ML17058B511
| ML17058B511 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1991 |
| From: | NRC - INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17056C371 | List:
|
| References | |
| CON-IIT07-117A-91, CON-IIT07-117B-91, CON-IIT7-117A-91, CON-IIT7-117B-91 NUREG-1455, NUDOCS 9305060227 | |
| Download: ML17058B511 (64) | |
Text
ORtstMAL OFFICIALTRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS Agencp
Title:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Incident Investigation Team Nine Mile Point Nuclear,'ower Plant Interview of:
ALFRED DENNY Docket No.
- Scriba, New York DATE
- Sunday, august 18, 1991 PAGES:
1 13
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM 6
Interview of 7
ALFRED DENNY 8
(Closed) 10 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 Conference Room B
Administration Building Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Two Lake Road
- Scriba, New York 13093
- Sunday, August 18, 1991 The interview commenced, pursuant to notice, 20 at 2: 12 p.m.
21 22 23 24 25 PRESENT FOR THE IIT:
John Kauffman, NRC Michael Jordan, NRC PRESENT WITH MR.
DENNY:
Jerry Helker, Niagara Mohawk
P R 0 C
E E
D I N G
S
[2: 12 p.m. ]
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
This is an interview associated 4
with the Incident Investigation Team investigation of the 5
August 13 event at Nine Mile Point Two.
We'e in the Nine 6
Mile Point Two P Admin Building, and the date is August 18, 7
1991.
The time is 2:12 p.m.
My name is John Kauffman.
I 'm with AEOD.
MR.
JORDAN:
My name is Michael Jordan.
I'm with 10 the NRC, Region III.
MR.
DENNY:
My name is Alfred Denny, and I'm the 12 site -- I should say the station emergency plan coordinator 13 for Nine Mile Point. Two.
14 MR.
HELKER:
My name is Jerry Helliker.
I'm the 15 general supervisor of operations at Nine Mile Two, here at 16 Al Denny's request.
17 18 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Okay.
Good.
To start out, we'd like you to tell us a little 19 about your previous background and experience and jobs 20 you'e held prior to your current job -- a little bit about 21 your work history 22 MR.
DENNY:
Okay.
I started out in life as a high 23 school science teacher.
I taught two years of high school 24 25 science and math in South Dakota, and I spent three years in the United States Army, and I came back to South Dakota and
3 1
taught two more years.
Then, in 1968, I joined the General 2
Electric nuclear energy division as an engineering 3
assistant.
I worked my way up to the title of associate 4
- engineer, and I worked in various departments:
I worked in 5
the projects department.
Finally, I worked in the 6
international business development in San Jose.
Then I had the opportunity to go to the training
~8 department and work with the Tulsa training center.
At that 9
time, General Electric had established a product line of 10 BWR-6 and had two simulators.
It had the Perry simulator 11 and the Black Box, and I worked as senior reactor operator 12 instructor on the Black Box simulator.
13 Then, in October, 1984, I came to work for Niagara 14 Mohawk, for the position as an apprentice for the assistant 15 station shift supervisor.
I sat through the license 16 exam -- through the training, and I passed the written, but 17 I did not pass 18 19 20 MR.
JORDAN:
Let's stop.
[Pause for announcement on public address system.]
MR.
DENNY:
So I worked in their operations 21 department, and I worked in the independent safety 22 engineering group.
More recently, I'm back in the 23 operations department, for about the last six months.
24 My current assignment is the station emergency 25 plan coordinator.
At the time of the incident, I had gone
~ t
4 1
to work at 6 p.m. the previous evening.
At the time of the 2
incident, I was turning over to my relief, Tom Tuttle, at 6
3 a.m. -- it was actually before 6 -- on the 13th of August.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Okay.
When the event started and happened, I'd like you 6
to just run through what you saw, what you did, and 7
basically describe what happened.
MR.
DENNY:
Okay.
Our desk is actually in the 9
corner of the control room behind the fire panel.
The first 10 indication of the incident was that there was a dramatic 11 dimming of the lights.
