ML17058B546
| ML17058B546 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/20/1991 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17056C371 | List:
|
| References | |
| CON-IIT07-089.0A-91, CON-IIT07-089.0B-91, CON-IIT7-89.0A-91, CON-IIT7-89.0B-91 NUREG-1455, NUDOCS 9305060317 | |
| Download: ML17058B546 (92) | |
Text
OFFICIALTRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS Agency:
Title:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Incident Investigation Team Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant Interview of: ERIC HOFFMAN Docket No.
UXATION.
- Scriba, New York DATE: Tuesday, August 20, 1991 PACES:
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM 6
Interview of 7
ERIC HOFFMAN 8
(Closed) 10 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 Conference Room B
Administration Building Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Two N
Lake Road
- Scriba, New York 13093
- Tuesday, August 20, 1991 The interview commenced, pursuant to notice, 20 at 11: 02 a.m.
21 22 23 24 25 PRESENT FOR THE IIT:
Michael Jordan, NRC Rich Conte, INPO
WP
P R 0 C
E E
D I N G
S
[11:02 a.m.]
MR.
JORDAN:
Good morning.
We'e at the Nine Mile 4
Point Unit Two, in the P building. It s August 20, 1991.
5 We'e here to cover an event of a transient that occurred on 6
August 13, 1991.
I am Michael Jordan.
I'm with the NRC out 7
of Region III.
8 MR.
CONTE:
I'm Rich Conte.
I'm a section chief 9
from Region I.
10 MR.
HOFFMAN:
I'm Eric Hoffman, an auxiliary 11 operator C, Nine Mile Point Two.
12 MR.
JORDAN:
Eric, before we get started, why 13 don't you just go ahead and give us a background of your 14 experience?
15 MR.
HOFFMAN:
I started in Nine Mile Two 16 operations back in 1984, during constructions
- days, and I 17 progressed through first fuel on site, startup and testing, 18 into commercial run.
Prior to 1984, I was in college for a 19 couple years.
20 21 licensed?
MR.
JORDAN:
Are you licensed, or are you not 22 MR.
HOFFMAN:
I am not licensed.
I'm non-23 licensed.
24 25 MR.
JORDAN:
Non-licensed operator.
Okay, Eric.
Why don't you in your own words just
1 give an idea of what you saw transpire when you came on 2
shift during the event?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Okay.
I was riding down the 4
elevator when on the elevator we lost all lights.
First we 5
thought the elevator just go stuck, but it continued to come 6
down.
When the door opened on the 261 elevation, lights 7
were off in that area.
We then proceeded to go to the 8
nearest here-here system 10 12 MR.
JORDAN:
What's the system?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Here-here, PA system.
MR.
JORDAN:
Oh.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
-- to contact the control room to t
13 find out what was going on.
We went to the PA system.
It 14 did not work, so we then proceeded to a site phone and 15 contacted the control room.
They told us that they wanted 16 up upstairs immediately because they have lost indication.
17 We then proceeded to go upstairs back into the control room, 18 where I was then instructed to man reactor pressure level 19 and reactor level gauges on the emergency core cooling 20 system panels.
21 22 23 level.
MR.
CONTE:
Reactor pressure level and what?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Reactor pressure and reactor water 25 MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
Just those two parameters.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
I think the first set of readings I 3
called off was a reactor water level of 175 inches, and 4
reactor pressure was 964 inches -- or 964 pounds; excuse me.
5 I then proceeded to keep on calling off numbers when I 6
noticed any decline or increase in either one, and continued 7
calling them off until we reached 159 inches water level.
8 The pressure was till 900, I think; I'm not exactly sure of 9
the exact number on it.
The station shift supervisor 10 started up RCIC, had a licensed operator come over and start 11 reactor core isolation cooling, to inject water into the 12 vessel.
t 13 We started RCIC in auto first, and then the 14 licensed operator switched over to manual, because it seemed 15 there was erratic control when it was in auto.
He was 16 injecting; I was watching level.
Level still was 17 decreasing; pressure still was decreasing.
He continued 18 injection.
Then I noticed a turn-around, where level 19 started to rise.
I called off the reading to the
- SSS, which 20 he wrote down, and continued to watch level.
21 Level continued on climbing, to the point where 22 the licensed operator backed off on the flow of RCIC because 23 level was coming up.
Level continued on rising, to the 24 point that the licensed operator -- we hit level 8, and RCIC 25 was already off line, basically; it was past min flow.
We
1
)
a J
5 I
1 went off-scale on the wide band recorder that' was reading.
Mainly I just kept on calling off pressures
.and 3
levels as the licensed operators were manipulating various 4
other systems to try to regain everything.
MR.
JORDAN:
When the level was coming up, do you 6
have any idea of a time frame when the annunciators came 7
back on and the power came back?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
I can't really remember, but I don' 9
think it was 10 MR.
JORDAN:
Before or after RCIC tripped?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
RCIC didn't trip; we shut RCIC down.
12 It probably was like five, six minutes.
I m not positive.
13 To me that sounds about right, because I was still watching 14 level when it came back on.
15 MR.
JORDAN:
Five to six minutes after, before?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Probably from the time that we 17 started RCIC to the time that the lights came back on.
18 19 20 MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
Can you continue.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Basically, I was assigned to that 21 position and watching that when they tried to re-establish 22 flow and everything with the condensate booster pumps.
