ML17058B504
| ML17058B504 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1991 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17056C371 | List:
|
| References | |
| CON-IIT07-084.0A-91, CON-IIT07-084.0B-91, CON-IIT7-84.0A-91, CON-IIT7-84.0B-91 NUREG-1455, NUDOCS 9305060211 | |
| Download: ML17058B504 (68) | |
Text
OFFICIALTRANSCRIPI'F PROCEEDINGS Agency Tit1e:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Incident Investigation Team Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant Interview of: PHIL MacEWEN Docket No.
LOCATION:
- Scriba, New York DATE: Monday, August 19, 1991 p.~cps:
1 14 ANNRILEY&ASSOCIATES, LTD.
1612 KSL N.'Z, Suite 30Q Vhshington, D.C 20006 (20') Z93-3950.
hi i nti u ADDENDUMTO INTERVIEWOF /'H cJ{'.
Al~ ~C (Name/Pos tion)
~Pa rection and Reason f r rr ti n Page of Signature Datef /2~~9 3-7
J
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM 6
Interview of 7
PHIL MacEWEN
,8 (Closed) 10 12 14 15 16 17 18 Conference Room B
Administration Building Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Two Lake Road
- Scriba, New York 13093 Monday, August 19, 1991 19 The interview commenced, pursuant to notice, 20 at 4:05 p.m.
21 22 23 24 25 PRESENT FOR THE IIT:
John Kauffman, NRC William Vatter, INPO
4
P R 0 C
E E
D I N
G S
[4:05 p.m.]
MR.
VATTER: It's August 19.
We'e at Nine Mile 5
Point Unit Two, administration building, conducting an 6
interview with Phil MacEwen -- did I say it right?
MR.
MacEWEN:
Right.
MR.
VATTER:
My name is Bill Vatter.
I'm an 9
employee of INPO on loan to the NRC for the IIT 10 investigation of an event that occurred at Nine Mile Point 11 on August 13.
12 13 Also here is MR.
KAUFFMAN:
John Kauffman, from NRC 14 headquarters.
15 MR.
MacEWEN:
Phil MacEwen, auxiliary operator for 16 Niagara Mohawk.
17 MR. VATTER:
Phil, could you tell us a little bit 18 about your background, how long you'e worked for Niagara 19 Mohawk and what you did before then?
20 MR.
MacEWEN: I'e spent six years as an auxiliary 21 operator Niagara Mohawk.
Before that, I worked as a
22 mechanic as FitzPatrick nuclear plant, and I worked 23 construction for Johnson Controls Instrumentation at Nine 24 Mile Point.
25 MR.
VATTER:
Okay.
3 1
Phil, we'e interested in finding out about the 2
events of August 13, what you were doing and the things that 3
you did in response to the event.
Perhaps we could start by 4
having you tell us what your job assignment was that day and 5
what you were doing before the event occurred.
MR.
MacEWEN:
My first job assignment that day was 7
to go with --
There were six operators all together, I 8
believe.
MR. VATTER:
What time did you come in?
Were you 10 on the midnight shift?
MR.
MacEWEN:
No, I was on the day shift.
I was 12 in the control room at 6 o'lock.
13 MR. VATTER:
Okay.
When did you come onto the 14 site?
15 MR.
MacEWEN:
Within five minutes, probably 5:55 16 in the morning.
17 MR.
VATTER:
Okay.
When was the first time that 18 you were aware that things weren't like they should have 19 been?
20 MR.
MacEWEN:
About two minutes to 6, maybe.
I 21 was changing my shoes in the locker room, and one of the 22 other operators told me that there had been a scram, so I 23 hurried up to the control room.
When I got to the control 24 room, the CSO assigned me and another operator to try and 25 restart the UPS's.
MR. VATTER:
Who was the other operator that was 2
assigned with you?
MR.
MacEWEN:
MR.
VATTER:
And it was a
CSO that gave the 5
instruction?
8 UPS's.
MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
MR-VATTER:
And he told you to go and restart the MR.
MacEWEN:
He said, if it was possible to try 10 and start the UPS's.
12 MR.
VATTER:
Okay.
So what did you do then?
MR.
MacEWEN:
I went right from there to the 13 switch gear building.
When we got down there, we opened up 14 the procedure.
In the time that we were reviewing the 15 procedure, four more operators come down.
Two of them were 16
- CSOs, and one of them was an RO.
They pretty much were 17 telling us what to do.