Tom Tuttle and I walked out from 12 behind the panel, and the CSO also announced -- I believe it 13 was the CSO -- that we had lost all of our annunciators.
14 So the SSS also came out on the floor; the ASSS 15 came out on the floor.
Personally, I spent some time trying 16 to determine the status of the reactor.
I looked at various 17 indications to determine the status of the reactor.
18 At the time that the SSS said to put the mode 19 switch in shutdown, I went in search of the EAP-2 procedure, 20 which is the classification of a particular event.
I 21 assisted in the classification of the event and suggested 22 the classification to the SSS.
Once he agreed with that 23 classification and made the general announcement in the 24 control room and the time of that announcement, then I 25 proceeded to work with the communications coordinator, who
5 1
was a rad waste operator, in filling out the necessary forms 2
for our immediate notifications by the RED system.
Thereafter, during the incident, I would assist 4
him in filling out these forms.
I would get the SSS's 5
signature, with his agreement, as to the content of the 6
- form, and I would go to the panels and try to determine as 7
much additional information so that we could fillout the 8
forms more accurately.
- Then, once the power had been restored to the 10 panels, it was obvious that things were under control.
MR.
HELKER:
For clarification, for your benefit, 12 when he says "our desk,"
he means the SEPC desk, behind the 13 fire panel.
14 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
The SEPC function is a little 15 unusual.
It's not in most places in the industry.
16 MR.
HELKER:
I think the functions are in the 17 industry.
18 19 job is 20 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
The functions are, but he actual MR.
HELKER:
The actual individual performing 21 those functions may not be.
22 MR.
KAUFFMAN: I guess I'd like it if you could 23 just kind of describe not what you did, but just in general 24 what the SEPC's duties are.
25 MR.
DENNY:
Okay.
The SEPC was actually brought
out, I believe, historically, at this site,
- because, once we exceeded the necessary fifteen-minute notification period 3
from the time that the event was declared.
So it appeared 4
to be an over-burden problem for the SSS.
The SSS was simultaneously trying to operate in the
- EOPs, the emergency operating procedures, and to go into the emergency plan.
7 The idea was to allow him to work within the EOPs to stabilize the plant, and yet to provide him some assistance in meeting the requirements of immediate notification and 10 the emergency plan.
12 14 15 16 17 Basically, the shift emergency plan coordinator is working with the communications aide to fillout the forms necessary to make the immediate notification.
We also have, according to the emergency administrative procedures, the
Initially, during an event, the SSS is the site emergency
- director, and so the SEPC function not only helps him meet 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 his communication requirements, but it helps him meet his duties as the site emergency director.
MR.
JORDAN:
You say you suggested the classification of the event.
Can you give us an idea what was its classification that you suggested to him?
MR.
DENNY:
We had, if you go down through the CAP-2 on the left-hand column it gives an entire series of different things.
~,
One of the things listed there is loss of 2
annunciators and then if you move across horizontally on any 3
particular line it. will work you through unusual
- event, 4
alert, site emergency, general emergency.
So we had under the alert category here a
6 statement of loss of annunciators and then under the site 7
emergency there was loss of annunciators associated with 8
transient and we had the loss of annunciators and the 9
associated transient was the reactor scram.
10 That brought us into this particular category.
Also prior to showing that to the SSS I had shown 12 it to the oncoming
- ASSS, a guy by the name of Don Bosnic.
t 13 Once he and I saw or appeared to agree on that 14 classification then I went forward and talked to the SSS.
15 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Okay.
We know that that UPS's 16 affected some of the communications equipment, such as 17 Gaitronics.
18 Could you tell us how the notifications were made 19 and any problems that were encountered?
20 MR.
DENNY: Initially our telephones worked and so 21 it is my recollection that the oncoming
- ASSS, Don Bosnic 22 called over to Unit One.
He either called over or the CSO 23 had someone call over to Unit One then made the site 24 announcement over the Gaitronics.
25 We had lost our Gaitronics but Unit One had not.
Our telephones worked properly.
We were able to 2
use the RCS line and the NRC phone worked and we were able 3
to call Unit One so we had normal telephone communication.
4 We just appeared not to have Gaitronics.
MR.