Then 23 I was relieved of position as other licensed operators came 24 on who were coming in for the morning shift.
25 Then I was instructed to go down to the air
1 removal system and make sure that was ready to go into 2
service.
MR.
CONTE:
To make sure what was ready?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Air removal system.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
I was sent down to make sure that it 7
had proper seal water level, oil level, that they were both 8
able to be used to maintain condenser vacuum.
10 for?
MR.
JORDAN:
That's what the air removal system is 12 13 14 15 MR.
HOFFMAN:
To maintain condenser vacuum.
MR.
CONTE:
These are the hoggers?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
These are the hoggers, yes.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
About what time did you leave the control room?
16 The condensate booster feed pump attempt to start up 17 occurred around 7, 7:30.
Were you in the control room at 18 that time?
19 20 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, I was.
MR.
CONTE:
So it was after --
Based on that time 21 of reference, about how long after that?
22 MR.
HOFFMAN:
I can't remember the exact time, how 23 long.
I was in there for a while longer after that.
I was 24 still reading level when they were controlling with the 25 condensate booster.
I was reading the wide range, which was
4
~4s k
coming down back on the scale
- again, and they had a licensed operator reading narrow range over in another panel.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
You were down at the hoggers.
4 What happened next?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
I called the control room up to let 6
them know the situation with the hoggers -- they were ready 7
to be started -- and I was told not to go up to 277 because 10 12 zs 14 15 16 there was a high rad annunciator in on the off-gas system.
MR.
CONTE:
Go up to 277 elevation.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Turbine building.
MR.
CONTE:
Because of a high rad?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
High rad alarm was annunciated from off-gas system.
That's when I turned around and noticed the radiation monitors in the area.
There was one 30, 40 feet away from me annunciating
- also, alarming.
I then proceeded 17 18 19 20 21 22 MR.
CONTE:
What elevation?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
I was on 250.
MR.
CONTE:
And 250 is where the hoggers are.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, sir.
MR.
CONTE:
And there was a radiation monitor 23 around that?
24 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Around the paging system I was 25
- using, yes.
8 1
MR.
CONTE:
Is there a meter there, so you could 2
tell what the MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, there was.
MR.
CONTE:
Was that high?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
No, it wasn'.
It was reading 10 to 6
the minus 1st.
10 MR.
CONTE:
Was there an alarm?
MR.
HOFFMAN: The alarm light was going off, yes.
MR.
CONTE:
And in your mind is that unusual?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, it is.
I proceeded to tell the 11 licened operator I was talking to in the control room the 12 alarm was going off and I was leaving the area.
When I 13 walked past area I read the annunciator part of the meter 14 for that radiation monitor to see what it was reading and 15 proceeded to leave that area and ran past another radiation 16 monitor that was alarming and read that annunciator's level.
17 18 Both of them were reading ten to the minus first.
I then proceeded up to the control room and 19 explained what I saw down on 250 area to the licensed 20 operator.
He explained to the Chief Shift Operator what I 21 saw where they made the determination to evacuate the 22 turbine building until Rad Protection was able to go out and 23 survey because even though they were reading low levels they 24 wanted to make sure because the alarms were going.
MR.
CONTE:
Did anyone offer an explanation as to
( f~
1 why the alarms were in versus the indication?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes.
Talking to a Radiation 3
Protection tech, me and him, just between the two of us, 4
thoguht maybe due to the fact that when the UPS's did come 5
back into service that they might have spiked the radiation 6
- monitors, causing an alarm to come in and then, you know, as 7
soon as power was re-established it was reading normal 8
- again, but when the power initially came on the surge of 9
voltage might have spiked the monitors.
10 MR.
CONTE:
Is there a way we remove that alarm, 11 like hitting a reset button of some sort?
12 MR.
HOFFMAN:
There is an acknowledge and reset 13 button but we were instructed per administration procedures 14 when we see alarm to get the reading and get out and report 15 it.
16 MR.
CONTE:
Okay, continue.
You got back to the 17 control room, made your report.
18 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Then we were in the middle of the 19 site area emergency
- where, you know, we were instructed to 20 make sure you were logged in, into the control room area 21 and then waited for the next job, which basically from that 22 time, which is pretty close to by the time everything was 23 overwith and they figured out -- I think it was about 9:30 24 and basically since our shift was all night and there were 25 three other shifts, they basically just told us to sit down
~
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~
10 1
and wait until the emergency was over unless we were needed 2
to re-utilize MR.
CONTE:
Wait where?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
We were waiting in the control room 5
and then we were instructed to wait over at the beehive, 6
which is right across -- it's our staging area because there 7
is too many people and they wanted to maintain decorum in 8
the control room.
MR.
CONTE:
What time did you get relieved and 10 allowed to go home?
12t 13 beehive?
14 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Eleven o'lock.
MR.
CONTE:
So you spent 9:30 to 11:00 in the MR.
HOFFMAN:
Closer probably like 10:00.
I went 15 out and did a few minor jobs which were normal plant 16 function jobs, if you want to call it that 17 18 MR.
CONTE:
Like what?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
I charged the air compressors on one 19 of the diesels because we have to use a cross-tie on it and 20 gasically from then about a little after 10:00 to 10:30, 21 when they got permission from the EOF to let us leave, I was 22 instructed to wait in the staging area until I was needed.
23 MR.
CONTE:
Tell me something about this crosstie 24 and the need to charge the emergency diesels?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes.
Diesel generators.
