ML17054A492
| ML17054A492 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 02/29/1984 |
| From: | Haughey M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17054A491 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8403050371 | |
| Download: ML17054A492 (42) | |
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UNITED STATES NU AR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 February 29, 1984.
Docket No.:
50-410 APPLICANT
'ACILITY
'Ul'1f1ARY
'iagara tlohawk Power Corporation (NMPC)
NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2
SUMMARY
OF MEETINGS HELD WITH NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION (NMPC)
ON JANUARY 18,
- 1984, AND FEBRUARY 7 and 8,'984, TO DISCUSS INSTRUf1ENTATION AND CONTROLS FOR NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 2 On January 18,
- 1984, the NRC staff met with representatives of NNPC and General Electric Corporation (GE), in Bethesda, Maryland, to discuss instrumentation and controls at Nine t1ile Point Unit 2 (NMP-2).
On Februarv 7 and 8,
- 1984, the NRC staff met with representatives of NllPC and Stone and Ifebster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) at the SI!EC offices in Cherry Hill, 'Nevi Jersey.
The summaries o
these meetings are contained belovr.
Januar 18, 1984 (Bethesda, f1aryl and)
The purpose of the meeting held on January 18,
- 1984, was to, discuss apparent discrepancies in licensing documents which had been submitted by NtIPC.
A list of the 35 concerns discussed is included as Attachment 1.
During the process of the review of documentation submitted in the instrumentation and control area f'r NMP-2, a number of apparent discrepancies were noted.
This concern was discussed with NtlPC in November
- 1983, and a
number of updated drawings were submitted.
As apparent discrepancies continued to be identified, NtIPC was requested to meet with the NRC staff to clarify and explain the apparent discrepancies.
During the meeting on January 18, it was noted by Nt1PC that as the drawings that had been submitted were the updated
- drawings, the FSAR test novi laoged behind the drawings.
The NRC requested that NMPC perform a review of the documentation submitted in the instrumentation and control area and confirm by letter that the documentation submitted reflects the actual plant design.
Nt1PC stated that in some of the areas concerns could be eliminated by clarifications and discussion of plant design and were not actually discrepancies.
A number of the concerns that were discussed during the meeting are as follows:
1.
The elementary drawing (807E172TY) is correct and the FSAR text would be revised (pages 7.3-3 and 7.3-4).
In addition, N,"1PC would confirm that a
similar discrepancy did not exist in the RCIC system description and elementary drawings.
840305037l 840229 PDR ADOCK 050004l0 A
~
I
N 2-3. Elementary drawings (807E170TY and 807E171TY) are correct.
The FSAR will need to be revised (pages 7.3-6, 7.3-7, 7.3-9, and Figure 7.3-6).
4.
Elementary drawing (807E152TY) is correct.
This drawing may require further revisions to reflect ATWS modifications.
5.
Elementary drawing (807E166TY) is correct.
Transmitters are pressure transmitters and the FSAR text will be revised (page 7.3-13).
6.
Elementary drawing (807E152TY) is correct and the FSAR text will be revised (page 7.3-15).
7.
Elementary drawing (807E152TY) is correct and the FSAR text will be revised (page 7.3-17).
8.
Elementary drawing (807E152TY) is correct.
FSAR is unclear.
Clarifications will be provided in the FSAR (page 7.3-18).
9.
The PCRVICS elementary drawing (807E152TY) includes signals for RHR system isolation valves and includes sample valves.
Valve motor control circuits are not provided.
A discussion of the isolation signals should 'be included in FSAR.
10.
Nl1PC provided clarification that the elementary drawing (807E170TY) is correct and the FSAR text will be modified (page 7.3-18).
The remaining concerns were identified as mainly SWEC's scope of responsibility and discussion was deferred except to note the following:
23.
The system is not safety-related 26, 33, 34.
Items discussed are not safety-related 32.
NMPC to locate correct figure.
A list of meeting attendees is included as Attachment 2. ~
Februar 7 and 8, 1984 (Cherry Hill, New Jersey)
On February 7 and 8, 1984, the NRC staff met with Nt<PC to discuss responses to the requests for information contained in the October 24, 1983 letter to G.
K. Rhode from A. Schwencer.
This was the first of three meetinos scheduled during the December 7,
1983, meeting with NtlPC on instrunentation and controls.
The meeting summary from the December 7 meeting dated January 16, 1984, contained a list of requests for information to be discussed at each meeting.
That list has been revised and is included as Attachment 3.