18 MR. VATTER:
Do you remember who those guys were?
19 We might be able to figure it out here.
20 MR.
MacEWEN:
Well, Aaron Armstrong and myself 21 were the first two.
Then Jim Stevens came
- down, Dave 22
- Hanczyk, Mike Garbus, and Bob Spooner.
23 24 25 MR.
VATTER:
Okay.
MR.
MacEWEN:
Is that all of them?
MR. VATTER:
I think so.
2 procedure.
So you and Aaron were trying to figure out the MR.
MacEWEN:
We were thumbing through the 4
procedure.
We looked at the table of contents, trying to 5
find something that covered a tripped UPS.
It was not very 6
plain in the procedure how to restart a tripped UPS.
There 7
was how to start one up from a shut down position, but not 8
from a trip position.
10 MR.
VATTER:
Okay.
MR.
MacEWEN:
Like I said, we were looking through 11 the procedure, and then Dave Hanczyk showed up, Mike Garbus, 12 and Bob Spooner.
They diagnosed rather quickly that we have 13 to have power, and they directed us to close in the CB-4, 14 the maintenance supply.
15 MR.
VATTER:
Did you try operating any of the 16 switches or breakers 17 18 19 MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
MR.
VATTER:
-- before Dave showed up?
MR.
MacEWEN:
No.
When Dave showed up, he was the 20 one that started giving directions.
First we were going to 21 try a normal restart, but that wouldn't work.
22 23 24 MR. VATTER:
That was Dave's direction.
MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
MR. VATTER:
Did you have the cabinet doors opened 25 up before you got there?
MR.
MacEWEN:
No.
I don't think we had the cabinet -- I'm not sure 3
on that.
I mean, the procedure sits right on the door, and 4
we opened the procedure first.
I don't believe we opened a
5 door.
MR.
VATTER:
Okay.
MR.
MacEWEN:
I'm not positive on that.
MR.
VATTER:
So Dave sized up the situation and 9
told you what to do?
10 MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
He just told us what breakers 11 to reset and then told us to open --
He figured out the 12 first UPS.
He opened up the door on the CB-4, the 13 maintenance supply breaker 14 MR.
VATTER:
Did you try to do a normal start on 15 that thing first, before you did that?
16 17 MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
We tried the normal restart procedure, and that 18 didn't work.
19 20 MR. VATTER:
Okay.
MR.
MacEWEN:
That was resetting the CB-1, CB-2, 21 CB-3, and then trying to auto-restart, but it. wouldn't work.
22 I think it had to do with the logic also being tripped 23 from what I'e learned afterwards.
24 MR.
VATTER:
And then the CB-1 and CB-2 breakers 25 were shut after you made that attempt; is that right?
1 MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
MR. VATTER:
Then did you reopen those before you 3
shut CB-4?
MR.
MacEWEN:
CB-3 was open at the time.
To start it, you close CB-1, and then you try and 6
start it, and then you close CB-2 -- CB-2 is the battery 7
power.
I can't remember exactly how the procedure is 8
written, but, I mean MR. VATTER:
Well, did you reopen those breakers 10 before you shut in CB-4?
12 13 14 ago.
MR.
MacEWEN:
I'm not sure.
MR. VATTER:
Okay.
MR.
MacEWEN:
I'm really -- I mean, it was a week 15 MR. VATTER: I understand.
It was a week ago, and 16 it was going pretty fast, at the time.
17 18 MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
MR. VATTER:
So Dave -- did he shut CB-4, or did 19 he show somebody else how to do it?
20 MR.
MacEWEN:
He did the first one, and then I did 21 one UPS.
I closed the CB-4 on one of the UPS's, and I 22 believe Spooner and Garbus each did a UPS.
23 24 do that?
MR.
VATTER:
Have you ever had training on how to 25 MR.
MacEWEN:
Now from the training center. I'e
8 1
had it from the system engineer during the startup and test 2
days.
MR.
VATTER:
Would you have known how to close in 4
CB-4 is Dave wasn't there to show you?
MR.
MacEWEN:
I'm sure I -- If I would have had 6
direction from the control room to go outside of the 7
procedure, then I could have done that.
I knew how to do 8
it.
10 MR. VATTER:
You knew how to do it.
MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
But without having an RO or a
CSO there to make 12 the decision to go outside of procedure, I wouldn't have 13 done that.
14 MR. VATTER:
Okay.
Then what did you do?