We have
11 1
the diesel air compressor was being marked up to be fixed 2
and we have two compressors for the two tanks.
One 3
compressor is marked up so you have to open when the low 4
pressure alarm comes in, you have to manually charge it up.
They were trying to repair one of the dryers.
MR.
CONTE:
What's the crosstie aspect?
I 7
thought--
MR.
HOFFMAN: It was two tanks and what it does is 9
you open a crosstie.
Since one compressor's marked up it 10 allowed the compressor of the diesel or air compressor of ll the two tanks to each have a compressor, allows the 12 compressor, the different tank, to charge to one whose e
13 compressor is being marked up.
14 MR.
CONTE:
Does each tank have these two -- does 15 each diesel have these two tanks or does one tank go with 16 one diesel and the other tank go with the other diesel?
17 18 MR.
HOFFMAN:
No.
Each diesel has two tanks.
MR.
CONTE:
Oh, I see, so really a crosstie is 19 within one emergency diesel generator room?
20 21 22 MR.
HOFFMAN:
That's correct.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
MR.
HOFFMAN: It's sits between the two tanks and 23 the diesel to enable us to allow to charge the tank up to 24 acceptable pressure.
25 MR.
JORDAN:
Do you isolate one tank and then
f
12 1
charge the other when you crosstie or are they both tied 2
together?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Both tied together.
MR.
CONTE:
Until they get charged.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Until they get charged up and then 6
we re-isolate the crosstie and both tanks are now separate 7
again.
MR.
CONTE:
- Okay, so that takes us to when you 9
left, around 11:00.
10 MR.
HOFFMAN:
That's correct.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
I have some review questions 12 here based on that chronology of what you gave us.
13 Can you be specific in terms of the building?
14 You mentioned an elevation but what portion of the 15 building -- you were in the elevator?
16 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes.
That was for the auxiliary 17 service building.
18 MR.
CONTE:
Auxiliary service building.
Does this 19 elevator take you up and down past the Rad Protectio office 20 or something?
21 MR.
HOFFMAN:
The Rad Protection office is located 22 at the top of the elevator route, the 306.
23 24 MR.
CONTE:
You weren't in that area at all, 306?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Well, that's where I was coming down 25 from.
I was coming down from the control room down the 261
13 1
elevation.
MR.
CONTE:
- Okay, and you explained the symptom of 3
the elevator being black, black with the exception of -- was 4
there any lights in the elevator?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, there was.
The floor 6
indication light indicated between 2 and 3.
The elevator 7
seemed to stop momentarily and then continued down to 2,.
8 which is elevation 261.
MR.
CONTE:
When you come in on 261 of the aux 10 service building, you found darkness?
12 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, I did.
MR.
CONTE:
t 13 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Did not seem to be.
I did not 14 notice any on -- actually made the phone call, reported back 15 up to the control room.
The stairways were dark also.
16 17 18 19 20 MR.
JORDAN:
Did you have a flashlight?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, I did.
MR.
JORDAN:
Glad you had a flashlight?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, I am.
It got real dark.
MR.
CONTE:
The stairways in the aux service 21 building were?
22 23 MR.
HOFFMAN:
That is correct.
MR.
CONTE:
How many stairways are in this aux 24 service building, just that one?
25 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes.
It gets from the 261 entrance
14 1
into the plant up to the control building.
There's three 2
flights of stairs.
MR.
CONTE:
And the nearest here-here was where?
4 In that same building?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, it was.
It was probably from 6
the elevator it was 35 feet away.
10 MR.
CONTE:
Was that black in that area too?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, it was.
MR.
CONTE:
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Did not notice any.
The lighting was on and where we found the plant 12
- phone, which is in the locker room, the lighting was on in 14 15 16 MR.
CONTE:
That's interesting.
[Laughter.]
MR.
CONTE:
Lighting in the stairways and 17 elevators dark -- do the elevators have emergency lighting 18 in them?
19 MR.
HOFFMAN:
I really couldn't tell you, off 20 hand.
I would have to look again.
21 MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
Good.
On monitoring reactor 22 pressure and level can you tell me the highest and the 23 lowest of the two parameters that you ever observed?
24 MR.
HOFFMAN:
What I can remember is we started 25 out at a reactor pressure of 964 pounds, reactor water, the
~ \\
r
15 1
highest you want for reactor water was off scale on my meter 2
which is greater than 200 inches.
The lowest I saw -- that 3
I can remember reactor water getting was, I would have to 4
- say, not positively, but I would say in the 150 range -- 149 5
range.
The lowest -- reactor pressure continued on, 6
dropping down -- I can't remember exactly what the pressure 7
got to, it got down to 590, I do remember, but I think it 8
continued on lowering after that.
I do know that it seemed to stop twice when it was 10 decreasing.
It seemed to settle out for a minute or two 12 MR.
CONTE:
Level?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Level.
Yeah. It seemed to settle 13 and then it continued on dropping again.
14 MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
Do you happen to know what the 15 RCIC initiation is -- initiation setting is?
16 MR.
HOFFMAN:
I'm not really sure.
I think it is 17
-- well, single low level is, I think 158.8.
I am not 18 positive.
And the SSS called to start at 159.
I'm pretty 19 sure that was the number he called and started it at.
20 As I said before, a licensed operator was doing 21 many of those functions, just happened to be he gauge next 22 to mine.