A summary of the discussion of each of the requests for information from the October 24, 1983 letter, which were discussed during the February 7 and 8.
- meetings, is contained below..
Re vest for Information Corrrnen ts 421.01 421.02 In response to 421.1, NHPC will list the Branch Technical Positions (BTP's) related to instrumentation and control systems listed in SRP (NUREG-0800) Table 7. 1 and provided in Appendix 7A to Chapter 7 of the SRP and list 421 series question response or other reference for each.
BTP 12 should be "not applicable".
NHPC will submit revised Table 3.2-1 that was presented in draft at the meeting.
The word "fluid" will be deleted from the'ootnote.
421.03 On "first of a kind" instruments, NHPC will provide additional detail on control or
- nuclear, safety-related monitoring function of systems.
The response should include information on single failure criteria.
NHPC will provide a specific presentation on the digital radiation moni torino system (DRHS) prior to submitting a formal resonse to this question.
421.04 421.05 Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.47.
NHPC provided examples of how systems conform.
NHPC indicated equipment within supporting/safety-related systems that has or (modifies "equipment")
a considerable importance to the system operation is annunciated.
NHPC was requested to define or clarify "considerable importance",
and discuss the methodology used to determine which components would not be monitored.
NHPC agreed tc provide a draft response for review prior to submitting a formal response to this question.
(Reference request for information 430.23).
NHPC will provide examples of different types of separation barriers.
A clear explanation of separation criteria, including associated circuits, should be included in the FSAR.
NHPC should provide the program for identification and separation of internal wiring.
Balance of response to be provided by GE.
0 0
Re uest for Information Comments 421.06 NMPC to submit response that there are no shared safety systems between Nine Mile point Units 1
and 2.
421.07 421.09 NMPC provided an overview of the NHP-2 plant electrical distribution system.
Response
to 421.07 will reference diagrams included in FSAR and discussion provided.'MPC to correct a typographical error on the list of safety-related systems which are similar to licensed reactors.
421.10 421.12 421.13 NMPC should,iustify the lack of an annunciator alarm on the SRV open position, discuss the indication provided, and the methodology in
'determining computer setpoint.
Discussions in response to NUREG-0737 items II.K.3. 13, II.K.3.21 and II.K.3.22 to be provided by GE.
To be discussed at meeting with GE.
Types of instrumentation and control system isolation devices will be identified.
As testing and qualification is presently being pursued a schedule f'r submittal of qualification information will be provided.
In addition to dielectric test data, line to line and line to ground maximum creditable fault test data would be provided.
Test configurations should duplicate configurations of minimum special separation to confirm that as well as pretecting isolated circuits, no damage is concurred in circuits/components located adjacent to the isolation device.
421.15 421.16 This response should be ccordinated with 421.17(3).
NMPC should provide details on how new systems comply with Regulatory Guide requirements.
NMPC will look at providing a sampling of systems.
NRC will be given an opportunity to review list of systems chosen.
Additional discussion will be scheduled for another NHPC-SllEC meeting.
To be discussed at meeting with GE.
Re vest for Information Comments 421.17 Turbine scram inputs.
NMPC to expand on information provided in this area.
Among items to be addressed are Recirculation Pump trips, and hot shorts.
In addition NMPC to check if anticipatory or prime function trips are aFfected.
421.18 421.21 421.25 Mainly GE scope of responsibility (RPS setpoints).
SllEC has responsibility for some support systems and will be developing a
response for safety-related systems's setpoint methodology.
NMPC will provide a list of instruments used for protection that have a
common instrument tap and show redundancy or diversity.
Additional discussion is expected on this issue prior to submittal of the final response.
This issue will remain confirmatory until surveillance procedures are complete and the need for lifting leads, using jumpers or removing fuses can be determined.
421.28 421.29 This request covers both SllEC and GE scope of responsibility.
IE Bulletin 80-06 ESF Reset Controls.
SPEC portion of response to be provided.
This response should contain a statement indicating that each component is reset individually.
Balance to be covered during GE meeting.
FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis)
NMPC should provide discussion on process of updating the FflEA through fuel load and address how design changes will be considered after fuel load.
The FMEA should be explained and clarified in the FSAR.
421.30 NMPC to include statement in response that an objective of surveillance program is to include permissive interlocks.
Re uest for information Comments 421.34 Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP) i.