JORDAN:
Did you hear any of the notification 6
when Unit One made their notification in your control room?
MR.
DENNY:
No.
The Gaitronics did not.
I had no 8
-- in the press of events that these things
- made, others may 9
have heard them but I you know did not hear them.
10 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
How were the notification forms 11 filled out?
Who gathers -- what is the process?
Who 12 gathers the information and where do they get it?
13 MR.
DENNY: It is a joint effort between the site 14 emergency planning coordinator and the communications aide 15 and it is whoever feels the most familiar with getting the 16 particular information because they will have varying 17 degrees of experience and that person will gather the data.
18 These forms are on a
8 1/2 by 11 sheet that has 19 stick-um on the top and you can just rip off the forms, so 20 you can carry it around as a pad and gather the data and 21 then return it to the telephone or the communication aide.
22 In this particular instance the communication aide 23 was making the notifications and filling out the initial 24 things on this form like what the site was and what the time 25 was and then I was gathering the details for him.
P Then I would carry it up to the SSS and the SSS 2
would read what I had said and then sign it and I would 3
return it to the communications aide.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
You had no difficulty getting all 5
the information parameters you needed, even with the loss of 6
instrumentation or were there some data you couldn't get?
MR.
DENNY:
I was able to get all the data that I 8
needed for that form because the -- it was largely 9
meteorological data that we'e requested to put on that 10 form and all the meteorological instruments were powered.
You could verify, it was possible to say that 12 water level you know was under control because on the 603 13 panel -- 601 I believe it is --
the ECCS panel?
14 MR.
HELKER:
601-15 MR.
DENNY:
601 panel.
The charter recorders were 16 working and it was possible to verify the SRMs or the 17 neutron monitoring being down on the SRMs because three of 18 the source range monitors were working.
19 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Just kind of a, I guess a followup, 20 I haven't seen your form but most forms have something about 21 a stack rate or perhaps in-plant rad levels.
Do you have 22 any of that information on your forms?
23 MR.
DENNY:
Yes.
The forms says.
It also gives 24 us the option to say that a release is not applicable.
So 25 in this instance a release was not applicable but there is
10 1
definitely a place on that form for that data.
MR.
JORDAN:
I take it you have been or have not 3
been ever licensed as an operator?
MR.
DENNY:
I have never been licensed.
I was set 5
for the license class and I passed, you know, the local and 6
I passed the written but I have never passed the -- at one 7
time failing the walkthrough and another time the simulator.
MR.
JORDAN:
You say three SRMs were working?
MR.
DENNY:
Yes.
The ASRM we had a problem with 10 an IRM drawer and so the ASRM was removed from service 11 during that incident so we had -- or due to maintenance 12 prior to that incident -- and so we had B,
C and D showing 13 indication.
14 MR.
JORDAN:
A was removed prior to the event?
16 MR.
DENNY:
Yes.
MR.
JORDAN:
You mentioned that when you started 17 out that you were, the location of your desk that you 18 noticed a significant dimming in the lights?
19 MR.
DENNY:
Yes.
That didn't last long but it was 20 enough to like somebody hitting you over the head with 21 something to call your attention to it.
22 MR.
JORDAN:
Did the lights come back in the area 23 where you had access?
24 MR.
DENNY:
Yes.
It appeared to me that it was a
25 general dimming but the light level in the control room
11 1
thereafter was sufficient.
MR.
JORDAN:
- Okay, you noticed no other areas of 3
dimming lights in the area?
MR.
DENNY:
I didn't go any further than the 5
control room but in the control room I noticed no 6
deficiency in the lighting.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
When people came into the control 8
room did you hear any reports of areas in the plant having 9
lights out?
10 MR.
DENNY:
I didn'. If I did, I didn't pay any 11 attention to what they were saying.
It didn't register in 12 my brain anyhow.
14 15 MR.
HELKER:
May I ask a question to clarify?
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Sure.
MR.
HELKER:
Was it the actual lighting dimmed or 16 the level of lighting went down because the annunciator 17 lights went out?
18 MR.
DENNY:
I actually believe that the lights 19 dimmed.