23 MR.
CONTE:
You must have overheard the -- I guess 24 the operator who was controlling RCIC indicated going from 25 automatic to manual, did he give a reason?
Did you hear a
f-
16 1
reason?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
The best that I can
- remember, as I 3
said, I was more intently watching what I was told to do 4
was to do -- the flow was erratic and the flow meters seemed 5
to erratic in auto.
So, he announced he was switching over 6
to manual.
MR.
CONTE:
The flow was erratic.
Okay.
Did you 8
offer an explanation as to why the reactor level went high?
9 Did you hear or did you know anything?
10 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Not that I remember.
I don't really 11 remember why.
The only thing I could think of, is as we 12 started injecting flow, it came up and then even though we 13 backed off, it was still coming on.
14 MR.
CONTE:
You didn't hear any emotional 15 statement from anyone like "Oh no" or 16 17 MR.
HOFFMAN:
No.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
18 19 there.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Everything was very professional in 20 MR.
CONTE:
And when he got that Level 8, he shut 21 down RCIC?
22 MR.
HOFFMAN:
He was shut down before he hit Level 23 8 if I remember correctly.
24 MR.
CONTE:
And that was -- is that normal -- did 25 you happen to know if that is normal practice to shut down
17 1
RCIC before the Level 8 function comes in?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
I'm not trained in the control room 3
aspects of the systems.
I'm more into plant at this time.
MR.
CONTE:
That's a fair answer.
All right.
Mike, jump in, if you ve got anything.
MR.
JORDAN: I'e got just a couple questions.
7 Did -- you say it went off scale, high on level, did it stay 8
- there, did it come back down?
MR.
HOFFMAN: It stayed there for a while and then 10 came back down. It went --
on the wide range it went off 11 scale
- and, as I said before, I'm not real familiar with the 12 control rooms 13 MR.
JORDAN:
Did it come back down to the point 14 where they had to restart RCIC?
Did it come back down and 15 they were controlling it elsewhere outside of RCIC?
16 MR.
HOFFMAN: It came back down, but they never 17 restarted RCIC.
They came back down within acceptable 18 range.
19 20 21 MR.
JORDAN:
Do you know what range it was in?
/
MR.
HOFFMAN:
No, I can't
- remember, off hand.
As I said, they started to control with condensate boosters.
22 MR.
JORDAN:
So as far as you know RCIC was only 23 used one time?
24 25 MR.
HOFFMAN:
That is correct.
MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
You mentioned that you were at
18 1
the 250 foot area in the Hoggers, what building is that in?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
That is in the turbine building.
MR.
JORDAN:
Turbine building.
And you had the 4
RAD monitor that was close to the area alarming?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
That is correct.
MR.
JORDAN:
And you read it at ten to the MR.
HOFFMAN:
Ten to the minus first.
MR.
JORDAN:
And then you said there was another 9
alarm?
10 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Um hm.
MR.
JORDAN:
That you -- actually near that you 12 came across?
Do you have any idea where that was at?
Same 14 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Same elevation, the east end of the 15 building versus the first alarm was on the west end of the 16 building.
17 18 reading?
19 20 21 22 MR.
JORDAN:
And that one was alarming and it was MR.
HOFFMAN:
Ten to the minus one, again.
MR.
JORDAN:
Same thing?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, sir.
MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
And at that time you notified 23 the control room, is that correct:?
24 MR.
HOFFMAN:
I notified the control room the 25 first -- after they told me about the high radiation level
19 1
the 277 annunciator being in, I then looked around to make 2
sure that the ones on my level -- because I'm right below 3
that, weren't in and they turned out to be.
I then told the 4
control room I was leaving the area.
MR.
JORDAN:
Is the alarm an audible?
Is it a 6
visual -- what?
MR.
HOFFMAN: It's a visual.
The alarm that was 8
going was visual.
There is also audible, but the visual is 9
what I noticed it was pretty loud down there.
I didn't even 10 get right next to it.
I got close enough to be able to see 11 what the level was and then proceeded out of the building.
12 MR.
JORDAN:
That's how you -- in other words you t
13 didn't hear the audible alarm, you noticed the visual 14 alarm?
15 16 17 MR.
HOFFMAN:
That is correct.
MR.
JORDAN:
Or a light, what's the MR.
HOFFMAN: It's a flashing light. It's like a 18 siren light or police light.
19 MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
So it's a red light that 20
- flashes, is that correct?
22 MR.
HOFFMAN:
That's correct.
MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
The communications at that 23 time were working?
What were you using?
24 MR.
HOFFMAN:
I was using the here-here system.
25 By that time the UPS's -- our power had been restored to the
~
'a
20 1
annunciators and here-here systems.
MR.
JORDAN:
So after that time you knew of no 3
other problems as far communications with the control room?
4 You were out in the plant doing other activities for the 5
day?
10 MR.
HOFFMAN:
That is correct.
MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
MR.
CONTE:
I'm done.
MR.
JORDAN:
So am I.
MR.
CONTE:
Let's go off the record.
[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m.,
the taking of the 12 interview was concluded.]
zs 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
REPORTER' CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceed-ings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
NAME OP PROCEEDING: Int. of ERIC HOFFPAN DOCKET NUMBER:
PLACE OP PROCEEDING: Scriba, N.Y.
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for tne file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court report-ing company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.
JON HUNDLEY Official Reporter Ann Riley
& Associates, Ltd.
