ML17055B075

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AC Elem Diag - Misc AC Ckts Main Stm Isol Valve 2MSS*HYV6A Cont. Actual Rev STATUS:M4. Actual Drawing NUMBER:12177-ESK-7MSS13
ML17055B075
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/10/1984
From:
STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORP.
To:
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
Shared Package
ML17055A964 List: ... further results
References
12177-ESK-7MSS1, NUDOCS 8601210094
Download: ML17055B075 (8)


Text

ATTACHMENT A NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION LICENSE NO.

OPR-63 OOCKET NO. 50-220 Pro osed Chan es to Technical S ecii'ications (A

endix A

Existing page 47 will be replaced with the attached revised page.

This page has been retyped in its entirety with marginal markings to indicate changes to the text.

Beoaa>OOVe 860>2S PDR ADOCN, 05000220

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3 EMERGENCY COOLING SYSTEM A~ti Atilt Applies to the operating status of the emergency cooling system.

~0b'ective:

To assure the capability of the emergency cooling system to cool the reactor coolant in the event the normal reactor heat sink is not available.

A~ill tl SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.1.3 EMERGENCY COOLING SYSTEM A~ti Atilt Applies to periodic testing requirements for the emergency cooling system.

~0b'ective:

To assure the capability of the emergency cooling system for cooling of the reactor coolant.

~titi tl a.

During power operating conditions and whenever the reactor coolant temperature is greater than 212'F except for hydrostatic testing with the reactor not critical, both emergency cooling systems shall be operable except as specified in 3.1.3.b and c.

The emergency cooling system surveillance shall be performed as indicated below:

a.

At least once ever five ears The system heat removal capability shall be determined.

b.

C.

During the remainder of Cycle 8 with one emergency cooling system inoperable, Specification 3.1.3a shall be considered fulfilled, provided the additional surveillance required in 4.1.3.f is performed.

During Cycle 9 and subsequent cycles, if one emergency cooling system becomes inoperable, Specification 3.1.3.a shall be considered fulfilled, provided that the inoperable system is returned to an operable condition within 7 days and the additional surveillance required in 4.1.3.f is performed.

b.

At least once dail The shell side water level and makeup tank water level shall be checked.

c.

At least once er month The makeup tank level control valve shall be manually opened and closed.

47

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ATTACHMENT 8 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION LICENSE DPR-63 DOCKET NO. 50-220 Su ortin Information Hydrostatic test temperatures and pressures are governed by the requirements of Technical Specification 3.2.2.

The pressure temperature limits set forth therein are periodically revised based on measured nil-ductility temperature shifts of irradiated vessel material samples.

Recent revisions to these pressure/temperature limits will result in minimum temperatures for pressurization in excess of 212oF.

The Emergency Cooling System is normally an integral part of the hydrostatic test performed at Nine Mile Point Unit l.

During the test the Emergency Cooling System steam supply piping and emergency condenser tube bundles are filled with water.

In this condition, the Emergency Cooling System is not available to perform its intended function.

Therefore, the requirements for Emergency Cooling System operability when the reactor coolant is greater than 212oF is requested to be modified to exempt this requirement during hydrostatic testing with the reactor not critical.

10CFR50.91 requires that at the time a licensee requests an amendment, it must provide to the Commission its analysis, using the standards in Section 50.92, about the issue of no significant hazards consideration.

Therefore, in accordance with 10CFR50.91 and 10CFR50.92, the following analysis has been performed:

The ro osed amendment in accordance with the o eration of Nine Mile Point ns ws no invo ve a ss ni scan increase sn e

ro a

s s

or conse uences of an accident reviousl evaluated.

The Emergency-Cooling System is a standby high pressure system designed to act as a redundant backup to the main station condenser for receiving reactor core decay heat following reactor vessel isolation and scram.

In addition, for small line breaks, the Emergency Cooling System assists the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) in depressurizing the reactor vessel.

The Emergency Cooling System is not intended to mitigate the affects of initial pressure peaks resulting from various transients such as turbine trip, or main steam line isolation valve closure, but rather longer term decay heat removal.

The Emergency Cooling System consists of two independent loops each designed to remove decay heat at a rate of approximately three percent of maximum reactor steam flow.

This capacity is sufficient to handle the decay heat production at 100 seconds following SCRAM.

Each loop consists of a 12-inch steam supply header, two parallel condensers, a 10-inch condensate return line, two steam supply isolation valves and one condensate return isolation

valve, separate shell steam vents and separate instrumentation and control.

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3 ll ATTACHMENT B (cont'd)

The Emergency Cooling. System is designed such that operation is maintained by natural circulation.

Steam flows from the reactor vessel to the condensers where it is condensed.

The condensate returns by gravity to the suction side of a reactor recirculation loop where it is returned to the reactor vessel.

The configuration of Nine Mile Point Unit 1 for the hydrostatic test conditions differs from normal operation.

Control rods are fully inserted and water level is outside its normal band.

Pressurization is controlled utilizing the control rod drive system and/or hydrostatic test pump while temperature changes are affected utilizing the reactor recirculation system and/or other supplemental heat sources.

Also, the reactor coolant system, with the exception of the Emergency Cooling System, is isolated.

In this configuration, the capability of the Emergency Condenser System to remove decay heat following reactor isolation or to assist in reactor depressurization for small line break is not required.

Therefore, the proposed amendment will not invoke a significant increase in the probability of consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The ro osed amendment in accordance with the o eration of Nine Mile Point Unit 1 will not create the ossibi lit of a new or different kind of acci ent from an acci ent revious eva uate The proposed amendment eliminates the requirement for Emergency Condenser System operability with reactor coolant temperature greater than 212oF during hydrostatic testing with the reactor not critical.

The Emergency Cooling System is normally included in hydrostatic testing of the reactor coolant system.

With its steam supply lines full of water, the system is not available nor necessary to perform its designed function.

A break in the Emergency Condenser System under hydrostatic conditions is enveloped by a similar break under normal operating conditions.

Also, transients, which operation of the Emergency Cooling System would mitigate, are not feasible to occur due to the plant configuration existing during hydrostatic testing.

The proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The ro osed amendment in accordance with the o eration of Nine Mile Point Unit 1 will not involve a si nificant reduction in a mar in of safet Implementation of the proposed change will have no effect on the availability of the Emergency Cooling System for those plant operating conditions where it is required to mitigate the effects of operational transients.

Excl'uding the operability of the Emergency Cooling System during hydrostatic testing of the reactor coolant system with the reactor not critical will not result in a reduction in the margin of safety.

As determined by the analysis-above, this proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

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