That 15 was UPS -- which one did you do first?
16 17 18 running?
MR.
MacEWEN:
I believe it was 1A.
MR.
VATTER:
What happened after that one was MR.
MacEWEN:
We got that one running, and then we 20 proceeded to close the CB-4s on the rest of the UPS's.
21 22 MR.
VATTER:
Who was it that went and got G?
MR.
MacEWEN:
I don't know.
I was not involved in 23 G at all.
24 MR.
VATTER:
What did you do then, after the UPS's 25 were restored -- the power was restored there?
9 1
MR.
MacEWEN:
I went back to the control room for 2
another job.
MR. VATTER:
And what job did they give you to do?
MR.
MacEWEN:
Pretty much they said, Stay out of 5
the way.
[Laughter.]
MR.
MacEWEN:
I didn't get another job until maybe 8
a half hour after the event, and then they had me take the 9
steam generator-rejecter out of service and shut down off-10 gas.
12 MR.
VATTER:
Off-gas had already isolated.
MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
13 MR. VATTER:
14 plant to do that.
And you had to go back out in the 15 16 MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
MR. VATTER:
Did you have an RP tech go with 17 you -- rad tech?
18 MR.
MacEWEN:
I stopped at rad protection 19 Because of the time they had the alarms to monitors going 20 off in the turbine building, they said before we could go 21 into the turbine building we had to stop at rad protection, 22 and they said it was okay to go in the plant.
But we had to 23 log in before we went in and log out when we came out.
24 MR. VATTER:
Did they have the hogger running at 25 that time?
10 MR.
MacEWEN:
That was my other job.
We started 2
the hoggers, yes.
MR.
VATTER:
Do you have to start the hogger 4
locally, or can you start that up from the control room?
MR.
MacEWEN:
They start it from the control room, 6
but we did our prestart checks -- I did the prestart checks 7
locally, and they started it from the control room.
MR. VATTER:
Now, there was a rad monitor on the 9
off-gas.
Do you know what that was reading when you were 10 preparing to put the hogger one?
12 MR.
MacEWEN:
No.
MR.
VATTER: It reads only in the control room; is 13 that right?
I don't know.
14 MR.
MacEWEN:
They can read it in the control 15
- room, and I believe, if you were to go to it locally, you 16 can read it there.
17 18 MR.
VATTER:
But it's inside a room.
MR.
MacEWEN:
Right.
It's a different room 19 entirely from where the control panel is for off-gas.
20 MR.
VATTER:
So you don't have prestart checks to 21 do in that. room.
22 23 24 MR.
MacEWEN:
No.
MR.
VATTER:
At the local control panel.
MR.
MacEWEN:
The hoggers are separate.
I mean, 25 that was checking oil levels, water levels in the separator
11 1
- tank, and then having them start it.
After the hoggers are 2
- started, then I -- which way did this happen?
We isolated 3
the steam generator-rejecters and off-gas.
I'm pretty sure 4
that's the order we did it.
MR. VATTER:
Okay.
What did you do next?
MR.
MacEWEN:
I may have missed a step in here.
7 We restarted a condensate booster pump also.
I was on the 8
condensate booster pump.
I think that was -- that was 9
before the hoggers.
10 MR. VATTER:
What did you have to do locally to ll restart the condensate booster pump?
12 MR.
MacEWEN:
Actually, nothing.
I was standing 13 by to make sure that.
we had oil to the pump, make sure the 14 oil pump was running, and somebody else was at the con 15 demins.
It's hard to remember exactly what order --
Now 16 the jobs are coming back to me, what we did.
The booster 17 pump, I stood it, made sure that we had a good start on the 18 pump, that the stop check went open.
And then back to the 19 control room.
20 21 MR.
VATTER:
Okay.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
When you were out in the plant 22 early on in the event, were there any areas where you 23 noticed the lights were out?
24 MR.
MacEWEN:
When I first come into the plant and 25 I had changed my shoes, the lights were out in the stairway
12 1
going to the control room, right next to the elevator.
3 lights?
MR.
KAUFFMAN: All the lights or part of the MR.
MacEWEN:
There was some kind of lighting.
I 5
- mean, the stairway was lit, but it was dark.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Okay.
MR.
MacEWEN:
I mean, you could see the stairs, 8
but it was pretty dark.
MR. VATTER:
What do you think we ought to know 10 about this event that you haven't told us?
MR.
MacEWEN:
What I think you should know in 12 regards to what?