4
0'1 7'RP-g[
ORIGINAL OFFICIALTRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS Agency
Title:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Incident Investigation Team Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant Interview of: ERIC HOFFMAN Docket No.
UXATION Scriba,'New York DATE: Tuesday, August 20, 1991 PAGES: 1 - 20 AtWRILEY8c ASSOCIATES, LTD.
1612 KSt.N.'V., Suite 300 Vhshinyon, D.G 20006 (202) 293-3950 9305060317 911031
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM 6
Interview of 7
ERIC HOFFMAN 8
(Closed) 10 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 Conference Room B
Administration Building Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Two Lake Road
- Scriba, New York 13093
- Tuesday, August 20, 1991 The interview commenced, pursuant to notice, 20 at 11:02 a.m.
21 22 23 24 25 PRESENT FOR THE IIT:
Michael Jordan, NRC Rich Conte, INPO
l tii
0, P
R 0 C
E E
D I N
G S
[11:02 a.m.]
MR.
JORDAN:
Good morning.
We'e at the Nine Mile 4
Point Unit Two, in the P building. It s August 20, 1991.
5 We'e here to cover an event of a transient that occurred on 6
August 13, 1991.
I am Michael Jordan.
I'm with the NRC out 7
of Region III.
MR.
CONTE:
I'm Rich Conte.
I'm a section chief 9
from Region I.
10 MR.
HOFFMAN:
I'm Eric Hoffman, an auxiliary 11 operator C, Nine Mile Point Two.
12 MR.
JORDAN:
Eric, before we get started, why t
13 don't you just go ahead and give us a background of your 14 experience?
15 MR.
HOFFMAN:
I started in Nine Mile Two 16 operations back in 1984, during constructions
- days, and I 17 progressed through first fuel on site, startup and testing, 18 into commercial run.
Prior to 1984, I was in college for a 19 couple years.
20 21 licensed?
MR.
JORDAN:
Are you licensed, or are you not 22 MR.
HOFFMAN:
I am not licensed.
I'm non-23 licensed.
24 25 MR.
JORDAN:
Non-licensed operator.
Okay, Eric.
Why don't you in your own words just
Cl 1
1 give an idea of what you saw transpire when you came on 2
shift during the event?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Okay.
I was riding down the 4
elevator when on the elevator we lost all lights.
First we 5
thought the elevator just go stuck, but it continued to
- come, 6
down.
When the door opened on the 261 elevation, lights 7
were off in that area.
We then proceeded to go to the 8
nearest here-here system 10 12 MR.
JORDAN:
What's the system?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Here-here, PA system.
MR.
JORDAN:
Oh.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
-- to contact the control room to 1
13 find out what was going on.
We went to the PA system.
It 14 did not work, so we then proceeded to a site phone and 15 contacted the control room.
They told us that they wanted 16 up upstairs immediately because they have lost indication.
17 We then proceeded to go upstairs back into the control room, 18 where I was then instructed to man reactor pressure level 19 and reactor level gauges on the emergency core cooling 20 system panels.
22 23 level.
MR.
CONTE:
Reactor pressure level and what?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Reactor pressure and reactor water 24 25 MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
Just those two parameters.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes.
1 MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
I think the first set of readings I 3
called off was a reactor water level of 175 inches, and 4
reactor pressure was 964 inches -- or 964 pounds; excuse me.
5 I then proceeded to keep on calling off numbers when I 6
noticed any decline or increase in either one, and continued 7
calling them off until we reached 159 inches water level.
8 The pressure was till 900) I think; I'm not exactly sure of 9
the exact number on it.
The station shift supervisor 10 started up RCIC, had a licensed operator come over and start 11 reactor core isolation cooling, to inject water into the 12 vessel.
We started RCIC in auto first, and then the 14 licensed operator switched over to manual, because it seemed 15 there was erratic control when it was in auto.
He was 16 injecting; I was watching level.
Level still was 17 decreasing; pressure still was decreasing.
He continued 18 injection.
Then I noticed a turn-around, where level 19 started to rise.
I called off the reading to the
- SSS, which 20 he wrote down, and continued to watch level.
21 Level continued on climbing, to the point where 22 the licensed operator backed off on the flow of RCIC because 23 level was coming up.
Level continued on rising, to the 24 point that the licensed operator -- we hit level 8, and RCIC 25 was already off line, basically; it was past min flow.
We
t I
5 1
went off-scale on the wide band recorder that I was reading.
Mainly I just kept on calling off pressures and 3
levels as the licensed operators were manipulating various 4
other systems to try to regain everything.
5 MR.
JORDAN:
When the level was coming up, do you 6
have any idea of a time frame when the annunciators came 7
back on and the power came back?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
I can't really remember, but I don' 9
think it was 10 MR.
JORDAN:
Before or after RCIC tripped?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
RCIC didn't trip; we shut RCIC down.
12 It probably was like five, six minutes.
I m not positive.
1 13 To me that sounds about right, because I was still watching 14 level when it came back on.
15 16 MR.
JORDAN:
Five to six minutes after, before?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Probably from the time that we 17 started RCIC to the time that, the lights came back on.
18 19 20 MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
Can you continue.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Basically, I was assigned to that 21 position and watching that when they tried to re-establish 22 flow and everything with the condensate booster pumps.
Then 23 I was relieved of position as other licensed operators came 24 on who were coming in for the morning shift.
25 Then I was instructed to go down to the air
v' l
1 removal system and make sure that was ready to go into 2
service.