It struck me that the lights dimmed.
20 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
The overhead lights?
MR.
DENNY:
The overhead lights, although it could 22 have been, you know, it s entirely subjective but it struck 23 me that the overhead lights had dimmed.
24 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
We have heard from other people 25 that this started with a loud pop.
Did you hear any loud
~ I
12 pop.
MR.
DENNY:
I have no recollection.
That didn' 3
stick in my mind.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Emergency planning is not in the 5
- charter, and the emergency response really isn't in the 6
charter of our investigation so I think that this may be 7
about it for this interview.
8 MR.
JORDAN:
Is there anything that you know of, 9
something that we haven't
- covered, that you would like to 10 put on the record right now for information?
12 MR.
DENNY:
I can't think of anything.
MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
13 MR.
KAUFFMAN: I guess a general question we 14 normally ask too is if there was anything that helped you 15 respond to this, that helped make it really go well, or if 16 there was any area where you said, wow, I wish I'd have had 17 this or this procedure was really -- held us up here.
18 Do you have any suggestions or any compliments for 19 things that were there that worked really well?
20 MR.
DENNY:
I think that the general level of 21 training definitely contributed to the positive outcome and 22 it reduced, you know, any potential for panic.
23 I also think that the operations department has a
24 very high degree of professionalism and this also benefitted 25 the positive outcome of this event, but I didn't myself see
~
~
13 1
anything -- nothing sticks in my mind that needed improving, 2
no particular event or no particular procedure that 1 ran 3
across that needed improvement.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
That concludes the interview.
[Whereupon, at 2:32 p.m., the taking of the 6
interview was concluded.]
10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1
REPORT ER '
C 8RT E F ECATE This is to certify that the attached proceed-ings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
NAME OP PROCEEDXNG: 'Znt. of ALFRED DENNY DOCKET NUMBER.
PLACE OP PROCEEDING: Scriba, N.Y.
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court report-ing company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.
JON HUNDLEY Official Reporter Ann Riley
& Associates, Ltd.
~
I
u1 "ll'1IO-'ll OFFICIALTRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS Agency Titie:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Incident Investigation Team Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant Interview of: ALFRED DENNY Docket No.
UXATION I
- Scriba, New York DATE:
- Sunday, August 18, 1991 PAGES:
1 1 3
&&RILEY&ASSOCIATES, LTD.
l612 KSc.N.'%, Suite 300
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Exi' cni ADDENDUMTO INTERVIEWOF l~~ c ~
(Name/Position)
Sam
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3-7
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM 6
Interview of 7
ALFRED DENNY 8
(Closed) 10 12 zs 14 15 16 17 18 19 Conference Room B
Administration Building Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Two Lake Road
- Scriba, New York 13093
- Sunday, August 18, 1991 The interview commenced, pursuant to notice, 20 at 2:12 p.m.
21 22 23 24 25 PRESENT FOR THE IIT:
John Kauffman, NRC Michael Jordan, NRC PRESENT WITH MR.
DENNY:
Jerry Helker, Niagara Mohawk
e, P
R 0 C
E E
D I N
G S
[2:12 p.m.]
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
This is an interview associated 4
with the Incident Investigation Team investigation of the 5
August 13 event at Nine Mile Point Two.
Ne're in the Nine 6
Mile Point Two P Admin Building, and the date is August 18, 7
1991.
The time is 2:12 p.m.
My name is John Kauffman.
I'm with AEOD.
MR.
JORDAN:
My name is Michael Jordan.
I'm with 10 the NRC, Region III.
MR.
DENNY:
My name is Alfred Denny, and I'm the 12 site -- I should say the station emergency plan coordinator 13 for Nine Mile Point Two.
14 MR.
HELKER:
My name is Jerry Helliker.
I'm the 15 general supervisor of operations at Nine Mile Two, here at 16 Al Denny's request.
17 18 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Okay.
Good.
To start out, we'd like you to tell us a little 19 about your previous background and experience and jobs 20 you'e held prior to your current job -- a little bit about 21 your work history 22 MR.
DENNY:
Okay.