Personnel
- actions, equipment operations?
13 MR.
VATTER:
Yes, anything.
14 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Let's just kind of --
We asked you 15 what you did, and we explored it a little bit, but, if 16 there's something that we haven't brought up or talked about 17 that you think is interesting -- any problems encountered or 18 anything that helped you respond really well.
The question 19 is if you think there's anything that's important that we 20 should know, or just interesting.
That could be events or 21 good things or bad things -- whatever occurs to me.
22 MR.
MacEWEN:
They'e doing something in the 23 control room right now.
I believe they'e separating the 24 procedure for electrical distribution.
That s
a good thing, 25 because in our procedure we had UPS's and normal switch gear
13 1
and some of the other switch gear.
They'e separating the 2
procedures now so that it's not quite so confusing when you 3
open it up.
MR.
VATTER:
That's the procedure that's in the 5
rack down by the UPS's.
MR.
MacEWEN:
And in the control room.
I mean, 7
it's the same procedure.
Otherwise, not to pat ourselves on the back, but I 9
thought we did a pretty good job for a situation that has 10 never happened before.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Okay.
What was your involvement 12 when they did the site area emergency?
How was 13 accountability accomplished for you?
What did you have to 14 do for accountability?
15 MR.
MacEWEN:
Punch through the card reader into 16 the control room.
All the operators were in the control 17 room at that time, and from there they assigned jobs to us, 18 but then, after a while, they allowed us to go back to the 19 break area across the hall.
20 21 you?
You'e heard the UPS story enough times, haven' 22 MR. VATTER: I think so.
That's not to say that 23 your story isn't worth hearing.
24 MR.
MacEWEN:
I understand what you'e saying, 25 but, I mean, how many times can you hear that we closed CB-4
14 1
on the UPS'.
3 six times.
MR.
VATTER:
Well, you can hear it about five or MR.
KAUFFMAN: If there are no further questions 5
or comments, that's the end of the interview.
MR.
MacEWEN:
Okay.
[Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the taking of the 8
interview was concluded.]
10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
REPORTER' CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceed-ings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
NAME OF PROCEEDING: Int. of PHIL MacEWEN DOCKET NUMBER PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Scriba, N.Y.
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for tne file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court report-ing company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.
P JON HUNDLEY Official Reporter Ann Riley
& Associates, Ltd.
ORIGINAL OFFICIALT1VDSCRIFI'F PROCEEDINGS
, Agency Tit1e:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Incident Investigation Team Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant Interview of: PHIL MacEHEN Docket No.
LOCATION:
- Scriba, New York DATE:
- Monday, August 19, 1991 PAGEOS:
1 14
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1612 KSt. N,'Z, Suite 300
~hlngton, D.C. 20006 (2O2) 2H-SSSO.
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c ntinued ADDENDUMTO INTERVIEW OF 3
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(Name/Pos tion}
~Pa e Line rrection and Reason for orrection Page of Signature Datef /Q/~9 3-7
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM 6
Interview of 7
PHIL MacEWEN 8
(Closed) 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Conference Room B
Administration Building Nine Mile Point, Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Two Lake Road
- Scriba, New York 13093 Monday, August 19, 1991 The interview commenced, pursuant to notice, 20 at 4:05 p.m.
21 22 23 24 25 PRESENT FOR THE IIT:
John Kauffman, NRC William Vatter, INPO
4
P R 0 C
E E
D I N
G S
[4:05 p.m.]
MR.
VATTER: It's August 19.
We'e at Nine Mile 5
Point Unit Two, administration building, conducting an 6
interview with Phil MacEwen -- did I say it right?
MR.
MacEWEN:
Right.
MR.
VATTER:
My name is Bill Vatter.
I'm an 9
employee of INPO on loan to the NRC for the IIT 10 investigation of an event that occurred at Nine Mile Point 11 on August 13.
12 Also here is e
13 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
John Kauffman, from NRC 14 headquarters.
15 MR.
MacEWEN:
Phil MacEwen, auxiliary operator for 16 Niagara Mohawk.
17 MR. VATTER:
Phil, could you tell us a little bit 18 about your background, how long you'e worked for Niagara 19 Mohawk and what you did before then?
20 MR.
MacEWEN: I'e spent six years as an auxiliary 21 operator Niagara Mohawk.
Before that, I worked as a
22 mechanic as FitzPatrick nuclear plant, and I worked 23 construction for Johnson Controls Instrumentation at Nine 24 Mile Point.