"controls" should be included in means of achieving shutdown ii.
interlocks should be discussed in the transfer of control to RSP 421.36 421.39 421.44 421.45 421.46 iii. periodic transfer switches should be included in discussion of surveillance testing to be performed.
remains open NMPC to provide a figure on revised design of LPCI and LPCS interlocks and a description explaining the basis for the setpoint.
GE is responsible for major scope of this issue.
SHEC to provide response concerning DBA's with regard to SHEC provided equipment but GE will address transient analysis.
NMPC to provide discussion on the plant process computer system.
NMPC to provide expanded discussion of systems noted in 421.46 for which S'llEC is responsible.
This item will also be discussed at GE meeting.
In addition to the requests for additional information, items 11 through 35 of the concerns in Attachment 1 were discussed during the February 7 and 8
meetings at Cherry Hill.
The responses to each of these issues are included in Attachment 4 to this meeting summary.
Additional concerns identified in the process o
the review were identified during the February 7 and 8 meetings and are included as Attachment 5.
A list of attendants is included as Attachment 6.
A meeting was tentatively scheduled with GE for the first week of April to discuss instrumentation and control requests for additional information within the GE scope of review.
" 7.
~
r, 2 C r Mary F. Haughey, Project Manager Licensing Branch No.
2 Division of Licensing Attachments:
As stated cc w/ attachments::
",See:next~page~
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Nine Mile Point 2
Mr. Gerald K. Rhode Senior Vice Presi dent Ni a ga ra Mohawk P ower Co rpora tion 300 Erie Boulevard West
- Syracuse, Hew York 13202 CC:
Mr. Troy B. Conner, Jr.,
Esq.
Conner E Wetterhahn Suite 1050 1747 Pennsylvania
- Avenue, H.W.
Washington, D. C.
20006 Mr. Richard Goldsmith Syracuse Uni versity College of Law E. I. White Hall Campus
- Syracuse, Hew York 13210 Mr. Jay Dunkleberger, Director Technol ogi ca 1 Devel opment Programs New York State Energy Office Aoency Building 2
Empire State Plaza
- Albany, New York 12223 Ezra I. Bialik Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Bureau New York State Department of Law 2 World Trade Center Hew York, New York 10047 Resident Inspector Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station P. 0.
Box 99
- Lycoming, New York 13093 Mr. John W. Keib, Esq.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West
- Syracuse, New York 13202 Jay M. Gutierrez, Esq.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
ATTACHMENT l ENCLOSURE DISCREPANCIES WITHIN AND BETWEEN NINE NILE UNIT 2 LICENSING DOCUMENTS 1.
FSAR pages 7.3-3 and 7.3-4 provide a discussion on the high pressure core spray pump auto suction transfer from the condensate storage tank to the suppression pool on sensing low pump suction pressure.
Elemen-tary diagram 807E172TY and FSAR Figure 7.3-2 show transfer on sensing condensate storage tank level low or suppression pool level low.
2.
FSAR pages 7.3-6 and 7.3-7 provide a discussion on core spray system initiation via the core spray system instrumentation.
Elementary diagram 807E171TY shows the core spray system initiated via the load se-quencer except for one valve and annunciator actuation which is via.core spray instrumentation.
3.
Elementary diagram 807E170TY shows the low pressure coolant injection pumps and injection valves opening initiated via the load sequencer on sensing LOCA or loss of offsite power (LOOP).
This is not consistent with FSAR Figure 7.3-6 which shows pump start and valve opening via the low pressure coolant injection instrumentation.
In addition, the time delay discussion on FSAR page 7.3-9 (item 2) is not consistent with the time delay, shown on FSAR Figure 7.3-6 (1 of 5).
4.
FSAR page 7.3-13 states that there are two vessel level trip settings that initiate primary containment and reactor vessel isolation control system (PCRVICS) functions.
Elementary diagram 807E152TY sheet 14 shows a third trip on level 1 (see sheet f14 K 148A) isolating main steam line drain valves.
5.
FSAR page 7.3-13 states that high drywell pressure is monitored by four di fferential pressure transmitters.
Elementary diagram 807E166TY shows four pressure transmitters.
6.
FSAR page 7.3-15 states that the reactor building ventilation radiation is monitored and initiates intake and exhaust damper closure.
This is not shown on elementary diagram 807E152TY.
7.
FSAR page 7.3-17 states that the RHR system flow rate monitoring devices initiate RHR isolation on sensing high flow.
This is not shown on elemen-tary diagram 807E152TY.
8.
FSAR page 7.3-18 states that. the main condenser low vacuum trip can be bypassed manually when the turbine stop valve is not fully open.