MR.
CONTE:
To make sure what was ready?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Air removal system.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
I was sent down to make sure that it 7
had proper seal water level, oil level, that they were both 8
able to be used to maintain condenser vacuum.
MR.
JORDAN:
That's what the air removal system is 10 for?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
To maintain condenser vacuum.
12 zs 14 15 MR.
CONTE:
These are the hoggers?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
These are the hoggers, yes.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
About what time did you leave the control room?
16 The condensate booster feed pump attempt to start up 17 occurred around 7, 7:30.
Were you in the control room at 18 that time?
19 20 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, I was.
MR.
CONTE:
So it was after --
Based on that time 21 of reference, about how long after that?
22 MR.
HOFFMAN:
I can't remember the exact time, how 23 long.
I was in there for a while longer after that.
I was 24 still reading level when they were controlling with the 25 condensate booster.
I was reading the wide range, which was
1 coming down back on the scale
- again, and they had a licensed 2
operator reading narrow range over in another panel.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
You were down at the hoggers.
4 What happened next?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
I called the control room up to let 6
them know the situation with the hoggers -- they were ready 7
to be started -- and I was told not to go up to 277 because 8
there was a high rad annunciator in on the off-gas system.
10 12 MR.
CONTE:
Go up to 277 elevation.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Turbine building.
MR.
CONTE:
Because of a high rad?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
High rad alarm was annunciated from 13 off-gas system.
14 That's when I turned around and noticed the 15 radiation monitors in the area.
There was one 30, 40 feet 16 away from me annunciating
- also, alarming.
I then proceeded 17 18 19 20 21 22 MR.
CONTE:
What elevation?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
I was on 250.
MR.
CONTE:
And 250 is where the hoggers are.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, sir.
MR.
CONTE:
And there was a radiation monitor 23 around that?
24 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Around the paging system I was 25
- using, yes.
0, MR.
CONTE:
Is there a meter there, so you could 2
tell what the MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, there was.
MR.
CONTE:
Was that high?
5 MR.
HOFFMAN:
No, it wasn'.
It was reading 10 to 6
the minus 1st.
10 MR.
CONTE:
Was there an alarm?
MR.
HOFFMAN: The alarm light was going off, yes.
MR.
CONTE:
And in your mind is that unusual?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, it is.
I proceeded to tell the 11 licened operator I was talking to in the control room the 12 alarm was going off and I was leaving the area.
When I t
13 walked past area I read the annunciator part of the meter 14 for that radiation monitor to see what it was reading and 15 proceeded to leave that area and ran past another radiation 16 monitor that was alarming and read that annunciator's level.
17 18 Both of them were reading ten to the minus first.
I then proceeded up to the control room and 19 explained what I saw down on 250 area to the licensed 20 operator.
He explained to the Chief Shift Operator what I 21 saw where they made the determination to evacuate the 22 turbine building until Rad Protection was able to go out and 23 survey because even though they were reading low levels they 24 wanted to make sure because the alarms were going.
25 MR.
CONTE:
Did anyone offer an explanation as to
T
1 why the alarms were in versus the indication?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes.
Talking to a Radiation 3
Protection tech, me and him, just between the two of us, 4
thoguht maybe due to the fact that when the UPS's did come 5
back into service that they might have spiked the radiation 6
- monitors, causing an alarm to come in and then, you know, as 7
soon as power was re-established it was reading normal 8
- again, but when the power initially came on the surge of 9
voltage might have spiked the monitors.
10 MR.
CONTE:
Is there a way we remove that alarm, 11 like hitting a reset button of some sort?
12 MR.
HOFFMAN:
There is an acknowledge and reset 13 button but we were instructed per administration procedures 14 when we see alarm to get the reading and get out and report 15 it.
16 MR.
CONTE:
Okay, continue.
You got back to the 17 control room, made your report.
18 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Then we were in the middle of the 19 site area emergency
- where, you know, we were instructed to 20 make sure you were logged in, into the control room area 21 and then waited for the next job, which basically from that 22 time, which is pretty close to by the time everything was 23 overwith and they figured out -- I think it was about 9:30 24 and basically since our shift was all night and there were 25 three other shifts, they basically just told us to sit down
'I 0'
a
10 1
and wait until the emergency was over unless we were needed 2
to re-utilize MR.
CONTE:
Wait where?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
We were waiting in the control room 5
and then we were instructed.to wait over at the beehive, 6
which is right across -- it's our staging area because there 7
is too many people and they wanted to maintain decorum in 8
the control room.
MR.
CONTE:
What time did you get relieved and 10 allowed to go home?
12 13 beehive?
14 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Eleven o'lock.
MR.
CONTE:
So you spent 9:30 to 11:00 in the MR.
HOFFMAN:
Closer probably like 10:00.
I went 15 out and did a few minor jobs which were normal plant 16 function jobs, if you want to call it that 17 18 MR.
CONTE:
Like what?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
I charged the air compressors on one 19 of the diesels because we have to use a cross-tie on it and 20 gasically from then about a little after 10:00 to 10:30, 21 when they got permission from the EOF to let us leave, I was 22 instructed to wait in the staging area until I was needed.
23 MR.
CONTE:
Tell me something about this crosstie 24 and the need to charge the emergency diesels?
25 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes.
Diesel generators.
We have
a
11 1
the diesel air compressor was being marked up to be fixed 2
and we have two compressors for the two tanks.
