCEEDING Brian Grimes DOCKET NUMBER PI,ACE Op PROCEEDING:
- Bethesda, Maryland wer>> held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereaf ter reduced to typevr it Lng by me or under the direction of the court report-ing company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.
Official Reporter Ann Riley 6 Associates, Ltd.
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