Elementary diagram 807E152TY shows that this trip function is automat-ically bypassed when the mode switch is not in the RUN position and the turbine stop valve is less than 90$ open.
- 9..Elementary diagram 807E152TY shows RHR sample valves numbered E12-F060 A &
B and E12-FO 75A 5 B receive PCRVICS input signals vi a-contacts K59A and K59B.
There is no discussion on this PCRVICS func-tion in FSAR text.
10.
FSAR page 7.3-18 states that before an operator initiates containment
- spray, a permissive signaling that LOCA conditions still exist must be satisfied.
Elementary diagram 807E170TY shows that the K130 contact 41 permissive can also be closed through manual initiation circuits (i.e.,
the LOCA permissive is not satisfied).
FSAR page 7.3-18 does not include a discussion on suppression pool spray initiation and permis-sive circuits.
Elementary diagram 807E170TY shows permissive circuits.
ll. FSAR page 6.5-2 states that the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) is started automatically by low air flow in the exhaust ducts above and be-low the refueling floor.
This is not consistent with the initiation signals shown on Figure 6.5-1 of the FSAR.
FSAR page 6.5-2 states that high temperature in the charcoal bed activates an alarm.
Figure 6.5-1 shows that this high temperature signal also shuts down the SGTS.
12.
FSAR page 9.4-28 lists the drywell unit cooler permissive/interlock signals.
FSAR Figure 9.4-9 depicts the logic for the drywell unit cooler and shows one signal that prevents the unit cooler from start-ing and automatically secures the unit cooler which is not delineated on FSAR page 9.4-28; drywell unit cooler fan motor overload.
13.
FSAR page 9.4-29 lists the primary containment purge fan permissive/
interlock signals.
FIGURE 9.4-9 of the FSAR depicts the logic for the primary containment purge fan and shows one signal that prevents
the purge fan from starting and automatically secures the purge fan which is not delineated on FSAR page 9.4-29; fan motor overload.
14.
FSAR page 9.4-31 lists the refueling area exhaust air fan permissive/
interlock signals.
Figure 9.4-9 of the FSAR depicts the logic for the refueling area exhaust fan and shows one signal that prevents the fan from starting and automatically secures the fan if it is running which is not discussed on FSAR page 9.4-31; sustained bus undervoltage.
15.
The auxiliary filter fan is discussed on FSAR page 9.4-31 and logic for initiation/trip is shown on FSAR Figure 9.4-9.
The FSAR text on page 9.4-31 states that the fan is automatically tripped on sensing low dis-1 charge air flow.
FSAR figure 9.4-9 shows that the fan is interlocked to prevent starting if low discharge air flow is sensed at the reactor build-ing head evacuation auxiliary filter.
16..The standby gas treatment building roof fan is discussed on FSAR page 9.4-31 and the logic for initiation/trip is shown on FSAR Figure 9.4-9.
The FSAR text does not address the interlock/permissive derived from the fan motor overload shown on this figure.
Ct
17.
The standby emergency ventilation recirculation unit cooler starts automatically provided interlock/permissive logic is satisfied.
FSAR page 9.4-31 states that operating unit cooler air flow is sensed in an "or" logic.
- Figure 9.4-9 of the FSAR shows an "and" logic for this monitored parameter.
This figure also shows an inter-lock/permissive on sustained bus undervoltage which is not discussed in the FSAR text.
18.
FSAR page 9.2-6 lists the service water pump permissive/interlock signals.
Figure 9.2-2 of the FSAR depicts the logic for the service water pump initiation/trip functions and shows two interlock/permissive signals which are not discussed in the FSAR text; service water pump motor feeder electrical fault and sustained undervoltage on the pump motor bus.
19.
FSAR page 9.2-7 discusses the operation of the isolation valves that separate the safety-related portions of, the service water system from the non-safety related portions of the system.
This discussion inclu-des a statement that the valves can be opened (in the absence of a LOCA signal) from the control room.
FSAR Figure 9.2-2 shows the control logic for this valve and indicates that the valve can only be opened from the control room in the absence of LOCA, loss of offsite power, or low header pressure signal.
20.
Screenwell building supply fan is discussed on page 9.4-55 of the FSAR and fan logic is depicted on FSAR Figure 9.4-17.
This figure shows a permissive/interlock signal on sensing supply fan motor overload which is not discussed in the FSAR text.
21.