25 MR.
VATTER:
Okay.
Phil, we'e interested in finding out about the 2
events of August 13, what you were doing and the things that 3
you did in response to the event.
Perhaps we could start by 4
having you tell us what your job assignment was that day and 5
what you were doing before the event, occurred.
MR.
MacEWEN:
My first job assignment that day was 7
to go with --
There were six operators all together, I 8
believe.
MR.
VATTER:
What time did you come in?
Were you 10 on the midnight shift?
MR.
MacEWEN:
No, I was on the day shift.
I was 12 in the control room at 6 o'lock.
14 site?
MRS VATTER:
Okay.
When did you come onto the 15 MR.
MacEWEN:
Within five minutes, probably 5:55 16 in the morning.
17 MR. VATTER:
Okay.
When was the first time that 18 you were aware that things weren't like they should have 19 been?
20 MR.
MacEWEN:
About two minutes to 6, maybe.
I 21 was changing my shoes in the locker room, and one of the 22 other operators told me that there had been a scram, so I 23 hurried up to the control room.
When I got to the control 24 room, the CSO assigned me and another operator to try and 25 restart the UPS's.
MR.
VATTER:
Who was the other operator that was 2
assigned with you?
5 MR.
MacEWEN:
MR.
VATTER:
And it was a
CSO that gave the instruction?
8 UPS's.
MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
MR.
VATTER:
And he told you to go and restart the MR.
MacEWEN:
He said, if it was possible to try 10 and start the UPS's.
11 MR.
VATTER:
Okay.
So what did you do then?
12 MR.
MacEWEN:
I went right from there to the 13 switch gear building.
When we got down there, we opened up 14 the procedure.
In the time that we were reviewing the 15 procedure, four more operators come down.
Two of them were 16
- CSOs, and one of them was an RO.
They pretty much were 17 telling us what to do.
18 MR. VATTER:
Do you remember who those guys were?
19 We might be able to figure it out here.
20 MR.
MacEWEN:
Well, Aaron Armstrong and myself 21 were the first two.
Then Jim Stevens came
- down, Dave 22
- Hanczyk, Mike Garbus, and Bob Spooner.
23 24 25 MR.
VATTER:
Okay.
MR.
MacEWEN:
Is that all of them?
MR.
VATTER:
I think so.
2 procedure.
So you and Aaron were trying to figure out the MR.
MacEWEN:
We were thumbing through the 4
procedure.
We looked at the table of contents, trying to 5
find something that covered a tripped UPS.
It was not very 6
plain in the procedure how to restart a tripped UPS.
There 7
was how to start one up from a shut down position, but not 8
from a trip position.
10 MR.
VATTER:
Okay.
MR.
MacEWEN:
Like I said, we were looking through 11 the procedure, and then Dave Hanczyk showed up, Mike Garbus, 12 and Bob Spooner.
They diagnosed rather quickly that we have 13 to have power, and they directed us to close in the CB-4, 14 the maintenance supply.
15 MR.
VATTER:
Did you try operating any of the 16 switches or breakers 17 18 19 MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
MR.
VATTER: -- before Dave showed up?
MR.
MacEWEN:
No.
When Dave showed up, he was the 20 one that started giving directions.
First we were going to 21 try a normal restart, but that wouldn'0 work.
22 23 MR.
VATTER:
That was Dave's direction.
MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
24 MR.
VATTER:
Did you have the cabinet doors opened 25 up before you got there?
MR.
MacEWEN:
No.
I don't think we had the cabinet -- I'm not sure 3
on that.
I mean, the procedure sits right on the door, and 4
we opened the procedure first.
I don't believe we opened a
5 door.
MR.
VATTER:
Okay.
MR.
MacEWEN:
I'm not positive on that.
MR. VATTER:
So Dave sized up the situation and 9
told you what to do?
10 MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
He just told us what breakers 11 to reset and then told us to open --
He figured out the 12 first UPS.
He opened up the door on the CB-4, the 13 maintenance supply breaker 14 MR. VATTER:
Did you try to do a normal start on 15 that thing first, before you did that?
16 17 MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
We tried the normal restart procedure, and that 18 didn't work.
19 20 MR.
VATTER:
Okay.
MR.
MacEWEN:
That was resetting the CB-l, CB-2, 21 CB-3, and then trying to auto-restart, but it wouldn't work.