One 3
compressor is marked up so you have to open when the low 4
pressure alarm comes in, you have to manually charge it up.
They were trying to repair one of the dryers.
MR.
CONTE:
What's the crosstie aspect?
I 7
thought--
MR.
HOFFMAN: It was two tanks and what it does is 9
you open a crosstie.
Since one compressor's marked up it 10 allowed the compressor of the diesel or air compressor of 11 the two tanks to each have a compressor, allows the 12 compressor, the different tank, to charge to one whose 13 compressor is being marked up.
14 MR.
CONTE:
Does each tank have these two -- does 15 each diesel have these two tanks or does one tank go with 16 one diesel and the other tank go with the other diesel?
17 18 MR.
HOFFMAN:
No.
Each diesel has two tanks.
MR.
CONTE:
Oh, I see, so really a crosstie is 19 within one emergency diesel generator room?
20 21 22 MR.
HOFFMAN:
That's correct.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
MR.
HOFFMAN: It's sits between the two tanks and 23 the diesel to enable us to allow to charge the tank up to 24 acceptable pressure.
25 MR.
JORDAN:
Do you isolate one tank and then
~
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12 1
charge the other when you crosstie or are they both tied 2
together?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Both tied together.
MR.
CONTE:
Until they get charged.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Until they get charged up and then 6
we re-isolate the crosstie and both tanks are now separate 7
again.
MR.
CONTE:
- Okay, so that takes us to when you 9
left, around 11:00.
10 MR.
HOFFMAN:
That's correct.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
I have some review questions 12 here based on that chronology of what you gave us.
t 13 Can you be specific in terms of the building?
14 You mentioned an elevation but what portion of the 15 building -- you were in the elevator?
16 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes.
That was for the auxiliary 17 service building.
18 MR.
CONTE:
Auxiliary service building.
Does this 19 elevator take you up and down past the Rad Protectio office 20 or something?
21 MR.
HOFFMAN:
The Rad Protection office is located 22 at the top of the elevator route, the 306.
23 24 MR.
CONTE:
You weren't in that area at all, 306?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Well, that's where I was coming down 25 from.
I was coming down from the control room down the 261
X.
13 1
elevation.
MR.
CONTE:
- Okay, and you explained the symptom of 3
the elevator being black, black with the exception of -- was 4
there any lights in the elevator?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, there was.
The floor 6
indication light indicated between 2 and 3.
The elevator 7
seemed to stop momentarily and then continued down to 2, 8
which is elevation 261.
MR.
CONTE:
When you come in on 261 of the aux 10 service building, you found darkness?
12 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, I did.
MR.
CONTE:
13 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Did not seem to be.
I did not 14 notice any on -- actually made the phone call, reported back 15 up to the control room.
The stairways were dark also.
16 17 18 19 20 MR.
JORDAN:
Did you have a flashlight?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, I did.
MR.
JORDAN:
Glad you had a flashlight?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, I am.
It got real dark.
MR.
CONTE:
The stairways in the aux service 21 building were?
22 23 MR.
HOFFMAN:
That is correct.
MR.
CONTE:
How many stairways are in this aux 24 service building, just that one?
25 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes. It gets from the 261 entrance
14 1
into the plant up to the control building.
There's three 2
flights of stairs.
MR.
CONTE:
And the nearest here-here was where?
4 In that same building?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, it was.
It was probably from 6
the elevator it was 35 feet away.
10 MR.
CONTE:
Was that black in that area too?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, it was.
MR.
CONTE:
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Did not notice any.
The lighting was on and where we found the plant 12
- phone, which is in the locker room, the lighting was on in 14 15 16 MR.
CONTE:
That's interesting.
(Laughter.]
MR.
CONTE:
Lighting in the stairways and 17 elevators dark -- do the elevators have emergency lighting 18 in them?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
I really couldn't tell you, off 20 hand.
I would have to look again.
21 MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
Good.
On monitoring reactor 22 pressure and level can you tell me the highest and the 23 lowest of the two parameters that you ever observed?
24 MR.
HOFFMAN:
What I can remember is we started 25 out at a reactor pressure of 964 pounds, reactor water, the
1
~ ~
1 P
15 1
highest you want for reactor water was off scale on my meter 2
which is greater than 200 inches.
The lowest I saw -- that 3
I can remember reactor water getting was, I would have to 4
- say, not positively, but I would say in the 150 range -- 149 5
range.
The lowest -- reactor pressure continued on, 6
dropping down -- I can't remember exactly what the pressure 7
got to, it got down to 590, I do remember, but I think it 8
continued on lowering after that.
I do know that it seemed to stop twice when it was 10 decreasing.
It seemed to settle out for a minute or two 12 MR.
CONTE:
Level?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Level.
Yeah.
It seemed to settle 13 and then it continued on dropping again.
14 MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
Do you happen to know what the 15 RCIC initiation is -- initiation setting is?
16 MR.
HOFFMAN:
I'm not really sure.
I think it is 17
-- well, single low level is, I think 158.8.
I am not 18 positive.
And the SSS called to start at 159.
I'm pretty 19 sure that was the number he called and started it at.
20 As I said before, a licensed operator was doing 21 many of those functions, just happened to be he gauge next 22 to mine.
23 MR.
CONTE:
You must have overheard the -- I guess 24 the operator who was controlling RCIC indicated going from 25 automatic to manual, did he give a reason?