The screenwell building air dampers are discussed on FSAR page 9.4-55 of the FSAR and logic is depicted on FSAR Figure 9.4-17.
This figure shows a
smoke removal mode of operation which is not discussed in the FSAR text.
22.
The screenwell building roof fans are discussed on page 9.4-55 of the FSAR and logic is depicted on FSAR Figure 9.4-17.
This figure shows a permissive/interlock signal on sensing fan motor overload which is not discussed in the FSAR text.
23.
The circulating pump exhaust booster fans are discussed on FSAR page 9.4-55 of the FSAR and fan logic is depicted on FSAR Figure 9.4-17.
The discussion of the FSAR text states that a fan will start auto-matically when any pump is running and/or there is a low discharge air flow in the normally operating fan.
Figure 9.4-17 shows that a
fan will start automatically only if there is a low discharge air flow and the circulating pump is running.
- Further, Figure 9.4-17 shows a permissive/interlock signal on sensing fan motor overload which is not discussed in the FSAR text.
24.
The service water pump bays smoke removal fan is discussed on page 9.4-55 of the FSAR and the fan control logic is depicted on FSAR Figure 9.4-17.
This figure shows a permissive/interlock signal on sensing fan motor overload which is not discussed in the FSAR text.
25.
The service water pump bay unit coolers are discussed on page 9.4-55 of the FSAR and cooler control logic is depicted on FSAR Figure 9.4-17.
This figure shows a permissive/interlock signal on sensing cooler motor overload which is not discussed in the FSAR text.
26.
The electric bay supply fan, diesel fire pump room ventilation ex-haust fan, diesel fire pump vent supply fan, condensate storage tank building roof fan, electric bay roof fan, and diminer'alizer storage tank building roof fan are discussed on FSAR page 9.4-56 and control logic is depicted on FSAR Figure 9.4-17.
This figure shows permissive/in-terlock signals on sensing fan motor overload which are not discussed in the FSAR text.
27.
Various building unit heaters are discussed on FSAR page 9.4-56 and control logic depicted on FSAR Figure 9.4-17.
This figure shows thermal cut outs which are not discussed in the FSAR text.
28.
The control building air conditioning booster fan is discussed on FSAR page 9.4-10 and the control logic is depicted on FSAR Figure 9.4-4.
The FSAR discussion states that the standby fan will start automatically if the operating booster fan has not tripped on low discharge air flow.
This is not consistent with the control logic shown on Figure 9.4-4.
In addition, the fan motor interlock on motor overload depicted on Figure 9.4-4 is not discussed in the FSAR text.
29.
The control room air condition fan is discussed on FSAR page 9.4-11 and the control logic is depicted on FSAR Figure 9.4-4.
The FSAR dis-cussion states that interlocks prevent restarting the fan after the fan has tripped on low discharge air flow.
This is not consistent with the control logic shown on Figure 9.4-4.
In addition, the fan motor interlock on motor overload depicted on Figure 9.4-4 'is not discussed in the FSAR text.
30.
The control and relay room smoke removal fan is discussed on FSAR page 9.4-12 and control logic is depicted on FSAR Figure 9.4-5.
The fan motor interlock on motor overload depicted on Figure 9.4-5 is not discussed in the FSAR text.
31.
The relay room air conditioning fan is discussed on FSAR page 9.4-13 and control logic is depicted on FSAR Figure 9.4-5.
The fan motor interlock on motor overload depicted on Figure 9.4-5 is not discussed in the FSAR text.
32.
The standby switchgear rooms and HPCS switchgear rooms HVAC are discussed on page 9.4-15 of the FSAR.
The discussion on this page references FSAR Figure 9.4-5 as the HVAC logic drawing for these systems.
This figure does not show this logic.
33.
The normal switchgear HVAC system air dampers are discussed on page 9.4-17 of the FSAR with control logic shown on Figure 9.4-6.
The 9
discussion on normal and smoke removal operation is not consistent with the control logic drawing.
34.
The normal switchgear building unit heaters are discussed on page 9.4-17 of the FSAR and unit heater control logic is shown on Figure 9.4-6 of the FSAR.
The overtemperature thermal cut-out shown on Figure 9.4-6 is not discussed in the FSAR text.
35.
The electrical tunnels unit coolers are discussed on page 9.4-18 of the FSAR and control logic shown on Figure 9.4-7 of the FSAR.
The discussion on page 9.4-18 states that an interlock prevents closing which is not consistent with the control logic drawing.