22 I think it had to do with the logic also being tripped 23 from what I'e learned afterwards.
24 MR.
VATTER:
And then the CB-1 and CB-2 breakers 25 were shut after you made that attempt; is that right?
MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
MR.
VATTER:
Then did you reopen those before you 3
shut CB-4?
MR.
MacEWEN:
CB-3 was open at the time.
To start it, you close CB-1, and then you try and 6
start it, and then you close CB-2 -- CB-2 is the battery 7
power.
I can',
remember exactly how the procedure is 8
written, but, I mean MR.
VATTER:
Well, did you reopen those breakers 10 before you shut in CB-4?
12 13 14 ago.
MR.
MacEWEN:
I'm not sure.
MR.
VATTER:
Okay.
MR.
MacEWEN:
I'm really -- I mean, it was a week 15 MR.
VATTER:
I understand.
It was a week ago, and 16 it was going pretty fast at the time.
17 18 MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
MR.
VATTER:
So Dave -- did he shut CB-4, or did 19 he show somebody else how to do it?
20 MR.
MacEWEN:
He did the first one, and then I did 21 one UPS.
I closed the CB-4 on one of the UPS's, and I 22 believe Spooner and Garbus each did a UPS.
23 24 do that?
MR.
VATTER:
Have you ever had training on how to 25 MR.
MacEWEN:
Now from the training center. I'e
8 1
had it from the system engineer during the startup and test 2
days.
MR.
VATTER:
Would you have known how to close in 4
CB-4 is Dave wasn't there to show you?
MR.
MacEWEN:
I'm sure I -- If I would have had 6
direction from the control room to go outside of the 7
procedure, then I could have done that.
I knew how to do 8
it.
10 MR.
VATTER:
You knew how to do it.
MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
But without having an RO or a CSO there to make 12 the decision to go outside of procedure, I wouldn't have 13 done that.
14 MR. VATTER:
Okay.
Then what did you do?
That 15 was UPS -- which one did you do first?
16 17 18 running?
MR.
MacEWEN:
I believe it was 1A.
MR.
VATTER:
What happened after that one was 19 MR.
MacEWEN:
We got that one running, and then we 20 proceeded to close the CB-4s on the rest of the UPS's.
21 22 MR.
VATTER:
Who was it that went and got G?
MR.
MacEWEN:
I don't know.
I was not involved in 23 G at all.
24 MR. VATTER:
What did you do then, after the UPS's 25 were restored -- the power was restored there?
e 9
1 MR.
MacEWEN:
I went back to the control room for 2
another job.
MR.
VATTER:
And what job did they give you to do?
MR.
MacEWEN:
Pretty much they said, Stay out of 5
the way.
[Laughter.]
MR.
MacEWEN:
I didn't get another job until maybe 8
a half hour after the event, and then they had me take the 9
steam generator-rejecter out of service and shut down off-10 gas.
12 13 MR.
VATTER:
Off-gas had already isolated.
MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
MR. VATTER:
And you had to go back out in the 14 plant to do that.
15 16 MR.
MacEWEN:
Yes.
MR. VATTER:
Did you have an RP tech go with 17 you -- rad tech?
18 MR.
MacEWEN:
I stopped at rad protection 19 Because of the time they had the alarms to monitors going 20 off in the turbine building, they said before we could go 21 into the turbine building we had to stop at rad protection, 22 and they said it was okay to go in the plant.
But we had to 23 log in before we went in and log out when we came out.
24 MR. VATTER:
Did they have the hogger running at 25 that time?
10 MR.
MacEWEN:
That was my other job.
We started 2
the hoggers, yes.
MR. VATTER:
Do you have to start the hogger 4
locally, or can you start that up from the control room?
MR.
MacEWEN:
They start it from the control room, 6
but we did our prestart checks -- I did the prestart checks 7
locally, and they started it from the control room.
MR.
VATTER:
Now, there was a rad monitor on the 9
off-gas.
Do you know what that was reading when you were 10 preparing to put the hogger one?
MR.
MacEWEN:
No.
MR.
VATTER: It reads only in the control room; is 13 that right?
I don't know.
14 MR.
MacEWEN:
They can read it in the control 15
- room, and I believe, if you were to go to it locally, you 16 can read it there.
17 18 MR. VATTER:
But it's inside a room.
MR.
MacEWEN:
Right.
It's a different room 19 entirely from where the control panel is for off-gas.
20 MR.
VATTER:
So you don't have prestart checks to 21 do in that room.