I started out in life as a high 23 school science teacher.
I taught two years of high school 24 science and math in South Dakota, and I spent three years in 25 the United States Army, and I came back to South Dakota and
3 1
taught two more years.
Then, in 1968, I joined the General 2
Electric nuclear energy division as an engineering 3
assistant.
I worked my way up to the title of associate 4
- engineer, and I worked in various departments:
I worked in 5
the projects department.
Finally, I worked in the 6
international business development in San Jose.
Then I had the opportunity to go to the training 8
department and work with the Tulsa training center.
At that 9
time, General Electric had established a product line of 10 BWR-6 and had two simulators.
It had the Perry simulator 11 and the Black Box, and I worked as senior reactor operator 12 instructor on the Black Box simulator.
13 Then, in October, 1984, I came to work for Niagara 14 Mohawk, for the position as an apprentice for the assistant 15 station shift supervisor.
I sat through the license 16 exam -- through the training, and I passed the written, but 17 I did not pass 18 19 20 MR.
JORDAN:
Let's stop.
[Pause for announcement on public address system.]
MR.
DENNY:
So I worked in their operations 21 department, and I worked in the independent safety 22 engineering group.
More recently, I'm back in the 23 operations department, for about the last six months.
24 My current assignment is the station emergency 25 plan coordinator.
At the time of the incident, I had gone
4 1
to work at 6 p.m. the previous evening.
At the time of the 2
incident, I was turning over to my relief, Tom Tuttle, at 6
3 a.m. -- it was actually before 6 -- on the 13th of August.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Okay.
When the event started and happened, I'd like you 6
to just run through what you saw, what you did, and 7
basically describe what happened.
MR.
DENNY:
Okay.
Our desk is actually in the 9
corner of the control room behind the fire panel.
The first 10 indication of the incident was that there was a dramatic 11 dimming of the lights.
Tom Tuttle and I walked out from 12 behind the panel, and the CSO also announced -- I believe it 13 was the CSO -- that we had lost all of our annunciators.
14 So the SSS also came out on the floor; the ASSS 15 came out on the floor.
Personally, I spent some time trying 16 to determine the status of the reactor.
I looked at various 17 indications to determine the status of the reactor.
18 At the time that the SSS said to put the mode 19 switch in shutdown, I went in search of the EAP-2 procedure, 20 which is the classification of a particular event.
I 21 assisted in the classification of the event and suggested 22 the classification to the SSS.
Once he agreed with that 23 classification and made the general announcement in the 24 control room and the time of that announcement, then I 25 proceeded to work with the communications coordinator, who
5 1
was a rad waste operator, in filling out the necessary forms 2
for our immediate notifications by the RED system.
Thereafter, during the incident, I would assist 4
him in filling out these forms.
I would get the SSS's 5
signature, with his agreement, as to the content of the 6
form, and I would go to the panels and try to determine as 7
much additional information so that we could fillout the 8
forms more accurately.
- Then, once the power had been restored to the 10 panels, it was obvious that things were under control.
MR.
HELKER:
For clarification, for your benefit, 12 when he says "our desk,"
he means the SEPC desk, behind the 13 fire panel.
14 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
The SEPC function is a little 15 unusual.
It's not in most places in the industry.
16 MR.
HELKER: I think the functions are in the 17 industry.
18 19 job is MR.
KAUFFMAN:
The functions are, but he actual 20 MR.
HELKER:
The actual individual performing 21 those functions may not be.
22 MR.
KAUFFMAN: I guess I'd like it if you could 23 just kind of describe not what you did, but just in general 24 what the SEPC's duties are.
25 MR.
DENNY:
Okay.
The SEPC was actually brought
6 1
out, I believe, historically, at this site,
- because, once we 2
exceeded the necessary fifteen-minute notification period 3
from the time that the event was declared.
So it appeared 4
to be an over-burden problem for the SSS.
The SSS was 5
simultaneously trying to operate in the
- EOPs, the emergency 6
operating procedures, and to go into the emergency plan.
7 The idea was to allow him to work within the EOPs to 8
stabilize the plant, and yet to provide him some assistance 9
in meeting the requirements of immediate notification and 10 the emergency plan.