ATTACMt1ENT 2 MEETING ATTENDEES INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS NINE MILE P INT 2 J
NUARY 18, 1984 NAME Mary F. Haughey A. Schwencer J.
Calvo M. Virgilio A. Zallnick A. Koslow D. Baer ORGANIZATION NRC NRC NRC NRC Nt~iPC GE GE
ATTACHMENT 3 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO BE DISCUSSED AT MEETINGS DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1984.
REVISED SCHEDULE 2/9/84 1st Meeting (2/7-8/84)
SWEC 421. 1 421.2 421.3 421.4 421.5 421.6 421.7 421.9 421.10 421.12 421.13 421.15 421.16 421.17*
421.18**
421.21 421.25 421.28 421.29**
421.30 421.34 421.36 421.39 421.44**
421.45 421.46**
2nd Meeting GE 421.3 421.5 421 10**
421.12 421.13 421.16 421.18**
421.19 421.20 421.22 421.23 421.24 421.27 4Z1.28**
42] 29**
421.31**
421.32**
421.33"*
421.37 421.40 421.41 421.42 421.43 421.44**
421.46**
3rd Meeting SHEC
+
GE 421.03 421.13 421.15 421.18 421.21 421.25 421.35 421.36 421.38 421.45 421.46 No further Discussion needed 421.1 421.2 421.6 421.7 421.9 421.14 421.30 421.34 421.39 421.45 Requests for information 421.8, 421. 11, 421.26, are still being reviewed to determine what further action is necessary.
- Additional discussion to be
- Partial held during visit to site about September 1984.
ATTACHMENT 4 APPARENT DISCREPANCIES 1-10 12.
GE issues.
See January 18, 1984 meeting discussion FSAR text is correct, Fig. is outdated.
Figure will be revised FSAR will be revised to include a discussion of the interlocks shown on the drawings 13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24-26.
27.
28.
'9.
30-31.
32.
33.
34.
See 12 FSAR to be revised to included undervoltage permissive See 12 See 12 "and" logic gate will be include in text FSAR to be revised to include permissive i'nterlocks shown on drawings SMEC checking, appears to be correct as is See 12 FSAR to be revised to include smoke removal mode 'of operation (not safety-related) may not need to be revised See 12 See 12 Thermal cut-outs will be added to FSAR See 12 To be checked (NRC/SlJEC) / 2nd part See 12 See 12 Should be 9.4-7 May be non-safety-related, may not need to be chanaed SWEC to check 35.
This concern is unclear.
NRC to review and revise.
(Note Figure 9.4-7 shows manual capability to close the unit cooler discharge damper if the fan is running.
The "and" logic gate should be a
"not" gate.)
ATTACHMENT 5 36.
'37.
38.
Pages 7.3-13 and 7.3-14 of the FSAR provide a discussion on the main steam line high radiation inputs to the RTs and PCRVICs.
The discussion includes a statement that the signal to the PCRVICS is from the reactor protection system.
This statement is not consistent with the circuitry shown on elementary drawings 807E168TY, 807E166TY and 807E152TY.
Page 7.6-1 of the FSAR references Sections 6.2.1.7 and 11.5.2 for a description of the containment and drywell atmosphere process radiation monitoring system.
Neither referenced section includes an adequate description; Page 7.6-7 of the FSAR provides a discussion on the recirculation pump trip system.
This discussion includes a statement that transfer to low speed operation is automatic upon trip of both recirculation pumps.
This statement is not consistent with the discussion on page 7.6-23 of the FSAR which states that the RPS generates two signals; one to trip the recirculation pump and the other to initiate transfer.
4
ATTACHMENT 6 FEBRUARY 7, 1984 MEETING ATTENDEES INSTRUMENTATION CONTROLS NINE MILE P IN 2
NAME Mary F. Haughey MD Virgilio M. Jones D. Pike N. Rademacher B. Smith R. Carpenito R. Panicker J.
Kligerman P. Maturse G.
Hui'oman J.
Borden M. Gilman R. Pinney ORGANIZATION NRC NRC Nl'1PC NMr C NMPC SWEC SWEC SWEC SWEC SWEC SHEC SWEC SWEC SWEC FEBRUARY 8, 1984 Mary F. Haughey M. Jones P. I1aturse R. Panicker B. Smith R. Carpenito R. Pinney N. Rademacher D. Pike M. Virgilio ORGANIZATION NRC NMPC SWEC SWEC SWEC SWEC SWEC NMPC NMPC NRC
an P