Did you hear a
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16 1
reason?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
The best that I can
- remember, as I 3
said, I was more intently watching what I was told to do 4
was to do -- the flow was erratic and the flow meters seemed 5
to erratic in auto.
So, he announced he was switching over 6
to manual.
MR.
CONTE:
The flow was erratic.
Okay.
Did you 8
offer an explanation as to why the reactor level went high?
9 Did you hear or did you know anything?
10 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Not that I remember.
I don't really ll remember why.
The only thing I could think of, is as we 12 started injecting flow, it came up and then even though we 13 backed off, it was still coming on.
14 MR.
CONTE:
You didn't hear any emotional 15 statement from anyone like "Oh no" or 16 17 18 19 there.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
No.
MR.
CONTE:
Okay.
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Everything was very professional in 20 MR.
CONTE:
And when he got that Level 8, he shut 21 down RCIC?
22 MR.
HOFFMAN:
He was shut down before he hit Level 23 8 if I remember correctly.
24 MR.
CONTE:
And that was -- is that normal -- did 25 you happen to know if that is normal practice to shut down
~
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~
17 1
RCIC before the Level 8 function comes in?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
I'm not trained in the control room 3
aspects of the systems.
I'm more into plant at this time.
MR.
CONTE:
That's a fair answer.
All right.
Mike, jump in, if you ve got anything.
MR.
JORDAN: I'e got just a couple questions.
7 Did -- you say it went off scale, high on level, did it stay 8
- there, did it come back down?
MR.
HOFFMAN: It stayed there for a while and then 10 came back down. It went --
on the wide range it went off 11 scale
- and, as I said before, I'm not real familiar with the 12 control rooms 13 MR.
JORDAN:
Did it come back down to the point 14 where they had to restart RCIC?
Did it come back down and 15 they were controlling it elsewhere outside of RCIC?
16 MR.
HOFFMAN: It came back down, but they never 17 restarted RCIC.
They came back down within acceptable 18 range.
19 20 MR.
JORDAN:
Do you know what range it was in?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
No, I can't remember, off hand.
As 21 I said, they started to control with condensate boosters.
22 MR.
JORDAN:
So as far as you know RCIC was only 23 used one time?
24 25 MR.
HOFFMAN:
That is correct.
MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
You mentioned that you were at
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4
a 18 1
the 250 foot area in the Hoggers, what building is that in?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
That is in the turbine building.
MR.
JORDAN:
Turbine building.
And you had the 4
RAD monitor that was close to the area alarming?
. MR.
HOFFMAN:
That is correct.
MR.
JORDAN:
And you read it at ten to the MR.
HOFFMAN:
Ten to the minus first.
MR.
JORDAN:
And then you said there was another 9
alarm?
10 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Um hm.
MR.
JORDAN:
That you -- actually near that you 12 came across?
Do you have any idea where that was at?
Same 1
13 Elevation?
14 MR.
HOFFMAN:
Same elevation, the east end of the 15 building versus the first alarm was on the west end of the 16 building.
17 18 reading?
19 20 21
.22 MR.
JORDAN:
And that one was alarming and it was MR.
HOFFMAN:
Ten to the minus one, again.
MR.
JORDAN:
Same thing?
MR.
HOFFMAN:
Yes, sir.
MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
And at that time you notified 23 the control room, is that correct?
24 MR.
HOFFMAN:
I notified the control room the 25 first -- after they told me about the high radiation level
4
19 1
the 277 annunciator being in, I then looked around to make 2
sure that the ones on my level -- because I'm right below 3
that, weren't in and they turned out to be.
I then told the 4
control room I was leaving the area.
MR.
JORDAN:
Is the alarm an audible?
Is it a 6
visual -- what?
MR.
HOFFMAN: It's a visual.
The alarm that was 8
going was visual.
There is also audible, but the visual is 9
what I noticed it was pretty loud down there.
I didn't even 10 get right next to it.
I got close enough to be able to see 11 what the level was and then proceeded out of the building.
12 MR.
JORDAN:
That's how you -- in other words you 13 didn't hear the audible alarm, you noticed the visual 14 alarm?
15 16 17 MR.
HOFFMAN:
That is correct.
MR.
JORDAN:
Or a light, what's the MR.
HOFFMAN: It's a flashing light. It's like a 18 siren light or police light.
19 MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
So it's a red light that 20
- flashes, is that correct?
21 22 MR.
HOFFMAN:
That's correct.
MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
The communications at that 23 time were working?
What were you using?
24 MR.
HOFFMAN:
I was using the here-here system.
25 By that time the UPS's -- our power had been restored to the
o E
20 1
annunciators and here-here systems.
MR.
JORDAN:
So after that time you knew of no 3
other problems as far communications with the control room?
4 You were out in the plant doing other activities for the 5
day?
10 MR.
HOFFMAN:
That is correct.
MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
MR.
CONTE:
I'm done.
MR.
JORDAN:
So am I.
MR.
CONTE:
Let's go off the record.
[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m.,
the taking of the 12 interview was concluded.]
xs 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
e
1.
~ <<),
~
I REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceed-ings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
NAME OP PROCEEDING: Int. of ERIC HOFFMAN DOCKET NUMBER:
PLACE OP PROCEEDING: Scriba, N.Y.
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for tne file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court report-ing company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.
JON H.UNDLEY Official Reporter Ann Riley 6 Associates, Ltd.
a A
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