Basically, the shift emergency plan coordinator 12 is working with the communications aide to fillout the 13 forms necessary to make the immediate notification.
14 We also have, according to the emergency 15 administrative procedures, the
16 Initially, during an event, the SSS is the site emergency 17
- director, and so the SEPC function not only helps him meet 18 his communication requirements, but it helps him meet his 19 duties as the site emergency director.
20 MR.
JORDAN:
You say you suggested the 21 classification of the event.
Can you give us an idea what 22 was its classification that you suggested to him?
23 MR.
DENNY:
We had, if you go down through the 24 CAP-2 on the left-hand column it gives an entire series of 25 different things.
1 One of the things listed there is loss of 2
annunciators and then if you move across horizontally on any 3
particular line it will work you through unusual
- event, 4
alert, site emergency, general emergency.
So we had under the alert category here a
6 statement of loss of annunciators and then under the site 7
emergency there was loss of annunciators associated with 8
transient and we had the loss of annunciators and the 9
associated transient was the reactor scram.
10 That brought us into this particular category.
11 Also prior to showing that to the SSS I had shown 12 it to the oncoming
- ASSS, a guy by the name of Don Bosnic.
1 3 Once he and I saw or appeared to agree on that, 14 classification then I went forward and talked to the SSS.
15 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Okay.
We know that. that UPS's 16 affected some of the communications equipment, such as 17 Gaitronics.
18 Could you tell us how the notifications were made 19 and any problems that were encountered?
20 MR.
DENNY: Initially our telephones worked and so 21 it is my recollection that the oncoming
- ASSS, Don Bosnic 22 called over to Unit One.
He either called over or the CSO 23 had someone call over to Unit One then made the site 24 announcement over the Gaitronics.
25 We had lost our Gaitronics but Unit One had not.
8 1
Our telephones worked properly.
We were able to 2
use the RCS line and the NRC phone worked and we were able 3
to call Unit One so we had normal telephone communication.
4 We just appeared not to have Gaitronics.
MR.
JORDAN:
Did you hear any of the notification 6
when Unit One made their notification in your control room?
MR.
DENNY:
No.
The Gaitronics did not.
I had no 8
-- in the press of events that these things
- made, others may 9
have heard them but I you know did not hear them.
10 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
How were the notification forms 11 filled out?
Who gathers -- what is the process?
Who 12 gathers the information and where do they get it?
13 MR.
DENNY: It is a joint effort between the site 14 emergency planning coordinator and the communications aide 15 and it is whoever feels the most familiar with getting the 16 particular information because they will have varying 17 degrees of experience and that person will gather the data.
18 These forms are on a
8 1/2 by 11 sheet that has 19 stick-um on the top and you can just rip off the forms, so 20 you can carry it around as a pad and gather the data and 21 then return it to the telephone or the communication aide.
22 In this particular instance the communication aide 23 was making the notifications and filling out the initial 24 things on this form like what the site was and what the time 25 was and then I was gathering the details for him.
Then I would carry it up to the SSS and the SSS 2
would read what I had said and then sign it and I would 4
3 return it to the communications aide.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
You had no difficulty getting all 5
the information parameters you needed, even with the loss of 6
instrumentation or were there some data you couldn't get?
MR.
DENNY:
I was able to get all the data that I 8
needed for that form because the -- it was largely 9
meteorological data that we'e requested to put on that 10 form and all the meteorological instruments were powered.
You could verify, it was possible to say that 12 water level you know was under control because on the 603 13 panel -- 601 I believe it is --
the ECCS panel?
14 MR.
HELKER:
601
'5 MR.
DENNY:
601 panel.
The charter recorders were 16 working and it was possible to verify the SRMs or the 17 neutron monitoring being down on the SRMs because three of 18 the source range monitors were working.
19 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Just kind of a, I guess a followup, 20 I haven't seen your form but most forms have something about 21 a stack rate or perhaps in-plant rad levels.
Do you have 22 any of that information on your forms?
23 MR.
DENNY:
Yes.