22 23 24 MR.
MacEWEN:
No.
MR.
VATTER:
At the local control panel.
MR.
MacEWEN:
The hoggers are separate.
I mean, 25 that was checking oil levels, water levels in the separator
11 1
- tank, and then having them start it.
After the hoggers are 2
- started, then I -- which way did this happen?
We isolated 3
the steam generator-rejecters and off-gas.
I'm pretty sure 4
that's the order we did it.
MR.
VATTER:
Okay.
What did you do next?
MR.
MacEWEN:
I may have missed a step in here.
7 We restarted a condensate booster pump also.
I was on the 8
condensate booster pump.
I think that was -- that was 9
before the hoggers.
10 MR. VATTER:
What did you have to do locally to 11 restart the condensate booster pump?
12 MR.
MacEWEN:
Actually, nothing.
I was standing 13 by to make sure that we had oil to the pump, make sure the 14 oil pump was running, and somebody else was at the con 15 demins.
It's hard to remember exactly what order --
Now 16 the jobs are coming back to me, what we did.
The booster 17 pump, I stood it, made sure that we had a good start on the 18 pump, that the stop check went open.
And then back to the 19 control room.
20 21 MR.
VATTER:
Okay.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
When you were out. in the plant 22 early on in the event, were there any areas where you 23 noticed the lights were out?
24 MR.
MacEWEN:
When I first come into the plant and 25 I had changed my shoes, the lights were out in the stairway
h
12 1
going to the control room, right next to the elevator.
3 lights?
MR.
KAUFFMAN: All the lights or part of the MR.
MacEWEN:
There was some kind of lighting.
I 5
- mean, the stairway was lit, but it was dark.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Okay.
MR.
MacEWEN:
I mean, you could see the stairs, 8
but it was pretty dark.
MR.
VATTER:
What do you think we ought to know 10 about this event that you haven't told us?
MR.
MacEWEN:
What I think you should know in 12 regards to what?
Personnel
- actions, equipment operations?
13 MR.
VATTER:
Yes, anything.
14 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Let's just kind of --
We asked you 15 what you did, and we explored it a little bit, but, if 16 there's something that we haven't brought up or talked about 17 that you think is interesting -- any problems encountered or 18 anything that helped you respond really well.
The question 19 is if you think there's anything that's important that we 20 should know, or just interesting.
That could be events or 21 good things or bad things -- whatever occurs to me.
22 MR.
MacEWEN:
They'e doing something in the 23 control room right now.
I believe they'e separating the 24 procedure for electrical distribution.
That's a good thing, 25 because in our procedure we had UPS's and normal switch gear
13 1
and some of the other switch gear.
They'e separating the 2
procedures now so that it's not quite so confusing when you 3
open it up.
MR.
VATTER:
That's the procedure that's in the 5
rack down by the UPS's.
MR.
MacEWEN:
And in the control room.
I mean, 7
it's the same procedure.
Otherwise, not to pat ourselves on the back, but I 9
thought we did a pretty good job for a situation that has 10 never happened before.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Okay.
What was your involvement 12 when they did the site area emergency?
How was 13 accountability accomplished for you?
What did you have to 14 do for accountability?
15 MR.
MacEWEN:
Punch through the card reader into 16 the control room.
All the operators were in the control 17 room at that time, and from there they assigned jobs to us, 18 but then, after a while, they allowed us to go back to the 19 break area across the hall.
20 2 1 you?
You'e heard the UPS story enough times, haven' 22 MR. VATTER: I think so.
That's not to say that 23 your story isn't worth hearing.
24 MR.
MacEWEN:
I understand what you'e saying, 25 but, I mean, how many times can you hear that we closed CB-4
14 1
on the UPS'.
3 six times.
MR. VATTER:
Well, you can hear it about five or MR.
KAUFFMAN: If there are no further questions 5
or comments, that's the end of the interview.
MR.
MacEWEN:
Okay.
[Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m.,
the taking of the 8
interview was concluded.]
10 12 13 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
REPORTER' CERT INDICATE This is to certify that the attached proceed-ings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission i.n the matter of:
NAME OP PROCEEDING: 'Xnt. of PHIL MacEWEN DOCKET NUMBER.
PLACE OP PROCEEDING: Scriba, N.Y.
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereaf ter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court report-ing company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.
JON H.UNDLEY'f ficial Reporter Ann Riley 6 Associates, Ltd.