The forms says.
It also gives 24 us the option to say that a release is not applicable.
So 25 in this instance a release was not applicable but there is
~
~
10 1
definitely a place on that form for that data.
MR.
JORDAN:
I take it you have been or have not 3
been ever licensed as an operator?
MR.
DENNY: I have never been licensed.
I was set 5
for the license class and I passed, you know, the local and 6
I passed the written but I have never passed the -- at one 7
time failing the walkthrough and another time the simulator.
MR.
JORDAN:
You say three SRMs were working?
MR.
DENNY:
Yes.
The ASRM we had a problem with 10 an IRM drawer and so the ASRM was removed from service 11 during that incident so we had -- or due to maintenance 12 prior to that incident -- and so we had B,
C and D showing 13 indication.
14 MR.
JORDAN:
A was removed prior to the event?
15 16 MR.
DENNY:
Yes.
MR.
JORDAN:
You mentioned that when you started 17 out that you were, the location of your desk that you 18 noticed a significant dimming in the lights?
19 MR.
DENNY:
Yes.
That didn't last long but it was 20 enough to like somebody hitting you over the head with
'1 something to call your attention to it.
22 MR.
JORDAN:
Did the lights come back in the area 23 where you had access?
24 MR.
DENNY:
Yes.
It appeared to me that, it was a
25 general dimming but the light level in the control room
11 1
thereafter was sufficient.
MR.
JORDAN:
- Okay, you noticed no other areas of 3
dimming lights in the area?
MR.
DENNY:
I didn't go any further than the 5
control room but in the control room I noticed no i
6 deficiency in the lighting.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
When people came into the control 8
room did you hear any reports of areas in the plant having 9
lights out?
10 MR.
DENNY:
I didn'. If I did, I didn't pay any 11 attention to what they were saying.
It didn't register in 12 my brain anyhow.
13 MR.
HELKER:
May I ask a question to clarify?
14 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Sure.
15 MR.
HELKER:
Was it the actual lighting dimmed or 16 the level of lighting went down because the annunciator 17 lights went out?
18 MR.
DENNY:
I actually believe that the lights 19 dimmed.
It struck me that the lights dimmed.
20 21 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
The overhead lights?
MR.
DENNY:
The overhead lights, although it could 22 have been, you know, it s entirely subjective but it struck 23 me that the overhead lights had dimmed.
24 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
We have heard from other people 25 that this started with a loud pop.
Did you hear any loud
12 1
pop?
MR.
DENNY:
I have no recollection.
That didn' 3
stick in my mind.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Emergency planning is not in the 5
- charter, and the emergency response really isn't in the 6
charter of our investigation so I think that this may be 7
about it for this interview.
MR.
JORDAN:
Is there anything that you know of, 9
something that we haven't
- covered, that you would like to 10 put on the record right now for information?
12 MR.
DENNY:
I can't think of anything.
MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
13 MR.
KAUFFMAN: I guess a general question we 14 normally ask too is if there was anything that helped you 15 respond to this, that helped make it really go well, or if 16 there was any area where you said, wow, I wish I'd have had 17 this or this procedure was really -- held us up here.
18 Do you have any suggestions or any compliments for 19 things that were there that worked really well?
20 MR.
DENNY:
I think that the general level of 21 training definitely contributed to the positive outcome and 22 it reduced, you know, any potential for panic.
23 I also think that the operations department has a
24 very high degree of professionalism and this also benefitted 25 the positive outcome of this event, but I didn't myself see
13 1
anything -- nothing sticks in my mind that needed improving, 2
no particular event or no particular procedure that I ran 3
across that needed improvement.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
That concludes the interview.
[Whereupon, at 2:32 p.m., the taking of the 6
interview was concluded.]
10 12 zs 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
h
~
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceed-ings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
NAME OP PROCEEDING: 'Int. of ALPRED DENNY DOCKET NUMBER:
PLACE OP PROCEEDING: Scriba, N.Y.
~ere held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typeuri.ting by me or under the direction of the court report-ing company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.
JON HUNDLEY Official Reporter Ann Riley
& Associates, Ltd.